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THE CREATION OF GREATER LEBANON, 1918 - 1920:

THE ROLES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF

MOUNT LEBANON

by

James J. Simon

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts


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ABSTRACT

The Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon played a central role in the creation of Greater Lebanon under a French mandate after World War I. The council, formed by the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers after the massacres of 1860 in Mount Lebanon, was a confessionally elected body which has remained in the shadows of the traditional histories of the formation of modern Lebanon. This study attempts to demonstrate that the council (and its three delegations to the Paris Peace Conference) was a key participant in the establishment of Greater Lebanon from 1918 to 1920; indeed, their role was as important as those of the French, the British, the Syrians, and the Maronites.

The history of the shift from feudalism to confessional representation in the Mountain and the notion of Greater Lebanon before 1918 provide the backdrop for this study. Many largely overlooked speeches, memorandums, telegrams, resolutions, and declarations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon are integrated into the traditional narrative in this study, thus revealing that, to a great extent, the council's vision of a Lebanese nation was that which was declared in Beirut on September 1, 1920: an independent Greater Lebanon (albeit under a French mandate) within its *historical* and *natural* borders.

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
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
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

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Greater Lebanon, 1920 (based on Zamir, M., The Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. vi, and Salibi, K., A House of Many Mansions, p. vi).

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PREFACE

With Syrian troops currently occupying the Beqa'a Valley and Israeli troops occupying south of the Litani River, it seems appropriate to refocus on the establishment of Greater Lebanon after World War I (WW I). Many of the historical accounts of this period tend to focus on the role of the French, the British, Amir Faysal, and the Maronites, and certainly there is much that can be said in their regard. However, within the footnotes and margins of many of these traditional histories is the history of a confessionally elected group of Lebanese notables whose ideas for a Lebanese nation strikingly resemble the Lebanon of today. The purpose of this thesis is to re-investigate the aftermath of WW I from 1918 to 1920 in order to complete the history of the creation of Greater Lebanon by bringing to life the roles and expectations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

On July 10, 1920, seven councilors from the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon were arrested on the road from Beirut to Damascus by French military authorities and then sentenced, fined, and deported. They were on their way to meet with Amir Faysal to secure an independent Lebanon with strong ties to Syria in exchange for their renouncement of the council's plan to accept a French mandate. They claimed to represent the expectations of the council despite their earlier endorsement of

the council's December 1918 resolution calling for complete independence from Syria and acceptance of French assistance.

The arrest of the councilors and the dissolution of the council two days later by French authorities have caused most historians to portray the role of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon as French-influenced, Maronite-dominated, and minor when compared to the larger historical context. The historians who tend to view the council's role in the creation of Lebanon this way, while providing monumental, exhaustive studies of the larger history, include Zeine Zeine, Kamal Salibi, Albert Hourani, Philip Hitti, Jukka Nevakivi, Meir Zamir, and Engin Akarli. Their histories certainly tell the bulk of the story quite well, but a more thorough narrative of the roles and expectations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon would shed considerable light on the history of the creation of Greater Lebanon.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a more thorough history of the creation of Greater Lebanon by reexamining the roles and expectations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon from 1918 to 1920. My research analyzes the political, confessional, and military dance that occurred between the council, its delegations to the Paris Peace Conference, Maronite Patriarch Huwayyik, Amir Faysal, the French, the British, and the Christian and Muslim notables of Lebanon.

The period covered in this work is from the withdrawal of Turkish and German troops from Beirut (September 1918) to the

announcement in Beirut of the creation of Greater Lebanon under a French mandate (September 1920). The introduction traces the events and themes that reveal a gradual movement away from "feudalism" toward the establishment of the confessionally elected Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon in 1861. Also traced in the introduction is the history of the notion of "Greater Lebanon" as it came to replace the notion of "Mount Lebanon." The three chapters are primarily concerned with the roles and expectations of the council as they were reflected in the council's actions and resolutions. The core event around which each chapter revolves is the dispatching of three separate delegations to the peace conference by the council between 1918 to 1920.

This work concentrates on the oft cited memorandums, resolutions, speeches, and actions of the notable figures of this period while simultaneously integrating less often cited written sources concerning the roles and expectations of the council. The transliteration system used is of the International Journal of Middle East Studies.

The actions of the council and its delegations to the peace conference significantly contributed to lines being drawn on the map of the Middle East which resulted in the creation of Greater Lebanon after WW I. What was finally established in and around Mount Lebanon in September 1920 reflected not only the beginning of the French Mandate, the rejection of Faysal's "Greater Syria" and the formation of a "Greater Lebanon" but also the realiza-

tion of the administrative council's vision for Lebanon.

In the process of writing this thesis, I have had the privilege of working with many people without whom I could not have completed my work, especially Professor Byron D. Cannon. I would also like to thank Professor Michel M. Mazzaoui, Professor Peter von Sivers, Professor Peter J. Sluglett, Professor Bernard Weiss, Mr. Ragai Makar, Professor James Lehning, Professor Hussein Elkhafaifi, Professor Mushira Eid, and Ms. Samira Farwaneh. For their encouraging counsel and support I would also like to thank Msgr. Joseph Joseph, Father Gibran Bou-Mehri and Mr. Edward Allam. I would also like to extend a special thank you to Edmund and Barbara Lutz and to my parents, Salem and Regina Simon. Finally, I would like to express my most heartfelt appreciation to my wife Paula and my children. Without them, and but by the grace of God, this work would not have come to pass.

INTRODUCTION

There shall be for the entire Mountain one Central Administrative Council comprising twelve members: two Maronites, two Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, two Greek Catholics, two Matawilah, and two Muslims; it shall be charged with assessing taxes, administering revenues and expenditures, and rendering its advisory opinion on all questions submitted to it by the Governor.¹

This article, the second of seventeen articles contained in the Protocol (*Règlement Organique*) signed June 9, 1861, by the European powers and the Ottoman Empire,² defined the composition and duties of the newly created Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon (*majlis idara jabal lubnan*).³ In so doing, it began a process of confessional representation and administration that contributed to the creation of Greater Lebanon after World War I (WW I).⁴ The 1861 Protocol, in addition to being a watershed event signifying the end of feudalism⁵ and quelling years of religious strife in the region, was the foundation upon which the political and religious notables of Lebanon eventually built a nation.

In order to investigate accurately the two-year period after WW I in which the creation of "Greater Lebanon" occurred (at the expense of a "Greater Syria"⁶), it is necessary to ascertain why the 1861 Protocol was a turning point for the history of Lebanon. Pre-1918 Lebanese history contains two elements that directly pertain to this study: first, the history of the various borders of Mount Lebanon itself and, second, the

history of the transition in the administration of Mount Lebanon from multiple feudal lordships to one governor assisted by an elected administrative council.

The pre-1861 history of Lebanon could begin with the Phoenicians, the coming of Christianity and Islam, or even with the era of the Crusades;⁷ but the history most closely related to the creation of modern Lebanon took shape during the Ottoman period. Although the periodization of Lebanese history as pre-Ottoman and Ottoman is in some sense problematic, it is recognized that, even though beyond the scope of this work, the pre-Ottoman period is the soil in which the seeds of the modern history of Lebanon ultimately took root.

Selim I conquered Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Gaza in 1517⁸ and, before leaving for more Turkish conquests, carved provinces out of what is now called Lebanon, "not unlike that which had grown up under the Mamluks."⁹ These provinces consisted primarily of two regions (*vilayets*): Tripoli and Sidon.¹⁰ At that time, the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon were separated by religion and terrain; the area between Beirut and Sidon (Shuf Province) was primarily inhabited by Druze, and the area between Beirut and Tripoli (Kisrawan Province) was predominantly Maronite. The *vilayets* were not monolithic confessionally, however, and some Druze and Maronites, as well as other religious sects, were interspersed in these two provinces of Ottoman Lebanon.

The entire mountainous region stretching between the Tripoli and Sidon provinces came to be referred to as Mount

Lebanon by the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹¹ Also by this time, a significant number of Maronites had moved into the Druze region, as had other Christians (Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Melkites, Assyrian and Chaldean Catholic) and Muslims (Sunni, Shi'i [Mutawillah], Alawi, and Isma'ili).¹² Traditional "social ties and loyalties"¹³ remained intact, however, and the lines between confessional groupings persisted throughout the Ottoman period.

Families and clans, confessing various religions, were organized along semiautonomous tribal and feudal lines. Historically, the relationship of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon with outside powers had allowed a certain degree of autonomy insofar as geography and religion were concerned, thus strengthening the bonds of confessional and feudal authority.¹⁴ Indeed, according to Albert Hourani, "Caliphs, Crusading rulers and Ottoman Sultans alike refrained from demanding more from Lebanon than tribute and the formal recognition of their suzerainty."¹⁵

The tribal ties in Mount Lebanon were such that one's extended family (ahl), a family with common heritage and religion, formed blood ties that were "intimate and binding" and where "the sovereignty of the family transcends all other loyalties."¹⁶ These ties had persisted for centuries prior to Ottoman rule, and familial ties continued to affect the social, economic, and political lives of the inhabitants of the region well after Ottoman rule came to an end.¹⁷ Some of the more powerful families in the region, from which the earliest ruling

Ottoman amirs (governors) of the vilayets were drawn by the Porte, were the Druze Ma'n and Junblat families and the Sunni Shihab families.¹⁸ The other confessional groups, including the Maronites, were relegated to *dhimma* status (non-Muslims enjoying limited protection) under pre-1861 Ottoman rule.¹⁹

It was from the Ma'n clan that, in 1593, the Mountain came to be ruled by the powerful Druze chieftain Fakhr al-Din II. Under this amir the Mountain included not only what is now considered modern Lebanon but also portions of what is now northern Israel. Fakhr al-Din II was finally deposed by the Porte in 1633 as a result of representations by discontented Damascene notables who became concerned at his encroachment on their economic and administrative power.²⁰ However, despite the rolling back of portions of Lebanon's "borders" after Fakhr al-Din II's demise, it was to his period that several post-WW I notables referred for proof of the "historical, geographical, and economic" borders of Greater Lebanon.²¹

After Fakhr al-Din II's imprisonment and death in 1635 the rule of the Mountain continued under his Ma'n descendants until the Shihab clan, cousins of the Ma'n clan, took over with the rise to power of Bashir Shihab.²² Shihabi Sunni rule, although initially less than the area ruled by Fakhr al-Din, grew to include the entire region of the Mountain by the middle of the eighteenth century.²³ The concept of a unified Lebanese region under the Shihabis (a period in which, like Fakhr al-Din II's reign, the post-WW I Lebanese also looked to as proof of their historical Greater Lebanon borders) can be seen operating not

only geographically during this period but also administratively. The region was ruled by an Ottoman amir at the *vilayet* level and by confessionally determined leaders at the clan level and below. Meanwhile, the Shihabi's conversion to the Maronite faith (1756) served to enhance the position of the Maronites vis à vis the Druze in Mount Lebanon.²⁴

The primary form of the feudal system within Ottoman Lebanon was an arrangement whereby the more powerful Druze and Maronite clans became the dominant land-owning tax collectors acting on behalf of the Ottomans. The *muqata'ah* (fief in the name of a clan)²⁵ system operating in the first three and a half centuries of Ottoman rule not only dictated the relationship between the Porte and the *muqati'ji* (hereditary fief-holding clan chief),²⁶ but it also governed the relationship between the *muqati'jis* and the inhabitants dependent on them for protection and representation.²⁷

A closely linked aspect of the *muqata'ah* system was a governing system resembling a principedom (*imarah*)²⁸ which, as early as Fakhr al-Din II, was the result of "the rise of [certain] lordly families to supremacy over the others."²⁹ The amirs, even though subject to Ottoman rule externally, were the final authority in the *vilayets* under their control. The *imarah* and *muqata'ah* systems flourished in the Shihabi period and climaxed with the reign of Bashir Shihab II (1788 - 1840).³⁰

Bashir II ruled Mount Lebanon at a time in which the Ottoman Empire as a whole was beginning to feel a variety of complex and significant internal and external economic

pressures. The Ottoman economy was becoming increasingly integrated with European trade, and the Porte was experiencing economic challenges which led to increased taxation of its subjects. This change in both the external trade realities and the internal taxation requirements led to rising political strife between Shihabi leaders and their feudal clients.³¹

By the end of the eighteenth century this unstable economic situation was exacerbated when the powerful amir of Damascus, Ahmad al-Jazzar, stirred up more discontent among the inhabitants of the Mountain by trying to usurp taxation revenues.³² The situation continued to deteriorate when, after the Napoleonic conquests in Egypt and Syria were thwarted by al-Jazzar (1799) and after several years of Bashir II trying to consolidate his rule of the Mountain, confessional rivalries between the Maronites (led by the Shihabis) and the Druze (led by the Junblats) began to spread.³³

Despite Bashir II's ability to use Egyptian (Muhammad Ali) sponsorship to widen his authority in the Mountain by 1832 into a Greater Lebanon similar to the region controlled by Fakhr al-Din II nearly two hundred years earlier, the instances of sectarian conflict were bound to increase. He had already opened the doors of the Mountain to persecuted Christians, Druze, and others after increased restrictions were placed on non-Sunnis by the Ottomans. However, just when Bashir II's reign began to falter due to religious conflict between Maronites and Druze,³⁴ Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, invaded Syria from Egypt and supported Bashir II, the Maronites,

and other minorities in Mount Lebanon. The effect of Egyptian intervention, though helpful to Bashir II in the short term, forced the Druze (temporarily aligned by 1840 with the Maronites and Greek Catholics) to revolt against Bashir II's attempts to disarm them under instructions from the Egyptian controlled government in Damascus.³⁵

Ibrahim's occupation, as well as Bashir II's rule, ended in 1841 because of Druze, Maronite, Ottoman, and British opposition. The rivalry for control of the Mountain had piqued the interests of the main foreign powers, including France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The instability of Lebanon "became the object of concern for the European powers which were squabbling for the spoils of the sick man of Europe."³⁶

The interests of the French in the region were particularly threatened (especially after the Napoleonic Wars³⁷), not so much from Muhammad Ali but from the increasing sectarian violence threatening their interests and those of the Maronites. The history of French-Maronite friendship went back centuries. The French claim to a Catholic protectorate via the Capitulations of 1535, as well as Louis XIV's official offer of patronage for the Maronites in 1649, solidified their relationship.³⁸ Nearly two centuries later, the French were keen on maintaining close economic, religious, educational, and strategic ties with the Maronites. Meanwhile, the British were tending to support the interests of the Porte and the Druze.³⁹ The rivalry between the

Druze and the Maronites became coupled with the rivalry between the French and the British after 1841.

After the demise of the Shihabis, the government of the Mountain, while still under the authority of the Turkish amir in 1841, was to be placed under a newly formed council to deal, in part, with taxation questions. The new body, with three Druze, three Maronites, one Sunni, one Shi'i, one Greek Catholic, and one Greek Orthodox,⁴⁰ was the first attempt (in the spirit of recent *Tanzimat*⁴¹ proclamations and with the prodding of the European powers) to install a confessional representative body in Mount Lebanon.

However, the increase in sectarian conflict was too much for the council and the Mountain's Ottoman Amir Qasim to withstand. Nine days after the establishment of the council, the Porte recalled Amir Qasim because of Druze-Maromite violence in Dayr al-Qamar.⁴² The inability of the Ottomans to deal with the increased sectarian violence led the European powers to call for establishment of two administrative units under Ottoman suzerainty: one for the Druze south of Beirut, and one for the Maronites north of Beirut.⁴³ This new administrative system, bolstered by the Statute of 1845,⁴⁴ ensured that the two regions would apportion seats in the two councils based on confessional loyalties. Over a decade of relative peace in Mount Lebanon came as a result of these changes, but a troubled end to traditional feudal authority became inevitable because of the administrative interruption of "the chain of authority which stretched between the feudal lord and his subjects."⁴⁵

Because confessionally based representation of communities containing Druze, Maronites, and other sects proved problematic and because the economic and religious tensions resulting from the administrative weakening of feudal authority were never resolved, unrest broke out again between 1858 and 1860. A firsthand account of this period by the chronicler Antun Dahir al-Aqiqi reveals that the causes for the unrest were partly due to intersectarian rivalries and partly to the weakening of the feudal system.⁴⁶ In short, "an authority crisis"⁴⁷ occurred after Bashir II's demise, and before the European powers and the Porte could intervene, tragedy struck.

The bloody violence between Druze and Maronites ended in July 1860 leaving approximately 11,000 Christians (mostly Maronites) massacred, 4000 dead from starvation, and nearly 100,000 homeless.⁴⁸ By the end of July 1860, Ottoman and French troops had arrived in the Mountain to put an end to the massacres.⁴⁹ The result of what came historically to be known as the *Hawadith al-Sittin* (The Events of 1860) was not only the tragic loss of life but the intervention of the European powers into the affairs of the Sublime Porte in Mount Lebanon. European involvement, especially French, continued through the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WW I and ultimately resulted, in the case of Lebanon, in the French Mandate. The enduring legacy of this short-term European intervention was the 1861 Protocol cited earlier. The two themes traced thus far - the concept of an autonomous Mount Lebanon region and the

transition from feudal to confessional representation - would become the law of the land as a result of the protocol.

The third Article of the protocol divided Mount Lebanon into six administrative districts:

1. Al-Kura, including the lower sections, as well as such other sections of territory in which the population adheres to the Greek Orthodox sect, but excluding the city of al-Qalamun, situated on the coast and inhabited almost exclusively by Muslims.
2. The northern part of Lebanon, except for al-Kura, to the Nahr al-Kalb.
3. Zahlah and its territory.
4. Al-Matn, including Christian Sahal and the territories of Kata and Solima [?].
5. The territory to the south of the Damascus-Bayrut road to Jazzin.
6. Jazzin and Taffah.⁵⁰

The governorate of Lebanon (*mutasarrifiyya*) was decreed to be governed by a Ottoman-appointed, European-approved, non-Lebanese Christian governor (*mutasarraf*) directly responsible to the Porte. The six administrative districts were subdivided into subdistricts, and each district and subdistrict had an agent appointed by the *mutasarraf*, as well as a "shaykh selected by the inhabitants and appointed by the Governor."⁵¹

The institutional replacement for feudal lordship was to be the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, and the replacement for feudal estates was to be clearly defined borders, a judicial system, a police force, taxation schedules, and equality "before the law."⁵² The death knell for confessional feudalism and the birth of confessional representation were made clear by the protocol: "All feudal privileges, especially those appertaining to the *Muqata'aci*⁵³ [lease-holder or landowner, who was also

usually the local tax-farmer], are abolished."⁵⁴ The daily lives of the inhabitants of the region, however, were not spontaneously freed from feudal ties. Indeed, the parochial, economic, and political status of the feudal families would linger past 1861 and persist insofar as the *mutasarraf* needed these notables to effect the changes outlined in the protocol.⁵⁵

A September 6, 1864, amendment to the 1861 Protocol extended the governor's term from three to five years and changed the composition of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon to represent the confessional population of each district more accurately as follows: four Maronite councilors (from the districts of Kisrawan, Batroun, Jazzin, and Matn); three Druze (from the districts of Matn, Shuf, and Kura); two Greek Orthodox (from the Matn and Kura districts); one Greek Catholic (Zahle district); one Sunni (Jazzin district); and one Shia (Matn district).⁵⁶ The councilors were elected by the village shaykhs who, in practice, were "elected from among the dominant denomination in each village."⁵⁷ Hence, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, as an institution, was established with defined borders and confessional parity.

Despite the council's initially limited consultative role, it conducted several important functions under the Ottoman governor. The most important of these duties was the right to veto tax increases. Along with this influence over taxation, dictated by the protocol, the council "became the chief governmental agency responsible for the construction of public works, especially bridges and roads."⁵⁸ As much as any other aspects

of the council's duties, taxation and their ability to translate those taxes into public works projects with the cooperation of the governor "put the councillors at the center of public attention."⁵⁹ In this way, the expectations of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon would be increasingly addressed, if not completely fulfilled, by their elected councilors.

Meanwhile, under the rule of Da'ud Pasha, the first *mutasarraf* of Mount Lebanon (1861-1868), the last vestiges of the feudal system were "rapidly giving way to the rising agricultural and commercial middle class."⁶⁰ Beirut, although not within the *mutasarrafiyya*, began to reflect the changes in social and economic structure of the region in that many merchants from the surrounding mountains had considerable ties to the port and the shops of Beirut.⁶¹ In particular, Beirut reflected the departure from feudalism by population changes (approximately 6000 at the end of the eighteenth century to 70,000 in 1863),⁶² by commercial booms due to western trade markets (800 percent increase in the value of trade between 1827 and 1862),⁶³ and by educational opportunities both in Europe and in the expanding school system in Lebanon (i.e., the Syrian Protestant College was founded in Beirut in 1866).⁶⁴

The period of Lebanese history that stretches from the establishment of the *mutasarrafiyya* in 1861 to its disbanding by Turkish military decree in 1915 has correctly been called "the long peace."⁶⁵ Whatever difficulties the Ottomans experienced in initiating *Tanzimat* changes in the rest of the empire, the case of Lebanon is considered a relative success story.

Certainly the role of the French and British must be cited as having ensured that certain key reforms were sustained. The relative prosperity of the Lebanese economy also contributed greatly to the stability of the period. Additionally, the role of the council in representing the expectations of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to an ever increasing extent from 1861 to 1915 was another vital factor that contributed substantially to the prosperity and stability of the period.

The authority of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, although gradually increasing over the *mutasarrifiyya* period, ebbed and flowed depending on the *mutasarraf* of the time. Under the governorate of Franko Pasha (1868-1873), the council's involvement in settling internal disputes "of minor diplomatic significance"⁶⁶ and its right to veto taxes strengthened its position considerably. A case in which the veto authority nullified proposed tax increases occurred under Rustum Pasha's reign (1873-1883) when the Porte, suffering financial troubles of its own, tried to force Rustum Pasha to balance Mount Lebanon's budget on the backs of the inhabitants by means of increased taxes. After being unsuccessful in raising taxes because of the council's resistance, Rustum Pasha proceeded to cut spending to balance the budget.⁶⁷ However, this move tended to create a gulf between the council and the *mutasarraf*, a gulf that remained until Vasa Pasha (1882-1892) convinced the council to allow "new revenue sources in order to avoid the impairment of governmental and other public services in the Mountain."⁶⁸

Meanwhile, if the Christians (especially the Maronites) were profiting considerably from their relationship with France, the influence of France and the West in general was not limited to economics alone. Western notions of political independence and representative government were being grappled with in the Near East with various shades of Arab, Christian, and Muslim thought. By the turn of the century in Lebanon a growing nationalist sentiment had taken root.⁶⁹ With the rising activism of Lebanese intellectuals at the turn of the century (particularly their use of newly established Arabic newspapers to air their ideas), the theoretical formulations of what a broader society and polity might look like and how it should be governed moved from the theoretical framework to the establishment of like-minded clubs and societies in Lebanon, France, and elsewhere.⁷⁰

This nationalist phenomenon also was occurring in Syria, as reflected in the 1905 "Programme of the League of the Arab Fatherland." The Programme called for "an Arab empire stretching from the Tigris and the Euphrates to the Suez Isthmus, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman," while in the same breath stating that it would "respect the autonomy of Lebanon."⁷¹ Such statements calling for Greater Syria, as well as the writings of Lebanese intellectuals, did not endear these leaders of public opinion to the ruling Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909). As is well known, most of the Lebanese and Syrian intellectuals, many graduates of the Syrian Protestant College, were forced to operate their newspapers and

societies out of Cairo and Paris rather than Beirut and Damascus.⁷²

The turn of the century also witnessed increased cooperation between the Maronite patriarch and the pontiff in Rome, as well as French religious and governmental leaders.⁷³ The Maronite patriarch had always held considerable influence with his faithful, as well as with the French, and had always received investiture from Rome rather than the Porte.⁷⁴ A prime example of the influence of the Maronite prelates occurred under Rustum Pasha. As has been seen, in 1878, Rustum Pasha tried to increase taxes in the Mountain, but, largely due to the influence the Church had with the Maronite councilors on the council and the ability of the local bishops and priests to provoke unrest, his tax increases were never realized.⁷⁵

Rustum Pasha's three successor *mutasarrifs*, Vasa, Na`um, and Muzaffar each confronted the same difficulties as their predecessor: an administrative council that increasingly resisted Ottoman encroachment and tried to represent the vested interests of its constituents and the increasingly active role of the Maronite hierarchy in the politics of the Mountain. On a more general level, there were many signs of mounting difficulties for the Ottoman Empire in maintaining its crumbling empire and a growing belief within the European community that the dissolution of the empire was imminent.⁷⁶

Despite the council's increased political voice in the Mountain, an estimated 100,000 Lebanese migrated to Europe and the Americas between 1900 and 1914 because of economic hardship,

lack of land for the increasing population, and continued Ottoman repression.⁷⁷ Additionally, as the First World War approached, the *mutasarraf*, Yusuf Pasha (1907-1912), began to intervene in the internal dynamics of the council, alleging widespread corruption. An example which reminded the Lebanese councilors that they were still not without an Ottoman-appointed governor was the suspension of the Maronite councilor from Matn district, Shadid 'Aql, in 1908. Yusuf Pasha justified his actions by citing 'Aql's alleged corruption, but ardent opposition rose from the council and, at the insistence of the Porte, he was vindicated by the Council of State in Istanbul in 1910.⁷⁸ The experience suggested that the balance of power in the Mountain since 1861 still tended to favor the *mutasarraf*. The shift of power toward the confessionally elected Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon took a major war to become complete.

In 1909 the council underwent its last election before the war and, in fact, the last elections before it was dissolved in 1915 by Turkish military decree. The election came the year after the Young Turks came to power in Istanbul under the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress. The Young Turks' platform, which was substantially anti-Abdulhamidian, sparked the hopes of the Mountain's political elite.⁷⁹ The "euphoria" of the councilors was short-lived, however, because Yusuf Pasha had become more intransigent and unwilling to allow a strong council and had "suspended or threatened to suspend five of its twelve members" by the fall of 1910.⁸⁰

The power struggle between Yusuf Pasha and the council led to an important amendment to the original 1861-1864 Protocol as a result of European insistence. The December 21, 1912, protocol, signed by the Porte and the European powers, strengthened the position of the council by including "stipulations that broadened the autonomy and electoral base of the council."⁸¹ The protocol also limited the governor's prerogative to dismiss councilors, increased the Maronite representation on the council from four to five to reflect population distribution more closely and added a provision for every one hundred taxpayers to "join the sheikhs as electors of the councillors."⁸²

Before WW I, when increased authority for the council appeared promising, ideas of what Greater Lebanon would look like, should the opportunity for independence present itself, gained increasing attention. The publication of Maronite Bulus Nujaim's 1908 book, under the pen-name of M. Jouplain was one of the first to argue publicly "in favor of a greater Lebanon."⁸³ His exposition on the historical borders of Greater Lebanon, coupled with his call for French assistance in "helping the Lebanese Christians realize their aspirations for a state of their own,"⁸⁴ provided an outline for other more influential Lebanese notables. Council member Da'ud 'Ammun and other influential Christian Lebanese living in Paris, including Shukri Ghanem and K.T. Khairallah, formed the *Comité Libanais de Paris* and composed a *mémoire* for presentation to French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré in May 1912.⁸⁵

Their desiderata proposed universal suffrage, decreased authority for the governor, and a nineteen-member grand council to replace the twelve-member Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.⁸⁶ They were willing to negotiate some territorial claims that fell short of a Greater Lebanon (i.e., they offered either Beirut, Tripoli, or Sidon in exchange for compensation on the other terms of the *Mémoire*).⁸⁷ The 1912 Protocol that was signed in Mount Lebanon only six months after the *Mémoire* was submitted in Paris reflected many of the aspirations of these *Comité Libanais* notables. One Lebanese notable in particular, Maronite Council member, Da'ud 'Ammun, would arrive in Paris six years later as the president of the first Lebanese Delegation representing the post-WW I Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. The resolution he carried with him to the Paris Peace Conference in December 1918 proposed demands very similar to those of the *Comité Libanais* for recognition of Lebanese independence. The main difference would be that after the devastation of war, the council would be asking for much more than Mount Lebanon.

The First World War brought famine, disease, and martyrdom to Mount Lebanon. The history of WW I, although beyond the scope of this work, must be remembered not merely as the beginning of the end of 400 years of Ottoman rule nor as merely a succession of battles that eventually ousted the Turkish and German forces from the Levant. It should also be remembered for the terrible loss of human life and the lasting effects those losses had on the survivors.

Early in the war, in March 1915, the Turkish General Jamal Pasha moved into the Mountain and dissolved, arrested, and deported the council members.⁸⁸ After a brief attempt to appoint a pro-Turkish council, Jamal Pasha installed a Muslim governor and instituted military rule. Moves were also made against the Maronites and deportation of some clergy, as well as an execution of one priest, Yusuf al-Hayik.⁸⁹ The same month he dissolved the council, Jamal Pasha forced the Maronite patriarch to ask for official investiture (*firman*), which was traditionally bestowed by the Holy See, from the Porte.⁹⁰ On May 6, 1916, capping the maltreatment of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, fourteen Lebanese were hanged in Beirut, in what is now called "Martyr's Square," for collaboration with the Allied Powers and for espionage against the Turks.⁹¹

Even though persecution during the war was severe enough, it is estimated that "over one-fifth of the population of Mount Lebanon, most of them Christians, died of starvation or disease."⁹² The Allied powers, although not indifferent to the direness of the Lebanese situation, were not able to free the region until the fall of 1918.

In the interim, several negotiated agreements had been formulated between key figures inside and outside the Near East that would further entangle the complex question of how to draw lines on the map of the region after the war ended. The secret and not-so-secret diplomacy and deal-making that occurred during the war represent an exhaustive study in itself. For the purposes of this work, only the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,

the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and Britain's Declaration to the Seven are discussed to glean their essential provisions.

A. Husayn-McMahon Correspondence: The initial agreement that led the Arabs of the Hijaz, under the leadership of Sharif Husayn, to enter the war on the side of Britain arose from negotiations in February 1914 between one of Husayn's sons, Amir Abdullah, and the British consul-general in Cairo, Field Marshal Kitchener.⁹³ This incomplete dialogue eventually led in 1915 to an exchange of letters between Sharif Husayn and the British high commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon. A letter sent from McMahon to Husayn on October 24, 1915, described the limits of a future Arab State under Husayn. The British, as McMahon's communication stated, would exclude "the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo," because these areas "cannot be considered to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded."⁹⁴ Though not mentioned by name, the region the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon would later call Greater Lebanon was apparently viewed by the British as a region that should remain separate from Husayn's future state and as a region "wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France...."⁹⁵

The Arab Revolt began June 5, 1916, in support of Britain and her allies against the Turks and Germans. However, the history of how Britain intended to deal with the area west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo" and indeed how it intended to settle the Eastern Question was postponed

until further secret negotiations between Britain, France, and Russia could settle the issue.

B. Sykes-Picot Agreement: On October 23, 1916, the agreement drafted by Sir Mark Sykes, Kitchener's War Office assistant, and M. Georges-Picot, a career French diplomat, was consummated by diplomatic notes between the two governments.⁹⁶ The Sykes-Picot Agreement⁹⁷ drew prospective lines on the map of the Near East which, in the case of Lebanon, closely resembled the Greater Lebanon of the Administrative Council before its dissolution. The agreement divided the region into spheres of direct and indirect influence allotting present-day Jordan and Iraq to Britain and present-day Syria and Lebanon to France, leaving Palestine as an international zone. Lebanon was considered to fall within France's Blue Zone wherein she would exercise direct control.⁹⁸

C. Declaration to the Seven: The Sykes-Picot Agreement was disclosed in the autumn of 1917 by the Bolsheviks after they took over the government of Russia. The revelation not only to the Lebanese but also to the Arabs engaged in the fight against the Turks revealed the nature of British and French designs for the Near East after the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. Therefore, in June 1918, Britain made an attempt to assuage Arab fears by having an officer of the Arab Bureau make a declaration to seven notable Arabs in Cairo. By this time, the question of how to settle the future of the Ottoman Empire had proven to be very problematic. The declaration stated that "it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples in those

territories should obtain their freedom and independence."⁹⁹ This was viewed by the Arabs as a guarantee of continued British support for their designs, whereas the Lebanese were hesitant to apply this declaration to themselves as they were afraid the French guarantor status suggested by Sykes-Picot might be affected.

As the end of the war drew near, the devastation and subsequent Great Power intervention dwarfed all those post-1861 episodes in Mount Lebanon's history. French troops occupied the Mountain for only a few months after the 1861 massacres. After WW I, French troops remained in Lebanon for almost twenty-eight years.

The end of WW I brought with it the drama of diplomats and delegations, each making their respective ways to the Paris Peace Conference. When the dust settled in Paris, and after the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon had sent three delegations to represent the Lebanese case at the peace talks, their desire to create a confessional, representative state resulted in the establishment of Greater Lebanon, albeit under a French mandate.

Endnotes

¹"Regulation for the Administration of Lebanon," as translated in J.C. Hurewitz, ed., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1535-1914, vol. 1 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956) 166.

²The European powers, sometimes called the Great Powers, included Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The Ottoman Empire is sometimes referred to as the Sublime Porte, or simply as the Porte.

³The Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon (*majlis idara jabal lubnan*) administered the provincial district (*sanjak*) surrounding Mount Lebanon.

⁴Here the term "Greater Lebanon" refers to the area that, for the most part, resembles the present day borders of modern Lebanon. Further elaboration of the history of this term, as well as "Mount Lebanon," occurs later.

⁵Feudalism is the most often used term to describe the situation in early nineteenth century Mount Lebanon. Although it is not strictly the medieval sense of the term, it has unique Mount Lebanon characteristics (see *iqta`* discussion below).

⁶The "Greater Syria" notion is taken to include Lebanon and Palestine as posited by several authors including A.L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria (London: St. Martin's P, 1969), and Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (London: Oxford UP, 1990).

⁷For one of the first detailed histories of Lebanon since ancient times see, Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (London: MacMillan, 1957). For a more up-to-date history see Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968).

⁸Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977) 170.

⁹Clyde G. Hess, Herbert L. Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," Middle East Journal 8 (Winter 1954): 11.

¹⁰Salibi, Modern xi. According to Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria During the 16th

and 17th Centuries: The Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992): 665-675, the Tripoli-Sidon vilayet system included Beirut in the Sidon sanjak. Abu-Husayn also notes that the history of the Druze relationship with the Porte often differed from Ottoman administrative practices in other Lebanese sanjaks.

¹¹Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Los Angeles: U of California P, 1988) 64-67. Mount Lebanon originally meant, to the "Arab geo-graphers," the mountains between Tripoli and Jubayl, and Salibi traces the history of the usage of the term through the 1861 period. Mount Lebanon is sometimes referred to as "the Mountain."

¹²Salibi, Modern xii. Also see Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, 4th ed. (London: Oxford UP, 1968) 121-125, for population estimates and general location of each denomination.

¹³Samir Khalaf, Persistence and Change in 19th Century Lebanon (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1979) 11.

¹⁴Hess and Bodman 11.

¹⁵Hourani 130.

¹⁶Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," Middle East Journal 4 (April 1968): 246.

¹⁷Khalaf, "Primordial," 247.

¹⁸Salibi, Modern Chapter 1. Salibi outlines the debate over whether the Ma'n clan was Druze or Sunni, but his claim of the Ma'ns being Druze is the stance taken here. Also see Iliya F. Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968) 28-36.

¹⁹Harik 19-20.

²⁰Salibi, Modern 3, and Engin D. Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920 (Los Angeles: U of California P, 1993) 11.

²¹The notables referred to here included the members of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon evidenced by their resolution presented to the Paris Peace Conference, as well as Shukri Ghanem's remarks at the peace conference (see Chapter 1).

²²Salibi, Modern 3.

²³Akarli 14.

²⁴Hourani 19.

²⁵For detailed discussion of government by *muqati'jis* see Harik 64-71.

²⁶For detailed background of the institution of the *muqati'ji* see Harik 42-51.

²⁷Akarli 14-17.

²⁸For a detailed discussion of *imarah* see Harik 12-17.

²⁹Albert H. Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966) 16.

³⁰Hourani, "Lebanon," 19.

³¹Richard Von Leeuwen, "Monastic Estates and Agricultural Transformation in Mount Lebanon in the 18th Century," International Journal of Middle East Studies 23 (1991): 603.

³²Von Leeuwen 603.

³³Salibi, Modern 18-27.

³⁴Salibi, Modern 26-29.

³⁵Salibi, Modern 38-39.

³⁶Harik 35.

³⁷George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Doubleday, 1986) 310.

³⁸Louis XIV's letter (April 28, 1649) to his ambassador in Constantinople is often cited to demonstrate the pro-Maronite stance of France in the seventeenth century. See Ahmad R. Haffar, "France in the Establishment of Greater Lebanon: A Study of French Expansionism on the eve of the First World War," diss., Princeton U, 1961, Appendix IV. Also see Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1985) 16.

³⁹Salibi, Modern 78.

⁴⁰Hess and Bodman 12.

⁴¹Tanzimat was an Ottoman reform program designed to westernize the Empire from 1839 to 1876. For a detailed history of Tanzimat see, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 6th ed. (London: Oxford UP, 1979) Chapter IV.

⁴²Hess and Bodman 12.

⁴³Harik 35. For a more detailed breakdown of this arrangement see Salibi, Modern 62-65.

⁴⁴Hess and Bodman 13.

⁴⁵Hess and Bodman 13.

⁴⁶Malcom H. Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868: A Contemporary Account of Antun Dahir al-Aqiqi, and Other Documents (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1959) x.

⁴⁷Antoine J. Abraham, Lebanon at Mid-Century: Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon 1840-1860 (New York: UP of America, 1981) 18.

⁴⁸Salibi, Modern 106.

⁴⁹Abraham 109-110.

⁵⁰Article 3, in Hurewitz, vol. I, 166. The place names and the question mark after number four are depicted exactly as Hurewitz provides them. Taffah here refers to Tuffah.

⁵¹Article 5, Hurewitz, vol. I, 166.

⁵²Article 3 (borders), Articles 7-14 (judicial), Article 15 (police force), and Article 16 (taxation), Hurewitz, vol. I, 166-168.

⁵³muqata`ji

⁵⁴Hurewitz, vol. 1, 166. The parenthetical note is found in Hurewitz's translation.

⁵⁵Khalaf, Persistence 122-136.

⁵⁶Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke UP, 1976) 49.

⁵⁷Akarli 83. Akarli uses the word "elected" quite liberally in his narrative in Chapter 4. He cites some elections, but the degree of sophistication of these elections, especially the earlier ones, remains unclear. It also bears mentioning that the confessional representation of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon did not mean democracy in the sense of one person/one vote. Rather, the election of councilors was primarily meant to ensure the representation of the various religious groups in the council.

⁵⁸Akarli 86.

⁵⁹Akarli 86.

⁶⁰John P. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1914 (London: Ithaca P, 1977) 53.

⁶¹Akarli 60-62. According to Akarli 31, Beirut was considered by the Porte as a province of Saida (1861-1864), a province of Damascus (1864-1887), and the Province of Beirut (1887-1918) during the *mutasarrifiyya* period.

⁶²Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State, 1840-1985 (London: Ithaca P, 1986) 12.

⁶³Johnson 13.

⁶⁴Spagnolo 99.

⁶⁵Akarli title page.

⁶⁶Akarli 84.

⁶⁷Akarli 84.

⁶⁸Akarli 84-85.

⁶⁹George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, 5th ed. (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1946) 79-100. Contrast Salibi, Modern 153-156, and Hourani, Syria 96-120, with Antonius concerning the degree to which the rise of

Arab nationalism can be attributed to Lebanese Christians. Also see Albert H. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford UP, 1970) Chapters X and XI.

⁷⁰Zamir 23.

⁷¹M.S. Anderson, ed., The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923 (London: Edward Arnold, 1970) 148.

⁷²Hourani, Arabic 245-250. Also see C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1973) Chapter 6.

⁷³See Spagnolo 184-192, for French-Maronite contacts during this period.

⁷⁴Salibi, Modern 12-13.

⁷⁵Spagnolo 154-168.

⁷⁶Akarli 90-101.

⁷⁷Zamir 15.

⁷⁸Akarli 94-95.

⁷⁹Spagnolo cites Kan'an al-Dahir, Habib Pasha Sa'ad, Amir Shakib Arslan, Nassib Junblat, and Mustafa Arslan among those pushing for Yusuf Pasha's ouster (249-250).

⁸⁰Spagnolo 260.

⁸¹Akarli 100.

⁸²Akarli 100.

⁸³Zamir 15.

⁸⁴Zamir 16.

⁸⁵Spagnolo 274-275.

⁸⁶Spagnolo 276-278.

⁸⁷Spagnolo 278.

⁸⁸Zamir 36.

⁸⁹Nicholas Z. Ajay, "Political Intrigue and Suppression in Lebanon During World War I," International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974): 154.

⁹⁰Zamir 36.

⁹¹Ajay 157.

⁹²Zamir 36.

⁹³Briton C. Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Los Angeles: U of California P, 1971) 57. Also see Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence, 1914-1939 (London: Cambridge UP, 1976) 17.

⁹⁴J.A.S. Grenville, ed., The Major International Treaties 1914-1973. A History and Guide with Texts (New York: Stein and Day, 1974) 29.

⁹⁵Grenville 29.

⁹⁶Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London: The Athlone P, 1969) 28-30.

⁹⁷Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) 170. Sachar points out that this became the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov Agreement after the Russians joined in the provisions May 23, 1916.

⁹⁸Grenville 30-32.

⁹⁹Hurewitz, vol. II, 30.

CHAPTER 1

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND THE FIRST LEBANESE

DELEGATION: SEPTEMBER 1918 TO MAY 1919

The situation in the Lebanon is at present involved. The expulsion of the Turks took place almost without bloodshed, and local Moslem committees immediately took control and hoisted the Arab flag, but received no support from the Sherif: in consequence, since October 1, no government has existed.¹

This intelligence assessment sent from Major Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau in Cairo to the British Foreign Office in London on October 22, 1918, described the opening of a two-year period that witnessed the transformation of Mount Lebanon from an area in which "no government existed" to one that came to be referred to as Greater Lebanon (*Grand Liban*) under a French mandate after September 1920.

The creation of Greater Lebanon was by no means a foregone conclusion in the weeks that followed the Turkish retreat from Beirut on September 30, 1918. Even though the designs of Amir Faysal (son of the Hashemite leader in the Hijaz, Sharif Husayn) as well as those of the British and the French became clear after the dust began to settle in the Levant, one erstwhile deposed group of Lebanese notables remained obstinately attached to their expectations for an independent Lebanese nation. Within two months the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, disbanded by Turkish fiat in 1915, reconvened in Ba'abda (the

seat of the Turkish provincial government of Mount Lebanon during the war) under a newly appointed governor. This body formed a delegation which it dispatched to the Paris Peace Conference with a resolution calling for the recognition of Greater Lebanon. The events surrounding the first Lebanese Delegation's selection, travels, speeches in Paris, and return reveal the extent to which the most organized group of postwar Lebanese - the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon - came to represent the expectations of the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon.

The "Muslim committees" mentioned in Major Cornwallis' report that "hoisted the Arab flag" were in fact the first to lay claim to Lebanon. By so doing they showed their allegiance to Amir Faysal who was on the outskirts of Damascus at the time. The acting president of the Arab government in Damascus, Amir Sa'id al-Hassan al-Jaza'iri² immediately sent a telegram to the village heads in the Lebanon, to Druze leaders, and to the Maronite Patriarch Elias Butrus Huwayyik which stated that "Syria announces the independence of the Arabs" and that "our Lord, the first Sultan of the Arabs, the Amir Faisal"³ was its leader. This was the same al-Jaza'iri who had been named governor of Damascus by the retreating Turkish General Jamal Pasha September 30. Upon assuming the post of governor in Damascus and after having sent the above-mentioned telegram, al-Jaza'iri also sent a telegram October 1 to the Muslim notable 'Umar al-Da'uq,⁴ mayor of Beirut, asking him to establish an Arab government in Lebanon. The retreating Turkish governor

(wali) of the province (sanjaq) of Beirut, Isma'il Haqqi Bey, had previously relinquished control of Beirut to al-Da'uq. After al-Da'uq received the telegram from al-Jaza'iri he announced the establishment of an Arab government (symbolized by the hoisting of the Arab flag) in Beirut.⁵

The new arrangement did not last long partly because Amir Faysal and Colonel T.E. Lawrence (Faysal's British liaison officer during the Arab Revolt) quickly deposed al-Jaza'iri when they arrived in Damascus⁶ and partly because they then sent a former Arab officer in the Turkish army, Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi, accompanied by 100 horsemen, to Beirut on October 4.⁷ By this time, the reaction of not only the French but also the commander in chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, British Field-Marshal Viscount Edmund Allenby, had become inevitable. Allenby did not immediately learn of these events as they unfolded, but by October 5, after realizing Faysal's intentions, he ordered General E.S. Bulfin, commander of the 21st Corps up the coast to secure Beirut. Allenby also directed French Vice-Admiral Varney to send the French destroyer *Arbalète* into Beirut Harbour. The French warship arrived on October 7 and General Bulfin arrived the following day. By the evening of October 8, the Hijazi flags were removed, Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi was deposed, and Allenby had appointed Colonel de Piépape as the French military governor of the Blue Zone in Beirut.⁸

This first glimpse of the expectations of some of the notables of Lebanon revealed one of the most significant aspects of the struggle for independence that was to overshadow the next

two years. Recognition of their expectations by the French and British authorities was a prerequisite of success for the pro-Faysal notables, or any other group, and it was in this critical respect that the former initially lacked such recognition. Amir Faysal was compelled to submit to Allenby's command of the Levant until such time as he could negotiate more favorable commitments at the upcoming peace conference in Paris. In a letter to Lloyd George dated September 23, 1919, Faysal's understanding of the military reality of late 1918 was demonstrated when he stated,

It was the British Forces that lowered the Arab flags. Our confidence in the honour of the British Army, and the statement of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a telegram he sent to me in which he assured me of the nature of this arrangement, and the fact that it was understood that the whole country was to remain under the Commander-in-Chief until the final settlement, induced me to agree to the evacuation of the sea-coast by our troops and the removal of the Arab flags hoisted on the government buildings and elsewhere by the inhabitants.⁹

Meanwhile, in Ba`abda, the outgoing *mutasarraf*, the Sunni Turk Mumtaz Bey, had appointed the mayor of Ba`abda, Habib Fayyad (a Maronite), as the head of the government of the Mountain.¹⁰ Patriarch Huwayyik viewed this act, as well as those of al-Jaza`iri in Damascus and `Umar al Da`uq in Beirut with a cautious eye. Along with many other notables of Mount Lebanon including Greek Orthodox, Druze, Greek Catholics, Sunnis, and Shiites, Huwayyik was already looking toward Paris rather than Damascus for his expectations of an autonomous Greater Lebanon to be fulfilled. However, immediately after the

war the French military position in the Middle East was weak compared to that of the British.¹¹ Nonetheless, it was the French in Arwad whom Huwayyik had contacted with the news of `Umar al-Da`uq's pronouncements in Beirut during the first few days of October.¹² Shortly after Habib Fayyad became the *mutasarraf* in Ba`abda the remnants of the Mountain's pre-1915 government decided to elect Maronite Malik Shehab and Druze `Adil Arslan "to be temporarily at the head of a Provisional Government for the Lebanon."¹³

This early local attempt to institute some form of government that reflected the expectations of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and the vicinity was short-lived. After Patriarch Huwayyik expressed his support for the election of Malik Shehab, Habib Fayyad was deposed by Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi and the Maronite Habib Pasha as-Sa`d was installed in his place as head of the new government of Mount Lebanon October 7, 1918.<sup>14</sup> Although Habib as-Sa`d was initially appointed by al-Ayyubi as the pro-Faysal designate he soon found himself as the *mutasarraf* not of Faysal's Lebanon but of the newly appointed French representative Colonel de Piépape's government. As such Habib as-Sa`d, together with the reconstituted Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon (reestablished with the same confessional distribution that existed before the war¹⁵), began to set their own course, a course that eventually led to the election and dispatching of the first Lebanese Delegation of the council to the Paris Peace Conference.

Habib as-Sa'd was no stranger to the Mountain's confessional politics. The Armenian Catholic Ohannes Kuyumjian Pasha, the Turkish appointed *mutasarrif* (1912-1915), had appointed him deputy chairman of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon in 1913.¹⁶ Together with the re-appointment of the councilors elected before the war¹⁷ Habib as-Sa'd immediately began to regenerate the active governance of the Mountain in October 1918. The council members who eventually would set the course of the Mountain on the path to Greater Lebanon included Habib as-Sa'd (Maronite, deputy chairman), Khalil 'Aql (Maronite, Matn district), Da'ud 'Ammun (Maronite, Dayr al-Qamar district), Sulayman Kan'an (Maronite, Jazzin district), Sa'adallah al-Huwayyik (Maronite, Batrun district), Mahmud Junblat (Druze, Jazzin district), Fuad 'Abd al-Malik (Druze, Shuf district), Muhammad Sabra (Druze, Matn district), Ilias Shuwayri (Greek Orthodox, Matn district), Niquila Ghun (Greek Orthodox, Kura district), Husayn al-Hajjar (Sunni, Matn district), Muhammad Muhsin (Shiite, Kisrawan district), and Yusuf Baridi (Greek Catholic, Zahle district).¹⁸ The newly reconvened Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, while having to meet under the shadow of military occupation by British and French forces, as well as attempts by Arab nationalists led by Amir Faysal to speak for the indigenous Lebanese, was officially reinstated in accordance with General Headquarters telegram No. 98 of October 22, 1918.¹⁹

The day after the official reestablishment of the council, Patriarch Huwayyik was visited by the interim *Haut Commissaire*

en Palestine et Syrie, M. Robert Coulondre. Both parties agreed that the council could and should represent the expectations of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon.²⁰ The close relationship between the Maronites and the French during the years of the Ottoman Empire was now expected to help realize the extension of Mount Lebanon to that of Greater Lebanon. In having a significant number of Maronites, the confessional representation of the council was assumed to reflect the population breakdown of the indigenous Lebanese of the Mountain since 1864. Thus, despite Habib as-Sa'd's earlier inclinations toward Faysal's Arab government in Damascus and despite his appointment as the deputy chairman of the council by the Ottomans before the war, he was officially installed and praised by M. Coulondre in a ceremony in Ba`abda October 25, 1918.²¹

The members of the council went to work quickly even before the Allies had completed military operations against the German and Turkish forces in the Levant. General Allenby, along with Arab General Nuri as-Sa'id, defeated General Liman von Sanders and Turkish General Jamal Pasha in Aleppo and an armistice was signed on His Britannic Majesty's ship *Agamemnon*, at Port Mudros, Lemnos, October 30, 1918. Article XVI of the armistice called for the "surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied Commander."²² This fact ended the state of war between the belligerents in the Near East but left aside many difficult decisions regarding the future arrangements of the liberated territories.

However, the prospects for independence looked promising for the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, as they were now a seated, elected, legislative body preparing to send a delegation to Paris to represent their views at the peace talks. The attempts by Amir Faysal and his supporters to preempt a solution to the Levantine aspects of the Eastern Question²³ by *de facto* occupation had failed. Through persistent deliberations, the help of the French, and the ultimate lack of British support for Amir Faysal's vision of a Greater Syrian Arab state, the elected members of the council assumed they would have their chance to play a key role in representing the expectations of the indigenous people of Greater Lebanon.

One week after the Armistice of Mudros M. Coulondre was replaced by M. François Georges-Picot of Sykes-Picot renown.²⁴ The next day the British and French governments issued a statement that seemed to contradict what appeared, given Picot's appointment in Beirut, to be a clear leaning toward a Sykes-Picot-type agreement for Lebanon. The intentions of these two governments were published on November 7, 1918, in the widely circulated Anglo-French Declaration communicated from the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The declaration defined its intent of emancipating the peoples hitherto oppressed by the Turks with the following statement:

In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and

recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.²⁵

Without detailing any specifics concerning "the establishment of indigenous governments," the Anglo-French Declaration avoided making concrete commitments until the peace conference could address the future of the Near East. As Amir Faysal's delegation (Sharifian Delegation) and the Lebanese Delegation began making plans to attend the Paris Peace Conference, little could they have realized the difficulties and challenges that awaited them. A fundamental dilemma was unfolding with each passing day: the dilemma of who was going to speak for whom. In other words, who was going to have the final say in the drawing of lines on the map of the Near East: the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Hijazis, the French, or the British?

A dispatch from the Arab Bureau in Cairo to London on November 11, 1918, written by Commander D.H. Hogarth, the research director of the bureau, outlined the view of some that the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be shelved and that the "Arab State" should be given significant assurances especially with regard to Syria and Lebanon. Point five read as follows:

Syria - Pending settlements with French, whom no Syrian district, not even Lebanon and Beirut, will accept willingly (especially if Palestine and the Arab State are virtually British), the points to insist on provisionally seem to be these:-

a) That all inter-Ally agreements lose validity with the opening of the Peace Conference, if not before.

b) That in all official inter-Ally conversations about any part of the Arab area henceforth Arabs themselves must participate, as Allies.

c) That meanwhile the Arab State must have a seaport, preferably Tripoli, in order to pay its way.

Indirect taxation, through customs is its only reliable source of revenue.

e) That Syria be treated as an entity apart from either Mesopotamia and Iraq or Hedjaz.

f) That Arab leaders receive, as soon as possible, explicit assurances on above points. The recent joint declaration will not reassure any of them by any means....²⁶

Commander Hogarth's position was clearly at odds with the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon in calling for the scrapping of "inter-Ally agreements," the inclusion of Tripoli to the "Arab State," and insistence that neither Lebanon nor Beirut would accept French involvement.²⁷ Hogarth's dispatch reflected the view of some British and French officials, and it also reflected the views of some indigenous Lebanese and Syrians.²⁸ As to the future of Lebanon, very little common ground could be found outside of one group - the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. The council, because it was the only elected body in the entire Levant in October 1918, stepped into the debate to begin what would clearly be an uphill battle for independence.

On the heels of Hogarth's dispatch Amir Faysal toured Aleppo, Tripoli, Zahle, Ba'albek and finally Beirut between November 11 and 16. In most cases he received substantial support from the Muslims, and mixed reactions from the French and the Christians, especially the Maronites.²⁹ Finally, in the beginning of December, the council formally appointed the first Lebanese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in the hopes of raising a unified Lebanese voice in opposition to those of

the Hashemites, the pro-Faysal colonialists, or their local Syrian and Lebanese supporters.

In contrast to Hogarth's message claiming neither Lebanon nor Beirut would willingly accept the French, the council's resolution dated December 9, 1918, not only called for an independent Greater Lebanon (*lubnan al-kabir*), but it did so with the endorsement of the new *Haut Commissaire* Georges-Picot. The president of the council, Habib as-Sa'd, along with the other members of the council, wrote and signed the resolution, which summarized their expectations in four specific declarations:

1. Extension of the territory of Mount Lebanon to its generally recognized historical and geographical borders in accordance with its legal and economic needs so that the country will be able to have mastery over the life of its people and their needs and fortunes by a progressive, organized government.
2. Confirmation of the independence of this Lebanese country through managing administrative and legal affairs by means of its own countrymen.
3. Establishment for this Lebanese country a legislative assembly formed on the basis of proportional representation guarding the rights of the minority, and elected by the people. This assembly will have the right of legislation and the setting up of suitable laws in the country and all other duties enjoyed by the parliaments of democratic countries.
4. The help of the country of France for the realization of the preceding requests and its assistance of the local administration in facilitating the spread of knowledge and education, and advancing the country and its progress, and eliminating the causes of the division and disagreement [among the communities], and the application of these activities on the basis of justice, freedom, and equality and the guarantee of the aforementioned country for the previously mentioned independence hindering everything that may infringe upon it.³⁰

The call for recognition of its historical and geographical borders including, "on one hand, the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Sayda, and their dependencies, and on the other, the Beqa'a plain, Ba'albek and Jabal al-Shaykh and its cities of Hasbayah and Rashayah" formally pronounced the council's desire for Greater Lebanon (*lubnan al-kabir*). The resolution recalled the seventeenth-century rule of Amir Fakhir ad-Din II by claiming that the extent of its borders and its autonomous history under his rule.³¹ The council's claim that it had operated as the elected representatives of the Lebanese of the Mountain since 1864 and that it hoped for independence to be realized with the help of France was in stark contrast to the views reflected by Faysal, pro-Faysal Syrians and Lebanese, the British, and even some French - that a Syrian Arab nation should be created which would include Lebanon. The council had drawn a line in the sand that, within two years, would become a line on the map. By promulgating this official resolution and dispatching the first Lebanese Delegation to Paris, the only elected representatives of Mount Lebanon and the surrounding areas, the Administrative Council of Greater Mount Lebanon, as it now referred to itself,³² defined the role it intended to play in the race to create a separate Lebanese nation.

The appointees to the Lebanese Delegation consisted of two *majlis idara* councilors, Da'ud 'Ammun (Maronite, Dayr al-Qasam district) and Mahmud Junblat (Druze, Jazzin district), as well as four other Lebanese notables: Abdallah Khouri Sa'adeh (Greek Orthodox translator [*turjuman*] for the government of Mount

Lebanon), Emile Eddé (prominent Maronite lawyer), Ibrahim Abu Khatir (a former prefect), and `Abd al-Halim Hajjar (former Sunni magistrate).<sup>33</sup> Mahmud Junblat was subsequently replaced by Najib `Abd al-Malik (Druze). The Lebanese Delegation departed Beirut on board the French steamship *Tchitchakoff* on December 27, 1918.³⁴ The Sharifian Delegation had departed from Beirut on the British cruiser *Gloucester* on November 20, 1918, also on their way to the Paris Peace Conference.³⁵ The fate of each party's mission came to rest not only on the proceedings of the peace conference but on their ability and/or inability to speak for the people they claimed to represent.

The fact that Amir Faysal arrived in France aboard a British ship and that he was given a tour of France by Colonel Brémont was in stark contrast to the fate of the Lebanese Delegation's trip to France which was delayed by the British at Port Said. Brémont was directed by M. Jean Gout, the under-secretary for Asia at the ministry of foreign affairs, to delay Faysal's arrival in Paris as the French government was still not comfortable with his potential role at the peace conference. It seems important to note that along with stalling Amir Faysal with side trips to Lyon, Belfort, Than, Colmar, and Strasbourg, he was also awarded the *Croix de la Légion d'Honneur* at a military ceremony presided over by General Henri Gouraud of the IVth Army in Strasbourg.³⁶ This was the same General Gouraud who, less than two years later (July 24, 1920), would defeat Amir Faysal's forces at the Battle of Maysalun.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Delegation was detained at Port Said by British officials who claimed the delegate's passes, signed by Picot, were illegal.³⁷ Many British officials were as uncomfortable with a Lebanese Delegation as the French were uncomfortable with the Sharifian Delegation.³⁸ After strong protests by the French (especially Picot) and after several telegrams from Da'ud 'Ammun - one to the French consul in Port Said, M. Laffont (December 26, 1918), and one to the minister of France to Egypt, M. Lefevre-Pontalis (December 31, 1918) - the delegates were permitted to continue their travels to Paris.³⁹

The Lebanese Delegation arrived in Paris in January 1919 with the expectation that it would represent the indigenous Lebanese in their hopes of securing a Greater Lebanon. One group that already had a different agenda for Lebanon was clearly the Sharifian Delegation. Another delegation, however, came to represent a third major voice in the peace conference proceedings - the Central Syrian Committee (CSC). This group's aim was to convince the Lebanese and Sharifian Delegations of the need for a French mandate over both Syria and Lebanon, to convince the Syrians not to accept Hashemite hegemony, and to convince the Lebanese to accept Syrian tutelage in the short term.⁴⁰ The president of the CSC was Shukri Ghanem, previously mentioned as a member of the *Comité Libanais* (see Introduction),⁴¹ and his influence was largely felt from his group's ability to access high French officials. Each of these groups - the Sharifian Delegation, the Lebanese Delegation, and the CSC Delegation - presented a different solution to the

problem of how to draw lines on the map of the Middle East. None would leave Paris with an agreement to show for their efforts. One group, the Lebanese Delegation, presented a resolution that was strikingly similar to that which came to be modern Lebanon.

The first to be invited to present a proposal to the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference was Amir Faysal on February 6, 1919.⁴² In addition to his discussion about his central role in the Arab Revolt, the prior agreements between his father Shaykh Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon, the Fourteen Points elaborated by President Wilson and the Arab embrace of those principles, and his portrayal of the Arab unity he claimed to represent, Amir Faysal delivered several statements regarding Lebanon.⁴³ According to the minutes of the Paris Peace Conference, he claimed:

(x) In Damascus, Beyrout, Tripoli, Aleppo, Latakia, and the other districts of Syria, the civil population declared their independence and hoisted the Arab flag before the Allied troops arrived. The Allied Commander in Chief afterwards insisted that the flag be lowered to install temporary Military Governors. This he explained to the Arabs was provisional, till the Peace Conference settled the future of the country. Had the Arabs known it was in compliance with a secret treaty they would not have permitted it.⁴⁴

The secret treaty Amir Faysal claimed he was unaware of was the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. However, it is possible that Faysal was aware of the agreement and tried to raise Arab flags in these cities not ignorant of Sykes-Picot, but in spite of it.⁴⁵ The minutes of this conference also noted that Faysal

"was willing to admit their [Lebanese] independence, but thought it essential to maintain some form of economic union in the interest of mutual development." He also emphasized his hope that "nothing would be done now to render the admission of the Lebanon to the future confederation impossible, if it desired admission," which he clearly hoped they "would of their own accord decide for federal union" with Syria.⁴⁶ Amir Faysal's conciliatory tone concerning Lebanon would end in bitter disappointment when by the summer of 1920 he was ousted from not only Lebanon but also Syria. However, at this stage in the negotiations, Amir Faysal's voice carried considerable weight, especially with the British. Yet, he was not able to press his claim on Lebanon largely due to British refusal to distance themselves from the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France.⁴⁷

The second group to appear before the Council of Ten was the CSC led by Shukri Ghanem on February 13, 1919.⁴⁸ Immediately preceding the CSC was Dr. Howard Bliss, the president of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut.⁴⁹ His speech called for a commission to investigate the desires of Syria (including Lebanon):

My plea before this body on behalf of the people of Syria is this: that an Inter-Allied or a Neutral Commission, or a Mixed Commission, be sent at once to Syria in order to give an opportunity to the people of Syria - including the Lebanon - to express in a perfectly untrammelled way their political wishes and aspirations, viz: as to what form of Government they desire and as to what power, if any, should be their Mandatory Protecting Power.⁵⁰

Dr. Bliss defended his call for a commission by calling the Council of Ten's attention to the censorship of the press in Syria (including Lebanon) and the difficulty of holding public meetings in the region as a result of the British and French military authorities' need to maintain order. He believed military restrictions and censorship "had made it practically impossible for the people suffering from centuries of intimidation, and now timid to a degree, to express their opinions with any sort of freedom."⁵¹ Dr. Bliss acknowledged his awareness of the Lebanese Delegation's presence in Paris, and he claimed that other groups "would have gladly been here to speak for themselves and others had they been as fortunate as this group in being able to organize themselves and to find the means of travelling hither."⁵² However justified Dr. Bliss was in asking for other group's voices to be heard, the reality was that no other group had the persistence, the prestige, or the mandate of such a large portion of Greater Lebanon than the first Lebanese Delegation of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

On the same day Dr. Bliss spoke to the Council of Ten, the CSC spokesman, Shukri Ghanem, presented a case for a unified Syria under a French mandate that would include Lebanon. His statement, although not supported by any concrete statistics, asserted that he represented "over one million" Syrians and "Syrio-Lebanese Committees and Associations" around the world.⁵³ He traced the history of Syria as being unified traditionally, geographically, ethnically, and linguistically. His remarks

clearly echoed the Greater Syria sentiment when he said "Moslems, Druses, Christians of all sects, Jews - we were all Syrians."⁵⁴ Despite CSC support for the Greater Syria notion, they remained strongly opposed to Amir Faysal and the Hashemites gaining any foothold in Damascus. He argued against Syrian cities becoming "feudatories of the King of the Hedjaz, Shereef of Mecca [Sharif Husayn]."⁵⁵ Ghanem expounded the CSC view that Mount Lebanon, as well as the Levantine coast should become part of a democratic Syria.

At every point when the nature of the country favored defence against the invader, small groups, which have entirely escaped Turkish domination, have been formed. The largest of these is that of Mount Lebanon, which has assumed the official form of an autonomous government. The existence of these groups, far from being an obstacle to the establishment and working of a democratic government composed of autonomous provinces, would seem, on the contrary, likely to facilitate them.⁵⁶

Indeed, with the CSC's program of a French mandate, a Greater Syria, and a non-Hashemite government in Damascus, the CSC mirrored the Lebanese Delegation in all but one aspect - that of an independent, autonomous Greater Lebanon at the expense of a Greater Syrian federation.

Finally, after making several contacts with the French minister of foreign affairs, M. Stephen Pichon, the Lebanese Delegation, with the help of Shukri Ghanem, gained access to the Paris Peace Conference proceedings.⁵⁷ Thus, after Faysal, Bliss and Ghanem put forward their respective cases to the Council of Ten, the Lebanese Delegation, representing the Administrative

Council of Mount Lebanon, had their chance to present their view concerning the creation of a Greater Lebanon.

The first to speak was the president of the Lebanese Delegation, the councilor from Dayr al-Qasam district, Maronite Da'ud 'Ammun. His statement reflected the essential aspects of the resolution of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon (December 9, 1918) in that it called for acceptance of an autonomous Greater Lebanon, the restoration of the historical and natural frontiers of Greater Lebanon separated from the Mountain by the Turks, recognition of the confessionally represented Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon as the true representatives of the Lebanese, and the continuation of their historical friendship with France. He also called for freedom from fear of reprisals and hardships such as were recently endured because of Lebanese support of France and her Allies during the war.⁵⁸ With regard to the devastation of the war on the Lebanese people 'Ammun reminded the Council of Ten of Lebanese involvement in the Allied effort when he said,

As for the sacrifices Lebanon made because its having from the first taken side with the Entente, they are plain to everyone. Over half its population was wiped out through exile, hanging and systematic famishing at the hands of the Turks. With due proportion, this country is among those which suffered most owing to the attitude it adopted and preserved until the end.⁵⁹

After emphasizing the bitter, war-torn, historical setting from which the Lebanese emerged, 'Ammun proceeded to address the two issues that became the essential core of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon's case: the future role of France and

Syria in Greater Lebanon and the extent of their historical claim for a geographical Greater Lebanon.⁶⁰

It can be inferred from the words spoken by 'Ammun concerning the role of France in the future of a Greater Lebanon that he was echoing the resolution of the council by asking for France's collaboration, not its hegemony.

In our opinion such a collaboration does not imply the least abandonment of our rights, the slightest abdication of our independency. The help thus given will be that of a long experience, sparing us to make mistakes which a newly-born community is unavoidably liable to make, giving us an umpire whose decisions will be accepted by the various groups in our country, and lastly safeguarding our independency from any possible attempt.⁶¹

This clearly was a request for support that the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon had come to expect from France's centuries-old relationship with the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and the other coastal cities, especially the Christians. In concluding his remarks on French assistance 'Ammun said, "Consequently the Administrative Council faithfully expressing public opinion, unanimously requested the collaboration of France."⁶²

The degree to which 'Ammun's statement was "faithfully expressing public opinion" concerning the future role of France is difficult to gauge.⁶³ Yet, of all the delegations before the Council of Ten trying to represent the indigenous population, the Lebanese Delegation was the only elected entity to speak for the expectations of its constituents. That there were dissenters is clearly borne out by the events of 1920 (see

Chapter 3). At this juncture, however, and without the advantages of hindsight, it would be difficult to find any other group in and around Mount Lebanon who could have claimed to be the elected representatives of as many people as the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. `Ammun certainly believed that the council represented the indigenous Lebanese, and he placed the council's position on record when he opened his statement to the Council of Ten by saying:

Our Delegation holds its mandate from the Great Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, our national Parliament, elected on democratic bases by the suffrage of the whole nation of Lebanon. In the fullness of its rights, the said Council has nominated the Delegation of which I am President, and on behalf of which I am now speaking, to place before the Peace Conference, the claims of the nation of Lebanon.⁶⁴

As for union with Syria, the Lebanese Delegation's position was voiced with cautious and reserved words. On the one hand `Ammun stressed that "Lebanon could partake of the Syria integrality,"⁶⁵ whereas on the other hand he emphasized that "Lebanon would prefer the danger of its isolated position to the double peril of being drawn into the track of a country deprived of Government traditions and much less advanced in its evolution."⁶⁶ The Lebanese Delegation was willing to accept "integrality" only if Syria was willing to accept French collaboration. The fear of absorption into Syria without any guarantees of the council's historical, confessional representation was emphasized by the Druze member of the Lebanese Delegation, Najib `Abd al-Malik, when he stated:

With the conviction that any Government based on theocratic principles, while putting us in danger of being absorbed in a majority of a sectarian nature, would be particularly detrimental to us, we ask that the necessary help be given us by a power whose liberalism and spirit of tolerance would constitute a guarantee to us.⁶⁷

The Sunni member of the Lebanese Delegation, 'Abd al-Halim Hajjar, also spoke of "recognition of our independence" and moving "in the direction of a democratic Government, free from any religious and theocratic form."⁶⁸ Indeed, despite the confessional procedure of electing members to the council, once seated, the body was designed to equitably administer the affairs of the Mountain. What loomed on the horizon as a Faysal-controlled Syrian state was not the ideal aspired to, and in fact represented by, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

The first Lebanese Delegation completed their statements to the Council of Ten in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. They asked for the independence of their historically defined Greater Lebanon, French collaboration, and integrality with Syria given she accept French collaboration. Before leaving Paris, the Lebanese Delegation submitted a memorandum dated February 27, 1919, to the Council of Ten providing the details of their definition of Greater Lebanon's "historical borders." This memorandum, in addition to defending the concept of Greater Lebanon, defined the borders of Greater Lebanon:

These borders are as follows:

In the North - the River al-Kabir (Eleutheron);
In the South - the River al-Kasmiyah (Leontes);

In the East - the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, including the present districts of Ba'albek, Hasbaya, and Rashaya;

In the West - the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon, having these boundaries will include the cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon, as well as the districts of 'Akkar, Ba'albek, Hasbaya and Rashaya, Sidon, and Marj 'Ayyun.⁶⁹

In defending its position, the delegation reiterated the geographical and natural borders that constituted the historical borders of Lebanon. In the case of Beirut, the memorandum stated that "it is impossible to imagine that Beirut, surrounded on all sides by the territories of the present Lebanon, should be separated from them."⁷⁰ The memorandum mentions the crucial link between Beirut and the rest of Mount Lebanon, that it had always been "part and parcel" of Lebanon, and that "history tells us that Beirut was once the capital of Lebanon."⁷¹ Similar geographical, historical, and strategic justifications are offered for Tripoli, Sidon, 'Akkar, Ba'albek, Beqa'a, Hasbaya, and Marj 'Ayyun.⁷²

The historical memory of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, its delegation, and its constituents viewed Greater Lebanon as an inseparable whole. To them history supported their view and no more justification was necessary. However, to Amir Faysal and many pro-Syrian inhabitants of the region their collective memory was of a Greater Syria and to them no justification seemed sufficient enough reason to carve out a separate Lebanese nation. The closing paragraph of the memorandum of the Lebanese Delegation revealed one of the fundamental fears of the council when it explained:

It is thus not the spirit of conquest or megalomania that spurs Lebanon to reclaim its old borders, but rather a need that overrules all other considerations - survival. Without those borders, the work started in 1861 would remain incomplete, and the independence of Lebanon would be nothing but a cruel irony.⁷³

The Lebanese Delegation returned to Beirut empty-handed, primarily because the decisions that would lead to lines on the map of the Middle East were being sidelined by the more pressing issues needing attention. The Great Powers' concerns included settling issues before the Supreme War Council, continuing negotiations between the Entente and Central Powers, and conducting meetings of Allied representatives concerning the establishment of the League of Nations.⁷⁴ All of the negotiations concerning the fate of the Ottoman Empire in general, and Syria and Lebanon in particular, were delayed as other more pressing issues kept the attention of the peace conference delegates. However, this situation did not preclude Amir Faysal and Colonel Lawrence from continuing to lobby for the support of Clemenceau and Lloyd George throughout March and April 1919.

The Clemenceau-Faysal dialogue led to a meeting between them April 13 in which Clemenceau agreed to "recognize Syria's independence 'in the form of a federation of local autonomous communities in accordance with the wishes and traditions of the inhabitants,' if Faysal accepted a French mandate over Syria."⁷⁵ This agreement placed Faysal's position above any other contenders in the struggle for Lebanon. Meanwhile, the decision to send an inter-Allied commission to the Levant had gained

acceptance,⁷⁶ and Faysal was becoming convinced that he could be vindicated concerning his stance on Lebanon. In thanking the French prime minister for his kindness, Amir Faysal sent a letter to Clemenceau April 20, 1919, saying in part that what had been a difficult relationship between France and the Syrians was now one in which Faysal said he was "a warm friend of France and of your administration."⁷⁷

By the time Faysal arrived in Beirut April 30, 1919, the suspicion of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, and especially the Maronites of the Mountain, was piqued. As later events revealed, it is doubtful Faysal had accepted the idea of a French mandate;⁷⁸ rather he may have hoped to stall the negotiations and await what he envisioned would be a favorable outcome from the Inter-Allied Commission. He thought the commission would verify the Lebanese' expectations as being against a French mandate and for his leadership. The fact that the amir departed from Beirut aboard a British warship, but returned aboard a French one, tended to exacerbate the discomfort of the council.⁷⁹

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Delegation returned to Beirut March 22, 1919. Upon disembarking, Najib 'Abd al-Malik conducted an interview with the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* in which he recapped the events of the Paris Peace Conference and made favorable remarks about Clemenceau.⁸⁰ It did not take long before the members of the council began doubting whether Clemenceau had not in fact traded Lebanon to Faysal in exchange for a French mandate over Greater Syria. The *Lisan al-Hal* also reported on

Da'ud 'Ammun's speech to the administrative council in which he recalled his statement to the Council of Ten at the peace conference including the request for Greater Lebanon, French collaboration, and integrality with Syria given they accept French collaboration.⁸¹

While the delegation was in Paris, two petitions had been distributed by the French in several areas of the Greater Lebanon area. The first petition was distributed in the districts of Batroun, Shuf, Ramliyya, and Matn in January, and the second in Shuf, Kurah, and Matn. The results, although limited and not conclusive for the entire Greater Lebanon region, did favor the notion of Greater Lebanon and the assistance of the French.⁸² However, the first Lebanese Delegation's ability to gain acceptance of their case at the peace conference and the council's ability to convince all the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon were rapidly vanishing by May 1919.

In a speech before Syrian notables in the Town Hall of Damascus May 9, 1919, Amir Faysal rallied support for his rule and in so doing had several Lebanese vow their allegiance to his cause, further weakening the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon's position in the quest for independence. Some of the rhetoric in support of Faysal was aimed at dismantling the notion of Greater Lebanon and replacing it with the notion of a Syrian Arab state, as is apparent from the following statements:

Said Pasha Suleiman of Baalbek: "All the inhabitants of the Kaza Baalbek are at your service; hundreds and thousands awaiting your orders."

Ibrahim Effendi el-Khateeb (Southern Lebanon): "We choose you as our Sultan." (Emir Feisal, smiling: "Leave that aside now"). "Mount Lebanon is at part to complete Syria and would not be separated from it."

Sheikh Abu el-Mejd al-Mograbi of Tripoli: "The nation sacrifices her life and possessions for you."

Riza Bey Sulh of Beirut: "The Arabic nation lays confidence in your highness."

Riaz Bey Sulh of Sidon: "The hopes of the nation are attached to your Highness; the nation sacrifices her blood and soul for you, and from this minute I volunteer as a simple soldier."⁸³

Others who echoed similar impassioned support for Faysal and inclusion in Syria were "Emir Asad el-Ayoubi of Lebanon, Mustapha Bey Awad, on behalf of the Druze of Lebanon, and Abd el-Razala Effendi, el-Duadashly of Husn el-Akrad."⁸⁴ If there remained any doubts that there existed at that time an increasing number of voices of dissent from the administrative council's plan for an independent Greater Lebanon, they were quickly being discarded in light of Faysal's strong position.

Therefore, given that Amir Faysal's agenda was gaining acceptance for a Greater Syria (including Lebanon) with both the French and some Lebanese and that the looming arrival of the Inter-Allied Commission could possibly contradict what the council claimed was its mandate for a Greater Lebanon, the council felt compelled to declare independence in a resolution dated May 20, 1919. As had been the case when it began issuing resolutions after the end of the war, the declaration begins with the familiar preamble, "Whereas Mount Lebanon has been autonomous from times of old with its historical and

geographical borders,..."⁸⁵ and goes on, in part, with the following demands:

1. The proclamation of the political and administrative independence of Lebanon in its geographical and historical borders, and the recognition that the usurped regions are Lebanese territory as it was before they were stripped from it.
2. The making of the government of Lebanon a democratic institution based on freedom, fraternity, and equality, with the protection of the rights of minorities and the freedom of religions.
3. That the Lebanese government, with the assistance of the French government agree upon the regulating of economic relations between Lebanon and neighboring governments.
4. Pursuit of the studying and the organization of the fundamental laws in accordance with established principles
5. Presenting this resolution to the General Peace Conference.
6. Publication of this resolution in the official gazette and in other national newspapers, assuaging the opinions of the Lebanese, and declaring the protection of their rights.⁸⁶

The resolution unequivocally distanced itself from the Greater Syrian scheme, and not-so-subtly dampened its rhetoric calling for French assistance in its internal and external affairs. The Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon was no longer, if it ever was, in the pocket of the French.

Finally, the council declaration was followed by a ceremony in Ba`abda in which Lebanon's independence was pronounced, the Lebanese flag was raised, and the president of the council, Habib as-Sa`d asked Picot to relay the resolution to the Paris Peace Conference.⁸⁷ Given the new leanings of the French toward a Greater Syria in which the French believed they could guarantee the special status of Lebanon, and especially the status of the Christians of the Mountain, Picot was hesitant to

oblige Habib as-Sa`d. Hence the French dispersed the crowds in Ba`abda and tried to deflate the council's growing activism.⁸⁸

By the end of May 1919, the apparent loss of influence of the council with the French, especially with Picot, forced the council to defy Picot and appoint a second Lebanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. This time, the council's choice as president of the delegation was someone who was no stranger to the political, confessional, and personal dynamics of Ottoman, French, and Lebanese affairs - Maronite Patriarch Elias Huwayyik. The only confessionally elected, representative body in the Levant was not willing to give up its historic opportunity to represent the expectations of the Lebanese.

Endnotes

¹Dispatch from Major Cornwallis to London on October 22, 1918. Robin Bidwell, ed., The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 1916-1919, vol. III (London: Archive Editions, 1986) 357.

²Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983) 34-35. The Jaza'iris descended from the famed resistance warrior Amir `Abd al-Qadir of nineteenth-century French Algeria. By the end of WW I the al-Jaza'iri clan had become "landowning-scholarly families" in Damascus.

³Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria (Beirut: Khayats, 1960) 36n3.

⁴Salibi, Modern 160. Salibi does not specify what Muslim denomination `Umar al-Da'uq followed (but he was most likely Sunni).

⁵Salibi, Modern 28. Also see Zeine 28n1, where he quotes `Umar Bey Da'uq's address to the people of Beirut in the official gazette on October 3, "O inhabitants of Beirut, God has bestowed upon you blessings of independence under the protection of the Arab Hashemite Government... a truthful, faithful, honourable and proud Government."

⁶Salibi, Modern 26. Also see Bidwell Arab, vol. III, 350, October 22, 1918, where Lawrence's comments are cited in the Arab Bulletin from Cornwallis. They reveal the distaste Lawrence held for Sa'id al-Jaza'iri and Abd al-Qadir, "They are both insane, as well as pro-Turkish and religious fanatics of the most unpleasant sort."

⁷Zeine 28.

⁸Meir Zamir, "Faisal and the Lebanese Question, 1918-20," Middle Eastern Studies 27 (July 1991): 404. Also see Lawrence James, Imperial Warrior: The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, 1861-1936 (London: Orion, 1993) 172-173. According to James, Allenby first sent Vice-Admiral Thomas Jackson, the senior naval officer in the eastern Mediterranean to Beirut October 6 whereupon he discovered the French warship already in the harbor. This account varies with Zamir in that the latter places the French Navy in Beirut harbor on October 7, the latter being more reliable in this author's opinion as it is based on 21st Corps and Foreign Office records. Also, the Blue Zone was

designated such on September 30, 1918, in London as a provisional agreement on administering the occupied territories until further settlements were reached. Colonel de Piépape was put in charge of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration - West (O.E.T.A.-West) (see Robin Bidwell, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs, part II, series B, vol. 15 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985) 169-170, for copy of the September 30 agreement (BDEFA, II:B:15, 169-170). Also important to note is the fact that both Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges-Picot were present at that meeting.

⁹E.L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 1st series, vol. IV (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952) 412 (DBFP, I:IV, 412).

¹⁰Zeine 37. According to Salibi, Modern 160-161, the Turkish-appointed *mutasarrif*, Mumtaz Bey, handed over authority over Beirut to `Umar al-Da`uq. Zeine's account appears more reliable as he cites the correct location of the seat of government as Ba`abda during the war. Mumtaz Bey succeeded the Shiite *mutasarrif* Isma`il Haqqi Bey (1917-1918).

¹¹Akarli 175. Further evidence of this fact is cited in Zamir, Formation 51, and Zeine 39, where it is noted that the British troops were the ones who lowered the Arab flags and told Shukri Pasha that his "mission was over" (Zeine) in Beirut. Also see Sachar 253. According to Sachar, the British had 200,000 troops in the Middle East at the end of the war, while the French had "a poorly equipped, ragtag French army of 6000 men (half of them Armenian refugee conscripts)."

¹²Zamir, Formation 51.

¹³Zeine 37.

¹⁴Zeine 38.

¹⁵It remains unclear what happened to three of the original council members after it was dissolved in 1915 by the Turkish military authorities (see n18 below). According to Akarli 173, a number of the councilors were banished to Anatolia during the war. The confessional distribution of councilors as per the 1912 adjustment to the *Règlement* was five Maronite, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni and one Shiite.

¹⁶Akarli 100. Also see Salibi, Modern 114. Habib as-Sa`d is described by Akarli as a "veteran advocate of the cause of the

Council and a cautious politician" who headed the al-Arza (the Cedars) society before the war (Akarli 99).

¹⁷Akarli 82-101. The electoral system was devised initially by the 1864 protocol and significantly revised by a 1912 protocol. In the 1864 protocol each village elected its village shaykh who subsequently casted his vote for the councilor who would fill the district's seat for a six-year term on the council. The deputy chairman for the council was appointed by the *mutasarraf* and gained considerable power as the second-in-command of the government of the Mountain in the *mutasarraf's* absence. The adjustments in the 1912 protocol as cited in note 15 above also included the election of a representative of every hundred taxpaying villagers to cast their vote alongside the village shaykh for the councilor seat. The last elections before the war were held February through March 1910.

¹⁸The last ascertainable members of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon before the war are cited in Akarli 236n63 (as of July 1910), and 257n55 (as of June 10, 1920). This list was compared to the signatories of the resolution of the council dated December 9, 1918, outlining the requests the first Lebanese Delegation carried with them to Paris (see G.A. Karam, Qadiyyah Lubnan (Beirut: Editions Almanhal, 1985) 311). All the councilors can be verified with existing sources to have been members of the *majlis idara* before and after the war except Sulayman Kan'an, Niqla Ghushn, and Husayn al-Hajjar.

¹⁹DBFP, I:IV, 293. The senior military administrator of Lebanon had three deputy administrative officers, one in the northern district (Batrun), one in the southern district (Bayt ad-Din), and one in the eastern district (Zahle).

²⁰Zeine 40. According to Zeine, Huwayyik and Coulandre "agreed to leave for the time being its [Lebanon's] administration in the hands of its Administrative Council and as Governor, to appoint temporarily a French Officer."

²¹Zeine 40-41.

²²H.M.V. Temperley, "Armistice of Mudros," A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. I (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920) 496.

²³This term came to represent the question of what the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and others) were going to do with the eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The notion that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling goes back to the nineteenth-century. The

situation with the Levant reveals this earlier disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in light of the *Règlement* of 1861-1864 and its usurpation of some of the Ottoman authority to the Great Powers. See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (London: The MacMillan P, 1966) 156-158.

²⁴Zeine 50.

²⁵Anderson, *Great* 167. Also see Antonius Appendix E. It should be remembered that the definitions of Syria and Mesopotamia differ from the current definitions, and that in 1918, a consensus had not yet been reached by either foreign or local peoples on the definition of these areas.

²⁶BDEA, II:B:I, 12. This was a memorandum by D.G. Hogarth on "Certain Conditions of Settlement of Western Asia" received November 20, 1918, in London. Items 1-4, 5.d), and 5.f) in this citation were not applicable. Another similar memorandum by General George MacDonogh outlining British policy in the Levant called for "France to be given control of the non-Arab area north of the Litani, west of the crest of the Lebanon, and south of a line joining the north end of the Lebanon with a point on the coast just north of Tripoli." BDEP, II:B:15, 177.

²⁷While the notion of becoming a French mandate was not part of the council's platform, there was a "desire for French 'guidance' but not 'protection.'" (Haffar Chapter 2). See Resolution no. 80 of the council discussed later in text in regard to inclusion of Tripoli in Greater Lebanon. Almost forty-eight percent of the Mountain's inhabitants that were surveyed by the King-Crane Commission preferred France as a mandatory power. Also see Haffar 243-248; Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission (Beirut: Khayats, 1963) Chapter V; and U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, vol. XII (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government PO, 1947) 745-862 (PPC, XII, 745-862).

²⁸Haffar 229, explains the views of some of these pro-Faysal Lebanese, especially Iskandar Ammoun and Michel Lutfallah. However, the views of the council in this early period remained against union with Syria (see Resolution no. 80 in text).

²⁹Zeine 51, and Zamir, Formation 53.

³⁰Resolution no. 80 dated December 9, 1918, as reprinted in Karam 310-311 (translated from the Arabic by James J. Simon and reviewed by Professor M. Mazzaoui). The document was signed by

the president of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, Habib as-Sa'd, and the following councilors: Sa'adallah al-Huwayyik, Khalil 'Aql, Sulayman Kana'an, Mahmud Junblat, Fu'ad 'Abd al-Malik, Ilias al-Shuwayri, Muhammad Muhsin, Da'ud 'Ammun, Yusuf al-Baridi, Naqula Ghasan, and Muhammad Sabra al-'Aur. The document was endorsed by M. Georges-Picot.

³¹Resolution no. 80, Karam 310. The delegation's recollection of Fakhir ad-Din II's reign was that it included 'Akka and Haifa, while the other port cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida, as well as the Beqa'a Valley were separated from Greater Lebanon by the Ottomans.

³²Resolution no. 80, Karam 311. The document ends with "a'da' majlis idara jabal lubnan al-kabir."

³³Zamir, Formation 234n42, states that the council appointed seven members to the delegation but that only five actually went: Da'ud 'Ammun, Emile Eddé, Abdullah Khuri Sa'ada, Najib Abd al-Malik, and Abd al-Halim Hajjar. However, in the Arabic text of the resolution published in Karam 310-311, and Abdel-Aziz S. Nawar, Basic Documents for the Modern History of Lebanon, 1517-1920 (Beirut: Beirut UP, 1974) 519-522, the members appointed to the delegation are listed as stated in this text. The religion of Ibrahim Abu Khatir and the previous position of Najib 'Abd al-Malik are indeterminate. By the time of departure, a telegram from M. Georges-Picot to Paris reflects the addition of Tamir Bey Hamade (Greek Orthodox), and another Maronite, Melkite, and Sunni that remain unnamed (Karam 31-33, December 19, 1918). It appears, based on later telegrams related to the delegations travels that these latter travellers were not part of the official delegation. At the peace conference, five members are listed: Da'ud 'Ammun (president of the delegation and Maronite councilor), Abdallah Khoury Sa'ada (Greek Orthodox translator), Emile Eddé (prominent Maronite Lawyer), Najib 'Abd al-Malik (Druze lawyer), and 'Abd al-Halim Hajjar (Sunni councilor from Shuf District). This last delegate is also listed as a councilor by Karam 55-56.

³⁴Telegram from Picot to Cairo dated December 22, 1918, Karam 34-35.

³⁵Zeine 51-52. Accompanying Amir Faysal was General Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, Dr. Ahmad Qadri, Tahsin Bey Qadri, and Nasib al-Bakri.

³⁶Zeine 51-52.

³⁷Zamir, Formation 52-53.

³⁸Zamir, Formation 53. Those opposed to a Lebanese delegation included Generals Allenby and Clayton.

³⁹Telegrams from Da'ud 'Ammun to French consul in Port Said (December 20, 1918) and from 'Ammun to French minister to Egypt (December 31, 1918) and article published January 5, 1919, in the newspaper al-Haqiqa (Beirut), Karam 36-46.

⁴⁰Zamir, Formation 48.

⁴¹Zamir, Formation 23. Before the war Shukri Ghanem, along with Khairallah Khairallah and George Samne established the Comité Libanais of Paris which, after the war, became the Comité Central Syrien. This group as well as similar societies established in Egypt, the United States and elsewhere came to consist of emigrants who tried to influence the peace conference through publishing articles in journals. In Ghanem's case, his standing in French government circles was such that he was given the floor of the conference to speak on the Syrian/Lebanese issue. Also see Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate (London: Oxford UP, 1958) 28 and 88, as well as Tibawi 265, and Salibi, Modern 161.

⁴²PPC, III, 888-894. Present from the Council of Ten meeting in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay were President Wilson, Prime Minister Lloyd George, Prime Minister Clemenceau as well as members of the Italian, Japanese, and the Hijaz delegations.

⁴³PPC, III, 889-891.

⁴⁴PPC, III, 890.

⁴⁵Hourani, Syria 50. Hourani emphasizes that Amir Faysal and Col. Lawrence were aware of the Sykes-Picot Agreement after the Russian's disclosed its contents after the Bolshevik Revolution. What is apparent now is that neither Lawrence nor Faysal expected France to be strong enough to enforce the Sykes-Picot Agreement, nor did they expect Britain to honor the agreement. They were wrong on both counts.

⁴⁶PPC, III, 890.

⁴⁷The Sykes-Picot Agreement. Hourani, Syria 51, summarized the exchanges between Faysal and the British government succinctly by saying that "in the course of his discussions with British statesmen and officials it was made plain to him that Great Britain was not prepared to quarrel with France over Syria, however sympathetic she might be to Arab aspirations." Also

see, in the appendix to the memorandum by the British delegation in Paris dated February 18, the question of who Britain was going to favor - Faysal or France. It was made clear that Britain's pledge to Faysal was limited to "territories in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France." BDEFA, II:B:15, 277.

⁴⁸The members of the CSC present for this meeting were listed as "M. Shukri Ghanem, Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee, M. Anis Schenade, Orthodox Greek, Jamil Mardam Bey, Moslem, Dr. Georges Samne, Greek Melkite, Nejil Bey Maikarzel, Maronite, and Dr. Tewfik Farhi, Hebrew." PPC, III, 1014.

⁴⁹PPC, III, 1013-1038.

⁵⁰PPC, III, 1016.

⁵¹PPC, III, 1017.

⁵²Dr. Bliss' remarks were mostly aimed at encouraging the Council of Ten to appoint a commission, thus his emphasis on censorship. At one point in his discussion, he said, "It is true that a Lebanese delegation has succeeded in reaching Paris and is here today. I know these gentlemen, several of whom are my pupils, but there are many other groups besides this particular delegation, including other groups in Lebanon." PPC, III, 1017. When pressed by Mr. Balfour and Lord Milner as to whether the military authorities were using their position to influence or silence public opinion, Dr. Bliss admitted "that quite the contrary was the case. The existence of the censorship, however, made it difficult for the people to give proper expression to any views." PPC, III, 1021.

⁵³PPC, III, 1024.

⁵⁴PPC, III, 1028.

⁵⁵PPC, III, 1029.

⁵⁶PPC, III, 1031.

⁵⁷The Lebanese Delegation made contact with Shukri Ghanem once they came to Paris. According to Zamir, Formation 53, Ghanem was "coordinating the various Syrian and Lebanese groups on behalf of the Quai d'Orsay to support a French mandate over Syria at the Peace Conference." It remains unsupportable in the documentary evidence that Ghanem influenced the Lebanese Delegation on this point. The Lebanese Delegation clearly

avoided the term "mandate" in its statements before the Council of Ten. For transcripts of the letters outlining the Lebanese Delegation's intentions at the peace conference sent between Da'ud 'Ammun, Shukri Ghanem, M. Phillippe Berthelot, director of political and commercial affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, and M. Pichon see Karam 49-60.

⁵⁸PPC, IV, 3-4.

⁵⁹PPC, IV, 3.

⁶⁰The statements read to the Council of Ten by the members of the Lebanese Delegation did not specify the extent of the Greater Lebanon claims as described in Resolution no. 80 of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. The reason for the absence of these specifics could be attributed to their assumption that M. Pichon and M. Berthelot, both present during the proceedings, were previously informed of the extent of Greater Lebanon (see n57 above). Regardless of this, 'Ammun submitted a memorandum to the peace conference on March 8, 1919, giving the precise borders for Greater Lebanon.

⁶¹PPC, IV, 3.

⁶²PPC, IV, 3.

⁶³More will be said concerning the expectations of the Lebanese when the King-Crane Commission's results are discussed in chapter 2.

⁶⁴PPC, IV, 3.

⁶⁵PPC, IV, 4. The word "integrality" is transcribed in Karam as *al-majmu'a* in Arabic and *l'intégralité* in French, the former defined as "collection, alliance, or league", the latter as "integrality, entirety, wholeness." The PPC record chose integrality. However, the Arabic leaves the translation much more vague.

⁶⁶PPC, IV, 4.

⁶⁷PPC, IV, 4.

⁶⁸PPC, IV, 4.

⁶⁹Meir Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon - The Squaring of a Circle?" The Jerusalem Quarterly 23 (Spring 1982): 44. Arabic

and French version in Karam 73-77. Zamir dates this document as March 8, 1919, but the French and Arabic originals in Karam are dated February 27, 1919. The latter date seems correct in that the delegation departed Paris March 3, 1919 (Karam 26-27).

⁷⁰Zamir, "Smaller," 44.

⁷¹Zamir, "Smaller," 44.

⁷²Zamir, "Smaller," 44.

⁷³Zamir, "Smaller," 45.

⁷⁴Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (New York: St. Martin's P, 1991) 19.

⁷⁵Zamir, "Faisal," 410.

⁷⁶The idea for a commission was pushed by President Wilson and finally agreed to by Clemenceau and the Council of Ten March 20, 1919 (Howard 33).

⁷⁷BDFA, II:B:I, 44-45, "Letter from Amir Faisal to M. Clemenceau," April 20, 1919.

⁷⁸In the declaration of the Syrian Congress of March 7, 1920, of which Faysal presided, they declared the creation of Greater Syria including Lebanon and excluding France (see Chapter 3). Even in May 1919, General Clayton warned Faysal "that this policy of 'deception and intrigue' would eventually be to his detriment and that it could undermine Franco-British relations and his own ties with Britain." (Zamir, "Faisal," 410-411)

⁷⁹Zamir, "Faisal," 410-411.

⁸⁰*Lisan al-Hal*, no. 7763, March 22, 1919, Karam 83-85.

⁸¹*Lisan al-Hal*, no. 7763, March 22, 1919, Karam 88-90.

⁸²The first petition was concluded and the results sent from Picot to Paris with the completion of sixty-two petitions, while the second petition was completed and the results sent after the completion of seventy-nine petitions. The letters showing the results of the petitions are found in Karam 324-326. These results are not published in the existing reference with enough detail (names of petitioners, etc) to provide definitive

information concerning the desires of the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon.

⁸³BDEFA, II:B:I, 54. The text of Faysal's speech was obtained by Captain G.R.Hunter and included in an intelligence assessment from the Arab Bureau by LtCol Cornwallis dated May 12, 1919.

⁸⁴DBFP, I:IV, 543.

⁸⁵Bishara al-Khuri, Haqa'iq Lubnaniyah, vol. I (Beirut: Awraq Lubnaniyya, 1961) 272. Translated from the Arabic by James J. Simon and reviewed by Professor M. Mazzaoui.

⁸⁶al-Khuri 272.

⁸⁷Zamir, Formation 60-63.

⁸⁸Zamir, Formation 60-63.

CHAPTER 2

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND THE SECOND LEBANESE

DELEGATION: JUNE 1919 TO DECEMBER 1919

In the Lebanon there are two main parties, one in favor of an independent Lebanon and the other desirous of forming part of an Arab State with central government in Damascus.¹

This memorandum from General Clayton to Lord Curzon, the acting British foreign secretary, on June 23, 1919, gave a concise assessment of the growing split in the expectations of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. After nine months of being out from under the Ottoman yoke, the Lebanese were showing signs of disagreement. The Lebanese groups in favor of "forming part of an Arab State," according to General Clayton, included pro-Faysal Muslims and "a considerable number of Greek Orthodox Christians and of Druze."² The groups in favor of "an independent Lebanon" included most of the Maronites, "of which the Maronite Patriarch is a leading member,"³ and to a lesser extent the Muslims and Druze. It should be added, however, that General Clayton's assessment mentions one other group "which was in favour of the complete and absolute independence of Lebanon,"⁴ a group that was confessionally elected, one that was still speaking with a unified voice, and one that, over the previous fifty-eight years, had represented a large percentage

of the area in question: the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.⁵

The council, by continuing to adhere to its December 9, 1918, Resolution, still embraced an independent Greater Lebanon ideal. Yet, if General Clayton's assessment was accurate, the council could not claim to represent a Lebanese consensus which, in his estimation, did not exist. However, an appendix to General Clayton's memorandum written June 4, 1919, by French Colonel Copin (the chief administrator of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration - West [O.E.T.A.-West]),⁶ offered a different assessment:

At present the situation is clear. On one side, and these represent the great majority, the partisans for the autonomy of the Lebanon claim a Lebanon more or less large, but are entirely firm and unanimous on the principle of the independence of the country, under the French Protectorate. On the other side, the partisans of Feisal, most of whom are Druzes, demand the attachment of the Lebanon to Syria.⁷

Colonel Copin's claim (a claim coming from an officer reasonably close to the situation) that a "great majority" of the Lebanese desired independence "under the French Protectorate" differed from General Clayton's less confident description of the situation. Although it is possible that Copin's statement may merely represent the patriotic thinking of a Frenchman, it is also possible that he, along with the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, still perceived a Lebanese consensus. Hence, despite the temporary shift in French policy favoring Amir Faysal, the council continued to

press for a Lebanon that would accept French assistance but reject Syrian domination.

The initiative to send a second Lebanese Delegation to Paris gained momentum at the end of May 1919. The council moved to regain some of their lost power after Amir Faysal returned to Beirut from Paris aboard a French ship and after the first Lebanese Delegation to the peace conference returned without obtaining approval for the council's December 9, 1918, Resolution.

Meanwhile, M. Picot was aware that Patriarch Huwayyik was intent on diluting Amir Faysal's strengthened position and that the patriarch was capable of gathering considerable support in the Mountain (as had been seen when church-sanctioned demonstrations led to the council's declaration of independence May 20, 1919). In an exchange of memos at the end of May between M. Picot (in Beirut) and M. Pichon (in Paris), the idea of supporting a second delegation was gaining acceptance in French circles partly due to M. Picot's support, and partly due to the increasingly outspoken patriarch.⁸ In his May 29 letter to M. Picot, M. Pichon mentioned the possibility of the patriarch coming to Paris to discuss the "the situation of Lebanon and Syria and their mutual relations,"⁹ thereby acknowledging the importance of the patriarch's role, but also hinting that France had not abandoned the idea of the merger of Syria and Lebanon.

On June 16, 1919, the final decision to send a delegation was made by the council, and Patriarch Huwayyik was given the

task of leading it.¹⁰ Given French willingness to deal with the patriarch and the council's willingness to grant the patriarch "a mandate to represent all the Lebanese people at the Peace Conference and instructing him to request an independent Greater Lebanon,"¹¹ it seems likely that the council was trying to use the patriarch's respected position, both with the local population and with the French, to gain leverage at the peace talks. If there were any concerns over whether this was merely Huwayyik's delegation or the council's, those concerns were quickly allayed. The president of the council, Habib as-Sa'd, and all but one of the councilors of the confessionally represented council who had signed the resolution of December 9, 1918, carried by the first Lebanese Delegation, signed the resolution authorizing the second Lebanese Delegation and placing Huwayyik in charge.¹²

The council's June 16 decision reiterated its resolution of May 20, 1919, when it called for "confirmation of the administrative and political independence of Greater Mount Lebanon in its historical and natural borders."¹³ Despite the recent stalemate, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon did not show any visible signs of disunity. They still acted in unison on important matters (such as sending the second delegation), and they still believed they had a role to play (as the only elected officials in the Mountain) in the creation of a Greater Lebanon.

The members of the second Lebanese Delegation included Maronite Patriarch Elias Huwayyik (president of the delegation),

Shukrallah Khoury (Maronite bishop of Sur), Ignatius Mubarak (Maronite bishop of Beirut), Butrus Faghali (Maronite bishop of the see of the patriarch), Cyril Mughabghab (Greek Catholic bishop of Zahle), Father Theoduthius Ma'luf (secretary to Mughabghab), and one of the patriarch's brothers, Leon Huwayyik.¹⁴ The fact that the second delegation was comprised of only Christians, and mostly Maronite bishops, might best be seen in light of the leading role the Maronites in general, and the patriarch in particular, were beginning to take in their stand against a merger with Faysal, as well as their continued desire to have French collaboration and protection. Yet, whatever the council's motivation may have been, the fact remained that the council, made up of Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shiite, Greek Catholic, and Greek Orthodox councilors, was willing to place the future of their plans for an independent Greater Lebanon into the hands of these delegates, all of whom (except Leon Huwayyik) were clerics.

The second Lebanese Delegation departed Junieh July 15, 1919, aboard the French warship *Cassard*.¹⁵ En route to Paris, they stopped in Rome to confer with the pontiff, and then continued on their journey after making further arrangements for their arrival in Paris via contacts with the French Ambassador in Rome, M. Barrère.¹⁶ The exchanges between the delegation and M. Barrère, as well as the fact that the delegation was traveling aboard a French vessel, appeared to strengthen the delegation's position and move the council back into the good graces of the French. Perhaps this can be attributed to the

French realization that, by the summer of 1919, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon and the Maronites represented France's best chance of deflecting the criticism it expected to receive from the International Commission of Inquiry.¹⁷

On June 10, 1919, one week before the council formally decided to send the second Lebanese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, the King-Crane Commission arrived in Jaffa.¹⁸ What had been envisioned as an international commission was in fact only the "American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey."¹⁹ The reasons the British and the French did not participate with the commission of inquiry were several. First, they feared that the United States would usurp some of their authority in the region. They also believed that they held the best answer to the Eastern Question as outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and they were concerned that a commission would either be ineffective in trying to discern the desires of the local inhabitants of the Near East or, worse, conclude that Britain and France were not the mandatory powers most favored by the local population.²⁰

Despite Anglo-French resistance, President Wilson dispatched Henry C. King²¹ and Charles R. Crane²² to the Near East to conduct what Dr. Bliss had requested from the peace conference on February 13, 1919: a commission of inquiry. Included in the peace conference's instructions to the commissioners was a request for them to help the peace conference "acquaint itself as intimately as possible with the sentiments

of the people of these regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs."²³

After completing their inquiries in Jerusalem, Amman, and the surrounding areas and after hearing Amir Faysal and members of the newly seated General Syrian Congress²⁴ ask for "complete political independence" of Syria and denounce the idea of separating Lebanon from Syria as "inconsistent with the common welfare,"²⁵ the commission arrived in Ba'albek July 5. The commission's inquiry in Greater Lebanon (the "Greater Lebanon" of the council) lasted until July 12 and included conducting interviews and receiving petitions in Ba'albek, Beirut, Jubail, Batrun, Bkerke, Sidon, Tyre, Ainab, Ba'abda, Zahle, and Tripoli.²⁶

The King-Crane Commission Report was submitted to the peace conference August 28, 1919.²⁷ However, with the exception of several telegrams to Paris giving the peace conference updates concerning their progress, the results of the King-Crane Commission were not publicized and were largely ignored by French and British decision makers.²⁸ The first extracts of the King-Crane Commission Report were not published until December 1922,²⁹ well after the establishment of the mandatory system in the Near East, making publication moot. One of the reasons the French were not keen on disclosing the results was that "everyone knew they confirmed that the Syrians did not want the French as mandatories, preferring the Americans, or the British."³⁰ Yet, in hindsight, the results provide a window, however opaque, through which one can glimpse the expectations

of the local populace in and around Mount Lebanon during the summer of 1919. This helps determine whether or not their expectations were being heralded by the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

The primary methods of inquiry employed by the King-Crane Commission were interviews with groups (delegations) in each town visited and solicitation of petitions from the local populace. The report of the commission was separated into three regional categories. Issues concerning Lebanon fell within the O.E.T.A.-West category.

In the O.E.T.A.-West region the commission met with 163 delegations from the local populace. These delegations varied considerably in size and officialism, as the commission's report admits. The groups received by the commission included political, economic and social, and religious categories.³¹ The results of these meetings were not tabulated separately but appear to have been integrated with the petition results in order to produce the narrative of the report.

In the "Political Groups" category of O.E.T.A.-West, the Commission mentioned receiving thirteen "Mayors and Municipal Councils," six "Administrative Councils," twenty-three "Councils of Village Chiefs," two "Arab Sheikhs," and two "Arab Societies."³² It is not specified in their report who these "Municipal Councils" or "Administrative Councils" were or who they represented. Additionally, there was no clear reference to any group that could specifically be considered the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon anywhere in the

tabulated data or the narration of the report. Based on its own report, then, it appears that the commission did not meet with the council, a body with nearly sixty years of legislative history in the region.³³ This was in stark contrast to the commission's audience with the month-old General Syrian Congress and Amir Faysal in Damascus the week before. Whether this fact should be attributed to the commission's oversight, French interference, or the council's inaction, remains unclear. In light of this omission, however, the results from the interviews conducted with the groups the commission received, at least in the case of Lebanon, should be considered incomplete.

The commission also received 446 petitions from the region during their one week study. In the category of "Territorial Limits" 43.9 percent of the petitions received in O.E.T.A.-West were "For Independent Greater Lebanon." The next largest category of petitions which directly opposed this position were the 24.2 percent of petitions received "Against Independent Greater Lebanon."³⁴ The other relevant category for which petitions were received was the "Choice of Mandate" category. In the category petitioning "For French Assistance" the Commission received 48.1 percent in favor of this position, 28 percent were "For American Assistance," and 1.8 percent were "For British Assistance."³⁵ When combined with the other regions of Syria (O.E.T.A.-South and O.E.T.A.-East), the percentage of those in favor of an independent Greater Lebanon understandably dropped, as did the percentage in favor of a French mandate.³⁶

By the commission's own acknowledgment, the results from the petitions "cannot of course be regarded as a mathematically accurate analysis of the real desires of the peoples of Syria."³⁷ That being the case, it seems unusual that the King-Crane Commission Report offered any substantive recommendations whatsoever, much less against an "Independent Greater Lebanon" or against "French Assistance." Their results, had they accepted their own data, should have led them to recognize that, within O.E.T.A.-West, nearly twice as many of the petitions received called "For Independent Greater Lebanon" (43.9 compared to 24.2 percent). As for French assistance, nearly twice the number of petitions favored this option over the next closest country, America (48.1 compared to 28 percent). Additionally, it seems that if they did not trust their results, they should have concluded that the desires of the local populace were indeterminate, rather than disregard their own tabulated results and conclude that the inhabitants of O.E.T.A.-West desired unity with Syria and no French assistance.

Still, the commission did draw conclusions based on its one week inquiry in Lebanon. In its narrative analysis of the results of its inquiry, the commission summarized part of their findings in the following terms:

As a predominately Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged.

It is certain that *many of the more thoughtful Lebanese* themselves hold this view.³⁸

These comments appear to reflect the personal views of the commissioners more than they reflect the results of their inquiry. Besides sounding condescending in tone, they imply that the commission's overwhelming tabulated results favoring an independent Greater Lebanon most have reflected the "less thoughtful Lebanese."

As for the commission's findings concerning which of the Great Powers should "assist" in the Greater Lebanon region, the report states:

But outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is proposed to include in the "Greater Lebanon," such as Tyre, Sidon, "Hollow Syria," and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the people is *probably* averse to French rule. This includes practically all the Sunnite Moslems, most of the Shiites, a part of the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small group of Protestants. Most of these ask earnestly for America, with British as second choice; the balance for Britain with America as second choice.³⁹

This conclusion, if drawn from the statistical results of the entire Occupied Enemy Territory, is valid, but in the case of O.E.T.A.-West, the results of the petitions, rather than proving that "the majority of the people is *probably* averse to French rule," could only have led to the conclusion that France was the country most favored to provide "assistance" in Lebanon.

These irregularities in the findings of the commission, coupled with the alleged repression of dissenting views by the French and possible fraudulent signatures,⁴⁰ leave the validity of the inquiry in question. The remarks of U.S. Army Captain William Yale, a technical advisor for the commission who had

extensive service in the Near East during the war, offered a different perspective on the situation. Even though emphasizing that "Greater Mount Lebanon should be separated politically from Moslem Syria,"⁴¹ Captain Yale offered this opinion in a report to his superiors dated July 10, 1919, that was written for the United States delegates at the peace conference:

By this I do not mean that eventual union should not be an aim; it should be, but until Moslem fanaticism and Christian fanaticism are abated by education it would be dangerous and unstatesmanlike to try to bind together unreconcilable elements. Mount Lebanon is profoundly Christian and Syria profoundly Moslem; until these two civilizations can be brought closer together it would be folly to try to bond them together by artificial bonds. Such an experiment would possibly prove disastrous for the minority.⁴²

The "minority" Captain Yale spoke of was the Christian minority of Lebanon should a unified Syria come to pass. However, the decisions concerning the fate of the Lebanese did not rest on the King-Crane Commission Report, nor Captain Yale, however timely their findings may have been. The struggle between a unified Syria and an independent, greater Lebanon entered its next phase not in Beirut and Damascus, but in Paris and London.

With the second Lebanese Delegation already en route to Paris to press for a Greater Lebanon (it departed Junieh three days after the commission of inquiry left Tripoli), Amir Faysal decided to set sail once again for Paris to press for his plan for a Greater Syria and a British or American mandate. However, M. Clemenceau refused to meet with Amir Faysal after he arrived in Paris in the beginning of September partly because the former had already secured an important agreement with Lloyd George

which provided for the replacement of British troops by French troops in Lebanon and Cilicia. After learning of M. Clemenceau's refusal to meet Amir Faysal, Lloyd George invited Faysal to London. There, on September 18, 1919, Amir Faysal learned of the agreement to exchange British with French troops.⁴³ The *Aide-mémoire*, as communicated to the British Foreign Office September 18 for dissemination stated in part:

2. Notice is given, both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal, of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on the 1st November, 1919.

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

4. In pursuance of this policy, the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.⁴⁴

The decision to replace British troops in Lebanon with French forces, despite the "Arab force" being given the garrisons of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, incensed Amir Faysal. In the minutes of the meeting between Amir Faysal and Lloyd George on September 19,⁴⁵ Faysal learned that (despite the previous Husayn-McMahon Correspondence of 1915 and 1916, the Declaration to the Seven in June 1918 and the Anglo-French Declaration in November 1918) the British were not willing to continue their military involvement in Syria and Lebanon.

An important development toward the establishment of Greater Lebanon was decided by the *Aide-mémoire*. In fact, it

enhanced a Sykes-Picot type solution and strengthened the chances of the administrative council's resolution of December 1918 being realized. It also threatened Faysal's vision for a Greater Syria that he had hoped would include Lebanon. Faysal's response concerning Lebanon was summarized in the minutes of the September 18 meeting as follows:

What he himself thought was that, on the evacuation of the western zone by the British troops and their replacement by French troops, there would be great trouble and a rising if there was no British administration to appeal to. Then the French Catholics on the frontier of Lebanon would make great trouble in his own districts, and there would be a general rising against the French occupation of the coast. In his view Great Britain would be responsible for any bloodshed that might ensue.⁴⁶

Faysal's concern over the withdrawal of British troops foretold the bloodshed that did in fact occur, but it was not going to be due to the "French Catholics" making trouble for him. Faysal's ultimate failure to attain a Syrian Arab state stemmed from his confrontation with the French over his declaration of independence the following summer. Despite several exchanges between Amir Faysal, Lord Curzon, and Lloyd George in early October in which Faysal proposed "that the arrangement arrived at in Paris should be cancelled, or at least its execution suspended,"⁴⁷ the *Aide-mémoire* was not revoked.

Meanwhile, after the second Lebanese Delegation arrived in Paris August 22, 1919, they began making contacts with various French officials, including the French president, Raymond Poincaré; the president of the Senate, G. Clemenceau; the president of the Chamber of Deputies, H.A. Dubost; and the

minister of foreign affairs, Stephen Pichon.⁴⁸ They also met with ecclesiastical leaders, including Monsignor Amette, cardinal of Paris; Monsignor Emmanuel Pharès, curate of the Maronite patriarchate of Paris; and Monsignor Atié, curate of the Greek-Catholic patriarchate of Paris.⁴⁹ Patriarch Huwayyik also participated in several interviews with newspapers including *Jarida al-Bashir*.⁵⁰ An example of the patriarch's argument for independence in this period was quoted in the Damascus newspaper *al-Asimah* on September 18, 1919:

If the mandate concept based on article 22 of the League...aims to lead the nations to absolute national independence, then Lebanon, having been under international surveillance for nearly sixty years, thereby accumulating experience in political life, deserves now the right to be a country with sovereignty.⁵¹

Another example of the delegation's contacts was their meeting with a British official in Paris, Mr. Forbes-Adam, whose report of the contact was included in a memo from Sir Eyre Crowe (in Paris) to Lord Curzon (in London) on September 29. In the memo, Mr. Forbes-Adam explained the request of the delegation for a Greater Lebanon which would be as follows:

...bounded on the west by the Mediterranean, on the North by a line drawn from and including Tripoli to the Eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon, on the East by the Eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon including the Valley of the Bekaa and the towns of Hasbeya and Rasheya and on the south by the River Litany.⁵²

The delegation also described their fear of a "predominately Arab and Moslem government at Damascus which would rule the whole country including the Lebanon,"⁵³ and they requested that their concerns be made known to the British government.

The Christian Lebanese fear of a "Moslem Government" in Damascus was also mentioned in an intelligence assessment from a British officer in Damascus, Major J.N. Clayton, who, on October 15, 1919, reported to headquarters in Cairo that the possibility of trouble was "considerable, in view of the state of feeling in the Lebanon and the Islamic movement now on foot."⁵⁴ Amir Faysal himself was becoming concerned with his ability to appease the more vocal and radical elements of his constituency in Syria, and he mentioned his concern during a meeting with several British officers that the *Aide-mémoire* had "affected him not in his private capacity but as the representative of his people."⁵⁵

Unrest was also feared between Druze and Maronites as evidenced by a telegram, dated October 10, 1919, from Colonel Meinertzhagen of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Alexandria to Lord Curzon wherein the former stated:

There is little doubt that the French policy has favored Maronites at the expense of Druzes in Lebanon and that armed conflicts are inevitable on the withdrawal of British troops....The immediate effect of Maronite-Druzes conflict in Lebanon will be adoption by Druzes of Gebel Druze of Feisal's anti-French policy.⁵⁶

This assessment of the situation on the ground in Lebanon highlights the tensions that arose after the *Aide-mémoire*, but it did not deter the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon and its delegation from pressing for Greater Lebanon and French assistance. The confessionally elected council, despite Huwayyik's and others' fear of Muslim domination, viewed the problem

they faced not so much in the context of a Muslim-Christian paradigm, but more as a fear of Faysal's unelected General Syrian Congress.

Meanwhile, despite extensive contacts and publicity, the second Lebanese Delegation was not received by M. Clemenceau until the beginning of October. This meeting did not produce any results except possibly opening a dialogue between Huwayyik and Clemenceau, who "had not yet given up hope of reaching an agreement with Faisal" and who was "unwilling to commit himself before the final status of Syria had been decided."⁵⁷ Still, the delegation persisted in presenting its claims in Paris throughout October.

That same month, the council's chances were bolstered when, without their realizing the extent of his impact, General Henri Gouraud, a respected French officer, was appointed October 9 to lead the replacement of British troops with French forces in Lebanon. Gouraud had been commander in chief in the Dardenelles during the war where he lost an arm; "in French Roman Catholic circles" he was "known for his devotion to the Church."⁵⁸ His Catholicity, as his later contacts with Huwayyik reveal, did not, to say the least, hurt his reception among the Uniate Maronites.⁵⁹ He was also respected by Faysal, who had received the *Légion d'honneur* from Gouraud the previous year.⁶⁰

Finally, Patriarch Huwayyik, representing the second Lebanese Delegation, was given the opportunity to present the council's claims, in French, to the Paris Peace Conference

October 25, 1919. The memorandum emphasized four fundamental claims:

1. The recognition of the independence of Lebanon which the government of Lebanon and its people proclaimed on May 20, 1919.
2. The restoration of Lebanon to its historical and natural borders, with the return of the territories which were detached from it by Turkey.
3. Sanctions against the perpetrators of the atrocities and the executions, or the instigators of them, and which the Turkish and the German authorities in Lebanon planned. The coercion of Turkey to pay reparations to Lebanon for its restoration, and the increasing of the number of its inhabitants, part of whom had died by starvation which the enemy managed and organized.
4. In view of the fact that the Versailles Treaty, which was promulgated on 28 June 1919, established the principle of the mandates, which would not deny Lebanon its sovereignty, Lebanon requested that the mandate be entrusted to the Government of the Republic of France who will provide it with its assistance and its guidance, in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations.⁶¹

The declaration proceeded to elaborate these four points at length by clearly calling for a French mandate "which would not deny Lebanon its sovereignty" and the return of Lebanon's "historical and natural borders." By citing Article 22 of the newly established League of Nations, the memorandum recalled "the right of nations to self-determination,"⁶² something the members of the peace conference could not ignore. The tone of this memorandum, more than that of the first Lebanese Delegation to the peace conference, revealed a bitterness toward the Turks that still lingered in the minds of the inhabitants of the Mountain.

In its claim for a Greater Lebanon, the delegation's historical memory stretched far back in time when it stated:

When Lebanon demands to be enlarged it actually only demands territorial restoration to which both history and the map of the French Military Staff in 1860-1862 bear testimony....This area corresponds to a geographical entity which once was Phoenicia and which in modern times, up to 1840, constituted Lebanese territory.⁶³

The second Lebanese Delegation tried every possible historical benchmark, including the Phoenician example, in order to justify their claims. By stating the council's case before the peace conference in this way, Patriarch Huwayyik both reiterated what had already been proposed by the first Lebanese Delegation and expanded those arguments that supported the position of the council. Yet, despite this memorandum's argument, the delegation did not receive any guarantees from the peace conference for a Greater Lebanon or a French mandate.

The second Lebanese Delegation did not, however, leave Paris with nothing to show for their efforts. In a letter from M. Clemenceau to Patriarch Huwayyik dated November 10, 1919, Clemenceau assured the patriarch "that France was in full agreement with the Lebanese aspirations" but that "certain limitations" needed to be defined. However, those limitations "could not be defined for the time being before the mandate over Syria had been granted to France."⁶⁴ This letter was tantamount to Clemenceau recognizing a future independent Lebanon if the mandate fell to the French. Clemenceau, after consulting with Picot and Robert de Caix, a well-known writer and publicist at the time who favored the French position and was going to

accompany Gouraud as his secretary-general, became convinced of the need to support "Lebanese aspirations."⁶⁵

Hence, with their mission complete, the second Lebanese Delegation departed Paris and arrived in Beirut, via Rome, on December 25, 1919.⁶⁶ During the delegation's return trip, events in Lebanon, especially concerning the withdrawal of British troops in the Beqa`a Valley and their replacement by French troops, were beginning to cause considerable unrest.

On November 21, 1919, the same day General Gouraud arrived in Beirut to assume command of all French forces as the new French *Haut Commissaire*, Amir Faysal sent a telegram to Lloyd George that increased the stakes considerably. Faysal was worried that, should the British relinquish control of the Mountain to the French, areas under his command (particularly Beqa`a, Ba`albek, and Zabadani) would be threatened. In his telegram he said:

Any violation of the boundary by any Government or in any way contrary to the wishes of my father the King and the expressed desires of the people will be considered as an aggression which the Arab army cannot be blamed for actively resisting. This violation is expressly a breach of international law and the sacred rights of the people.⁶⁷

In order to stave off a confrontation and accepting the advice of General Congreve, the commander of British forces in Egypt, General Gouraud delayed deploying his troops in the Beqa`a Valley until he sent word of his intention to Faysal's chief of staff, Nuri al-Said, in Damascus.⁶⁸ Faysal, meanwhile, was still pressing for a revocation of the *Aide-mémoire* in Paris. A

temporary agreement between Faysal and Clemenceau, and the latter's message to Gouraud to stand fast, delayed the French occupation of the Beqa'a. However, Gouraud, skeptical of Faysal's intentions and with the concurrence of General Allenby and Nuri al-Said, began stationing small French garrisons in Rayak, Mu'allaka, Ba'albek, and Rashaya.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, the negotiations, statements, and agreements that had been decided in Paris and London since the summer of 1919 were, by the end of November, shifting back to the Mountain. The apparent success of the second Lebanese Delegation, and the fact that the French forces were replacing British ones, encouraged the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. Yet, the council was not pleased with several aspects of the military occupation under which they were having to live. In a resolution promulgated on November 29, 1919, the council reminded the French of the Mountain's autonomous history and then proceeded to register its complaints. Resolution no. 1304 of the council stated "their confidence in the occupying French forces and their belief in the sincere desire of the French to offer help unrelated to colonization and tyranny."⁷⁰ However, the resolution explained seven areas they felt needed to be addressed:

1. Occupying French administrators "must have limited authority and powers" thereby respecting the government of the Mountain.
2. French officials should not "interfere in juridical matters" nor exert "undue influence upon local tribunals."
3. French officials should not be able to fire or transfer magistrates.

4. "The Lebanese gendarmerie as well as the Military Council [should] be left free and independent in the fulfillment of their duties, and it is not permissible for the advisors to order them directly...."

5. The Council insists that civil servant employment be based on religious affiliation as well as on the basis of examination.

6. "No appointments for positions in the government of Mount Lebanon are to be allowed except for Lebanese citizens of Mount Lebanon."

7. "No employee is to be relieved of his duties for slight cause."⁷¹

In its conclusion, the council stated that, by accepting French aid, it did not intend to relinquish its independence. These words echoed the council's declarations since December 1918. The view of the council had always been, and was still, that French assistance and collaboration should not supplant Lebanese independence. In acknowledging General Gouraud's arrival, the council's resolution reminded the French that "it is doubly necessary that we as independent people must not have fewer rights and less freedom now than we have had previously."⁷²

By the end of 1919, tensions were rising between pro-Faysal groups and French forces in the Beqa'a Valley. During December, several pro-Faysal groups attacked French garrisons, railway lines, and Christian villages in the Beqa'a Valley and Marj 'Ayun. These disturbances began to convince General Gouraud, who had been sent to accept French responsibility in the Blue Zone of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, of the need for a military solution. One such incident, in which a French soldier was killed, compelled Gouraud to dispatch troops to Ba'albek in order to ensure public security despite the strong protest of Faysal.⁷³

Meanwhile, on December 23, 1919, in anticipation of Huwayyik and the second Lebanese Delegation's arrival, the Beirut daily newspaper *Jarida al-Bashir* offered their sentiments when they printed: "Beatitude, in the name of Lebanon, in the name of Syria, in the name of France, happy return! Welcome applause to the Patriarch of Lebanon."⁷⁴ Beyond the warm welcome Huwayyik received in some circles in Beirut, especially among the Christians,⁷⁵ there were those who began to feel that too much had been given up to the French by Huwayyik and the second Lebanese Delegation. Within the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, however, the only visible signs of discord were those cited by the council's November 29 Resolution.

In Paris, the continuing dialogue between Clemenceau and Faysal resulted in his tentative acceptance of Clemenceau's proposal to recognize an independent Lebanon, a French mandate, and borders to be determined by the peace conference.⁷⁶ Thus, despite the cautiousness with which some viewed the results of the second Lebanese Delegation, less than a week before Huwayyik arrived in Beirut, Faysal (who was still in Paris), reached an understanding with Clemenceau. In Article 4 of the draft agreement, Faysal agreed to "recognize the independence of the Lebanon under the French Mandate within the frontiers delimited by the Peace Conference."⁷⁷

Meanwhile, as evidenced by their November 29 Resolution, tensions were growing inside the council as a result of French military occupation. On the one hand, the horizon looked fairly promising for the council's plan for a Greater Lebanon, due to

French assistance and Faysal's willingness to allow extended borders should the peace conference decide in their favor. The question was fast becoming, however, to what degree French military occupation was going to remain one of assistance and guidance and, more concretely, the extent to which it was going to be viewed as a displacement of hard earned Lebanese autonomy.

Therefore, as 1920 began, positions were beginning to harden. Conflict arose over France's desire to assert its role as the responsible mandatory power in Lebanon and Syria. Tensions also increased between Faysal and the French over the Beqa'a Valley and his fear of French designs on Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus. Lastly, but perhaps more importantly, the business of settling the Eastern Question would reach a crescendo in the Great Power politics of 1920: lines that never before existed on the map of the Near East, particularly Greater Lebanon, were about to be drawn.

The Entente had long since signed the treaty of peace with Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Other settlements were fleshed out as well; treaties with Austria (September 10), Bulgaria (November 27), and Hungary (whose delegation was summoned to Paris December 1 to begin finalizing their peace treaty) were either completed or were close to being signed.⁷⁸ Hence, nothing was left for the Great Powers but to engage the thorny questions concerning the fate of the "Sick Man of Europe." In the case of Lebanon, however, there remained a persistently vocal body whose voice would

continue to be heard in 1920: the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

Since October 1918 when it reconvened after the war, the council had managed to remain a confessionally elected, deliberative body. It had successfully dispatched two delegations to the peace conference, the second of which gained significant, though not final, assurances. Looking forward to 1920, despite signs of disagreement over the role the French were going to have in Greater Lebanon and whether it should become part of Greater Syria, the council continued to represent expectations that it thought most closely reflected the will of the vast majority of the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon. As had been the case since October 1918, the council chose to rely in 1920 on the one means it had available that afforded them a strong voice at the peace talks: they decided to try one more Lebanese delegation. By so doing, they displayed one of their last vestiges of solidarity in their hope for independence.

Endnotes

- ¹BDFA, II:B:I, 66.
- ²BDFA, II:B:I, 66.
- ³BDFA, II:B:I, 66.
- ⁴BDFA, II:B:I, 66.
- ⁵BDFA, II:B:I, 66.
- ⁶O.E.T.A.-West included Mount Lebanon, the Beqa'a Valley, and the coastal regions from Alexandretta to Tyre.
- ⁷BDFA, II:B:I, 69.
- ⁸Zamir, Formation 63.
- ⁹Karam 101-102.
- ¹⁰Karam 333. The actual resolution of the council selecting Huwayyik, according to Zamir Formation 237n89, was published in *L'Asie arabe*, October 5, 1919. A June 23, 1919, newspaper article in *Jarida al-Qahira* (Karam 334-336) announced the decision of the *majlis idara* to send a delegation led by Huwayyik.
- ¹¹Zamir, Formation 70.
- ¹²The signatories included Habib as-Sa'd, Khalil 'Aql, Da'ud 'Ammun, Sulayman Kan'an, Sa'adallah al-Huwayyik, Mahmud Junblat, Fuad 'Abd al-Malik, Muhammad Sabra, Ilias Shuwayri, Muhammad Muhsin, and Yusuf Baridi. Niqula Ghusn (Greek Orthodox, Kura district) was the only councilor whose signature, for unknown reasons, was not on the resolution (Karam 334).
- ¹³Karam 334. Compare to May 20, 1919, resolution in al-Khuri 272.
- ¹⁴Article published in the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* September 25, 1919, Karam 128-129. This list differs from Karam's summary of events concerning the second delegation where he states that Ma'luf was a bishop (93). Also, contrast this list with Zamir, Formation 70, and Akarli 176, who do not mention the patriarch's brother at all.

¹⁵Dispatch from M. Picot to Paris outlining the travel plans of the delegation, Karam 109.

¹⁶Several telegrams are cited in Karam 112-125, between Barrère, the delegation, and Pichon from July 27 to August 12, 1919.

¹⁷Zamir, Formation 66-70.

¹⁸PPC, XII, 753.

¹⁹PPC, XII, 751.

²⁰Nevakivi 131-140, and Howard 31-50. Howard also points out that Lloyd George had been willing to have Britain participate in the inquiry until the French refused to participate because the commission was not going to include Mesopotamia in its inquiry.

²¹president of Oberlin College, Ohio.

²²treasurer of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.

²³PPC, XII, 747.

²⁴Longrigg 90. The General Syrian Congress declared itself the legal representative of Syria June 20, 1919. Just prior to the King-Crane Commission's visit in Damascus, the General Syrian Congress approved the "Damascus Programme" which opposed the separation of Lebanon and Palestine from Syria (Zamir, Formation 3-4).

²⁵Howard 119-120.

²⁶PPC, XII, 754.

²⁷PPC, XII, 751.

²⁸PPC, XII, 745-750.

²⁹Howard 311. According to Howard, the report arrived the day after President Wilson collapsed while on his campaign tour.

³⁰Sharp 180.

³¹PPC, XII, 756.

³²PPC, XII, 756.

³³There was no mention of the commission meeting with the council in its report, nor is there any mention of contact between them in Howard's exhaustive study of the commission. The report does not mention meeting with Patriarch Huwayyik; however, in a memorandum from Mr. Forbes-Adam (see n51 below), the second Lebanese Delegation stated that they had "explained their views to the American Commissioners on their recent visit to Syria." This points to the possibility that the commissioners may have met with some of the members of the second Lebanese Delegation in Bkerke, but the fact remains that, in the case of the council, no evidence exists of any meetings.

³⁴PPC, XII, 759 and 764. The percentage in support of each program were calculated by the commission giving different values to each petition based on the number of signatures on each. In O.E.T.A.-West, 26,884 signatures were received. In the category "For Independent Greater Lebanon" the results were 187 petitions out of 446, whereas in the category "Against Independent Greater Lebanon" the results were 108 petitions out of 446.

³⁵PPC, XII, 759. The results were 215 petitions out of 446 "For French Assistance," 125 out of 446 "For American Assistance," and 8 out of 446 "For British Assistance."

³⁶PPC, XII, 759-780. Out of 1863 petitions received, those "For United Syria" were 80.4 percent, while those "For Independent Greater Lebanon" were 10.9 percent. Those "For French Mandate" were 14.52 percent, and those "For French Assistance" were 14.68 percent. However, these results reflect the opinions of the entire region and not those of O.E.T.A.-West, the region of Lebanon itself. The entire region surveyed included Palestine and the areas around Amman and Alexandretta, and all of Syria.

³⁷PPC, XII, 763.

³⁸PPC, XII, 790. Italics added for emphasis.

³⁹PPC, XII, 775. Italics added for emphasis.

⁴⁰PPC, XII, 849.

⁴¹Howard 131.

⁴²Howard 131.

⁴³Zeine 111-112.

⁴⁴BDEFA, II:B:I, 96-97.

⁴⁵DBFP, I:IV, 395-404. In addition to Amir Faysal and General Haddad (director of public security in O.E.T.A.-East), the meeting was attended by the key British decision makers of the time: Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, General Allenby, and Colonel Cornwallis.

⁴⁶DBFP, I:IV, 401.

⁴⁷BDEFA, II:B:I, 103-111. The exchanges were on September 21 (Faysal to George), September 23 (Faysal to George), October 9 (Curzon to Faysal), October 9 (Faysal to George), October 10 (George to Faysal). In the last exchange, Lloyd George stated, "It is therefore impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw the proposals which they have made for dealing with the Syrian problem in the interim period until the Peace Conference can settle it."

⁴⁸Karam 93, and Zamir, Formation 71. The delegation also made contact with Shukri Ghanem, who helped them, like he did with the first delegation, make contacts with French officials. For exchange of letters between Ghanem, the delegation, and other French officials, see Karam 181-201.

⁴⁹Karam 93.

⁵⁰Karam 127-138. The Lebanese delegation and its objectives were also discussed in several *Jarida Lisan al-Hal* articles cited by Karam. These articles occurred between August 25 and September 25.

⁵¹As quoted by Haffar 230.

⁵²DBFP, I:IV, 439-440.

⁵³DBFP, I:IV, 439.

⁵⁴BDEFA, II:B:I, 163.

⁵⁵BDEFA, II:B:I, 115. Memo sent from Colonel Cornwallis to the foreign office, October 11 summarizing a meeting between Faysal and Colonel de Meru. Also see Zeine 120-121.

⁵⁶DBFP, I:IV, 451. Colonel Meinertzhagen was responding to a message he had received (October 9, 1919) from Amir Zeid of the "Lebanese civil defence committee." This telegram, from a hitherto unmentioned Lebanese committee, stressed their view of the direness of the situation this way: "Country full of disturbances, murderous attacks of very frequent occurrence. It has become dangerous for individuals to travel in districts and almost impossible for local French authorities to pacify country owing to political disputes. Non-Maronites absolutely refused French intervention." This telegram was signed by "Selim-el-Yaoussef, Amin Khadre, Mahoud Eskieddini, and A. Musfy." However, in his report of the situation, Meinertzhagen stated that "there is no evidence of such alarming situation as outlined in above quoted telegram."

⁵⁷Zamir, Formation 71.

⁵⁸DBFP, I:IV, 449-450. Telegram from Earl of Derby to Lord Curzon (October 9, 1919).

⁵⁹Karam 152. Huwayyik sent a letter to General Gouraud (November 8, 1919) before either of them had left Paris and enclosed a copy of his memorandum to the peace conference for Gouraud to consider before he assumed his position in Beirut.

⁶⁰BDEFA, II:B:I, 115. Also see n54 above.

⁶¹Karam 154. Translated from the Arabic by James J. Simon.

⁶²For detailed discussion of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the resulting mandate system see Norman Bentwich, The Mandates System (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), and Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1930).

⁶³Zamir, "Smaller," 45.

⁶⁴Zeine 122. For transcript of the letter see Zeine Appendix F. Also, for coverage of the Huwayyik-Clemenceau contacts see *Jarida Lisan al-Hal* article reproduced in Karam 175-177, dated November 12, 1919.

⁶⁵Zamir, Formation 72.

⁶⁶Karam 205. Dispatch from Gouraud to Paris on the delegation's itinerary (dated December 16, 1919).

⁶⁷BDFA, II:B:I, 147.

⁶⁸Zamir, "Smaller," 414.

⁶⁹Zamir, "~~Sm~~aller," 415.

⁷⁰Haffar 330. Also see Nawar 534-537 (Arabic), and Zamir, Formation 281-284 (French).

⁷¹Haffar 330-332. Haffar lists eight resolutions as part of this declaration; however, he includes the conclusion of the document in number eight, which is not actually enumerated in the Arabic text (see Nawar 536).

⁷²Haffar 332.

⁷³Zamir, "Smaller," 416-418. The incident referred to was on December 14 and 15, 1919. In a telegram from Faysal to Lord Curzon, Faysal protested against the French moving troops into the Ba'albek area "on the grounds that a French sergeant was wounded in the course of a dispute between a French officer and some Arabs," to which Faysal asked for "the immediate withdrawal of their [French] troops (DBFP, I:IV, 591-592, telegram dated December 19, 1919)."

⁷⁴Karam 244.

⁷⁵Karam 234.

⁷⁶Zamir, "Smaller," 416.

⁷⁷DBFP, I:IV, 593. It should be noted that the arrangements for the border of southern Lebanon and northern Palestine were also being heavily debated throughout this period. In a lengthy report to the British peace delegation on December 12, 1919, M. Berthelot outlined the Zionist desire for Palestine to include the Litani River and Mount Hermon. The French called for recognition of the Sykes-Picot lines (running east from just north of Acre, then turning north over Mount Hermon), DBFP, I:IV, 577-587. The refinement of these border issues was worked out primarily between Britain and France during the San Remo Conference in April 1920 (see Chapter 3).

⁷⁸Sharp 38-39.

CHAPTER 3

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND THE THIRD LEBANESE

DELEGATION: JANUARY 1920 TO SEPTEMBER 1920

In the district of Beqa`a, which is claimed both by Lebanon and the Arab state, the police administration will be provisionally carried out by an Arab gendarmerie officered by French military inspectors. The ultimate attribution of that district - either to Lebanon or to the Arab State - will be decided by the Peace Conference; but it appears probable that the claims of Lebanon will be favored.¹

Little could the Earl of Derby in Paris have known when he telegraphed Lord Curzon in London on January 8, 1920, how accurate his prediction for the Beqa`a Valley was. Not only was the Beqa`a Valley's fate, as well as the rest of the Near East, ultimately "decided by the Peace Conference," but also the "claims of Lebanon" were "favored." Surely, few years in the history of Lebanon and Syria witnessed more high-level negotiations and agreements, and more decisive turning points, than did the year 1920. Going into the year, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon had agreed to the dispatch of the third Lebanese Delegation. By September 1920, the council had split, been dissolved, and then, while its third delegation was still in Paris, had witnessed the realization of its goals as they had first articulated them in their December 9, 1918, Resolution.

The decision to send a third Lebanese delegation to the peace talks in the beginning of 1920 came amidst sporadic

clashes between French forces and the Christian villages on the one hand, and pro-Faysal Shi'i Mutawallih (and occasionally Druze and bedouin) on the other.² These ongoing skirmishes, however, were not as threatening to General Gouraud as the difficulties the French were experiencing in Cilicia between January and April 1920. Indeed, as much as Gouraud wanted to ensure French control in the Blue Zone around Mount Lebanon and the Beqa'a Valley, he was just as keen on maintaining control in the province of Cilicia, and particularly, the port of Alexandretta. M. Aristide Briand, who by January 1921 would become French prime minister, remarked to the Chamber of Deputies in June 1920, "The gulf of Alexandretta is an important thing in the Mediterranean, its possession is essential to the future of France!"³

The attention Cilicia continued to receive in early 1920 was not enough, however, to completely sideline the unsettled affairs of the Lebanese region. After a short respite in Bkerke, the seat of his patriarchate, Huwayyik sent, on January 31, a letter to the O.E.T.A.-West's administrative agent (Colonel Nieger) outlining a plan to dispatch a third Lebanese Delegation to the peace talks.⁴ Patriarch Huwayyik also wrote to the administrative council concerning a third delegation, and the council approved the Huwayyik plan and made it their own by a February 28, 1920, Resolution.⁵

The president of the third Lebanese Delegation was Maronite Archbishop 'Abdallah Khouiry, representative (curate) of the patriarchate. The other members included Alfred Musa Sursuq,

Orthodox Christian and head of the Christian Committee in Beirut; Ahmad Bey al-Asa'd, a Shi'i notable from Jabal 'Amil, Amir Tawfiq Arslan, Druze notable from Lebanon; Shaykh Yusuf Gemayal, Lebanese industrialist; and Emile Eddé, Lebanese lawyer and member of the first Lebanese Delegation.⁶ The mission of the third Lebanese Delegation, as Huwayyik proposed it in his letter to Colonel Nieger, was summarized as follows:

They are charged with requesting an independent Lebanon, with its plains and villages and ports which the Turks have stripped from her; and with regard to the mandate of the French, in conformity with the memorandum we presented to the Peace Conference on October 25, 1919.⁷

In their February 28, 1920, Resolution making the third Lebanese Delegation their own, the council seconded Huwayyik's letter to Nieger in January when it stated:

Accordingly, the entire Council has decided to commission as its representative Archbishop 'Abdallah Khoury, who is currently present in Paris, for completing the endeavor in front of the Peace Conference.⁸

Thus, despite the fact that the idea of the third delegation had originated from Patriarch Huwayyik, by the end of February, the council had accepted the delegation as its own.

By the time the third Lebanese Delegation began to engage French officials in Paris, two significant changes had already taken place in January 1920: Alexandre Millerand had taken over as prime minister of France January 20,⁹ and the Paris Peace Conference had officially closed its doors January 21.¹⁰ Millerand tended to be more supportive than Clemenceau of Gouraud and of his needs in the Levant and Cilicia, including

approval of additional troops, as the spring of 1920 approached.¹¹ Meanwhile, while the Lebanese Delegation concentrated on the French and remained in Paris, the next round of negotiations concerning the settlement of the former Ottoman Empire shifted to London and the Supreme Council of the Allies.

The Conference of London began February 12, 1920, and continued through April 10. The settlement of the Eastern Question included discussions of the Ottoman debt; control of the Straits and Constantinople; spheres of influence in Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia; treatment of minorities (especially Armenians); Greek and Italian claims; and oil rights in the region.¹² In the case of Syria and Lebanon, Lord Curzon stated during the February 14 session what had been presumed since the Armistice of Mudros over a year before: "that it was resolutely the intention of the Powers to separate from Turkey proper the non-Turkish States of Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, &c."¹³ It then became the task of the Allies to decide how to separate from Turkey those non-Turkish states of which Lebanon was one. Thus, the time had come to erase the Ottoman lines on the map of the Near East, and to replace them with lines which would not only decide the fate of Amir Faysal and the General Syrian Congress, but also the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon and its third Lebanese Delegation.

The members of the London Conference were not unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Lebanese/Syrian dilemma. Indeed, it had only been one month since Amir Faysal's departure from Paris (January 7) with an unsigned agreement with Clemenceau in which

it was agreed that the "Peace Conference" would decide the borders of Greater Lebanon. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, M. Cambon, M. Berthelot¹⁴ - these were high-level French and British officials who had considerable histories of involvement in their governments' respective foreign policies in the Levant. For its part, the United States had lost what influence it had in the peace talks after President Wilson's collapse, and had relegated itself to observer status in the sessions after December 9, 1919.¹⁵ Thus, the future of the Levant was increasingly being decided in Franco-British circles (something the Lebanese delegations, and Amir Faysal, knew all too well).

In addition to settling the Syria-Palestine and Syria-Mesopotamia border issues during the course of the conference, the February 17, 1920, session also resolved the Anglo-French disputes concerning the Lebanon-Palestine border, deciding that the Litani River would be inside Lebanon.¹⁶ Also agreed to at the February 17 session, while the members awaited League of Nations approval for their plan, was the acceptance of the Palestine and Mesopotamia mandates by Britain and the Lebanon and Syria mandates by France.¹⁷ The League, established by the second plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference on January 25, 1919,¹⁸ had drafted into its covenant Article 22 which included the following introduction:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inherited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the

principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.¹⁹

Article 22 established the mandatory arrangement which, under the supervision of the Permanent Mandates Commission, was designed to ensure that the "sacred trust" would not be broken. Knowing that the mandate system would soon be implemented, Britain and France agreed, at the London Conference, to be the powers who could best fulfill the "Covenant."

On February 18 M. Berthelot briefed the conference on the main provisions of the Clemenceau-Faysal draft agreement of December 1919. The key aspect of Berthelot's presentation was the one that foretold what was in fact happening to Faysal in Damascus. In the minutes of the meeting, Berthelot concluded:

He [Berthelot] fully realized...that his [Faisal's] position would be a difficult one, on account of his being surrounded in Damascus by a group of enemies, who entertained anti-French sentiments. But, should the Emir Feisal lose authority owing to his weakness, it was understood that all agreements entered into would, *ipso facto*, lapse.²⁰

As Berthelot had predicted, Amir Faysal's "weakness" was becoming more and more apparent. Thus, while the London Conference moved on to issues other than Levantine ones after the end of March and would not resume talks concerning the Levant until the San Remo Conference in the middle of April, Amir Faysal had returned to Damascus after a four-month round of negotiations in Britain and France.

After arriving in Beirut January 14, 1920, Faysal was presented with several grievances by General Gouraud concerning

the continuing attacks against French troops and Christian villages. In his memos Gouraud included lists of Arab army officers and leaders of groups who were suspected of being involved in the attacks.²¹ However, Faysal was having to face an increasingly outspoken General Syrian Congress, and his ability to cool their anti-French sentiments became increasingly dependent on the degree to which he was willing to defy Gouraud. Gouraud was intent on a separate Lebanon and the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. Hence, by the time of the London Conference, the December 1919 agreement Faysal had made with Clemenceau was becoming less and less possible for Faysal to accept, whereas Gouraud saw the Clemenceau-Faysal agreement, especially with regard to Lebanon, as the unofficial law of the land.

By the end of February, Amir Faysal's options were rapidly diminishing. He either had to lead the increasingly nationalist, anti-French Syrian Congress, or get out of its way. He eventually chose the former option. A timely assessment of Faysal's situation in Syria and Lebanon, one that showed he had not yet abandoned the notion of working with the French, came from Lieutenant Commander Butler, a British officer sent to Beirut to assess the situation on the ground. After meeting with the British consul-general, General Gouraud, several French military officers, and others, Butler's report of February 24, 1920, stated, in part:

The Emir Feisal, he [Gouraud] thought, would keep to his contract with the French in his own interests.

He had to have the appui of one of the Great Powers, and since Mr. George had told him he would not have British tutelage he realized he must turn to the French. He made no complaint against the Emir or the present Government in Damascus, and only referred indignantly to their past encouragement of brigands in the French sphere.²²

Indeed, Faysal was being backed into a corner by his own constituents and could no longer appear weak regarding the French, whereas Gouraud, though still willing to work with Faysal, soon found himself backed into a corner as well.

Meanwhile, following Millerand's return from the London Conference, the third Lebanese Delegation managed to open a dialogue which, with the help of the dramatic events that unfolded in Damascus in the beginning of March, would lead to the establishment of Greater Lebanon by the summer's end. After arriving in Paris February 11, 1920, the Lebanese Delegation began a series of contacts, beginning with the director of political and commercial affairs, M. Paléologue, on February 21. Finally they engaged in direct correspondence with Millerand on March 13.²³ Just prior to receiving the delegation's March 13 letter, however, Millerand received news of what the British had begun to suspect,²⁴ and of what Gouraud had actually heard might happen from Nuri as-Said in a meeting in Beirut March 4:²⁵ Faysal and the General Syrian Congress declared the independence of Syria "in the name of the Syrian Arab nation," on March 7, 1920.²⁶

The Syrian declaration of independence stated that Syria included not only Palestine and Lebanon but Mesopotamia as well. Amir Faysal was elected King of Syria, Palestine, and Mosul, and

his brother, Amir `Abdallah, was appointed King of Mesopotamia.

The declaration stated the following concerning Lebanon:

National Lebanese aspirations would be preserved in their own administrative region, guaranteeing its generally recognized borders from before the World War, on the condition that it be detached from any foreign influence.²⁷

This was clearly a decision that strengthened Faysal's position with his Damascene and Syrian supporters. However, by declaring the independence of the Syrian Arab nation, Faysal not only alienated the British and the French but also the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, its delegation in Paris, and the Maronite patriarch.

Faysal's action, in concert with the General Syrian Congress, set in motion a series of events that had immediate consequences for the creation of Greater Lebanon. The first voices of protest were heard in Beirut, and those cries of discontent quickly reached Huwayyik, who immediately sent a telegram to Millerand. The third Lebanese Delegation in Paris also sent a telegram to Millerand (March 18) protesting Faysal's moves and asking for an audience to state their case. `Abdullah Khoury, president of the delegation, had previously sent a telegram to Huwayyik, through Gouraud, on March 15 reassuring them both that no change in French policy had occurred.²⁸ By the March 20, Millerand responded to the Lebanese Delegation's March 18 letter by meeting the delegation and thereby solidifying French support for an independent Greater Lebanon and

reaffirming the Clemenceau-Huwayyik agreement of November 1919.²⁹

Despite Faysal's telegrams to Britain and France attempting to convince them of the righteousness of his decision,³⁰ the reaction was swift and clear. Britain especially protested Faysal's claims on Palestine and Mesopotamia; France objected to any infringement on their Syrian and Lebanese mandate and to the notion of Lebanon being allowed its autonomy only if it "detached" itself from "any foreign influence." The Syrian Arab state's declaration of independence served not only to deafen the ears of Britain and France to Faysal, but, with the upcoming San Remo Conference, it also ushered in growing uneasiness and renewed activism by the council, its delegation in Paris, and Patriarch Huwayyik.

Within a few days after the Syrian declaration of independence, the council met with Gouraud to press for the constitution they had initially called for in their declaration of independence of May 20, 1919. They desired a representative, elected, confessional constituent assembly. Despite postponement of their constitutional hopes by Gouraud,³¹ they did take several steps which were cited by Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American high commissioner in Constantinople, in his March 18, 1920, telegram to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in Washington, D.C.. In summarizing the report he had received from Beirut, Bristol transmitted the following agenda to be taken up in the upcoming meeting of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon:

One, to proclaim the independence of the Grand Lebanon, with its historical and natural borders, with the assistance of France; two, to protest against the coronation of Faisal as King of Syria; three, to protest against the Lebanese who are at present in Damascus as being unqualified to speak in the name of Lebanon; four, to solicit the Allied Powers to take up now, before the final decision of the peace conference, the matter of drafting a constitution for the independent government of Mount Lebanon; five, to hoist the Lebanese flag over all the government buildings in the Lebanon.³²

Based on Bristol's report, it appears that the council recognized the implications of the Syrian Arab state's declaration, the importance of drafting a constitution before the peace conference made its final decisions, and the potentially disruptive effect that could result from "unqualified" Lebanese speaking for Lebanon. In phrasing the council's plans in this way, Bristol reaffirmed the persistent council call for a *Grand Liban* within its "historical and natural borders," and the "assistance of France."

When the meeting mentioned in Bristol's report took place March 22, the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* reported the next day that a meeting of the council and Lebanese notables had met in Ba`abda (the *mutasarrifiyya* capital of Mount Lebanon), and declared the independence of Lebanon. The ceremony was complete with the unfolding of the new Lebanese flag, which Lebanese soldiers saluted, and it was conducted with the tacit approval of the French. Less than a year before, when the council declared Lebanon's independence after Faysal had once before tried to annex Lebanon, the French authorities had disbanded the meeting and lowered the Lebanese flag. This time, the flag

remained hoisted and unfurled on the Government House in Ba`abda.³³

However dissonant the voices of the council were to become by July, the fact remains that during the March 22 ceremonies, they were continuing to speak with one voice. Yet, the closer the council came to having to chose between Mount Lebanon or Greater Lebanon, between a Greater Lebanon or a Greater Syria, and between union with Syria or French assistance, the less they spoke with one voice. Still, with their third delegation actively involved in Paris, they continued to play an active role in the creation of a Greater Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the third Lebanese Delegation continued to lobby in Paris for Greater Lebanon and French assistance, which by this time meant a French mandate. Despite granting an audience to the delegation and assuring them of his support of the Clemenceau-Huwayyik agreement, Millerand was careful not to act unilaterally concerning their requests, especially concerning Lebanon's borders.³⁴ Millerand explained to the delegation that, although he could all but guarantee a French mandate, the final decisions concerning the actual extent of Greater Lebanon would have to wait until after he consulted with the other powers, meaning the Supreme Council.³⁵

The Supreme Council to which Millerand referred in his meeting with the Lebanese Delegation was engaged in discussions at the time of the delegation's audience. After answering many of the Eastern Question problems placed before it, especially concerning German and Anatolian issues, the Supreme Council

shifted its attention to the Levant and shifted its meeting place to the *Villa Devachan* in San Remo, Italy.³⁶

The San Remo Conference, called into session primarily to promulgate a treaty with Turkey, finalized the mandate agreement previously reached by Britain and France. In so doing, it not only confirmed the essence of the agreement Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot had fashioned in 1916,³⁷ but it also fulfilled, in large measure, the expectations the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon had held since December 1918. France and Britain were certainly acting in their own interests when they reached the San Remo Agreement, but they were also not unaware, especially in Millerand's case, of the council's desires and those of its delegations. After all, the French prime minister had just received the third Lebanese Delegation a few weeks before San Remo and had assured them of his intention to meet their expectations to whatever degree possible.

Meanwhile, there were few surprises offered by the delegates to the San Remo Conference, since the decision makers were the same ones who had attended the London Conference and the Paris Peace Conference before that.³⁸ Hence, as the sessions began April 18, 1920,³⁹ the outcome concerning Lebanon and Syria was all but determined. The time for putting lines on the map of the Middle East had finally arrived.

On April 28, 1920, two days after the San Remo Conference had adjourned, Amir Faysal was informed by General Allenby of the decision taken in San Remo giving France the mandate over Syria.⁴⁰ In his telegram to Faysal, Allenby stated, in part:

As a result of recent decisions taken by Allied Powers in Conference at San Remo, provision has been made to recognize Syria and Mesopotamia as independent States, subject to assistance of a mandatory power, until such time as both states can stand alone. In pursuance of these decisions a Mandate for Syria has been entrusted to France, while that for Mesopotamia has been entrusted to Great Britain. Great Britain has also been nominated mandatory power for Palestine.⁴¹

Not only was this agreement in direct opposition to the Syrian Arab state announced by Faysal and the General Syrian Congress March 7, 1920, but it also foretold the showdown between Gouraud and Faysal that was soon to occur.

The immediate impact of the San Remo Agreement giving France the mandate over Syria and Lebanon had a fourfold effect. First, the Syrian cabinet under Rikabi Pasha fell, and Faysal replaced it with a cabinet under Hashim al-Atasi that vowed to resist the loss of Syrian independence by all means necessary.⁴² This hardened position taken by the Syrian government increased the likelihood of conflict with Gouraud. Second, the attacks by pro-Syrian armed groups in the Beqa'a Valley against French forces and Lebanese Christians were stepped up.⁴³ This too increased the pressure on Gouraud to intervene against Damascus-backed attacks. Third, the Syrian Congress' May 8 Resolution demanded "full independence and absolute rejection" of the San Remo Agreement.⁴⁴ Hence, what had begun as a reaction to San Remo was fast becoming outright defiance of British and French designs. Lastly, in May, a temporary agreement brokered between de Caix and Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia was reached, thus easing the military requirements for Gouraud in Cilicia.⁴⁵ General

Gouraud then began redeploying the bulk of his forces to Lebanon in preparation for increased hostilities. Hence, the possibility of open confrontation as a result of the San Remo Conference was gathering considerable momentum in May and June 1920.

In response to the Syrian Congress' May 8 rejection of the San Remo Agreement and disappointed that Lebanon was not specifically identified as being independent under the French Mandate,⁴⁶ the council and their delegation in Paris once again began a flurry of diplomatic initiatives. On May 13, 1920, the Lebanese Delegation sent a letter to Prime Minister Millerand which concluded:

And [we] are hoping for the attainment of appeasements which our country awaits with legitimate anxiety; and we anticipate, Monsieur President of the Council, your favor by accepting assurances of our sentiments and respectful devotion.⁴⁷

In his response to this anxious, yet essentially loyal letter from the Lebanese Delegation, Millerand reiterated that, after having received the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, France "had not changed its absolute intentions of calling for the independence of Lebanon under the French Mandate."⁴⁸

While the Lebanese Delegation was hearing the reassurances it had hoped to hear in Paris, the council received reassuring words from the minister of foreign affairs (Pichon) in Paris through the high commissioner (Gouraud) in Beirut on May 14, 1920. Both the council and Patriarch Huwayyik were reassured by Gouraud of the favorable results the third Lebanese Delegation

received through their contacts with Millerand.⁴⁹ The French position, by insisting on the Syrian mandate and by favoring the establishment of an independent Lebanon under a French mandate, had hardened against Faysal to the degree that, in a telegram from Millerand to Gouraud three days earlier, he stated:

The French government could not agree any longer to the daily violation of the principles of the agreement accepted by the Emir and that French soldiers continue to be massacred by semi-Turkish, semi-Arab gangs....The mandate granted to France in Syria gives her not only the right but also the duty to maintain order and security....⁵⁰

As a result of this telegram from Millerand, Gouraud had been given the responsibility to implement the mandate for Syria given to France by the San Remo Agreement. His marching orders were clear: he was given "not only the right but also the duty to maintain order and security." It appeared to be only a matter of time before a direct confrontation would occur between him and Faysal.

In an exchange of telegrams between Lord Curzon, General Allenby, and M. Cambon at the end of May, the prevailing opinion in British and French diplomatic and military circles was that Faysal should return to Europe so that he could once again be presented with the realities of his situation. If he did not travel to Europe, according to Lord Curzon, the following alternatives would be presented to him:

1. That he would no longer be recognized as representing the Hedjaz at the Peace Conference of the Powers.
2. That all financial assistance both from the French Government and from His Majesty's Government would cease forthwith.

3. That the French Government would be at liberty to occupy the Homs-Aleppo Railway for the objects specified by them.⁵¹

Despite these threatened measures and however much the British and French wanted Faysal to return to Europe a third time, he would not. Not only did he have troubles in Damascus with the Syrian congress, but he feared that the Christians were being armed by Gouraud and that he might be needed to lead the defense against them. These factors, as well as resistance by Gouraud to the idea of Faysal going to Paris, all led him to remain in Damascus.⁵²

It appeared that the three "alternatives" outlined in the Curzon's telegram would need to be applied after Faysal delivered a lengthy speech in Damascus on May 27 in which he assured the audience that "you have not been condemned to death."⁵³ In addition to being a speech meant to uplift the spirits of the Syrians in the face of the buildup of French forces, Faysal's speech also emphasized the need for an army and money to finance it. For both of these he turned to the Syrian people. He asked them to buy "bonds and prove to the civilized world that they [the Syrian people] have everything, that they don't need foreigners even for money."⁵⁴

Meanwhile, Habib as-Sa'd was informed on June 2, 1920, that Gouraud had appointed a fourteen-member commission to work alongside the council in the drafting of a constitution.⁵⁵ What at first seemed to be the fruition of the council's May 20, 1919, declaration of independence calling for a constitution,

turned out to be the beginning of the end for the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

Gouraud's decision, as well as the months of increasingly stringent military rule by the French, appeared to many Lebanese notables as a further attempt to divest the council of its authority. Although some of the council members went along with the Gouraud's constitutional offer, including Habib as-Sa'd, president of the council, and Da'ud 'Ammun, council member and president of the first Lebanese Delegation,⁵⁶ others began to look elsewhere to counter French maneuvering. Thus, when Faysal began secret contacts with, and financial inducements to, certain members of the council, a permanent split in the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon occurred.⁵⁷

To this point, the council had managed to speak with one voice on two fundamental issues: their desire to create Greater Lebanon in its "historical and natural borders" (the *Grand Liban* notion) and their consensus on the "assistance and collaboration" of France. The only factor that had essentially changed was that, in light of the awards of the mandates at San Remo, the French were no longer viewed by some members of the council as "assisting" and "collaborating" with the Lebanese. Rather, the French were beginning to be seen as dominating the council and the administration of the Mountain. Hence, closer ties with Syria, instead of with France, seemed, for some of the councilors, to be the preferred option.

Throughout their legislative history since December 1918, the council had played a role in the creation of an independent

Lebanon through resolutions that articulated their expectations. They also were able to agree, when necessary, to dispatch delegations to Paris to fight for their cause. Nonetheless, despite the fact that its third delegation was still in Paris and that it had passed a resolution declaring the independence of Lebanon for the second time as recently as March 22, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon split.

Following a secret meeting of the council on July 10, 1920, seven members decided to travel to Damascus with a resolution bearing five fundamental declarations:

1. The complete and absolute independence of Lebanon.
2. Its political neutrality, in the sense that it shall not have an army and it shall not be subject to any military intervention.
3. The restitution of the territory that was detached from it, which shall be effected through mutual agreement between it and the Government of Syria.
4. The study of the economic questions by a mixed commission whose decision shall be effective after it has been ratified by both the Lebanon and the Syrian Parliaments.
5. The two parties shall co-operate in the move to have the Powers sanction and guarantee the four articles above mentioned.⁵⁸

The July 10, 1920, Resolution was signed by Sa`adallah Huwayyik, Sulayman Kan`an, Fuad Abdal-Malik, Khalil `Aql, Mahmud Junblat, Ilias Shuwayri, and Muhammad Muhsin. Of the twelve sitting members of the council (the Kisrawan seat was vacant at the time),⁵⁹ seven out of twelve signed the document and attempted to travel to Damascus, and then on to Paris, to present their claims. They were arrested on July 10 by French authorities near Zahle on the road from Beirut to Damascus. Meanwhile,

while the events of July in the Levant unfolded, the seven councilors were exiled, first to the island of Arwad, then Corsica, and finally Paris.⁶⁰

The day after the seven councilors were arrested, Amir Faysal sent a telegram to General Allenby in Cairo informing him that Nuri as-Sa'id had returned from a meeting with Gouraud in Beirut with the following French demands:

1. The [French] military occupation of the railway stations from Rayak to Aleppo.
2. The acceptance of the French mandate without conditions.
3. The acceptance of Syrian bank-notes [sic] issued by General Gouraud in the western zone.
4. To give up my [Faisal's] visit to Europe unless I accept the terms of General Gouraud, who declared that if I proceed by some other route he will be free to take such action as he may decide upon.⁶¹

Gouraud's tone was now that of a general who was less inclined to negotiate than to dictate. His threat to "take such action as he may decide" would apply to Faysal as much as it had applied to the seven councilors arrested the previous day. It also applied the day after he sent this first ultimatum to Faysal when he moved to dissolve the remnants of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

On July 12, 1920, General Gouraud dissolved the council, or at least what was left of it, and ended nearly sixty years of confessional representation in Mount Lebanon. In a letter to Huwayyik the same day, Gouraud expressed his "profound regret" at having to arrest the councilors. He also stated that he had uncovered a secretly financed scheme of treason to undermine the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon.⁶² Huwayyik responded to

Gouraud in a letter dated July 14 in which he also expressed his "regret" concerning this "unfortunate incident," and, in the same way he had articulated to Clemenceau the year before, Huwayyik expressed his willingness to accept France's assistance in attaining the independence of Greater Lebanon.⁶³

In an enclosure attached to a telegram from Gouraud to M. Pichon, Habib as-Sa`d, the last president of the council, and Ignatius Mubarak, Maronite archbishop of Beirut (also a member of the second Lebanese Delegation), stated their denunciation of the councilors who had parted from the council's traditional aspirations.⁶⁴ The primary point of departure for the seven councilors from the traditional aspirations of the council was their unwillingness to accept what looked like a repressive mandate under the French and their willingness to accept closer ties with Syria.⁶⁵ However, their view was not held by all, or necessarily even by most of the inhabitants of Lebanon. Several other telegrams and newspaper articles portraying the seven councilors as defectors were published during the next few weeks.⁶⁶ Hence, with the council dissolved, the only remaining spokesmen for the inhabitants of Lebanon seem to have been the remaining, unseated councilors, the Maronite patriarch and the third Lebanese Delegation in Paris. While Gouraud prepared the bases for his upcoming public relations battle, another battle of a much bloodier kind came to pass.

On July 14, the same day Gouraud received the letter from Huwayyik, Faysal received a second French ultimatum in Damascus. General Gouraud outlined in detail the actions that were

expected of Faysal, failing which Gouraud would be forced to use "unshakable determination."⁶⁷ The five terms of the ultimatum were:

1. Absolute control of the Rayak-Aleppo Railroad for the purpose of transporting such materiel as may be ordered by the French authorities.
2. Repeal of the conscription law.
3. Acceptance of the French Mandate.
4. Acceptance of Syrian paper currency.
5. Punishment of criminals. Those who are the most violent enemies of France.⁶⁸

These demands were to be accepted by July 17 by Faysal and the General Syrian Congress. However, it became evident to Faisal that he did not have the support in the Syrian congress to accept such an ultimatum.⁶⁹

Faysal managed to delay Gouraud by sending Sati` al-Husri as his envoy.<sup>70</sup> After several days of stalling Gouraud, and after dissolving the Syrian congress, Faysal and his cabinet agreed to Gouraud's terms. However, having received the latest acceptance too late, Gouraud proceeded with his army to occupy part of the Beqa`a Valley, including Zahle and Wadi al-Harir.⁷¹ Finally, after toughening his demands on Faysal because of the latter's failure to execute the first set of demands, General Gouraud attacked Arab forces with the 3rd Division of the Army of the Levant at Maysalun on July 24, 1920.⁷²

By the end of the day, 150 Arab soldiers were killed (including their commander, Yusuf al-`Azma, Faysal's minister of war), and another 1500 were wounded. The French suffered 42 dead, 152 wounded, and 14 missing.⁷³ By July 25, Gouraud and his troops had occupied Damascus, and Faysal, with his brother

Zaid, and his cabinet, left Damascus on a train headed south toward Dar`a.⁷⁴

Faysal's defeat and exile shattered the hopes of the Syrian nationalists for an independent Greater Syria. At the same time it boosted the chances of the Lebanese realizing their hopes for Greater Lebanon. The French military presence in Lebanon was assured after the Battle of Maysalun, and although formal pronouncements were still a month away, discussions designed to settle the borders of Greater Lebanon ensued. Robert de Caix, General Gouraud's secretary-general, had already outlined his notion for Lebanon's borders as follows:

To sum up, Greater Lebanon must include Jabal `Akkar and Beqa`a, leaving out Tripoli, whereas the fate of the *Sanjaks* of Tyre should constitute a group, ruled by a largely independent delegate of the High Commissioner if the latter comes to dwell in the north of Syria.⁷⁵

After accepting the de Caix plan, Millerand sent a telegram to Gouraud August 6, 1920, outlining this new French policy. However, Gouraud sided with those Lebanese who, like Huwayyik, called for the Greater Lebanon borders reflected in the December 9, 1918, and May 20, 1919, Resolutions of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. On August 3, Gouraud had already annexed the Beqa`a Valley to Lebanon in a ceremony in Zahle.⁷⁶ Thus, the mandate of France over Lebanon and Syria was a *fait accompli* by the time the "final" treaty with the former Ottoman Empire was signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920.

The Supreme Council of the Allies, after moving the peace negotiations back to France, signed the Turkish treaty in one of

the exhibition rooms of the famous china factory at Sèvres. The Treaty of Sèvres, in addition to settling the outstanding issues concerning the Eastern Question, officially granted the mandate of Syria and Lebanon to France.⁷⁷ The Treaty of Sèvres, however, was not put into effect and was eventually replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 because of Ataturk's military successes in Turkey. Still, the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon remained.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the debate in August 1920, instigated by de Caix's arguments against integrating largely Muslim areas into Greater Lebanon, continued. One of the more difficult aspects of the remaining issues to settle was determining the demographics of the population of those towns outside Mount Lebanon. In particular, Sidon in the south and Tripoli in the north were being viewed as primarily Muslim, when in fact, depending on whose population figures were being cited, those same cities also had a significant number of Christians.⁷⁹ In the end, however, Gouraud's backing of the (by then dissolved) council's "historical and natural" border plan was accepted by Millerand.⁸⁰

After the Gouraud-de Caix debate over the border question, all that was left was to declare what had *de facto* come into being: the creation of Greater Lebanon. It seems fitting that the first group to be informed of the pending declaration of Greater Lebanon was the all but forgotten third Lebanese Delegation in Paris. In a letter to the president of the

delegation, Archbishop `Abdallah Khoury, the French prime minister stated on August 24, 1920:

As for the objective of France, it is for the return of your nation to its natural borders by the creation of *Grand Liban* which will include Jabal `Akkar, likewise its southern border will be with Palestine, and it will necessarily have attached to it the cities of Tripoli and Beirut [sic].⁸¹

In Beirut, on September 1, 1920, after nearly two years of struggle, the French high commissioner in Syria and Cilicia, General Gouraud, in the presence of the consular corps, the Maronite patriarch, and other Lebanese notables pronounced the creation of Greater Lebanon.⁸² In his declaration, Gouraud stated that Greater Lebanon extended from:

Nahr al-Kabir in the north to the boundary of Palestine in the south and to the summits of the Anti-Lebanon in the East. Thus the Lebanon is enlarged by the addition of the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, Jabal `Amil, Hasbayah, Rashaya and Ba`albek, and the rich plains of the Bega`a.⁸³

In the end, the borders announced by Gouraud bore a striking resemblance to those proposed nearly two years ago by the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. For their part, having been assured that the formal announcement of the creation of Greater Lebanon under a French mandate would take place the next day, the council's third Lebanese Delegation departed Paris August 30, 1920.⁸⁴

Endnotes

¹DBFP, I:IV, 611.

²Zamir, Formation 81-86.

³Stephen H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (London: P.S. King and Son, LTD, 1929) 591.

⁴Karam 252-254.

⁵The document which reveals the fact that the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon approved of the third Lebanese Delegation and made it its own was their resolution signed by the president of the council, as well as all of its members on February 28 in Ba'abda (Karam 340-341). Additionally, in a telegram from Gouraud to Paris dated March 7, a copy of the February 28 decision was enclosed. Some have suggested (Zeine 144, Akarli 180) that the third delegation was Huwayyik's delegation, thus implying the council did not approve of the delegation. While it appears true that the patriarch initiated the third delegation, the fact that the council sanctioned it remains indisputable based on the above-mentioned documents. In fact, this delegation was more representative of the various sects than the one Huwayyik led in 1919.

⁶Karam 253-254. This list, and the titles for each delegate are found in Huwayyik's letter to Colonel Nieger. In a telegram from Gouraud to Paris, dated March 13, 1920 (Karam 258-259), an additional delegate, Greek Catholic Bishop Mughabghab of Zahle was going to join the delegation in March. This decision was made after Faysal and the General Syrian Congress had declared the independence of the Syrian Arab nation. Mughabghab's presence in Paris as a Greek Catholic leader from Zahle was testimony to the third delegation's recognition of the importance of the contested Beqa'a Valley.

⁷Karam 254. Cited from Huwayyik's letter to Colonel Nieger (translated by James J. Simon).

⁸Karam 340-341. The resolution is signed in Arabic as follows: "tawqii' ra'iis al-majlis, tawqii' jamii' al-'uda'." (translated by James J. Simon).

⁹Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State UP, 1974) 221-222. According to Dan Eldar, "France in Syria: The Abolition of the Sharifian Government,

April-July 1920," Middle Eastern Studies 29 (July 1993): 487, Millerand represented "a halt to the friendly relations which had begun to develop between Faysal and France at the end of 1919." Contrast this with Zamir, "Faisal," 417.

¹⁰Zeine 135.

¹¹Zamir, Formation 77.

¹²Helmreich 242-272.

¹³DBFP, I:VII, 43, British Foreign Secretary Curzon's notes of the Allied Conference.

¹⁴DBFP, I:VII, 99, February 17, 1920. Also present representing Italian interests was Signor Nitti. Berthelot, who would begin taking a lead role in the London Conference after Millerand returned to Paris, had extensive exposure to the Lebanese delegations. See Karam 51 (first delegation); 123, 182, 195-205 (second delegation), and, for his role at the San Remo Conference see DBFP, I:VIII, 1-252.

¹⁵Wright 45n54.

¹⁶DBFP, I:VII, 99-111, February 17 session.

¹⁷DBFP, I:VII, 106-108.

¹⁸Wright 35n35.

¹⁹Wright Appendix I.

²⁰DBFP, I:VII, 118.

²¹Zamir, "Faisal," 418.

²²BDFA, II:B:I, 273. Butler's report was to Admiral de Robeck.

²³Karam 262. Also see `Abdullah's letter to Huwayyik concerning the contents of the meeting (271-272).

²⁴DBFP, I:XIII, 220-222. Telegram exchanges between Allenby and Curzon reveal they suspected that Faysal would declare independence as early as March 2.

²⁵Zamir, "Faisal," 419.

²⁶Nawar 538-541 (translated by James J. Simon).

²⁷Nawar 541 (translated by James J. Simon).

²⁸Zeine 143-145. Also see Karam 268-269.

²⁹Zeine 145.

³⁰DBFP, I:XIII, 222-236 (March 8-30).

³¹Zamir, Formation 88.

³²Walter L. Browne, ed., The Political History of Lebanon, 1920 - 1950, vol. I (Salisbury, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1976) 11.

³³Zeine 148-149. Zeine cites the *Lisan al-Hal* article published March 23, 1920. Also see Longrigg 99.

³⁴Karam 271-272. `Abdallah sent a letter to Huwayyik on March 21, 1920, summarizing the delegation's meeting with Millerand.

³⁵Zeine 145-146.

³⁶DBFP, I:VIII, 1.

³⁷DBFP, I:VIII, 173-175, April 25, 1920. The minutes of the meeting reveal that Curzon, while willing to accept the Syrian/Palestinian borders, was against settling the Syrian/Lebanese and Syrian/Mesopotamian borders in light of Faysal's recent declarations in Damascus. The minutes state that, "Emir Feisal would almost certainly be coming to Europe very shortly, and Lord Curzon urged that it would be better to await his arrival before the council definitely committed itself." However, Berthelot was cited in the minutes as saying that "the simplest thing to do was to have it stated that the two Powers adhered to the line which was fixed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement." Lloyd George over-ruled Curzon and agreed with Berthelot, hence the announcement of the mandates was assured.

³⁸In particular, the attendees with long experience in the matter were: Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Alexandre Millerand, and Phillipe Berthelot. For the meeting minutes of and participants in the San Remo Conference see DBFP, I:VIII, 1-252. The

meetings also included, at times, American, Belgian, Italian, Japanese, Greek, and Armenian delegates.

³⁹DBFP, I:XIII, 1.

⁴⁰DBFP, I:XIII, 252-253. A summary of Allenby's statement to Faysal was included in a telegram from Allenby (Cairo) to Lord Curzon (San Remo) on April 27, 1920.

⁴¹DBFP, I:XIII, 253.

⁴²Zeine 155-156.

⁴³Zeine 157 and, Sachar 285-286.

⁴⁴Longrigg 100.

⁴⁵Zamir, "Faisal," 421.

⁴⁶Zeine 158.

⁴⁷Karam 27-277. This letter was signed by Khoury, Arslan, Mughabhab, Gemayal, and Eddé (translated by James J. Simon).

⁴⁸Karam 279-280, dated May, 19, 1920 (translated from the French by James J. Simon). Compare to Zeine 158.

⁴⁹Karam 280-281.

⁵⁰Cited from *Série Levant: Syrie-Liban*, vol. 27, 237-239, May 11, 1920, by Eldar 489. The telegram was also addressed to the French ambassador in London.

⁵¹BDFA, II:B:I, 330. Telegram from Lord Curzon to M. Cambon dated May 18, 1920. For the financial assistance issue see DBFP, I:XIII, 286, Curzon to Allenby; and Zamir, "Faisal," 415. For the railway question see Eldar 487-504.

⁵²DBFP, I:XIII, 282-285, telegrams exchanged between Faysal, Curzon, Lloyd George, and Allenby.

⁵³Sati al-Husri, The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1966) 117-119; and Zeine 159. For French version of text of speech see DBFP, I:VIII, 281-282.

⁵⁴al-Husri 119; and Zeine 158-159.

⁵⁵Zamir, Formation 88-89.

⁵⁶Zamir, Formation 89.

⁵⁷Compare Zeine 164-167; and Zamir, Formation 89-91. The question surrounding how much money was offered to the councilors and by whom, remains a controversial one. As much as 40,000 livres is cited, with advanced payments of 1500 livres per person. According to Zamir and Zeine, Arif Ni'ami, a rich Beirut merchant with ties to Faysal, provided the money.

⁵⁸Browne 9. This is a copy in English of the document (with the incorrect date), while Karam 345-348, contains the Arabic and French copies (with the correct date). Also, the Browne copy lists only six councilors, while the Karam copy lists Ilias Shuwayri as the seventh signatory.

⁵⁹The signatories are on the bottom of the resolution, while the text mentions the Kisrawan councilor was absent (Browne 9-10).

⁶⁰Zeine 164-165.

⁶¹BDEFA, II:B:II, 9-10. Telegram dated July 11, 1920.

⁶²Karam 370-372.

⁶³Karam 373-375. Also see Zeine 165-167.

⁶⁴Karam 376-377. Dated July 12, 1920.

⁶⁵Haffar 263, explores the notion that Faysal perhaps had not planned on giving the seven councilors as much autonomy as they had hoped for. In fact, in light of the May 8, 1920, declaration of independence by Faysal and the General Syrian Congress - a declaration that included Lebanon and Palestine as part of a Greater Syria - it remains doubtful that he planned on an independent Greater Lebanon at all.

⁶⁶Karam 377-390. Telegrams included one in which Gouraud obtained the following signatures against the seven councilors; Alfred Sursock, Pierre Trad, Arcache de Freige, Nakle Naffah, Antoine Arab, Albert Misk, Michel Chiha, Saad Accaoui, and Choueri Tabet, July 14 telegram, Karam 380. The newspaper articles included *al-Bashir* and *Lisan al-Hal*.

⁶⁷al-Husri 155.

⁶⁸al-Husri 154.

⁶⁹Zeine 174.

⁷⁰Faisal's minister of education.

⁷¹Zeine 178.

⁷²Sachar 287. Zeine 183, lists the composition of the French 3rd Division as including Algerian, Senegalese, Moroccan, African, and French troops.

⁷³Khoury 97.

⁷⁴Zeine 184-188.

⁷⁵Zamir, "Smaller," 48.

⁷⁶Zamir, Formation 92-96.

⁷⁷Helmreich 320-321, and Bentwich 11-13.

⁷⁸Sharp 39 and 183.

⁷⁹Zamir, Formation 94. The estimates Gouraud cited for Tripoli, should it and the surrounding areas of Husn and `Akkar be included in Greater Lebanon, would add 57,000 Sunnis and 69,000 Greek Orthodox and Maronite Christians. These population estimates, according to Zamir, were based on a 1911 *mutasarraf* estimate of Mount Lebanon published in 1918. The first official census in 1932 found the Christians with 51% of the population of Greater Lebanon (see Zamir, Formation, table 3.1, 98; and Hourani, Syria, Chapter VII, for various population estimates).

⁸⁰Zamir, Formation 94. Millerand authorized Gouraud to extend the borders August 21, 1920.

⁸¹Karam 286-289 (translated by James J. Simon).

⁸²Browne 12-14.

⁸³Browne 12-14.

⁸⁴Karam 301.

CONCLUSION

Messrs. Representatives, the task which is thus set before you is as vast as it is beautiful. Approach it in the double spirit of a politician before a debate and a general before a battle. The one and the other are poised between the difficulty of the undertaking and the greatness of the peril, and the confidence they draw from their own valor and from that of their party or troops. If they feel a strong support by their side they are sure of success.¹

This remark by General Gouraud to the opening session of the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon on May 25, 1922, began a new era in confessional representation in Greater Lebanon. From July 12, 1920 (when he dissolved the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon), until March 8, 1922, Gouraud had been assisted in the governing of Lebanon by an appointed, seventeen-member advisory council.² After May 1922, the thirty member, confessionally elected representative council, led by President Habib as-Sa'd of administrative council fame,³ took on much of the same duties and responsibilities that its predecessor, the council, had assumed. Hence, the Lebanese historical experience which had replaced feudalism with confessional representation, and Mount Lebanon with Greater Lebanon, seemed to have come full circle.

In retrospect, the Lebanese transition from feudalism to confessional representation after 1861 had been accomplished in several stages. In fact, the transition seems to have been completed only when, as the twentieth century unfolded, the

Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon shifted from being an administrative body with limited authority to being a legislative body with wider authority and with high expectations of representing the inhabitants of not only the Mountain but the Greater Lebanon of old. Indeed, the council's decision to send three delegations to Paris after WW I reflected its confidence that it was the only elected body in the Levant capable of speaking for the inhabitants of Lebanon.

However, as much as the council and its delegations tried to play a role in the creation of Greater Lebanon, they were never left to their own devices. Six significant groups - the British, the French, the Americans, the Syrians, the pro-Syrian Lebanese, and the Maronites - each had their own ideas on several issues: the borders of Greater Lebanon, its relationship with the French, and whether there should be any form of federation with Syria. Each wrestled for position in the high stakes diplomacy and bloody clashes that marked the two-year period ending with the pronouncement of Greater Lebanon on September 1, 1920.

First, and perhaps foremost in stature, were the British. No matter who one was or where one hailed from in the Levant or who one claimed to represent, upon arrival in Paris or London for the peace conference after WW I, the group to persuade was the British. If not simply by virtue of their military predominance in the postwar Near East, then by their diplomatic entanglements (Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, Sykes-Picot Agreement, and Declaration to the Seven), the British were

inseparably involved. From Lloyd George to Lord Curzon, and from General Allenby to Colonel Lawrence, the British position in the debate over the settlement of the Eastern Question, and the future of Lebanon in particular, must be given considerable weight.

Second, the role of the French, especially considering their commercial interests in the region and their relationship with the Uniate churches, must also be considered paramount. As became readily apparent to the British, Amir Faysal, and even the council, the French were not about to dissolve their centuries-old religious, educational, and economic ties with the Lebanese in the aftermath of WW I. In fact, whereas the British role shifted to primarily a diplomatic one after they withdrew their troops from Syria and Lebanon in November 1919, the French moved quickly to fill the vacuum both militarily and diplomatically. Even though Clemenceau, Millerand, Pichon, and Berthelot were instrumental during this period, they would have been without major influence in the Mountain without Picot, Gouraud, and de Caix.

As for the Americans, the King-Crane Commission and Wilson's Fourteen Points are certainly worth mentioning. Had the results of the commission been seriously weighed, the lines on the map of the Near East might not have included a state of Lebanon. Had it not been for Wilson's collapse (and subsequent American isolationism), the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations might have created a different future for the indigenous peoples of the region. The American role in the process of

nation-building in the Middle East after WW I was considerably less than Wilson had wished. It would take another world war before the American presence became deeply enmeshed in the Middle East in general, and Lebanon in particular.

For the Syrians, and especially for Amir Faysal, the Hijazi leader whose voice carried considerable weight during this period, the creation of Greater Lebanon was the death knell for any hopes of a Greater Syria. No amount of shuttling from Damascus to London and Paris could gain Faysal his ultimate desire, the creation of a unified Syrian Arab nation. In his tireless attempts to speak for the Syrians, the fact remained that he was ever wary of his limited support in Syrian circles. As a result of his never having gained the complete confidence of the General Syrian Congress and his inability to quell attacks on French garrisons and Christian villages, he suffered complete defeat. His defeat represented the defeat of Syrians who hoped for union with not only Lebanon but Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Mesopotamia as well.

The primary voices of discontent among Lebanese notables came from those groups who both favored some type of federation with Syria and opposed French encroachment. Initially, this group was comprised of Lebanese who were difficult to identify, including some Sunnis, Mutawallis, Druze, and, to a lesser degree, some Maronites and Greek Orthodox (not to mention Shukri Ghanem and Howard Bliss). Added to these groups by the summer of 1920 were the seven councilors who split from the council over French and Syrian issues. Ironically, despite the apparent

veracity of the councilors' denouncement of the path Lebanon was taking, they had, in fact, been in agreement with that very same path since October 1918.

It seems, in retrospect, that when they realized that the French Mandate and the creation of a Greater Lebanon separate from Syria was approaching, the councilors became unwilling to risk losing their autonomous position (which, in fact, eventually occurred). Yet, they had supported the independence of Greater Lebanon and French assistance and collaboration in both their December 9, 1918, Resolution and their May 20, 1919, declaration of independence. In the final analysis, their position was not unwarranted, it was just not sustainable given the hardened French position regarding the mandates. Had they not tried to leave Beirut and tried to make their way to Damascus in secret, they might have been able to convince the rest of the council of their case.

Of the six groups vying for recognition of their aspirations for an independent Greater Lebanon and French assistance, the Maronites stand out as probably the most tenacious. Their relationship with the French dated back centuries and they had become accustomed to safeguarding their interests as the largest confessional group in the Mountain. At this critical period, they were led by their patriarch, Elias Huwayyik, and they gained what was, for the most part, their vision of Greater Lebanon. Added to that was the fact that, although not always unanimous in their views (the patriarch's brother, Sa'adallah Huwayyik, was among those councilors who split), they held key

positions within the council (e.g., Da'ud 'Ammun and Habib as-Sa'd). Patriarch Huwayyik, despite the split of the council in the last months before Greater Lebanon was declared, was instrumental in pushing for the realization of the council's December 1918, and May 1919, Resolutions. Thus, with the support of the French, the Maronites were able to play a significant role before, during, and after the creation of Greater Lebanon.

However much the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon's power was either diminished or enhanced by these various groups, the fact remains that their resolutions and declarations, as represented by their delegations, bear a striking resemblance to the final settlement of the Lebanese question after WW I. Whether the resemblance simply reflects the French position and, therefore, is insignificant as an indigenous sentiment is difficult to settle historically. Whatever limitations they had and whatever obstacles they were unable to overcome, the essence of their idea for a confessionally represented Greater Lebanon has survived, albeit under a new name and with an increased membership, until today.

By 1926, as a result of the establishment of the Lebanese Constitutional Republic, the representative council (which resembled its confessionally elected predecessor, the administrative council) was replaced by the Chamber of Deputies.⁴ This change, along with the establishment of a presidency and a senate,⁵ strengthened the confessional nature of Lebanese government but failed to put into writing any fixed ratios of

proportional representation of the various religious sects.⁶ The 1926 constitution, while ensuring "equal representation of the various sects in public office," did not specify, for instance, the ratio of representation of each sect in the legislature, nor the specific confession for which key government positions would be reserved.⁷ The constitution underwent amendments in 1927 and 1929 which reshaped the legislative functions and attempted to increase the power of the president. However, the constitution was dissolved under French mandatory authority from 1932 to 1937 and again from 1939 to 1943. The modern era of the Lebanese governmental system became finalized after the 1943 National Pact.⁸

Despite last-ditch attempts by the Free French to maintain their jurisdiction in Syria and Lebanon during World War II, by 1943 the national independence movement among such Lebanese notables as Bishara al-Khuri, Emile Eddé, Michel Chiha, and Riadh al-Sulh produced the National Pact. The National Pact of 1943, which called for sectarian distribution of government offices under a restored constitution,⁹ was not a welcome development in French circles. After two more years of arrests (including the president, Bishara al-Khuri) and after the French tried again to suppress the constitution, the inhabitants of Lebanon prevailed.

Once the French Mandate ended in 1946, the last obstacles to Lebanon's independence were removed. The National Pact was formalized over the next eight years through legislation that put on paper what had been in practice to varying degrees since

1861: confessional representation in Lebanese politics. Henceforth, the president was a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni; the speaker of the house a Shi'i; and the Chamber of Deputies included a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims.¹⁰

In retrospect, the critical period in Lebanese history between 1918 and 1920 can be seen as but a small portion of the centuries-long history of the Lebanese. As Hourani and Salibi have pointed out, one's historiographical view of this period in Lebanese history often depends on whether one is Christian or Muslim, whether one sees Lebanon as Arab or Western, or whether one sees a Lebanon at all. Hourani said it well when he remarked, "It is unwise to ignore the historic imagination of peoples, even when its content is partly legend and only partly history."¹¹

Some would see the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon's role as inconsequential in view of the fact that, as an institution, it did not survive. This argument, however, diminishes the significance of most, if not all, of the representative institutions of the early postwar period in the Middle East. The argument presented here is that the administrative council did survive: in the form of the representative council, and then the Chamber of Deputies.

Some would see the administrative council's role overshadowed by that of the French, the Maronites, or the patriarch himself. Certainly there is some truth in the notion that France, especially General Gouraud, played a significant role in the creation of Greater Lebanon. So too is there truth to the

assertion that the Maronites, especially Patriarch Huwayyik, contributed a great deal to the establishment of modern Lebanon under a French mandate. The argument presented here is that, although the French and Maronite roles were pervasive, the council's role, especially with regard to its resolutions and delegations, was relentless and, therefore, cannot be ignored.

Some would claim the council's decision to expand Mount Lebanon's borders was ill-advised in that it brought in areas not necessarily keen on a Greater Lebanon, including the Beqa'a Valley, Tripoli, and Jabal 'Amil. There is certainly some truth to the position that some of the inhabitants of these regions did not want union with Lebanon, but rather hoped to be part of a Greater Syria. Yet, given the council members' understanding of their history, an understanding bolstered by French and Maronite views of Greater Lebanon, the council decided to call, for better or for worse, for a Lebanon within its "historical and natural" borders.

Lastly, some would claim that the decision to accept the French mandate and reject federation with Syria was a mistake. On this issue, the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon stood unanimously in favor of French assistance and independence from Syria until the very end of their two-year tenure following WW I. That they finally split in the summer of 1920 does not mean that they were wrong on the issue of the French mandate and Syrian federation; it simply means that some came to view French assistance as meaning French domination. Hence they turned to Syria for alternatives.

Given the research provided in this thesis, it does not seem unreasonable to say that the history of the creation of Greater Lebanon after World War I was partly the realization of French interests, partly the rejection of a Greater Syria, and partly a dream come true for the majority of Maronites and their patriarch, but it was also, for the most part, the attainment of the goals and expectations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon.

What had begun in 1861 as an attempt to establish a confessionally representative body in a traditionally feudal and communal society was, after 1922, transformed into a unique and resilient legislative body. What had begun as a mountainous enclave with remarkable autonomy under the Ottomans was, after 1920, fashioned into the modern state of Greater Lebanon. The idea of confessional representation within a Greater Lebanon - an idea heralded before the peace conference by delegations of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon from 1918 to 1920 - would be challenged to withstand the test of time. Despite the split in the council in the summer of 1920;¹² despite the French mandatory years and challenges to constitutional government;¹³ despite World War II; and, indeed, despite the disastrous recent civil war; the idea of confessional political representation, as it was begun by the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, continues to undergird the Lebanese governmental system.

Today, with the benefit of over seventy years of hindsight, some might see the seeds of recent sectarian conflict as having been sown by the two themes which the council was known to

champion: confessional representation and an independent Greater Lebanon. However, in the final analysis, this explanation discounts the human component of the council. From 1918 to 1920, the council represented not merely a collection of religions, but a collection of individuals of different faiths. This was both their blessing and their curse. There was something of a curse in that, in the end, they did not speak with one voice. There was a blessing in that, when the lines on the map of the Middle East were being drawn by foreigners after WW I, the inhabitants of Lebanon could rely on their councilor to represent them not only as their spokesman and as one who shared their faith, but also as one who helped bring about the realization of a centuries-long expectation: recognition of Greater Lebanon.

Endnotes

¹Browne 42. Speech delivered by General Gouraud to the opening session of the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon, Thursday, May 25, 1922.

²Salibi, Modern 166-167.

³Browne 44-50. Telegram from the American Consulate to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, dated June 3, 1922. Also in the new representative council were Emile Eddé of the first and third Lebanese Delegations to the peace conference, and Naoum Bakhos, a former member of the administrative council. The distribution of confessions was as follows: ten Maronites, six Sunnis, five Mutawalli, four Greek Orthodox, two Druze, two Greek Catholic, and one minority (Protestant, or other).

⁴Baaklini 62-71.

⁵Baaklini 62-71. The president was elected by the legislature (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and could assemble a council of ministers to assist him. The senate had sixteen members, seven appointed by the president, the others elected.

⁶Salibi 167; and, The Lebanese Constitution: A Reference Edition in English Translation, American University of Beirut edition, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, 1960.

⁷Salibi 166-167.

⁸According to Baaklini 109, the National Pact was not so much a written document as it was "a number of guidelines found in speeches of Bishara al-Khuri (1947) and the first ministerial statement prepared by Riadh al-Sulh when his cabinet received the unanimous vote of confidence of the parliament."

⁹Baaklini 109-111. At this stage in the formation of the National Pact, the president (al-Khuri) was a Maronite, and the prime minister (al-Sulh) a Sunni.

¹⁰Helen Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder, Colorado: Westview P, 1985) 77. The law of 1952 allotted the following seats to the forty-four seats of the Chamber of Deputies: thirteen Maronite, nine Sunni, eight Shi'i, five Greek Orthodox, three Druze, three Greek Catholic, two Armenian Catholic, and one other confession (Protestant, Jewish, Nestorian, etc.). See

W.B. Fisher, Lebanon (London: Europa Publications Limited, 40th edition, 1994) 598.

¹¹Hourani, Syria 146. Also see Salibi, House Chapter 11.

¹²Browne 1-11. From Mt Lebanon, this is the text of the memorandum the seven councilors sent to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1923).

¹³The formal establishment of the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was ratified in the League of Nations on July 24, 1922 (Wright 607-611).

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