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*The Dardanelles Operations and the Gallipoli Campaign:
A Crisis in Leadership
What do they have to say to today's operational artists?*

by


David J. Delia

GS-15 CIA

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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
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Operational Chain of Command for the Gallipoli Campaign 1914-1916



KEY

Command: —————>

Control: - - - - -

Relief: ()

Thesis: Successful resolutions of today's military operations, among the most complex of all human activities, are seldom achieved or thwarted as a result of one overriding factor. Rather it is the combination of many disparate colors from the operational artist's palette that results in a coherent portrait of victory or defeat.

Discussion: The study of Amphibious Warfare Operations--littoral warfare--is *de rigueur* for any current or potential Commander in Chief (CINC) or Joint Force Commander (JFC) in accord with the U.S. maritime strategy as related in ...From the Sea¹ and Forward ...From the Sea.² According to some historians, in war, we never learn very much from outstanding successes or overwhelming defeats. Rather it is the "very nearlys" that have the most to offer military leadership to optimally perform their wartime duties. Although the Allies in the Second World War very nearly lost at Anzio, they did win, hence the impetus to "learn lessons" seems lessened. In contrast, nowhere in the course of 20th century warfare was there a more nearly won (i.e., lost) campaign, than in 1915 on the Gallipoli peninsula, the site of the largest amphibious assault until that time. (See Map 1.)

A series of at least four and as many as six, linked (if not properly planned, sequenced, or supported) major operations, lasting over a year, all with the same unattainable objective--winning the First World War on the cheap--marked what became the Gallipoli campaign. Although no attempt will be made to definitively recount all of its engagements, battles, and operations, some salient learning points can be teased from these events that may be useful to today's leaders, focusing on a few of the more critical operational judgments that may have parallels in future operations. Rather than present these points in the traditional laundry-list-of-lessons-learned segment as a parting shot (because memory is actually the first thing to go) they will be dealt with along the way. An examination of the two most critical aspects of successful warfighting, leadership and logistics, reveals how the Allies failed to deal with many other facets of operational art.

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As few remaining witnesses can attest, eighty years ago operations to control the Turkish Straits began with a foolish naval bombardment in November 1914 and ended in ignominious withdrawal after 14 months, snuffing out 50,000 Allied lives, inflicting 250,000 Allied casualties, and absorbing the efforts of almost 500,000 Allied soldiers and sailors; over 60,000 no-less-precious Turkish lives were also lost.³ This may pale in comparison with the carnage along the Somme or in the forests of Yprés, yet it was the same species of mass murder. Almost a tenth of the male population of Australia and New Zealand became casualties, including over 7,500 killed each.

To better understand the magnitude of the errors, infer more successful alternatives, and glean useful lessons, we must first encapsulate the history. By the Fall 1914, the War in the West was stalemated along trench lines stretching from Belgium to the Swiss border. Enlightened military thinkers were looking for alternatives to killing Germans in France--the current "Western" strategy. One of those visionaries, Winston S. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) advocated a peripheral, Corbettian⁴ strategy to crush German allies, reap Romanian, Bulgarian, and Greek support, strengthen a faltering Russia, gain Russian grain for a hungry Britain, and end the war quickly. Diplomacy failed, and Turkey (bungled into war against Britain in October) was the key to this "Eastern" strategy. The key to Turkey was Constantinople, seat of the still precarious young Turk rulers installed in 1908.

One got at Constantinople through the Straits, guarded by a few old forts, and some "inferior" troops--a piece of cake for the world's premier navy. If there had been a coherent, sequenced plan rather than a series of blundering actions, the following series of major operations would have comprised the Gallipoli Campaign. In November 1914, the British and French shelled the forts "to test their guns"; in February 1915, the entrance forts were shelled as a demonstration of support for Russia; in March, over 40 old battleships (BBs) and cruisers⁵ tried to force the Dardanelles, intending to pass through the Narrows, enter the Sea of Marmora, then

capture Constantinople at the southern end of the Bosphorus. They never got past the front door. In April, troops landed along the southern (Helles) and western (Gaba Tepe) sides of the peninsula, with a diversion in Asia (Kum Kale) and a feint to the north (Bulair). (See Map 2.) Failure to press the attacks resulted in a bogged down land war that quickly reverted to the same trench-bound stalemate being fought in the West. The only respite from failure was achieved by a few British submarines that ran the gauntlet submerged and very nearly interdicted the movement of Turkish troops and supplies. In August, another amphibious assault above Gaba Tepe (Suvla) was attempted but was also doomed. Evacuation was decided upon in October and the only "successful" military operation of the entire campaign--the withdrawal--was completed in January 1916.

The 1917 Dardanelles Commission blamed everybody and in effect nobody for the disaster.⁶ Since then, scores of books and articles, many first-hand accounts, several self-serving apologias, a host of vitriolic accusations, and a few seemingly dispassionate accounts have revealed a saga that any modern day commander might profitably investigate, both for its applicability to current situations as well as its revealing account of a crisis in personal leadership.⁷

In culling the most far-reaching lessons from this case study we need to understand that there is no cook book solution to the complexities of military operations, still, many such formulae have been offered. We are deluged with MOOSEMUSSs⁸ and other acronyms to jog our minds about the overriding principles of military operations, to rescue us from the tactical weeds and deliver us to the strategic nirvanas envisioned by our political sages. Although much homage is paid to common sense, nowhere is it less commonly applied than in warfare. As we boil the broth down, two overpowering ingredients, leadership and logistics, are identifiable among secondary spices in the stew of Gallipoli.

Leadership: In any form of complex human activity someone must be in charge; one person, one mind must be responsible or no one is responsible. It is ultimately the leader, elected, appointed, assumed, or defaulted to, that makes choices and decides success or failure. No leadership gene has yet been scientifically isolated, and although some folks seem to be more inclined toward command than others, this “natural selection” by no means insures their success.

The Secretary of State for War in 1914, Lord Kitchener (see poster), the one man that COULD have been in charge, was the epitome of the contemporary leader. He very nearly WAS England! However, the obeisance the British populace, government, and chief military officers paid to this imposing figure was out of all proportion to his true abilities as a leader.

A political-military chameleon, he sympathized with the visionary insights of Churchill but lacked the decisiveness to challenge either his own army commander in France (General John French) or the French commander, Josef Joffré. Kitchener vacillated between support for an all naval endeavor (not even endorsed by his First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Fisher)⁹ to a sequential navy-army show after appointing General Sir Ian Hamilton Commander, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). Primarily because he had no concept of unity of command ingrained within him, Kitchener saw little need to formalize such authority within his chosen proconsul Hamilton, relying instead on the traditional cooperation of the British services.

This nominal civilian control of the military (Kitchener continued to order rather than engineer policy) was in reality as non-existent as the leadership offered by Prime Minister, Lord H. H. Asquith, who exercised almost no control over this ostensible soldier in street dress. Even with Sir Edward Grey at State and David Lloyd George at the Exchequer, still no one was in charge. Certainly no one was in charge of the theater of war, or the theater of operations, so it was hardly surprising that no one was thinking about a Turkish campaign. If this could be considered a

theater at all, it was the theater of the absurd playing off-off-West End. Unlike Eisenhower (Normandy) or Woodward (Falklands), no single hand guided events.¹⁰

It would have been hard to imagine a greater foil to Kitchener's Uncle Sam-like air of authority, than Ian Hamilton. His effeminate manner was in stark contrast to Vice Admiral John de Roebeck's salty bearing (see photo), yet neither proved to be the right man for their job. Intellectually, perhaps even militarily gifted, Hamilton was no war leader yet he was painfully aware of his subordinate's limitations. Pleas for better officers to lead his divisions fell on Kitchener's deaf ears.¹¹ A better poet and diarist than warrior, Hamilton was perhaps the man least likely to poke his nose into his generals' business, countermand an exceptionally inane order, or exert capital "L" leadership.¹² Keith Murdoch (the Australian journalist and Rupert's father) who pleaded for Hamilton's removal, wrote of him "It is not for me to judge Hamilton, but it is plain that when an army has completely lost faith in its General, ...only one thing can be done." He accused him of "...murder through incapacity."¹³

Of all the military experts involved in the campaign, only two stand out as having had the slightest understanding of coherent military operations, and *neither* Royal Marine Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey (Secretary of the War Council) *nor* Commodore Roger Keyes (Chief of Staff for Vice Admirals S. H. Carden and de Roebeck) were able to influence their masters.

Given this overwhelming lack of effective leadership, it seems clear that there was probably no alternative to disaster along the Straits. The British military and political system, which fell down so badly on the Western front, could hardly be expected to have miraculously transformed itself in the East, especially when all the best leaders were hoarded by French and Joffré in the West!

What does this tragedy of errors say to today's potential commanders? It is the ultimate responsibility of the commander to command, but this requires the commander to recognize both his opponent's strengths as well as his own personal

deficiencies.¹⁴ This is no small task for today's CINC/JFC super egos, many of whom have been raised to four-star rank as a result of their unshakable self certainty. An effective JFC must be in charge of the operation totally, and to be totally effective, they must be in charge of themselves. This requires even the gifted commander to recognize their limitations in the same manner that Admiral Metcalfe recognized the need for a capable Army leader and secured General Schwartzkopf's assistance for URGENT FURY. Nor is it enough to simply get a good staff together, the JFC has to listen to voices from below and persuade those above. Commodore Keyes was constantly flitting along the battle's edge, advising his superiors about the best naval paths to follow; yet, although uniformly applauded, he was ultimately ignored in favor of less gifted but better connected advisors.

A leader's planning can be among the most vital aspects of their operational art. Planning itself consists of a number of vital sub-components. Keeping one's eyes firmly fixed on the prize or objective is the first and most important part of the plan. To say that Kitchener, Hamilton, Carden, or de Roebeck had no plan would not be exactly accurate; they all had different and frequently conflicting partial plans. Yet the Allied plan was only marginally inferior to the German-dominated Turkish plan (Liman von Sanders commanded the Turkish forces) because the best the German could come up with was a reactive defense that included wasteful charges into Allied machine guns. Here truly, rather than the side with the best plan, the side that made the fewest catastrophic errors prevailed.

Lack of unity of command on the Allied side fostered the lack of unified objective. If Constantinople was the operational objective, and if its capture would have the strategic impact of knocking Turkey out of the war, thereby shattering the German alliance system, then sufficiently powerful Allied forces needed to be massed, sequenced in their attacks, moved forward swiftly (capitalizing on surprise), and coordinated in their ground and naval efforts toward destroying or

neutralizing the enemy Center of Gravity--the Young Turk government. Thus the lack of a well-defined, operationally-derived, and strategically significant end state for the Gallipoli campaign almost guaranteed failure.

The optimal JFC might have applied some additional operational tools, adding the effects of operational fire (using massed submarines to destroy Constantinople' munitions plants and the road and rail systems supplying the city) to influence the naval and ground offensive. A case could also be made for redirecting the deceptive French attack at Kum Kale, the most successful tactical event of the initial amphibious operation, but meaningless because it did not markedly influence operations. An attack in strength, perhaps even the main assault at Bulair could have served this end. Whatever passed for a plan was not so much a sequenced blueprint for military actions, but a cobbled together, reactive hodgepodge of ad hoc actions, "campaign creep" to modify a borrowed modernism. Today's planners need to avoid the pitfalls of reactive planning or court disaster.

No one can chart the exact course of war's winding path, least of all professional planners who most likely have less actual trench time than those charged with the plan's execution. Even the best plans are subject to Clausewitzian friction, Murphy's law, or its British equivalent; however, without a logically thought-out and sequenced road map for guidance toward an eventual destination, replete with alternative passageways (branches) given the most likely blocking points, no JFC can start on the journey let alone hope for successful arrival. It is the mark of the insightful and talented operational artist that when one path is blocked, they invariably find an opportunity to punch through in another direction; this however, is not a matter of luck, it is a well-developed branch or contingency plan.

Such flexibility flows from knowledge, and in war operations, such knowledge is termed intelligence. Would a soldier or sailor go off to work without the simplest tools of their trade? These folks seldom forget their weapons, but the

number of times warfighters have encountered the enemy without proper maps is legendary. Going to Gallipoli with 18th century maps was as absurd as going to the Falklands with 19th century Admiralty charts and depending on tourist brochures in Grenada. How high were the Turkish cliffs? How deep were the inlets? How many troops were *really* inland? How were they armed, led, fed? These questions were not totally ignored, but intelligence had lower priority than packing the band's tubas!

The lack of respect for intelligence as a force multiplier at Gallipoli was often documented, but never so graphically portrayed as when, in the name of secrecy, all maps, charts, and photos of the trenches near the Suvla beaches were collected and destroyed, including aerial photos taken only days before. These tools could have provided key information on the route of advance to link up with the ANZAC forces.¹⁵ Could such overemphasis on the trappings of security exist today?

One of today's JFC's most important tasks is to see to it that the proper intelligence is collected and analyzed beforehand; continually updated with on-the-scene reporting; fused into a digestible resource for the warfighter; and transmitted to and received by the right consumer--linking it inexorably to command and control.¹⁶ Does this mean that every aviator needs a heads-up display of the latest, nationally-collected imagery as they speed toward their targets at 500 knots and 100 meters over the deck? Hardly, but determining how much is too much and just what information IS needed is dependent on the tone set by the CINCs thorough their understanding of the precise needs of the warfighter and familiarity with the capabilities of today's fast-changing intelligence resources. "My Admiral wants it!" is just not good enough an excuse for demanding an entire Joint Intelligence Center be turned on its ear to determine the precise angel count on any particular pinhead in his or her Area of Responsibility. Operations with minimal casualties demand operational understanding born of long-term intelligence prioritization, in line with plan requirements, which must not be sacrificed upon the alter of crisis response.

Demanding that the mines disappear on D-day minus 1 when for the past year only one E-2 was allocated to their search while 50 others hunted for AAA after some visiting O-8's helicopter was fired upon will not get the job done.

Another often-touted but seldom-achieved force multiplier is surprise, and it is truly surprising how little real surprise is possible in war. It is even more surprising how often that which is achievable is thrown away by sheer stupidity. What is perhaps most surprising is how resilient surprise really is mainly due to the dullness and lethargy of the enemy who is often as poorly equipped to handle the complexities of dealing with new information as we are!

At the Dardanelles, it would seem unwise to telegraph one's intentions even to the supposedly dense Turks and their only slightly less dense German advisors, but that's just what those clever Allies did, not once, but twice! On 13 November 1914, for the sake of testing the navy's guns and to get the range of the Turkish guns (did they suspect that this was not already written down somewhere?) the Allies pummeled the forts with a few hundred shells. Common sense might dictate that this action would tip off the foe to some future assault yet they repeated the error! On 19 February 1915, to reassure the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas,¹⁷ (such folly would eventually cost him his crown) the Allies massed their obsolete battlewagons off the southern forts and really let the Turks have it. Several batteries were put out of action, but all hopes of surprise were lost given that the follow-up naval assault was barely a month away!¹⁸ Notwithstanding the various schemes of Churchill and the reluctance of Fisher to go it alone with ships, the Allies had no widely supported plan for a combined naval and ground attack at this point. The November and February attacks simply provided a wake-up call to the enemy that resulted in their planting more mines as well as redeploying their forces all along the peninsula.¹⁹ Remarkably, surprise was still achieved in some areas; however, the Allies paid dearly for such an obvious lack of common sense.

Security was also sorely lacking from the Allied perspective when every marketplace in Egypt buzzed with the most up-to-date plans for invasion. The Allies couldn't keep the operation secret; Hamilton was commonly referred to as MEF commander before his arrival and all but the exact landing sites were being speculated upon openly. For a hush-hush operation, British press accounts abounded that gave details, maps, and force structures the envy of any CNN correspondent.²⁰ Today's JFC must be aware that security cannot be completely controlled especially in American society, but it can be addressed better. There was no need for a junior artillery officer to have knowledge of the "New Trojan Horse" (the collier *River Clyde* used to surreptitiously land infantry at V beach) and write home alluding to the plan!²¹ Information was there for the plucking. Today's adversaries can also be counted upon to read newspapers and keep their ears and eyes open, not to mention more sophisticated intelligence gathering techniques.

Another lesson for today's JFCs, if you're going to network your vision, get consensus or all you will accomplish is annoying folks. Churchill got so hypnotized by his "vision thing" that he completely ignored Fisher's and other expert's reality checks. Churchill's Dardanelles concept (he never convinced anyone enough to turn out a proper plan) may well have been the only original idea in WW-I, and was probably the only viable alternative to four more years of meat grinding in the West. The costs in the East certainly had the potential of being far less, thus worth the risks. Building consensus is essential to gain the commitment which is fundamental to operational success. Lacking this commitment, the loss of three old BBs was enough to get Carden's lukewarm successor de Roebeck to quit the operation by ships alone before it got truly underway.²²

Even without optimal joint cooperation, naval cooperation was possible but this also failed. Understanding and commitment to the essential naval operations might have avoided the most glaring defects of the "plan." The vitally important

minesweepers (actually North Sea fishing trawlers fitted with sweep gear and manned by civilians unused to being shot at) failed after the first push. When alternatives were offered by Keyes using more capable destroyers and unemployed BB crews, eager for revenge, they were ignored, mostly because of lack of commitment. The failure to coordinate Marine and Naval Division employment (to occupy forts and put the shell-shocked Turks to flight vice the handful of Bluejackets used to spike a few guns), is understandable only if one accepts the lack of planning born of scant commitment. Ultimately, the failure to persevere, engendered by a lack of consensual commitment, could be linked to the failure to communicate the commander's intent, never fully formulated and certainly never transmitted to senior subordinates much less soldiers and sailors. This stopped the fleet in March and worse, prevented its effective employment again until the evacuation operations. Never have so many, with so much potential, accomplished so little, for so long, at so great a cost!

Future CINCs and JFCs will get what's available, not necessarily ideal senior subordinates. Recognize the strengths and weaknesses of your staff (for they are truly your own), and have the courage to act decisively! Hamilton should have fired Sir Almyr Hunter-Weston and Sir Frederick Stopford, the blithering commanders at Helles and Suvla.²³ If things start going badly wrong as a result of a poor call by your subordinate, you may have to step in. Is it more reprehensible to lose face as a failed job giver or lives and perhaps the operation as a failed war leader? Similarly, commanders must also insure that their intent is made clear, especially to mid-level and junior officers even if it entails personal briefings. Not just ego-building, cheer-leading sessions (and one cannot overlook the beneficial aspects of such endeavors) but clear course-of-action briefings. If the lieutenants and majors scrambling up the various hills along the Gallipoli peninsula had been commonly forged into one mind set, intent on inexorable inland movement rather than settling down to beach front

occupancy, at least one of the three major opportunities for victory on the ground could have been successful.²⁴ Juniors cannot be faulted for lacking initiative when sensible direction from division and corps levels is commonly wanting.

Still, how do you teach common sense? We do not yet have War College curriculum specifically aimed at its development; however, the current emphasis on jointness (not in the politically correct but in the militarily imperative sense) can help. Jointness will also help us overcome an inexorably shrinking military budget. Rather than doing the same with less, we can do *better*, through the most efficient use of what we've got--economy of force in its truest sense. That economy cannot be achieved until everyone is on board consensually and committed, emotionally as well as intellectually.

Logistics: Whether it boils down to enough ammunition of the right type in the right place at the right time; the supply of water without which no human can operate for very long; the provision of the correct clothing for the climate; the care of the sick and wounded; or the proper sanitary facilities to avoid what may be the biggest killer of armies and their morale--disease--no JFC can neglect logistics. It rests on the simple principle that until the digital battlefield is populated by self-sustaining robots and UAVs that can be teleported at will, humans will have to fight the operations JFCs plan. These imperfect beings are all subject to Maslow's motivational hierarchy on the battlefield. Survival comes first, only then can the JFC guide people toward victory; no one wishes to fail but everyone needs to live!

From the outset at the Dardanelles, it seems as if logistical planning was a burden to be overcome when it got unbearable rather than a tool for success. Hospital facilities, so vital in amphibious operations where casualties are higher than in almost any other form of military operation, were nominally provided, but in an unrealistic fashion. Field hospitals, set up on beaches under constant enemy fire, became untenable so hospital ships were employed in perhaps the most inefficient

manner possible. Instead of insuring adequate supplies before departure, water tins were gathered from market stalls in Alexandria, and ship's condensers were hose-connected to the shore as stop gaps. Rations of bully beef were particularly ill-suited to the Mediterranean climate. Dysentery compounded by the inadequate latrine facilities had soldiers literally dying to relieve themselves.²⁵ These least glamorous of leadership concerns emphasize that no life-related detail can be overlooked.

Of special interest to today's JFCs faced with forcefully implementing American global commitments, were the self-inflicted delays the Allies experienced in getting the right equipment to the peninsula caused by the age old problem of poor packing. Ships packed in Britain were repacked in France, repacked again in Egypt, and often repacked at Lemnos, the forward staging base. Still, the right equipment was often lacking and the wrong stuff delivered; armored cars and trucks were shipped to an area of razorback hills, devoid of roads, choked by scrub pine.

Get the right equipment for the job. All right, so the original "plan" did not include trench warfare, so why bring periscopes, trench mortars, howitzers, and hand grenades? But when things turned sour, the troops on the beaches and sailors aboard the battleships had to manufacture jam pot bombs and periscope rifles because their commanders could not secure an adequate supply of trench war weapons. Nature too can be a fierce adversary to logistics planners as the Allies learned. The lack of winter clothing and trench cover material accounted for hundreds of Allied dead when a blizzard struck the peninsula in late November.²⁶ Today's JFCs will need alternatives (or branch plans) for logistics as well as for battlefield operations when things go wrong, as well as sequels for when they go right. Alternative logistics options would certainly have helped the Germans (or Napoléon) on the road to Moscow, but then no one ever plans to get bogged down.

More and better attention is being paid in the form of pre-loaded equipment aboard prepositioned ships, but will the spirit of jointness be inculcated down to the level of ensuring tomorrow's ships bring the right stuff for everyone?

A word about mines (and submarines): Just as they were a decisive factor in turning back the fleet in March 1915 (See Map 3), mines remain the number one threat to amphibious operations today. They are the core of the poor man's coastal defense system; they are cheap, effective, and readily available. They can render the most expensive amphibious ship useless or worse, a coffin for thousands of Marines. Will we wait until we actually lose an LHA or LHD before we adequately support mine-clearing? It is up to potential CINCs and JFCs to make these needs known at the service chief level before tragedy strikes.

Just as at the Turkish Straits, where only one German U-boat sinking a few old ships caused the combined fleet to abandon the troops and seek shelter off Lemnos, today's JFCs will have to address coastal submarines. To get over there "from the sea" most forces must travel *on the sea* and the proliferation of diesel-powered submarines will make this journey much more hazardous.²⁷ If you want to get there from here you cannot ignore either MIW or ASW!

A word about the press: Hamilton's removal was a function of his own ineptitude. Although protected from recall after his initial mistakes (like many "old boys" before and since), even Kitchener was powerless to counter Murdoch's dispatch that wound up on London's front pages, forcing Asquith's action. In a representative society responsive to public opinion, today's JFC's mistakes will be made known. Our society rightly demands forthrightness and honesty within the bounds of battlefield security--live with it, it comes with the territory, and it's what your fighting for!

Conclusions:

Tomorrow's CINCs and JFCs must be many things but above all, exceptional operational artists. Without becoming mired in detail they must be aware of concepts down to some ill-defined level of specificity; the art is knowing how much is enough and how little will be disastrous. They must build the bridge between the seats of political power and the grunt in the trenches. They must be directors not producers; scenic designers not set decorators. They must be maestros with an internal sense of what the composer (planner) intended, able to control virtuoso pianists or replace ham-fisted keyboard bashers.

The number of CINCs and JFCs entrusted with the lives of our sons and daughters over the next decade would most likely fit aboard a New York City subway car with ample room left over for the requisite transit cops, muggers, and panhandlers. So why gear the nation's War Colleges toward producing more effective such commanders when less than one percent of their collective graduates will achieve that lofty status? The simple answer is leadership enhancement for the thousands of staff officers charged with carrying out JFC directives.

History is full of the human and financial costs incurred by inattention to this critical detail. It has been frequently stated that you can't teach leadership; that it is a trait one is either blessed with or cursed to endure life without. Leadership can, however, be substantially enhanced through effective examination of historical applications.

The lessons of Gallipoli are not gleaned so much from an examination of what *was*, but in clearly seeing what, through more appropriate application of operational art, *could have been*, in order that tomorrow's battlefield Rembrants will be better equipped to illuminate the path our forces must take through periods of darkness yet to come.

¹Sean O'Keefe, Frank B. Kelso, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr., ...From the Sea, (Washington DC: United States Navy, 1992).

²John H. Dalton, J. M. Boorda, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Forward...From the Sea, (Washington, DC: United States Navy, 1994).

³John Laffin, Damn the Dardanelles! The Story of Gallipoli, (London: Osprey, 1980.) p. 181.

⁴Sir Julian Corbett was the official naval historian of the war, and his influence on British and American naval strategy is legendary.

⁵United States Naval Institute, "European War Notes." Proceedings, September-October, 1915, Volume 41 Number 5, pp. 1735-1736.

⁶United States Naval Institute, "Professional Notes." Proceedings, February, 1920, Volume 46 Number 2, p. 274.

⁷Norman Wilkinson, The Dardanelles, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1915.)

General Sir Ian S. Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary. In two volumes. (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920.)

Admiral Lord Rosslyn E. Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924.)

Jeffrey D. Wallin, By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981.)

Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956, New Edition, 1967.)

⁸Relating to the nine principles of warfare: Mass, Objective, Offensive, Security, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Simplicity, and Surprise.

⁹He managed to transform the Royal Navy into a straight-shooting, capable sea force but lacked the will to speak out when in disagreement with his political superiors.

¹⁰Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (New York: Doubleday, 1948.)

Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days; The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1992.)

¹¹Laffin, p. 128.

¹²On 26 April 1915, the night when Hamilton should have been adjusting his battle plans (the landings started on 25 April), he found time to make a 5,000 word entry into his diary!

¹³William Shawcross, Murdoch, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 37.

¹⁴Sun Tzu's plea to know your enemy and yourself lest defeat be invited.

¹⁵The Australia New Zealand Army Corps gave its name to the beach these two divisions (under British generalship) landed upon in April. That they failed to break out was far less their fault than that of their leadership. These gallant soldiers accounted for over 10,000 Turkish casualties over a few days as they repulsed Mustafa Kemal's fierce, almost suicidal counterattacks. In homage, 25 April is known as ANZAC day (equivalent to Memorial [US] or Remembrance [UK] day) down under and the two new Kiwi frigates will be known as the ANZAC-class.

¹⁶Several commanders frequently claimed not to have received key information or orders. It would be impossible to determine how many absurd orders were countermanded at lower levels using the excuse of admittedly poor command and control systems.

¹⁷Wallin, pp. 51-52.

¹⁸This was an inspired use for near scrap metal and one of the few really bright decisions of the campaign; however, sailors just hate to lose ships of any vintage and the fleet that was intended to be sacrificed was instead guarded as jealously as any modern day Carrier Battle Group.

¹⁹The infamous Turkish steamer *Nousret* planted twenty mines on the night of 7/8 March, a key turning point in the campaign when they sank three BBs ten days later.

²⁰United States Naval Institute. "European War Notes." Proceedings, July-August, 1915, Volume 41 Number 4, pp. 1376-1383.

²¹Captain Garth N. Walford as quoted in Peter H. Liddle, Gallipoli 1915 Pens, Pencils, and Cameras at War, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985). p. 39.

²²Jeffrey D. Wallin, By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981.)

²³Laffin, chapters 6 and 10.

²⁴Besides the failed naval push, the failure to take Krithia after the Helles landings, the failure to push to the Narrows from the ANZAC beach, and the failure to push south from Suvla to link up with ANZACs were the key milestones of disaster.

²⁵Certain aspects of military operations will probably never change. The introduction of over 2,000 troops a day to Haiti's already overburdened (non-existent) sanitary system, was a vital logistical concern during RESTORE DEMOCRACY.

²⁶Laffin, pp. 164-165.

²⁷As reported in the open press, ONI estimates that, by the year 2000, over 40 nations will be operating small but potentially lethal, diesel-powered coastal submarines. The richer nations will have already acquired more advanced, air-independent propulsion units that can stay submerged for a week or more.

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MAP 1



The Gallipoli Peninsula, The Dardanelles, The Balkans and The Eastern Mediterranean 1915.

THE ALLIED PLAN FOR ASSAULTING THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA APRIL 1915



LANDING OPERATIONS

Covering forces to be disembarked from warships (a mile from the beaches they would transfer to cutters and ultimately be rowed ashore); warships to bombard the defences; main forces to be disembarked from transports and rowed ashore in cutters.

The ideal plan should have been firm in outline, flexible at local level, and (most important) understood by all those partaking in the operations

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION

HQ. Liman von Sanders.




KEY

- Definite attacks.
- Feint attacks.
- Landing beaches.
- Main forts.

ALLIED STRENGTHS


Troops: 75,000
Ships: 200

PROGRESS TO THE BEACHES




KEY

- Royal Naval Division (Paris).
- Australian and New Zealand Corps (Birdwood).
- British 29 Division (Hunter-Weston).
- French Army Corps (d'Amade).
- 'Y' Beach force (Hunter-Weston).
- Assembly areas.



The positions of mines and forts are based on the Official Naval History.



YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS

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COMMODORE KEYES, VICE-ADMIRAL DE ROBECK, GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON AND MAJOR-GENERAL BRAITHWAITE ON BOARD THE 'TRIAD'

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