Air Support For the Division Deep Battle: Doctrinal Disconnect.
Abstract
This monograph discusses the linkage between air support and the division deep battle from 1982-1994. In 1982, the Army introduced battlefield air interdiction (BAI) as an important asset for the corps and division deep battle. After the Army published the 1986 version of FM 100-5, operational level commanders assumed more control over BAI. Consequently, the division rarely received fixed wing air support for its deep battle. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in Operation Desert Storm eliminated BAI and established only two categories of air support: close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). Following the Gulf War, service and joint doctrine have abandoned the air support system that worked in the Gulf War and have reverted to the pre-war system without BAI. The conclusions and recommendations fall into two categories: AI and CAS. First, AI was controlled by operational commanders to attack operational targets. The operational commander exercises complete authority over AI within his battlespace. Given the success of AI during Operation Desert Storm, AI doctrine works well now. However, the Army's doctrine relies too heavily on AI for the division deep battle. Consequently, Army division doctrine requires revision. (RWJ)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 31, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA294122
Entities
People
- Robert D. Grymes
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College