Elements of Operational Design in the Russo-Finnish War.

Abstract

The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 presents several lessons and pertinent examples of operational design, both well and poorly crafted. It can serve as an important case study, specifically in regard to the capabilities of a smaller force operating without technical advantage to successfully delay, allowing time for an external response, coalition or allied. In addition, the conduct of the operation by the Soviet forces offers historical perspective that may be applied to the current environment, using force against smaller nations in the "near abroad". The Soviet emphasis on an operational solution to overcome tactical weaknesses, training tand employment, is also demonstrated. The components of operational design are tracked through the preparation and execution of the conflict, comparing anticipated results of that design with the reality achieved.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 16, 1995
Accession Number
ADA297824

Entities

People

  • William H. Deane

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Artillery
  • Artillery Fire
  • Attrition
  • Battles
  • Civil War
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • Guns
  • Lessons Learned
  • Losses
  • Military Operations
  • New York
  • Students
  • Training
  • Ussr
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design