


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PARADIGMS AND POLICY
Observation and Assumptions
Underlying U.S. National Security
Policy After the Cold War



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ABSTRACT

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So, in the Cold War, it was reasonable to assume that two nation-states, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the primary actors, and that they used the traditional resources--military, economic, and diplomatic--to implement their policies. This concept is no longer valid and thus cannot serve as the basis of a general policy. An so this paper outlines an Alternate Candidate Paradigm for World Politics in the Post-Cold War Era.

The essential characteristics of modern democratic, market-oriented societies today is that they are based on and depend upon a network of relations among people and organizations that facilitate the free exchange of data and hard goods. Note that this open network is necessary for democracy (which assumes unrestricted exchange of information to form coalitions and mobilize popular support) and market economies (which assumes the unrestricted ability of buyers and sellers to interact).

Over the long-term, it is possible that most of the world will become sufficiently economically developed and as dependent on free interchange of ideas, information, and goods as Western countries currently are. The current National Strategic Policy of Engagement and Enlargement, link all the administration's policy initiatives to achieve just such an interdependence.

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PARADIGMS AND POLICY: OBSERVATIONS ON ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Most foreign policy observers agree that the end of the Cold War will require the United States to develop a new general policy to take the place of containment. Containment policy served as the organizing concept for U.S. national security policy. It established a set of broad goals for the United States: deterring or, if necessary, defeating Soviet expansion. U.S. leaders used containment to explain and justify year-to-year and day-to-day decisions. The goals of containment also served as a reference point for planning within the government itself, and as the basis for policy debates in public arenas.

Saying that the fall of the Soviet Union has "created a vacuum" in the national security community is a good shorthand, but barely captures the full impact of the situation. Now that containment is no longer relevant; officials and national security specialists are struggling to find a new reference point. With-out one, it is hard to justify programs, negotiations, budgets, or even the continued existence of certain organizations (witness the calls by Daniel Moynihan to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency as a relic of the Cold War).

In truth, planning for the Cold War had become a routine process. One could assume that the objective was to contain the Soviet threat and immediately proceed to more specific questions. In some cases, the problem was purely incremental (e.g., develop better armor to defeat the latest generation of Soviet anti-tank weapons) or the latest twist on an issue three or four decades old (e.g., how to maintain consensus with NATO). Now the routine is gone.

Last summer the Clinton Administration offered a candidate for a new general policy: "enlargement."¹ The goal of enlargement (the next evolution of containment--get it?) was to expand the number of countries that have democratic governments and market economies. The Administration argued that this policy will promote peace and prosperity because democracies rarely wage war one each other, and free trade will permit the United States to sell more goods abroad.

Alas, the reaction to enlargement was lukewarm at best. John Lewis Gaddis, a leading scholar of the Cold War, called it "banal." Other critics said that enlargement provided little guidance for planning specific military or diplomatic action. Most telling, the critics complained that enlargement, unlike containment, offered no basis for setting priorities--for example, when to take drastic measures that presented significant risks, when to let events run their own course, or when to compromise with a middle course of action.

Several weeks later Secretary of State Warren Christopher amended this policy during an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee² by defining the six "top priorities" for U.S. foreign policy. These priorities were economic security; support for Russia and the newly independent states; relations with Europe and NATO; relations with Asia and the Pacific; stability in the Middle East; and non-proliferation and other global

¹ See Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Study (Washington, DC, 21 September 1993).

²"Statement of the Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," (Washington, DC, U.S. Department of State, 4 November 1993).

issues.

Yet this clarification did not satisfy the Administration's critics either. The priorities seemed more like a laundry list of things to worry about rather than a logically-connected plan of action. The individual items seemed unrelated to each other. Moreover, even the newly-amended policy offered no basis for deciding priorities--when, say, supporting Russian democracy conflicted with pressuring Russia to prevent nuclear proliferation. And the policy was still long on good intentions and short on principals on which to develop specifics; the policy said little, for instance, about designing a new U.S. military force structure or setting guidelines for the use of force. Indeed, according to Christopher,

"In the Cold War world, stability was based on confrontation. In the new world, stability will be based on common interests and shared values."

Another problem, said the critics, was that the Administration's stated policy and priorities seemed to have little relationship to its actions. For instance, the most controversial international events in the first year of the Clinton Administration were the debate over U.S. action in Bosnia (the Administration repeatedly threatened to intervene, only to encounter opposition from our European allies); peacekeeping in Somalia (where the scope of the mission for U.S. military forces appeared to ratchet upward); and intervening in Haiti (where U.S. forces were readied off the coast, and then withdrawn when conditions ashore proved less than friendly, and later sent in again in a non-lethal invasion). Yet none of the three

situations fit into the Administration's Top Six.

General Policy and Understanding "How the World Works"

Few people could argue with the goals of enlargement; the problem is with the policy itself. In addition to defining goals, an effective general policy needs to provide a paradigm. This paradigm is an explicit set of assumptions about the most important factors that drive world events. These assumptions must then be linked together into a logical story that explains why these factors constitute a threat to the United States (or, indeed, whether they constitute a threat at all), and why the policy developed to deal with the threat will be successful.

This is the real reason why "enlargement" has been so unsatisfying, prone to contradiction and, in practice, a pasted-together chain of ad hoc responses to events in near-real time. It offers no compelling underlying logic about "how the world works" today, how this affects the welfare of Americans, and what the United States needs to do about it. In other words, the Administration skipped a step in the development of its policy. As a result, it has no foundation.

In contrast, containment was both a policy and a paradigm. This is one reason why containment proved such a compelling policy, commanding a broad consensus for four decades. Indeed, the containment paradigm was articulated before the containment policy was

developed (although it is likely that its advocates knew where they wanted to go before they began the intellectual exercise). The containment paradigm that served as the foundation for containment paradigm was logical, clear, and explicit, as follows:³

- The most important factor driving world events after World War II was the expansionist nature of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, it was assumed, was expansionist for historical and ideological reasons.
- However, it was also assumed that the Soviet Union was risk-averse. Soviet leaders believed that the fall of capitalism was inevitable (so time was on the side of communism). Also, the Soviet Union lacked the brute power necessary to defeat the West. Therefore, if the Soviets were met with resistance each time they tested the West, they would back down.
- At the same time, it assumed that social and ethnic fissures within the Soviet Union, combined with the ineffective Soviet economy and the costs of maintaining control over the Soviet empire, would eventually cause the Soviet regime to collapse, if given enough time.
- Finally, it was acknowledged that attempting to eliminate the Soviet threat by force would be difficult and extremely risky.

Therefore, the optimal policy for the United States and its allies to adopt was, logically, one of determined--but measured--containment. Under containment, the United States and its allies would respond when necessary to Soviet attempts to test the West and expand its influence. However, the West would use no more force than necessary, and for the most part would simply play for time until the internal weaknesses within the Soviet Union

³Kennan, George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* XXV (July 1947), pp. 566-82.

eliminated the long-term threat.

In all, containment had a lot to offer as a political argument and organizing concept. Its most important asset was that it provided an underlying "story" that enabled U.S. leaders to win long-term support from the American people. The United States was traditionally isolationist and, even today the default option in U.S. politics is to stay at home and concentrate on domestic affairs unless there is a very compelling reason to do otherwise.

The containment paradigm made it clear that there was a threat to the survival and welfare of the United States--Soviet expansionism. When combined with the facts of communist aggression in Azerbaijan, Greece, Germany, Czechoslovakia, China, and Korea, this conceptual threat assisted U.S. leaders in mobilizing the public support necessary for a large standing military establishment and an activist foreign policy.

Remember, the whole point of Anthony Lake's address in September 1994 was to argue the case for the Administration policy of active engagement at a time when it was being roundly criticized. Lake, Christopher, Les Aspen, and other members of the Clinton national security team are often contrasted with their more dovish counterparts in the Democratic party, who see U.S. meddling in world affairs as ill-conceived and likely to lead to ill-fated foreign entanglements. Lake's remarks were also directed at New Wave isolationists in the Republican party, such as Pat Buchanan, who also opposed not only U.S. intervention in Bosnia, but also the North American Free Trade Agreement. Unfortunately, as has been

demonstrated, advocating engagement without explaining why the United States needs to be engaged is unlikely to succeed.

The second strength of the containment paradigm was that it made reasonably clear how the United States national security establishment should be organized and what each agency was supposed to do. Containment policy consisted of an integrated approach to national security combining diplomacy, defense, economics, and intelligence. Each arm of the national security establishment had a defined mission, which it then translated into set programs designed to carry out these missions. This principal for this division of labor was robust enough to work for each of the three main threats that set the national security policy agenda of the Cold War:

- The conventional military threat to Europe and other theaters adjacent to the Soviet Union (from 1946 on);
- The strategic nuclear threat to the United States and its allies (from 1949 on); and
- The regional security threat in the developing world (from the mid-1950s on).

Although different in execution, containing the Soviet threat provided the general orientation for U.S. government organizations in each case. As illustration, Tables 1-3 provide examples of how the overall policy of containment was applied in each case.

TABLE 1

U.S. CONTAINMENT POLICY FOR CONVENTIONAL THREATS

COMPONENT	POLICY	PROGRAMS
<p>DIPLOMACY</p>	<p>Contain Soviet threat through a network of regional alliances; manage level of tension between Soviet and Western blocs; promote democratic movements in satellite countries.</p>	<p>-- Initiatives leading to the creation and maintenance of NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, etc. -- Conventional arms control. -- Overt programs to promote democracy (e.g., Voice of America, National Endowment for Democracy).</p>
<p>MILITARY</p>	<p>Maintain sufficient military forces to deter Soviet-Bloc conventional attack, attrit Bloc forces in the event war occurs in order to control escalation.</p>	<p>-- DoD force structure and war planning for two-and-a-half war scenario (later, one-and-a half wars).</p>
<p>ECONOMICS</p>	<p>Promote economic prosperity in allied community in order to avert communist subversion.</p>	<p>-- Post-war economic recovery programs (Marshall Plan, IMF, World Bank, etc.). -- Western economic integration (promotion of EEC, trade with Japan, Taiwan, Korea).</p>
<p>INTELLIGENCE</p>	<p>Provide I&W of Bloc preparation for conventional attack; provide qualitative advantage to Western military forces; prevent subversion of democracies; assist democratic movements in Bloc countries.</p>	<p>-- Conventional force threat estimates; tactical intelligence support programs. -- Intelligence support to development and support of weapons systems. -- Cold War covert action programs (Radio Free Europe; political action campaigns); later covert support to Solidarity, other pro-democracy movements.</p>

TABLE 2

U.S. CONTAINMENT POLICY FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR THREATS

COMPONENT	POLICY	PROGRAMS
DIPLOMACY	Lower the probability of nuclear war through engagement with the Soviet Union.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Strategic arms control (SALT, START, IMF). -- Crisis management (e.g., Hot Line).
MILITARY	Maintain nuclear forces optimized to deter a Soviet strike, control escalation and prevail in the event nuclear war occurs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Strategic nuclear force structure, C3I (updated periodically in response to new interpretations of Soviet threat). -- Development of doctrine, plans, and training.
ECONOMICS	Maintain technology base necessary for cost-effective deterrent optimized in response to Soviet strategic nuclear doctrine.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Base technology programs for small nuclear devices; high-accuracy missiles; stealth; SDIO.
INTELLIGENCE	Provide I&W to prevent surprise attack, maintain accurate assessment of Soviet strategic forces for U.S. planning of forces and operations; verify strategic arms control.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- NTW for I&W and arms control monitoring. -- NIE 11-3/8. -- Databases for support of JSTPS.

TABLE 3

U.S. CONTAINMENT POLICY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY THREATS

COMPONENT	POLICY	PROGRAMS
DIPLOMACY	Promote democratization through nation-building and security support.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Overt programs to build institutions and popular support for democratization in developing countries (VOA, Radio Marti, NED). -- Participation in U.S., OAS.
MILITARY	Provide training, equipment, and (in limited cases) direct assistance to friendly regimes; provide deterrent and response to LIC threats to the U.S.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Military transfers and training programs. -- Establishment of USSOCOM and other LIC-oriented forces. -- Training and deployment of specified conventional forces (e.g., Indian Ocean CVBG; USCENTCOM). -- Pre-positioning of forces.
ECONOMICS	Promote economic growth and market economies in developing countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Direct aid through AID. -- Indirect aid (World Bank, IMF).
INTELLIGENCE	Provide assessments of pro-Soviet regimes and movements; provide support to LIC operations; support pro-democracy movements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Intelligence collection and analysis in developing countries. -- Regional covert action programs (paramilitary operations, security assistance, counter-terrorism).

These examples could be reduced to finer detail (for example, the military and intelligence components of the policy could be analyzed in terms of specific missions and the operational requirements associated with those missions, and the diplomatic and economic components of the program could be differentiated for specific countries), but the point should be evident: the paradigm or "story" of containment provided a logical basis for an integrated U.S. policy for more than four decades.

Finally, containment offered one other critical feature: salvation. The containment paradigm and the logic underlying containment policy provided the United States a discrete, achievable goal, namely the eventual collapse of communism. After communism collapsed, which democracy and capitalism would presumably flourish and the United States would be able to take a breather. This promise was critical to building the support necessary to mobilize the American public into a long-term policy requiring engagement, which often really meant economic sacrifice, the compromise of values (e.g., doing business with dictators), and the loss of American lives, Pershing II missiles, or whether the United States should exert greater pressure on the Soviet economy by fielding SDI and opposing a natural gas pipeline to Western Europe. So much for Cold War nostalgia.

Developing a paradigm for a general national security policy is a two-part process. Part of the process is traditional theory-building, the kind of work done by academics, think-tanks, and the Policy Planning Staff. This part of the process entails developing and refuting logical arguments. It also entails a certain amount of research, as such theories are supposed

to have some basis in reality. Indeed, the State Department, Defense Department, and the intelligence community all have massive efforts underway to develop this body of knowledge.

The other part of the process of developing a paradigm is political, and will probably be at least as important. Unlike paradigms in science, where natural selection determines which theories are adopted⁴ (some work, some don't), paradigms in the policy world are only partly connected to the real world. One reason is evidence; by the time we knew that Kennan was more or less correct, the Cold War was over. The evidence was never sufficient to prove whether the Soviets were hell-bent on expansion, opportunistic, or just maladjusted and misunderstood. The spaces in between the facts were filled with politics.

Politicians thus had to build the consensus to support the containment paradigm. They did this using the usual strategies and tactics of politics. These strategies and tactics included arguing the case for containment on the merits of the evidence, of course. They also included, though, identifying mutual values and interests that would unite varied segments of Western society (e.g., appealing to both Americans of Eastern European extraction, whose countries had been incorporated into the Soviet Bloc, and at the same time appealing to the internationalist intellectual community represented by, for example, John Foster Dulles, who believed a larger role for the United States in world affairs was appropriate in and of itself). The strategies for selling containment also included the traditional political pork (e.g., the Interstate Highway system, National Defense Student Loans, and the space program after the

⁴Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

launch of Sputnik, and so on).

The advocates of post-World War II engagement succeeded in building the consensus supporting the containment paradigm and resulting policies. However, it is important to remember that in the late 1940s a number of other candidate paradigms were also available to serve as the basis of U.S. policy--for example, a paradigm of colonial powers versus the Third World, or a paradigm asserting that foreign affairs were of no concern, modern technology would permit the United States to build impregnable defenses, and so the country could resume a policy of isolationism. Of the possible alternatives that were floated, some were rejected because they were too narrow, empirically wrong, could not command the necessary support of the public or policy elites, or were simply defeated in the political arena.

It is also important to note that the durability of this consensus depended on the ability of leaders to identify core concepts and core policies. The consensus supporting containment broke down somewhat toward the end of the Cold War, in that the political left and right in the United States disagreed on just how expansionist the Soviet Union really was. Also, while a broad consensus existed on the general concept of Soviet expansionism and containment policy, this consensus tended to fray on more specific concepts and policies. For example, there was much less consensus over whether Soviet leaders believed that victory was possible in a nuclear war, and even less consensus over the various notions of a Soviet-led network of Marxist organizations.

Still, the consensus remained mainly intact and was sufficient to support U.S. policy. It is notable, for example, that throughout the Cold War no Presidential candidate was elected who was remarkably outside the mainstream of containment policy, either on the left (e.g., McGovern, Mondale, Dukakis, who were perceived as "soft") or the right (e.g., Goldwater, who was portrayed as wanting to go beyond containment to "rolling back" communism).

Candidates for a Concept to Support General Policy

Similarly, today several alternatives are being floated as the dominant paradigm.

Some of the candidates include:

- Samuel Huntington has proposed the "clash of civilizations" as an organizing paradigm, in which members of cultural groups find common identify and seek cultural goals.
- Others have argued that a new Cold War is in the offing, except that it will be based on religious nationalism rather than economic ideology; Mark Juergensmeyer has provided the best analysis of this idea, although he rejects it himself.
- Pat Choat and Edward Luttwak have argued that competition of the Cold War, mainly a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, will be replaced by an "economic cold war" between trading blocs, which can be expected to use tactics ranging from protective tariffs to industrial espionage. Japan, the United States, and the European Community are usually cited as the main antagonists.

- A number of writers have said that the prevailing paradigm will continue to be oriented on competition between nations and will continue to have a military flavor, although the players will change. The Pentagon planning exercises of the early 1990s, which speculated on the possibility of various local wars and the rise of a "regional hegemon" are representative of this line of thinking, as is the Gulf War.
- And, finally, a number of writers have argued that the paradigm may have less to do with competition between nations or groups, and more with global issues such as environmental damage that threaten the entire world.

A quick reflection on recent events suggests that all of these potential paradigms seem to have some validity. However, it should also be clear that no single one of these candidates is sufficiently broad to address all of the major international developments that seem to present a threat to U.S. interests. To the contrary, each of the paradigms that have been presented up to now have usually been presented in the form of a counter-thesis, e.g., religious nationalism is more important than geographical nationalism; economic conflict is more important than traditional military conflict; regional ethnic-based conflict is more important than superpower conflict; and so on.

If all of the candidate's paradigms cited above have some validity some of the time, but are unable to account for all or most events in world politics, then there should be a concept and resulting paradigm that can reconcile them. Such a broader concept is necessary to serve as a valid, politically viable basis for a long-term general policy.

The reason why each of the candidate paradigms has some--but only partial--validity is

that they focus on specific categories of players in world politics and specific modes of interaction (and, hence, conflict). Such a focus may have been valid up to now because the nation-state was the only entity that could muster the resources and collective will to play such a role. So, in the Cold War, it was reasonable to assume that two nation-states, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the primary actors, and that they used the traditional resources--military, economic, and diplomatic--to implement their policies. This concept is no longer valid and thus cannot serve as the basis of a general policy.

An Alternate Candidate Paradigm for World Politics in the Post-Cold War Era

The essential characteristic of modern democratic, market-oriented societies today is that they are based on and depend upon a network of relations among people and organizations that facilitate the free exchange of data and hard goods. Note that this open network is necessary for democracy (which assumes unrestricted exchange of information to form coalitions and mobilize popular support) and market economies (which assumes the unrestricted ability of buyers and sellers to interact).

This network of relationships is supported by a communications and transportation infrastructure that has become more complex and vulnerable in recent years with the advancement of technology. The vulnerability of the infrastructure within democratic, market-oriented societies is less of a problem than might otherwise seem likely because the vast majority of the participants in these societies have a shared interest in maintaining both

the survival of the network and its infrastructure.

Yet, although technology has facilitated the development of democracy and market economies, and although this social system is dependent on such technology, such societies do not have a monopoly on the technology itself. To the contrary, one of the important developments of the current age is that advanced technology is readily available to many potential players in international politics, including many that do have a shared interest in permitting the infrastructure to survive.⁵

Previously nation-states monopolized the two technological capabilities necessary to be a player in world politics:

- The technology to mobilize masses of people; only national governments had the means necessary to raise armies and organize large industrial projects; and
- The technology of destruction; only national governments had access to the industrial bases necessary to build the weapons systems used for conventional and nuclear combat, which were the dominant means of conflict.

⁵ Although not directly discussed here, this concept of an open network for communication and transportation, could also encompass trade disputes, e.g., predatory trade policies or the kinds of economic aggression Choat and Luttwak discuss. In particular, trade constraints can be seen as an attempt to disrupt the network for the benefit of a single nation, such as Japan.

Writers such as James Fallows argue that countries such as Japan adopt these policies because they reject the idea promoted by Adam Smith that free trade benefits all parties. However, Fallows does not criticize Smith's free trade theories themselves, but only suggests that the United States realize that other countries may not be following the same policies that it is. A considerable amount of research does suggest that trade policies likely follow patterns found in other forms of conflict, and that, over time, a policy of tit-for-tat dominates and encourages mutual restraint in protectionist policies--which is to say that it is likely that trade is like other issues, and eventually players will find it in their interest not to upset the network of relationships and supporting infrastructure.

Today, potential players other than nation-states have access to these two capabilities. Modern technology has made it possible for such diverse groups as religious movements, ethnic groups, and business corporations to mobilize people to common action. Examples include, for instance, the cassette tapes used by the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iranian Revolution; the use of the public media and private systems by virtually all modern political campaigns; the various cults that have begun to exchange communications on Internet, America On-Line, Prodigy, CompUServe and other systems; and so on.

Similarly, access to the technology of destruction is also more widely available. This trend is usually cited in reference to the proliferation of advanced conventional and nuclear weapons, but such greater availability of destructive technology is actually more widespread, e.g., the universal availability of automatic weapons, the ease of manufacturing chemical and biological weapons, software viruses, etc.

The proliferation in the technology of destructions has been accompanied by the parallel increasing vulnerability of the most productive target--the information and transportation infrastructure, which can be damaged by almost anyone who is able to use it, which is by definition, in a democratic, market economy society, everybody.

The net result is that the entry fee for becoming a player in world politics has fallen. It is only natural, then, that the players in international politics have become more varied. Previously one needed a large conventional military force, and this in turn required the people

and industrial base of a nation-state. Today such a military is not essential, and other potential players have access to the technologies that are relevant to power in the modern world.⁶

Moreover, contrary to those analysts who argue that direct threats to the security of the United States have diminished because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, in fact the threat is greater today than ever before. The target is more vulnerable, and there is a wider range of parties that can threaten it. Also, whereas the potential costs of a war with the Soviet Union were enormous, that particular threat could be deterred so that its actual probability was quite low. The new threat, in contrast, is much more diffuse and difficult to deter, so the probability of such threats being acted upon is greater and the risks are greater.

In short, today the threat is everywhere. Currently large portions of the world population do not share in the benefits of modern Western society and therefore do not have the mutual incentive to leave it intact. Defense and deterrence are more difficult. Instead of having a single likely potential attacker, today we have many, and the target is so large and complex that it is difficult to defend.

⁶The importance and the vulnerability of this infrastructure, combined with the ready availability of the means to destroy major portions of it, represent a change in national power and warfare as significant as that of strategic bombing and the strategic warfare doctrine of Douhet.

Douhet argued that power in the industrial age was dependent on modern armies using mechanized weapons, and that industry also provided an attacker the means--airpower--to destroy the industrial base of an opponent; this enabled combatants to avoid a conventional ground war, and also implied that the most important threat was that of air attack. Similarly, today the same technology that makes the information and transportation infrastructure possible also makes it possible for a number of different types of players to attack it. And, as in the case of strategic warfare, this form of direct attack is possibly the more significant threat today, rather than conventional combat.

It is possible that, in the long term, these disenfranchised parties will develop sufficiently that they do have a shared interest in leaving the maintaining the modern social networks intact. If so, then like containment, a policy of deterring and defending against the new treat will yield a more peaceful, stable situation. Until then, it is necessary to develop an analogous range of military, diplomatic, and intelligence capabilities to respond to the new threat.

As a result, U.S. policy under the new paradigm, like the containment paradigm, will need to follow a short-term and long-term strategy. The short-term strategy is to identify and prepare for the new threat as best we can, given the nature of the threat, the available responses, and cost. The short-term strategy needs to examine in considerable detail the various forms that the threat to the information and transportation network can take, and develop appropriate countermeasures.

The most difficult hurdle for developing these counter-measures may be institutional inertia. Much of the technology, force structure, and organization developed to deter the Soviet threats ineffective against these new threats currently exists. To cite a few examples:

- Traditional nuclear forces such as ICBMs and SLBMs may continue to be needed to deter traditional forms of nuclear warfare, but they are likely to be ineffective in deterring either "quiet proliferation" (the kind most likely to occur in the near future) or even the use of nuclear weapons (if, for example, a nuclear weapon is detonated covertly);

- Large-scale conventional forces, such as armored divisions and carrier battle groups, will prove useful in an increasingly narrow range of scenarios--even though they currently account for the vast majority of defense spending.
- Intelligence systems developed for monitoring traditional threats and supporting current military forces (e.g., current space-based imaging systems and many SIGINT systems) will be ill-suited and not cost-effective for monitoring many of the new threats (e.g., hackers-for-hire; underground nuclear facilities). Also, the spread of technology will permit opponents to evade or defeat traditional intelligence systems.
- The divisions of responsibility among organizations within the national security community may be inappropriate for addressing the new threat. For example, much of the threat to the information infrastructure will use communications systems and databases themselves as the medium of attack, rather than movements over the land, air, or sea. Yet, although the United States has an Army, Air Force, and Navy, it does not have a dedicated organization for fighting in this new medium. The C3I organizations of the services and DoD come close to having such a mission area, but have not had the opportunity to develop the integrated organization for developing responses to the new threat.
- Doctrine, strategy, and tactics, which are ingrained in existing organizations, may no longer be relevant or adequate. The C3I community, lacking an integrated structure, has not had the opportunity yet to develop its own analogue to the kinds of doctrine that the services have developed over four decades.
- Responses to the new threat will need to be more closely coordinated with organizations outside the traditional national security community; these organizations are not accustomed to working with the national security community, and, indeed, many have viewed it antagonistically in the past.

Dealing with these issues may also be expensive. Changing hardware means large write-offs of existing systems and investments in new systems and the recruitment and training of personnel. Changing organizational structure and responsibility may be even more challenging; debates over roles and mission within DoD have always been contentious, and the difficulty of pushing military reform through Congress (e.g., the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which required several years) suggests the high degree of effort that will be needed.

Of course, these are only examples, and not detailed examples at that. Probably the U.S. government and the broader national security community will need to expend at least as much effort to analyze and develop options for responding to the new threat as we have in dealing with the Cold War threat.

Over the long-term, it is possible that most of the world will become sufficiently economically developed and as dependent on free interchange of ideas, information, and goods as Western countries are currently. It is in the interest of the United States to promote this trend. The ultimate goal should be to ensure that all potential players that have the capability to disrupt the "delicate network" have a greater stake in leaving it alone. The analogous condition is that observed in stable democratic regimes. In stable democracies, everyone is sufficiently prosperous and dependent on civil order that they are willing to lose elections and compete the next time, rather than bring down the entire regime.

Similarly, the goal of the new paradigm is to seek a situation in which, even though

some people are on the "losing end" of the social-economic order, no one has sufficient incentive to tamper with it. This ultimate objective would parallel the "salvation" containment offered in the form of the eventual fall of communism. In sum, U.S. policy should aim for this ideal condition, and "keeping a lid" on potential threats until the objective is reached.

Epilogue

No doubt with the July 1994, and the subsequent February 1995, release of the administration's **National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement**, the terms Engagement and Enlargement take on the meaning of linkage between all of the various major policy initiatives that the US intends to pursue. Behind the terms Engagement and Enlargement, the underlying structure of the linked policies, is the concept of security, as defined by three categories: Economic Security, with a focus on prosperity, Sovereign Security, with an external threat focus, and Societal Security, with an internal cohesion focus. It appears the Administration is on its way to committing itself to a long term paradigm utilizing the engagement and enlargement theme to provide for not only peace and security, but also prosperity.