

**CANADA, GETTING IT RIGHT THIS TIME:
THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER**

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FOREWORD

In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in "times of penury." During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a "strategy of commitment." Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a "strategy of choice" derived from Canadian national interests.

The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security.

Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them. To that end, the Strategic Studies Institute presents Dr. Sokolsky's views for your consideration.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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Introduction.

A cynic might claim that Canada should have no difficulties adjusting to “strategy during the lean years.” In the first place, the Ottawa government has never had to worry about formulating its own national security strategy. Since confederation in 1867, in war and peace it simply adopted the strategy of its allies. And in the second, with the exception of the world wars and the early years of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces (CF)¹ have known little else but lean times. Indeed, it has been charged that Canada began collecting its “peace dividend” the first time the Cold War ended, during the detente of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For the last 20 years it has spent only 2 per cent of Gross National Product (GDP) on defense. The so-called “commitment-capability gap” has plagued the CF into the 1980s, while heightened peacekeeping duties have continued to place a strain on resources in the first 5 years of the post-Cold War era.

The latest White Paper on defense, released in December 1994, seeks to chart a course that will allow Canada to better cope with the transformed international security environment that it faces abroad and the stark fiscal realities that it faces at home.² These realities were brought home by the Federal budget reductions in February 1995. Here, too, the past practice may foster a measure of scepticism. The three previous White Papers, and the budgets to fund them, proved to be poor predictors of both global and domestic trends. Their policy prescriptions seemed to be more appropriate to the situations which preceded their release rather than those which followed. As a result, they had extremely short lives as guides to subsequent defense policy and force posture decisions.

It is argued here that this time, the White Paper seems to have gotten it right. It contains a reasoned and realistic assessment of global trends and, more importantly, of what domestic politics will allow. While not articulating a ‘strategy’ in the classic understanding of the term, the White Paper does provide an approach to the role of defense policy in support of overall Canadian foreign objectives which more closely matches commitments with capabilities. This is not, however, because the CF are to be given the capabilities they have so long been denied, but rather because the current policy adopts a leaner view of what Canada’s commitments should be.

Getting It Wrong: White Papers 1964-1987.

The fundamentals of post-1945 Canadian defense policy were set during the early years of the Cold War and remained remarkably constant until the late 1980s. Canada accepted the need for containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union, especially in Europe, and sought its security in alliance with the United States and other NATO powers. To this extent, the late R.B. Byers noted that Canadian defense policy did not contain a great deal of “independent strategic thought and analysis.”⁴

This meant that force development decisions were largely driven by allied strategies and political requirements. Thus, ground and air forces were dispatched to Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War, while naval forces were postured primarily to support NATO's Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) requirements in the Atlantic. For North American defense, the air force maintained interceptors and radar lines to meet the Soviet bomber threat under the NORAD combined command with the United States. As Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) forces grew, NORAD's role became that of missile warning and attack assessment, combined with a declining air defense and air sovereignty role. At sea, the Canadian Navy collaborated with the United States Navy (USN) in monitoring the ocean approaches to the continent. In the early 1960s, Canada even equipped its European and North American forces with tactical nuclear weapons (under a standard "two-key" arrangement with the U.S.).

The domestic tasks of the CF, the protection of sovereignty against nonmilitary threats and assistance to the civil authorities, were performed by the forces acquired to meet the more demanding NATO and NORAD missions. After the Suez Crisis of 1956, Canada became a major contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. But, the forces dispatched for peacekeeping duties were also drawn from those raised and maintained to fulfil allied roles.

Although at the operational level the CF trained for nuclear and conventional warfare along side the forces of allies, at the highest governmental levels the general view was that the forces bought Ottawa a "seat at the table." They allowed Canada to participate in discussions that touched on global security issues. This involvement complemented Canada's status as a major Western industrial nation. The approach was summed up by James Eayrs in 1965:

. . . the main and overriding motive for the maintenance of Canadian military establishment since the second world war has had little to do with our national security as such . . . it has had everything to do with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating position vis-a-vis various international organizations and other countries.⁵

In general, this approach to defense policy enjoyed broad public support throughout the Cold War. Defense was not a priority public policy item for most Canadians, therefore, there was relatively little public or media attention devoted to it. Canadians wanted their country to remain in NATO and NORAD, and there was a particularly high acceptance of peacekeeping which many saw as something distinctively Canadian. However, the public did not want large amounts of funds spent on defense, even for national sovereignty purposes.

As a percentage of GDP and the federal budget, defense spending peaked in the early 1950s. By the early 1960s, the high cost of weapons, combined with new demands on the federal government to allocate more to social programs, compelled a reevaluation of

defense policy and how it was conducted. The *White Paper on Defence* of March 1964⁶ was “not so much interested in international aspects of Canadian defence policies” as in “reorganizing the Canadian Forces.”⁷ In the next few years, the headquarters of the separate services were integrated under a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and eventually a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) emerged, combining the military and civilian leadership of the CF and DND. In 1968, the three services were themselves unified into a single entity—the Canadian Forces—divided along environmental or functional lines. The government argued that the savings derived from this reorganization could be channelled into new equipment.

While fiscal considerations were the major concern, the “flexible response” ideas then being put forth by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were used to justify unification. DND contended this new organization would make the CF highly mobile and flexible, able to combine air, sea, and ground units. Such forces, the Minister argued, would be available to meet the needs of peacekeeping and “brush-fire” wars and related missions.”⁸

The problem was that, since the Korean War, Canada had deliberately avoided participating in limited or “brush-fire wars” (and would not do so again until the Gulf War in 1990). Peacekeeping did not involve the deployment of Canadian troops in the face of hostile fire. As David Burke observed: “Canada’s world-wide intervention force . . . was literally all dressed up with nowhere to go . . . Canada had a structurally unified defence force without a mission to match. Moreover, since no allied commitment has been dropped, Canada continued to supply discrete air, sea and land units to NATO and NORAD.”⁹ In addition, any savings from unification, which were supposed to go into capital, were lost both by reduced defense budgets and inflation.

By the late 1960s, with detente, the Vietnam War, and concerns about Canadian independence and sovereignty, the very fundamentals of the Cold War defense policy were being challenged. In 1969, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau complained that NATO had come to determine all of Canada’s defense policy and defense policy had come to determine “all our foreign policy” and thus Canada “had no foreign policy except that which flowed from NATO.”¹⁰ He set about trying to change this. Henceforth, foreign policy would be the extension abroad of domestic priorities and defense policy would fall in line.

Such an approach was now possible because of the changed international security environment. The government assumed that East-West tensions would continue to ease and that mutual nuclear deterrence reduced the risk of war, and the European allies could assume more of the burden for conventional defense. It cut the size of Canada’s forces in Europe in half, moving the ground forces away from the inter-German border; discarded tactical nuclear weapons; said it would not replace the existing tank forces; indicated less emphasis would be placed on ASW; and looked forward to curtailing contributions to NORAD. This was accompanied by cuts in personnel and real reductions in defense expenditures. All of this was repeated in the 1971 *White Paper, Defence in the 70’s*,¹¹ which stressed that domestic roles, especially the protecting of

Canadian sovereignty against nonmilitary threats, fishing violations, and environmental dangers, would take priority over allied commitments, as well as peacekeeping, in day-to-day operations and force posture decisions.

Although reflecting the period of detente, the document was out of step with NATO's new strategy of flexible response and its emphasis upon conventional forces. Yet, as with the previous White Paper, the 1971 statement did not withdraw Canada from any allied commitments. In addition, Canada continued to remain an active contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the Trudeau government had actually added a pledge to reinforce northern Norway. Thus, detente began to wane as reduced defense budgets quickly took their toll, and the 1971 policy was already being reversed by 1974. As a result of the Defence Structure Review (DSR), allied commitments, especially those to NATO as opposed to sovereignty protection, reemerged as the key determinant of force posture decisions. Defense budgets were increased. Over the next 10 years, Canada reequipped its land forces in Germany with new tanks, acquired a new interceptor for the NATO and NORAD roles and new ASW long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA), and began construction of a fleet of ASW frigates. In 1985 agreement was reached on the modernization of NORAD's air defense capabilities. At the same time, defense budgets, though rising, meant that equipment replacement was slow and fewer were bought.

It was 1987 before the next White Paper was issued, this time by the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Entitled *Challenge and Commitment*,¹² this document stated explicitly that the previous Liberal government had gotten it wrong. The Liberals had been overly optimistic about the course of East-West relations, had undermined Canada's credibility with its allies, and had allowed a dangerous "commitment-capability gap" to emerge within the CF. In the meantime, new factors had emerged, especially the advent of cruise missiles and the growing strategic importance of the Arctic, which directly threatened North American and Canadian security. To meet these challenges, the Mulroney government pledged to dramatically increase defense spending. It would acquire new and more tanks for the ground forces in Germany, additional surface ships and LRPAs, and, most ambitiously, a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) capable of under-ice operations. The SSNs were also justified on the grounds of the need to assert Canadian sovereignty in waters American SSNs were known to transit.

Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987 document "got it wrong" the most profoundly and had the shortest life. Its tone reflected the increased East-West acrimony of the early 1980s and thus found itself caught by the rapidly changing situation of the Gorbachev years. Within a few months after its release, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The Mulroney government might be excused for not predicting the subsequent abrupt end to the Cold War, but it had also completely misread the domestic situation. While public opinion polls had shown some concern about poor Arctic sovereignty and the state of the CF equipment, there turned out to be very little support for SSNs or for major defense expenditures given the improved international security environment.¹³ In addition, it turned out that the Minister

of Defence had secured only tepid and conditional support from his cabinet colleagues, especially the Minister of Finance, on the funding formula necessary to implement *Challenge and Commitment*.¹⁴

The Mulroney government began to hedge on its defense pledges and deliberately avoided discussing the White Paper during the 1988 federal election campaign. Once returned to office, its 1989 budget essentially gutted the 1987 White Paper, cancelling the SSN program and postponing the tank purchase. Subsequent budgets further reduced defense expenditures, eventually abandoning new tanks and other equipment, although continuing with the building of 12 new frigates and plans to replace land and seaborne helicopters with the EH 101. Between 1989 and 1992 planned DND expenditures were reduced by \$5.6 billion.¹⁵

A statement on defense policy released in April 1992¹⁶ announced that the CF would be reduced from 81,000 to 75,000 regular force, but the reserves increased from 29,000 to 40,000. Most significantly, while the document reaffirmed Canada's commitment to NORAD and NATO, it also announced that Canada was withdrawing all of its air and ground forces from Germany. Heretofore, a physical presence in Europe, no matter how small, was considered a *sine qua non* for Canadian defense policy, the necessary price for a seat at the table.

However, as the Conservatives cutback on defense, they also, following a now familiar Canadian pattern, increased their commitments and activities. Canada sent forces to fight in the Gulf War and expanded its peacekeeping obligations. A new version of the "commitment-capability gap" appeared to be emerging, one which focused primarily on the Army which bore the brunt of peacekeeping duties and which had been least favored in the equipment purchases of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In October 1993, the Liberals returned to power in Ottawa under Prime Minister Jean Chretien. While in opposition and during the election campaign, they had criticized the Mulroney government for adopting a Cold War defense policy, one that was too supportive of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Among other things, the Liberals promised a total review of defense and foreign policy, including public consultations and parliamentary hearings. In the meantime, the new government moved to curtail defense spending, including the cancellation of the EH 101 helicopter, whose cost and sophisticated ASW capabilities were said to be inconsistent with the changed global environment. In its February 1994 budget, DND was again hit with reductions and base closures, including two of the three military colleges.¹⁷

A Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate began hearings on defense policy in the spring of 1994. It became apparent that two views on the future of the CF were emerging. The first, set forth by the Canada 21 Council, a group of former governmental officials, senior officers and academics, argued that Canada should concentrate on contributing to "common security" throughout the U.N. and other multilateral organizations. The CF, especially the Army, should be postured primarily for traditional peacekeeping as opposed to high intensity combat. Canada would

maintain its alliance ties, such as NATO and NORAD, but only insofar as these were consistent with the emphasis upon common security. Many of the Air Force and the Navy's larger units could be retired.¹⁸ The second view was that Canada still confronted a "dangerous world," wherein alliance ties would be important and wherein the CF had to maintain a balanced combat-capable posture.¹⁹

In its report,²⁰ the Special Joint Committee favored maintaining combat-capable forces and existing alliance ties. This was the direction the CF wanted to go in the new White Paper. But, in doing so, the forces had to fashion a policy that was consistent with the post-Cold War security environment, overall Canadian foreign policy, and, above all, domestic political and fiscal realities.

Doing Less and Doing With Less: The 1994 White Paper.

The 1994 White Paper reflects the more secure, yet uncertain international strategic environment that Canada now faces. It begins by declaring that "the primary obligation" of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces "is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security . . . In the final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving."²¹ The document stresses that the basic nature of the threats to Canadian security has changed—that regional and ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, global overpopulation and environmental degradation all compete for attention on the global security stage. But, as the February 1995 government statement on foreign policy, *Canada in the World*, emphasizes, "direct threats to Canada's territory are diminished."²² Future challenges to Canadian security are likely to be of a nonmilitary nature, economic, environmental and demographic. Thus, while the "Government considers it necessary to maintain a military capability appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving international environment, including continued membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence Command, "we are making adjustments within that capability to enhance our ability to contain conflict." In the February 1995 budget, DND took more hits over and above those announced last year. It would appear then, that while Canada is worth preserving and defending, it can be done with less military capability.

Overall, the current defense policy is based more upon domestic determinants rather than trying to fashion the CF to keep pace with allied demands and strategies. Most notable is the diminished role given NATO, heretofore the central pillar of Canadian defense policy and force structure. At the same time, multiple roles and, indeed, multilateralism, are very much a part of the new defense policy and, certainly, the White Paper calls for the establishment of new military ties with countries of Latin America and the Pacific. But while the White Paper promises a global presence for Canada, it, along with the budget, does imply global commitments.

As in previous White Papers, the current policy largely retains the four traditional roles for the Canadian Forces; sovereignty protection, NATO, bilateral military cooperation with the United States (especially NORAD), and peacekeeping will be

retained. Previous White Papers have rhetorically reordered priorities, but actual practice and force building have tended to reinforce the centrality of NATO and, to a lesser extent, bilateral cooperation as key determinants in defense policy. The 1994 Defence White Paper and the 1995 budget mark a significant change in this approach. Canada has already withdrawn its air and ground forces from Germany. The government will continue to supply maritime forces to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and to provide crews to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft and individual personnel to various NATO staff positions. Forces withdrawn and retained in Canada will be available to the Alliance consistent with allied strategy, which foresees no major challenge to Western European security and will rely upon mobilized forces in the event one should emerge. But in the White Paper, commitments and contributions to NATO are included under general support for international security and multilateral operations such as the United Nations and ad hoc coalitions. Canada is also seeking to reduce its financial contributions to the allied infrastructure program.

In contrast, the 1994 White Paper devotes considerable attention to the roles and missions of the CF in North America. It devotes one whole chapter to the protection of Canada and another to Canada-United States defense cooperation. There is also discussion about expanding military links to Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and to countries in the Asia Pacific area.²³ To this extent, it would appear that in the post-Cold War era, Ottawa intends to conduct a security policy more global in scope than it has for the last 50 years, one firmly anchored in North America but reaching out to new regions. For example, there has always been some military presence in the Pacific, but this generally took second place to the Atlantic region. Now more emphasis is to be put on ties with traditional Pacific partners, such as the U.S, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the new regional economic powers.

While the CF may find itself operating further afield, the government also intends to cut back on military expenditures. The defense budget is to drop by 14.2 percent between now and 1997, which entails a reduction in planned spending by about \$2.8 billion over the next 4 years, a reduction in annual spending of just over \$1.6 billion by the 1997-98 fiscal year compared to spending in fiscal year 1994-95. In that year DND's budget will be \$9.2 billion compared to the current level of \$11.5 billion. By the end of the decade, the regular force will cut from 74,900 to 60,000, the primary reserves from 29,400 to 20,000, and the civilian work force will drop to 20,000 from the present 32,500. There will be commensurate reductions in the number of senior officers, with generals cut by 25 percent and colonels by 20 percent. In addition, "about \$15 billion worth of capital equipment will be delayed, reduced, or cancelled over the next 15 years." There is to be another round of base closures and consolidations, most notably the elimination of all three of the elemental command headquarters: (Maritime Command (MARCOM), Air Command (AIRCOM), Land Force Command (LANCOM)) and the relocation of their functions to National Defence Headquarters.²⁴ All of this may make it difficult to accept the White Paper's claim that DND will maintain "multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad."²⁵

The government argues, however, that in contrast to previous Canadian experience, the budget is fully consistent with the White Paper. And the savings derived from personnel reductions and base closures can be redirected into giving the Canadian Forces the equipment they will need to carry out their national and international missions.²⁶ As announced in the White Paper, among the cutbacks in equipment will include a 25 percent reduction for fighter forces and support including the retirement of all CF-5 fighters and the reduction of operational CF-18s from 72 to “between 60 and 48” aircraft. But there will be no reduction in the transport aircraft fleet of 30 C-130s, 5 CC-137s and 5 CC-150s (A110); and the VIP A-310 *Airbus* will be re-fitted for a strategic lift and air cargo role. This will support the ability of the CF to sustain peacekeeping operations far afield. A replacement for the *Labrador* search-and-rescue helicopters will depend upon a decision to replace the *Sea King* maritime helicopters.²⁷

For the Army, which lost its coveted armored role when Canadian forces were withdrawn from Europe but which has borne the brunt of peacekeeping missions, there will be both more personnel and new equipment. Its 114 *Leopard I* tanks, now in Canada, will be retained for possible deployment abroad. Some 3,000 troops are to be added to its ranks, and the government has pledged to purchase new armored personnel carriers (APCs) by 1997 and to modernize parts of the current APC fleet.

The service which emerged the most unscathed from the White Paper and budget was the Navy. As with the Army, the Navy has seen wide service in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War, with deployments to Haiti and the Adriatic. Canada will retain all 16 of its surface warships, including 12 new city-class frigates, and will be acquiring 12 new maritime coastal defense vessels (MCDV) to “maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops, equipment and supplies for multilateral operations.” One of three support ships, the *HMCS Provider*, which had been scheduled to be paid off in 1996, will be retained. Also kept will be the existing force of 18 maritime long-range patrol aircraft. Shortly after their election in 1993, the Liberals fulfilled a campaign promise to cancel a \$5 billion program to acquire 50 new helicopters, including 30-year-old *Sea Kings* carried by the surface ships. The White Paper pledges to find an “affordable” replacement. Most surprisingly, the Government has not ruled out new submarines and will “explore the option” of acquiring *Upholder* class submarines recently constructed by the United Kingdom.

Thus, while DND will have to do with less, the White Paper claims that Canada will still have forces capable of providing for domestic surveillance and sovereignty tasks, North American defense, and “make a significant contribution to international peace and stability, within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.”²⁸ Canada will maintain a naval task group in the Pacific and Atlantic comprised of destroyers, frigates, submarines, a support ship, and maritime air. On land, three “separable battle groups or a brigade group with infantry, armor, and artillery will be available for deployment. The air forces will have two fighter squadrons available for NORAD but could send a wing of tactical fighters and a squadron of transport aircraft. Some of these forces will be earmarked for immediate standby, short notice deployment for NATO or the U.N. In the event of a major contingency abroad, Ottawa would be

prepared to send land, sea and air forces simultaneously, and "this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel."²⁹ However, the White Paper indicates that Canada could not send substantial forces to both contingencies at once, and thus forces would have to be redeployed from other multilateral operations.

Given Canada's budget crisis, the CF could have been asked by the government to do with even smaller forces. For fiscal year 1994-95, the federal deficit will be \$37.9 billion, or more than 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while the accumulated debt amounts to \$546.1 billion. By fiscal year 1996-97, the government hopes to bring the deficit down to \$24.3 billion, but interest on the debt will still be \$50.7 billion or nearly a quarter of the federal budget.³⁰

With roughly a third of the debt in foreign hands, there has been continual downward pressure on the Canadian dollar which now stands at just above 70 cents U.S. International money markets were demanding a tough budget from Finance Minister Paul Martin, and they got one. Ottawa intends to implement major reductions in expenditures, including on social services such as health care and welfare. This will entail cutting back and changing the transfer payments to the provinces. In addition, government operating expenditures will be slashed. Over the next 3 years the federal civil service will be reduced by 14 percent or 45,000.³¹

Under these circumstances, DND is fortunate not to have suffered further reductions. It will still have the largest operating budget of any government department. While the Canadian Forces might contend otherwise, it can be argued with regard to the 1994 White Paper on defense and 1995 federal budget, that as the slogan of the famous American beer from Milwaukee used to boast "it doesn't get any better than this."

In addition, civil-military relations have not been particularly good in Canada during the last several months. There have been revelations of torture and murder of civilians by members of the Airborne Regiment during peacekeeping duties in Somalia leading to a series of courts martial. This was compounded by exposure of unseemly conduct recorded on videos and what the government viewed as failure by senior officers to deal with the unit's problems. All of which led Defence Minister Collenette to disband the regiment earlier this year even though the Chief of the Defence Staff advised against it.

Should the economy experience slower growth and rising interests rates, Mr. Martin's predictions may not come to fruition. It likely would be, then, that in next year's budget, or even before, the Liberal government would not hesitate to make further cuts in defense expenditures. Indeed, it can be argued that as far as Prime Minister Chretien and most of his Ministers are concerned, there is always room for less defense spending. There would be little public outcry in light of the fact that the public and the provinces are being asked to do a lot with less.

Canada-U.S. Defense Relations.

The level and tempo of Canada-U.S. defense relations, particularly in NORAD, has been decreasing since the late 1980s. The epoch-making transformation of global affairs notwithstanding, the NORAD agreement was renewed in April 1991 for another 5 years. In sharp contrast to 1986, the renewal went almost unnoticed, even in Canada. Also little noticed was the emphasis placed upon NORAD's role in counter-narcotics activities, indicating that the air sovereignty mission encompassed surveillance and monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs. Counter-narcotics had become an important task for the U.S. armed forces in the late 1980s, and the Canadian Air Force was cooperating in the air side of the effort.³²

By the late 1980s, the frequency of Soviet Bear bomber flights near North America was "significantly reduced during 1989," down to just 21. In the 1986-1988 period, there had been as many as 66 flights per year.³³ A U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee report released in July 1990 noted that "the Soviets have ceased submarine patrols off the U.S. coast, and flights by Bear bombers to Canada's northern border." Accordingly, Washington cut back on plans contained in the 1985 North American Air Defence Modernization agreement, including cancellation of two and the deactivation of one of the four new Over the Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars.³⁴ Congress had stopped all funding for the American contribution to the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), while budget cuts in the United States Air Force were creating problems in the apportionment of costs for the Northern Warning System (NWS).

More recent American actions with respect to air defense, however, suggest that this NORAD role has been significantly reduced in importance. After some delay and difficulties over the apportionment of construction expenditures, the full NWS will be completed. However, the United States Air Force and Canada will run it at a very reduced capacity in order to lower operation and maintenance costs. Congress, though, has continued to refuse funding for the American portion of the cost of the forward operating locations, although Canada went ahead and constructed four of them.

The classic air defense mission against massive bomber attack has been put on the "back burner." Forces for this mission have been put in a "regeneration" category with expectation that there will be as much as a 2-year strategic warning of any insurgent air threat. There are no longer "war plans" but "concept plans" for North American air defense.³⁵ NORAD is also likely to scale back its counter-narcotics role, as the United States has become persuaded that this and other military measures were having little impact in the drug war.³⁶ If the USAF experiences additional funding cuts, there may be even more reductions in NORAD's air defense and air sovereignty roles.

With the air defense mission waning and with the threat of large scale ballistic missile attack all but gone, focus has shifted to the possible role of NORAD in some kind of limited missile defense, both for North America and abroad. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former CINCNORAD American General Charles Horner stressed the need for NORAD to continue with its binational air sovereignty mission. He also emphasized "the national necessity for an integrated ballistic missile defense . . . system—a system that will best protect deployed forces, as

well as North American borders . . .”³⁷ In a fall 1993 article, Executive Officer to the Deputy CINCNOAD Canadian Lieutenant General Brian Smith seemed to suggest that the command could become the North American component of a multinational “global warning initiative” designed to meet the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. In addition to meeting threats against North America, the system could be applied “in a regional content (sic) anywhere in the world.”³⁸ For the United States, the emphasis following upon the Gulf War has been less on the massive Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) envisioned by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and more on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Traditionally, Canada has been wary of BMD because of its allegedly adverse implications for strategic nuclear stability and arms control. But when President Bush suggested a multilateral approach to BMD two years ago, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated Canadian interest.

In the meantime, the end of the Cold War saw a continuation of close cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the United States Navy (USN). In contrast to aerospace ties which were concentrated in a single binational command, naval relations have largely been on a strictly navy-to-navy basis with a myriad of arrangements that have allowed the two maritime forces to operate closely together. Reflecting the USN’s own organization and the NATO emphasis of overall Canadian defense policy, this cooperation has been much more extensive in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, although there have been long-standing arrangements and joint exercises on the west coast. In the 1980s there was some Canadian concern about the operation of USN submarines in the Arctic which led to the proposal in the 1987 Canadian White Paper to acquire a fleet of nuclear-power attack submarines capable of under-ice operations. This project was abandoned in 1989. As in the air, the end of the Cold War saw a decline in the sea-based danger to North America, which has reduced the importance of maritime surveillance.

Given the absence of a direct threat to the continent, it is surprising that, as noted above, an entire chapter in the White Paper is devoted to defense relations with the United States. The DND argues that the defense ties with the United States must be maintained if Canada is to continue reaping its varied rewards, which have included increased training and operational experience, retention of an influential voice in American defense policy formulation, continued access to significant defense-related intelligence, and maintaining access to the large U.S. defense industrial market.³⁹ For these reasons, the Canadian/American defense partnership has rightfully earned a fair number of supporters.

Most noteworthy of the White Paper recommendations is that the NORAD agreement should be renewed in 1996. The document admits that direct threats to North American security are unlikely in the foreseeable future and assumes that any new threat will provide 1-2 years of strategic warning. The White Paper therefore maintains that Canada must continue to support a foundation of defense cooperation with the United States which could be expanded if needed. For the Air Force, the White paper states that Canada will maintain aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air defense capabilities at a significantly reduced level, while preserving the ability to regenerate forces should a strategic threat to the continent arise.⁴⁰

The White Paper also declares that greater emphasis must be placed within the agreement on the examination of ballistic missile defense options.⁴¹

The Government will examine closely those areas which may require updating in accordance with evolving challenges to continental security. Canada will work towards an agreement that furthers our national interest and meets our defence needs, now and into the 21st century.⁴²

Canada's potential role in ballistic missile defence will not be determined in isolation, but in conjunction with the evolution of North American and possibly NATO-wide aerospace defence arrangements.⁴³

Canada's willingness to participate in the research and development of a ballistic missile defensive system marks a major departure from the previous Canadian view, especially that of the Liberal Party. The American emphasis upon TMD has made Canadian involvement more acceptable. As the Chief of the Defence Staff John de Chastelain noted, the idea of protecting North America is now "recognized as pie in the sky." Rather "We're talking about joint involvement in the development of a product that would produce a regional BDM system."⁴⁴

It is, though, unclear how much emphasis the United States intends to put into BMD for North America. The Clinton administration is continuing the emphasis on TMD for the protection of American forces forwardly deployed. In February 1995 an effort by some Republicans in the House of Representatives to speed up the fielding of a BMD system to defend the United States was defeated in favor of more funding for TMD.⁴⁵

Test and evaluation agreements will also continue under the White Paper—the February 1993 agreement to renew the Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Program was reaffirmed "as an integral part of our bilateral defence relationship." The White Paper also indicated that Canada will seek to maintain cooperation in defense production through the defense production/defense sharing agreements, which will continue.⁴⁶

In view of the declining threat (never that great in the past), it should be possible to sustain joint arrangements for the surveillance of the maritime approaches to the continent. The existing maritime forces, plans to augment the naval presence in the Pacific, recent improvements to the underwater surveillance system, and plans to upgrade Maritime Command's information and tactical data links, including those with NORAD, will make the Canadian maritime contribution to continental defense actually better than it is at present.⁴⁷

Another somewhat new dimension to bilateral cooperation is in the area of joint warfare—the effort to better coordinate air, sea, and land forces. This has become a high priority in the United States. In October 1993, the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, became the joint headquarters for most American forces in the continental United States (CONUS). In shifting "from a

predominately naval headquarters to a more balanced combatant command headquarters,” USACOM will “facilitate the identification, training, preparation, and rapid response of designated CONUS-based forces currently under the Army’s Forces Command, the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, the Air Forces’s Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps’ Marine Forces Atlantic.” As well as preparing forces for overseas deployments, this new headquarters would be responsible for the land defense of CONUS and direct any response to natural disasters “and other requirements for military support to civil authorities when requested by State Governors and as directed by the President.”⁴⁸

It is interesting to note that, although ACC will be a component of USACOM, the new command was not given the continental air defense role, leaving this role to NORAD. The creation of USACOM will have other implications for Canada. Its commander, now for the first time a Marine general and not a USN Admiral, will still be NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. In addition, to mesh with USACOM’s joint approach, the Canadian forces will have their own “joint task headquarters” to support the Canada-U.S. basic security plan. This will give the Canadian Army more of a role than in the past and a “brigade group and associated support elements” will be assigned North American roles (in addition to other missions).⁴⁹

In general, Canada’s military capabilities will be more than adequate for continued defense ties with the United States in the defense of North America. At sea and in the air there has always been the so-called “defence against help” argument, which stresses that, unless Canada is prepared to monitor its own air and sea approaches, the United States will see to it, thereby challenging Canadian sovereignty and independence. In accordance with this argument, Canada has mounted a contribution to the air and maritime defense of North America. Yet this argument is losing much of its persuasiveness as the United States itself questions the need for a major air and maritime surveillance effort, a fact that has evidently not been lost on Ottawa.

Moreover, the forces, especially naval and air units required to sustain cooperation with the United States in continental defense, are almost identical to those needed for domestic tasks. This is especially the case for the Navy, whose surface ships, aircraft and submarines are expected to assert Canadian sovereignty and protect off-shore resources. Indeed, since those earmarked for NATO and the U.N. are also now based in Canada, they, too, are available for North American tasks.

In the past, Canada’s security relations with the United States have always been problematic, not so much from an equipment standpoint but in the context of domestic politics. This is because Canadian governments have been caught between their support for collective defense, which has made military cooperation with the United States essential, and popular fears that national sovereignty and independence would be compromised by too close an association with the Pentagon. For this reason NATO, with its multilateral framework, had always been stressed more than the strictly bilateral NORAD or other continental arrangements. In addition, the close working relationship between the Canadian and American air forces and bureaucracies has always lent a faint

air of illegitimacy to NORAD.⁵⁰ The suggestion is that the Canadian military, eager to play in the big leagues, has promoted an integration of defense efforts of which the political leadership has not always been fully cognizant.

In the present international circumstances with no real threat to North America, a renewal of NORAD, especially one that includes an explicit reference to BMD, might be expected to encounter criticism that this is anachronistic business, as usual at the expense of a new, more independent Canadian defense policy. Moreover, with the North American Free Trade Agreement binding Canada ever more closely to the United States economically, Ottawa could anticipate a reaction against further continentalist policies.

However, this is not 1986 when the Canadian “peace movement” weighed in heavily against NORAD renewal, largely on the grounds that it would draw Canada into the Strategic Defense Initiative. For many in the movement, the problem has not been the roles and missions of the Canadian Forces, but the allegedly dangerous defense policies of the United States. With the “threat of annihilation without representation” gone and with the United States drawing down its military and debating the merits of continued military expenditure, there appears to be much less sensitivity in the public and the media. Indeed, drawing upon media commentary in the United States, the prevalent view in the public mind is that the Clinton administration, pressured by the Republicans, is not doing enough around the world and may even be heading toward neo-isolationism.⁵¹ (Even former New Democratic Party leader Edward Broadbent called upon the United States to invade Haiti.) In this sense, peace has weakened the peace movement, depriving it of its ability to combine fear of nuclear war with Canadian nationalism. Media, reporting on Secretary Perry’s visit in May 1994, suggest that the popular concern over the link between independence and bilateral defense cooperation appears to be waning. (Secretary Perry even helped the new Liberal government on the public relations front when he announced, just prior to his visit, that the United States would no longer need to test cruise missiles in Canada, something the Liberals had pledged to stop during the election campaign).

There was scant mention made of NORAD in the testimony by interests groups before the parliamentary committees on foreign and defense policy. In their reports, the committees called for renewal of NORAD. Indeed, the foreign policy committee, while cautioning against greater economic dependence on the United States, not only supported renewal but called for a “further shift of emphasis from air defence to global space surveillance.”⁵² The opposition parties, the right-of-center Reform Party and the pro-Quebec sovereigntist Bloc Québécois, (BQ), for different reasons, favor continued military ties with the United States and will support a NORAD renewal.

Under these circumstances the Liberal government clearly felt that it was safe in not only including its intention to renew NORAD in the White Paper, but indicating its interests in BMD. There is likely to be little public opposition to renewal on grounds of national sovereignty and independence. Indeed, it may be argued that the importance attached to continuing bilateral defense relations in the White Paper was only possible

because the Canadian government appreciates that such cooperation will not place great demands upon the Canadian forces.

@LEFTHEADING = Contributions to International Security.

In the ultimately successful struggle of containment and deterrence, it was always more important to Washington that Canadian forces be deployed in Europe than in Canada. Hence the anomaly in the 1950s and 1960s that, while Canadians were in France and Germany, U.S. forces helped stand the “long polar watch” in Canada.

Similarly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Washington is quite interested in Canada’s participation in peacekeeping and its recent variations. Indeed, the Americans seem more concerned that Canada play a full role in Bosnia than Bagotville, in Cambodia than Cold Lake, in the Adriatic than in the Arctic. During his visit to Ottawa last May, U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry, while calling for continued bilateral cooperation, also urged Canada to remain active in NATO and to maintain “robust, flexible and sustainable” forces for global operations.⁵³

To a certain extent, therefore, the 1994 White Paper with its multilateral orientation and pledge to maintain a global combat capability would seem to mesh well with current contemporary American defense policy, which stresses the need to remain engaged abroad, including through multilateral arrangements.⁵⁴ In this regard, the links being developed between the Canadian forces and USACOM could also serve to foster Canada-U.S. cooperation since one of the prime tasks of the new American command is preparing U.S. forces for deployment overseas, including for peacekeeping operations.

However, while cooperation outside North America continues, it is premature to conclude that the two countries are about to engage in a new joint approach to international security threats, despite Ottawa’s commitment to multilateralism. This is because there is a fundamental difference between the two countries in how they approach multilateral solutions and operations. For the United States, multilateralism is a tool to be used when it can support the achievement of American interests, legitimize U.S. action, and harmonize western policies. In addition, Washington wants allies, especially in NATO, to do more.⁵⁵ Americans want to lead, on their own terms, and will be looking for followers.

Canada views multilateralism as a means of continuing to participate actively in global affairs so as to increase the influence it might otherwise not exercise, including influence over the United States. It does want to see Washington take the lead on many issues but hopes to use multilateralism as a mechanism of restraining unilateral American actions and policies. Above all, Canada does not equate a commitment to multilateralism as requiring that it assume a greater share of the burden for defending western interests around the globe. The limited Canadian involvement in the Gulf War, though fully supportive of the U.S.-led coalition, reflected Ottawa’s modest assessment of what Canada can be expected to contribute.⁵⁶

Although Ottawa is committed to continued participation in NATO and has pledged to send forces to Europe in the event of an emergency, the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Germany, combined with a desire to reduce contributions to allied infrastructure programs, sends a clear signal that the Alliance is no longer the focal point of Canadian defense policy. At the same time, Ottawa seems convinced that it can still use its membership in NATO as an entry point into European security affairs from a political standpoint. The White Paper notes that:

@BLOCK QUOTE = Canada will be an active participant in the Alliance's ongoing efforts to reach out to the countries of Central Europe as well as those of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We give our full support to NATO expansion, but continue to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully—certainly, the process must not exacerbate Russian fears of encirclement or exclusion.⁵⁷

There is little doubt that the European allies, as well as the United States, were not happy with this part of the White Paper any more than with the 1992 decision to pull the forces out of Germany. But given fiscal realities, this is an appropriate position and one that is consistent with current NATO strategies. If a major new threat emerges in Europe, there is little doubt that Canada will respond. Moreover, Ottawa can argue that with over 2,000 troops in the former Yugoslavia for the last 3 years, Canada is doing more than its share for European security and doing it in situations where the Europeans are apparently unable to do on their own.

But Canada's involvement in any future security arrangements that NATO may foster in Europe is to be undertaken in such a way that they do not place new demands upon the Canadian forces. As noted above, the forces earmarked for the Alliance are also available to U.N. peacekeeping and fall under the general heading of multilateral operations, especially peacekeeping. Indeed, it would appear that Ottawa wants NATO to follow its approach by putting the Alliance at the service of the U.N.⁵⁸

Canada has enjoyed a long-standing reputation for active involvement and support of peacekeeping operations. As the United Nations has increased its activities in the post-Cold War era, so has Canadian participation. Since 1989, Canadian forces have been deployed to the Persian Gulf to participate in Desert Storm and on a multitude of peacekeeping missions, from Bosnia to Cambodia to Rwanda. As of the beginning of 1995, 3.6 percent "of all peacekeepers on duty in the world" were Canadian—some 2,900, with 2,000 of these in the former Yugoslavia. Additional forces were preparing to deploy to Haiti.⁵⁹ In addition to the Army, the AIRCOM's transport fleet continues to fly humanitarian relief missions while the Navy has supported U.N.-mandated embargoes in the Adriatic and off Haiti.

The White Paper applauds the humanitarian aspects of U.N. action and supports the principles of the U.N. charter but denigrates the woeful military efficiency of U.N. peacekeeping missions.⁶⁰ Chronic lack of funding, an unmanageable bureaucracy, the archaic structure of the permanent members of the Security Council, the over reliance on the goodwill of member nations to contribute forces for U.N. missions⁶¹—these

failings encourage Canadian cynicism and reluctance to participate in further U.N. peacekeeping efforts.

Canada would like to see a more efficient military command and operations structure put in place for U.N. missions and believes such a tool is already available in the current NATO Alliance. The White Paper notes that "Canada believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to U.N. operations," by "providing the U.N. with the vigorous military support that it currently lacks."⁶² More efficient and greater military contributions from NATO would presumably increase the capacity of the U.N. However, the military tools of NATO must not be decoupled from the political direction of the U.N. The White Paper strongly maintains that ultimate political and strategic direction given by the U.N. must rest with the Security Council. NATO's means for U.N. ends can best encapsulate Canada's new NATO policy.

If U.N. reform and NATO support are not forthcoming, then Ottawa might well begin reducing its peacekeeping operations. This was suggested by the recent decision regarding Canadian forces in the former Yugoslavia. Ten Canadians have died in Yugoslavia over the last 3 years, dozens more were injured, and there are reports of depression leading to suicide among returning soldiers.⁶³ Thus while agreeing to replace the units in Bosnia, the government indicated that it might soon withdraw from there and consolidate in Croatia where the intensity of the fighting has been less. "Drawing a parallel with the 29-year presence of Canadian U.N. peacekeepers in Cyprus which ended in 1993," the Minister of Defence told the House of Commons that "it was urgent for the international community to understand that it cannot count on Canada to keep troops in the former Yugoslavia forever while the world waits for some demonstration of the political will to resolve the dispute."⁶⁴ Many Canadians have also noted that their government is not included in the contact group seeking to find an end to the conflict.

In some ways, Canada's views on reforming the U.N. and partnering it to NATO are mirrored in the United States, which therefore becomes especially relevant in Canada's relations with the United States in the NATO forum. Although the United States would also like to see the forces of NATO take a more active role in U.N. missions, especially in the former Yugoslavia, it is highly unlikely that the maintenance of sole political direction from the security council would be acceptable in the United States. The American view is that reform of the U.N. must precede any expansion of its military capabilities. The United States is pressing to change the membership in the Security Council to include both Japan and Germany,⁶⁵ to reform the funding procedures for U.N. operations,⁶⁶ and to streamline the bureaucratic process. Clearer political mandates and more stringent criteria for measuring the likelihood of success must be applied in future missions. In addition, the United States will place more conditions on when, where, and how American troops are to be placed under the operational command of U.N. commanders, if at all.

Indeed, so strong is the American desire for management reform of the United Nations that in 1993 the United States withheld 10 percent of its U.N. dues until the post

of Inspector- General was established.⁶⁷ Charges of waste, corruption, and mismanagement may inhibit greater U.S. endorsement of or participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions.⁶⁸ In addition, from the viewpoint of many Americans, the United States should be charging the U.N. for the costs which the Pentagon incurs “in peacekeeping operations approved by the Security Council but not directed by the United Nations.” Included here would be the fall 1994 intervention into Haiti.⁶⁹

In May 1994 the Clinton administration, responding to congressional criticism, issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which called for reform of the U.N. and limits on American military participation.⁷⁰ Opposition to peacekeeping has increased with the new Republican-controlled Congress. In February 1995 the House of Representatives, by a vote of 241 to 181, approved a bill that included provisions that went beyond PDD-25, curtailing the authority of the President to participate in peacekeeping operations and “set strict limits on when American troops may serve under United Nations command.” Congress would be afforded a greater role in determining where, when, and how American troops were used. The bill would also allow the United States to deduct from Washington’s annual peacekeeping dues “the extra cost the Pentagon incurs in American-run military missions that receive the blessing of the United Nations,” such as the Haitian operation. In 1994, those costs were estimated to be \$1.7 billion, an amount that would have wiped out the American assessment. Although the bill provides for Presidential waivers, these would only have amounted to about \$240 million.⁷¹

It is unclear whether the bill will pass the Senate in its present form. On the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense, President Clinton has threatened to veto it if it does. Given that a veto would be difficult to override, it is likely that the provisions of the bill will be moderated. Administration officials argue that if implemented, the provisions would cripple U.N. peacekeeping operations and provide an excuse for other nations to cut back their contributions.

These indications of decreasing American willingness to participate in or provide funds for U.N.-directed peacekeeping missions, unless on American terms, could have important effects on Canadian defense policy, compelling further evaluation of Canada’s contributions. A U.N. budget bereft of U.S. funds is not going to have the necessary monies to carry out much in the way of peacekeeping. Similarly, if the United States withholds certain specialized equipment only it possesses—primarily the rapid air and sealift capacity so necessary for quick deployment—then peacekeeping missions will be grounded before they are begun. If American participation and funding are reduced, then so might Canadian participation in peacekeeping, which has always relied on American monetary, logistical, and military support.

Beyond peacekeeping, Canada is also showing a new interest in other regions of the world, particularly with the countries of the Far East and those of Latin America. For example, Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s most publicized trade missions have been to these two areas.⁷² This current emphasis on bolstering trade relations in areas other than Europe does not necessarily imply any lessening of Canada’s strategic, cultural, and

economic ties with that area—but it does indicate that these newer areas are going to require greater attention by Canadian defense planners as they absorb an increasing portion of Canadian trade.

The White Paper reflects this state of affairs. It documents how Canadian interest in the security of the Asia Pacific region has become much more active—through the encouragement of regional security dialogues such as the Asia Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security.⁷³ Canada will expand the current program of bilateral military contacts with a variety of Asian nations, including Japan, South Korea, and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations.⁷⁴

Increased Canadian military ties in Latin America, the Pacific, and elsewhere will involve cooperation with the United States. But this new interest in broader security issues cannot be equated with a Canadian commitment to the security of these regions, a commitment necessitating greatly expanded military operations. It must be acknowledged that the key motivating factor behind expanding defense ties is the economic consideration, not that of traditional military security. Recently, a high-level Canadian military delegation went to China to establish contacts with the Peoples Liberation Army and to explore opportunities for military exports.⁷⁵ A cruise by Canada's newest warship into the Persian Gulf was likewise intended to promote Canadian defense products. Here, Canada encounters the United States trying to do the same thing. Thus in the wider world, the two countries are sometimes competitors, both seeking out new markets.

Ottawa believes that as Canada seeks out new trading opportunities, there should be some commensurate augmentation in military links with other regions and countries outside the traditional North Atlantic triangle. To this extent, it is unlikely that beyond staff talks, exchanges of information, and the occasional port visit and participation in joint exercises, Canada is prepared to commit itself to new concrete security arrangements. The emphasis upon naval ties is noteworthy since they are a relatively inexpensive way to maintain a nominal “global” presence. And just because forces exercise together does not mean they will fight together. Indeed, the attractiveness of these new links seems to rest for the most part in their relatively low political, and above all financial, costs.

Even if the Canadian forces can hold the line on further cuts, the reductions already announced will make it difficult to retain more or less balanced air, sea and ground forces. And while this may worry the military and its supporters, it is evident that it is not especially troublesome to the government whose approach to the role of the armed forces in Canadian foreign policy, like that followed during the Cold War, does not place an especially high value on combat capability. In the present global security environment, Ottawa apparently believes that not only can it secure its place in various international fora with a lot less, but that military hardware is no longer the coin of the realm in the highly competitive post-Cold War global environment. Thus, Washington

may well be disappointed if it looks to Canada for support in meeting regional contingencies in the post-Cold War world.

Conclusion.

As defense analyst Douglas Bland has observed, the new policy moves away from a “strategy of commitments” toward one of “strategy of choice derived from Canada’s national interests.” The 1994 White Paper thus prepares “the way for a national strategy and armed forces structure more appropriate to the new security environment.” It is a document about “choice and change.”⁷⁶

The 1994 Canadian White Paper is indeed about change and choice. Ottawa has changed defense policy from its Cold War orientation. But it has also chosen to sustain its traditional alliance ties that have marked Canadian defense policy since 1945. But here, too, there is change. Thus, for the first time in two generations, NATO will no longer be the focal point, in either word or deed, of defense policy. But it is also the result of fiscal realities. The government evidently believes that membership in NORAD and NATO, and any new military ties it forges, will be inexpensive. It will afford Canada the ability to maintain close defense relations with the world’s most powerful nation and an array of medium powers at acceptable (and indeed declining) levels of expenditure.

As with previous White Papers, the 1994 document very much reflects the global trends that preceded its writing. Not surprisingly, then, peacekeeping constitutes an important part of the new policy. Here, it may be argued that this White Paper will suffer the same fate of its predecessors in that its proposal will be more appropriate to the immediate past than the future. This is because the rising tide of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era may well have peaked. But, the White Paper acknowledges the problems of contemporary peacekeeping. It does not put its emphasis upon this role exclusively, but rather in maintaining a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. To be sure, there is a certain hollowness to the White Paper’s claims for global combat capability. And the new links, which the government indicates it wishes to establish with regional powers, carry little implication of solid security commitments. Nevertheless, the proposed posture is about as much as the Canadian forces, and Canada’s allies, could expect.

The 1994 Canadian White Paper on defense gets it right this time. But this is not so much because it offers an impeccably reasoned and clairvoyant national security strategy. But, rather because it is largely consistent with overall foreign policy objectives, what the public purse is capable of paying for and what the Canadian people are likely to support. As such, it responds to the challenge of a more secure, yet unpredictable security situation abroad and the more precarious, yet inescapably certain realities at home.

In an ironic sense, Canada may well find that it can finally put its particular, if not always successful, experience in setting national strategy in lean times to good use.

ENDNOTES

1. In 1968 the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian Army were “unified” into a single service, with a single rank structure and even uniform. Initially divided along “environmental” and functional lines, eventually Maritime Command, Air Command and Land Forces Command came to replace the older services. Since the 1980s, more frequent mention has been made to the Navy, Air Force, and Army and the distinctive uniforms returned.

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16. *Ibid.*

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19. See for example Colin Gray, *Canadians in a Dangerous World*, Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1994.

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21. *1994 White Paper*, p.2.

22. Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the World*, Ottawa: 1995, p. 24.

23. *1994 White Paper*, pp. 37-38.

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25. *1994 White Paper*, p. 2.

26. The figures below are partially drawn from Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee on Canada's National Defence, *Security in a Changing World*, Ottawa: 1994, Appendices, p. 19.

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38. Lieutenant Colonel David Bashow, "NORAD, Past, Present and Future," *Forum* 8, Fall 1993. See also McDonald, "Canada's Role in Rebirth of Star Wars," p. A17.

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71. *Ibid.*, p. A1, A9.
72. Prime Minister Chretien, along with a group of provincial Premiers, embarked to China in the fall of 1994 in an attempt to increase trade relations between Canada and the Far East. In early 1995 a similar delegation travelled throughout Latin America in an attempt to increase Canadian business in that region as well.
73. 1994 *White Paper*, p. 37.
74. *Ibid.*

75. Rod Mickleburgh, "Canada Holds Talks With Chinese Military," *The Globe and Mail*, March 18, 1995, pp. A1, A13.

76. Douglas Bland, "New Direction for Defence," *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 5, 1994, p. A9.

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