


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CORDON AND SEARCH:

AN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) TASK FOR INFANTRY BATTALION

**A Monograph
by**

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Infantry**



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ABSTRACT

CORDON AND SEARCH: AN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) TASK FOR INFANTRY BATTALIONS by MAJ Brian D. Barham, USA 52 pages.

This monograph discusses the merit of using Cordon and Search as a method to train infantry battalions in preparation for possible deployment to perform OOTW activities. Using one training event to generically prepare infantry units to perform OOTW activities must incorporate many of the tasks that Operations Other Than War require infantry units to perform, but must also reinforce the OOTW principles. This monograph demonstrates how Cordon and Search incorporates the necessary tasks while reinforcing OOTW principles.

The introduction briefly relates the background and history of U.S. involvement in OOTW. Referring to FM 100-5: Operations, the monograph cites the Army current OOTW position. A brief OOTW theory discussion relates that the key distinguishing factor for Operations Other Than War is the purpose for which military forces are used. The monograph then identifies gaps in the training literature. It proposes changes in FM 25-101: Battle Focused Training to include OOTW tasks as part of a battalion's Mission Essential Task List (METL).

The monograph then draws on the available data of recent OOTW deployments by infantry units. It identifies tasks that infantry units performed. Then the component parts of Cordon and Search are examined to determine that they incorporate most of the OOTW tasks while reinforcing the OOTW principles. A historical vignette further demonstrates how the OOTW principles are reinforced by Cordon and Search. Finally, an Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is offered in Mission Training Plan (MTP) format for Cordon and Search. The monograph closes with a summary and draws some conclusions for OOTW training philosophy.

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
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
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Table of Content

Section I:	Introduction	p. 1
Section II:	Theory for Operations Other Than War	p. 7
Section III:	Challenges of Training for OOTW Missions	p. 12
Section IV:	OOTW Infantry Tasks	p. 16
Section V:	Cordon and Search as a Training Tool	p. 21
Section VI:	Historical Example of a Successful OOTW Mission	p. 27
Section VII:	Sample ARTEP for Cordon and Search	p. 30
Section VIII:	Conclusions	p. 40
	Endnotes	p. 43
	Bibliography	p. 46
	Glossary	p. 50
	Appendix A	p. 52

Table of Charts and Diagrams

{Sequential Order}

Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment (From figure 2-1, FM 100-5, p 2-1)	p. 6
Matrix of OOTW Tasks	p. 22
Diagram of a Road Block	p. 23
Diagram of the Screening Process	p. 24
Cordon and Search Activity Diagram	p. 24-1

I. Introduction

The 1993 version of FM 100-5: Operations acknowledges that the Army may be used in roles that do not necessarily involve war. The perspective role of the military as an instrument of power can span the spectrum of conflict. From peaceful competition to all out war, our military may find itself intimately involved. Preparation for war had been the unchallenged focus of the Army. In this new version of FM 100-5, the Army made some philosophical and doctrinal shifts. "Our former strategy of deterrence and the use of force should deterrence fail does not provide the full range or response options necessary to secure our aims."¹ Hence, the introduction of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in Chapter 13 of the revised FM 100-5.

How should infantry units prepare for Operations Other Than War? Commanders must select a method for training that captures as many tasks that soldiers can be expected to perform as part of an OOTW mission while reinforcing the OOTW principles found in Chapter 13 of FM 100-5. The question this monograph seeks to answer is, "Can Cordon and Search function as an Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) style task to provide a base level of training that prepares infantry battalions for typical OOTW challenges?"

To lay the foundation for answering the question, the monograph will first establish OOTW as a legitimate concept. The monograph also offers a theory for OOTW. If founded on a solid theory, a concept has merit. Legitimate concepts founded on a solid philosophy are worthy of taking the time to train units in preparation for their special challenges. Next, the monograph will address the training literature void for OOTW. While OOTW is a doctrinal concept, the training literature has gaps that make training for OOTW difficult.

After addressing the legitimacy of OOTW as a philosophically sound concept and highlighting the training literature shortcomings, the monograph then identifies tasks that

infantry units performed during recent OOTW missions. These tasks are part of the criteria for determining if Cordon and Search is a good training tool for OOTW. In order to be of use as an OOTW training tool, Cordon and Search must incorporate the tasks of multiple OOTW activities. These tasks then become part of the methodology for answering if Cordon and Search is a good method for training for OOTW. The other key element in the methodology is determining if the tasks can be roled into a Cordon and Search training operation that reinforces the OOTW principles.

The monograph will offer a brief historical example of Cordon and Search that demonstrates how Cordon and Search reinforces the OOTW principles. Ultimately, an ARTEP package for Cordon and Search is presented. This ARTEP contains task, conditions, and standards in the style used in ARTEP 7-20 MTP. The ARTEP must capture many tasks that infantry units perform during Operations Other Than War while lending itself to application of the OOTW principles. The monograph will close with a brief summary. It will review the merits of using Cordon and Search to train for OOTW, and draw some conclusions for OOTW training philosophy.

OOTW as a legitimate concept: A brief reflection of the past uses of the U.S. Army illustrates that, while not captured in doctrine, the Army has performed OOTW activities all along. Now, the Army has a doctrine that identifies OOTW activities, and gives planners some principles upon which to guide their actions. This introduction will relate the advent of OOTW into the Army's doctrine and attempt to offer some explanations for the resistance it has encountered. Further, it will relate why OOTW is different than war and why it is the same. Both war and Operations Other Than War must be linked to strategic objectives, however, the method of using the military differs. The defining characteristic is in the intended *purpose* for the use of the military. War has a different *purpose* for the military than Operations Other Than War. Consulting the works of some recognized military theorists helps to quantify OOTW. Having satisfactorily established the legitimate background of OOTW, the subject of training for

OOTW must then be addressed. Legitimacy begins with the recognition that OOTW have been a part of Army operations for a long time.

The Army was performing OOTW missions long before the introduction of the 1993 version of FM 100-5. Previous doctrine addressed war but largely ignored the Army's other activities. There was a gap. It did not capture what these other activities were. Some examples:

*As settlers moved to the American frontier, the Army served as peacekeepers and peace enforcers between the settlers and the Indians.

*The Army served as an occupation force in the South after the Civil War and in Germany after WW II.

*The Army was committed as peacekeepers in the Sinai Desert and in Macedonia.

All of these activities occurred prior to the incorporation of OOTW into our doctrine. One reason that the Army performed these tasks is that it could. Soldiers have a history of being resourceful. "A colonial soldier was much more than a warrior. He was administer, farmer, architect, and engineer--in short, he took up any skill required to develop the region in his charge."² As time past, the skills required of the soldier grew in demand. Chapter 13: "Operations Other Than War" of FM 100-5: Operations closes the gap in the Army doctrine by identifying the following as OOTW activities that place even greater demands upon the soldiers skills:

*Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

*Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

*Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

*Security Assistance

*Nation Assistance

*Support to Counterdrug Operations

*Combatting Terrorism

*Peacekeeping Operations

*Peace Enforcement

*Show of Force

*Attacks and Raids

*Support to Domestic Civil Authorities

*Arms Control

These diverse, challenging, and even non-traditional activities have been part of military operations for ages. OOTW merely captures those missions that the Army has customarily performed all along and gives it a doctrinal foundation in the cornerstone of the Army's doctrinal manuals, FM 100-5.

In spite of this cornerstone doctrinal publication that identifies activities that do not include combat, many regard training for Operations Other Than War as unnecessary. Some regard OOTW as a detractor of the Army's effort to prepare for war. "...[H]ere emerges the standard school of thought that normal battlefield training and soldier discipline will meet our needs in these types of conflicts."³ A 1994 survey of CGSC students revealed the following attitudes toward OOTW:⁴

*If a unit prepares for war, it can then scale down to the appropriate level for Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

*There is a resistance to training for OOTW. Officers feel that if they focused on OOTW tasks they would be robbing their units of critical training time for their Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) priorities. Training for war using the approved METL takes every available resource.

*Officers are also concerned that they might compromise the soldiers' warrior spirit by causing troops to train on OOTW tasks.

*Most officers could not identify sources that contained Tasks, Conditions and Standards to train units for OOTW missions. However, indications were that if Tasks, Conditions, and Standards were provided for them in a fashion that complemented the units' METL, officers would be inclined to train their units for OOTW.

Because many lack an understanding of what OOTW actually means, some officers develop a negative attitude. Fighting fires, handing out food at a distribution center, and cleaning up after a hurricane are possible OOTW missions. The Army responded when required to perform these missions even before there was a doctrine that incorporated these types of missions. However, patrolling while constrained by tedious

Rules of Engagement, setting up road blocks, searching vehicles and personnel are types of OOTW tasks, too. Today, soldiers can be called upon to perform any of their "combat missions" and many missions that are not considered "combat" under the auspices of OOTW. For some, this contributes to the confusion as to what OOTW really are.

Objective linked to Policy: To avoid confusion, soldiers, leaders, and civilian leaders should keep in mind that OOTW are linked to an overall objective. Just as with traditional military operations, there must be a policy that links the actions of the military to a political objective for OOTW. The U.S. government realized this even when dealing with the plains Indians in 1870's and 1880's. In actions that today would be classified as Operations Other Than War, the Army functioned in pursuit of national objectives.

"...[T]he Army did have an Indian policy that was internalized throughout the command structure. This policy, which provided for the application of military power (within budgetary and manpower constraints), was a reflection of the national security objectives of the Hayes administration."⁵

Today, our doctrine acknowledges the vital link of armed force to strategic objectives irrespective of the environment. FM 100-5 relates that OOTW activities by the Army should have the same strategic relationship as activities that are required by war.

"The U.S. seeks to achieve its strategic objectives in three diverse environments, using all elements of national power. The Army classifies its activities during peacetime and conflict as operations other than war (OOTW). During peacetime, the U.S. attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilities to secure objectives. The last environment--that of war--involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy.

"Often the Army will operate in all three environments at once. Whenever operations in these environments occur simultaneously, the Army integrates and coordinates their effects so they mutually support the attainment of strategic objectives."⁶

Attainment of strategic objectives is the aim. OOTW may be the ways or method. The Army may be the means. As the chart below indicates, OOTW includes conflict and peacetime states of the environment. Even though the purpose for using troops may vary, the Army may be operating in all three states of the environment (War, Conflict, Peace) simultaneously in various locations throughout a theater of war.

STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT	GOAL	MILITARY OPERATIONS	EXAMPLES
WAR	Fight and Win	WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale combat operations . . . • Attack • Defend
CONFLICT	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	OTHER THAN WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strikes and raids • Peace enforcement • Support to insurgency • Antiterrorism • Peacekeeping • NEO
PEACETIME	Promote Peace	OTHER THAN WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counterdrug • Disaster relief • Civil support • Peace building • Nation assistance

COMBAT

NONCOMBAT

The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.

Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment⁷

Training: The above excerpts from FM 100-5 validate the OOTW concept. Still, some officers do not consider it worthy of a training focus. Training for OOTW is difficult. One reason may be that OOTW Tasks, Conditions, and Standards do not exist in the same fashion that METL exists. This could be fixed by creating a training plan that incorporates the Tasks, Conditions, and Standards for an OOTW mission in a user-

friendly fashion. An approved training plan would eliminate the confusion of what needs to be taught and how to teach it. When a unit is assigned a specific OOTW mission, it would not have to start totally unprepared. It could tailor its predeployment training after having already laid the groundwork for a possible OOTW mission during routine home-station training. It would provide soldiers, leaders, and units with the advantage of already honed some of the skills that are to be required of them. But if officers do not believe in OOTW as a concept, it may prove difficult getting them to train their units.

II. Theory for Operations Other Than War

There may be another reason today's officers are reluctant to embrace OOTW as a concept. FM 100-5 relates the doctrine and principles based upon theories of war that officers are comfortable with. The doctrine appears to be historically sound yet relevant for waging war with today's army. One can readily point to Jomini's Decisive Points, and Lines of Operation in our doctrine. Clausewitz's Center of Gravity and Culminating Point are part of the "Theory of War" contained in FM 100-5. FM 100-5 uses Jomini's and Clausewitz's methods when discussing "Concepts of Theater and Operational Design."⁸ Aware of its origins, officers are satisfied that the doctrine contained in FM 100-5 is largely based on time honored truths--until the concept of Operations Other Than War appeared.

If we based doctrine, principles, and tenets for war on a philosophy of war, would it not seem prudent to base the doctrine, principles, and tenets of Operations Other Than War on a philosophy of Operations Other Than War? That is the key element that is missing from Chapter 13: "Operations Other Than War" of FM 100-5. What should be the philosophy for Operations Other Than War? Is there one?

Roger Trinquier, French officer, warrior, and author thought that warfare was changing after WW II. The purpose of warfare was changing. This required a different attitude toward war and its means.

"Since the end of WW II, a new form of warfare has been born. Called at times either *subversive warfare* or *revolutionary warfare*, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle. This confrontation, which in times past saw the annihilation of an enemy army in one or more battles, no longer occurs.

Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions--political, economic, psychological, military--that aims at the *overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime*. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked--ideological, social, religious, economic--any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered."⁹

This is enlightening. Trinquier wrote this concerning counterinsurgency as a new type of warfare. However, according to our present doctrine, counterinsurgency is not a type of warfare. It is one type of OOTW activity. Trinquier makes valid points concerning variables that interlock and impact on the tension of a population. How should all the other aspects of OOTW fit in? Rather than focus on each individual OOTW activity and then compile a combined list of what constitutes OOTW, one should focus on the broader categories--war and Operations Other Than War. To examine what the OOTW philosophy should be, one should first consider what it is not.

It is not war. Clausewitz states that, "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."¹⁰ This seems reasonable, but certainly some of the OOTW activities contain acts of force to compel the enemy to do our will. Clausewitz further states that "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means...[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."¹¹ This is sound, however, the military is frequently used by political entities all over the world to carry out policies that do not include acts of war. Since the military may provide the instrument to achieve the desired end for both war and OOTW how is this distinguishable?

The key lies in the *purpose* for which military forces are committed. Mao Tse Tung understood this. He developed a strategy especially for China. The military had expressed purposes for operating at expressed times. Mao used his army to help harvest crops, repair fences, and other activities to retain the support of the public. Often times, the activities of Mao's army did not include war, but they were linked to a higher purpose.

"...[T]he Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should consider such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary power and setting up Party organizations... Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence."¹²

Mao's army knew it had a purpose. Mao's strategy was specific for China, but his expression of linking the military actions to a specific purpose is wise council for all.

Referring again to the chart that depicts the "Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment," on page six, consider the *purpose* for the use of the military. The goal during war is to fight and win. The goal during conflict is to deter war and resolve conflict. The goal during peacetime is to promote peace. Only military operations during war require fighting and winning as the principle purpose of military forces. While conflict may involve some fighting, its goal is to deter war. Occasionally, deterring war may involve some combat-type activities. This is why FM 100-5 relates that the "doctrine for war complements that for Operations Other Than War."¹³ However, there is a special difference when combat activities take place in OOTW. The objective of these combat activities may be to contain the conflict, or eliminate disruptive influences. The overall aim for the use of the military is not to fight and win against an adversary. The key difference is the *purpose* for the use of the military.

Principles: FM 100-5 emphasizes the link to the purpose when relating the OOTW principles. One can easily recognize the similarity to the principles of war. The

principles should resemble each other. Both circumstances use the military in pursuit of strategic objectives. The principles serve as a guide. "Commanders must balance these principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature of the operation."¹⁴ Hence the continued emphasis on the purpose for military activities. The following are OOTW principles found in FM 100-5:

- *Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

- *Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort toward every objective...Military commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.

- *Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

- *Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

- *Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

- *Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

These principles apply to OOTW. However, OOTW rarely occurs in isolation. It seems easy to acknowledge that there may be OOTW missions ongoing in a theater of war. Certainly, NEO, Nation Assistance, Peacekeeping and other OOTW activities are acknowledged to be ongoing activities in a theater of war that mostly contains horrific combat between adversaries. The above principles can guide the actions of soldiers attempting to carry out OOTW missions in a theater of war.

The same argument should hold true in a theater for OOTW. There could be isolated incidents of combat-type activities ongoing in a large theater where OOTW was the major emphasis. The principle purpose for the use of the military may be to promote peace, but there may be enough saboteurs attempting to disrupt the peace that upon occasion the military is required to combat the saboteurs with arms. This may prove to

be a more difficult task during OOTW because of the strategic purpose that involved the military in the first place.

"Operations Other Than War will not always be peaceful actions. Determined opponents may resort to fighting or other aggressive acts in an attempt to defeat our purpose and promote theirs. While all military forces have the right of self-defense, the use of overwhelming force may complicate the process toward the Army's stated objectives. As a result, operational commanders may find themselves operating under restrictive ROE."¹⁵

Overview: It is apparent that the U.S. Army performed Operations Other Than War long before OOTW was written as a doctrinal concept. It is just as apparent that in order to best prepare the Army to meet the challenges of the changing strategic environment, a sound doctrinal foundation upon which to operate will stand the Army in good stead. In this day and time, a sound concept includes OOTW. Regardless of whether performing in war or in Operations Other Than War, the Army must link its actions to clear strategic objectives. Operations Other Than War are defined by their purpose. There need not be any further philosophical debate. Each OOTW action will present its own peculiar conditions. The best doctrine can do is to provide a foundation for a planner to build upon. Once intimate with the environment, a planner will plan in accordance with his particular circumstances. Recent activities by the U.S. Army in operation "Restore Democracy" for Haiti indicate that units must be prepared for war and for Operations Other Than War. In order to prepare properly, soldiers must train to perform their tasks under the conditions they expect to encounter after deployed. Even normal combat-type actions may be restricted by Rules of Engagement (ROE) that preclude the best tactical use of force. Reinforcing OOTW principles while training on relevant tasks are difficult circumstances to capture when training. The training method that prepares units for operating in the OOTW environment must accomplish both.

Our capstone manual, FM 100-5, expresses OOTW as a doctrinal concept. Yet, our doctrinal training literature expressly directs commanders to prepare for tasks they expect to perform during wartime. Once again, there is a gap.

III. Challenges of Training for OOTW Missions

There is little training literature for OOTW. The Army's published manuals do not address OOTW training at all. Units deploying for OOTW missions often have to develop training plans that depart from their normal Mission Essential Task List (METL). This monograph proposes modifications to include OOTW tasks in the Mission Essential Tasks process as outlined in FM 25-100, FM 25-101, and ARTEP 7-20 MTP. This will legitimize OOTW training.

"The problem is that FM 25-101 [Battle Focused Training] defines METL as *an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions (p 2-2)*. Because OOTW operations are combat, not war, they seem to fall outside the realm of the METL. But OOTW is the war many units plan to fight, and hot spots such as Bosnia and Haiti seem likely sites for the OOTW role."¹⁵

Legitimize OOTW training: The suggestion is to delete *wartime missions* and add *any mission that units are expected to perform when involved in a war or conflict*. This will allow units to keep a combat focus while preparing for operations that they anticipate being tasked to perform. It enables commanders to anticipate the training needs of his unit inclusive of any possible environment that he expects his unit to encounter.

There is a need to include OOTW tasks in the routine training conducted at home station. Units are performing OOTW missions at an accelerated rate. A reflection of recent past reveals that "...Operations Other Than War are not new to the Army. Their pace, frequency and variety, however, have quickened in the last three decades."¹⁶

Prudent trainers will train their units for those activities that they expect to encounter. Trainers should replicate as closely as they possibly can the conditions under which soldiers are expected to perform their tasks. This is true for war. It is also true for Operations Other Than War. One reason to train for OOTW is that "[t]he conditions in OOTW can be radically different from those for which our normal battle-focused training has prepared us."¹⁷

The OOTW Contention: The tenet of Versatility purportedly would substantiate the argument that units are adaptable. The Army requires "...tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some which may not be on unit mission essential task lists (METL)."¹⁸ The implication is that there need not be any special emphasis on OOTW.

"Taken at face value, this makes sense, but to expand it into a prohibition against putting OOTW tasks such as peace enforcement on a unit METL seems to contradict the basic training philosophy of *Don't have soldiers do something that they are not trained to do.*"¹⁹

Even FM 25-101 states, "A unit must train as it plans to fight."²⁰ Some of the "fights" that recently called the Army to action were Operations Other Than War. Witness the Army's effort for Disaster Relief following hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Actions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti have proven to be very challenging operations that sometimes involve combat. The military--largely Air Force--still supports Operations Other Than War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Desert Storm appears to be the exception. While Desert Storm reminds anyone who may become overly enamored with OOTW that fighting a conventional war is still a real possibility, the Army is conducting strenuous OOTW operations at an alarming rate. If troops mass on the Iraqi border with Kuwait, who can predict what will happen next? Leaders must do their best to ensure that soldiers experience focused training prior to having to execute any mission.

Battle Focus: FM 25-100: Training the Force recognizes that there are many tasks to train and not enough time for training. To ensure the leaders focus their units on the proper tasks, FM 25-100 introduces a concept called battle focus.

"Battle focus is a recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints. However, commanders can achieve a successful training program by consciously narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment.

A critical aspect of the battle focus concept is to understand the responsibility for the linkage between the collective mission essential tasks and the individual tasks which support them."²¹

Training for Operations Other Than War would be simplified if commanders were provided a training plan that captured individual, battle staff, and collective tasks that enabled commanders to use one training vehicle and one training event to address the most important aspects in preparing for Operations Other Than War. Commanders require a "battle focused" OOTW training plan. The Infantry has done a great job of packaging training plans in Mission Training Plans (MTPs) "...with a descriptive, mission-oriented, training program to train the infantry battalion to perform its critical wartime missions/operations"²² The same material should be provided for training OOTW missions.

"The problem is that our training managers at battalion level and below do not have the doctrinal support materials they need to assure an adequate level of preparedness for conducting peace operations."²³

The Army should create MTPs for Operations Other Than War. Operations Other Than War have unique tasks, conditions, and standards that should be addressed in training literature. The method the MTPs use to convey how to train for critical wartime missions is a good one. The same procedure can be used to convey how to train for Operations Other Than War.

"An MTP is a descriptive, mission-oriented program that helps a unit train on its critical wartime missions. An MTP establishes minimum acceptable standards

that apply to all like units in the execution of tasks associated with missions appropriate to those units. Further, the MTP format is familiar to trainers at all levels, and it aligns the training of the unit with the Army's training and tactical doctrine...

We cannot expect to depend on current MTPs to adequately prepare for peacekeeping [and peace enforcement] missions."²⁴

Recognizing that time, resources, and training literature are not in abundant supply, the Infantry would be well served to capture the commonality of tasks shared in most of its OOTW missions. Then it could prepare a generic OOTW training plan in the MTP format that captures many of the OOTW characteristics that infantrymen experience. Trainers could use this generic training plan to obtain a base level proficiency on a number of OOTW tasks. Then, if allowed time to prepare for a specific mission, trainers could tailor specific training plans to prepare their units. They would have the advantage of not starting from scratch. If commanders had to commit their units directly into an OOTW action without the benefit of specifically training for the mission, they could do so knowing that their unit already had some level of proficiency operating in the OOTW environment.

Having a standing OOTW training plan could prove useful. Units expected to deploy as peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were rapidly pushed through a special training program at the Hohenfels Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).²⁵ To attempt to prepare their units for the special OOTW environment they expected to encounter for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, commanders in the 10th Mountain Division had their units conduct country orientations, and "train for what they might encounter, while equipment was prepared for operations..."²⁶ Time was short. Some of the required equipment for training was shipped before the training could take place. In contrast, units preparing to deploy to the Sinai Desert as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force spent six months training for this special OOTW event.²⁷

Units have taken as much time as possible to prepare for OOTW missions when given the chance. Perhaps *time* should be a qualification added to the tenet of Versatility.

Given time, units can adapt to different missions and tasks. This is true for war. It is also true for Operations Other Than War. A time saving venture would be to have an approved OOTW training event that was periodically accomplished as part of a normal training cycle. There is a need for units to train for OOTW. There should be a training plan. A training plan can create a foundation by examining those OOTW tasks and skills that are often required. Once identified, a trainer could begin to put together a "battle focused" training plan for OOTW.

IV. OOTW Infantry Tasks

The Infantry has seen its fair share of Operations Other Than War. Infantry units are almost exclusively the dominant force for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement operations. Further, infantry units can perform valuable functions for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions. The facts are in. Highlights of the types of activities that infantry units performed during recent OOTW missions are captured below.

Operation Restore Hope for Somalia was a Peace Enforcement operation.²⁸ "Peace Enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities."²⁹ The following activities were identified as important for success of infantry units in Peace Enforcement operations:

OPERATIONS

- Air Assault Operations
- MOUT Operations
- Patrolling
- Psychological Operations (leaflets, handbills, loud speaker teams)
- Security Operations (convoys, food distribution sites, port facilities, airfields, base-ops & billeting area)

Link-up Operations (with SOF, other services, and within battalions)

Weapons Confiscation

SECURITY

Force Protection

Crowd Control

Roadblocks

Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

Checkpoints

Observation Points

Survival [health/hygiene] in extreme environmental conditions

INTELLIGENCE

Nontraditional IPB

Strategic and Tactical IPB

Detailed Intelligence Collection Tasks (use of UAVs would have helped.)

Identification of friend or foe

Intensive HUMINT effort

Information Dissemination

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

External Coordination

Coordination with Department of State (DOS) and other governmental agencies

Coordination with Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

MANEUVER SKILLS

Target Identification (identification of friend or foe.)

Use of Night Observation Devices (NODS)

Fire and Maneuver (with flak vests and helmets)

Illumination (searchlights, Helicopter "night sun" with IR filter, 40mm, 60mm, local purchased portable searchlights)

Fire Control (use of AIM-1 laser)

Indirect Fire Control: Army Attack Helicopters, Special Operations Attack Helicopters, AC130s, Air Force CAS, Marine Air Assets, organic artillery, Marine artillery

Preparation of fighting positions

COMMUNICATIONS

Redundant Communications Plan

Use of TACSAT and HF radios

Use of Linguists

"Humanitarian Assistance operations use DOD personnel equipment and supplies to promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters...Disaster Relief operations fall within the overall context of humanitarian assistance. They are conducted in emergency situations to prevent loss of life and property."³⁰ These operations were also done as Support to Domestic Civil Authorities. The tasks performed by infantry units during the aftermaths of the Los Angeles earthquake, and hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii identified the following tasks as important for the success of infantry units performing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations:³¹

OPERATIONS

Security Operations (Security of property)

Restoration/Clean-up

SECURITY

Traffic Control Point (TCP)

Crowd Control

Road Blocks

Secure Food Distribution Sites

COORDINATION

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

State and local governing agencies

NGOs

COMMUNICATION

Use of Linguists (mostly Spanish)

Command & Control nets to facilitate operations

"Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict...Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant."³² The following tasks are identified as being important to success of infantry units in Haiti (Promote Democracy)³³ and by an infantry unit in Iraq (Provide Comfort) performing peacekeeping roles.³⁴

OPERATIONS

MOUT Training

Patrolling

Psychological Operations

Security Operations

Link-up Operations

Weapons Confiscation

SECURITY

Force Protection

Crowd Control

Roadblocks

Traffic Control Points

Checkpoints

Observation Points

INTELLIGENCE

Nontraditional IPB

Detailed Collection Tasks

Identification of Friend or Foe

Intensive HUMINT effort

Information Dissemination

COORDINATION & LIAISON

External Coordination

Coordination with NGOs

MANEUVER SKILLS

Use of NODS

Fire Control/Fire Discipline

Mine Identification, antitampering, clearing

Navigation (GPS, SLUGGER, laser range finder)

Preparation of fighting positions

COMMUNICATIONS

Redundant Communications Plan

Use of Linguists

LOGISTICS

Resupply/Sustainment

It becomes obvious that OOTW activities require infantry units to perform a variety of tasks. Some of these tasks directly apply when the same tasks are performed during combat operations. Some tasks are performed differently because the environment and ROE changes. Some tasks are unique to the OOTW environment. By identifying the tasks that infantry units have performed during recent OOTW missions, a

trainer can determine that a unique training program is necessary to prepare units for the complexity, variety, and changing conditions of OOTW missions. The single best training event to prepare today's infantrymen for the variety of OOTW activities is Cordon and Search. Cordon and Search will train the tasks inherent in Operations Other Than War environment while reinforcing the application of the OOTW principles.

Section V: Cordon and Search as a Training Tool

Identifying the types of tasks required of infantry units that recently performed OOTW activities is useful in that trainers can review the tasks to determine if their units need to train-up. Commanders and trainers can review old AARs of units that have performed similar OOTW activities that they expect their units to encounter. Providing that there is enough notice, units could then train to the specific tasks that trainers expect their soldiers to perform. There is another possibility for use of this information.

By identifying the types of tasks that infantry units have performed in recent OOTW activities, trainers can then operate with a base of knowledge of what is normally required of soldiers performing OOTW activities. These tasks can be combined into a single training event, and commanders can train their units on typical OOTW tasks as part of a home-station training plan. This would ensure that the unit maintained an acceptable level on training for most OOTW activities. If the unit were given time, the trainers could have the unit train-up for a specific OOTW mission. The training program would not have to start from scratch. The soldiers would already have a base level of knowledge, and would be able to train on difficult tasks more quickly. Soldiers would also be confident that their leaders had foreseen this possibility and had started training them for the upcoming task. Reacting to an OOTW mission would not seem to have caught the leaders unprepared. If the units were having to deploy without notice, at least soldiers would deploy with a degree of proficiency in some of the tasks that they would likely be asked to perform, and would be less apprehensive about operating in an OOTW

environment. The leaders would not be trying to organize how to do everything on the fly.

By using Cordon and Search as the training vehicle for all OOTW activities, infantry trainers could prepare their soldiers for many of the tasks that they are likely to perform. Cordon and Search is a difficult mission for soldiers, units, and leaders. It demands detailed planning, flexible responses to a variety of possibilities, deft leadership, constant communication, integrated efforts with supporting units, negotiation skills, dealing with belligerents and civilians that are intermixed, rigid adherence to basic soldiers skills, while operating in emotionally and politically charged environment. In short, Cordon and Search is the type of training event that will stretch commanders, staffs, and soldiers to do their jobs well. It the exact sort of event to prepare infantry units for Operations Other Than War.

Presently, there is not a single MTP task that captures the bulk of the above tasks in one event. There should be. There could be. Cordon and Search captures the tasks that infantry units have had to recently perform during OOTW commitments. The graph below illustrates how cordon and search ensures that units would train on OOTW tasks.

TASKS	Peace Enforcement	Peace Keeping	Hum Asst & Disas Rif	Cordon & Search
Air Assault	x	x		Optional
MOUT	x	x		Optional
Partolling	x	x	x	x
PSYOPS	x	x		x
Security Ops	x	x	x	x
Weapons Confication	x	x		x
Force protection	x	x	x	x
Crowd Control	x	x	x	x
Roadblocks	x	x	x	x
TCPs	x	x	x	x
Check Points	x	x	x	x
Survival	x			Optional
Nontraditional IPB	x	x		x
Strategic & Tactical IPB	x			Optional
Intel Collection	x	x		x
HUMIT	x	x		x
Info Dissemination	x	x		x
DOS Coord	x	x	x	Optional
NGO Coord	x	x	x	Optional
External Coord	x	x	x	x
Navagation	x	x	x	x
Target ID	x	x		x
NODS	x	x		x
Fire and Maneuver	x	x		x
Illumination	x			Optional
Fire Control	x	x		x
Indirect Fire Control	x	x		x
Prep Fighting Pos	x	x		x
Mine ID	x	x		Optional
Mine Clearing	x	x		Optional
Commo Plan	x	x	x	x
TACSAT & HF Radios	x	x	x	Optional
Linguists	x	x	x	Optional

Cordon and Search works by first isolating an area and then conducting a thorough search to locate the desired personnel, items, or both. A cordon is a "line or circle of police [or] soldiers...stationed around an area to guard it ...[To cordon an area is] to encircle or shut (off) with a cordon."³⁵ Cordon and Search has three primary elements, the outer cordon, the inner cordon, and the search element.

The cordon isolates the objective. It prevents any movement into or out of the objective area. The outer cordon element that primarily prevents any movement into the area. Depending on the situation and the ROE, the outer cordon may set up traffic control points, road blocks, blocking positions or other means to isolate the objective. The inner cordon element that prevents movement out of the objective area. This element usually has 360 degree eyes-on the objective area, and works in close concert with the search element.




Diagram of a Road Block

The search element moves into the objective area and conducts the actual search. The search element is further broken down into units that perform searching, screening, guarding, escorting, and securing functions. Each of these units work within the objective area and must be in constant communication with each other.

*Search: Consist of soldiers, police, and dogs that search the houses, bunkers, and inhabitants in the objective.

*Screen: Soldiers, intelligence, and police personnel that identify belligerents, suspects, and people to be detained.

*Guard: Soldiers that erect and guard enclosures (cages) for people awaiting interrogation by the Screening Party, and at a separate location guard the detainees.

*Escort: These soldiers take the detainees to the guards. Additionally, Escorts must be assigned to any civilian moving in the objective area.

*Security: These soldiers and police operate OPs, overwatch positions, and provide security within the objective area.

*County Fair: Soldiers operating the county fair operate in a secure area. Civilians that have already been processed and who will not be detained are escorted to the county fair and required to remain assembled there until the commander decides to release them. This help keep control of the objective. Efforts at the county fair may be medical, social, educational, informational, entertainment, meals, or any other the commander determines to use to convey goodwill to the civilian populace





Diagram of Screening Process

Cordon and Search also requires a reserve. The reserve must be mobile and located where it can assist any of the elements that require assistance. It could be called upon to assist the search team with overpowering some belligerents, the guard team with



CORDON & SEARCH ACTIVITY DIAGRAM

transporting captured material, reinforcing the outer cordon suppressing an attempt by belligerents that are attempting to rescue some comrades that are isolated within the objective, etc. The reserve for cordon and search must be ready for any eventuality.

Because of the special conditions and ROE applied when conducting a cordon and search operation, the principles of OOTW are relevant. Since part of OOTW training for soldiers and leaders requires them to operate in a unique environment, it is appropriate and fortunate that Cordon and Search readily reinforces the OOTW principles.

"Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective...understand strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that they contribute to unity of effort with other agencies."³⁶ Due to the complex nature of a Cordon and Search mission, there is ample opportunity for soldiers and leaders to get distracted as to what the objective is. Dealing with civilians, NGOs, press, and an untold amount of other distractions requires soldiers to focus on the objective. Most training missions that focus on combat do not address these types of distractions.

"Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort toward every objective...[I]n Operations Other than War, this may be more difficult to obtain. In such operations, other government agencies will often have the lead."³⁷ Soldiers and Officers understand unity of command. When coordinating a Cordon and Search mission, the need for unity of effort on the part of all elements becomes apparent. The local police, the NGOs, the U.S. Army, and all other agencies must be operating in concert with one another for the mission to be successful.

"Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions...Legitimacy derives from the perception that constituted authority is both genuine and effective and employs appropriate means for reasonable purposes."³⁸ Trainers will have to write this aspect into the scenario. The legitimate reason for

conducting the Cordon and Search must be emphasized in the OPORD. This is also linked to restraint. While the unit has the combat power to conduct more lethal operations than Cordon and Search, the unit chooses Cordon and Search because it reinforces the theme of legitimacy. When the Cordon and Search includes a County Fair the people receive needed care and attention. This balances some of the inconvenience of having the U.S. soldiers assist in protecting them; may make the soldiers' actions appear more favorable, and their presence legitimate.

"Restraint: Apply appropriate military capabilities prudently."³⁹ This is linked to the ROE that the unit will operate under. The nature of Cordon and Search requires soldiers and leaders to be prudent in the use of force. Obviously, the unit possesses more than enough combat power to conduct a much more lethal operation. However, because demonstration of restraint is desired, Cordon and Search is the appropriate operation.

"Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."⁴⁰ This is a difficult aspect to capture in any training program. One by-product of instituting a training program for OOTW may be to instill an attitude of perseverance in the soldiers when they undertake OOTW missions. The thought and concept of perseverance will not be foreign to soldiers. No short simple training event will replicate the aspect of perseverance by itself. However, soldiers will at least be exposed to the idea of persevering in an OOTW environment while following specific rules of engagement. The results are not measurable, but at least soldiers are educated properly.

"Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage."⁴¹ The use of the inner and outer cordons reinforces this principle. The manner in which the search element conducts its operations should bear security in mind as well. Security has application throughout Cordon and Search. The battalion must keep the soldiers are secure as possible while operating in a difficult environment. The civilians must be kept secure. They should be protected from the belligerents. The civilians should also be

protected from indiscriminate use of force by the U.S. units. Additionally, once seized, the belligerents must be kept secure from members of the public that would seek to harm them. The belligerents should also be kept safe from each other.

Cordon and Search proves the correct training vehicle for not only capturing the tasks that infantrymen are asked to perform during OOTW operations, but by reinforcing the OOTW principles as well. Cordon and Search is a complex operation that requires a multitude of critical tasks to be done well while operating under difficult circumstances in a potentially explosive environment. These are exactly the sorts of challenges that soldiers must be faced with in training to increase their effectiveness when executing actual OOTW missions. A historical example that captures the relevant tasks, conditions, and standards for Cordon and Search while reinforcing the OOTW principles proves a worthy study.

Section VI: Historical Example of a Successful OOTW Mission

To illustrate the value of using Cordon and Search as a method to prepare infantry units to conduct operations in an OOTW environment, review of a historical example proves helpful. Perhaps most importantly, the example will prove the value of conducting operations with the OOTW principles in mind. OOTW operations that are conducted while relying on the OOTW principles have a good chance of success. Cordon and Search is the best method to train infantry to reinforce the OOTW principles. What follows is not a lengthy blow by blow recollection of how units moved on the ground. This vignette focuses on what happen and what were the results. This information was obtained from Vietnam Lessons Learned NO. 75.⁴¹

Operation Phu Vang I was conducted in the Phu Vang, Hong Tru and Phu Thu Districts in Thua Thien Province. This operation was conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) from 27 September to 9 October 1968.

(1) Remarks:

(a) Vietnamese forces were utilized in the operation, and in most cases closely integrated with US Forces.

(b) Surprise was achieved by last-minute notification of the District forces, and by diversionary operations in areas adjacent to the cordon area.

(c) The cordon was closed by first manning blocking positions, then closing the cordon. The area was 28 square kilometers, completely surrounded by navigable waterways.

(d) Destruction was minimized. Artillery was not employed although preparations for its employment were made. Helo gunships were on station, but were not used.

(e) Population screening was conducted by US units and by GVN [Government of Vietnam] personnel attached to the unit for this purpose. The ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] battalion conducting a sweep also conducted screening concurrently.

(f) Detailed search and rapid exploitation of intelligence was conducted within AOs, utilizing information gained from civilians, prisoners, and Hoi Chanh. All personnel of military age were detained for processing at the Combined Interrogation Center. Enemy forces were forced to remain in the cordon.

(g) Naval forces screened the waterways adjacent to the AO.

2. Results.

(a) The enemy lost 96 killed, 168 prisoners of war and 42 Hoi Chanh for a total of 306.

(b) A total of 332 persons were processed, of which 32 were found to be males of military age, 5 were ARVN deserters, and 295 were released as innocent civilians.

(c) Friendly losses were one ARVN killed and eight wounded. Two Popular Forces (PF) and nine US were wounded in the action.

With the information provided, one can determine the validity of the operation using the principles of OOTW as criteria. Keeping in mind that the operation took place

before OOTW was a concept, it is remarkable how appropriate the OOTW principles apply to Cordon and Search for Operation Phu Vang I.

Objective: The objective was to clear the area of operations of communist operators. All forces (U.S. Army, Navy, and Vietnamese forces) were employed to support this end.

Unity of Effort: The forces involved U.S. Army (infantry, artillery, lift helicopters, helicopter gunships) Navy patrol boats, GVN & ARVN all worked in pursuit of the same end. Their efforts assisted and supported each other. A cooperative effort was required from different arms, services, host nation civilians, and host nation military for the operation to be a success.

Legitimacy: Legitimacy was reinforced by having host nation military units accompany U.S. units in performing the operation. Legitimacy was further reinforced by having host nation government personnel perform some of the screening. Legitimacy of the host nation government policies and procedures are reinforced when the civilian populace believes that U.S. units are assisting the host nation. The U.S. forces must avoid appearing imperialistic by having the host nation seem as if it is having its government and military personnel doing the bidding of the U.S.

Restraint: By planning for the use of artillery but not using it, it is obvious that some degree of restraint was exercised. All parties involved knew that the U.S. forces were capable of employing artillery. By not employing artillery and minimizing collateral damage, the local populace can be made aware of the efforts to use restraint.

Perseverance: This operation did not take place overnight. Units did not rush in order to complete the mission. While only long term commitment can truly demonstrate perseverance, this was a start. If efforts to keep the area clear of communist influence followed up this operation, that would send a message of perseverance to the local populace and to the communists. In light of the end result of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, it is difficult to state that there was any lasting effort at perseverance.

Security: Security was employed at all levels. By capitalizing on surprise and employing diversionary operations, security was already a factor. The security effort involved the Navy patrolling the waters around the area of operations. The inner and outer cordon provided security. The actions within the objective area employed security. The greatest testimony as to the effectiveness of the security measures is the casualty count. Not getting soldiers killed usually means that security efforts were successful.

This historical example of Cordon and Search indicates the validity of the OOTW principles. The mission operated within all but the perseverance principle and was a tactical success. This also demonstrates that the OOTW principles can be directly applied when training an infantry unit for Cordon and Search. Cordon and Search constructively employs not only the tasks to prepare units for Operations Other Than War, it also reinforces the importance of the OOTW principles when planning and executing the operation. These factors are important when using an ARTEP as a training tool to prepare a unit for future operations.

Section VII: Sample ARTEP for Cordon and Search

What follows is an infantry battalion ARTEP for Cordon and Search. It is modeled after the style used in ARTEP 7-20: Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion. Some units in the field already are performing Cordon and Search operations. Presently, it is not a doctrinally recognized mission for an infantry battalion. Yet, Cordon and Search is a technique taught by the Jungle Operations Training Center in Panama.⁴² Cordon and Search was the most frequent operation performed by infantry units in Somalia.⁴³ Units in Haiti are already performing Cordon and Search operations.⁴⁴ Since units in the field are conducting Cordon and Search operations, there must be some merit to it. This monograph proposes Tasks, Conditions, and Standards that would enable Cordon and Search to be a doctrinally recognized technique for training infantry battalions how to operate in an OOTW environment. Units may elect to perform Cordon

and Search in pursuit of a variety of objectives. The search may be for a cache of weapons or supplies. The search may be for some belligerents. Regardless of the object being pursued, Cordon and Search can be an effective technique.

"The purpose of these operations [is] to eliminate weapons and ammunition in the area, apprehend enemy personnel, destroy or capture equipment, gather intelligence, demonstrate UN legitimacy...and separate militiamen of the noncomplying factions from their support base."⁴⁵

[NOTE: The Tasks, Conditions, and Standards are drawn from various sources. The principle contributions came from: Vietnam Lessons Learned NO. 75, "Cordon and Search; MAJ Parker's article in News From the Front, "Cordon and Search in Somalia;" CPT Huges' fax on "Cordon and Search" from Haiti; CALL's Newsletter NO. 93, "MOUT" {Draft}; and some original thought by the author.]

ELEMENT: Infantry Battalion

TASK: Cordon and Search

CONDITION: The battalion received an order to conduct a cordon and search operation for a specified area of operations during night and daylight hours. The area of operations may be rural, built-up, or a combination. The enemy has insurgents and some sympathizers in the area, but most of the local population is docile and indifferent to the insurgents cause. When compromised the insurgents' may fight, flee, or attempt to blend in with the local populace. Depending upon the value of the compromised insurgents, rescue attempts from other insurgents are possible. A recruiting effort is underway, and leaders of the insurgent movement are thought to be operating in the battalion's area of operations. The host government has requested U.S. involvement because of an inability to adequately confront the insurgents with their limited national assets. Each community has a small local police element that desires to work with the U.S. Army. The population is neither pro or against the involvement of the U.S. military, but vocal minorities are gathering support for either point of view. Media coverage is ongoing within the area of

operations. Drought has caused many of the local population to become migrant refugees. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) are attempting to assist feeding the local population, but are being harassed by the insurgents. The battalion is ordered to capture, force removal, or eliminate (destroy) the insurgents. The battalion is ordered to locate, seize, and remove any caches of enemy supplies, training materials, propaganda, and weapons while avoiding alienating the local residents. Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, DPRE, Military Police, Counter-Intelligence, Engineer (with EOD teams), and Linguist assets are OPCON to the battalion. Indirect Fire Support, CAS, Attack Helicopter, and Lift Helicopters assets may be available.

TASK STANDARDS:

- a. The battalion establishes a collection plan, initiates reconnaissance, places observation on the target and collects PIR on the target area without compromise.
- b. The battalion conducts planning and task organizes into a cordon element, search element, and a reserve. The plan incorporates the ROE and does not violate local laws.
- c. The cordon consists of an Outer Cordon element and an Inner Cordon element. The purpose is to isolate the objective to prevent infiltration into or exfiltration out of the objective. Outer Cordon may have road blocks and check points to provide early warning and prevent the movement of personnel into or out of the area to be searched. Inner Cordon surrounds the objective. Movement must not be allowed into or out of the area to be searched.
- d. Search element must be organized into Security, Guard, Escort, Screen, Search, and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Teams. Ensure Search Teams have females assigned to search females as required. Belligerents, precious cargo, and contraband items are to be processed IAW established procedures. The Search element:
 - *Separates the enemy from their support base.
 - *Captures or destroys enemy personnel and equipment.
 - *Processes personnel using 5 S's. Initially retains insurgents in a cage/holding facility.
 - *Removes/transportes insurgents from the Area of Operations. Turns insurgents over to proper authorities.
 - *Liberates civilians from enemy control.
 - *Demonstrates host nation/US/UN legitimacy to the population.

e. Maximum use is made of civilian authorities to conduct and legitimize the search.

f. ROE and laws are observed by all parties.

g. The battalion sustains no casualties from friendly fire.

h. The battalion is not surprised by the enemy.

i. Establish a Reserve. The reserve should be mobile and able to respond to threats in the objective area and to threats to the inner and outer cordons.

j. The local populace is controlled, segregated, and processed IAW the commanders intent and the ROE.

k. The battalion does not cause excessive collateral damage.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS:

GO/NO GO

1. Battle Staff: Battalion commander and staff plan and control a Cordon and Search operation for a special environment.

a. Conduct nontraditional IPB. Make use of Population Status Overlay, Legal Status Overlay, Concealment and Cover Overlay, LOC and Likely Ambush Sites Overlay, Trap Maps, Logistics Sustainability Overlay, Activities Matrix, Incident Reports, and Event Template/Matrix IAW FM 34 -130 p. 3-55 thru 3-90 and chapter 6.

b. Ensure plan provides for employment of Cordon, Search and Reserve. Plan should allow the commander the flexibility of enlarging the search based upon new information.

c. Ensure plan does not violate ROE and accomplishes Commander's Intent. (e.g. Search of personnel, vehicles, residence)

d. Ensure plan accounts for routes and axes that provide concealment and allow Cordon, Search and Reserve elements to get into position without compromise. Plan appropriate link-up efforts.

e. Designate order of movement and sequence for Cordon, Search and Reserve to be in position.

f. Designate control and coordination measures to facilitate reporting and FRAGOs. Re-evaluate SOPs to ensure they are appropriate for OOTW environment. (e.g. Mark/ID building/bunker/area that is cleared day/night)

g. Position and employ additional elements of the task organization where they can best support the operation. (e.g. MPs, Engineers, PSYOPS, CA)

h. Plan Fire Support, G/VLLD, COLT control for precision munitions and position assets.

i. Plan air/ground Casualty Evac for troops, civilians, and enemy personnel.

j. Plan for the processing and transfer of insurgents. Pick appropriate location to conduct processing. (e.g. soccer field, baseball field, auditorium, meeting hall, police station.) Civilian population should be told to gather at a certain location (e.g. church, well, stadium) where they can be controlled, or issued a curfew and told to remain in their quarters. Only civilians with an appropriate escort should be allowed out. If requiring the civilians to assemble, the battalion must have a plan for controlling and administering to the civilians. A "County Fair" method may be used to assist the local populace, convey goodwill, and make controlling the civilians an easier process.

k. Plan for Displaced Persons, Refugee and Evacuee (DPRE) contingencies.

l. Define role for S-5, PAO, CMO, Liaison Officers/NCOs. (Most likely these are additional duties at battalion level and the responsible officer/NCO may require specific guidance.)

n. Prepare to liaison with NGOs.

n. Liaison with higher, adjacent units, local officials.

o. Ensure communications interoperability and procedures.

p. Ensure Logistical Plan complements Cordon and Search Operation.

q. Plan soldiers' load appropriate for their sub-element and mission.

r. Plan instructions for civilians halted by the outer cordon. Instructions must include the best alternate route through the area.

s. Conduct rehearsal.

2. Battalion begins movement.
 - a. Units cross LD (in PZ posture) at designated time.
 - b. Continuous reconnaissance performed on objective. Commander and units advised of any changes. (e.g. movement of additional insurgents into or out of the objective.)
 - c. Soldier's load IAW OPORD.
3. Battalion maintains security during movement.
 - a. Each element provides for its own security.
 - b. Breaks in contact/gaps do not develop.
 - c. Appropriate security efforts at halts. Take cover, disperse, all round security set up within five minutes of halting. Able to resume movement within five minutes of notification.
4. Battalion minimizes exposure moving into position.
 - a. Outer and Inner cordons establish positions.
 - b. Reserve is positioned to react to contingencies.
 - c. Search team is not compromised.
 - d. Link-up effected with element performing observation of target.
5. Battalion conducts search.
 - a. Search Elements (Security, Search, Escort, Guard, Screen, Quick Reaction Force, and County Fair) perform tasks.
 - *Security element ensures the safety of the battalions efforts in the objective area. (Overwatch, Snipers, Support by Fire Positions, Observation Points)
 - *Search element conducts actual search of the objective. Search element searches people, dwellings, trenches, etc.
 - *Escort soldiers keep control of people being delivered to the guard element.
 - *Guard element controls the personnel awaiting to be processed and the personnel to be detained at the holding area/cage.

- *Screen element identify personnel to be detained. Men & women are segregated. Children under 12 are allowed to remain with their mothers.
- *Quick Reaction Force (QRF) reacts to information obtained from the screening center that requires timely action, but not the combat power from the reserve.
- *County Fair element (if required) administers to the populace in a controlled, secure area. Efforts for county fair may be educational, medical, social services, entertainment, or others determined by the commander.

b. Inner Cordon prohibits movement into or out of the objective. (Primary concern is prohibiting exfiltration from objective. Establish 360 degree observation of objective. Stop personnel attempting to depart objective area IAW ROE and OPORD.)

c. Outer Cordon prohibits movement into or out of the objective. (Primary concern is prohibiting infiltration into objective. Make use of Patrols, Screens, Road Blocks, Traffic Control Points, and Blocking Positions.)

d. Reserve positioned to be able to respond quickly for contingencies.

e. The local populace is controlled, processed, and segregated IAW the commander's intent and the ROE.

f. Insurgents that attempt to fight or flee are quickly isolated. Units use appropriate combat power to eliminate threat. Capture or destroy insurgents IAW the commander's intent and the ROE. Minimal risk is required of civilian population. Collateral damage is not excessive.

g. Insurgents attempting to penetrate the outer cordon are identified. Efforts to assist insurgent personnel in the objective area fail.

h. Insurgents attempting to blend in with the civilian populace are captured.

i. All precious cargo, caches, and contraband material are discovered, checked for booby traps, processed for recovery, or destroyed IAW OPORD.

j. Captured insurgents are processed, safeguarded, and turned over to proper authorities.

k. Casualties (friendly, insurgent & civilian) are evacuated IAW OPORD.

l. PSYOP, CA, DPRE, Engineer, MP, Linguists, and Counter-Intel

assets are employed effectively.

m. Maximum use is made of local authorities.

n. Commander located where he can best control the operation.

6. The battalion withdraws from the Area of Operations.

a. The casualties, insurgents and contraband material that is recovered exit first. Security is provided for the insurgents. Force must be large enough to control all insurgents and defeat any rescue attempt.

b. The objective area should be cleaned up. Series 200 locks are used to secure places where locks have been cut. Efforts are taken to prevent looting and ransacking the area after U.S. forces depart. Local civilian authorities should be informed how to process any claims for damage. If required, a site for food distribution is secured. Preparations for arrival of NGOs take place.

c. If NGO operation is to follow Cordon and Search, security arrangements (to include convoy security) are established.

d. On order, the remainder of the search team withdraws from the objective.

e. On order, inner and outer cordon teams withdraw from their sites.

f. Battalion withdraws from the area IAW OPORD.

OPFOR TASKS AND STANDARDS:

1. There are a number of variables to be interjected by the OPFOR. There must be a local populace that is mostly neutral. If the U.S. infantry battalion conducts operations IAW the ROE, the bulk of the populace should remain neutral or become slightly friendly toward U.S. forces. If the battalion violates the ROE, the populace should become anti U.S. and unfriendly. Within the population, there are minor factions that are anti U.S. and pro U.S. The commander can tailor the size, composition (male, female, children, ethnic group, language, etc) and activities of the civilians in the objective area to challenge his unit as he desires. Once U.S. forces are in the objective area, local

civilian officials (village headman, mayor) will have some requests for support by the battalion. These requests can range from some asking assistance with minor repairs, to arranging for food distribution, to DPRE handling.

2. There must be cadre of insurgents. Most of them are located in a base site (tunnel system, farm house, barn, nondescript building, etc). Some of the cadre mingles with the local population. The insurgent cadre are attempting to recruit and train volunteers.

These insurgents are all located within the objective area. If compromised, they attempt to fight, flee, or both. They are armed with small arms and machineguns. They may have grenades, mines, and light anti-tank weapons. If operating alone, the insurgent attempts to blend in with the locals.

3. There should be an insurgent Emergency Reaction Force (ERF). If the insurgent cadre becomes captured, this ERF attempts to penetrate the outer cordon and rescue the insurgent cadre.

4. Regular civilian traffic should be encountered by the outer cordon.

5. Both insurgents and civilians should attempt to bypass the inner cordon. The insurgents are attempting to escape. The civilians are attempting to go to work, or to get to a food distribution center.

6. Caches are hidden in the objective area.

7. Members of the press operate in the objective area.

TASK: Perform OPFOR for and Infantry Battalion Cordon and Search.

CONDITIONS: The OPFOR and civilian role players are established IAW 1-7 above.

STANDARD:

1. The OPFOR tests the effectiveness of the outer cordon.

2. The OPFOR tests the effectiveness of the inner cordon.

3. The OPFOR test the effectiveness of the Search elements.

4. The OPFOR fights, flees, and attempts to blend in with the civilian populace.
5. The OPFOR's actions require the infantry battalion to commit the reserve.
6. Civilian role players perform their roles in a manner to require action by the battalion.

EQUIPMENT:

The following is a recommended list of equipment for each Cordon and Search Team. As battalions establish their SOPs and conduct rehearsals other specific equipment will be identified.

<u>Road Block & Outer Cordon</u>	<u>Inner Cordon</u>	<u>Security</u>	<u>Search</u>
Engineer Tape	Flashlights	Flashlights	Pistols (searchers)
Concertina Wire	Plastic Fast Cuffs	Plastic Fast Cuffs	M16A2s (guards)
Flashlights	Flack Vests	Flack Vests	Mine Detector
Mirrors to check under vehicles	TOE Equipment	TOE Equipment	Chalk for marking
Plastic Fast Cuffs			Chemlite for marking
Barriers for Road Blocks	<u>Reserve</u>		Shovels, Picks, Axes, Sledgehammers, Pry Bar, Bolt Cutters, Rope & Ladders
Reflective Vests	TOE Equipment		Series 200 locks
Fire Extinguishers			Plastic bags
Portable Lamps			Personnel and Equipment Processing Tags
Marker Lights			Cameras
Traffic Cones			Video Cameras
Visor Sleeves			Tear Gas
Tire puncture chains			Fire Extinguishers
Luminous Tape			Portable Lighting
Luminous Signs			Engineer Tape
Flack Vests			Concertina Wire
TOE Equipment			Safety Harness
			Flack Vests
			TOE Equipment

The intent of this ARTEP is to have the battalion undertake a difficult mission in an environment that replicates an OOTW setting. Cordon and Search reinforces the OOTW principles. It has infantrymen perform many of the tasks that they would perform during an OOTW mission. The battalion staff must plan an involved operation that

requires flexibility to adapt to numerous contingencies. The commander must keep control during an operation that finds some elements of his battalion involved in combat and others practicing Humanitarian Aid. The local populace provides the dilemma for the battalion commander. The purpose of the Cordon and Search is to eliminate the insurgents and remove their disruptive influence on the local populace while at the same time gaining favor of the locals. If the locals favor U.S. presence, it makes our adversaries' attempt to gain support for an insurgency movement extremely difficult. How does the commander accomplish this? Tackling these challenges in peacetime as part of a routine training plan helps prepare commanders, leaders, staffs, and soldiers to be successful during actual OOTW missions. These are the challenges that Cordon and Search offers.

VIII. Conclusion

The monograph began with establishing that Operations Other Than War are a legitimate part of the Army's doctrine. The U.S. Army undertook OOTW activities since its infancy, and has continued to find itself dispatched to accomplish OOTW missions all along. The 1993 revision of FM100-5 formally introduced Operations Other Than War in Chapter 13.

Thus formally introduced into our doctrine, OOTW posed some problems. Should units train for possible OOTW deployments, or will normal METL training prepare units for both war and Operations Other Than War? The monograph related that OOTW is a legitimate concept and worthy of a training effort. It provided a theory to substantiate the concept. Operations Other Than War may employ the military to execute policy in pursuit of Strategic directives and compel our enemy to do our will when the purpose of armed forces is promote peace, deter war, and resolve conflict. The purpose of the military is not to fight and defeat an enemy. Then the monograph pointed out the shortcomings with the Army's METL training philosophy as stated in FM 25-101.

METL only allows for wartime tasks. Realizing that the METL process is a good one, the monograph proposed a modification. Allow METL to encompass those tasks that a commander expects his unit to perform in a war or a conflict. This would allow for OOTW training.

Having laid the foundation to substantiate the validity of OOTW as a concept the monograph then addresses the research question, "Can Cordon and Search function as an ARTEP-style task to provide a base level of training that prepares infantry battalions for typical OOTW challenges?" In order for Cordon and Search to function as a training tool for all OOTW activities, it must accomplish two things. It must encompass many of the tasks that infantrymen will perform during OOTW missions. It must also reinforce the OOTW principles. By meeting both of these criteria, Cordon and Search has validity as a tool to generically train infantrymen for all OOTW activities. The methodology used to compile the tasks was to review recent OOTW deployments of infantry units and determine what was required of them. The monograph related tasks performed while conducting Peace Enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peacekeeping activities. Most of these tasks were determined to have direct application for Cordon and Search.

Ensuring that the OOTW principles apply to Cordon and Search was related in two manners. The special conditions inherit Cordon and Search when reinforced by an OOTW ROE cause the OOTW principles to be relevant. The monograph examined each OOTW principle and determined its applicability to Cordon and Search. Further, the monograph related the historical example of Operation Phu Vang I, a Cordon and Search operation that took place in Vietnam in 1968. The OOTW principles were determined to have merit when reviewing the operation. The exception was perseverance. It is impossible to impart perseverance in one operation--or one training event.

Having established OOTW as a legitimate concept worthy of a training effort, and related the methodology for determining what Cordon and Search must encompass if it is to be the method to generically train infantrymen for all OOTW activities, the

monograph cites the need for a Cordon and Search ARTEP. In order to fill the gaps in the Army's training doctrine and provide the infantry with a Cordon and Search ARTEP to provide a base level of training that prepares infantry battalions for typical OOTW challenges, the monograph provided one. The answer to the question is yes, Cordon and Search can function as an ARTEP-style task to provide a base level of training that prepares infantry battalions for typical OOTW challenges. The qualification is "base level."

Just as no one wartime METL task fully prepares infantry units to perform all their wartime missions, no one OOTW task can fully prepare infantry units for all OOTW activities. Just as no two battles are the same, no two OOTW activities are exactly the same either. It would be wrong to view Cordon and Search as a cookie cutter solution to all the OOTW challenges. While Cordon and Search does provide that base level of training that may be the difference in allowing an infantry battalion to gain an edge, a unit can not be over prepared. If understood, replication of the exact OOTW activity is the best training event. Balancing the need to prepare today's infantrymen for both war and Operations Other Than War is the challenge for today's leader. Cordon and Search is able to assist in meeting the challenge

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GLOSSARY

AA	Assemble Area
AAR	After Action Review
AO	Area Of Operation
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CA	Civil Affairs
CAS	Close Air Support
CMO	Civil Military Officer/Operations
CMTC	Combat Manuever Training Center located at Hohenfels Germany
COLT	Combat Observation/Lasing Team
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPRE	Displaced Persons, Refugees & Evacuees
EOD	Emergency Ordinance Demolition (Team)
ERF	Emergency Reaction Force
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual
GPS	Global Positioning System
G/VLLD	Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator
GVN	Government of Vietnam
Hoi Chanh	Voluntary Vietnamese surrender
HUMIT	Human Intelligence
IAW	In Accordance With
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
LD	Line of Departure
METL	Mission Essential Training List

MOUT	Military Operations on Urban Terrain
MP	Military Police
MTP	Mission Training Plan
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NODS	Night Observation Device
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPCON	Operational Control
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OPORD	Operations Order
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PZ	Pick-up posture for Air Assault/Air Movement operation (helicopters)
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite Radio
TCP	Traffic Control Point
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
US	United States