Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations.
Abstract
This monograph argues that the Army's focus on fighting and winning wars often obscures the equally important mission of winning the peace. In the chaos that generally follows battle, the most potent policy instrument of the government is usually the force which achieved the military victory. This means that combat soldiers can expect to have a hand in postconflict operations. The monograph compares the experiences of the American Army in the occupation of Germany (1944-1945) and in the liberation of Panama during Operations Just Cause/Promote Liberty (1989-1990) to evaluate the postconflict missions given combat forces. The monograph then examines the way current Army doctrine addresses postconflict operations. The monograph concludes that Army doctrine has begun to recognize the need to conduct postconflict operations. It suggests that postconflict operations should be recognized as an operation other than war mission called "stability" operations." It also recommends that unit METLs include postconflict operations, and that Mission Training Plans reflect postconflict task training.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 21, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA293961
Entities
People
- Kenneth O. Mccreedy
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College