


# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

CONFLICT CONTAINMENT IN THE BALKANS:  
TESTING EXTENDED DETERRENCE

by

Walter M. Pjetraj

March 1995

Thesis Advisor:

David S. Yost

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## 13. ABSTRACT

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CONFLICT CONTAINMENT IN THE BALKANS:  
TESTING EXTENDED DETERRENCE

by

Walter M. Pjetraj  
Captain, United States Army  
B.S., Marquette University, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of


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
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


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De Oppresso Liber!

WMP

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overarching goal of the international community's military peacekeeping in the Balkans is to localize the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to promote a peaceful settlement. A spill-over of hostilities into the Serbian province of Kosovo and/or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia could lead to a wider regional war that might threaten European security and stability. While other states have relied mainly on the peacekeeping approach, the United States has also adopted an apparent deterrence strategy. Two U.S. presidents--George Bush and Bill Clinton-- have threatened Serbia with military retaliation in the event of Serbian aggression against the ethnically Albanian population of Kosovo. The U.S. decision to deploy an army battalion to Macedonia has, furthermore, conveyed the impression that the United States will not tolerate Serbian expansion into this new state. However, U.S. diplomatic statements and actions may be subject to misinterpretation by Belgrade.

This thesis critically analyzes a prominent theoretical framework concerning the conditions necessary for successful deterrence and conflict-containment, with special attention to historical antecedents to the current conflict in the Balkans. The analysis of four case studies is based on Paul K. Huth's hypotheses about extended deterrence. Three historical case studies examine the general and specific conditions in which the actions of the defender and the protégé achieved deterrence success. The fourth case study is specifically oriented toward contemporary deterrence and conflict containment efforts in the Balkans. In the first two historical case studies, Russia and Serbia assumed the roles of the

potential attackers. Germany served as the defender, and Austria-Hungary was the protégé.

In the third historical case Serbia again served as the potential attacker, while Austria-Hungary became the defender, and newly formed Albania was the protégé. In the current case study, Serbia once again is the potential attacker, Kosovo and Macedonia are the protégés, and the United States is the ostensible defender. The three historical cases are compared with the current one. The findings suggest that the likelihood of deterrence success is increased when the immediate and short-term balance of forces favors the defender and the protégé. Additionally, the analysis concludes that the defender may create an environment conducive to deterrence success through the use of coercive diplomacy. In the current Balkan crisis, military and diplomatic coercion have at times moderated Serbian behavior. However, the potential withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers from Bosnia and the lack of a truly defensive rather than peacekeeping force in Macedonia may encourage the Serbian leadership to view U.S. warnings regarding the security of Macedonia and the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo as a bluff. If so, the likelihood of deterrence success may grow problematic.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Hostilities have been underway in the former Yugoslav federation since 1991, but few outside states have demonstrated the willingness or capacity to end the conflict through the use of military force. Over 40,000 peacemakers and peacekeepers under NATO and U.N. auspices, embodied in the United Nations Protection Forces-Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, and associated entities and operations, are currently deployed in the region. However, their mission is largely humanitarian in scope.

The war in the former Yugoslav federation began when the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia sought their independence in mid-1991. After a cease-fire and international mediation, Serbia recognized Slovenia as a state. Belgrade then concentrated its military efforts on Croatia, where the Serbs made substantial gains. When Bosnia voted to secede from Yugoslavia, it also became embroiled in conflict.<sup>1</sup> Due to the complexities of the regional dispersal of ethnic and religious enclaves, the war took on new dimensions. The initial alliances in Bosnia pitted Bosnian Croats and Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. But the coalition broke down in mid-1993, and fighting between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims increased in central Bosnia. The conflict became a three-way battle to incorporate the enclaves within ethnic territories whose boundaries would have to be changed.<sup>2</sup> At present, the most intense fighting is limited to the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The state entities involved in the conflict are Croatia, Bosnia, and various ethnic groups found within those areas. However, some evidence supports the judgement that Serbia is involved as well.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, has described the conflict as an international war, as well as a civil war. In reference to what caused the war, he stated, "Nor, as has been alleged, is the Bosnian conflict primarily a civil war, although of course Bosnians are fighting Bosnians. It is more correctly seen as a war of aggression for which the Serbian operation in Croatia provided the model." Warren Zimmermann, *Illyria, The Albanian-American Newspaper*, 12-14 December 1994, Vol. 4. No 356. Bronx, NY, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Steven J. Woehrel and Juli Kim, "Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia: Ongoing Conflict and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief* (IB91089), 27 Sep 1994, p.1.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Michael Roskin suggested that Serbia continues to be involved in the conflict. He stated: "Although the JNA [YPA-Yugoslav Peoples Army] deliberately cloaks its actions in the fog of war, it appears

The conflict has not yet placed the vital interests of outside states at risk, and thus does not challenge the stability of Europe. However, these states do not remain unaffected. Some have endured tremendous political and economic strains as a result of their positions towards the conflict. Some countries (such as Germany and Italy) have opened their doors to a large influx of refugees, and this has sapped their own social programs. Others have discovered their relative impotence in diplomatic influence, in view of numerous failed peace initiatives.<sup>4</sup> Still others have suffered economic strain by participating in, and enforcing, the international economic and military sanctions levied on the former Yugoslav federation. The absence of a major military intervention by outside powers may suggest that these powers judge that any gains achieved by military intervention in attempting to end the conflict would be outweighed by the costs. Additionally, Western governments may fear that such an intervention risks provoking the Russians to side with the Serbs. Furthermore, intervening in such a war could possibly result in a protracted low-intensity conflict with Balkan insurgents, or a mid- to high-intensity conflict with the Russians. Therefore, it is difficult for outside states to justify armed intervention on behalf of conflict resolution even to their own constituencies.

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that most lines of authority lead back to the general staff in Belgrade. With nothing more than a change of shoulder patches, Serbian officers, specialists (intelligence, communications, radar, artillery and so on), and even ordinary soldiers rotate in and out of the Krajina (western Croatian) and Bosnian Serb Armies. These armies try to preserve the fiction that they are purely local militias defending their respective Serbian communities. But weapons and ammunition flow from Serbia. Heavy equipment is returned to Serbia for repair. Seriously wounded are evacuated to Serbia. Military conscription continues in Serbia, although ostensibly 'Serbia' is uninvolved in the fighting." Michael G. Roskin, "The Third Balkan War, and How It Will End," *Parameters* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Autumn 1994) pp. 58-59. In July 1992, after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia distanced itself from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Belgrade was attempting to present a plan for the resolution of the crisis. However, as the Bosnian Serbs were conducting the sieges of Sarajevo and Gorazda, they were being supplied by the YPA Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 71, No. 41, Fall 1992), p. 95.

<sup>4</sup> The EU, for example, sponsored 14 negotiated cease-fires and a major peace conference in the second half of 1991. Critics complained of mismanagement, but as John Zametica observed, rather than incompetence it was psychological impotence. As the Serbs ignored the cease-fires, the Europeans questioned the rational nature of international relations upon which their collective calculations were based. John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 270, (London, UK, IISS, Summer 1992) p. 59. See also Douglas T. Stuart, *Can Europe Survive Maastrich?* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) pp. 27-30.

While operating under the U.N. umbrella, the outside states have attempted to maintain a neutral position in their efforts to influence the war. From this perspective, the issue of deterring an enlarged conflict has received limited attention. In one attempt to address this issue, the U.N. Security Council created UNPROFOR Macedonia. The United States responded by providing military ground forces. For other countries united in attempts to bring about peace in Bosnia, their focus is limited to Bosnia. Their strategy, or lack of one in reference to preventing a spill-over, may pose a serious flaw for long-term stability and peace in the region. Without sufficient mechanisms in place to deter a larger war, the outside powers may inadvertently encourage its occurrence. If the war were to expand in scope, the vital interests of numerous states might be put at risk, and the potential for an even larger war could increase.

#### **A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

This thesis is primarily concerned with identifying the key factors that might be integrated into a strategy that could successfully deter Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia. It analyzes three historical cases in addition to the current situation. It tests hypotheses drawn from a specific theory about how force balances and other factors may affect prospects for success in deterrence. Although each theory may explain a portion of the situation, the goal of this thesis is to identify the theoretical approaches that may offer the most promise for a successful deterrent strategy. The findings may support the current strategy, and/or identify inadequacies within it. The study may assist policy makers and planners in a further assessment of the Balkan situation. Its findings, if adopted, could suggest a possible deterrent strategy that might successfully contain the current war in Bosnia. Such a strategy might even provide adequate leverage to encourage conflict resolution in Bosnia, and might be relevant in other deterrent situations.

The conclusion highlights the primary conditions that existed in the past when Serbia succumbed to a deterrent threat and identifies the theoretical approaches that may best support a deterrent strategy in the future. This thesis critically examines a deterrence theory

that relies on the balance of military forces and other factors.<sup>5</sup> It also distinguishes among various conditions, suggesting that in a holistic approach, each theory be integrated into the present deterrent strategy pragmatically. Finally, the thesis offers recommendations for U.S. policy.

## B. CASE SELECTION

The three historical cases used are drawn from the period immediately preceding the First World War. They were chosen for analysis in order to identify the types of similarities that existed in what Paul K. Huth has identified as successful attempts to achieve extended-immediate deterrence in the Balkans.<sup>6</sup> In the first two cases both Russia and Serbia were in a position prepared to attack but were deterred from initiating conflict. In the third case, Serbia was again deterred. Because the analysis is conducted upon a longitudinal basis, the results of each historical case can be evaluated and compared to similarities in the current Balkan crisis. This thesis identifies the elements that contributed to success in each case and then compares the findings to those elements present in the current Balkan crisis.

The first case is the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908-1909. In this case evidence suggests that a combination of coercive diplomacy and deterrence was required to maintain the peace. During this episode, the Austro-Hungarian government attempted to maintain order in its southern provinces. Its concerns coincided with Russia's attempts to open the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Russian warships. While the Russian attempts failed, the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded. In response to its own failure, Russia attempted to thwart Austria-Hungary's success. When Belgrade mobilized its army and threatened war, it received Russia's support. The escalation of the

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<sup>5</sup> This thesis uses the analytical approaches established in Paul K. Huth's *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1988), p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> "Extended-immediate deterrence is a policy in which (a) A potential attacker is actively considering the use of military force against a protégé of the defender. (b) Policy makers in the defender state are aware of this threat; and (c) Recognizing that an attack is possible policy makers of the defender state, either explicitly or by the movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an attempt to prevent the use of military force by the potential attacker." Huth, *ibid.*, pp.16, 24, Table 1., and pp.183-184.

crisis ended in what amounted to a German ultimatum to Russia to recognize the annexation. Russia, unprepared for war, backed down. Without Russia's support, Serbia also acquiesced. It demobilized its forces and recognized the annexation.

The second case, the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, as closely linked to and intertwined with the First Balkan War. Some of the causes leading to the crisis were rooted in the earlier annexation crisis. While deterrence succeeded, elements of coercive diplomacy shaped the conditions which led to the success. In order to secure Turkish consent to the annexation of territory that was an Ottoman possession, Austria-Hungary paid a hefty monetary sum in compensation. In order to show good will, it also conceded its military control over the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. On returning the territory to Turkey, Austria-Hungary evacuated its military presence. In 1912, the first of the Balkan wars erupted. The newly formed Balkan League, consisting of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, attacked Turkey and quickly experienced numerous victories.<sup>7</sup> Serbia and Montenegro entered into the Sandjak. Serbia moved forces into the northern region of Albania and occupied the Albanian port of Durazzo (Durrës), while Montenegro laid siege to the Turkish fortress of Scutari. Neither of the two incidents was acceptable to Austria-Hungary. In order to deter an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, Russian forces were mobilized. However, when German forces were mobilized in response, coupled with firm warnings, Russia again backed down. At this point the crisis was placed in the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors which was in session in London. The convention decided that Montenegro would not receive Scutari, that Serbia would not maintain Albanian territory, and that Albania would become autonomous. After a sizable international naval demonstration on the coast of Montenegro followed by a blockade, Montenegro was still unwilling to budge. But, after Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Montenegro, forces in Scutari and Serbian forces in Albania and Durazzo were withdrawn.

The third case is the Balkan crisis of Autumn 1913, immediately following the end of the Second Balkan War. In this case, while deterrence was ultimately successful, coercive

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<sup>7</sup> Romania was also a member of the Balkan League, but it did not participate in the attack on Turkey.

diplomacy established the framework for success. During the summer of 1913, the London Conference of Ambassadors had established a boundary commission to set in place the frontiers between Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. While the boundaries were being surveyed, conflict broke out between Albanian insurgents and Serbian forces. In response, the Serbian army was mobilized and Albanian territory was reoccupied. As a result, the Austro-Hungarian military was mobilized. Without Russian support Serbia would be no match for the Hapsburg forces. After weeks of nonproductive negotiations, Vienna issued an ultimatum to Serbia to withdraw its forces within eight days. As a result, Serbia yielded and ordered its troops back to Serbian soil within the prescribed time frame.

The fourth case is the Balkan crisis of the 1990s. After the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation, war broke out between the former republics. A cease fire and recognition of Slovenia occurred first. This was followed by heavy fighting in Croatia and a temporary settlement. However, the conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina and is still ongoing. While the international community under the U.N. and the European powers have attempted to prevent a spill-over of the conflict by deploying peacekeeping forces into the former Yugoslavia, the United States has apparently chosen to follow a deterrent policy in relation to Kosovo and Macedonia. In this analysis, the current efforts of the United States are compared with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the three previous cases, in which an extended-immediate deterrence threat succeeded.

It is important to distinguish deterrence and coercion. Thomas Schelling suggests that coercion is too imprecise a term, because it encompasses the meanings of both deterrence and compellence. He suggests that deterrence and compellence are related, but differ in numerous respects. Shelling suggests that most of the differences correspond to

something like the difference between statics and dynamics. . . Deterrence involves setting the stage. . . and waiting. . . Compellence in contrast, usually

involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.<sup>8</sup>

Additional factors of timing contribute to the contrast between the two types of activity. Schelling suggests that while deterrence tends to be indefinite, compellence involves definite deadlines.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, a distinction exists between the two, and the historical case studies consider both phenomena.

### C. THEORY TESTING

The theories that have been chosen for analysis are derived from the structural and organizational levels of analysis. This thesis suggests that both levels are necessary to the overall strategy. It attempts to highlight the significant factors at each level at which a deterrent strategy may best be focused and the expected responses that may occur. It also suggests that the deterrent strategy may best be served by identifying and embracing the theoretical approaches that provide the greatest likelihood of success. This may introduce a new calculus for assessing strategies that are derived from unitary actor-based theories, and that are applied towards participants that do not quite fit the traditional definitions.

The object of this thesis is to identify the theoretical approaches that provide the best insight on how to wage a successful deterrent strategy against the Serbs, specifically with regard to deterring potential Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia. The theory is critically tested in historical case analyses of prior interactions with Serbia as the potential attacker that is deterred. This longitudinal design is intended to furnish insights regarding the motivations that have shaped Serbian decision-making at various times.

At the structural level, a general balance of power theory is used in combination with a theory of extended deterrence. Since 1991, the military balance in the former Yugoslav federation has been tipped in the direction of the Serbs. Although current Muslim and Croat

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-70. For a full discussion see Schelling, pp. 69-78.

<sup>9</sup>Schelling, p. 70.

offensives may change the local appearance of the Bosnian battlefields, if Serbia's military were to intervene directly the situation would change. The Yugoslav People's Army, YPA, is still a formidable entity, fully capable of offensive operations. This suggests that capabilities as well as intentions should be addressed when considering the requirements of a deterrent strategy. Since the potential for conflict exists in both Kosovo and Macedonia, a strategy of extended deterrence may best secure a quasi peace until a more permanent settlement is reached.

Immediate extended deterrence, as posited by Paul K. Huth, suggests that the actual balance of forces on the ground, rather than hypothetical military potentialities, affects the strategic planning calculus of a potential aggressor in favor of deterrence.<sup>10</sup> This balance is created when an external actor guarantees its own involvement in a potential conflict by positioning forces in proximity to the potential attacker. The theory suggests that if the inferior forces of a potential victim, in this case Kosovo and Macedonia, are augmented by the action of an external power to become equal or superior to the forces of the potential attacker, in this case Serbia, then the probability of attack should be lessened.

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<sup>10</sup> Huth, p. 16. According to Huth, who bases his argument on the work of Patrick Morgan, "extended-immediate deterrence" exists when "(a) A potential attacker is actively considering the use of military force against a protégé of the defender; (b) Policymakers in the defender state are aware of this threat; and (c) Recognizing that an attack is possible, policymakers of the defender state, either explicitly or by the movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an attempt to prevent the use of military force by the potential attacker." This theory is outlined in greater depth in Chapter II of this thesis.

## II. EXTENDED DETERRENCE

### A. DETERRENCE

#### 1. General Definition

Deterrence is a means of preventing an opponent from choosing a particular course of action out of fear of failure and/or retaliation. As John Mearsheimer suggests, deterrence can be based on two conditions: punishment and for denial. Deterrence based on punishment is usually associated with weapons, either nuclear or conventional, that threaten to destroy large portions of the adversary's civil population and industry. Deterrence based on denial attempts to convince the opponent that his goal will not be achieved. It is based on battlefield denial and is linked to conventional forces.<sup>11</sup> As Paul K. Huth suggests, a deterrence policy in its general form is one in which a government seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs and risks of using military force to resolve a political conflict will outweigh the benefits.<sup>12</sup> In this sense, deterrence is focused on influencing the cost-benefit calculations in a potential attacker's decision making process.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 14-15.

<sup>12</sup> Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1988), p. 16. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11. See also Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61: 2 (1982-1983): 315.

<sup>13</sup> Andre Beaufre, *Deterrence Strategy*, translation by Major General R. H. Barry, (New York, NY, Praeger Press, 1966), p. 24. As Arnold Wolfers states, "Deterrence can only work in the minds of the men in charge of Soviet policy by convincing them that acts they might otherwise wish to undertake would prove too costly in light of the punishment the United States would, in their opinion, be able and prepared to inflict." See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 9.

## 2. Theory, Problems, and Assumptions

As Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out, a gap exists between deterrence theory and policy. They suggest that theories generally simplify or ignore many complexities of reality, and it may be appropriate to identify those aspects of deterrence phenomena in real-life settings that may be critical for deterrence outcomes, yet are excluded in the theory.<sup>14</sup> Further, George and Smoke warn that without a clear grasp of the complexities that deterrence theory simplifies or ignores, the successful application of a deterrence strategy to real-life situations is highly problematic.<sup>15</sup>

Accordingly, American policy makers have attempted to fill the gap between theory and policy. "Moreover, deterrence *strategy* as applied by policy-makers, bears only a loose resemblance to the primitive, abstract, only partially developed deterrence *theory*."<sup>16</sup> Therefore, neither successes nor failures can be attributed in full to application of the theory. George and Smoke provide seven simplifying assumptions to promote a clearer understanding of deterrence theory, but suggest that situational analysis may better explain the successes and failures of actual strategies. First, each side is a unitary, purposive actor. Second, pay offs (or rewards) and choices are deduced by assuming that one single general "rationality" exists. Third, general deterrence can be useful to policy makers although a strategy's scope and relevance as an instrument of policy is undefined. Fourth, the major threat to the defender is the capability of the potential attacker to strike. Fifth, deterrence commitments are always an "either or" matter. Sixth, the defender can rely on threats to persuade the potential attacker not to alter the status quo. Seventh, the critical and most problematic task is to achieve credibility of commitment.<sup>17</sup>

This thesis suggests that it may be useful to take certain excluded phenomena into account--namely, strategic culture. It suggests that in the Balkans, where numerous cultures,

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<sup>14</sup> George and Smoke, pp. 503-504.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, pp. 503-504.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 504. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, pp. 504-505.

religions, ethnic cleavages and other allegiances intersect, the concept of a "single general rationality" should be questioned.<sup>18</sup> This consideration should be seen as qualifying the findings.

The success or failure of extended deterrence is measured by whether the potential attacker decides to challenge the defender's threat to use force to protect its protégé.<sup>19</sup> In using the criteria presented by Alexander George and Richard Smoke as well as Paul K. Huth, this thesis suggests that in order to rely on deterrence as a tool of policy with a reasonable expectation of success, certain "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions must be met. "Necessary" conditions describe elements that must be present in order to expect success. "Sufficient" conditions describe the situation achieved when all the necessary conditions are aggregated. First, a clearly articulated policy must be present. Second, credible means by which the policies may be implemented must exist. Third, intent and resolve should be signalled through the careful use and integration of each element of national power. This should show the adversary the defender's capabilities. It should further demonstrate the defender's awareness of the existing options, and make credible the willingness to use force as a potential option. Fourth, the defender's commitment to the protégé as well as the policy should be demonstrated both domestically and internationally.

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<sup>18</sup> A more in-depth study might also analyze the psychological and bureaucratic nature of the potential aggressor. It could analyze the effects of such theories as suggested by Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 147-201. Rationality is not absolute. Many different factors affect the decision making process. A society in crisis or revolution may not be able to engage in a normal selection process of its leadership. In this respect, an individual who may rise to positions of leadership may not even subscribe to the rationality of the society from which he came. Other theories may suggest that certain organizations in an aggressor government may enjoy primacy in decision making. In this case, rationality may be skewed because of domestic or organizational incentives. Aggressors may find it to their advantage to pose as an irrational actor. Furthermore, the nature and intensity of some conflicts may stress rationality beyond its operating limits. Other theories exist; however, they lie beyond the scope of this thesis. For the advantages of different types of rationality, see Schelling, pp. 36-43.

<sup>19</sup> Huth, p. 28.

Finally, and possibly most importantly, the message must reach the potential attacker, and it must be understood.<sup>20</sup>

Additionally, Huth discusses credibility and stability. Credibility is established if the potential attacker believes that the defender possesses both the military capabilities to exact substantial costs on the attacker and the will to use those capabilities. Stability is present if the measures in place preclude increasing the potential attacker's fears of a preemptive strike and do not alienate the attacker's bargaining reputation, which could result in diplomatic stalemate.<sup>21</sup> While the sufficient conditions, in theory, should provide a means to achieve deterrence success, the uncertain and conditional nature of each case may prove that the theory is probabilistic rather than deterministic.

### **3. Conventional Deterrence**

Three theories concerning conventional deterrence are particularly relevant to this thesis. The first theory is organizational in nature. It suggests that the type of weapons systems that a state develops is closely related to the state's strategic and military culture. If the aggregated offensive weapon systems of a potential attacker are superior qualitatively and quantitatively to the defensive weapon systems of the defender, the probability increases that deterrence might fail. If the defense is superior, the converse is true.<sup>22</sup>

The second theory comes closer to the center of the argument of this thesis. It concerns the balance of military forces. This theory suggests that when the potential attacker has superiority, deterrence fails. Conversely, if there is a rough equality in the quantitative

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<sup>20</sup> This is an expansion of George and Smoke's three conditions: (1) the full formulation of one's intent to protect a nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up the intent; (3) the communication of the intent to the potential aggressor. See George and Smoke, p. 64. See also Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins University Press, 1981).

<sup>21</sup> Huth, pp. 33-34.

<sup>22</sup> Mearsheimer, p. 25. See George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York, NY, John Wiley, 1977). Quester suggests that likelihood of war is clearly influenced by how effective the offensive weapon seems to be, as compared with the defense.

and qualitative size of the opposing forces, then deterrence is expected to succeed.<sup>23</sup> A variation to the theory might suggest that while the defender enjoys a qualitative superiority but has a numerical inferiority, deterrence is likely to succeed. However, a common rationality must be assumed in this case--as well as an approximate consensus about the military significance of both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the capabilities in question.

The third theory utilizes the previous two theories and possibly provides the best insight for deterrence success and failure. It suggests that deterrence is a function of the particular strategy available to the attacker. In measuring the military balance, Huth suggests that the immediate, short-term, and long-term balance of military force determines the outcome of pursuing the three respective principal military strategies that exist: limited aims, blitzkrieg, and attrition.<sup>24</sup>

Of the three choices, the first may be marginal and territory-oriented while the second and third seek to defeat the enemy decisively. The limited aims strategy is the least costly because it attempts to minimize contact with defending forces. The objective of this strategy is often to seize control of strategic or disputed territory. While it provides the highest likelihood for success, it is not the common choice. Due to various influences, states desire decisive victories. Additionally, a successful limited attack could evolve into a protracted war simply because the defender has not been defeated and therefore will go on fighting.<sup>25</sup>

The blitzkrieg strategy is the ideal tool for achieving quick victory at low costs without a series of bloody battles. Its aim is to defeat and destroy the enemy's military. Although a series of battles may be fought, the goal of a decisive and quick victory with minimal costs would be degraded if the attacker were embroiled in set piece battles. While

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<sup>23</sup> Mearsheimer, pp. 26-27.

<sup>24</sup> Huth, p. 57. See Mearsheimer, pp. 35-43.

<sup>25</sup> Huth, p. 35. See Mearsheimer, p. 63.

deterrence is likely to fail if the attacker thinks a blitz offensive will work, it is greatly strengthened when the potential attacker envisions war as a series of set piece battles.<sup>26</sup>

In an attritional strategy the aim of the attacking force is once again to defeat and destroy the defending military. However, it is the total destruction of that military that defines success. It involves a long war in which the side with the greater resources is likely to emerge victorious. Because of the costs associated with an attritional strategy, if both sides are roughly equal in strength, deterrence is likely to succeed.<sup>27</sup>

In each of the three aggressor strategies, if the attacker is significantly superior in forces to the protégé, and/or to the defender, to the extent that the potential attacker does not doubt victory on the battlefield, then deterrence will likely fail. The failure of the deterrent effort would be due to a lack of credibility on the part of the defender. The defender's military disposition and actions should affect the attacker's calculations. If the defender's actions do not serve as a brake, influencing the potential attacker's decision making, then deterrence is likely to fail.<sup>28</sup>

#### **4. Extended-Immediate Deterrence**

This thesis also uses the structural framework established in *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. It suggests that by employing an extended-immediate deterrent policy, the current Balkan conflict might be contained. One reason why the strategy might be important in reference to the current conflict in the Balkans is that deterrence failures have "...led to the outbreak of some of the most destructive and important international conflicts

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<sup>26</sup> Huth, p. 36. See Mearsheimer, p. 30. For clarification, while Mearsheimer suggests that the objective of a blitz strategy is to defeat the opponent without a series of bloody battles, Huth suggests that its aim is to defeat the opponent's armed forces in a series of large-scale battles and to paralyze its fighting capacity. Further, Mearsheimer suggests that the blitz strategy demonstrates that an attacker can succeed even when he does not have superiority in numbers. See Mearsheimer, p. 36.

<sup>27</sup> Huth, pp. 38-39. See Mearsheimer, pp. 32-35 and 59.

<sup>28</sup> Mearsheimer, p. 59.

of the twentieth century."<sup>29</sup> It is in this light that an extended-immediate deterrence policy must be handled with great understanding and foresight.

At this point it is appropriate to identify and define the types of deterrence of concern in this thesis:

First, *extended deterrence*. . . [is] a situation in which policy makers ( . . . [the] defender) threaten military retaliation against another state (the potential attacker) in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally (or protégé) of the defender. . . . Second, *extended-immediate deterrence* is a policy in which (a) A potential attacker is actively considering the use of military force against a protégé of the defender. (b) Policy makers in the defender state are aware of this threat; and (c) Recognizing that an attack is possible policy makers of the defender state, either explicitly or by the movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an attempt to prevent the use of military force by the potential attacker.<sup>30</sup>

The former differs from the latter insofar as in the latter, the attacker is actively considering the use of military force. *General deterrence* is a situation in which a defender allocates resources and deploys military forces for the contingency of an armed attack, although none is imminent. In contrast, *extended-general deterrence* is a situation in which political and military competition exists between a potential attacker and defender. While the possibility of armed conflict over another state is present, the potential attacker is neither actively considering the use of force, nor is it engaging in a confrontation that may threaten war. However, the extended nature of deterrence exists because the defender is protecting the protégé from attack.<sup>31</sup>

U.S. military power is known throughout the world. However, recently the U.S. willingness to use that power has been challenged numerous times, including the 1990-91

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<sup>29</sup> Huth, p. 18.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pp. 16-17.

and 1994 Persian Gulf crises as well as the 1994 Korean and Haitian crises. Policy makers have the critical task of integrating aspects of reality that deterrence theory excludes. Moreover, to ensure credibility, they must articulate an appropriate declaratory strategy, coupled with signalling that demonstrates the level of commitment necessary to carry out pledges to defend the protégé.<sup>32</sup> It is in this respect that U.S. diplomatic and military actions signal resolve and intent. The signalling, if conveyed in a manner that is understandable by the potential attacker, fosters U.S. credibility. It demonstrates that the U.S. has the capability to retaliate and will do so, if necessary.<sup>33</sup> Generating the belief that the costs and risks of attack outweigh the expected benefits, is therefore the object of U.S. deterrent policy. However, a potential attacker must first perceive the signal of intent and then find it credible.<sup>34</sup>

Huth's analytical research design of extended-immediate deterrence limited the case selection to those that met the following criteria:

- 1) The initial threat of force by the potential attacker had to be explicit and the target of the threat clearly identifiable. Military and political actions by the potential attacker that constituted a threat to use force included:
  - a. Statement of intent to use force: A verbal threat to use force against a protégé.
  - b. Buildup of military forces for potential use: The reinforcement and movement of forces to positions behind the border or the coast of a protégé.
  - c. Preparations of military forces for imminent use: The concentration and alerting of forces on the border or off the coast of a protégé.
- 2) The threat of military retaliation by the defender had to be clearly directed at and perceived by the potential attacker. Military and political actions that indicated a threat of possible retaliation included:
  - a. Statement of intent to use force: A verbal threat to use force against the potential attacker.

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<sup>32</sup> George and Smoke, p. 60.

<sup>33</sup> Huth, p. 33.

<sup>34</sup> George and Smoke, p. 60.

- b. Show of military force: Exercises held near the border or off the coast of the potential attacker or protégé.
- c. Buildup of military forces for potential use: The reinforcement and movement of forces to positions behind the border or off the coast of the potential attacker or protégé.
- d. Preparation of military forces for imminent use: The concentration and alerting of forces on the border or off the coast of the potential attacker or protégé.<sup>35</sup>

In Huth's argument, two categories of perception are critical in the potential attacker's calculations, and help to determine the credibility of a defender's deterrent threat. They are the structural and behavioral features of the defender's current deterrent policy. The structural level is concerned with the stated deterrent policy and the local balance of force. It includes the attacker's assessment of his own capabilities and the capabilities of the defending force, as well as the value that the defending force has placed on its protégé.<sup>36</sup>

The behavioral level is concerned with the stated diplomatic strategies in the current interaction and the defender's record in previous international conflicts. It also includes the movement and positioning of forces as signals to reinforce a projected perception of resolve and intent on the part of the defender. These preparations could of course, be mistakenly interpreted and thus provoke a preemptive attack. However, diplomatic negotiations could clarify the threatening nature of preparations and promote a stable environment.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the defender's past and current record influences the potential attacker's perception of the defender's deterrent capability and credibility.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Huth, pp. 23-25.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

## 5. Hypotheses on Extended Deterrence

Whether extended-immediate deterrence ultimately succeeds or fails depends on the interaction between the defender and the potential attacker. In formulating hypotheses on how a potential attacker will behave, Huth made several assumptions. "First, a potential attacker chooses between reliance on military threats and/or the use of military force and reliance on negotiations and a diplomatic solution to resolve the conflict with the defender and protégé."<sup>39</sup> Second, the potential attacker considers the dangers or costs associated with each course of action.<sup>40</sup> Third, the potential attacker continuously reassesses the situation based on information on the intentions and capabilities of the defender, in view of the defender's diplomatic and military actions.<sup>41</sup> Finally, the potential attacker may be motivated to initiate confrontation by a combination of offensive and defensive aims.<sup>42</sup>

Huth formulated his hypotheses based on the structural conditions of the balance of power and the past behavior of the defender, as well as the actions, both military and diplomatic, that enhance the credibility of deterrence and avoid provoking an attack.<sup>43</sup> While each of Huth's hypotheses is useful in determining the likelihood for the success or failure of extended deterrence, the six hypotheses listed below may provide the most insight, for conflict containment in the Balkans.

The first hypothesis is concerned with the balance of military force. As already discussed above, this hypothesis suggests that deterrence may succeed if the potential attacker believes that the probability of success is low and that the price would be high. As Huth has stipulated, when the defending power is operating from the advantage qualitatively

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p. 30.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 31.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 32.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 35.

and quantitatively, deterrence has a higher likelihood of success. It is from this position that the limited aims and blitzkrieg strategies would be deterred.

**Hypothesis 1.1:** The probability of deterrence success increases as the balance of military forces between attacker and defender shifts to the advantage of the defender. The immediate and short-term balance of military forces will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than will the long-term balance of military forces.<sup>44</sup>

The second hypothesis suggests that one method used by Great Powers to establish their spheres of influence, and thereby interests in a region is to create alliances. Close political relationships depend on the value that the defender places on the protégé. This is demonstrated by political, economic, and military linkages. Defense pacts specify further the method by which each member of the alliance will act in specific scenarios. Credibility is established when alliances are created because states place value on their reputations, which effect foreign perceptions that obligations will be fulfilled elsewhere. If the alliance exists, a potential attacker will be likely to consider it in his cost-benefit calculations. In Huth's words,

**Hypothesis 2.1:** The probability of deterrence success will increase if the defender and protégé are linked by military alliance.<sup>45</sup>

The third hypothesis suggests that a defender's interests in a protégé may be demonstrated through military linkages and shown through the transfer of arms. Although the transfer of arms alone might not necessarily provide evidence of commitment, it provides the potential attacker state reason to believe that the defender is interested in the survival of the protégé, and that the protégé may be of strategic importance to the defender.

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<sup>44</sup> Paul K. Huth, p. 41. See Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics* 36: 4 (1984), pp. 509-10.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 44.

It also takes into account the fact that some arms transfers are conducted for economic reasons. As Huth puts it,

**Hypothesis 2.2:** The probability of deterrence success increases as the dependence of the protégé on military arms transfers from the defender increases.<sup>46</sup>

The fourth hypothesis suggests that while military defense and arms transfers might add to the calculus that sustains peace, the economic relationship between the defender and the protégé may be equally important. The protégé's importance increases if it functions as the defender's source of raw materials and essential commodities which are crucial to the defender's vital interests. If this relationship is disrupted, the defender could have reason to protect not only its protégé, but the interest which the protégé represents. According to Huth,

**Hypothesis 2.3:** The probability of deterrence success increases with higher levels of foreign trade between defender and protégé.<sup>47</sup>

The fifth hypothesis suggests that the proximity of the potential attacker to the protégé affects the deterrent outcome. An additional condition may be assigned if the defender state is not within a reasonable distance from either the attacker or protégé. However, this may be modified if a defending force presence exists within the region.

**Hypothesis 3.1:** The probability of deterrence success decreases if the potential attacker is contiguous with the protégé.<sup>48</sup>

The sixth hypothesis is taken from what Huth calls the three general policies of military escalation: strength, tit for tat, and caution. In the first, the defender responds to the

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 46.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 47.

actions of the potential attacker with greater than equal levels of military capability. In the second, he responds with equal levels. And in the third, he responds with less than equal capability.<sup>49</sup> The tit-for-tat policy suggests that if the defender responds to the military actions of the potential attacker with a gradual and equal escalation, that deterrent effort is likely to succeed. It is under these circumstances that the actions of the defender do not provoke an attack. One criticism might suggest that this approach could invite an attack due to a perception of the lack of decisive resolve.

**Hypothesis 4.1:** The adoption of a policy of tit for tat in military escalation by the defender will increase the probability of deterrence success as compared with alternative policies of military escalation.<sup>50</sup>

The seventh hypothesis is taken from the three general diplomatic strategies (as outlined by Huth) that a defender may choose to use: the bullying strategy, the firm-but-flexible strategy, and the conciliatory strategy.<sup>51</sup> For various reasons Huth suggests that the firm-but-flexible strategy might offer reasonable means to success. It provides the mechanisms needed for compromise and enables the potential attacker to maintain his prestige or save face when he de-escalates. Huth also suggests that it is more cooperative than the tit-for-tat strategy.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 49. While some critics suggest that a policy of tit for tat is less provocative than a policy of strength, others such as Henry Kissinger suggest that it is the most risky. Kissinger maintains that a policy of strength is most effective. The gradual escalation in a tit-for-tat policy intended to show moderation may be misinterpreted as irresolution. Kissinger suggests that once committed a leader must end the confrontation quickly. He must be prepared to escalate rapidly and brutally. See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA, Little and Brown, 1979), p. 621. For an in depth analysis of tit-for-tat theory, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, NY, Basic Books, Inc, Publishers, 1984).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 51.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, pp. 51-52. In a bullying strategy, the defender acts from an unyielding position. The strategy does not accommodate initiatives made by the potential attacker. The firm-but-flexible strategy uses the technique of standing firm in response to repeated demands by the potential attacker while offering compromise based on reciprocal accommodation. In a conciliatory strategy the defender accommodates the potential attacker without reciprocity. This last strategy, if not appeasement, is very close to it.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 53. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 101. Policies that reduce the costs of retreating increase the chance

**Hypothesis 4.2:** The adoption of a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy by the defender will increase the probability of deterrence success as compared with alternative strategies.<sup>53</sup>

The eighth hypothesis is concerned with the past behavior of the defender and the perception of that behavior by the potential attacker. One critical variable that influences the outcome of deterrence is the perception held by the potential attacker of the amount of risk that the defender is willing to accept. Some critics might suggest that, if the vital interests of the defending power are not at stake, the credibility of its deterrent threat is degraded. However, as each action that the defender undertakes has some significance for its commitments in the international community, the defender may credibly threaten intervention to strengthen its general bargaining position and reputation.<sup>54</sup>

**Hypothesis 5.1:** The past behavior of the defender in confrontations in which the current attacker was directly involved will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than in cases in which the current attacker was not directly involved.<sup>55</sup>

As Huth suggests in this latter hypothesis, the defender's past behavior and record affect the outcome of deterrence. A record of using a firm-but-flexible strategy increases the probability of deterrence success. A record of concessions under coercion, and of an unwillingness to risk armed conflict, weakens the defender's future credibility. Lastly, a record of bullying would have already affected the potential attacker. In this case the potential attacker may be forced to protect its own bargaining reputation and be provoked into action, a situation in which deterrence fails.<sup>56</sup>

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of deterrence success.

<sup>53</sup> Huth, p. 53.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p. 54.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

**Hypothesis 5.2:** Firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender in past confrontations between defender and potential attacker enhances the deterrent actions of the defender in the next confrontation between the two states. If the defender, however, has adopted a bullying or conciliatory strategy in the past, then the probability of deterrence failure in the next confrontation increases.<sup>57</sup>

## 6. Testing

Since the object of this thesis is to understand whether extended-immediate deterrent policies and strategies might succeed in containing the current Balkan conflict, it is important to analyze the cases in which the potential attacker was successfully deterred. The primary analytical assumption made by the author is that Serbia is a potential attacker that could widen the current conflict in the Balkans. In Three historical cases, the extended deterrent policies and strategies of a defender succeeded in dissuading Serbia from attacking a protégé. In the current Balkan conflict, deterrence has obviously failed in that the Serbs (both the Bosnian and the Belgrade Serbs) have conducted offensives against the Bosnian Government forces with little restraint. The historical analyses, and the variables pertaining to deterrence in these cases are measured and the findings are compared to the circumstances in the current conflict. These analyses may provide insight regarding the conditions that might permit successful deterrence.

The military balance variable identifies the immediate, short-term, and long-term balance of military forces. This variable must be correlated with the three strategies already identified: limited aims, blitzkrieg, and attrition. In each case, this thesis identifies the force structure that existed in relation to each of these levels of force, based on the following definitions. The immediate balance of forces is defined as those land forces of a potential attacker in a position to initiate an attack and those land forces of the defender and protégé

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

in a position to repulse such an attack.<sup>58</sup> The short-term balance of forces is defined as the capacity of the attacker, the defender and protégé to augment the immediate balance of forces by mobilizing ground and air force man power as well as the first class of trained reserves.<sup>59</sup> The long-term balance of force is defined as the capacity of the defender and protégé and potential attacker to build up their existing armed forces and to maintain an increased level of fighting strength by mobilizing the economy and civilian population for war.<sup>60</sup>

In each case the value of the protégé is evaluated. The criteria for the evaluation rest on the presence of a combination of military alliances and trade-related linkages. This section identifies whether a military alliance exists, if the protégé depends on the defender for weapons and material, and if economic interaction occurs. It also attempts to evaluate the level of importance that the potential attacker places on the defender's protégé.<sup>61</sup>

In each case, the bargaining behavior of the defender is evaluated. The analysis identifies the diplomatic strategy that the defender adopted--bullying, firm but flexible, or conciliatory. The difference between the first and the second is that the latter can adapt and react in a positive manner to a potential attacker's initiatives as well as initiate possible compromise.

In each case, the strategy of military escalation is evaluated. The defender's choice is coded in one of three categories: a policy of strength, a policy of tit-for-tat, or a policy of caution. Huth established six categories for the escalatory levels of response available to the defender and potential attacker.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 58. "To be in position to engage in combat, the opposing forces must either be concentrated and prepared for action . . . or be capable of mobilization for immediate combat from forward positions to the point of attack." Huth, pp. 58-59.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 60. The short-term balance of force measures the effective strength of opposing sides and draws largely on mobilization capabilities.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 61.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp. 62-64. The value of the protégé is affected by the proximity of the attacker to the protégé as well as the distance between the defender and the protégé and between the defender and the potential attacker.

(1) Symbolic show of force or display of military presence: Naval visits to ports of protégé, the dispatch of a warship to coast of protégé, naval reconnaissance off coast of protégé; (2) Demonstration of military capabilities: Naval exercises or war games held near the coast of the protégé or adversary, land exercises or war games held near the border of the protégé or adversary; (3) Buildup of military forces: Reinforcements of ground forces moved to borders or points of likely armed confrontation, naval reinforcements at bases or at sea in region of protégé or adversary; (4) Positioning of military forces for immediate use: Buildup of ground forces on borders or points of likely armed confrontation, buildup of naval forces off the coast of protégé or adversary; (5) Preparation of forces for immediate use: Concentration and alerting of ground and/or naval forces on the border, off the coast of the adversary, or at points of likely armed confrontation; and (6) Mobilization of forces for war: Partial or general mobilization of ground and/or naval forces for combat.<sup>62</sup>

The past behavior of the defender in each case is evaluated. As Huth suggests, the behavior of the defender bears more significance if a confrontation recently occurred between the defender and the potential attacker. If a confrontation with another state occurred, the behavior is noted, yet does not constitute a direct influence on the potential attacker. If a confrontation did occur between the defender and the potential attacker, the defender's past record will influence the current confrontation. If the defender's past record included bullying or conciliation towards the potential attacker, the probability of deterrence success decreases. If the defender chose a firm-but-flexible bargaining policy in prior confrontations, then the probability of deterrence success in the current confrontation increases.

The outcomes of attempted extended deterrence are categorized as the following: 1) success, 2) failure followed by armed support, and 3) capitulation. Success is self-evident.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid, pp. 67-71. Huth used the following sources to construct the scale of military escalation: Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 38-57; Edward Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 74-79; and James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (London, UK, Chatto and Windus, 1971), pp. 23-68.

Failure but armed support suggests that deterrence failed and the defender intervened. Capitulation suggests that deterrence failed and the defender failed to intervene. The outcomes of the most recent confrontations between the defender and the potential attacker can be described in three ways: diplomatic put-down, stalemate, and diplomatic defeat. In the diplomatic put-down, the defender bullies the potential attacker into critical concessions in order to avoid armed conflict. In a stalemate, direct military confrontation is avoided, but the firm-but-flexible bargaining policy fails to resolve the underlying issues of the confrontation. In diplomatic defeat, the defender succumbs under pressure and concedes on critical issues in attempts to avoid military confrontation.<sup>63</sup>

The following three historical case studies critically analyze the general and specific conditions in which the actions of the defender and the protégé enhanced deterrence success. The fourth case study is specifically oriented toward conflict containment in the current Balkan crisis. It is analyzed in relation to international and U.S. efforts to achieve this goal. The results of the three historical cases in which deterrence succeeded are compared to the judgements concerning the current conditions. The findings suggest that the likelihood of deterrence success is increased when the defender and protégé create the required conditions utilizing coercive diplomacy.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid, pp. 69. Huth categorized the outcomes of disputes (who won) from Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982), appendix 2., and Russell J. Leng, "Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27:3 (1983), pp. 379-420.

### III. SERBIA, RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA'S ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1908-1909

#### A. BACKGROUND

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany's influence in the Near East was a cause of concern for both Russia and Great Britain. By financing, and to an extent administering, the Baghdad railway, Germany had assumed a predominant position in Anatolia and Mesopotamia.<sup>64</sup> Russia had designs on Constantinople and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. It was therefore concerned that German activities might resuscitate an ailing Turkey and spoil Russia's pursuit of its self-proclaimed mission as the patron of the Christian nations of the Balkans and hinder Russia's grasp of a strategic opportunity in the Turkish straits. Already in 1899, the Russian foreign minister informed his German counterpart that Russia had exclusive claims on Constantinople and would have a watchful eye on any power assuming a dominating position on the Bosphorus.<sup>65</sup>

In Russia's war with Japan in 1904, St. Petersburg lost Manchuria with Port Arthur. In focusing towards rebuilding and regaining its prestige as a great power, Russia sought to expand its military power in the south, especially its Black Sea fleet.<sup>66</sup> However, for Russia, control of the Turkish straits would be the only method of accomplishing this goal.<sup>67</sup> In order to resolve the problem of access to the Mediterranean, Russian foreign minister Izvolski met with his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Aehrenthal, in Vienna in September 1907. At this initial meeting, the two discussed possible solutions to each other's problems.

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<sup>64</sup> Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, *The Coming of the War 1914*, Vol. I (New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 89-91.

<sup>65</sup> Sydney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Vol. I, (New York, NY, The MacMillan Company, 1930), p. 366.

<sup>66</sup> Fay, p. 369.

<sup>67</sup> Leonard Charles Frederick Turner, *Origins of the First World War* (New York, NY, W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1970), p. 32. Control of the straits would also support the enormous wheat exports from Ukraine and the need to import heavy equipment through the Black Sea to further Russia's southern industrial expansion.

Through the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Austria-Hungary enjoyed military control over three Ottoman provinces: Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. The Dual Monarchy, led by Emperor Franz Joseph, reigned over a polyglot empire that consisted of numerous nationalities. For several years, Serbians within and outside the empire had caused great disruption. Serbia wanted to implement its Yugoslav dream and threatened to unite not only the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Croats and Slovenes as well. Strategically, this would deprive the Hapsburg empire of its sole outlet to the sea and seriously compromise its position as a great power.<sup>68</sup> In order to prevent further turmoil in the southern region which could ignite additional fires of national consciousness and cause more problems within the empire, Austria-Hungary became interested in incorporating the entire region in which Serbians lived (an Anschluss).<sup>69</sup> However, due to the certainty of Russian protest and possibly war, Austria-Hungary pursued a limited aims strategy of annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>70</sup>

On 2 July 1908, Izvolski wired Aehrenthal. He proposed that, in view of the Young Turk Revolution, the timing might be right for both powers to achieve their aims. This was followed by a meeting in Buchlau on 15 September 1908. At this private conference, it was agreed that Vienna would support Russian efforts to open the straits to Russian warships exclusively, while St. Petersburg would support the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>71</sup> Aehrenthal informed Izvolski that the annexation would have to be conducted before the meeting of the Austro-Hungarian Delegation on 8 October 1908.

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<sup>68</sup> Schmitt, p. 105.

<sup>69</sup> Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, Vol I, translated by Isabella M. Massey, (London, UK, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 205. Aehrenthal was interested in incorporating Serbia into the empire. In doing so he would join the Serbs with the Slavs of the empire and create a large southern Slav Kingdom under the Hapsburg scepter. This would transform the Dual Monarchy into a Tripartite Monarchy.

<sup>70</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 68.

<sup>71</sup> Fay, pp. 374-5.

Apparently, Izvolski misunderstood this to mean merely laying out the plan, not the presentation of a *fait accompli*.<sup>72</sup> While Aehrenthal made arrangements to announce the annexation, Izvolski went on holiday. He eventually presented his proposal to the other great powers of Europe, but France and Great Britain were not receptive.<sup>73</sup> To everyone's surprise, on 5 October 1908, Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared independence from Turkey. Knowing that the Turkish response to an annexation would be negative, Aehrenthal immediately announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 October 1908.<sup>74</sup>

Turkey protested the annexation as a violation of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Article 25 of that treaty had assigned domestic jurisdiction to Austria-Hungary while Constantinople maintained suzerainty. Because of the annexation and the newly declared Bulgarian independence, Turkey mobilized its forces in a defensive measure.<sup>75</sup> Its economic efforts, however, were more compelling. The Turks organized a boycott of Hapsburg goods and services. Austro-Hungarian shops were boycotted, cargoes in harbors were left unloaded, and deposits were withdrawn from banks. Vienna experienced losses exceeding 100,000,000 crowns.<sup>76</sup> Ongoing negotiations between the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires eventually restored the former friendly relationship. On 26 February 1913, in return for Turkey's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vienna agreed to compensate Constantinople with a payment of 2.5 million Turkish pounds, and to renounce its rights to occupation of the Sandjak.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Fay, p. 376.

<sup>73</sup> Schmitt, 1930, p. 128. See Fay, p. 379. France was sympathetic but noncommittal, and Britain would not agree to the passage of Russian warships through the Turkish straits unless all powers enjoyed the same rights.

<sup>74</sup> Fay, p. 376.

<sup>75</sup> John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary* (West Lafayette, IN, Purdue University Press, 1983), p.40. See Fay, p. 387.

<sup>76</sup> Albertini, p. 224.

<sup>77</sup> Treadway, p. 40. See Fay, p. 388.

From the beginning, the Serbians were outraged. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the center of their national feeling. Many famous figures of the Serb nation had originated in Bosnia, and the Herzegovina dialect had been used in founding modern Serbian literature.<sup>78</sup> The annexation prevented them from uniting with the Croats and the Bosnian population. It also denied them an outlet to the sea which was vital to their economic growth. Furious crowds in Belgrade organized demonstrations and public protests. The windows of the Austrian Embassy were smashed and the Austrian flag was burned.<sup>79</sup>

Immediately following the announcement of the annexation an emergency session of the Serbian Skupshtina (assembly) was convened. The Serbs assumed that war was inevitable. Belgrade ordered the mobilization of the first reserve (120,000 men), passed an emergency credit for war, and founded Narodna Obrana (National Defense) as a society dedicated to the protection of national interests in the annexed provinces.<sup>80</sup> A "holy war" was preached in the Skupshtina, and a minority of 66 to 93 actually voted to go to war.<sup>81</sup> Belgrade even attempted to make a military pact with Turkey, but the Turkish response was half-hearted; and after its rapprochement with Vienna, Constantinople's military dialogue with Belgrade ceased.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, the Serbian boycott of Austro-Hungarian goods added to the tensions.

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<sup>78</sup> Albertini, p. 222.

<sup>79</sup> G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy 1904-1914* (New York, NY, The Century Co., 1926), p. 170. Dickinson cites Heinrich Freidjung, *des Imperialismus 1884-1914* (Berlin, 3 Bde, 1919-1922), pp. 181-182.

<sup>80</sup> Albertini, p. 222. See also Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (London, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 46. The situation was very serious in Serbia. "The Foreign Minister told the Italian chargé that 'the government were in a very serious dilemma, as it found themselves between war or revolution.'" On 8 October 1908, Serbia informed the Powers that 20,000 reservists had been mobilized. Schmitt, p. 46.

<sup>81</sup> Dickinson, p. 170. Dickinson cites Freidjung, pp. 181-122.

<sup>82</sup> Schmitt, 1930, p. 125.

Sentiment was similar in Montenegro. From the onset, Montenegrin forces were prepared for action. Orders were given to distribute food rations to the troops, and to provide each man with 220 rounds of ammunition. Artillery pieces were positioned at the fortifications at Mount Lovcen which overlooked the Austro-Hungarian southern most harbor at the Dalmatian port of Cuttaro. From Mount Lovcen, Montenegrin artillery could dominate the harbor and the Adriatic coast.<sup>83</sup> Additionally the Montenegrin Red Cross was activated.<sup>84</sup> The Montenegrin army was estimated to be comprised of four divisions consisting of 50,000 troops, but it lacked resources and a strong economic base of support.<sup>85</sup> This number of forces also included the estimated 10,000 men expected to return from the various Montenegrin diaspora communities abroad.<sup>86</sup>

However, war was not immediately to follow. On 12 October 1908, Serbia protested the annexation. Belgrade demanded either "the full restoration of the situation created by the Treaty of Berlin" or "a corresponding compensation."<sup>87</sup> Belgrade provided indications that a justifiable compensation would be a concession on a railway to the Adriatic, and changes in the border with Bosnia. The Great Powers, however, gave little encouragement to Serbia. Almost immediately after the announcement of the annexation Izvolski told the Serbian minister in Paris that Russia could not go to war over Bosnia. He suggested that Vienna's evacuation from the Sandjak would be beneficial to Serbia since it provided the opportunity for a common border between Serbia and Montenegro. Later, when speaking to the Serbian minister in London, Izvolski suggested that the Serbian government should

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<sup>83</sup> Samuel R. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (London, UK, MacMillan Education LTD, 1991), p. 109.

<sup>84</sup> Treadway, pp. 36-37. Treadway cites Martinovic *Ot por Noroda u Crnoj Gori*, p. 504.

<sup>85</sup> Williamson, p. 109.

<sup>86</sup> Treadway, pp. 226-227, n. "As the threats of war grew, Montenegrins began to return home from the United States, Canada, Russia, Turkey (especially Constantinople) and elsewhere." Treadway cites Javonovic, *Stav Crne Gore prema aneksiji*, pp. 93-99. n.

<sup>87</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 47.

not allow itself to be provoked by domestic unrest. He acknowledged that Bosnia-Herzegovina had been lost, and suggested that war with Austria-Hungary would be suicide for Serbia. He recommended that Serbia stop its military preparations and restrain its people. In Vienna ideas of Serbian territorial gains were dismissed. Contiguous borders would seal the remainder of the Sandjak off from Vienna. However, Austria-Hungary was willing to agree to an independent Danube-Adriatic railway.<sup>88</sup>

In response to the increased level of military readiness attributed to the Serbian mobilization and Montenegrin movement of troops, Austria-Hungary took appropriate measures. Many in the government, along with the Austro-Hungarian Army Chief of Staff, wanted a preemptive war, but this was tempered by Aehrenthal's attempts to find a diplomatic solution. Meanwhile military preparations began. On 21 October 1908, Aehrenthal made preliminary arrangements for Albanian tribesmen to engage Montenegro if Montenegro initiated aggression against Austria-Hungary. On 24 October 1908, Aehrenthal partially implemented the "Brown Mobilization," which in itself was a partial mobilization. This raised the troop levels of the 15th Corps headquartered in Sarajevo and rotated several battalions to southern Dalmatia.<sup>89</sup> In November, realizing that his forces in Dalmatia were in vulnerable positions, Aehrenthal reinforced them by deploying another five divisions (68,000 men) there.<sup>90</sup> On 7 December 1908, the "Brown Mobilization" was fully implemented when Austro-Serbian relations deteriorated. Evidence existed that Austria-Hungary had activated 60,000 men and had mobilized three corps.<sup>91</sup>

In the new year, 1909, the crisis continued to escalate. Vienna complained that Serbia's actions were becoming very serious. By 17 February, evidence existed that Serbia's

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<sup>88</sup> Albertini, p. 275.

<sup>89</sup> Treadway, p. 38., and p. 226. n. 76. Conrad informed Aehrenthal that the time frame necessary to maintain normal appearances on the railways would require seventeen days for the "Brown Mobilization" to be implemented fully, but it could be accelerated if necessary.

<sup>90</sup> Williamson, p. 110. See Treadway, p. 38. See also Schmitt, 1937, p. 75.

<sup>91</sup> Fay, p. 381. See Schmitt, 1937, p. 76.

intentions were becoming more militant. The Second (Ban) Cavalry reservists (2500 men) were given three weeks training.<sup>92</sup> By 9 March 1909, the Serbian government called up the last of the reserves.<sup>93</sup> Austria-Hungary countered the Serbian increases in military preparedness by increasing the strength of the 63 battalions in Dalmatia and Bosnia to war levels. Vienna reinforced this move by sending an additional 15 battalions to these provinces.<sup>94</sup> Aehrenthal insisted that Serbia must formally recognize the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, give up her objections, and claims to compensation, and make a formal declaration that it harbored no aggressive intentions against Vienna.<sup>95</sup> Tensions and concern increased on 14 March 1909 with reports that Russia was mobilizing its Kiev military district. However, Izvolski denied the assertions, claiming that troops had merely returned to Kiev from the Caucasus.<sup>96</sup> He, in turn, was concerned that in the event of war, Vienna was planning to mobilize four corps in Galacia against Russia, but Aehrenthal likewise denied the claim as fabricated.

For Russia, the Austro-Hungarian annexation was a great embarrassment at home and abroad. Izvolski was unable to obtain British and French consent for opening the Turkish straits, and Russia's historical mission as the patron of the Slavs in the Balkans had failed. Many in the government as well as the powerful Pan-Slav movement in Russia were severely critical of Izvolski.<sup>97</sup> In response to domestic and governmental pressure Izvolski attempted to sabotage Vienna's success by insisting that the question of the annexation be laid before

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<sup>92</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 155. n.

<sup>93</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 180.

<sup>94</sup> Schmitt, 1937, pp. 180-181.

<sup>95</sup> Albertini, p. 275.

<sup>96</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 193.

<sup>97</sup> Fay, pp. 379-381. Many in Russia were outraged by the situation. Not only had Izvolski allowed Vienna to subjugate the Serbs, but during his tenure, the Bulgarians achieved independence unaided by St. Petersburg.

an international conference.<sup>98</sup> However, he also warned Belgrade that Russia was not yet in position to go to war. He stated:

Serbia must remain quiet and should do nothing which could provoke Austria and provide an opportunity of annihilating Serbia. Russia is not yet ready with her armaments and cannot now make war, and she is not willing to do so now on account of Bosnia and Herzegovina, come what may. . . . We Russians have not abandoned the demands for territorial compensation for Serbia, but according to all that I have heard, we cannot make them good.<sup>99</sup>

As the situation deteriorated between Vienna and Belgrade, relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg also suffered. By the middle of December 1908, strained relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia reached the point that official communications were limited to written notes. Realizing the grave nature of the crisis, on 30 December 1908, Tsar Nicholas sent a note to Emperor Franz Joseph. In it he addressed the annexation and warned, that any conflict in the Balkans would likely lead to general unrest in the Balkans as well as Russia. Because of that probability, a conflict in the Balkans might lead Europe to a general war.<sup>100</sup>

In January 1909, the Serbian minister in St. Petersburg was coaxed not to push Vienna to the point of war. On 28 January 1909, General Popovich assured the Serbs that,

We [the Russians] are now busily exerting ourselves to bring our military power to such a level that Russia can pursue the policy required by her traditions and dignity. Serbia must take this into account and wait for a more favorable time.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Fay, p. 380. Izvolski knew that it would be difficult to convene such an assembly, and by insisting on this as a precondition for the recognition of the annexation, he attempted to stop the annexation.

<sup>99</sup> Izvolski cited in Schmitt, 1937, pp. 71-72 n.

<sup>100</sup> Albertini, pp. 232-233.

<sup>101</sup> Schmitt, 1930, pp. 128-129.

On 27 February 1909, Izvolski informed Belgrade that "The Great Powers [were] not disposed to support the idea of a territorial aggrandizement of Serbia."<sup>102</sup> However, out of fear that Vienna would attack Serbia, Russia remained evasive on whether it recognized the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>103</sup> Izvolski continued to propose that the decision to abrogate Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin should be decided by a conference of the Great Powers. However, on 29 March 1909, after the receipt of the German-proposed solution, which was viewed as an ultimatum, Russia yielded and accepted the plan.<sup>104</sup>

The annexation had caught Kaiser Wilhelm off guard. While the annexation had implications for the Baghdad railway, the Kaiser's primary concern was the potential for war with Russia, and Germany's obligations to Austria-Hungary.<sup>105</sup> With the Kaiser's approval, in January 1909, discussions took place between Conrad, the Austro-Hungarian Army Chief of Staff, and his German counterpart Moltke. Because Vienna and Berlin were allies, Conrad wanted to know the details of the German campaign plans if war broke out. After deliberation, it was decided that Germany would be required to protect itself from a French mobilization and offensive. On 21 January 1909, Moltke provided Conrad with his plan. Germany would "... hurl the main body of the German forces first against France."<sup>106</sup> In Moltke's note to Conrad, he stated:

It is to be anticipated that the moment may come when the patience of the Monarchy toward Serbian provocations will come to an end. Then there will be nothing left for the Monarchy to do but march into Serbia.

I believe that only an Austrian invasion of Serbia will bring about an eventual active intervention of Russia. This will create the *casus foederis* for Germany. The joint military action that would then begin would--according

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<sup>102</sup> Treadway, pp. 42-43.

<sup>103</sup> Schmitt, 1930, p. 41.

<sup>104</sup> Fay, p. 392.

<sup>105</sup> Fay, p. 386.

<sup>106</sup> Albertini, p. 269.

to the statement of your Excellency--rest on the basis that at first Austria could concentrate only 30 divisions in Galacia against Russia.

At the same moment that Russia mobilizes, Germany will also mobilize and will mobilize her entire army.<sup>107</sup>

In order to augment what both Conrad and Moltke considered to be a weak Austro-Hungarian force in comparison with the expected Russian forces, Germany agreed to leave thirteen divisions in East Prussia. These divisions would launch an offensive against Russia from East Prussia in order to take the weight off of Austria in case of a Russian attack.<sup>108</sup>

Out of the Conrad-Moltke correspondence, Austria devised two courses of action: Plan A, Case Russia, and Plan B, Case Balkan. In Plan A, minimal forces were assigned to the south, Minimal-Gruppe Balkan, which consisted of twelve divisions, and A-Staffel (echelon or formation) which consisted of thirty divisions in Galacia. B-Staffel served as a reserve which could augment either A-Staffel, or Minimal-Gruppe Balkan, if needed. If war broke out with Russia, A-Staffel would be brought to full strength for offensive operations in Galacia. Meanwhile, Minimal-Gruppe Balkan would remain on the defense. In Plan B, a war with Serbia would mean that Minimal-Gruppe Balkan would be strengthened, while A-Staffel would stay on the defense in Galacia against Russia.<sup>109</sup>

In February 1909, with the frustration of Serbian defiance, Aehrenthal made it known that he was planning an ultimatum, and that if the Serbs failed to recognize the annexation then an invasion was pending.<sup>110</sup> After a breakdown in negotiations, Vienna

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<sup>107</sup> Moltke cited in Schmitt, 1930, p. 15. See Albertini, p. 370. See also Schmitt, 1937, p. 96. Schmitt cites Conrad, I: pp. 379-384.

<sup>108</sup> Albertini, pp. 369-370. See F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria Hungary, 1866-1914* (Boston, MA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 315. See also Schmitt, 1937, p. 96. As a compromise for the assistance of thirteen German divisions, Conrad agreed to invade Russia (that is, Russian-dominated Poland) with his forces in Galacia.

<sup>109</sup> Bridge, p. 315.

<sup>110</sup> Schmitt, pp. 123-124.

attempted to coerce Serbia. Aehrenthal approved Conrad's demands to call up additional troops and transport fifteen extra battalions to the Serbian border.<sup>111</sup>

In an attempt to preserve the peace, Germany offered a complicated formula which would provide Russia an opportunity to accept the annexation, and in principle maintain its prestige. Germany proposed that instead of the powers convening in a conference, the powers should approve the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin and recognize the annexation by exchanging telegrams. Since the other Great Powers were likely to accept the proposal in order to maintain the peace, Russia would be compelled to do so as well. If not, a refusal would have probably meant war. However, prior to Berlin informing the other powers, the German Foreign Minister, Bulow, stipulated that Russia would have to provide its consent first. He sent the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg the following instructions:

Please say to Mr. Izvolski that we learn with great satisfaction that he recognizes the friendly spirit of our proposal and seems willing to accept it. . . But before we make the proposal to Austria-Hungary we must know positively that Russia will answer the Austrian note by giving consent to the nullification of Article 25 without any reservation. Please say to Mr. Izvolski in [a] clear cut fashion that we expect a precise answer-yes or no; we must regard any evasive, conditional or unclear answer as a refusal. We should then draw back and let things take their course. The responsibility for all subsequent events would then fall on Mr. Izvolski exclusively. . .<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Treadway, p. 45. Treadway cites Conrad, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, 5 vol. (Vienna, 1921-1925), I: p. 138-157.

<sup>112</sup> Schmitt, 1930, p. 41. See Fay, p. 391. Fay cites *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, ed by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme, 40 vol. (Berlin, 1927). This citation is later identified as G.P. See also Treadway, p. 45. The German proposal to resolve the crisis by telegram appealed to the Powers. An international conference would have required addressing numerous issues. Since many wanted to address only the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the method of the telegram would solve this complication.

On 29 March 1909, St. Petersburg accepted the proposal and recognized the annexation. Izvolski attempted to dissuade Serbia from acting irrationally and suggested that Belgrade accept the terms that Aehrenthal had prescribed.

Without the promise of a Serbian recognition of Vienna's demands the crisis continued into March. On 28 March, Austro-Hungarian authorities closed the border with Montenegro except for the road from Kotor in Dalmatia that led to Cetinje, the Montenegrin capital. On 29 March, before news reached Vienna that Russia had yielded, a council of ministers ordered the "Yellow Mobilization," Plan B. This provided for the utilization of five of the fifteen Corps against Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>113</sup>

Finally, on 31 March 1909, under pressure from each of the Great Powers, Serbia accepted Vienna's terms. Belgrade passed a note to Emperor Franz Joseph himself stating:

Serbia recognizes that she has not been affected in her rights by the *fait accompli* created in Bosnia, and that consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in regard to article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted since last autumn with regard to the annexation. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.

In conformity with these declarations and with confidence in the peaceful intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will replace her army, as far as concerns its organization and the location and number of the troops, to the state in which it was in the spring of 1908. She will disarm and disband the volunteers and irregular forces and prevent the formation of new irregular corps on her territory.<sup>114</sup>

Within a few weeks of Vienna's acceptance of Belgrade's note recognizing the annexation, troops on both sides of the border were demobilized and tensions began to ease.

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<sup>113</sup> Fay, p. 392. This was a partial mobilization in case of war against Serbia and Montenegro only, but was a complete mobilization for the five Corps involved in the theater. See Treadway, p. 45.

<sup>114</sup> Fay, p. 393. Fay cites G.P. XXVI p. 731. See Schmitt, 1930, p. 474.

Although the dimensions of the crisis had been reduced significantly by Serbia's capitulation, the tensions in the region were not yet resolved. Montenegro maintained an obstinate disposition and continued to seek compensation. In April 1909, owing in part to Izvolski's recommendation to Cetinje that it should keep the peace and not pursue compensations, Italy successfully mediated the negotiations and was able to convince King Nicholas of Montenegro to accept the annexation. On 6 April 1909, Cetinje provided Vienna with its note recognizing the annexation, which was accepted on 8 April 1909.<sup>115</sup>

## B. ANALYSIS

The crisis created by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a classic example of what Richard Ned Lebow defines as "brinkmanship"--that is, ". . . a confrontation in which one state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another with the expectation that its adversary will back down when challenged."<sup>116</sup> While both Russia and Serbia certainly attempted to convince Austria-Hungary to give up the annexation, Vienna was likewise relentless. Throughout the crisis, negotiations continued, either directly, or through second and third parties. However, it was not until the German ultimatum that Russia backed down, with Serbia and Montenegro soon to follow.

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<sup>115</sup> Treadway, pp. 47-49. The deliberations over Cetinje's acceptance of the annexation involved additional concessions on Vienna's part, namely the partial abrogation of Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin. Treadway, p. 47. However, concessions were made by both parties. The abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin provided Vienna with complete political and military control over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The abrogation of Article 29 would provide Montenegro with complete sovereignty over its territory. However, in securing a compromise, Britain and Italy were successful in the deletion of several paragraphs. Montenegro was given sovereignty over its littorals, but only with a pledge by King Nicholas that Cetinje would not make Antivari a naval port. Since Montenegro was so small, Vienna could not allow the international crisis to continue over such a matter. Additionally, Vienna did not allow an incident in which two Austro-Hungarian soldiers were taken prisoner and moved to Cetinje to provoke a confrontation. See Albertini, pp. 213, 281, 288-289, 292.

<sup>116</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," pp. 89-124., in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p.119. See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 57-97.

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 1.1 concerning the immediate and short-term balance of force increasing the likelihood of deterrence success appears to be relevant. Evidence suggests that Russia did not want war because it was unprepared. As stated above, Russia's war with Japan had caused tremendous complications to its military strategy, as well as compromising its status as a Great Power. Therefore, St. Petersburg could not afford to respond militarily until it was fully prepared. For mobilization purposes, France had financed the construction of a Russian strategic railway that was planned to stretch into Poland. However, this had not yet materialized.<sup>117</sup> Already in February 1908, Izvolski had recommended an offensive policy and warned against the defense. He wanted Russia to accomplish its historic mission of controlling the Turkish straits through force rather than diplomacy. Even at that time, he was rebuffed by the Russian Chief of the General Staff, who pointed out that Russia was unprepared militarily. The War Ministry complained that the Army lacked artillery, machine guns, and uniforms. The Minister of Marine stated that the Black Sea Fleet was not ready and was in need of sailors, coal, ammunition, and mines.<sup>118</sup>

Other evidence also suggests that Russia's actions and governmental responses demonstrated to the world that it was not prepared for war. On 7 December 1908, the German military attaché in St. Petersburg was assured by the Russian Minister of War that Russia would not go to war over the Serbs. It was, furthermore, the opinion of the attaché that the belief in a general lack of military readiness had penetrated the entire Russian officer corps.<sup>119</sup> By February 1909, information had reached Vienna that the Russian military chiefs themselves believed it would take three to five years to prepare the Army. Vienna believed from this information that St. Petersburg would either abandon Serbia, or enter into a war

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<sup>117</sup> A. J. P. Taylor, *War by Time Table: How the First World War Began* (New York, NY, American Heritage, 1969), p. 23.

<sup>118</sup> Fay, p. 371.

<sup>119</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 85.

under unfavorable circumstances.<sup>120</sup> Nicholson, the British minister in St. Petersburg, noted that aside from the military unpreparedness, a war would upset Russia's finances. However, the most notable major concern was the fear of a potential revolution. If Russia went to war, the government believed, the revolutionaries of the past would take advantage of the situation to create internal unrest.<sup>121</sup> On 13 March 1909, a Russian council of war was convened. Together, the military and naval leaders and the minister of finance agreed that Russia could not go to war. However, they would defer to the decision of the Tsar.<sup>122</sup>

Although the balance of forces that deterred Russia was only planned and never materialized as a force poised for immediate use, it is important to analyze the planning that took place. From these estimates, it is clear that the combination of Austro-Hungarian and German forces would enjoy the advantage of superior numbers in the short-term balance of force. If Russia had not backed down, Conrad and Moltke had estimated that St. Petersburg would have 51.5 divisions available in the west by the twentieth day of mobilization, with 24 units aimed at Austria-Hungary, and with more to follow.<sup>123</sup> In this scenario, Plan A would have already positioned A-Staffel (30 divisions) in Galicia. This force would be reinforced by B-Staffel (12 divisions). Therefore, the total Austrian force positioned in Galicia would be 42 divisions, which was almost twice that expected in an initial Russian attack. Owing to the terms of the alliance between Vienna and Berlin, Germany was obligated to leave 13 German divisions in Eastern Prussia. Conrad and Moltke believed that Russia would be required to split its forces and attack both Germany and Austria-Hungary if it came to war. Therefore, numerically, Russia's 51.5 divisions were at a disadvantage in

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<sup>120</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 85.

<sup>121</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 162. n.

<sup>122</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 189.

<sup>123</sup> Williamson, p. 117. Williamson cites Risto Ropponen, *Die Kraft Russlands* (Helsinki, 1968), pp. 241-245, and Conrad, I: pp. 284-93.

relation to the total combined forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which would number 55 divisions.

With Germany's support, Austria-Hungary was confident that eventually Russia would back down. Although Austria-Hungary's mobilization was a considerable burden to Hapsburg finances, especially after the losses of revenue from both Turkey and Serbia, it continued to maintain its firm stand. With Russia deterred from intervention, Vienna enjoyed a commanding advantage in the immediate and short-term balance of forces in the Balkans. Aehrenthal admitted on 16 November 1908 that the 15th Corps, headquartered in Sarajevo, had been strengthened by several thousand men.<sup>124</sup> Aehrenthal claimed that Vienna had only increased its peace time readiness and had not mobilized. By 7 December 1908, information had reached Britain, an arbitrator in the crisis, that Austria-Hungary had activated 60,000 men, and had taken measures to activate three corps.<sup>125</sup> By the peak of the crisis, on 29 March 1909, Vienna had fully mobilized five corps to war strength. As Plan B was put into operation, Minimal-Gruppe Balkan was reinforced by B-Staffel and a total of 24 divisions were oriented toward Serbia. It is difficult to ascertain whether the divisions already deployed to Bosnia were incorporated into this number. However, on the basis of documentation that stated that five corps were activated, a total estimated strength of the Austro-Hungarian army poised for combat against Serbia was between 296,727 and 340,000 men.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 75.

<sup>125</sup> Schmitt, 1937, pp. 75-76.

<sup>126</sup> This estimate is based on the documented troop strength of five divisions that were activated, but discrepancies in the totals do exist. Williamson states that five divisions consisted of 68,000 men. Williamson, p. 110. Using the same scenario, Treadway states that the number 68,000 was used for five and a half divisions. See also Treadway, p. 39. This analysis identifies Williamson's estimate, as Troop Strength A equating to 13,600 men per division. Treadway's estimate will be identified as Troop Strength B, accounting for 12,363 men per division. Another discrepancy exists. Plan B stated that 24 divisions would take the field in Bosnia against Serbia, but activation orders stated that five total corps were brought to war strength. The conclusion may be drawn that the total Austro-Hungarian force present in Bosnia did not exceed 25 divisions, which is consistent with five corps, and did not fall below 24 divisions, which is consistent with Plan B. Using the low estimate, or Troop Strength B (12,363 men per division), the Austro-Hungarian force applied to Plan B (24

In reference to Huth's Hypothesis 2.1, it is evident that, as stated above, the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary obligated Berlin to provide assistance to Vienna. Thus, the threat of Germany entering a war provided the forces required to deter a Russian attack. Even though Russia wanted to maintain its historic relationship with Serbia, and to preserve its own prestige, St. Petersburg was coerced to modify its attitude and behavior. Since Russia was not prepared for war, it agreed to the annexation. Furthermore, St. Petersburg informed Belgrade and Cetinje that Russian military intervention would not be forthcoming, and recommended that both Serbia and Montenegro comply with the terms agreed upon by the Great Powers. Given the agreements created by the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance and their immediate and short-term advantage in the balance of force, the necessary conditions existed for deterrence success.

Although economic factors entered into the calculus of the crisis, the economic interactions between Germany and Austria-Hungary were not critical. Germany's interests in the Baghdad railway were of economic concern, but the potential impact of a war with Russia was greater. If Vienna had not annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an attempt to prevent further deterioration of its southern region, with the potential of Yugoslav unification, Austria-Hungary could have lost its access to the Adriatic. This would have had serious economic ramifications and could have compromised the Hapsburg Empire's position as a Great Power. In view of the fact that both Austria-Hungary and Germany were independent empires with industrial capabilities, it appears reasonable to assume that the military and commercial trade between the two did not directly affect the outcome of this case. While both military and commercial trade were important, in the creation and maintenance of the

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divisions) was no less than 296,727 men, and when applied to five total corps (25 divisions) no larger than 309,090 men. Using the high estimate of Troop Strength A (13,600 men per division), the Austro-Hungarian force when applied to Plan B (24 divisions) did not fall below 326,400 men, and when applied to five total corps (25 divisions) did not exceed 340,000 men. The low total of Troop Strength B suggests that Austria-Hungary's force of 296,727 was over 100,000 men larger than the Serbian and Montenegrin forces combined. The high total of Troop Strength A suggests that Austria-Hungary's force of 340,000 was double the size of the Serbian and Montenegrin forces combined (Serbia--120,000 men, and Montenegro--50,000 men, combined strength estimated at 170,000 men).

alliance, these factors were overshadowed by the implications of a potential war. Therefore, Huth's hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 were factors that played a minor role in this case.

In 1908-1909, Russia shared a large portion of its south western border in Galacia with Austria-Hungary. It also shared its western border in Poland with Germany's East Prussia. Huth's hypothesis 3.1 suggests that since Austria-Hungary (the protégé) and Russia (the potential attacker, and ally of Serbia) shared a contiguous border, deterrence success would be degraded. However, two additional facts negate the effect of this condition. First, Germany (the defender) shared contiguous borders with both Russia and Austria-Hungary. Second, although Russia could have possibly mobilized its Warsaw, Kiev, or Odessa military districts, which were much closer to the borders, the fact remains that Russia's center of gravity was in Moscow. Additionally, Russia's strategic mobilization railway had not yet been constructed. In merely computing the distances to the border, it can be concluded that both the German and Austro-Hungarian centers of gravity were closer to the proposed locations of probable conflict than that of Russia. Therefore, Huth's hypothesis 3.1 did not affect this case. The results from this case may suggest a corollary to this hypothesis: If both the defender and the protégé share contiguous borders, and likewise share contiguous borders with the potential attacker, then the potential for deterrence success increases.

In reference to Huth's hypothesis 4.1, it is clear that in this annexation crisis, Germany (the defender) did not escalate its defensive posture. It is safe to conclude that Germany's peace-time army of 624,000 troops, coupled with a full scale mobilization, would threaten both France and Russia.<sup>127</sup> Two facts demonstrated Russia's inability to wage war. First, Russia did not attempt to conceal its unprepared military disposition. Second, St. Petersburg did not initiate any provocative military measures which could have been misconstrued by the defender and the protégé as a preparation for war (mobilization) or as a test of the resolve of its adversaries (military maneuvers). In fact, when both Berlin and Vienna became concerned over the possibility that St. Petersburg was mobilizing its Kiev

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<sup>127</sup> Turner, p. 30.

military district, Izvolski denied it by explaining that the increased military presence was caused by the return of troops from the Caucasus. Clearly, it was Germany's ultimatum that forced Russia to the realization that the benefits of assisting the Serbs would be outweighed by the costs of a war.

While the actions taken by Vienna upset the overall balance of power, the reactions of Serbia and Montenegro precipitated the crisis. In addition, the measures taken by each escalated the tensions. It is important to understand the mechanics that led to the cessation of tensions. While Austria-Hungary's offensive escalation in the Balkans affected Russia's actions and behavior, it is difficult to separate the effects on Russia from the effects on Serbia and Montenegro. A similar analysis regarding the interactions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as well as Montenegro would be a study of coercive diplomacy between a potential attacker (Serbia) and a defender (Austria-Hungary). While it is conceivable that in isolation the roles of defender and potential attacker might be reversed, if Vienna threatened Belgrade, this thesis focuses on the defender's activities. However, a partial analysis is warranted. Vienna did not follow a tit for tat military escalation policy. It operated from a policy of strength, answering both Belgrade and Cetinje with equal or greater military preparedness. Therefore, although Austria-Hungary was the defender in this case, its actions in the Balkans did not follow Huth's hypothesis 4.1 which suggested that a tit for tat strategy would increase the probability of deterrence success. It is noted, therefore, that for coercive diplomacy to work against both Serbia and Montenegro in 1908-1909, a considerable amount of pressure had to be exerted by not only Austria-Hungary, but by the Great Powers as well.

While Huth suggests in hypothesis 4.2 that a firm but flexible diplomatic strategy would increase the probability of deterrent success in the case in question, it is unclear whether Germany's ultimatum was used to "bully" Russia, or if it was an extension of a firm but flexible strategy. Although it is true that throughout the crisis Germany attempted to moderate Vienna's potential preemptive reactions to Serbian and Montenegrin behavior, Berlin never ceased to support the Hapsburg position. But, in Germany's external strategy,

its position towards Russia allowed no room for compromise. Going back to hypothesis 4.1, as Kissinger suggests in his appraisal of a "policy of strength," once the potential of war increased in 1909 with the Austro-Hungarian mobilizations, Germany ended the confrontation quickly with the ultimatum to Izvolski. Furthermore, as indicated in the correspondence between Conrad and Moltke, Germany was prepared to escalate rapidly and brutally. The final appraisal of the German strategy must be found somewhere in the middle.<sup>128</sup>

While hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 have importance in the cases to follow, they have little relevance to this initial confrontation between Germany (the defender), Austria-Hungary (the protégé), and Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro (the potential attackers). In the previous several years, Berlin had enjoyed a friendly relationship with St. Petersburg. In Russia's war with Japan, Germany had assisted Russia as far as possible without violating the laws of neutrality. Furthermore, it had been the Kaiser's intent to join the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy) with the Dual Alliance (France and Russia) and secure peace in Europe.<sup>129</sup> Additionally, in reference to Germany's relations with Serbia and Montenegro, the Balkans had been and continued to be in the Hapsburg sphere of influence. As early as November 1875, Bismarck stated:

Germany has no direct interests in European Turkey, but indirectly the greatest in preventing Austria and Russia from quarrelling over the Sick Man's inheritance. Germany must therefore adhere strictly to the part of peacemaker and never side so completely with either of her allies as to make two against one in a tripartite alliance.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> See Chapter II of this thesis.

<sup>129</sup> Fay, pp. 171-177. Kaiser Wilhelm attempted to use his personal influence with Tsar Nicholas to win France over. In July 1905, a Russo-German treaty was concluded at Bjorko. (Fay, p. 171n.) However, Russia withdrew from the treaty on 7 October 1905 because of difficulties with France. (Fay, p. 177n.)

<sup>130</sup> Bismarck cited in Alan Palmer, *Bismarck*, (London, UK, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976), p. 187.

Additionally, when asked about Germany's interests in the Eastern Question, which was a reference to whether Berlin would take up arms for the sake of the Balkans, Bismarck replied: "I see in it for Germany no interest. . . worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian Musketeer."<sup>131</sup>

After close analysis of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it becomes clear that the crisis management was not merely of a traditional deterrent nature. While both sides attempted to make the other back down, in the end the forces on the ground were decisive. The alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany created the overall force package that initially forced Russia to back down. Once Russia's intervention was negated, Austria-Hungary commanded the short-term balance of forces in the Balkan region. This situation deterred a Serbian attack. The pressure exerted by Vienna on Belgrade to accept the annexation, and to renounce its claims of compensation and ill will, was multiplied by the fact that Serbia was warned by each of the Great Powers to back down. Similar conditions were applicable to Montenegro. While this case is one in which deterrence succeeded, it also has significant value as an example of successful German/Austro-Hungarian coercive diplomacy.

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<sup>131</sup> Bismarck cited in Palmer, p. 187.



## IV. BALKAN CRISIS, 1912-1913

### A. BACKGROUND

In early 1912, Russia sponsored negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria which resulted in a defensive alliance aimed at Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Through the creation of the alliance, Russia felt confident that Serbia and Bulgaria, together, would stop Austria-Hungary from continuing to spread its influence in the Balkan Peninsula.<sup>132</sup> On the conclusion of the negotiations, on 14 March 1912, Tsar Nicholas expressed his pleasure that Serbia's aspirations against Austria-Hungary would finally be realized.<sup>133</sup> These proceedings set the stage for additional treaties which became known as the Balkan Alliance, consisting of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.

After the Young Turk Revolution, the treatment of Christian ethnic groups in European Turkey became a subject of great concern among the independent Balkan states. They appealed to Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, which required the Porte to reform politically and administratively in Europe by establishing committees on which non-Turkish populations would be represented.<sup>134</sup> On 13 October 1912, the ultimatum posed by the Balkan Alliance demanded that Constantinople reform its political and administrative rule in European Turkey. This demand renewed the Great Power frictions experienced in 1908-1909. Attempts were made by the Great Powers to prevent a potential conflict, and if

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<sup>132</sup> Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars: 1912-1913* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 52-68, 151. The alliance also took a defensive position against an attack by Romania. Initially, the alliance would be activated in case of an attack by Romania on Bulgaria, or an attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia, or the positioning of Hapsburg military forces in the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. The pact was later amended to include an attack by Turkey. The alliance also identified the spoils of the Ottoman Empire that would be split between Serbia and Bulgaria. This, later, became the source of the dispute that precipitated the initiation of the Second Balkan War. See p. 54.

<sup>133</sup> Charles Katsainos, *The Theory and Practice of Russian Pan-Slavism*, Ph.D. Thesis, (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, 1951), p. 367-368.

<sup>134</sup> Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 306-307n. See Helmreich, pp. 135-137. Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin provided for administrative autonomy of the provinces, Belgian and Swiss Governors, elected local assemblies, gendarmerie, educational liberty, and local militia. Helmreich, p. 136.

unsuccessful, to contain a localized war in order to prevent a general European war.<sup>135</sup>

Although tensions mounted between the Balkan Alliance and the Ottoman Empire, Russia still believed that it would be able to prevent the Balkan states from attacking. Since Russia maintained a "big brother" or "mentor" role in relation to the Alliance and the position of arbiter of disputes, it believed that it could use its political leverage to keep the peace without being a member.<sup>136</sup> St. Petersburg feared that a Balkan Alliance attack on Turkey could bring Austria-Hungary into the conflict. A war with Austria-Hungary would obligate Russia to intervene, and this would bring Germany into the war. But Russia's military position was still weak. In the previous year, on 31 August 1911, in a meeting between the Russian and French chiefs of staff, Russia admitted that it was unprepared for war. The Russian military chief of staff indicated that Russia could not expect the slightest chance of success against Germany, and would not be in a position to do so for at least two years. This was reiterated in July 1912.<sup>137</sup>

In the summer of 1912, discussions between Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov and British Foreign Minister Grey confirmed London's commitment to participate in the eventuality of a general European war. Discussions over landing British troops on the continent had already occurred between France and Britain. Additionally, King George assured Sazonov that "We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of."<sup>138</sup> Russia secured a loan from France amounting to 2.8 billion francs, to be applied to the construction of the strategic railway in Poland, as well as to purchasing new equipment, and increasing the size of the army.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Helmreich, p. 116.

<sup>136</sup> Helmreich, p. 152

<sup>137</sup> Helmreich, p. 153.

<sup>138</sup> Helmreich, pp. 150-151.

<sup>139</sup> Schmitt, 1967, p. 380.

Early in 1912, British and French ships dominated the Mediterranean. With the heightened Anglo-German naval race, however, Hapsburg naval capabilities gained importance. German construction and manning schemes had threatened British naval effectiveness in the North Sea. In response, Britain was forced to withdraw its battleship squadron (six older ships) from Malta to Gibraltar, which left four battle cruisers at Malta. As both the Italians and the Austro-Hungarians were scheduled to complete construction of their dreadnoughts in 1912, parity in the Mediterranean between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente would exist. When Germany later sent its Cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* to the Mediterranean during the crisis, the balance was tipped in favor of the Triple Alliance.<sup>140</sup>

On the eve of the First Balkan War, Vienna had reason to question Berlin's commitment to Vienna and its interest in maintaining the status quo of European Turkey. In 1910, after the Potsdam Conference, German Chancellor Bethmann assured Sazonov that Berlin had never obligated itself to support Vienna's plans in the Balkans.<sup>141</sup> Possibly because Vienna believed that it could not count on Berlin's unconditional support, Austria-Hungary adopted a conservative policy and strategy in the Balkans.<sup>142</sup> Vienna feared that if a Great or Small power gained control in the Balkans it could then also control the Albanian Adriatic coast.<sup>143</sup> In this case, if Italy cooperated with a blockade, Austrian maritime

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<sup>140</sup> Williamson, p. 113.

<sup>141</sup> Helmreich, p. 180. See Albertini, pp. 399-401. In 1912, Kaiser Wilhelm did not fully appreciate Vienna's situation, nor its irreducible demands for an independent Albania. He believed that a pro-Austrian and anti-Russian "United States of the Balkans" could not include Albania, which he considered to be a robber state. Furthermore, he did not believe that a Serbian harbor in Albania would hurt the Hapsburg Empire. Germany's support for Austria-Hungary was not confirmed until November 1912. The Kaiser stated that Germany would not support Austria-Hungary unconditionally, but "Of course if Austria were attacked by Russia, the *casus foederis* would arise. But only if Austria has not provoked Russia to the attack." However, if Russia rejected suitable Austrian proposals for mediation approved by the other powers, then in case of a potential conflict Germany would mobilize. (Kaiser Wilhelm cited in Albertini, p. 400.) Berlin informed Vienna that support would come if Austria would "appear not as the provoker but as the provoked." Albertini, p. 400. For a full description of the misunderstandings in Austro-German relations, see Albertini, pp. 379-385, and 433-440.

<sup>142</sup> Helmreich, pp. 117, 181-182.

<sup>143</sup> Helmreich, pp. 167, 189. See Treadway, p. 118.

shipping and naval power could be cut off from the Mediterranean.<sup>144</sup> Additionally, a Greater Serbia would become a source of trouble for the southern portion of the Hapsburg Empire. For these reasons, Vienna supported compensation, but opposed any changes of territorial boundaries if the Balkan states were successful in their war with Turkey.

In 1909, Germany had been concerned about its interests in Turkey and urged Austria-Hungary to take measures that would ultimately lead to a return of Hapsburg troops to the Sandjak. However, Vienna did not pursue this opportunity. In 1912, Vienna did become interested in the Sandjak but hesitated to move.<sup>145</sup> Vienna's actions were limited to diplomatic maneuvering. In the summer of 1912, together with the Great Powers, Vienna attempted to pacify the Balkan Alliance and to prevent a potential war.<sup>146</sup> But the combined efforts of the Great Powers were half-hearted. While each of the Powers believed it improbable that the Turks would be defeated if it came to war, each also entertained hopes of benefitting from the success of the Balkan Alliance.

While Turkey made some administrative reforms, political reforms were not a possibility. Rather than honoring the requests of the Great Powers to preserve the peace, most of the Balkan states acted independently, mobilizing their armies for war against Turkey.<sup>147</sup> While Montenegro had already declared war on Turkey on 8 October 1912,

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<sup>144</sup> Helmreich, p. 212. Although Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, frictions had existed between Rome and Vienna.

<sup>145</sup> Helmreich, pp. 182-183. In 1912 Constantinople presented Vienna with an invitation to occupy the Sandjak militarily in order to maintain the *status quo*, but Vienna declined. Helmreich, p. 185. Although it is unclear whether the reported Turkish offer was genuine, Vienna declined. Three potential conditions could have emerged if Austria-Hungary had occupied the Sandjak. First, Hapsburg forces might have been attacked by Bulgarian, Montenegrin, and Serbian forces. Second, Austria's involvement in a Balkan conflict could have obligated Russia to use force in Galicia. However, a contrary view exists. If Austria had occupied the Sandjak, then possibly the Balkan Wars might have been averted and the *status quo* maintained.

<sup>146</sup> Helmreich, p. 116.

<sup>147</sup> Romania was also a member of the Balkan League, but it did not participate in the attack on Turkey.

Turkey's negative answer regarding reforms prompted the newly formed Alliance to begin the attack on 18 October 1912.<sup>148</sup>

Without the formidable presence of Hapsburg troops in the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a political-military vacuum existed which both Serbia and Montenegro exploited.<sup>149</sup> Although Ottoman forces were present in 1912, both Serbia and Montenegro were highly successful in their military campaigns and quickly defeated Turkish units. As a result, both Serbia and Montenegro defied Austria-Hungary and began to occupy the Sandjak. From the beginning, on 8 October 1912, the Montenegrin army conducted operations on three axes of attack. One group of forces invaded Kosovo, while the other two advanced on Scutari from opposite sides of the lake.<sup>150</sup> Because of its military victories against Turkey, Belgrade felt justified in claiming both the Sandjak and Northern Albania for Greater Serbia. However, Berchtold --acting on behalf of Vienna--opposed these claims, and used the agreement concluded by the Great Powers to make any Serbian advance into Albania an international incident.

On 23 October 1912, the Serbians defeated the Turks at Kumanovo and on 29 October 1912 they joined the Montenegrins in Metohija. In the Sandjak, the Montenegrins defeated the Turks at Pec and Djakova, and the Serbian Army entered Prishtina and Prizren. At that time, Belgrade demanded that Vienna recall the Austrian consul in Prizren, who was accused of inciting insurgent activities against the Serbs.<sup>151</sup> In early November the Montenegrin forces occupied the Albanian city of Shëngjin opposite Scutari. Vienna informed Cetinje that the occupation of Albanian coast land would be inconsistent with an autonomous Albania. However, King Nicholas of Montenegro was obstinate and refused to

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<sup>148</sup> Helmreich, pp. 126 and 137.

<sup>149</sup> Williamson, p. 125.

<sup>150</sup> Helmreich, p. 195.

<sup>151</sup> Treadway, p. 121.

listen.<sup>152</sup> By mid-November, his forces occupied the northern side of the Drin River.<sup>153</sup> Meanwhile, the Serbian forces continued to move into Albania.<sup>154</sup> By 29 November 1912, Serbian cavalry waded into the Adriatic and seized Durazzo.<sup>155</sup> On 30 November 1912, the Third Serbian Army under General Yankovic occupied the port city.<sup>156</sup> As the London *Times* reported, Belgrade believed that it would be easier for the Great Powers to accept Serbia's annexation of Durazzo if the Powers were presented with the Serbian occupation of the port as a *fait accompli*.<sup>157</sup> At the end of November 1912, the forces of the Balkan Alliance had achieved complete victories over their Ottoman opponents, with the exceptions of the fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari.<sup>158</sup>

In October 1912, St. Petersburg requested that Vienna formally state its position on the localization of the war. However, Vienna was evasive. It was only after 8 October 1912, when Sazonov formally pledged that Russia would follow a policy of no territorial gains, that Berchtold announced that Vienna would not tolerate Serbian and Montenegrin occupation of the Sandjak. Vienna warned both Belgrade and Cetinje not to move troops into the Sandjak. Berchtold stipulated that if troops were introduced into the region, they would have

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<sup>152</sup> Treadway, p. 120. King Nicholas was not receptive, but gave conditions under which he would consider Albanian autonomy. On 12 November 1912, when Vienna informed Cetinje that occupation of Albanian territory would not be consistent with the agreement concluded by the Great Powers, King Nicholas suggested that Shëngjin could not be separated from Scutari. Furthermore, a few days later he proposed that his youngest son be married to the Austrian Archduchess, and that he (Nicholas) be carried by a Hapsburg warship to Valonia (Vlorë) to be crowned King of the Albanians. Vienna rejected his proposals.

<sup>153</sup> Treadway, pp. 119-120.

<sup>154</sup> Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo: Focus on Serbian-Albanian Relations* (Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, NY, 1984), p. 101.

<sup>155</sup> Dragnich and Todorovich, p. 101.

<sup>156</sup> Helmreich, p. 196.

<sup>157</sup> Treadway, p. 258, n. 41.

<sup>158</sup> Fay, p. 439.

to be withdrawn upon the cessation of hostilities.<sup>159</sup> Berchtold had manipulated the situation in such a manner that the Russian agreement to the principle of no territorial changes benefited the Hapsburg Empire in two respects. First, if the Turks were victorious, the boundaries of the Balkan states would not be changed. Second, if the Balkan Alliance won, Vienna would be able to use the occupation of the Sandjak as a bargaining chip to ensure the establishment of an independent Albania. Because Serbian and Montenegrin conquest of the Sandjak would violate the agreement of the Great Powers that prevented territorial gains, Vienna could use the Sandjak as a trump. In order for Austria-Hungary to approve of Montenegrin and Serbian occupation of the Sandjak, which would create contiguous borders, the Great Powers would have to agree with Austria-Hungary to create an independent Albanian state. Otherwise, Vienna would treat the occupation as a violation of an international agreement and escalate tensions, causing an international crisis. The establishment of an independent Albania would prevent Serbian access to the sea. If Turkey was successful against the Balkan states, Vienna wanted Albania to be autonomous. If Turkey was defeated, Vienna wanted Albania to be as large as possible and independent. Berchtold's plan was proposed to Germany and was endorsed by Kaiser Wilhelm.<sup>160</sup>

On 27 September 1912, Berchtold informed Berlin that in case of a Balkan war, Vienna would not tolerate Serbian expansion into the Sandjak.<sup>161</sup> On 25 October 1912, Vienna recanted and approved Serbia's expansion into areas inhabited by Slavs in return for an economic rapprochement guaranteeing good neighborliness. But Serbia's expansion to the Adriatic would not be tolerated. Furthermore, a demand to seek control over Albanian territory and Durazzo would demonstrate that Serbia did not want good relations with Austria-Hungary.<sup>162</sup> On 29 October 1912, Vienna ordered an increase of military strength

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<sup>159</sup> Williamson, p. 125.

<sup>160</sup> Treadway, p. 119. See Chapter IV of this thesis.

<sup>161</sup> Albertini, p. 385.

<sup>162</sup> Albertini, p. 391.

in the three southern provinces of the Empire: Bosnia, Vojvodina, and Croatia-Slovenia.<sup>163</sup> Berchtold was concerned about the potential threat that a Great Serbia would pose to the Empire. Both Serbia and Montenegro were conducting offensive operations in the Sandjak, and contiguous borders seemed inevitable. If Serbia was linked with Montenegro, it would provide Belgrade with an outlet to the sea--although a difficult one to reach. With this capability, Vienna believed, the increasing desire for south Slav unity would likewise increase the chances of Croatia-Slovenia and Slovenia to break away from Hapsburg rule.<sup>164</sup>

In October 1912, Russia had conducted a "Trial Mobilization," of the Warsaw Military District. Since it had been planned and announced in advance, no immediate counter-measures were taken by Austria-Hungary in Galicia except for increased intelligence activity.<sup>165</sup> While the "Trial Mobilization" did not initially disturb Vienna and Berlin, Vienna did respond. At the end of October 1912, Austria-Hungary enlisted 181,000 new recruits.<sup>166</sup> By the middle of November 1912, Hapsburg troop strength facing the Russians in Galicia was increased, and Conrad resumed the post of Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

In November 1912, tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary were renewed. On 24 November 1912, St. Petersburg supported Belgrade in its demands for control of Albanian territory, including the port of Durazzo.<sup>167</sup> In order to strengthen its position,

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<sup>163</sup> Treadway, p. 119.

<sup>164</sup> Helmreich, p. 210. In 1911, a secret Serbian military organization had formed. "The Black Hand," as it was called, was responsible for stirring unrest and revolutionary activity. The Black Hand was also responsible for smuggling weapons into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the summer of 1912, in response to increasing reports of trouble, Austria-Hungary increased its border controls with Serbia, took precautions against agitation amongst nationalities, and ordered new recruits to report to their units early. See Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914* (New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 251.

<sup>165</sup> Williamson, pp. 126-127. Hapsburg generals were deeply concerned that the Russian mobilization, which was conducted simultaneously with the first attacks of the First Balkan War, had afforded Serbia the opportunity to concentrate its forces against Turkey.

<sup>166</sup> Bridge, p. 348.

<sup>167</sup> Helmreich, p. 224.

Russia increased troop strength in the Russian-controlled area of eastern Galicia to 220,000 men.<sup>168</sup> With this move, Austro-Russian relations became strained. In response, Vienna took corresponding measures on 21 November 1912. First, Hapsburg troop strength in Galicia was increased by fifty percent. Second, on 23 November 1912, more reservists were activated. Additionally, while the Empire's fleet was instructed to prepare for mobilization, its Danube flotilla of small monitor ships was in fact mobilized.<sup>169</sup> As the crisis continued, reports reaching St. Petersburg suggested that Vienna had completed mobilization of three corps against Russia in Galicia and had completed military preparations against Serbia. By the 18th of November 1912, Russia believed that Vienna was preparing the full mobilization of 10 corps.<sup>170</sup>

On 18 November 1912, the German minister in Bucharest was informed that, due to Russian military measures, and the disorganized state of Hapsburg forces in Galicia, Vienna was considering strengthening its eastern army corps. It was to be done quietly, and was intended to defend against Russia if Serbia provoked a war.<sup>171</sup> By the end of December 1912, the Austrian military measures were complete. The troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

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<sup>168</sup> Williamson, p. 128. The intent of the Russian increases was to force Vienna to permit the realization of Serbia's aspirations to an outlet to the sea in Durazzo. However, it likewise jeopardized the localization of the Balkan War.

<sup>169</sup> Williamson, p. 128.

<sup>170</sup> Dickinson, pp. 334-335. Russian reports led Sazonov in St. Petersburg and Izvolski, now Ambassador to France, in Paris, to believe that Vienna had completed the mobilization of three corps, and was in the process of activating ten additional corps with a portion aimed at Russia. Dickinson, pp. 334-335. See Albertini, pp. 411-412. "Austria is at the point of completing the full mobilization of ten army corps, one of which is openly sent to position against Russia." Izvolski cited in Albertini, p. 412. See also Samuel Williamson, "Military Dimensions of Hapsburg-Romanov Relations During the Era of the Balkan Wars," in *East Central European Society in the Balkan Wars*, ed., Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, Vol. XVIII, *War and Society in East Central Europe* (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 320-321. On 18 November 1912, I, VI, X, and XI (four total) Corps were strengthened, either adjacent to or near the Russian border, increasing strength levels from 57,000 to 97,000 men. Williamson, 1987, pp. 320-321.

<sup>171</sup> Helmreich, p. 237.

Dalmatia were at war strength. While the Austrians claimed to have called up 224,000 men. Russian estimates suggested that it was closer to 300,000 men.<sup>172</sup>

During November 1912, Serbia's demand to receive an Albanian port was presented to the Great Powers. However, deliberations on the issue were complicated by two additional occurrences. First, Ismail Kemal, the Albanian patriot, declared Albanian independence in Valonia (Vlorë) on 28 November 1912.<sup>173</sup> Second, St. Petersburg announced the retention of its third year levy of conscripts, who were usually released in October with the arrival of new recruits. By this measure, Russia increased its standing army by 400,000 men.<sup>174</sup> Austria expected war, and went so far as to instruct its representatives in Belgrade, Cetinje, Durazzo and St. Petersburg to be prepared to depart if war broke out.<sup>175</sup>

On 9 November 1912, Sazonov telegraphed Belgrade, informing the Serbs that Russia could not go to war in order for Serbia to gain access to the Adriatic. He also disapproved of a Serbian march on Durazzo. Again on 11 November 1912, Sazonov informed Serbia that Austria could not be convinced to allow Serbian access to the sea. In the note, Sazonov explained that Vienna's position was supported by Germany and Italy. Moreover, France and Britain were unwilling to enter into conflict with the Triple Alliance over a Serbian harbor. He warned Serbia not to try to drag Russia into conflict over the port. Stating that an independent state of Albania was inevitable, Sazonov warned Belgrade that

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<sup>172</sup> Helmreich, p. 357. The garrisons in Agram, Temesvar, Budapest, Krakau, Prezensyl and Lemberg were materially strengthened.

<sup>173</sup> Skendi, pp. 458-463.

<sup>174</sup> Helmreich, pp. 215-216. On 12 November 1912, at a conference of the Commanders of the Warsaw and Kiev military districts, the Tsar decided to mobilize the entire Kiev district and part of the Warsaw district, and ordered preparations to mobilize the Odessa district. Both Kokovtsov, the Russian Minister of Finance, and Sazonov protested furiously. As a compromise, Kokovtsov suggested that the third year levy of conscripts be retained for an additional six months. This would increase the army's effectiveness and yet avoid the inherent dangers of a mobilization. Helmreich, pp. 219-220.

<sup>175</sup> Helmreich, pp. 215-216.

if Serbia marched on Durazzo, St. Petersburg would break its solidarity with Belgrade.<sup>176</sup> In the Spring of 1913, Sazonov insisted that Serbia refrain from assisting Montenegro in its siege of Scutari.<sup>177</sup>

Earlier in November 1912, Sazonov had already informed Belgrade that St. Petersburg would not support the Serbian occupation of Albania. However, now Sazonov suggested that St. Petersburg would support the economic emancipation of Serbia and its access to the Adriatic through Albania, by means of a railroad with Durazzo as a "free port." In reply, Belgrade stated that it would entrust the definition of a Serbian outlet to the sea to the Great Powers.<sup>178</sup>

On 22 November 1912, Vienna informed Cetinje that even if Cetinje's efforts to conquer Scutari were successful, Montenegro would not be permitted to retain Scutari or its immediate vicinity indefinitely without compensation to Austria-Hungary. The Austrian Minister in Cetinje offered King Nicholas territorial and economic alternatives. Vienna was prepared to yield Scutari to the Montenegrins in exchange for Mt. Lovcen. In response, King Nicholas warned that if Vienna attempted to evict him, he would fight to the last goat and cartridge. Nicholas listened to the Austrian proposal but made it clear that if an agreement was not reached he would wait with "sword in hand" in Scutari for Austria-Hungary to evict him.<sup>179</sup> While the extensive economic proposal was considered, Mt. Lovcen was non-negotiable. Therefore, Vienna was forced to take the position that Scutari would belong to Albania.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Albertini, p. 403.

<sup>177</sup> Schmitt, 1930, p. 135.

<sup>178</sup> Dragnich and Todorovich, pp. 102-103.

<sup>179</sup> Treadway, p. 125.

<sup>180</sup> Treadway, p. 128. King Nicholas made numerous proposals but each required that Montenegro retain both Mt. Lovcen and Scutari. He suggested that Vienna and Cetinje create an alliance against Serbia. The Hapsburg military would keep the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, as well as defend Montenegro's interests in the Sandjak, and Vienna would provide massive economic assistance. In return King

On 3 December 1912, a cease-fire between Turkey and the Balkan Alliance was proclaimed, with peace negotiations to begin in London on 16 December 1912. While the Great Powers considered this development a means to slow the momentum toward a wider European war, Vienna became concerned. If peace was achieved with Turkey, then Serbia could move its entire army against Austria-Hungary.<sup>181</sup> While on 5 December 1912, the Triple Alliance was renewed for an additional five years, Vienna authorized the activation of 28,000 more troops, but without declaring a mobilization in the South. The cost of maintaining this heightened level of preparedness became an economic burden.<sup>182</sup> On 23 December 1912, Conrad and other officials wanted to activate another 48,000 men to be positioned in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this request was denied since the potential of a confrontation with Serbia had subsided.

In December 1912, Russia experienced economic difficulties due to the crisis. St. Petersburg had already spent over 8 million rubles supplying its army and maintaining its third year levy of conscripts. The retention of the conscripts increased the Russian forces by approximately 350,000 men, but 150,000 remained in Asia on the eastern front. Russian ministers in Vienna and Berlin requested that both Vienna and St. Petersburg conduct a simultaneous reduction in forces. But Berchtold refused to comply until the Serbian Army was withdrawn from Albania.<sup>183</sup>

In January 1913, the Hungarian Finance Minister predicted economic ruin if expenditures continued at the current pace. Additional troop increases would therefore have to be postponed until foreign activities justified them. Meanwhile, until the crisis was formally ended, 86,000 troops continued to be stationed in Galicia, 86,000 troops in Bosnia-

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Nicholas would support Vienna's autonomous Albania as long as it did not include Shëngjin and Scutari. Treadway, p. 128.

<sup>181</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 129.

<sup>182</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 131.

<sup>183</sup> Helmreich, pp. 357-358. Pressure to demobilize was placed on Vienna by Sir Edward Grey, French Foreign Minister Poincaré, and King George V.

Herzegovina, and 50,000 troops in other locations. Furthermore, the navy retained an additional 6,500 personnel on active duty. The Danube flotilla continued to be mobilized, and naval forces in the Adriatic were at mobilization readiness and strength.<sup>184</sup>

Two conferences convened in London in December 1912. The St. James Conference concerned the peace settlement of the Balkan war. The other was the Conference of Ambassadors.<sup>185</sup> In January 1913, Turkey refused to surrender Adrianople, the Aegean Islands and Crete; thus the Balkan war resumed. Meanwhile, the Conference of Ambassadors endorsed the Austro-Hungarian-sponsored program for a neutral and autonomous Albanian state guaranteed by the Great Powers for economic viability. However, in order for the Great Powers to gain Russian support, the other Powers acquiesced on the point of Serbian access to the sea through a neutral Albanian free port--possibly Durazzo--connected to Serbia by rail.<sup>186</sup>

In January 1913, Grey introduced the issue of Scutari to the conference. The Great Powers realized that if Montenegro continued to demand control of the Albanian city, Vienna would march on Cetinje. This would reintroduce the crises of the past that threatened to ignite a general European war.<sup>187</sup> In February 1913, Hapsburg Prince Hohenlohe went on a diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg. There he gained Russian concessions. On 4 February 1913, Tsar Nicholas pledged that Serbian troops would be withdrawn from the Adriatic.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 132.

<sup>185</sup> Treadway, p. 130. At the Conference of Ambassadors British Foreign Minister Grey presided. In all, the conference met 63 times and lasted eight months. The last meeting was on 13 August 1913. See Albertini, p. 423.

<sup>186</sup> Treadway, p. 130.

<sup>187</sup> Treadway, p. 132.

<sup>188</sup> Helmreich, 282.

In response to Vienna's demands, the Great Powers disapproved unilateral action on the part of Vienna, but agreed that, if Cetinje continued to resist, the Great Powers would hold a joint (combined) naval demonstration off the Montenegrin coast.<sup>189</sup>

In mid-March 1913, when the conference in London assured Berchtold that Scutari would remain Albanian, Berchtold conceded Djakova to Serbia. Meanwhile, both Vienna and St. Petersburg cooperated on reducing troop strength in Galicia, the Russians diminishing force levels in the Russian-controlled area of eastern Galicia. On 11 March 1913, both Russia and Austria-Hungary announced substantial troop cuts. While Russia released 370,000 men, Austria-Hungary released 40,000. These reductions greatly reduced Austro-Russian tensions.<sup>190</sup>

On 18 March 1913, Berchtold demanded that Cetinje stop the bombardment of Scutari and allow the civilian population to evacuate the city. The next day, a Hapsburg naval force steamed for the Bay of Kotor.<sup>191</sup> On 20 March 1913, three Austrian battleships, two cruisers, and a torpedo flotilla were in place. This escalated the pressure on both Belgrade and Cetinje.<sup>192</sup> Berchtold wanted to settle the Scutari question before Montenegro was able to occupy the city. Since numerous Albanian towns and cities were also involved in the territorial dispute, Vienna offered Djakova and the arid periphery of the Sandjak in order to secure Scutari, the greater heartland, and the coast for Albania.<sup>193</sup> Berchtold demanded the following: that Montenegro (now being assisted by Serbian forces) stop the siege of Scutari and yield to the Great Powers; that Serbian troops be immediately withdrawn from the Albanian coastal region; that the Great Powers recognize the already agreed upon

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<sup>189</sup> Treadway, p. 133.

<sup>190</sup> Williamson, 1991, pp. 134-135.

<sup>191</sup> Treadway, pp. 262-263. n. 80.

<sup>192</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 136.

<sup>193</sup> In the concessions, the boundaries of Albania did not include Ipek, Djakova, Dibra, Prizren, or Prishtina, which together accounted for over 500 thousand Albanians.

northern borders of Albania; and that the Great Powers guarantee the protection of minorities, namely Catholics and Muslims. In response, on 30 March 1913, the Montenegrins and the Serbians intensified their attack on Scutari.<sup>194</sup>

At the Conference of Ambassadors, Austria-Hungary requested an international show of force against Montenegro. On 30 March 1913, British and Italian ships joined the naval demonstration off the coast of Montenegro. On 31 March 1913, St. Petersburg accepted the principle of international coercion to end Scutari's siege, but did not participate.<sup>195</sup> By 5 April 1913, five ships from the European concert were in place. Germany hesitated but eventually sent the *Breslau* to participate. On 5 April 1913, Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the British senior commander of the ships, demanded that Montenegro end the siege of Scutari and threatened a total blockade of the Montenegrin coast if Cetinje refused.<sup>196</sup> Since King Nicholas was not impressed, he defied the Great Powers and continued the siege.

The blockade was implemented on 10 April 1913 with strict rules of engagement. The international squadron was ordered not to fire unless fired upon. Almost immediately the blockade experienced success. Serbian troops on Greek transport ships in Salonica harbor were ordered to disembark. The Greek government announced that it would not convoy Serbian troops into the Albanian theater. However, despite the successes of the blockade, the siege of Scutari continued.<sup>197</sup>

When the international demonstration had little effect on Cetinje, Vienna moved closer to a unilateral solution. Vienna estimated that Serbian forces in Albania exceeded 110,000 men.<sup>198</sup> Vienna considered implementing Plan M, which would use 50,000 troops

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<sup>194</sup> Treadway, p. 133.

<sup>195</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 136.

<sup>196</sup> Treadway, p. 136.

<sup>197</sup> Treadway, p. 137.

<sup>198</sup> Treadway, p. 137.

against Montenegro. On 30 April 1913, when King Nicholas remained steadfast in resisting foreign pressure, Vienna sanctioned emergency rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina effective 1 May 1913. Additionally, funding for horses was approved for the 15th and 16th Corps. Vienna was willing to risk war with Russia, but not yet at the expense of its economy. Plan B would possibly bankrupt the country. Instead, the leaders in Vienna decided to activate the remaining reserves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to issue a 48-hour ultimatum to Cetinje. If King Nicholas did not concede, then Hapsburg troops would march on Montenegro.<sup>199</sup>

On 3 May 1913, emergency rule was implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Horse purchases began, and the provinces were prepared for war. On the same day, Montenegro capitulated. Crown Prince Danilo requested that Vienna delay acting on the ultimatum. On 4 May 1913, Montenegro announced that its forces would be evacuated from Scutari, and that Serbian forces would be withdrawn from San Giovanni de Medua and Durazzo. After confirmation, Hapsburg horse purchases in Bosnia-Herzegovina were halted, emergency regulations were rescinded, and the extra troops were sent home. While 60,000 reservists remained on active duty, tensions had been reduced tremendously.<sup>200</sup>

Since Belgrade was under pressure from Vienna and the Great Powers, the Serbian government finally succumbed, announcing on 11 April 1913 that Belgrade would terminate hostilities and pull out of Scutari. This outraged King Nicholas of Montenegro. While the Serbian withdrawal provided Cetinje the opportunity to withdraw as well and to save prestige by blaming Belgrade, King Nicholas remained publicly belligerent. Privately, however, King Nicholas stated that

The siege of Scutari will be continued until its conquest or occupation by [a] detachment of the Great Powers or a bombardment of a Montenegrin harbor.

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<sup>199</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 138-139.

<sup>200</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 140. See Helmreich, p. 322. Vienna mobilized the Bosnia-Herzegovina District's first, second and third reserves.

In the last two cases Montenegro would be assured of an honorable withdrawal.<sup>201</sup>

Meanwhile, Belgrade complied with the agreement, and arranged for troops in Albania to be withdrawn by Greek ships. However, Montenegrin forces acquired tremendous military matériel left behind by the Serbian forces.<sup>202</sup>

In order to bring King Nicholas to terms, several economic proposals were offered. In London a Franco-Italian plan was approved that would loan 30 million francs to Cetinje. This would normalize Montenegro's finances and defray its war expenditures. However, King Nicholas was not receptive. The only money he wanted was war reparations from Turkey. Crown Prince Danilo suggested that the King might lift the siege of Scutari in exchange for adequate territorial compensation.<sup>203</sup>

The situation in Scutari deteriorated by the day. Many were dying of illness and starvation. Berchtold feared that if the city fell, the population would be massacred. He wanted strong steps to be taken against Montenegro. As a minimum, for Vienna to approve of a financial aid program, Berchtold demanded that the international naval detachment land and occupy the Montenegrin ports of Bar and Ulcinj. He also proposed that Scutari should be resupplied from the ships of the international squadron. Furthermore, Berchtold threatened that, without an international agreement to this effect, Vienna would act independently.<sup>204</sup>

While the British opposed Berchtold's proposition, because it equated to an act of war, on 21 April 1913, the Great Powers embraced a different proposal. The French suggested that the Porte should cede Scutari directly to the Great Powers. This would mean

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<sup>201</sup> Treadway, p. 137.

<sup>202</sup> Treadway, p. 138.

<sup>203</sup> Treadway, p. 139.

<sup>204</sup> Treadway, p. 139.

that if Montenegro continued the siege, it would be attacking the Great Powers. This would provide the King another opportunity to end the siege with honor. However, on 22-23 April 1913, the Montenegrins seized Tarabosh, the mountain overlooking Scutari. This forced Essad Pasha Toptani, the Albanian-born commander of the Turkish garrison, to surrender the city. Essad and his army of 25,000 men were granted free passage from the city and were permitted to retain their war matériel. On 24 April 1913, Montenegrin forces under General Vukotic took control of the city.<sup>205</sup>

The news that Scutari had fallen outraged the Austro-Hungarians.<sup>206</sup> While some at the Conference of Ambassadors believed that with control of Scutari, King Nicholas's position would be softened, Berchtold insisted that the Great Powers land troops. Cetinje did propose various ways to facilitate a Montenegrin decision to evacuate Scutari. Again, King Nicholas suggested that the Great Powers collectively or Austria independently land troops on the Montenegrin coast. This would demonstrate the "forceful action of Europe" and provide Cetinje with an excuse to withdraw from Scutari.<sup>207</sup>

Because Britain's interests were not directly involved in the fall of Scutari, London ruled out British military actions. But London did agree to one or more Great Powers taking coercive action against Montenegro. On 28 April 1913, Grey proposed a final warning to Cetinje before actions proceeded. Grey suggested that if Montenegro withdrew from Scutari, "reasonable compensations" would be forthcoming; otherwise, the Great Powers would let things take their course--meaning that Vienna would not be restrained. The German

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<sup>205</sup> Treadway, pp. 141-142.

<sup>206</sup> Treadway, p. 143. The British Ambassador in Vienna suggested that the Hapsburg reaction to the fall of Scutari resembled the British reaction after the fall of Khartoum. He also suggested that this was a turning point in the crisis, one which might divide the Great Powers.

<sup>207</sup> Treadway, p. 145. These actions were seen as attempts to lure the Great Powers into further deliberations and to postpone any action. Meanwhile, Cetinje attempted to organize a plebiscite in Scutari in order to incorporate the city into Montenegro. Treadway, p. 145.

Ambassador seconded the proposal, and requested that the Powers adopt it as soon as possible.<sup>208</sup>

Although Grey believed that this new proposal would pacify Vienna, the opposite was true. Vienna was outraged and reserved the right to intervene to implement the will of Europe. In St. Petersburg, Sazonov requested that Vienna act with caution. He suggested that reports already indicated that the majority of the Montenegrin army had been withdrawn from Scutari and that only five battalions remained. But this did not calm Vienna. Conrad believed that the Montenegrin forces were being transferred to the Austro-Hungarian border.<sup>209</sup>

Since King Nicholas still wanted territorial and economic compensation, Grey proposed a final demarche--with a deadline--to the Ambassadors, and the Great Powers agreed. Both London and St. Petersburg urged Vienna to refrain from offensive coercive measures until Cetinje had time to respond. The telegram that Grey sent to King Nicholas stipulated that this would be the last opportunity to respond peacefully. The alternative was Austrian unilateral action and the forfeiture of compensations. In this last demarche, Vienna did not participate. The Russians were unsure of the course of action that the Austrians would take if diplomatic steps failed. Sazonov indicated, however, that if Vienna's actions were limited "to obtaining the evacuation of Scutari, he trusted that [the Russian] government would be able to control public opinion. But if it assumed larger proportions he could not answer for consequences."<sup>210</sup>

With Grey's warnings, Montenegro's political isolation, and the imminent nature of a Hapsburg offensive, King Nicholas capitulated.<sup>211</sup> On 4 May 1913, King Nicholas declared: "My dignity and that of my people not permitting me to submit to isolated

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<sup>208</sup> Treadway, p. 145.

<sup>209</sup> Treadway, p. 146.

<sup>210</sup> Sazonov cited in Treadway, pp. 147-148.

<sup>211</sup> Treadway, p. 150.

demands, I leave the fate of the town of Scutari in the hands of the powers."<sup>212</sup> For Vienna, as well as the Conference of Ambassadors in London, this good news was augmented on 5 May 1913, by Belgrade's announcement that it would withdraw the last Serbian troops from Durazzo.<sup>213</sup>

On 9 May 1913, Admiral Burney of the international naval squadron and the Montenegrin Interior Minister signed the protocol governing the formal surrender of the city. Under the protocol, Scutari would be divided into sectors which each of the international detachments would occupy. Collectively, these commanders would govern Scutari until other arrangements were made. On 14 May 1913, the international detachments entered and took control of the city. Meanwhile the Great Power blockade of Montenegro was formally ended.<sup>214</sup> On 7 May 1913, Vienna ordered the purchase of horses stopped, and the following day, the Hapsburg reservists called to colors were dismissed.

## **B. ANALYSIS**

The Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913 is one in which intervening and interrelated variables cannot be discounted. To isolate the friction between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and Vienna and Belgrade and Cetinje, respectively, from the parallel crisis of the Balkan War is nearly impossible. The interrelated nature of the crisis, however, does not detract from another example of "brinkmanship."<sup>215</sup> In this case, Austria-Hungary artfully and skillfully manipulated the negotiations and escalated tensions many times to the point at which Russia was forced to back down. Russia was deterred from attack each time. St. Petersburg's unwillingness to go to war, coupled with the international pressures placed on Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, eventually caused each to capitulate.

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<sup>212</sup> King Nicholas cited in Treadway, p. 151.

<sup>213</sup> Treadway, p. 152.

<sup>214</sup> Treadway, pp. 155-156.

<sup>215</sup> See Chapter III of this thesis.

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 1.1 concerning the immediate and short-term balance of force increasing the likelihood of deterrent success seems to be relevant. However, unlike the case concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the threat of German involvement was always present, Vienna played the major role in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913. Again in 1912, Russia was unprepared for war and stated this to its French allies. Yet, in this case St. Petersburg was better prepared than in 1908. Moreover, in contrast with earlier situations, Russia attempted to gain the initiative at an early point in this case. St. Petersburg did this by approaching both Britain and France in the summer of 1912 to gain support. Additionally, in fostering the Balkan Alliance, Russia had created a counterpoise to Hapsburg military strength and influence in the Balkans. With the "Trial Mobilization" of October 1912, Russia placed itself in a position in which Vienna could not interfere in the conflict without increasing the risk of a larger European war. However, in light of Hapsburg foreign policy at that time, these efforts seemed to be unnecessary due to Vienna's disinclination to pursue an active role in the Balkan war with Turkey.

St. Petersburg attempted to ensure that Vienna would agree to the localization of the Balkan war. With the "Trial Mobilization" and the arrival of new recruits, Russia increased the strength of its peace time army from 1.2 million to 1.6 million, or by 350,000 to 400,000 men. The entire Hapsburg active duty strength was only 440,000 men.<sup>216</sup> Vienna did not immediately view this as a threat, but later in October 1912, it increased its entire force by 181,000 men. In the immediate balance of forces, the Russian forces in the Russian-controlled area of eastern Galicia numbering 220,000 men, enjoyed the advantage. However, by the end of November 1912, Austria-Hungary increased its threat level to "alarm" status and escalated its own level of preparedness in Galicia. At this heightened level of alert, I, X, and XI Corps (three corps) containing 130,000 men were poised for war with Russia. This does not account for VI Corps, which had been activated and was near the Russian

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<sup>216</sup> Williamson, 1987, p. 320.

front.<sup>217</sup> While Austria-Hungary alone did not enjoy the advantage in the immediate balance of forces, the short-term balance of forces would favor the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance. With Germany's 13 divisions committed by alliance, coupled with the possible activation of an additional seven to ten Hapsburg corps, the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance enjoyed the numerical advantage. However, unlike Vienna, St. Petersburg was not willing to escalate crisis tensions. This was evident in St. Petersburg's decision to retain the third year levy of recruits rather than to accept the proposition to mobilize the Kiev and Warsaw Military Districts as well as to prepare to mobilize the Odessa Military District.<sup>218</sup> This short-term balance, rather than the former immediate balance of forces, compelled Russia to back down in November 1912, and encouraged St. Petersburg to modify its position on issues of Serbian territorial demands and military behavior.<sup>219</sup> Due to Russia's perceived unreadiness, on 3 February 1913, the Tsar pledged that the Serbians would withdraw from the Adriatic.<sup>220</sup> Because it was in no position to argue with agreements made by the Conference of Ambassadors, St. Petersburg was again forced to recommend to Cetinje that it withdraw from Scutari.<sup>221</sup>

When on 3 December 1912, the participants in the Balkan war announced a cease-fire, the crisis in Galicia was expanded to include Bosnia-Herzegovina. Previously, in the Serbo-Bulgarian Pact, Bulgaria had agreed to provide Serbia with 200,000 troops if Austria-Hungary either attacked Serbia, or entered into the Sandjak.<sup>222</sup> While actual documentation

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<sup>217</sup> Williamson, 1987. pp. 321 and 325.

<sup>218</sup> Helmreich, pp. 219-220

<sup>219</sup> Albertini, p. 403.

<sup>220</sup> Helmreich, p. 282.

<sup>221</sup> Williamson, 1991, pp. 134-135. In conjunction with the simultaneous reduction of troops in Galicia by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia consented to the Great Power agreement to guarantee that Scutari would remain Albanian.

<sup>222</sup> Albertini, p. 389.

of Serbian and Montenegrin force strength during the cease-fire cannot be established, the force strength at the beginning of the First Balkan War is available. In October 1912, Serbian forces numbered 355,000 men.<sup>223</sup> At the same time Montenegrin forces numbered 35,000 men.<sup>224</sup>

This means that had the Balkan war not occurred, Vienna might have faced the combined forces of Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia of approximately 590,000 troops. However, the Balkan war did occur, and casualties were sustained. Due to the fact that each of these armies was engaged in continuous combat against Turkish forces for approximately two months, casualties from combat, as well as from disease and pestilence, reduced the original count. Additionally, in order to defend against a potential Turkish attack, some Serbian, Bulgarian and Montenegrin forces would have had to remain oriented against the Ottoman front during any war with Austria-Hungary. Therefore, a generous estimate would suggest that one fourth (147,000 men) of the original potential (590,000 men) might have been available for action against Austria-Hungary. However, it is reasonable to believe that in the absence of a real peace settlement, the Balkan Alliance would not and could not split its forces and expect success. Therefore, Vienna's superiority in the immediate and short-term balance of forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina deterred attack.

In May 1912, Germany increased its peacetime military strength from 624,000 to 651,000 troops. Meanwhile, Berlin's relations with Paris were tense, and Germany did not want to provoke a war.<sup>225</sup> Germany had been displeased with the fact that Austria-Hungary

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<sup>223</sup> Boris Ratković, "Mobilization of the Serbian Army For the First Balkan War, October 1912," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, Vol. XVIII, *War and Society in East Central Europe* (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 154.

<sup>224</sup> Novica Rakočević, "The Organization and Character of the Montenegrin Army in the First Balkan War," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, Vol. XVIII, *War and Society in East Central Europe*, (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 123.

<sup>225</sup> Turner, p. 30. In the summer of 1912, numerous torch-lit parades stimulated French patriotism in defiance of Germany and its annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In September 1912, a crowd in Nancy surrounded the car of Princess Colleredo-Mansfeld, tore off the German flag and trampled it into the gutter.

had presented demarches without consultation. Berlin was upset because it disliked the implications of having to support an ally whose current policy was not clear.<sup>226</sup> However, the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance, with its total force potential, did assist in creating the conditions in which Russia was deterred. As stated earlier, the Anglo-German naval race caused British concern in the North Sea. As a result, when London displaced its battleships from Malta to Gibraltar, naval parity between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was reached in the Mediterranean. Although London was not affected by the outcome of the siege of Scutari and was not willing to enter into conflict over the city, when Germany introduced the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* into the Mediterranean, the advantage in the immediate balance of forces went to the Triple Alliance.<sup>227</sup> On the ground, as in the case of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when Russia became immobilized, Austria-Hungary's immediate and short-term balance of forces deterred Serbia from attack. Additionally, in the absence of their Russian patron, Belgrade and Cetinje were coerced to behave according to Vienna's demands, and to recognize the agreements made by the Great Powers.

As stated above, the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance incorporating Italy seem to have affected the unfolding of the crisis. However, while Huth's hypothesis 2.1 is important, Vienna's actions alone seem to have been dominant. While Germany neither privately nor publicly abandoned its ally, evidence suggests that Berlin attempted to moderate Vienna's actions. Since Berlin had difficulty understanding Vienna's intent, it is fair to conclude that Berlin did not want to be dragged into a war without consultation, and over interests which could have been in conflict with its own. But the Kaiser reassured Vienna in November 1912 by promising that if Russia

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Other such incidents were reported. For German attempts to moderate Austria-Hungary, see Albertini, pp. 379-385 and 433-440.

<sup>226</sup> Albertini, pp. 379, 382. Bethmann was upset with Berchtold because the latter had introduced a demarche to the Great Powers concerning the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire before he had consulted Berlin. This failure to consult had occurred repeatedly and was annoying. However, Berlin did not abandon Vienna in its moments of crisis.

<sup>227</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 113.

attacked the Hapsburg Empire without provocation, Germany would respond. Additionally, despite mutual misunderstandings and criticisms, the Triple Alliance was renewed on 5 December 1912.<sup>228</sup>

In this case as in the previous case, Huth's hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 concerning economic and military transactions between Germany (the defender) and Austria-Hungary (the protégé) were not particularly relevant. However, economic considerations on the part of Russia and Austria-Hungary were important in the escalation of the crisis and played a major role in the decision to reduce the troop strength and to reduce tensions in Galicia. The example of Yugoslavism was potent in fanning the flames of nationalism elsewhere in the Hapsburg Empire. The potential of a Greater Serbia eventually prying Slovenia, Croatia-Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina away from the Empire would mean economic disaster for Vienna. Therefore, Vienna found it vital to the Empire's existence to ensure that Serbia remained small and without access to the Adriatic. In order to achieve this goal, Vienna manipulated the crisis to ensure an independent and economically viable Albania.

In the 1912-1913 Balkan crisis, the general situation in relation to contiguity of borders had not changed from the previous crisis in 1908-1909. Huth's hypothesis 3.1 suggesting that contiguity of borders would degrade the prospects for successful deterrence was again of little relevance. However, while in the first case Russia's "center of gravity"--St. Petersburg's main military force--was farther from the potential location of conflict than was the "center of gravity" of either Germany, or Austria-Hungary, this situation changed in the 1912-1913 crisis. With the "Trial Mobilization" of the Warsaw Military District, the Russian center of gravity was shifted westward. As stated above, this had little relevance to Austro-Hungarian policy. But, as the crisis escalated, the retention of the third year levy of reserves maintained the center of gravity forward toward Austria's portion of Galicia. In the south, the scenario was quite different. While Vienna was concerned over the borders

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<sup>228</sup> Albertini, p. 400.

between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Belgrade's "center of gravity" was aimed at Turkey, owing to the war with the Porte.

Huth's hypothesis 4.1, suggesting that a tit-for-tat policy of military escalation will increase the probability of deterrence success, has partial significance in this case. As stated above, Germany had increased its peace time military strength to 651,000 men in the summer of 1912. On the ground, this was Germany's only escalation, and it occurred prior to the crisis. At sea, however, the German decision to deploy the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* to the Mediterranean seems to reflect at least a new dimension in the escalation of the Anglo-German naval arms race. It is speculative, but appropriate to suggest that this type of escalation in the Mediterranean might have been meant to guarantee that the other Great Powers would not interfere, at least with naval actions, against Hapsburg naval operations against Montenegro. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that Germany (the defender) adopted a non-escalatory policy on the ground, while it pursued a partial tit-for-tat policy at sea.

While in this case Russia gained the initiative and acted first, with its "Trial Mobilization," Austria-Hungary initially responded in November 1912 with less than equal force. However, by December 1912 measures were completed which significantly increased Vienna's military capabilities. Using the alliance with Germany as a force multiplier, Vienna adopted a tit-for-tat policy of military escalation in Galicia. However, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the measures taken to defend against a potential Serbian attack were greater than equal. In this area, Vienna used a policy of strength.<sup>229</sup>

The firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy suggested by Huth's hypothesis 4.2 seems to have significance in this case. While Germany (the defender) provided support to Austria-Hungary (the protégé), Berlin's efforts were of minimal importance in diplomatic strategy. Vienna's efforts (as its own defender) bear more significance. It is fair to state that Austria-Hungary adopted a mixture of "bullying" and "firm-but-flexible" diplomatic strategies. First, Vienna would not accept anything less than a guarantee that Serbia would evacuate its forces

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<sup>229</sup> See Chapter II of this thesis.

from the Adriatic. Berchtold demonstrated that he was willing to escalate the crisis and military tensions in Galicia until Russia backed down. Once Russia agreed to this condition, forces on both sides were demobilized. Moreover, in the discussions over the Montenegrin siege of Scutari, Vienna would not be satisfied with anything short of an Albanian solution. However, Berchtold was willing to compromise over several Albanian cities and towns in the Sandjak. Therefore, the mixture of the two strategies deterred Russian intervention, effectively countered Serbian expansion, and coerced Montenegro to defer to the Great Powers.

Huth's hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 concerning the behavior of the defender in past confrontations are applicable to this crisis. Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary eventually proved to be a necessary condition for Russia to be deterred from attacking the Hapsburg Empire. Russia's concern over its own unpreparedness encouraged St. Petersburg to position itself in a situation which would afford a better bargaining position in times of crisis. The historical evidence suggests that St. Petersburg conducted its "Trial Mobilization" to deter any actions Vienna might take against Belgrade at the start of the Balkan war. Although Russia's actions seem to have been unnecessary, St. Petersburg appears to have taken to heart the Bethmann-Sazonov conversation after the Potsdam Conference.<sup>230</sup> Russia might have interpreted Bethmann's statements denying that Germany had any unconditional obligations to Austria-Hungary as an invitation to St. Petersburg to pursue a more interventionist Balkan policy. However, in order to support a more interventionist policy in spite of its self-perceived military unpreparedness, Russia believed that it would have to operate from an advantage. With the memory of the 1909 ultimatum still fresh in the minds of the Russian leadership, St. Petersburg was unwilling to escalate the crisis by conducting the proposed mobilizations.

In the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-1909, it was unclear whether Germany's ultimatum was used to "bully" Russia, or was an extension of a

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<sup>230</sup> Helmreich, p. 180. See Williamson, p. 113.

firm but flexible diplomatic strategy. In either case, it is reasonable to conclude that Germany's previous actions had lasting effect. While it is possible that Berlin's support of Vienna was not quite as vigorous in 1912-1913 as it had been in 1908-1909, it was never absent. Although reasons existed for Russia to believe that solidarity between Berlin and Vienna was not complete, St. Petersburg never doubted that if the crisis escalated to war, Berlin would side with Vienna.

Likewise in relation to Austria-Hungary, Russia knew that Vienna had escalated the 1908-1909 crisis to the brink of war, and realized that Vienna might do it again. Therefore, St. Petersburg would need to seize the initiative at an early juncture in order to support its bargaining position. However, because Russia's leadership believed it was not prepared for war, St. Petersburg was deterred from attacking the Hapsburg Empire. As it was previously in 1908-1909, when Russia was reduced to diplomatic measures alone, Serbia was likewise deterred from attacking Austria-Hungary and was coerced into accepting the agreements made by the Great Powers. While Montenegro's behavior was belligerent, its offensive operations were aimed at Turkey, Albania, and the city of Scutari. Without outside intervention it would have been suicide for such a small state to attack the Hapsburg Empire. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Montenegro was deterred from attacking Austria-Hungary. However, it is clear that the coercive measures taken by the Great Powers, combined with the threat of a Hapsburg invasion, compelled Cetinje to acknowledge and to abide by the agreements made by the Great Powers regarding Scutari.

As it was concluded in the first case (concerning the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina), this case of crisis management was not solely of a traditional deterrent nature. Throughout the crisis, the evidence suggests, the combination of coercive diplomacy and military threats eventually created the situation in which deterrence was successful. When Russia concluded that the costs of sustaining Serbian claims to an Albanian port would exceed the benefits that a war would incur, St. Petersburg backed down. Likewise, because the Balkan war had sapped Serbia's potential to wage war against Austria-Hungary, when Russia conceded to Vienna's demands, Serbia was deterred as well. While

it took tremendous pressure by each of the Great Powers, including Russia, Montenegro was finally coerced into accepting the decisions made at the Conference of Ambassadors. While deterrence succeeded in this case, the element of successful coercive diplomacy by Austria-Hungary as well as the other Great Powers must not be discounted.



## V. BALKAN CRISIS 1913

### A. BACKGROUND

In May 1913, the siege of Scutari had ended, due in large part to the actions of the Great Powers at the Conference of Ambassadors in London. In Austria-Hungary, while most of the troops that had previously been mobilized were dismissed, the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained at full strength.<sup>231</sup> During the summer of 1913, while attempting to prevent another crisis from emerging, as well as implementing the agreements made at the Conference, the Ambassadors created three commissions that would be sent to Albania. The first commission would establish the borders between Albania and Greece. The second would mark the boundaries between Albania and Montenegro and Serbia respectively. The third would administer Albania until a government was set in place.<sup>232</sup> Ismail Kemal, with the assistance of the third commission, organized the government. In July 1913 William of Wied, a German prince, was chosen to head the new Albanian government and to become its monarch, but he did not accept this position until 1914.

Meanwhile, Albania's frontier with Serbia was in dispute and was subject to continuous disturbances, owing in part to the international border commission's late start in establishing borders, as well as the obstacles it encountered.<sup>233</sup> In order to pacify the region, Serbia advanced its forces into Albanian territory.<sup>234</sup> Additional disputes emerged. When some Serbian forces departed, they took with them Albanian cattle, which caused the Albanians to pursue the detachments into Serbian territory. In other matters, while the Serbians enjoyed free access to Albania, Albanians were not allowed into areas allocated to

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<sup>231</sup>Helmreich, p. 369.

<sup>232</sup>Fay, p. 464.

<sup>233</sup>Fay, p. 464. While the commission was slow to get organized, unexpected obstacles presented by terrain and weather caused additional delays. Moreover, the commissioners experienced numerous problems with border guards who were suspicious of their activities.

<sup>234</sup> Dragnich and Todorovich, p. 107.

Serbia. This caused unrest in the region because, in many cases, the traditional market existed on the Serbian side.<sup>235</sup> Due to various incidents, Serbian forces were reintroduced into Albanian territories and remained.<sup>236</sup>

On 29 July 1913, Sir Edward Grey proposed to the Conference of Ambassadors that a demarche be made against Serbia, requiring Belgrade to remove the troops. The demarche was agreed upon, but delayed in its presentation until 17 August 1913. While Serbian Foreign Minister Pašić pledged to remove the troops, they were still in place on 4 September 1913. Since the Albanian government was not yet operational, Serbia was attempting to influence its formation by remaining on Albanian soil.<sup>237</sup> On 15 September 1913, Belgrade notified both Vienna and St. Petersburg that Serbian forces would be withdrawn up to the Drin River. But this plan changed four days later, when Belgrade explained that it was necessary to reoccupy strategic positions.<sup>238</sup>

In September 1913, new uprisings emerged. Albanian guerrillas attacked the cities of Debar and Struga.<sup>239</sup> In doing so, the Albanians routed a Serbian detachment. Serbia reacted by mobilizing part of its army to attack Albania.<sup>240</sup> While Russia sympathized with Serbia, St. Petersburg recommended that Belgrade show prudence because military action would raise Austro-Hungarian objections. Despite this admonishment, Belgrade still found it necessary to secure some territory and villages, provisionally, in order to defend against

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<sup>235</sup> Helmreich, p. 419n.

<sup>236</sup> Helmreich, p. 418. Serbian forces remained in place, claiming that the positions that they held were strategic. See Albertini, p. 473.

<sup>237</sup> Helmreich, pp. 418-420. The Serbs hoped that Essad Pasha would be successful in his attempts to become king and to create a government in Valonia (Vlorë). Due to his friendly relationship with Serbia, Belgrade believed that he would allow a Serbian occupation of Albanian lands.

<sup>238</sup> Albertini, pl 473.

<sup>239</sup> Dragnich and Todorovich, p. 105.

<sup>240</sup> Fay, p. 465. See Helmreich, p. 422.

future attack.<sup>241</sup> During the first two weeks of October 1913, Serbian troops reoccupied Albanian territory in direct violation of the decisions made at the Conference of Ambassadors. Belgrade announced that the occupation was "provisional."<sup>242</sup>

During the first days of October 1913, the leadership in Vienna deliberated over the available options. Prince Hohenlohe, who had in February 1913 received the Tsar's commitment that Serbia would evacuate its forces from Albanian territory, had again returned from St. Petersburg. He informed Conrad that Russia was not likely to interfere with Austria-Hungary if Vienna acted quickly and energetically against Serbia.<sup>243</sup> The leadership in Vienna realized that forcing Montenegro's troops out of Scutari had required an international blockade. Therefore, to force Serbia's troops from Albania would require resolute action.<sup>244</sup>

Conrad urged a quick decisive action, especially if Romania was being pried away from Hapsburg influence by Russia. Conrad proposed that Vienna compel Belgrade to accept a peaceful incorporation into the Hapsburg Empire (an *Anschluss*). Serbia would have a status similar to that of Bavaria or Saxony in Germany. He stipulated that if this was impossible, then Vienna should issue an ultimatum to Belgrade, requiring that Serbia's forces be removed from Albania. If Serbia did not comply, then Vienna should wage an immediate and energetic war.<sup>245</sup> Conrad also warned that if mobilized, the Austro-Hungarian army must not be required to settle for a diplomatic solution. He suggested that military morale could

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<sup>241</sup> Helmreich, p. 422.

<sup>242</sup> Helmreich, p. 423.

<sup>243</sup> Fay, p. 466-467. At that time Russia was attempting to pull Romania away from the Triple Alliance.

<sup>244</sup> Helmreich, p. 423.

<sup>245</sup> Fay, p. 467. See Albertini, p. 472.

not tolerate mobilization without war for a third time. Conrad urged "either the complete incorporation of Serbia by peaceful means--or the use of force."<sup>246</sup>

In contrast with Conrad's inclinations toward a forceful settlement, Count Tisza, the Hungarian Minister-President, urged a diplomatic solution. He believed that incorporating Serbia into the Hapsburg Empire would be disastrous. Furthermore, he was interested in reestablishing a balance in the Balkans by winning over Bulgaria and Turkey.<sup>247</sup>

When it came time to act, Berchtold was hesitant. He was concerned over whether Germany and Italy would support a military option. Additionally he feared Russian intervention. Three courses of action were approved. First, Vienna would warn Belgrade that it must remove its troops from Albania promptly. If Serbia refused to comply with this demand, Austria-Hungary would follow up with an ultimatum. Second, Vienna would inform its allies of possible action. Third, four soldiers in civilian clothes would be infiltrated into Albania to observe whether the Serbs actually evacuated the occupied territory.<sup>248</sup> But no final decision was implemented. On 14 October 1913, Berchtold requested that Belgrade remove its troops from Albanian soil by a date that Serbia would establish.<sup>249</sup> He suggested that Vienna's response would depend on Belgrade's answer. Vienna's response was also contingent on whether Serbia would recognize and adhere to the arrangements stipulated by the Great Powers.<sup>250</sup> Meanwhile, both Sazonov and French Foreign Minister Pichon urged Belgrade to withdraw its troops from Albania at once.<sup>251</sup> On 15 October 1913, Pašić replied to Vienna:

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<sup>246</sup> Conrad cited in Fay, p. 468.

<sup>247</sup> Fay, p. 468.

<sup>248</sup> Williamson, 1991, 152-153.

<sup>249</sup> Fay, p. 470. Fay states that this was an "amicable request."

<sup>250</sup> Helmreich, p. 424.

<sup>251</sup> Fay, p. 470. See Albertini, p. 478.

The order to halt the further advance of the Serbian troops towards Albania has already been given. The question, as to when the Serbian troops already on Albanian soil would be withdrawn, would depend on the development of circumstances in Albania.<sup>252</sup>

It became evident that Serbia was using the internal situation in Albania as a means to influence the placement of the boundaries as well as to promote the creation of a pro-Serbian government. Since the boundary commission had not yet established the borders, Belgrade hoped that the presence of Serbian troops might influence the commission's decisions to Serbia's advantage.<sup>253</sup> Belgrade's answer was not acceptable to the leadership in Vienna.

Berchtold informed Berlin of the situation, suggesting that Albania's existence was a strategic matter. Additionally, he explained that, after all that had preceded this situation, if Vienna acquiesced now, it would be an abdication to Serbia. Berchtold requested that Berlin support Vienna in this matter.<sup>254</sup> Furthermore, Berchtold informed Berlin that if Serbia did not yield, Vienna would be forced to intervene in Belgrade. If the Serbian reply was negative, Vienna would fix a date and demand the prompt withdrawal of the Serbian troops. If Belgrade still refused to withdraw its forces from Albania, Vienna would react with the extreme measures that had already been approved by Franz Joseph, the emperor.<sup>255</sup>

In response to Berchtold's request, on 16 October 1913, Berlin assured Vienna of its moral support and provided its full backing of Vienna's actions to preserve Albania.<sup>256</sup> Germany also approached London, requesting that Grey use his influence in Belgrade and in the Conference of Ambassadors to encourage Serbia to respect the decisions of the Great Powers. The British were informed that

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<sup>252</sup> Helmreich, p. 425.

<sup>253</sup> Helmreich, p. 420. See Albertini, 478.

<sup>254</sup> Fay, p. 472. See Albertini, p. 480.

<sup>255</sup> Albertini, p. 482.

<sup>256</sup> Fay, p. 472. See Tuner, p. 57.

if the warnings of the Vienna Cabinet at Belgrade remain unheeded, it is to be feared from the form and content of Count Berchtold's representations in Berlin that Austria will go ahead independently.<sup>257</sup>

Since Grey was not present, London did not take action.

Meanwhile, Montenegro had received the French loan promised as a concession to evacuate Scutari. It was reported that Montenegrin forces had occupied some Albanian territory, and that Montenegro was on the verge of a general mobilization against Albania. Additionally, rumors suggested that Montenegro and Serbia had merged into a "Greater Serbia."<sup>258</sup> However, while it was true that Montenegro had occupied some Albanian territory, a mobilization of Montenegro's forces had not occurred. Cetinje removed its forces from Albania by the middle of October 1913.<sup>259</sup>

On 17-18 October 1913, Berchtold sent an ultimatum to Belgrade. The note insisted that Serbia respect Albanian sovereignty and withdraw its troops from Albania within eight days. "Otherwise Austria would be forced, with regret, to have recourse to the proper measures to secure the realization of her demands."<sup>260</sup> Belgrade received the ultimatum on 18 October 1913, in shock and outrage. This was complemented by additional pressure when each of the Great Powers sent Belgrade strong warnings. In order to ease the tensions, France offered to open its money markets to Belgrade. This was coupled with firm advice from St. Petersburg counseling Serbia to yield. Serbia complied with the ultimatum and ordered its troops to leave the occupied Albanian territory.<sup>261</sup> On 20 October 1913, Pašić

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<sup>257</sup> Zimmermann cited in Fay, p. 472.

<sup>258</sup> Fay, p. 471.

<sup>259</sup> Treadway, pp. 161-162.

<sup>260</sup> Fay, p. 473. See Helmreich, p. 425.

<sup>261</sup> Fay, p. 474. See Helmreich, p. 427. See also Turner, p. 57.

announced that Serbia would meet the deadline, removing all Serbian forces from Albania by 26 October 1913.<sup>262</sup>

The note that Vienna sent arrived in Belgrade as well as the other European capitals simultaneously. In essence Vienna was presenting the other capitals with a *fait accompli*. While the international community was not pleased with the manner in which Austria-Hungary had handled the situation, and criticized Vienna's actions, no move was made to defend Serbia.<sup>263</sup> Serbian forces completed their evacuation from Albanian territory on 26 October 1913.

## B. ANALYSIS

The crisis that emerged in September and October 1913 could be considered a continuation of the previous crisis. Although separated in time by several months, the issues remained constant--above all, whether Serbia would respect the decisions made by the Great Powers at the Conference of Ambassadors in London. While the previous two cases involved tremendous preparations and movements of military forces, in this case the diplomatic measures seem to have been sufficient to force Serbia to respect the agreements made by the Great Powers to ensure the removal of Serbian troops from Albania.

In the previous two cases, military and diplomatic measures taken by Austria-Hungary (the protégé) as well as the other participants led to successful deterrence and coercive diplomacy. This case is different. First, in Huth's analysis, the result of this crisis is considered a success for deterrence. In this case Serbia is considered the potential attacker, while Austria-Hungary assumes the position of the defender, and Albania takes on the role of the protégé. Second, while Huth suggests that Serbia was deterred from attacking Albania, it is not clear to what extent Serbia was prepared to continue to attack when Vienna issued its ultimatum. Evidence does exist that Serbia had mobilized certain portions of its

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<sup>262</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 153.

<sup>263</sup> Helmreich, p. 426. See Williamson, 1991, 153. St. Petersburg criticized Vienna for having presented its partners in the Triple Alliance with a *fait accompli* which had to be accepted.

army to attack Albania. But this mobilization was reported on 27 September 1913, at least three weeks before the ultimatum.<sup>264</sup> Meanwhile, many of the Great Powers, including Russia, attempted to moderate Serbia's behavior. Third, while in the previous cases, the protégé's forces contributed significantly to deterring an attack, in this case the protégé's forces--those of Albania--were too weak and too disorganized to play such a role. Ultimately, Serbia was coerced to recognize the agreements of the London Conference and eventually removed its troops from Albania. Additionally, Serbia was deterred from mounting another attack on Albania.

In the Balkan Crisis of 1913, Huth's hypothesis 1.1 has some application. The immediate balance of forces that existed cannot be established with precision. It can be assumed, however, that since Serbia had in August 1913 just concluded the two-month Second Balkan War against Bulgaria, its forces were either still mobilized or in the process of demobilization. At the same time Hapsburg forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained at full strength.<sup>265</sup> Therefore, it can be judged that the immediate balance of forces probably did not affect the results of the crisis. It may, however, be concluded that Vienna maintained the advantage in its short-term balance of forces. Because Serbia had just experienced almost one year's worth of fighting, it is reasonable to presume that Serbia was exhausted, or at least that Belgrade's capabilities were significantly degraded. In contrast, the Hapsburg army had not been recently involved in combat. Although Austro-Hungarian military morale might have been low, Vienna's military capabilities had not been depleted. Therefore, Austria-Hungary's advantage in the short-term balance of forces was an important element in the conditions that forced Serbia to withdraw its forces from Albania. It is possible to conclude that Serbia was deterred from attacking Albania in September and October 1913. However, it is easily established that Vienna successfully coerced Belgrade

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<sup>264</sup> Helmreich, p. 422.

<sup>265</sup> Helmreich, p. 369.

to respect the agreements of the Great Powers and to withdraw its troops from Albania. After the ultimatum, deterrence succeeded in preventing further Serbian attacks.

It appears that Huth's hypothesis 2.1 had little to do with this case. While ensuring Albania's independence became the linchpin of Hapsburg strategy, little evidence suggests that a formal alliance had been created. Ismail Kemal's government was still being organized with the assistance of the international commission. But in light of numerous agreements concluded between Vienna and different Albanian groups in the previous crises, it is fair to assume that cordial relations, as well as an air of Albanian dependence on Vienna, did exist. While Vienna did not come to Albania's assistance because of a treaty obligation, the agreements concluded in London served as a pretext for Hapsburg involvement. It was because of strategic interests that Vienna attempted to ensure that Serbia did not gain access to the Adriatic.

As in the previous cases, Huth's hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 are of little relevance in explaining the results of this crisis. Evidence suggests that Austria-Hungary had supplied the Albanians with weapons and munitions in the past, but that linkage was not critical in this crisis. Likewise, in reference to hypothesis 2.3, Albania had not yet developed its economic base significantly. Therefore, trade between Albania and Austria-Hungary was probably of secondary importance. Hapsburg patronage in Albania had two important effects on the military and economic balance in the region. First, it prevented Serbian access to the sea, and therefore impeded Serbia's economic development while enhancing that of Vienna. Second, it securing the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto, Austria-Hungary prevented any possibility of Vienna being denied access to the Mediterranean.

Huth's hypothesis 3.1, which concerns the contiguity of borders potentially degrading prospects for deterrent success, seems not to have played a great role in this case. Although exact borders had not yet been established between Serbia and Albania, it was common knowledge that boundaries would be defined. Serbia attempted to take advantage of the situation by occupying Albanian territory in order to affect the decisions of the boundary commission. With this move, Belgrade hoped to present the Great Powers with a *fait*

*accompli* which would result in an international crisis if Vienna attempted to restore the *status quo*. Contrary to Huth's hypothesis, in this case successful deterrence was achieved due to the contiguity between Albania (the protégé), Serbia (the potential attacker), and Austria-Hungary (the defender). Like the corollary in the case concerning the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, another corollary might apply in this case. If both the defender and the protégé share contiguous borders with the potential attacker, but are separated by the potential attacker, then the potential for deterrence success increases. In this situation, when Serbia threatened Albania's borders which were not contiguous with Austria-Hungary, Vienna threatened Belgrade's northern border. This caused Serbia to face the prospect of war on two fronts and encouraged crisis resolution, effective coercive diplomacy, and to an extent deterrence success.<sup>266</sup>

In this case Huth's hypothesis 4.1 seems to be irrelevant. While Austria-Hungary was concerned over Serbian ambitions in Albania, Vienna operated from a position of strength. At no time does the historical evidence suggest that Vienna escalated its military preparedness. This is supported by the fact that much of the Hapsburg army was demobilized, even though the strength of the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained at war levels.<sup>267</sup> In this case it is possible but not probable that Serbia maintained its previous level of military preparedness. This judgement is supported by the report that in September 1913, in reaction to Albanian activity, Belgrade "mobilize[d] anew certain divisions of the army."<sup>268</sup> Therefore, it was Vienna's policy of strength rather than one of tit-for-tat that brought the crisis to closure.

Austria's diplomatic strategy was partially consistent with Huth's hypothesis 4.2. In order to enforce the decisions of the Great Powers, Vienna appealed to Germany, as well as

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<sup>266</sup> It is plausible to suggest that, although the Treaty of Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War on 10 August 1913, if Serbia had not backed down, the Bulgarian front could have been reopened, creating a third front.

<sup>267</sup> Helmreich, p. 369.

<sup>268</sup> Helmreich, p. 422.

to the Conference of Ambassadors in London. In using a firm-but-flexible strategy, Berchtold even offered Belgrade the opportunity to choose its own date of departure. However, when Belgrade did not reciprocate with a reasonable answer, Vienna abandoned the firm-but-flexible strategy and adopted a bullying strategy. This was reflected in the ultimatum to Belgrade and in the implicit message that the ultimatum was a *fait accompli* presented to the Great Powers. In this case, the bullying strategy was successful.

It is evident from the research conducted that Huth's hypothesis 5.1 is possibly the most relevant to this case. In the Balkan Crisis of 1913, the past behavior of the defender (Austria-Hungary) in confrontations with the potential attacker (Serbia) had great impact on the potential attacker. In the past cases, Austria-Hungary acted as the protégé. Vienna's military preparedness and willingness to escalate each crisis to the brink of conflict weighed heavily on the leadership in Belgrade as well as on that of the Great Powers. In this case, it was evident that without Russian support, Serbia was immobilized. Additionally, each of the Great Powers urged Belgrade to moderate its behavior. When Vienna's ultimatum arrived, each Great Power again urged Serbian compliance. Even Russia provided firm advice to this effect. In attempting to ease the crisis, which could have escalated to a general European war, France offered financial compensation to Belgrade in the form of access to the French money market. Therefore, since Belgrade as well as the Great Powers realized that Vienna would not back down, Serbia had no choice but to yield, or to go to war without support.

Huth's hypothesis 5.2, which suggests that the current defender's historical diplomatic bargaining policy affects deterrent success, has minimal application in this case. Huth stipulates that the defender's record in pursuing a firm-but-flexible strategy enhances the likelihood of deterrence success, while a record of pursuing a bullying strategy degrades the likelihood of deterrence success. However, in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913, Austria-Hungary adopted a mixture of strategies by starting with a "firm-but-flexible" strategy and finally resorting to a "bullying" strategy. In that case the diplomatic strategy of "bullying" resulted in deterrence success. Since coercive diplomacy and deterrence succeeded in the

Balkan Crisis of 1913, it is difficult not to conclude that the "bullying" strategy of the past had a positive influence.

After much scrutiny, it becomes clear that Vienna's management of the Balkan Crisis of 1913 was not an example of deterrence alone. Rather, this case exhibits stronger traits of coercive diplomacy than of deterrence. However, once the coercive measures were taken, deterrence was successful. In this case, as in the two previous cases, the absence of Russian support caused Serbia to back down. When Serbia realized that the advantages of gaining strategic positions in Albania would probably involve a conflict in which Russian assistance would not be forthcoming, Belgrade was unwilling to incur the costs. While it is probable that Serbia might have attempted to continue to test Austria-Hungary, if Russian support had been present, after Vienna's ultimatum this became unlikely. Additionally, the warnings provided by the Great Powers seem to have convinced Belgrade that the time had come to respect the decisions of the London Conference. Therefore, while deterrence ultimately succeeded, this case must also be identified as one in which coercive diplomacy created the conditions necessary for deterrence success.

## VI. CURRENT BALKAN CRISIS

### A. BACKGROUND

The rupture of the former Yugoslav federation in 1991 was a byproduct of numerous factors, including relative economic deprivation, ethnic unrest, political disenfranchisement, and politicized ethnicity (also known as ethnic nationalism and ethnic hegemonism).<sup>269</sup> Another leading factor was the weakness of the federal government. From the end of the Second World War until Tito's death in 1980, the government looked to Tito alone for leadership. His political legacy included a weak federal government. Tito had designed the federal system in this way, in order to prevent any single ethnic group from gaining primacy in the government. However, the decisive feature for any governmental success in this Titoist system was strong leadership--Tito himself.<sup>270</sup>

After Tito's death, Yugoslavia experienced numerous crises, owing in large part to inter-ethnic and inter-republic strife. Economically, the republics were relatively isolated from each other. The annual inflation rate exceeded one thousand percent in 1989. Production had fallen dramatically, and with it the standard of living had depreciated substantially.<sup>271</sup> The Yugoslav Communist Party became a coalition of republic and provincial parties, which served to separate rather than unite the republics. While Gorbachev's policy of "Glasnost" decreased perceptions of an external threat, the people and

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<sup>269</sup> Numerous books exist on the origins of the break up of the former Yugoslavia. Several outstanding works provide the reader with insight regarding the ethnic, social, economic and political turmoil that afflicted Yugoslavia in the 1980s. See, among other sources, Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism* (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1994), James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1992), Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, ed. *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1992).

<sup>270</sup> Jim Seroka, "Variation in the Evolution of the Yugoslav Communist Parties," pp. 67-88. ed. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 72.

<sup>271</sup> Seroka, pp. 72-75.

government in Yugoslavia increasingly looked inward.<sup>272</sup> With the democratic reforms elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and the demands of a dissatisfied Yugoslav population, the multi-party elections of 1990 placed real power at the republic level. During the last three years of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the central government lost prestige and control. Ultimately, the Yugoslav state became a coalition of republics. However, due to domestic political pressures, heightened by ethnic unrest, some of the individual republics sought to increase their autonomy, while others attempted to return to federal centralization. This again led to ethnic and political unrest.<sup>273</sup> Finally, on 25 June 1991, the Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

For over a year, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) had been preparing for heightened ethnic unrest. Secession had also been anticipated. Troops and material had been positioned throughout the country. On 26 June 1991, the YPA challenged control of Slovene border posts. The following day, violence erupted between Slovene forces and the YPA. After two weeks of fighting, the European Community (EC) intervened and

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<sup>272</sup> Due to the political rift between Tito and Stalin in 1948, Yugoslav military forces were placed on the defensive against a possible Soviet invasion. Gow, p. 43. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 terrified Yugoslav politicians as well as the population. In February 1969 the National Defense Law created the Territorial Defense organized at the Republic and Province levels. The basic strategy was as follows: The YPA would conduct an initial frontal defense while the Territorial Defense would conduct guerrilla operations. Gow, p. 46. The Territorial Defense created a citizen's militia which would merge together with the regular armed forces if Yugoslavia was attacked. See Dusko Dudor, *The Yugoslavs* (New York, NY, Random House Inc., 1978), pp. 139-140. The political revolutions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1989 encouraged the Slovenes and the Croats to seek competitive elections. Anton Belber, "Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military," ed by Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation*, (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 134.

<sup>273</sup> Serbian initiatives, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, attempted to strengthen a central federal government which would keep the federation together. However, the Serbian agenda was in conflict with the political objectives of the other republics. Both the Slovenes and the Croats, under the leadership of Milan Kucan and Franjo Tudjman, respectively, espoused a confederate structure which would provide each republic the right to secede. Due to the demography of each republic, this constitutional debate evolved into ethnic group rivalry and competitive attempts to secure dominance. Gow, pp. 122-131.

negotiated a cease-fire.<sup>274</sup> In August 1991, in Croatia's Krajina and Slavonian regions, Serbian irregular forces, assisted by the YPA, were embroiled in combat against the Croats. The fiercest battles raged in the vicinity of Vukovar. As the war progressed, numerous peace plans were proposed. However, the war continued, because none of the plans received political approval.

In December 1991, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its sovereignty. This caused further political and ethnic unrest. In March 1992, as a result of a republic-wide referendum, the Bosnian government announced its independence. This was followed by armed conflict between two coalitions. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats fought against the Bosnian Serbs and the YPA. Additionally, during this time, war lords such as "Commander Arkan" and his "Tigers" and radical Chetnik formations of "Duke Šešelj" conducted "ethnic cleansing"--that is, looting and (above all) expelling disfavored ethnic populations by threat, intimidation and massacre.<sup>275</sup> On 3 January 1992, a Croatian-Serbian cease-fire was signed. This was followed by the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers. However, numerous incidents suggest that renewed conflicts may again emerge in this relationship. Meanwhile, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fighting continued through 1994. While several cease-fires and peace plans have been negotiated, the conflict continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with some potential for expansion.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Gow, p. 1. The cease-fire was linked to a required ninety-day moratorium on full implementation of independence. This period was used to negotiate the evolution of the six republics into state-like entities. Gow, p. 1. See James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, July-August 1991.

<sup>275</sup> Mihailo Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama* (Buffalo, NY, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 179.

<sup>276</sup> Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, "Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia: Ongoing Conflict and U.S. Policy," IB91089, *CRS Issue Brief* (Washington Congressional Research Service, 27 September 1994), p. ii. Fighting in Bihac has continued despite the December 1994 cease-fire.

## B. CONFLICT CONTAINMENT EFFORTS

The containment of the current conflict in the former Yugoslav federation is of tremendous concern to the governments of Western countries, particularly those in Europe.

Structurally, if the current conflict is contained in Bosnia, and does not result in the elimination of the Bosnian state, the conflict will not threaten neighboring countries. If, however, parallel crises create conditions for Serbian military operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or in Kosovo, the resulting widened conflict could lead to a larger regional war. A spill-over of conflict into Macedonia and/or Kosovo could provoke the intervention of the former Yugoslavia's neighbors: Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey.<sup>277</sup>

The multiple scenarios that could give rise to a widened conflict are further complicated by the legal status of Kosovo. While Macedonia declared independence on 18 September 1991, and was recognized as an independent state and received membership in the U.N. on 7 April 1993, Kosovo is a province of Serbia.<sup>278</sup> Serbian aggression, by either regular military, militia, and/or irregular units, against Macedonia would be an international incident, whereas aggression against the ethnically Albanian population in Kosovo would be a Serbian domestic affair. However, either form of aggression could sufficiently

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<sup>277</sup> Steven Woehrel, "Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis," 92-818F, *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington Congressional Research Service, 16 November 1992), p. 7. Cause for concern exists in the deteriorating Albanian-Greek relationship, continued Macedonian-Greek disputes, and recurring Turkish-Greek island and territorial water disputes in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Any of these could spark a larger conflict. Because of the nature of the contiguous borders of these parties, the threat of a spill-over of fighting from Kosovo and/or Macedonia is increased. Turkey, a pivotal actor, has strategic interests in defending its north eastern frontier with Armenia and its littoral possessions in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Moreover, increased fighting in the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and/or extreme measures taken by the Russians against the breakaway Republic of Chechnya might encourage the Turks to attempt to balance Russian power in the Balkans. In reference to the potential pull-out of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, Turkey's Foreign Minister, Murat Karayalcin, stated, "In case there is a vacancy, I believe it will soon be filled by various countries including the members of [the] Islamic Conference Organization." Karayalcin cited in *Illyria*, Albanian-American Newspaper, 12-14 December 1994, Vol. 4 No. 356. Bronx, NY, p. 4.

<sup>278</sup> Due to disputes with Greece over the use of historical symbols, Macedonia received recognition by the EC and U.N. only after its government changed its formal name. Macedonia is legally known as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Through U.N. Security Council Resolution 817 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was recognized as a U.N. member.

antagonize border states to the point that the Balkans could become engulfed in a regional war. A larger regional war involving NATO countries could have tremendous implications for international security and European defense. The possibility of NATO states choosing sides in a wider conflict could cause instability and might unravel the alliance.

In order to bring peace and stability to the Balkan region, particularly Bosnia, the European Community (EC) and the United Nations (U.N.) have fostered numerous peace conferences. However, none has resulted in total peace. With the passage of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established. The 14,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed to the Krajina region of Croatia have experienced some success. In Bosnia, approximately 18,000 U.N. peacekeepers were deployed to six U.N.-declared "safe areas:" Srebrenica, Zepa, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Sarajevo.<sup>279</sup> On 11 December 1992, UNSC Resolution 795 approved the deployment of peacekeepers in Macedonia (UNPROFOR Macedonia). While minor border incidents have occurred in Macedonia, the *status quo* has been maintained. However, in Bosnia the fighting continues.

Diplomatic and economic measures have been taken to encourage peaceful resolution of the Balkan conflict. Evidence suggests that the combination of political and economic coercion has been successful in modifying Serbia's behavior. When the EC declared that it would use economic measures against the republics of the former Yugoslav federation which were not cooperative, Serbia conceded on the principle that there would be no unilateral changes of borders.<sup>280</sup> Colonel-General Panic of the YPA stated that

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<sup>279</sup> Woehrel and Kim, IB91089, pp. 7-8.

<sup>280</sup> James Gow, "The Use of Coercion in The Yugoslav Crisis," *The World Today* (Vol. 48. No. 11. November 1992), p. 199. Gow suggests that it was the employment of diplomatic coercion that forced numerous other Serbian concessions: the agreement to the deployment of CSCE monitors in Croatia that had been blocked for two months, the establishment of a Conference on Yugoslavia, and ending the war in Croatia. Gow suggests that Hans van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, who held the position of president of the EC, used political "bullying" to force Serbia to acquiesce. Gow, November 1992, p. 199.

The Yugoslav Army 'had to end' the war in Slovenia because of EC pressure, and the war in Croatia had to be cut short after the EC 'offered' diplomatic recognition to Croatia because it would have had to give up its gains 'under international pressure.'<sup>281</sup>

In April 1992, Yugoslavia was threatened with exclusion from the CSCE if fighting continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In response, Belgrade distanced itself from Bosnia-Herzegovina by declaring a newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which consisted of only Serbia and Montenegro. When the U.N. began deliberations over economic sanctions in May 1992, the FRY attempted to moderate its international image. First, Milan Panic was asked to become the prime minister of the new state. Second, the YPA was divided between the Serbs in Bosnia and the FRY.<sup>282</sup> However, these Serbian initiatives did not prevent the U.N. economic sanctions which were imposed on 30 May 1992. A decision at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on 10 July 1992 suspended Yugoslavia from membership. This brought additional concessions from Belgrade. First, the FRY agreed to begin negotiations on the recognition of all of the independent republics. Second, CSCE human-rights monitors were authorized to be positioned in Kosovo. Third, Serbian forces in Bosnia placed their heavy weaponry under U.N. supervision.<sup>283</sup> But when the FRY was expelled from the CSCE in mid-1993, 100 CSCE observers stationed in Kosovo were expelled in retaliation.

Through U.N. resolution 713 in September 1991, an arms embargo was imposed against all the constituent members of the former Yugoslav federation. However, this measure was not successful. The embargo appears to have placed the Bosnian Muslims at

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<sup>281</sup> Colonel-General Panic cited in Gow, November 1992, p. 200.

<sup>282</sup> Milan Panic was selected as the Prime Minister in order to convey the impression that Serbia had a moderate government. Panic is an American citizen who emigrated from Yugoslavia in 1955. Additionally, Belgrade believed that by dividing the YPA it could separate itself from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and avert the sanctions. Gow, November 1992, p. 200.

<sup>283</sup> Gow, November 1992, p. 200.

a disadvantage and to have encouraged Bosnian Serb attacks.<sup>284</sup> Additional pressures were added on 30 May 1992, when U.N. economic sanctions were placed on Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, on 23 September 1994, some sanctions against Serbia were lifted in response to Belgrade's announced blockade of support to the Bosnian Serbs.<sup>285</sup>

The European Union (or EU, the name of the European Community since November 1993) and the U.N. have attempted to ease tensions and to localize the current conflict with the deployment of peacekeepers. Military options have been limited to humanitarian aid, the enforcement of a no-fly zone (Operation Deny Flight), and air-to-ground strikes against forces violating the military exclusion zones established around the Bosnian "safe areas." The United States, however, has taken a different approach to the localization of the war.

While the United States has consented to and participated in the employment of NATO air power, Washington has limited its military role in Bosnia. Meanwhile, Washington has taken the lead role in the deterrence of a spill-over of the conflict into Kosovo and Macedonia. Washington's apparent deterrent strategy to counter potential Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia began with a diplomatic threat made by President Bush in December 1992. On 1 March 1993, President Clinton continued the Bush policy by reiterating the threat. Both presidents warned Belgrade that if armed conflict occurred in Kosovo due to Serbian aggression, the United States would respond with military reprisals.<sup>286</sup> While a clear U.S. policy has not been formally stated in reference to

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<sup>284</sup> In November 1994, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from active participation in embargo enforcement measures.

<sup>285</sup> Woehrel and Kim, IB91089, pp. 9-10.

<sup>286</sup> On 27 December 1992, President Bush warned the Serbs not to widen the war. The warning was conveyed orally and in writing. The document stated: "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper." At that point, the military option rested largely on air strikes. *New York Times*, 28 December 1992, p. A 6. On 1 March 1993, President Clinton also warned the Serbs, suggesting that the United States "would respond as appropriate if there were violence in Kosovo." This again rested on air power. *Washington Post*, 2 March 1993, p. A 14. See "U.S. Warns Serbia on Kosovo," *Facts on File*, 11 March 1993, Vol 53, No 2728, p. 151. On 18 June 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 842, expanding the size of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Beginning on 3 July 1993,

Macedonia, the intent is apparent. The clearly stated threats delivered to Serbia to deter military action in Kosovo, coupled with the deployment of U.S. troops to Macedonia, have implied the intent to deter Serbian aggression in both locations.

The proximity of U.S. air bases in Italy, U.S. naval and marine forces in the Mediterranean, and the U.S. enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 781, which created a no-fly zone in Bosnia, have provided some credibility to U.S. signals of resolve. In July 1993, the U.S. signalled a slightly strengthened position through the deployment of U.S. army ground forces to Macedonia. President Clinton declared, "This deployment is important to our foreign policy and national security interests. . . ." <sup>287</sup> In this declaration, President Clinton clearly implied that the U.S. interest in the region had shaped the commitment. <sup>288</sup>

Once the American position was stated, upholding it became a national interest. Two presidents had threatened Belgrade with military retaliation, and the presence of ground forces could reinforce the diplomatic demarche. However, the signal of U.S. commitment and resolve may be vulnerable to Serbian misinterpretation due to two factors. First, confusion persists over the role and mission that the force may assume. Some analysts suggest, and many in Washington believe, that the U.S. military presence in Macedonia is deterrent in nature. President Clinton's communication to the Congress stated that U.S. forces would be

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the U.S. augmented UNPROFOR Macedonia with elements of what now is an Army battalion to support multilateral efforts to prevent the Balkan conflict from spreading and to contribute to the stability of the region. *103d Congress, 1st Session, House Document, 103-111, "Communication from the President of the United States," 13 July 1993.*

<sup>287</sup> "A Report of U.S. Efforts Towards Peace and Stability in the Vital Balkan Region," *Communication from the President of the United States*, (103d Congress, 1st Session, House Document 103-11, 31 July 1993).

<sup>288</sup> In 1971, President Nixon stated that; "We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around." Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York, NY, Simon and Shuster, 1994), p. 712. See "First Annual Report to Congress on the United States Foreign Policy," 25 February 1971, in *Nixon Papers*, 1970 vol., p. 119.

stationed along the northern Macedonian border with the mandate of monitoring and reporting any developments that could signify a threat to the territory of Macedonia. . . . Although UNPROFOR Macedonia is a U.N. peace keeping force under Chapter VI of the Charter and has not encountered hostilities to date, our forces are fully prepared not only to fulfill their peace keeping mission but to defend themselves if necessary.<sup>289</sup>

However, Danish General Finn Saermark Thomsen, Commander of UNPROFOR Macedonia, stated, "We are not a protection force. We will not protect Macedonians. We will observe and report."<sup>290</sup> Through these latter statements, it is possible that the signalling of resolve and determination by the use of diplomatic and military power may have been lost.

In view of its size in relation to existing Serbian capabilities, an army battalion positioned in such a manner might have provided a semblance of deterrent capability as a trip wire. Instead, the constraints of the peacekeeping mission and the U.N. commander's remarks have probably removed the psychological leverage which the battalion might have achieved as a trip wire. Meanwhile, the potential for Serbian aggression in either Kosovo or Macedonia continues to exist.

### C. ANALYSIS

The current Balkan crisis, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has frustrated the various states involved in peacekeeping. In the current situation a total withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers is conceivable and perhaps even probable. In this event, the efforts to localize the conflict would suffer. In the absence of the peacekeepers, the Bosnian Serbs would be

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<sup>289</sup> "A Report of U.S. Efforts Towards Peace and Stability in the Vital Balkan Region."

<sup>290</sup> Thomsen cited in Letter to the President of the United States of America, dated 7 July 1993 from Republican Whip, Congressman Newt Gingrich. Gingrich suggested that the statement made by the Danish General Finn Sermak Thomsen, the U.N. Commander in Macedonia, encouraged rather than discouraged aggression. He further stated, "When American troops and the American Flag arrive in a country, there should be a presumption that we are serious. Potential aggressors should know that violence will be met with overwhelming force. . . . In Macedonia, we must be determined to defend the Macedonians and to use decisive force if necessary. If we are doing the former but the UN is describing the latter, we are in danger of confusing our opponents as Secretary of State Dean Acheson did with Korea in 1950."

unrestrained in their military efforts. Additionally, a Bosnian Serb victory could lead to efforts to consolidate the Serbian ethnic communities.<sup>291</sup> Such efforts could involve new demands in Macedonia and/or Kosovo. On 28 November 1994, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher suggested that "the United States would not object if the Serbs in Bosnia formed a political link with those in neighboring Serbia--in essence creating a greater Serbia--as long as the warring parties agreed to such an arrangement."<sup>292</sup> While the current cease-fire in Bosnia calmed the fighting, the siege of Bihac continued.

This analysis suggests that while Serbia--and the FRY as a whole--have taken on the role of the potential attacker, the United States has positioned itself as the defender. By virtue of U.S. presidential threats in reference to the security of the population of Kosovo and the deployment of a U.S. Army battalion to Macedonia, both Kosovo and Macedonia have become quasi-protégés of the United States.

Huth's hypothesis 1.1, concerning the immediate and short-term balance of forces, may be relevant to the unfolding of future events in relation to Macedonia and Kosovo. In 1992, before the YPA split between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, 138,000 troops were on active duty and 400,000 were in the reserves.<sup>293</sup> Tens of thousands of people have died in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, yet it is difficult to determine the number of military casualties. However, it is reasonable to suggest that since the YPA enjoyed advantages in armament and matériel its casualties have probably not been as great as those of its

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<sup>291</sup> FRY President Slobodan Milosevic stated that after the peace in Bosnia is settled, that the possible unification of Bosnian Serbs with the FRY exists and will be negotiated at a later date. President Milosevic in a live televised interview by television journalist Larry King, on *Larry King Live*, 21 December 1994.

<sup>292</sup> Christopher cited in "U.S. Policy Shift on Bosnia Creates a Muddle With Allies," *New York Times*, 30 November 1994, p. A. 1.

<sup>293</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 71. No. 41, Fall 1992). James Gow suggests that the YPA was divided between the Bosnian Serbs and the newly declared Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See James Gow, "The Use of Coercion in The Yugoslav Crisis," *The World Today* (Vol. 48. No. 11. November 1992., p. 200.

adversaries. While the numbers above refer to the military units under the control of the government, tens of thousands of irregular troops exist.

If the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is settled without international measures to restrain the Serbian forces, the conflict could spread to new areas. As demonstrated through previous actions in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian forces have attempted to concentrate on one adversary at a time. With the reconsolidation of Serbian forces and capabilities, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs might be tempted to concentrate their efforts on Macedonia, and/or in Kosovo. Although Serbian ethnic communities in Macedonia and Kosovo are small, control of Macedonia would provide the Serbians with an unimpeded thoroughfare to the traditional trade routes to Salonica. After Macedonia declared independence in 1991, the YPA units were withdrawn from Macedonia and relocated in Kosovo. Each of the major cities in Kosovo was occupied by YPA units.<sup>294</sup> Numerous analysts suggest that the presence of the YPA is intended to provoke the Kosovar Albanians into revolt in order to justify an armed intervention. However, the non-recognized Kosovar-Albanian government of Ibrahim Rugova has demonstrated significant control over the population, encouraging non-violent protest and passive resistance.

The use of Serbian history and mythology in political rhetoric--indeed, the use of ethnic nationalism-- launched Slobodan Milosevic into power. By using Kosovo as a rallying point for ethnic Serbs, Milosevic capitalized on ethnic unrest and Serbian dissatisfaction with the government. His political rhetoric of the 1980s suggests that while the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina may soon end, his larger goals have not yet been realized, and more conflict is possible.<sup>295</sup> On 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary celebration of the

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<sup>294</sup> "All major towns--Prishtina, Pec, Prizren, Djakova and Kosovska Mitovica--became garrisoned with a full range of armor and artillery which could be deployed swiftly." Derek Hall, *Albania and the Albanians* (New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 209.

<sup>295</sup> Kosovo has symbolic, mythical and political importance to Serbia. It has been referred to as the "Serbian Jerusalem." It is the site at which the Serbians and their coalition partners were defeated by the Turks on 28 June 1389. In 1988, Slobodan Milosevic stated that "it is time for struggle. . . We shall win the battle

Battle of Kosovo Polje, over a million Serbians migrated from outside Kosovo to the site of the battlefield. At that location, Slobodan Milosevic addressed the masses. He stated that "Six centuries [after the Battle of Kosovo], now we are again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet."<sup>296</sup> Such statements suggest that the consolidation of a Greater Serbia will not be complete until all the diaspora Serbian ethnic communities in adjacent areas are incorporated into the FRY.

Currently, the UNPROFOR Macedonia is the only physical obstacle that might discourage the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from following through with its promises. As stated earlier, U.S. air bases in Italy provide some military force capabilities. Additionally, in July 1992, the United States deployed six warships (including 2,200 marines) into the south Adriatic to protect the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.<sup>297</sup> While these forces were positioned for purposes other than deterrence of a conflict in Macedonia and Kosovo, it is possible that their mission could be changed to include this objective. However, policy statements to this effect have not been forthcoming.

In reference to the immediate and short-term balance of forces associated with Macedonia and Kosovo, the FRY clearly enjoys substantial advantages. Although the YPA was divided between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY in May 1992, it can be assumed (taking into account casualties sustained in combat against Slovenia and Croatia) that approximately half of the original force continues to exist under the control of the FRY--that is, approximately 69,000 active duty troops and at least 200,000 reservists.<sup>298</sup> While no YPA

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for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country. . . We shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country. We tell them that we enter every battle with the aim of winning it. . . And there is no battle in the world that the people have lost." Slobodan Milosevic cited in Ramet, p. 83.

<sup>296</sup> Eliz Biberaj, *Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis?* (London, UK, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989), p. 10.

<sup>297</sup> Ramet, p. 96.

<sup>298</sup> These estimates suggest that while the YPA sustained casualties when the division occurred between the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs, the FRY obtained a larger percentage of the original force. The

troops are located in Macedonia, Kosovo is garrisoned with thousands of YPA troops. Official Serbian statistics claim that 4,000 YPA troops are deployed there, along with 1,200 military reservists, but this does not count the militia and irregular units. The council on human rights in Kosovo estimates that nearly 100,000 military and federal police troops occupy the area.<sup>299</sup> In this respect, the overwhelming immediate and short-term advantages in the balance of forces enjoyed by the FRY may jeopardize deterrence success.

Huth's hypothesis 2.1 suggesting that the probability of deterrence success increases if a military alliance exists between the protégé and the defender is relevant in this case. Currently, the United States does not have a military alliance with Macedonia, and little potential for such an alliance is evident. Moreover, due to the issues surrounding the legal status of Kosovo, it is highly improbable that a U.S. military alliance with that province could be established. Although a military alliance does not exist, other measures could be taken in order to compensate for the absence of an alliance. Diplomatically, the U.S. could demonstrate its commitment to Macedonia by installing an ambassador and establishing full diplomatic relations with that state. Currently, formal diplomacy is conducted by a chargé d'affaires. While the U.S. is demonstrating to its European allies that it is participating in burden-sharing by providing troops for UNPROFOR Macedonia, it has not signalled the formal commitment of a full diplomatic presence in that country.<sup>300</sup> In reference to Kosovo, the U.S. attention to Ibrahim Rugova and his non-recognized government should be maintained, if not increased. This U.S. measure would demonstrate to Belgrade that the U.S. interest in keeping peace in Kosovo is genuine. Since U.S. alliances with Kosovo and

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estimates are derived from the force levels described in Ramet, p. 92.

<sup>299</sup> *Open Wounds, Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo*, (New York, NY, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1993), p. 95. See "Conflict Prevention Center Fact Finding Mission to Kosovo," *Report of the CSCE* (Vienna, 5 June 1992), p. 4.

<sup>300</sup> Marshall Freeman Harris, "Stand Up For Macedonia," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 August 1994, p. 18.

Macedonia do not exist, and only partial diplomatic linkages are present. the potential for successful deterrence in either location is severely degraded.

In this case, the conditions stipulated in Huth's hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 are not present. U.S. military arms transfers are not in existence with either protégé. Commercial trade between the United States and Macedonia is not substantial. Furthermore, since Kosovo is a province of Serbia, it has also been subject to the U.N. economic sanctions. The benefits of the relationships suggested by hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 do not exist and therefore the contrary to the hypotheses may be asserted. In the absence of military arms transfers and commercial trade between the defender and the protégé, the probability of deterrence success is degraded.

Huth's hypothesis 3.1 suggests that, if the borders of the potential attacker (Serbia/FRY) and the protégé (Macedonia and Kosovo) are contiguous, the probability of deterrence success decreases. In the Macedonian case this situation is evident. In the case of Kosovo, the situation is dramatically different. While borders do exist between the Serbian province of Kosovo and Serbia proper, Kosovo lies within the international borders of the FRY. Although the U.S. and other NATO states have a forward presence and air delivery capability, expanding the range of the defender's forces (in this case, those of the United States) and increasing the defender's ability to hurt an enemy, a Serbian *fait accompli* in either or both locations is possible due to the disparity in immediately available force ratios. Therefore, while forward presence and air power (coupled with a peacekeeping force) do affect the balance of forces, the contiguity of the borders may degrade the probability of successful deterrence in both locations.

Huth's hypothesis 4.1 (concerning a defender's tit-for-tat policy of military escalation increasing the probability of deterrence success) has important implications for this case. While the international community approved a preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces to Macedonia, these efforts can in no way be considered as derived from a policy of strength. It is possible to suggest that while Serbia has not yet positioned forces in a provocative manner which threatens Macedonia, the credibility provided by U.S. military

participation in the deployment of peacekeepers can be viewed as derived from the adoption of a tit-for-tat policy. However, owing to the inherent nature of the mission, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.N. (and U.S.) deployment of forces to Macedonia stems from what Huth defines as a policy of caution--that is, less than equal levels of military capability. Additionally, with reference to Kosovo, it is difficult to judge whether the U.S. threats to Belgrade are credible and, moreover, to what extent air power can hurt Serbia. Therefore, in the case of both protégés, it can be concluded that the U.S. and the other members of the international community outside the former Yugoslavia have adopted a policy of military escalation which is a mixture of the "tit-for-tat" and "caution" approaches. In this case, according to Huth's hypothesis 4.1, due to the mixture of policies, the likelihood of deterrence success is degraded.

Huth's hypothesis 4.2, which suggests that a firm but flexible diplomatic strategy would increase the probability of deterrent success, appears to have little relevance to this case. In peace negotiations and other conferences sponsored by the EC (or the EU), diplomatic coercion or "bullying" succeeded in modifying Serbia's behavior and provided the circumstances in which Serbia was deterred from continuing to attack Slovenia and later Croatia. In reference to Kosovo and Macedonia, the threat of U.S. retaliation against Belgrade might be viewed as "bullying." However, the international community has mixed its initial bullying diplomatic strategy with a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy. This is evident in the partial lifting of the economic sanctions against Serbia.

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 5.1 seems to be relevant. Huth suggests that the known behavior of the defender (the United States) in confrontations with the potential attacker (Serbia) will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than the history of the defender's behavior in cases in which the current potential attacker was not involved. In this case to date, no confrontations have occurred between the United States and Serbia. The only confrontations in which the United States participated in the Balkan theater were approved by the U.N. and involved the participation of other NATO allies in operations against Bosnian Serb targets. However, since the Bosnian Serb forces were formerly part

of the YPA, and until August 1994 Serbia was supplying these forces with support. the correlation is probably close enough to permit one to regard the Bosnian Serbs as an extension of the Belgrade Serbs.

On 28 February 1994, U.S. aircraft enforced UNSC Resolution 781 (the no-fly zone) by shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft. On 10 April 1994, U.S. aircraft were again employed, this time in an air strike against a Bosnian Serb ground target. On 22 April 1994, NATO ordered the Bosnian Serbs to halt their attacks on Gorazde. NATO stipulated that the Bosnian Serbs must withdraw their troops three kilometers from Gorazde and withdraw their heavy weapons by twenty kilometers. This became an exclusion zone and was enforced by the threat of airstrikes. Later, NATO expanded its protection to include all six U.N. safe areas. On 4 August 1994, in an apparent attempt to test NATO resolve, Bosnian Serb ground forces removed heavy weapons from a U.N.-monitored collection point near Sarajevo. U.S. and NATO aircraft responded immediately, conducting air strikes against Bosnian Serb ground targets. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs returned the weapons to the U.N. depot. While U.S. aircraft participated in the air strikes, each mission was requested by the U.N. and conducted by NATO. Although the Bosnian Serbs eventually respected the threat of air strikes, in this case the interrelated nature of the military actions could provide the Serbians reasonable doubt as to whether the United States would act unilaterally.

In addition, the past behavior of the United States (the defender) in other confrontations not involving Serbia (the potential attacker) will probably be evaluated by the potential attacker. While U.S. military power is respected throughout the world once it is deployed, it has been challenged numerous times, including the 1990-91 and 1994 Persian Gulf crises, and the 1994 Korean and Haitian crises. In these examples, the complex process of approving the U.S. actions may provide an element of doubt in the assessment by a potential attacker. While Huth suggests that these types of conflicts have less impact on the decision-making of the potential attacker in the specific current conflict, it is reasonable to believe that it enters into the attacker's cost-benefit calculations. This is evident in Serbian rhetoric in reference to the potential of U.S. intervention. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian

Serb leader, stated that "Americans do not have the stomach for casualties."<sup>301</sup> Therefore, while Serbia fears U.S. retaliation, Belgrade may question the likelihood of U.S. unilateral action. Serbia may have doubts over whether the U.S. commitment to Kosovo and Macedonia is sufficient to threaten Serbia with additional military involvement.

Huth's hypothesis 5.2 (concerning the bargaining record of the defender in relation to the potential attacker) suggests that a history of a firm-but-flexible strategy enhances the credibility of deterrent-oriented actions in the next confrontation. Likewise, the probability of failure increases in the next confrontation if the defender adopts a bullying strategy. As stated above, the U.S. has experienced limited diplomatic and military confrontations with Serbia. Aside from the threat of military retaliation in the case of Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia, U.S. efforts have been multilateral. Therefore, Huth's hypothesis 5.2 has limited applicability to this case. However, U.S. rhetoric in reference to war crimes might be viewed as bullying. While UNSC Resolution 808 (adopted on 22 February 1993) was fully warranted, in the absence of a total victory, the implications of a Nuremburg-type trial strengthen the resolve of political and military leaders to stay in power as well as galvanizing them to continue to fight.

In possible attempts to demonstrate some action, or to begin to consolidate domestic support, some U.S. politicians have vilified Serbian governmental and military leaders along with known criminals.<sup>302</sup> The premise for concern on this matter is based on an extrapolation

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<sup>301</sup> Benjamin C. Schwarz, "Foes Misread U.S. Fear of Casualties," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 November 1994. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, stated that "Americans do not have the stomach for casualties." As Schwarz suggests, "In the face of mounting combat deaths and injuries, the U.S. public will demand withdrawal from a military intervention before the U.S. can achieve its goals." "[T]he U.S. public's supposed intolerance to casualties appears to be America's Achilles' heel, hobbling U.S. ability to use its military potential." However, as Schwarz suggests, evidence proves that the contrary is true. Once involved the U.S. is capable of enduring casualties. Unfortunately, in order to prevent a potentially larger war, the timing of involvement is one of the crucial variables.

<sup>302</sup> On 16 December 1992, U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger commented on the record that some Serbian leaders and generals may be guilty of war crimes. He implicated Slobodan Milosevic, among others, and accused both Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj and paramilitary leader Arkan--Zeljko Raznjatovic of war crimes at the United Nations in Geneva. Julie Kim, "Serbia, Montenegro, (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)": "Background and Current Issues," 93-67F, *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington

from the goals of organizations, as outlined in organizational theory. The goals of organizations have two primary functions: goal accomplishment and self-preservation.<sup>303</sup> Although both functions may be reinforced by the threat of a war crimes tribunal, it is the latter that suggests that those who may be charged will certainly have sufficient reason to attempt to stay in power. For potential war criminals it is a zero-sum game. As long as the organization in which the "criminal" holds membership survives, he likewise survives.

Unless the external powers achieve victory, advertising the creation of an international war crimes tribunal may be harmful to conflict resolution. In some cases, the military and/or civilian leadership may have induced entire units as well as civilian populations to participate in the perpetration of crimes in order to create cohesion and commitment to the cause. Unless military victory is achieved by the external powers, the independent actor organizations may "spread the guilt" in order to protect not only the leadership but the entire organization from this very type of tribunal.<sup>304</sup> Therefore, the

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Congressional Research Service, 11 January 1993), pp. 9 and 13. In 1993, "Senator Dennis DeConcini, co-chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe said that troops under [Bosnian Serb General Ratko] Mladic's control 'are responsible for many of the atrocities we hear about in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the continuing siege of Sarajevo, which isolates and strangles the city's more than 300,000 remaining residents.'" David Binder, "Ratko Mladic, Pariah as Patriot," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 September 1994, p. 26.

<sup>303</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," ed. Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 109.

<sup>304</sup> Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant, the Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1979), pp. 252-255. Popkin suggests that "unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest." n.26 from Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 2. This type of coercion may have been created by the institution of the International War Crimes Tribunal. Popkin suggests that many collective projects can be restricted to participants but their benefits are enjoyed by participants as well as nonparticipants. In order to ensure participation and membership, Popkin suggests that the threat of losing valuable benefits will overcome the free-rider problem. To avoid a free-rider situation where an entire group benefits yet not all participate, the leadership may use coercion to enforce discipline and reduce the likelihood of defection. In short, the presence of the tribunal may encourage the group not only to continue fighting to maintain control and avert the trials, but it may also encourage the leadership of the various groups to spread the guilt among the ranks in order to limit the possibility of defection.

bullying element in some U.S. political rhetoric may degrade prospects for deterrence success.

It is clear that in reference to Serbian aggression, passive measures have not been totally successful. It has been the dual use of diplomatic and military coercion that has thus far moderated Serbian behavior. It is reasonable to conclude that if an imposing military force with a truly defensive rather than peacekeeping mission were deployed to a location perceived by Belgrade as critical, deterrence might succeed. However, if U.N. peacekeepers are withdrawn from Bosnia and the Macedonian task force is not strengthened, Belgrade may view the U.S. warnings regarding the security of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the ethnically Albanian population of Kosovo as a bluff.



## **VII. CONCLUSION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze critically a prominent theoretical framework concerning the conditions necessary for successful deterrence and conflict-containment, with special attention to historical antecedents to the current conflict in the Balkans. The analysis of each of the case studies are based on Paul K. Huth's hypotheses and help to build a comparative study. The three historical case studies were chosen in order to identify the factors that have contributed to documented deterrence success when Serbia acted as the potential attacker. The longitudinal design provides insight regarding some underlying issues that continue to be relevant--for example, the traditional relationship that Serbia has maintained with Russia. Evidence from the historical case studies suggests that while certain efforts to deter aggression succeeded, diplomatic and military coercion created the environment that facilitated that success. The following comparative analysis provides insight regarding the possible conditions that might establish a framework for successfully deterring Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia.

### **B. COMPARISON BETWEEN CASES**

#### **1. Annexation of Bosnian-Herzegovina and the Current Balkan Crisis**

In the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, two potential attackers existed: Russia and Serbia. Germany took on the role of the defender and Austria-Hungary served as the protégé. In this case, St. Petersburg attempted to make gains at the Turkish straits at the expense of the Serbs. According to a secret agreement between Izvolski and Aehrenthal, Vienna would support St. Petersburg's attempt to control the Turkish straits while St. Petersburg would support Vienna's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When the annexation occurred, Russian domestic criticism was rampant. The Pan-Slav movement was outraged, and many in the government were dissatisfied with Izvolski's

negotiations. In order to pacify domestic unrest, Izvolski attempted to block Austro-Hungarian gains in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this case, St. Petersburg attempted to stop international recognition of the annexation by requiring that it be approved by an international convention with wide participation. Since this type of gathering was highly improbable, Russia believed that Vienna would have to give up its claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the Serbians would benefit from Austro-Hungarian losses.

In the current Balkan crisis, unlike the annexation crisis, none of the traditional Great Powers have expressed great interest in the Balkans. However, the Balkans continue to be a potential powder keg. Since none of the external powers has intervened militarily against Belgrade, Russia may continue to remain passive and dependent on diplomatic measures. However, since the crisis has not escalated to the point that external powers have taken military measures against Belgrade, Moscow's diplomatic efforts have been sufficient to protect Serbia. Russia has intervened diplomatically numerous times in support of Belgrade. This includes advocating a lifting of the economic sanctions against Serbia. Most recently, at the December 1994 CSCE European security summit in Budapest, Russia blocked all language concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina from being entered into the final document. As the chief Bosnian delegate described the situation, "The Russians blocked everything. . . . That means there will be nothing in the final document on the most burning crisis in Europe."<sup>305</sup>

## **2. Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913 and the Current Balkan Crisis**

The Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913 provides perhaps the best comparison for the current crisis. In this crisis, both Russia and Serbia were potential attackers. Germany took on the role of the defender, and Austria-Hungary served as the protégé. In 1912-1913, Russia still

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<sup>305</sup> "All language on the former Yugoslavia--including a description of Serbs as 'aggressors' because of attacks on the U.N. 'safe area' of Bihac in northwest Bosnia--was excised from the final document at the insistence of Moscow." Reuters, AP, AFP, "Russia Blocks Any Reference To the Conflict," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 December 1994.

considered itself unprepared for war. However, its position had improved since the annexation crisis. St. Petersburg positioned its military forces in such a manner that Vienna would not be able to act against the Balkan Alliance, which was then engaged in a war against Turkey. Since the First Balkan war threatened to escalate into a general European war, each of the Great Powers attempted to negotiate with the Balkan Alliance and with Ottoman Turkey in efforts to localize the war.

In the current Balkan crisis, the international community and outside powers have attempted to prevent a spill-over into new areas through the use of diplomatic negotiations which have included diplomatic and economic coercion. While the U.N. has responded with the deployment of peacekeepers to the former Yugoslavia, the U.S. has taken an apparent deterrent approach.

In the crisis of 1912-1913, Russia considered itself unprepared for war and was ultimately unwilling to go to war in support of Serbia. Today, Russia is a state that has suffered through the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia continues to maintain formidable military power, but it is not equivalent to the power the Soviet Union exerted. Currently, Russia is engaged militarily within its own borders in Chechnya and in various parts of the former Soviet Union (e.g., Tadjikistan), and is experiencing discontent within the ranks of its armed forces.

In the Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913, Russia was concerned over domestic unrest and the possibility of a revolution. This fear seemed to be of chief concern to both the military and political leadership, and entered into the cost-benefit calculations of the decision-makers. It ultimately affected the decision not to go to war over Serbia's claims for a port on the Adriatic, and later over Serbia's territorial gains in Albania.

In the current Balkan crisis, Russia has maintained its support for Serbia. However, possibly due to Russia's own economic and political difficulties, Moscow has chosen to cooperate with some of the international efforts to localize and stop the war. Russia has officially agreed to the U.N. economic sanctions, and has participated in UNPROFOR by

sending troops to the Balkans. However, Moscow has taken diplomatic measures to protect Serbian interests.

Diplomatically, in the 1912-1913 crisis, the Conference of Ambassadors in London created an international forum that attempted to localize the Balkan War, and to ease the tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary. At the Conference, Russian participants championed Serbian aspirations--access to the Adriatic, and territorial gains. However, St. Petersburg was forced to back down due to the expense of maintaining a mobilized force in Galicia. Once Russia agreed to ensure that Scutari would remain Albanian, tensions were eased between St. Petersburg and Vienna, and military forces were demobilized.

In the current crisis, the situation is comparable in some respects. Although Russia has joined the attempts of the U.N. and the EU to ease the tensions in the Balkans, Moscow continues to champion the Serbian cause. While Russia's military forces have not been mobilized, Moscow has pursued diplomatic methods. The importance of diplomatic maneuvers is substantial since the international community has not intervened beyond peacekeeping. If U.N. or U.S. efforts expand beyond peacekeeping, Russia is likely to intervene more forcefully.

Finally, it is difficult to assert that changes in minor variables might have modified the outcome of the 1912-1913 crisis. However, if Aehrenthal had not returned the Sandjak of Novi Bazar to the Porte in 1909, it is possible that Austria-Hungary might have been in a stronger position to deter Serbian aggression or to influence the course of events in the following two crises. Likewise, in the current crisis, a U.N. withdrawal from Bosnia and/or a U.S. withdrawal from Macedonia might encourage Serbian expansionism.

### **3. Balkan Crisis of 1913 and the Current Balkan Crisis**

In the crisis of 1913, the roles of the participants changed. The potential attacker was Serbia alone, because its traditional ally, Russia, did not intervene. The defender was Austria-Hungary, and Albania played the role of the protégé. In September 1913, Serbia had just ended the Second Balkan war. Ethnic Albanian civil unrest in the newly acquired region

of Macedonia, as well as in the disputed area in the Sandjak, provided Serbia with a pretext to enter the territory in attempts to pacify the situation. Serbia intended to influence the definition of the borders between itself and the newly formed Albania. Belgrade also hoped that its troops would influence the selection of a pro-Serbian Albanian government which would authorize Serbian occupation.

In the current Balkan crisis Bosnian Serb forces (formerly YPA forces) are engaged in defeating the Muslim forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once the conflict is resolved, a union between the territory held by the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY is possible. It seems plausible that ethnic Albanian unrest in Kosovo and/or Macedonia may provide a pretext for Serbian intervention in order to protect ethnic Serbs and Serbian interests, and to further expand a Greater Serbia/FRY. Already in Kosovo, thousands of YPA forces along with militia and federal police forces are in position and ready to act. Additionally, it is possible that the nominally independent forces of "war lords" may receive tacit approval from Belgrade to begin further "ethnic cleansing." In this case Belgrade would attain its goals of a Greater Serbia with a means of "plausible denial" of the responsibility for independent actions by irregular forces.

In the crisis of 1913, Serbia attempted to present the Great Powers with a *fait accompli* which Belgrade believed would not be challenged because it could lead to a larger war. However, Vienna used the agreements of the Ambassadors in London to pursue its own strategic interests. As a result, Serbia complied with the agreements of the Conference in London. In the current Balkan crisis, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly presented the international community with *faits accomplis*. It can be concluded that both the Belgrade Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs realize that little other than diplomatic and economic sanctions will be applied in retaliation. The potential exists for additional *faits accomplis*, owing to the apparent unwillingness of the external powers to challenge the Serbs.

## C. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES

### 1. Hypothesis 1.1

The probability of deterrence success increases as the balance of military forces between attacker and defender shifts to the advantage of the defender. The immediate and short-term balance of military forces will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than will the long-term balance of military forces.<sup>306</sup>

#### *a. Bosnian Annexation*

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 1.1 appears to be relevant. Evidence suggests that Russia was unprepared for war. Governmental responses demonstrated this feeling. Furthermore, it was reported that Russian Minister of War assured the German attaché that Russia would not go to war over the Serbs. Moreover, a general lack of military readiness had penetrated the entire Russian officer corps.<sup>307</sup> By February 1909, information had reached Vienna that the Russian military chiefs themselves believed it would take three to five years to prepare the Army.

It is clear that if an armed conflict transpired, the combination of Austro-Hungarian and German forces would enjoy the advantage of superior numbers in the short-term balance of force. Numerically, Russia's 51.5 divisions were at a disadvantage in relation to the total combined forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which would number 55 divisions.

After Germany's ultimatum, Russia backed down. At that point, Vienna enjoyed a commanding advantage in the immediate and short-term balance of forces in the Balkans. By the peak of the crisis, on 29 March 1909, Vienna's combat forces numbered

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<sup>306</sup> Paul K. Huth, p. 41. See Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics* 36: 4 (1984), pp. 509-10.

<sup>307</sup> Schmitt, 1937, p. 85.

between 296,727 and 340,000 men. Serbian and Montenegrin combined total force strength only reached 170,000 men.

***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 1.1 seems to be relevant. While German commitment was always present, Vienna the (protégé) played the major role in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913. Again in 1912, Russia was unprepared for war. Yet, in this case St. Petersburg was better prepared than in 1908.

In this case, St. Petersburg attempted to ensure that Vienna would agree to the localization of the Balkan war. The "Trial Mobilization" and the arrival of new recruits, increased the strength of the Russian peace time army from 1.2 million to 1.6 million, or by 350,000 to 400,000 men. The entire Hapsburg active duty strength was only 440,000 men.<sup>308</sup> Vienna did not immediately view this as a threat, but later in October 1912, it increased its entire force by 181,000 men. In the immediate balance of forces, the Russian forces in the Russian-controlled area of eastern Galicia numbering 220,000 men, enjoyed the advantage. However, by the end of November 1912, Austria-Hungary increased its own level of preparedness in Galicia to 130,000 men. This does not account for other activated forces. While Austria-Hungary alone did not enjoy the advantage in the immediate balance of forces, the short-term balance of forces favored the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance. Germany's 13 divisions committed by alliance, coupled with the possible activation of an additional seven to ten Hapsburg corps enjoyed the numerical advantage. This short-term balance, rather than the former immediate balance of forces, compelled Russia to back down in November 1912, and encouraged St. Petersburg to modify its position on issues of Serbian territorial demands and military behavior.<sup>309</sup> Due to Russia's perceived unreadiness, on 3

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<sup>308</sup> Williamson, 1987, p. 320.

<sup>309</sup> Albertini, p. 403.

February 1913, the Tsar pledged that the Serbians would withdraw from the Adriatic.<sup>310</sup> Because it was in no position to argue with agreements made by the Conference of Ambassadors, St. Petersburg was again forced to recommend to Cetinje that it withdraw from Scutari.<sup>311</sup>

When on 3 December 1912, the participants in the Balkan war announced a cease-fire, the crisis in Galicia was expanded to include Bosnia-Herzegovina. In October 1912, Serbian forces numbered 355,000 men.<sup>312</sup> At the same time Montenegrin forces numbered 35,000 men.<sup>313</sup> However, these forces were oriented against Turkish opponents. Vienna's superiority in the immediate and short-term balance of forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina deterred attack.

In May 1912, Germany's peacetime military strength reached 651,000 troops. Due to the Anglo-German naval race in the North Sea, naval parity between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was reached in the Mediterranean. When Germany introduced the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* into the Mediterranean, the advantage in the immediate balance of naval forces went to the Triple Alliance.<sup>314</sup> On the ground, as in the case of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when Russia became immobilized, Austria-Hungary's immediate and short-term balance of forces deterred Serbia from attack. Additionally, in the absence of their Russian patron, Belgrade and Cetinje were coerced to

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<sup>310</sup> Helmreich, p. 282.

<sup>311</sup> Williamson, 1991, pp. 134-135. In conjunction with the simultaneous reduction of troops in Galicia by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia consented to the Great Power agreement to guarantee that Scutari would remain Albanian.

<sup>312</sup> Boris Ratković, "Mobilization of the Serbian Army For the First Balkan War, October 1912," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, Vol. XVIII, *War and Society in East Central Europe* (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 154.

<sup>313</sup> Novica Rakočević, "The Organization and Character of the Montenegrin Army in the First Balkan War," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, Vol. XVIII, *War and Society in East Central Europe*, (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 123.

<sup>314</sup> Williamson, 1991, p. 113.

behave according to Vienna's demands, and to recognize the agreements made by the Great Powers.

### *c. Balkan Crisis 1913*

Huth's hypothesis 1.1 has some relevance. Due to the disposition of Serbian forces either still mobilized or in the process of demobilization, the immediate balance of forces did not effect this case. However, Vienna maintained the advantage in its short-term balance of forces. Due to a year's worth of fighting against Turkey and then Bulgaria, Belgrade's capabilities were significantly degraded. In contrast, the Hapsburg army had not been recently involved in combat, and its military capabilities had not been depleted. Therefore, Austria-Hungary's advantage in the short-term balance of forces was an important element in the conditions that forced Serbia to withdraw its forces from Albania. Serbia was deterred from attacking Albania in September and October 1913. Vienna successfully coerced Belgrade to respect the agreements of the Great Powers and to withdraw its troops from Albania. After the ultimatum, deterrence succeeded in preventing further Serbian attacks.

### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

This analysis suggests that while Serbia--and the FRY as a whole-- have taken on the role of the potential attacker, the United States has positioned itself as the defender. By virtue of U.S. presidential threats in reference to the security of the population of Kosovo, and the deployment of a U.S. Army battalion to Macedonia, both Kosovo and Macedonia have become quasi-protégés of the United States.

Huth's hypothesis 1.1, concerning the immediate and short-term balance of force in relation to Macedonia and Kosovo may be very relevant to the unfolding of future events. In 1992, before the YPA split between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, 138,000 troops

were on active duty and 400,000 were in the reserves.<sup>315</sup> It is reasonable to suggest that since the YPA enjoyed advantages in armament and matériel that their casualties have not been as great as those of its adversaries. While the numbers above refer to the military units under control of the government, tens of thousands of irregular troops exist.

Currently, the UNPROFOR Macedonia is the only physical obstacle that might discourage the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from following through with its promises. As stated earlier, U.S. air bases in Italy provide some military force capabilities. Additionally, in July 1992, the United States deployed six warships (including 2,200 marines) into the south Adriatic to protect the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.<sup>316</sup> While these forces were positioned for purposes other than deterrence of a conflict in Macedonia and Kosovo, it is possible that their mission could be changed to include this objective. However, types of statements to this effect have not been forthcoming.

In reference to the immediate and short-term balance of force associated with Macedonia and Kosovo, the FRY clearly enjoys substantial advantages. Although the YPA was divided between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY in May 1992, it can be assumed (taking account for casualties sustained in combat against Slovenia and Croatia) that approximately half of the original force continues to exist under the control of the FRY--that is approximately 69,000 active duty troops and at least 200,000 reservists.<sup>317</sup> While no YPA troops are located in Macedonia, Kosovo is garrisoned with thousands of YPA troops. Official Serbian statistics claim that 4,000 YPA troops are deployed there, along with 1,200 military reservists, but this does not count the militia and irregular units. The council on

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<sup>315</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 71, No. 41, Fall 1992). James Gow suggests that the YPA divided itself between the Bosnian Serbs and the newly declared Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See James Gow, "The Use of Coercion in The Yugoslav Crisis," *The World Today* (Vol. 48, No. 11, November 1992).

<sup>316</sup> Ramet, p. 96.

<sup>317</sup> These estimates suggest that while the YPA sustained casualties when the division occurred between the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs, the FRY maintained a larger percentage of the existing force. The estimates are derived from the force levels described in Ramet, p. 92.

human rights in Kosovo estimates that nearly 100,000 military and federal police troops occupy the area.<sup>318</sup> In this respect, the overwhelming immediate and short-term advantages in the balance of forces enjoyed by the FRY may jeopardize deterrence success.

#### *e. Findings*

In each of the historical cases the immediate and short term balance of forces appeared to be relevant to successful deterrence. In the first two historical cases the existing combination of forces provided by the defender (Germany) and the protégé (Austria-Hungary) probably affected the decision-making process of the potential attackers (Russia and Serbia) and thus contributed to deterrence. In the third historical case, Austria-Hungary alone provided the deterrent forces. It is important to note that in the first two historical cases, the combination of two large armies deterred Russia. Furthermore, it was Austro-Hungarian mobilized forces that deterred Serbia. In the current case such a preponderance in the immediate and short-term balance of forces does not exist; and this may degrade the likelihood of deterrence success.

### **2. Hypothesis 2.1**

The probability of deterrence success will increase if the defender and protégé are linked by military alliance.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> *Open Wounds, Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo*, (New York, NY, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1993), p. 95. See "Conflict Prevention Center Fact Finding Mission to Kosovo," *Report of the CSCE* (Vienna, 5 June 1992), p. 4.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

*a. Bosnian Annexation*

Huth's Hypothesis 2.1 seems to be relevant in this case. The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary obligated Berlin to provide assistance to Vienna. Thus, the threat of Germany entering a war provided the forces required to deter a Russian attack. Given the agreements created by the German--Austro-Hungarian alliance and their immediate and short-term advantage in the balance of force, the necessary conditions existed for deterrence success.

*b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913*

In this case Huth's hypothesis 2.1 has relevance. The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance incorporating Italy seem to have affected the unfolding of the crisis. However, Vienna's actions alone (as the protégé) seem to have been dominant. In November 1912 the Kaiser promised that if Russia attacked the Hapsburg Empire without provocation, Germany would respond. Additionally, the Triple Alliance was renewed on 5 December 1912.<sup>320</sup>

*c. Balkan Crisis 1913*

It appears that Huth's hypothesis 2.1 had little relevance with this case. Little evidence suggests that a formal alliance between Albania's new government and Vienna. However, due to previously concluded numerous agreements, it is fair to assume that cordial relations, as well as an air of Albanian dependence on Vienna, did exist. While Vienna did not come to Albania's assistance because of a treaty obligation, the agreements concluded in London served as a pretext for Hapsburg involvement.

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<sup>320</sup> Albertini, p. 400.

#### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

Huth's hypothesis 2.1 has relevance in this case. Currently, the United States does not have a military alliance with Macedonia, and little potential for such an alliance is evident. Moreover, due to the issues surrounding the legal status of Kosovo, it is highly improbable that a U.S. military alliance with that province could be established. Although a military alliance does not exist, other measures were taken in order to compensate. Since U.S. alliances with Kosovo and Macedonia do not exist, and only partial diplomatic linkages are present, the potential for deterrence in either location is severely degraded.

#### *e. Findings*

In the first two historical cases, Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary proved to be the decisive factor that caused Russia to back down. Once Russia was immobilized militarily, Serbia was forced to recognize that the costs of war with Austria-Hungary exceeded any benefits it could plausibly obtain. Therefore, without Russia's participation Serbia was likewise deterred. In the third historical case, Russia did not offer military assistance to Belgrade, and Serbia was coerced to accept the agreements of the Great Powers made at the London Conference. Due to the fear of Austro-Hungarian intervention, Serbia was deterred from continuing to attack the Albanians. In the current case, while Serbia does not enjoy any military commitment from the Russians, it is reasonable to conclude that no immediate or short-term balance of forces threatens Serbia sufficiently to ensure deterrence success.

### **3. Hypothesis 2.2**

The probability of deterrence success increases as the dependence of the protégé on military arms transfers from the defender increases.<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

***a. Bosnian Annexation***

Although military linkages existed, arms transfers between Germany and Austria-Hungary were not critical. In view of the fact that both Austria-Hungary and Germany were independent empires with industrial capabilities, it appears reasonable to assume that the military trade between the two did not directly affect the outcome of this case. Furthermore, it is fair to assume due to primitive technologies that much military hardware was probably incompatible. This would make the trade of raw materials of greater importance. While military trade existed, it was overshadowed by the implications of a potential war. Therefore, Huth's hypothesis 2.2 played a minor role in this case.

***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

In this case Huth's hypotheses 2.2 concerning economic and military transactions between Germany (the defender) and Austria-Hungary (the protégé) was not relevant.

***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

Huth's hypothesis 2.2 had little relevance in explaining the results of this crisis. Evidence suggests that Austria-Hungary had supplied the Albanians with weapons and munitions in the past, but that linkage was not critical in this crisis. Hapsburg patronage in Albania had two strategic effects on the military balance in the region. First, it prevented Serbian access to the sea, impeding Serbia's economic development while enhancing that of Vienna. Second, it secured the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto and prevented the possibility of Vienna being denied access to the Mediterranean.

***d. Current Balkan Crisis***

In this case, the conditions stipulated in Huth's hypothesis 2.2 do not exist. U.S. military arms transfers are not in existence with either protégé. Therefore the contrary

to the hypotheses may be asserted. In the absence of military arms transfers, the probability of deterrence success is degraded.

*e. Findings*

In the three historical cases, military arms transfers did not contribute to deterrence success. In the current Balkan crisis, military arms transfers from the ostensible defender (the United States) to the protégés (Kosovo and Macedonia) do not exist either. However, due to the information revolution, this factor may have more importance than it did in the past because the weakness of the protégés is more obvious. Arms transfers are a means by which a defender's commitment may be signalled, and no such signal is being sent by the United States with this means in this case.

**4. Hypothesis 2.3**

The probability of deterrence success increases with higher levels of foreign trade between defender and protégé.<sup>322</sup>

*a. Bosnian Annexation*

Although economic factors entered into the calculus of the crisis, the economic interactions between Germany and Austria-Hungary were not critical. Germany's interests in the Baghdad railway were of economic concern, but the potential impact of a war with Russia was greater. If Vienna had not annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an attempt to prevent further deterioration of its southern region, with the potential of Yugoslav unification, Austria-Hungary could have lost its access to the Adriatic. This would have had serious economic ramifications and could have compromised the Hapsburg Empire's position as a Great Power. While commercial trade was of utmost importance, the trade between the

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<sup>322</sup> Ibid, p. 46.

defender and protégé was not of great significance. Therefore, Huth's hypothesis 2.3 was a factor that played a minor role in this case.

***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

In this case, Huth's hypothesis 2.3 was not relevant. However, economic considerations on the part of Russia and Austria-Hungary were important in the escalation of the crisis, and played a major role in the decision to reduce the troop strength and tensions in Galicia. The potential of a Greater Serbia eventually prying Slovenia, Croatia-Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina away from the Empire would mean economic disaster for Vienna. Therefore, Vienna found it vital to the Empire's existence to ensure that Serbia remained small and without access to the Adriatic. In order to achieve this goal, Vienna manipulated the crisis to ensure an independent and economically viable Albania.

***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

Huth's hypothesis 2.3 was of little relevance in explaining the results of this crisis. Albania had not yet developed its economic base significantly. Therefore, trade between Albania and Austria-Hungary was probably of secondary importance.

***d. Current Balkan Crisis***

In this case, the conditions stipulated in Huth's hypothesis 2.3 do not exist. commercial trade between the United States and Macedonia is not substantial. Furthermore, since Kosovo is a province of Serbia, it has also been subject to the U.N. economic sanctions. Therefore, one contrary to the hypotheses may be asserted. In the absence of economic trade, the probability of deterrence success is degraded.

### *e. Findings*

In the three historical cases, the commercial trade between the defender and the protégé had little relevance. Rather it was because of strategic, economic, and military interests that the coercion was undertaken, and this brought about successful deterrence. In the current crisis, commercial trade between the protégés (here defined as Kosovo and Macedonia) and the ostensible defender (the United States) does not exist. Economic factors are involved in the cost-benefit calculations of the defender. Expensive force commitments with poor results could encourage a withdrawal. However, the prospects of a wider war have serious implications for the stability of Europe, and could affect the economic interests of many parties.

## **5. Hypothesis 3.1**

The probability of deterrence success decreases if the potential attacker is contiguous with the protégé.<sup>323</sup>

### *a. Bosnian Annexation*

In 1908-1909, Russia shared a portion of its south western border in Galacia with Austria-Hungary. It also shared its western border in Poland with Germany's East Prussia. Germany (the defender) shared contiguous borders with both Russia and Austria-Hungary. In this case, the German and Austro-Hungarian centers of gravity were closer to the proposed locations of probable conflict than that of Russia. Therefore, Huth's hypothesis 3.1 did not affect this case. The results from this case may suggest a corollary to this hypothesis: If both the defender and the protégé share contiguous borders, and likewise share contiguous borders with the potential attacker, then the potential for deterrence success increases.

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid, p. 47.

#### ***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

Huth's hypothesis 3.1 was of little relevance in results in the 1912-1913 Balkan crisis. With the "Trial Mobilization" of the Warsaw Military District, the Russian center of gravity was shifted westward. As stated above, this had little relevance to Austro-Hungarian policy. But, as the crisis escalated, the retention of the third year levy of reserves maintained the center of gravity forward toward Austria's portion of Galicia. In the south, the scenario was quite different. While Vienna was concerned over the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Belgrade's "center of gravity" was aimed at Turkey, owing to the war with the Porte. In this case, the disposition of the immediate balance of forces effected the conditional advantage of contiguous borders.

#### ***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

Huth's hypothesis 3.1 seems not to be relevant in this case. Serbia attempted to affect the decisions of the boundary commission by occupying Albanian territory. Belgrade hoped to present the Great Powers with a *fait accompli* which would result in an international crisis if Vienna attempted to restore the *status quo*. But, in this case successful deterrence was achieved due to the contiguity between Serbia (the potential attacker), and Austria-Hungary (the defender). A corollary might apply in this case. If both the defender and the protégé share contiguous borders with the potential attacker, but are separated by the potential attacker, then the potential for deterrence success increases.

#### ***d. Current Balkan Crisis***

Huth's hypothesis 3.1 applies to Macedonian case, but not to Kosovo. Kosovo lies within the international borders of the FRY. While the U.S. forward presence and air power (coupled with a peacekeeping force) do effect the balance of force, the contiguity of the borders may degrade the probability of successful deterrence in both locations. The FRY enjoys the advantage of the immediate balance of forces in Kosovo, as well as on the Macedonian border. This condition is reason for concern.

### *e. Findings*

In the historical case studies the contiguity of borders did not affect overall deterrence success. However, it must be emphasized that in each case the defender also shared contiguous borders with the potential attacker. In the current conflict, while forward presence and air power on the part of the ostensible defender (the United States) erode part of the advantages that a potential attacker (Serbia) enjoys owing to a contiguous border, forward presence and air power cannot be substituted for an actual presence of substantial forces in the vicinity of the protégés (Kosovo and Macedonia).

## **6. Hypothesis 4.1**

The adoption of a policy of tit for tat in military escalation by the defender will increase the probability of deterrence success as compared with alternative policies of military escalation.<sup>324</sup>

### *a. Bosnian Annexation*

In reference to Huth's hypothesis 4.1, it is clear that in this annexation crisis, Germany (the defender) did not escalate its defensive posture. It maintained a peacetime army of 624,000 troops. St. Petersburg did not initiate any provocative military measures which could have been misconstrued by the defender and the protégé as a preparation for war (mobilization) or as a test of the resolve of its adversaries (military maneuvers). Clearly, it was Germany's ultimatum that forced Russia to the realization that the benefits of assisting the Serbs would be outweighed by the costs of a war.

Austria-Hungary's offensive escalation in the Balkans affected Russia's actions and behavior. Vienna did not follow a tit for tat military escalation policy; it operated from a policy of strength, answering both Belgrade and Cetinje with equal or greater military

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<sup>324</sup> Ibid, p. 51.

preparedness. Therefore, although Austria-Hungary was the protégé in this case, its actions in the Balkans did not follow Huth's hypothesis 4.1. It is noted, therefore, that for coercive diplomacy to work against both Serbia and Montenegro in 1908-1909, a considerable amount of pressure had to be exerted by not only Austria-Hungary, but by the Great Powers as well.

#### ***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

Huth's hypothesis 4.1, has partial significance in this case. Germany had increased its peace time military strength to 651,000 men in the summer of 1912. On the ground, this was Germany's only escalation, and it occurred prior to the crisis. At sea, however, the German decision to deploy the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* to the Mediterranean might have been meant to guarantee that the other Great Powers would not interfere, at least with naval actions, against Hapsburg naval operations against Montenegro. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that Germany (the defender) adopted a non-escalatory policy on the ground, while it pursued a partial tit-for-tat policy at sea.

While in this case Russia gained the initiative with its "Trial Mobilization," Austria-Hungary initially responded in November 1912 with less than equal force. However, by December 1912 measures were completed which significantly increased Vienna's military capabilities. Using the alliance with Germany as a force multiplier, Vienna adopted a tit-for-tat policy of military escalation in Galicia. However, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the measures taken to defend against a potential Serbian attack were greater than equal. In this area, Vienna used a policy of strength.<sup>325</sup>

#### ***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

In this case Huth's hypothesis 4.1 seems to be irrelevant. While Austria-Hungary was concerned over Serbian ambitions in Albania, Vienna operated from a position of strength. Vienna did not escalate its military preparedness. While much of the Hapsburg

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<sup>325</sup> See Chapter II of this thesis.

army was demobilized, the strength of the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained at war levels.<sup>326</sup> In this case it is possible but not probable that Serbia maintained its previous level of military preparedness. This judgement is supported by the report that in September 1913, in reaction to Albanian activity, Belgrade "mobilize[d] anew certain divisions of the army."<sup>327</sup> Therefore, it was Vienna's policy of strength rather than one of tit-for-tat that brought the crisis to closure.

#### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

Huth's hypothesis 4.1 has important implications for this case. While the international community conducted a preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces to Macedonia, these efforts are not derived from a policy of strength. While Serbia has not yet positioned forces which threatens Macedonia, the credibility provided by U.S. military participation in the deployment of peacekeepers can be viewed as derived from the adoption of a tit-for-tat policy. However, owing to the inherent nature of the mission, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.N. (and U.S.) deployment of forces to Macedonia stems from what Huth defines as a policy of caution--that is, less than equal levels of military capability. Additionally, reference to Kosovo, it is difficult to judge whether the U.S. threats to Belgrade are credible and moreover, to what extent air power can hurt Serbia. Therefore, in the case of both protégés, it can be concluded that the U.S. and the other members of the international community outside the former Yugoslavia have adopted a policy of military escalation which is a mixture of a tit-for-tat and a caution approaches. In this case, according to Huth's hypothesis 4.1, due to the mixture of policies, the likelihood of deterrence success is degraded.

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<sup>326</sup> Helmreich, p. 369.

<sup>327</sup> Helmreich, p. 422.

### *e. Findings*

In the historical cases, the defender did not escalate its level of military preparedness. However, forces were present. In the first two cases, the protégé (Austria-Hungary) did escalate its military preparedness. In the current case, the U.N. and the U.S. have escalated their military preparedness and presence. However, this is in a peacekeeping role that is non-threatening. While the historical cases suggest that a defender's role may be successful when using a policy of strength, the current defenders are pursuing what Huth calls a combination of policies of tit-for-tat and caution. This seems to degrade prospects for deterrence success.

## **7. Hypothesis 4.2**

The adoption of a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy by the defender will increase the probability of deterrence success as compared with alternative strategies.<sup>328</sup>

### *a. Bosnian Annexation*

Huth's hypothesis 4.2 is partially relevant to this case. Germany's ultimatum could be viewed as an attempt to "bully" Russia, or as an extension of a firm but flexible strategy. While Germany's position towards Russia allowed no room for compromise, the final appraisal of the German strategy must be found somewhere in the middle.<sup>329</sup>

### *b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913*

Huth's hypothesis 4.2 seems to have relevance to this case. While Germany provided support to Austria-Hungary, Berlin's efforts were of minimal importance in diplomatic strategy. Vienna's efforts (as its own defender) bear more significance. It is fair to state that Austria-Hungary adopted a mixture of "bullying" and "firm-but-flexible"

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<sup>328</sup> Huth, p. 53.

<sup>329</sup> See n. 39, Chapter II of this thesis.

diplomatic strategies. First, Vienna would not accept anything less than a guarantee that Serbia would evacuate its forces from the Adriatic. Berchtold demonstrated that he was willing to escalate the crisis and military tensions in Galicia until Russia backed down. Once Russia agreed to this condition, forces on both sides were demobilized. Moreover, in the discussions over the Montenegrin siege of Scutari, Vienna would not be satisfied with anything short of an Albanian solution. However, Berchtold was willing to compromise over several Albanian cities and towns in the Sandjak. Therefore, the mixture of the two strategies deterred Russian intervention, effectively countered Serbian expansion, and coerced Montenegro to defer to the Great Powers.

#### *c. Balkan Crisis 1913*

Austria's diplomatic strategy was partially consistent with Huth's hypothesis 4.2. In using a firm-but-flexible strategy, Berchtold even offered Belgrade the opportunity to choose its own date of departure. However, when Belgrade did not reciprocate with a reasonable answer, Vienna abandoned the firm-but-flexible strategy and adopted a bullying strategy. This was reflected in the ultimatum to Belgrade and in the implicit message that the ultimatum was a *fait accompli* presented to the Great Powers. In this case, the bullying strategy was successful.

#### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

Huth's hypothesis 4.2 appears to have little relevance to this case. In peace negotiations and other conferences sponsored by the EC (or the EU), diplomatic coercion or "bullying" succeeded in modifying Serbia's behavior and provided the circumstances in which Serbia was coerced diplomatically and deterred from continuing to attack Slovenia and later Croatia. In reference to Kosovo and Macedonia, the threat of U.S. retaliation against Belgrade might be viewed as "bullying." However, the international community has mixed its initial bullying diplomatic strategy with a firm-but flexible diplomatic strategy.

This is evident in the partial lifting of the economic sanctions against Serbia. Thus far bullying has succeeded against Serbia.

#### *e. Findings*

In the first and third historical cases the defender adopted a combination of firm-but-flexible and bullying strategies. In the second case the defender's role was overshadowed by that of the protégé (Austria-Hungary). Austria-Hungary adopted a mixture of firm-but-flexible and bullying strategies. Evidence suggests that in these historical cases, when either or both the defender and the protégé adopted a mixture of firm-but-flexible and bullying strategies, the optimum circumstances were created for deterrence success. In the current Balkan crisis, while the diplomatic strategy of both the U.N. and the United States contains elements of this mixture, elements of a conciliatory strategy are also present. Therefore the message sent to the potential attacker (Serbia) is not consistent. Due to this situation, Serbia may perceive a lack of resolve and commitment on behalf of the U.N. and the United States. If so, this would cause the prospects for deterrence success to be degraded.

### **8. Hypothesis 5.1**

The past behavior of the defender in confrontations in which the current attacker was directly involved will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than in cases in which the current attacker was not directly involved.<sup>330</sup>

#### *a. Bosnian Annexation*

Huth's hypotheses 5.1 had little relevance in this case. In the previous several years, Berlin had enjoyed a friendly relationship with St. Petersburg. Additionally, when asked about Germany's interests in the Eastern Question, which was a reference to whether

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<sup>330</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

Berlin would take up arms for the sake of the Balkans, Bismarck replied: "I see in it for Germany no interest. . . worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian Musketeer."<sup>331</sup>

#### ***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

Huth's hypotheses 5.1 seems to be relevant to this case. Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary eventually proved to be a necessary condition for Russia to be deterred from attacking the Hapsburg Empire. In order to support a more interventionist policy, in spite of its self-perceived military unpreparedness, Russia believed that it would have to operate from an advantage. With the memory of the 1909 ultimatum still fresh in the minds of the Russian leadership, St. Petersburg was unwilling to escalate the crisis by conducting the proposed mobilizations.

It is unclear whether Germany's ultimatum was used to "bully" Russia, or was an extension of a firm but flexible diplomatic strategy. In either case, it is reasonable to conclude that Germany's previous actions had lasting effect. St. Petersburg never doubted that if the crisis escalated to war, Berlin would side with Vienna.

Likewise in relation to Austria-Hungary, Russia knew that Vienna had escalated the 1908-1909 crisis to the brink of war, and realized that Vienna might do it again. Therefore, with the combination of German and Austro-Hungarian military and diplomatic force, St. Petersburg was deterred from attacking the Hapsburg Empire. When Russia was reduced to diplomatic measures alone, Serbia was likewise deterred from attacking Austria-Hungary and was coerced into accepting the agreements made by the Great Powers.

#### ***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

Huth's hypothesis 5.1 is possibly the most relevant to this case. In the Balkan Crisis of 1913, the past behavior of the defender (Austria-Hungary) in confrontations with the potential attacker (Serbia) had great impact on the potential attacker. In the past cases,

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<sup>331</sup> Bismarck cited in Palmer, p. 187.

Austria-Hungary acted as the protégé. Vienna's military preparedness and willingness to escalate each crisis to the brink of conflict weighed heavily on the leadership in Belgrade as well as on that of the Great Powers. In this case, it was evident that without Russian support, Serbia was immobilized. Additionally, each of the Great Powers urged Belgrade to moderate its behavior. Since Belgrade, as well as the Great Powers, realized that Vienna would not back down, Serbia had no choice but to yield, or to go to war without support.

#### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

Huth's hypothesis 5.1 seems to be relevant. In this case to date, no confrontations have occurred between the United States and Serbia. The only confrontations in which the United States participated in the Balkan theater were approved by the U.N. and involved the participation of other NATO allies in operating against Bosnian Serb targets. However since the Bosnian Serb forces were formerly part of the YPA, and until August 1994 Serbia was supplying these forces with support, the correlation is probably close enough to permit one to regard the Bosnian Serbs as an extension of the Belgrade Serbs.

In addition, the past behavior of the United States (the defender) in other confrontations not involving Serbia (the potential attacker) will probably be evaluated by the potential attacker. While U.S. military power is respected, the complex process of approving the U.S. actions may provide an element of doubt in the assessment by a potential attacker. Serbia may have doubts over whether U.S. commitment to Kosovo and Macedonia is sufficient enough to threaten Serbia with additional military involvement.

#### *e. Findings*

This hypothesis appears to be relevant, but only after a series of confrontations between the potential attacker and the defender. In the initial confrontation, the potential attacker will judge the defender's record in other confrontations. This is consistent with the first historical case as well as the current Balkan crisis. However, if one

extends the linkage between the Bosnian Serbs and the Belgrade Serbs, then the Belgrade Serbs may view U.S. actions in Bosnia with greater concern. However, this phenomenon is internal to the potential attacker and cannot be judged accurately by outside observers. In the second historical case Russia recognized Germany's military potential and remembered the ultimatum in 1909. St. Petersburg also recalled Vienna's willingness to escalate the crisis. The Serbs realized that without Russia's support, Belgrade's fate would be in the hands of Vienna. Therefore, the past behavior did have an effect on the deterrence outcome in the second historical case. In the third historical case the defender had been the protégé in the past two crises. In this respect, Belgrade was familiar with Vienna's capabilities and willingness to escalate the crisis. In the end, due to the lack of Russian support, Serbia was coerced to withdraw from Albania, and also deterred from resuming its aggression.

## **9. Hypothesis 5.2**

Firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender in past confrontations between defender and potential attacker enhances the deterrent actions of the defender in the next confrontation between the two states. If the defender, however, has adopted a bullying or conciliatory strategy in the past, then the probability of deterrence failure in the next confrontation increases.<sup>332</sup>

### ***a. Bosnian Annexation***

Huth's hypothesis 5.2 has little relevance to this case. In the previous several years, Berlin had enjoyed a friendly relationship with St. Petersburg. In Russia's war with Japan, Germany had assisted Russia as far as possible without violating the laws of neutrality. Furthermore, it had been the Kaiser's intent to join the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy) with the Dual Alliance (France and Russia) and secure peace

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

in Europe.<sup>333</sup> Additionally, in reference to Germany's relations with Serbia and Montenegro, the Balkans had been and continued to be in the Hapsburg sphere of influence.

#### ***b. Balkan Crisis 1912-1913***

Huth's hypothesis 5.1 is relevant to this crisis. Germany's past confrontation with Russia was during the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-1909, it was unclear whether Germany's ultimatum was used to "bully" Russia, or was an extension of a firm but flexible diplomatic strategy. In either case, it is reasonable to conclude that Germany's previous actions had lasting effect. St. Petersburg never doubted that if the crisis escalated to war, Berlin would side with Vienna.

Likewise in relation to Austria-Hungary, Russia knew that Vienna had escalated the 1908-1909 crisis to the brink of war, and realized that Vienna might do it again. As it was previously in 1908-1909, when Russia was reduced to diplomatic measures alone, Serbia was likewise deterred from attacking Austria-Hungary, and was coerced into accepting the agreements made by the Great Powers.

#### ***c. Balkan Crisis 1913***

Huth's hypothesis 5.2, has minimal relevance in this case. However, in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-1913, Austria-Hungary adopted a mixture of strategies by starting with a "firm-but-flexible" strategy and finally resorting to a "bullying" strategy. In that case the diplomatic strategy of "bullying" resulted in deterrence success. Since coercive diplomacy and deterrence succeeded in the Balkan Crisis of 1913, it is difficult not to conclude that the "bullying" strategy of the past had a positive influence.

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<sup>333</sup> Fay, pp. 171-177. Kaiser Wilhelm attempted to use his personal influence with Tsar Nicholas to win France over. In July 1905, a Russo-German treaty was concluded at Bjorko. (Fay, p. 171n.) However, Russia withdrew from the treaty on 7 October 1905 because of difficulties with France. (Fay, p. 177n.)

#### *d. Current Balkan Crisis*

Huth's hypothesis 5.2 has limited relevance to this case. The U.S. has experienced limited diplomatic and military confrontations with Serbia. Aside from the threat of military retaliation in the case of Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia, U.S. efforts against Bosnian Serbs have been multilateral. However, U.S. rhetoric in reference to war crimes might be viewed as bullying. While UNSC Resolution 808 (adopted on 22 February 1993) was fully warranted, in the absence of a total victory, the implications of a Nuremburg-type trial strengthen the resolve of political and military leaders to stay in power as well as galvanizing them to continue to fight. Therefore, the bullying element in some U.S. political rhetoric may degrade prospects for deterrence success.

#### *e. Findings*

As in the findings for hypothesis 5.1, Huth's hypothesis 5.2 is best evaluated after a series of confrontations (as noted in the discussion of the findings of hypothesis 5.1 above). In the second historical case study, the defender's ultimatum, whether from a bullying or firm-but-flexible strategy, had a lasting effect on Russia. When Serbia realized that military assistance was not forthcoming, Belgrade was coerced to withdraw from Durazzo and deterred from attacking Austria-Hungary. In the third historical case study, Austria assumed the position of the defender. As a protégé, Vienna had escalated the crisis in 1912-1913, and used a mixed diplomatic strategy. Belgrade was coerced into recognizing and honoring the agreements of the great powers and was deterred from resuming its aggression. The findings in the second and third historical cases may suggest that the mixture of bullying and firm-but-flexible strategies by the defender effectively influenced the cost-benefit calculations of the potential attacker, and created the environment conducive to deterrence success.

## 10. Assessment

This analysis of the historical case studies and the current Balkan crisis suggests that crisis management, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence are closely linked to the existing balance of forces. It is reasonable to conclude that if an imposing military force with a truly defensive rather than peacekeeping mission were deployed to a location perceived by Belgrade as critical, deterrence might succeed. However, if U.N. peacekeepers are withdrawn from Bosnia and the Macedonian task force is not strengthened, Belgrade may view the U.S. warnings regarding the security of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the ethnically Albanian population of Kosovo as a bluff.

In relation to Huth's hypotheses and conclusions, it is clear that while the historical case studies can be seen as examples of successful deterrence, an additional dimension--coercive diplomacy--was required to provide the environment for success. In the case studies analyzed, several of Huth's hypotheses appear relevant, while others seem less significant. Possibly the most relevant are hypotheses 1.1 and 2.1. However, the relevance that 2.1 provides is in relation to the immediate and short-term balance of forces. Once the favorable balance of forces is established, the next most relevant hypotheses are 4.1 and 4.2.

## D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Without a truly defensive mechanism in place to deter a spill-over of the current conflict to Kosovo and Macedonia, the external powers may inadvertently encourage this possibility. If the war expands in scope, the vital interests of numerous states may be at risk and the potential for an even larger war could increase.

One assumption may be made in the general context of Balkan culture. Most states and ethnic groups in the region base their cost-benefit calculations on a basis of honor. Success is honorable and failure is not. The mentality of the actors in the region favors an all-or-nothing, zero-sum calculus which provides little room for diplomatic negotiations.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> This attitude is typified by actions and statements such as those of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. When he was asked about giving land back to the Muslims, he replied "I would never order my units to retreat. I wouldn't do it if I had a million lives and had to lose them all. Only an army that is defeated retreats." General Ratko Mladic cited in David Binder, "Ratko Mladic, Pariah as Patriot," *New York Times*

The state or group that perceives its position to be superior may attempt to maximize its potential gains through the use of force. In this culturally diverse and ethnically polarized region, unless violence is deterred by an external actor, it may escalate until one or more sides burn up, or burn out.<sup>335</sup> However, the conflicts that may emerge during this process could involve other states.

The following theory about the requirements of deterrence might provide guidance for successful conflict containment in the Balkans. A successful U.S. deterrence strategy would integrate four levels of statecraft: diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological.<sup>336</sup> In reference to deterring potential aggression by Serbia, or even a larger war, only elements of the first three required levels are present, and the fourth is entirely lacking as far as sending a constructive deterrent message is concerned. Indeed, a counter-productive psychological message has already been sent to the Balkans. That is, the United States is reluctant to place substantial numbers of its military forces in danger in the Balkan region.

Diplomatically, the potential for additional Serbian aggression should be addressed by all the states of the international community. Crises in areas immediately adjacent to this

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*Magazine*, 4 September 1994. p. 29.

<sup>335</sup> "Burn up or burn out" is a concept posited by Dr. Gordon McCormick in two courses at the Naval Postgraduate School: NS 3800 Theory and Practice of Social Revolution, and NS 3801 International Terrorism. The concept suggests that a group may engage in particular activities until it is either incapable of continuing due to exhaustion --lack of resources, or due to a lack of interest.

<sup>336</sup> Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Veld, *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1960, p. 4. The four levels of statecraft identified by Holt and van de Veld are essentially equivalent to the traditional three elements of national power: diplomatic, economic and military, with the addition of psychology/information. The 1988 version of the *National Security Strategy of the United States* identifies these four elements as the means available to achieve U.S. objectives, and strategies that relate means to ends. They are the means of national power which are employed to influence the behavior of other nations. In it, the informational element supports diplomatic power. It is through a combination of public and private organizations as well as individual efforts that information enhances diplomacy. Additionally, the informational role in power is quintessential to strategy. It is the environment in which everything operates. It must reach the peoples of denied areas to provide truth. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1988, pp. 7-24.

tinder box should be regarded with great seriousness, due to the probability that a spill-over could find immediate grounds for further conflict in these locations.<sup>337</sup>

Economically, the international community's embargo efforts have been monumental. Yet money, weapons, and material have found their desired destinations.

Militarily, no significant and highly capable ground force has been deployed that could deter potential Serbian aggression.<sup>338</sup>

Psychologically, the Serbian and Montenegrin people have been held hostage to a clearly biased state-run and state-controlled media. Numerous analysts suggest that an external campaign aimed at informing the Serbian public with balanced information might change the situation internally. However, very little has been done to exploit this opportunity, or to operationalize the effort. In general, a failure to pursue a strong policy, coupled with strong signaling, may be perceived by potential Serbian attackers as proof of a lack of will or determination on the part of the international community and the United States in particular. It is possible, in other words, that Serbian leaders could misread not only international, but U.S. intent. As with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, a *fait accompli* in new areas may be perceived as possible, owing to the apparent lack of resolve in the

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<sup>337</sup> Concern is focused on deteriorating Albanian-Greek relations, continued Macedonian-Greek disputes, and a recurring Turkish-Greek dispute over islands and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. All, in one way or another, could spark a larger conflict. By the nature of contiguous borders, this increases the probabilities of the inclusion of both Kosovo and Macedonia, thus broadening the war.

<sup>338</sup> An international coalition of air force fighter craft provides only a limited portion of this type of force. The U.S. Army battalion in Macedonia does not, have, great combat power and therefore cannot be labeled as capable of wielding this type of power.

defender.<sup>339</sup> Thus the lack of an effective strategy may signal tacit approval for the aggressor and result in a larger regional war.

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<sup>339</sup> Benjamin C. Schwarz, "Foes Misread U.S. Fear of Casualties," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 Nov 94. Radovan Kradzic the Bosnian Serb leader stated that; "Americans do not have the stomach for casualties." As Schwarz suggests, "In the face of mounting combat deaths and injuries, the US. public will demand withdrawal from a military intervention before the U.S. can achieve its goals."...[T]he US. public's supposed intolerance to casualties appears to be America's Achilles' heel, hobbling U.S. ability to use its military potential." However, as Schwarz suggests, evidence proves that the contrary is true. Once involved the U.S. is capable of enduring casualties. Unfortunately, in order to prevent a potentially larger war, the timing of involvement is one of the crucial variables.



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