


United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



With the Cold War behind us, the United States has a great historical opportunity to transform the nature of international security. I have asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to develop a series of regional security reports, consistent with President Clinton's strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement," to explain our efforts to meet this challenge.

The Europe Strategy Report is part of this series. President Clinton has declared U.S. support for expanding the zone of stability through his vision of "a free and undivided Europe" and "an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity." We must seek to realize this vision by maintaining a strong NATO Alliance, while avoiding the creation of new dividing lines that could exacerbate security threats in Europe.

Overall, there is a need to develop a new security architecture in Europe that builds upon and adapts the current architecture. Fortunately, we and our transatlantic allies share common values and objectives, and have inherited from the Cold War era institutions and habits that facilitate coordination of policies and cooperation. We are now seeking to preserve, adapt, and extend these patterns and institutions to meet the new challenges and priorities of today.

As explained in this report, the United States has a comprehensive approach to creating a new security architecture for Europe. Its key elements include enhancing NATO's efforts to reach out to the East through the Partnership for Peace; developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement; building cooperative relationships with Russia; supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU); and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); as well as maintaining close bilateral relationships with both our allies and new partners.

I invite your attention to this important report.

William J. Perry
William J. Perry



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Introduction

Throughout its history, America has been inextricably linked to Europe. It has influenced the balance of power and the struggle among competing ideas in Europe. In this century, America's essential role has been underscored in one World War against ultra-nationalism, a second against fascism, and a Cold War against communism. With the end of the Cold War, some thought that the struggle over power and ideas in Europe had ended with the victory of democracy over communism, and that an American presence would no longer be necessary. But after only a few years, it is clear that American involvement remains essential for European stability. The building of tolerant democratic societies, and the balance of power that allows them to take root and flourish, are still at risk. President Clinton's four trips to Europe last year reflect a continuing historical fact: America has been a European power, it remains a European power, and it will continue to be a European power.

Europe represents the world's greatest concentration of nations and peoples which share our commitment to democracy and market economies. America's cultural heritage and institutions largely spring from European roots. Our most important multilateral alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—is centered there. The continent is also one of the world's greatest centers of economic power and represents a massive export market for U.S. products. Thus, our continued political, cultural, and economic well-being is inextricably tied to Europe.

Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the reemergence of

historic grievances have replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. The United States and its transatlantic allies must jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the unresolved legacies of past conflicts are contained and resolved.

In this context, building a new security architecture for Europe means providing a framework to build stable democracies, market economies, and ultimately a stable and just peace across the continent. If we are to realize our goal of a peaceful, democratic, prosperous, and undivided Europe, we must work with our transatlantic partners to extend the zone of stability to the region as a whole.

The United States National Security Strategy, published in February 1995, is designed to meet this European challenge. Our global strategy seeks to enlarge the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation and our interests through engagement with our allies. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are to enhance security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; to promote democracy abroad; and to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth.

This document explains how U.S. defense policy is furthering these goals in Europe. As will be seen, we are pursuing our security strategy not only through NATO, but also through other multilateral institutions, such as the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), supporting separate yet complementary efforts by our allies and friends in the European Union, and through the bilateral relationships that have played such a valuable role in U.S.-European cooperation for more than forty years.

Our vision for transatlantic security is a system of interlocking institutions and relationships rooted in a common commitment to democracy, individual rights and the rule of law: a Europe that, for the first time since the establishment of nation states, would not be divided by violent conflict or lingering animosities.



White House Photo

President Clinton with Allied Heads of State at the NATO Summit in Brussels, January 10, 1994.

America's Enduring Interests in Europe

Vital U.S. Interests in Europe

Political and Security Interests

The United States has vital interests in a Europe that is democratic, undivided, stable and prosperous, open to trade and investment opportunities, and supportive of political, economic, and military cooperation with the United States in Europe and other important parts of the world. Transatlantic cooperation is the key not only to advancing our mutual interests in Europe, but also to solving global problems. The United States and its NATO allies play leading roles in the major institutions and in developing the tools needed to shape the international community; constituting three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, six of the seven G-7 group of major industrialized states, and the majority of the board members of the International Monetary Fund. Our transatlantic allies are major international aid and developmental assistance donors throughout the world. U.S. leadership on European security issues not only shapes our own and allied views toward consensus on the major defense issues, it also facilitates cooperation and gives the United States leverage in other important forums.

Because of their level of technological achievement, their solid democratic systems, their military competence, their wealth, and other enduring factors, our European allies will perforce play important roles in addressing the risks to U.S. security and well-being. Moreover, the collapse of totalitarianism and the commitment to build democratic political institutions and free

market economies by Europe's former communist states represent a historical opportunity to expand the circle of states that see it in their interest to cooperate in the pursuit of common goals. If the reform process is successful, the importance of Europe as a partner in meeting the world's problems will increase still further.

For these reasons, the United States will continue to have a great stake in maintaining influence in the decisions and policies of Europe's governments and multinational organizations. NATO in particular, the institutional embodiment of the transatlantic partnership, has been the key element in maintaining general peace in Europe for more than 45 years, an achievement unparalleled by any other international organization. Critical to America's interests in the region is maintaining the viability and vitality of NATO as an institution which is able to deter and defend against any attacks on its members. At the core of NATO's success is the integrated military command structure, through which the forces of the Alliance cooperate, train, and plan together for the common defense.

Economic Interests

An often ignored facet of Europe's importance to U.S. national security is the tremendous economic benefits Americans receive from our cooperative relationship with this prosperous and dynamic region. Inside the "zone of stability" defended by NATO, the United States and its allies have developed strong economic ties that have been of great mutual profit. These ties generate jobs for American workers, quality

goods for American consumers, and investments and profits for American businesses.

America's military presence in Europe and the defense contributions of our allies are the prerequisites for the stable security environment that nurtures these economic benefits. By pursuing a policy that shares responsibility for defending our mutual interests with our transatlantic allies,

Economic Importance of Europe

- Nearly 3 million Americans are employed in the United States by European-owned firms, and 1.5 million American workers are supported by U.S. exports to Europe.
- About 50% of U.S. direct investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60% of foreign direct investment in the United States is from Europe.
- Europe has more of the Gross World Product than any other region—in 1992, 35% at market exchange rates and 27% at purchasing power parity exchange rates.
- Europe was the United States' second-largest customer in 1993, taking 31% of U.S. exports of goods and services, exceeded only by Asia with 33%.
- Europe was the United States' second-largest supplier in 1993, providing 29% of U.S. imports of goods and services, exceeded only by Asia with 41%.
- Europe provides the United States with relatively balanced trade, with only a \$7 billion U.S. merchandise trade deficit in 1993, compared to \$115 billion for Asia.

Source: *Strategic Assessment 1995* by INSS

America reduces its own defense costs and increases the security of its vital economic interests.

Expanding the "zone of stability" will not only decrease the threat of instability damaging our economic interests in Europe, but will also increase the value of those interests as the development of new markets provides new trade and investment opportunities for Americans. The result of such prudent security investments in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to parallel the economic benefits we derive from our 40-year security relationship with our NATO allies: increasing employment opportunities, expanded selection of products, and profitable investments and exports.

Social and Cultural Interests

The majority of Americans claim European ancestry or ethnic origin. In the 1990 U.S. Census 249 million people were counted:

U.S. Population Claiming Sole or Primary European Ancestry or Ethnic Origin

	Millions	Percent
German	45.6	18.3
Irish	22.7	9.0
English	22.7	9.0
Italian	11.3	4.5
Polish	6.5	2.6
French	6.2	2.5
Scot-Irish	4.3	1.7
Dutch	3.5	1.4
Scottish	3.3	1.3
Swedish	2.9	1.2
Norwegian	2.5	1.0
Welsh	1.0	0.4
Other Western European	5.1	2.1
Former Yugoslavia	0.8	0.3
3 Baltic States	0.6	0.2
Other Eastern European	3.5	1.4
TOTALS	142.5	56.9

Source: U.S. Census, 1990

143 million of these—87% of those indicating specific foreign ancestries and 57% of the total population—indicated European ancestry.


Moreover, there are myriad of deep historical and political-philosophical ties between the United States and Europe. America's relationship with Europe and the mutual security interests the United States defends with its allies are thus of fundamental importance to the American public.

Fundamental Objectives

At the most basic level, our national objectives are to secure for Americans their lives and personal safety; their values, freedoms, and institutions; and their prosperity. The surest approach to securing these basic goals is for the United States and the free nations of Europe to preserve, adapt, and extend current mechanisms for policy coordination and cooperation, thus laying an ever stronger basis for the pursuit of common ends.

Given the great importance of Europe to the United States, there are certain objectives which take on overarching importance to this nation in its relations with the nations of Europe and which shape our strategy toward them:

- Continuing adherence by our allies to democratic principles, preventing the renationalization of foreign and defense policies, strengthening constructive economic relations vital to our prosperity, and maintaining a close and cooperative security relationship for addressing global problems;
- Deterring and defending against threats to the territory of NATO members;
- Assisting the consolidation of democratic and market reforms in the East and helping to promote stability by engaging the new European democracies in a growing network of security relationships, both bilateral and multilateral;
- Preventing the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in active cooperation with Canada and Europe's technologically advanced states;
- Deterring the spread of instability in Europe, especially in some Balkan and former Soviet states where the end of communism has led to the reopening of old wounds;
- Developing effective capabilities to contain and resolve regional conflicts, including military capabilities for peacekeeping and peace enforcement; and
- Preserving and enhancing the effectiveness of European security organizations, especially NATO, as the principal vehicle for continued United States leadership and influence on European security issues.



DoD Photo by Ward

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry attending the Informal Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Seville, September 29, 1994.

Engagement and Enlargement

President Clinton has declared U.S. support for expanding the zone of stability through his vision of "a free and undivided Europe" and "an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity." The challenge is to assist our Eastern partners in developing democracy and free markets, maintain a strong NATO Alliance, and avoid the creation of new dividing lines that could exacerbate security threats in Europe. Through a strategy of "engagement and enlargement" the United States has already taken bold steps to meet this challenge.

With the end of the Cold War, there is a need to develop a new security architecture that builds upon and adapts the current security relationships in response to the dramatically changed environment. Fortunately, the United States and its transatlantic allies and friends share common values and objectives, and have inherited from the Cold War era institutions and relationships that facilitate coordination of policies and cooperation. We are now seeking to preserve, adapt, and extend these patterns and institutions to meet the new challenges and priorities of today.

The central security pillar of the new architecture is the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. NATO is the most successful and capable political-military alliance in history. NATO is a unified force for stability in a fragmented, unstable world. We and our allies cherish peace and freedom, respect human rights, and thrive on free enterprise.

The Alliance is a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. NATO provides a proven structure for managing transatlantic security. This is why its mission has endured, and why its benefits are so attractive to Europe's new democracies.

President Clinton's comprehensive strategy to develop a new interlocking security architecture builds on the success and enduring value of NATO while also working to strengthen other institutions with a critical role to play in European integration. Its key elements include accelerating NATO's transformation, enhancing the Partnership for Peace, developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU), and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Intra-Alliance Activities

NATO's Transformation

In response to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Alliance began a historic transformation that continues today. New goals were set forth in NATO's London Summit Declaration of July 1990. NATO declared that it no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program for cooperation open to all the former communist states of the East. Just as importantly, NATO called for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its strategy.

This declaration also led to the establishment of the first formal ties between NATO and the countries of what was then the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

In June 1991 in Copenhagen, NATO continued its evolution by issuing a statement declaring, "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free." This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to extend security throughout Europe.

The work begun at the London Summit came to fruition in the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991, when the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept which committed NATO to a broad approach to stability and security. The new Strategic Concept reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense. It also clearly identified the changing European security landscape and sought to encourage the changes that were underway in the East. The strategy stressed dialogue and partnership with the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact. It identified for the first time the importance of addressing security threats beyond the NATO area, establishing the basis for peacekeeping and coalition crisis management operations as important NATO missions. In pursuit of these objectives, the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands were radically restructured to better deal with the new security environment in Europe.

Another manifestation of NATO's commitment to an inclusive Europe was its creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the same Rome Summit. This established a new institutional framework for consultation and cooperation on political

and security issues between NATO and the former communist states of the East.

In 1992, NATO took the unprecedented step of declaring its willingness to make its resources and expertise available on a case-by-case basis for peacekeeping activities outside NATO territory under the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE) and the United Nations (UN).

The next milestone was the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, where the United States launched three important milestones that markedly accelerated NATO's transformation. These were the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and counterproliferation initiatives.

Combined Joint Task Forces

In 1994, the Alliance recognized that it would be necessary to examine ways in which NATO's forces and structures could respond more efficiently and flexibly to new security challenges while providing capabilities for Europeans to address security concerns under their own banner. In so doing, NATO sought ways to make it possible for non-NATO partners to participate in NATO-led contingencies. The resulting concept, known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), will meet that challenge through the provision of "separable but not separate" military structures that will avoid wasteful and expensive duplication of effort and assets in responding to security concerns both inside and outside the scope of NATO collective defense.

The concept of the CJTF is designed to allow NATO forces and structures

to respond more efficiently and flexibly to new security challenges, while also supporting a strengthened European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union (WEU). Under this concept, a CJTF could deploy as a NATO-led force or, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, as a WEU-led force supported by the collective assets of the Alliance. In either case, non-NATO members, such as PFP partners, could also participate. The January 1994 NATO Summit endorsed this concept and called upon NATO authorities to develop it further and proceed with its implementation.

Essentially, this concept seeks to adapt NATO's internal structure to meet the challenges of the future. The United States supports the identification of CJTF elements at major NATO commands. Once activated, a CJTF could deploy in various configurations for Article Five contingencies (defense of NATO territory) or for new contingencies, such as crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. Discussions are underway at NATO headquarters to develop the plans and formulate the guidance required to finalize the CJTF concept and to proceed with its implementation. We are seeking to reach agreement on the details of the CJTF concept by the end of this year.

Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States has been working with its NATO allies to develop a common approach to countering proliferation. Following President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 Summit on the danger to NATO from proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) and the initiative launched by allied leaders, the Alliance has made significant progress toward integrating a counterproliferation policy into its new, post-Cold War agenda.

In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone documents: a political framework paper structuring the broad political-military approach of the Alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase work plan for the newly created Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (SDGP) to address the defense implications of proliferation. The Senior Defense Group is co-chaired by the United States and one of the European allies (currently France) on a rotating basis. Having assessed the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the Alliance, the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation has begun the next phase of its work, in which it is grappling with the operational implications of the use of weapons of mass destruction for the Alliance's military capabilities. In this task NATO is building on the relevant capabilities of the national militaries and the joint work of NATO planning groups. NATO is working to establish a defense policy framework for defense activities related to proliferation and to provide conclusions on the full spectrum of needed Alliance and national capabilities.

The Defense Group's work in assessing proliferation risks to NATO is an important part of NATO's continuing adaptation to the new security environment. While diplomatic efforts to prevent proliferation remain NATO's primary goal, NATO must also ensure that it has the range of capabilities needed to discourage the use of weapons of mass destruction and to counter, if necessary, threats to NATO populations, territory, and forces. Political-military uncertainties

and future technological trends related to weapons of mass destruction will inform NATO's decisions today about needed future capabilities. NATO is concerned about the continuing risks of illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery, and the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to states on NATO's periphery.

NATO's work clearly shows that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The Alliance remains relevant and forward-looking on military topics central to its core mission of collective defense, and demonstrates the continued interest of the European allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the United States and Canada.

Building a New European Security Architecture

Partnership for Peace

President Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative was the centerpiece of the January 1994 NATO Summit. This initiative sought to go beyond the dialogue and cooperation already underway in the NACC and to forge a real partnership with the new Eastern democracies as well as other European states, such as the former neutrals, willing and able to participate. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. Participating states will work within PFP in concrete ways to promote transparency in defense planning, democratic control of the military, and joint planning and training with NATO military forces. Over the long term, a key objective is to develop partner capabilities to operate effectively with NATO forces in

such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. Those who participate actively will begin developing the standard operating procedures, the habits of cooperation, and the routines of consultation that are the lifeblood of an effective military relationship.

Within the Partnership each participating state will be encouraged to pursue its relationship with NATO at a pace and scope determined by its own capabilities and interests. To join PFP, the first step is to sign the Framework Document approved at the 1994 Summit. A partner then outlines its interests in PFP and advises NATO of what it plans to contribute. Essentially, while NATO develops an overall Partnership Work Program, each partner "creates" an individual program tailored to its own needs. This is formalized in an agreed Individual Partnership Program which the partner and NATO work out on a bilateral basis. The overall work program and individual programs will then be updated on an annual basis. As this process evolves, we expect that some partners, through a process of self-differentiation, will become fully ready to join the Alliance as effective contributors to NATO's common security.

In its first year, PFP has evolved from a promising idea to a bold reality. Important developments include the following:

- As of April 1995, 26 nations have joined PFP including all of the former Warsaw Pact nations and their successor states, except Tajikistan, and most of the former neutrals. Several have full-time representatives at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.



NATO Information Service Photo

NATO and Partner troops participating in a PFP exercise in Poland, September, 1994.

- A Partnership Coordination Cell has been established at Mons, Belgium (the location of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe) to carry out the military coordination and planning necessary to implement PFP programs. Most partners have full-time liaison officers there.
- After developing an initial Partnership Work Program for 1994, the Alliance has approved a much more ambitious program for 1995—including hundreds of training, planning and consultation activities involving almost all of NATO's principal committees.
- Most partners have already concluded agreed Individual Partnership Programs, and the first updating of these programs is now underway.
- Three exercises involving forces from partners and NATO countries were held last fall in Poland, the Netherlands and the North Sea. Over ten more complex field exercises and over 100 related events are scheduled for 1995, including several exercises in partner nations and a U.S.-hosted peacekeeping exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana in the summer of 1995. In addition, there will be numerous bilateral exercises with partner nations "in the spirit of PFP."
- A PFP defense planning and review process, similar to the Alliance's force planning system, was launched in January 1995. This will be a key means for achieving the goal of developing partner forces that can operate effectively with NATO forces. Fourteen partners have elected to participate in this process.

Most have already responded to a PFP survey, sharing data on their overall defense programs and identifying shortfalls in the interoperability of their forces. The Alliance has already begun to agree on interoperability objectives for each participant, which will be refined and further developed in subsequent iterations of this process.

PFP is already having a significant effect on partner nations. For example, some partners are submitting their Individual Partnership Programs to their parliaments for approval—establishing legislative oversight of military policy for the first time in recent history. Some are also beginning, with bilateral assistance as well as guidance from NATO, to organize most if not all of their armed forces around NATO planning concepts. Perhaps most important, PFP is already succeeding in extending eastward the zone of stability that NATO has helped to establish within the Alliance. A case in point is Hungary and Romania. These two nations, which have long-standing historic grievances, are using their cooperation with NATO to improve their bilateral security relationships.

Successful implementation of PFP's many objectives requires adequate funding. Many partners lack the resources to take full advantage of what NATO is offering. While partners are expected to pay their own way to the maximum extent feasible, we must ensure that adequate funding is available at NATO and in national bilateral channels to maintain the momentum of PFP.

Overall, the United States considers the Partnership an integral and lasting part of the new European security architecture. As the Alliance has made clear from the outset, participation in PFP will not guarantee admission to NATO but is the path

to membership for countries wanting to join. For some, PFP will be an essential tool in the demanding task of preparing themselves to meet the responsibilities of full NATO membership. PFP also provides a valuable framework for evaluating the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO membership—a testing ground for their capabilities.

PFP will have an equally important role to play for those partners not initially admitted into the Alliance or that do not wish to become NATO members. For them PFP could be their key link to the Alliance for many years to come. A robust and vigorous PFP will provide them with critical reassurance that NATO is concerned with their security as well as providing a structure for increasing close cooperation with NATO—in itself an important relationship for continued stability and security in Europe. Hence, for the foreseeable future, the dynamic interaction between NATO members and non-members through PFP will be an essential part of our overall efforts to move beyond the competitive alliance systems that have long plagued European history and to extend eastward a "zone of stability" to Europe as a whole.

NATO Enlargement

Another key element of the new European security architecture will be NATO enlargement. In the communique of the Alliance Summit in January 1994, NATO Heads of State and Government stated that they "expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." This initiative in part responded to the strong interest in NATO enlargement by several of the new

democracies of Central Europe. As President Clinton has said, the question is not whether enlargement will happen, but when and how.

This Summit commitment to enlargement was given additional impetus at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1994. Specifically, the Foreign Ministers accepted a U.S. proposal to launch a study of "how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership." This study is scheduled for completion in mid-1995, and the results will then be briefed to interested PFP partners. At their December 1995 meeting, the Ministers will assess the discussions with partners and decide on the next steps.

There is general agreement within the Alliance on several key points regarding NATO enlargement. These include the following:

- NATO enlargement should contribute to stability and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic region and not pose a threat to any nation.
- Enlargement should be gradual, deliberate, and transparent—not secret.
- There is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO. The answers to the critical questions of who and when will emerge after completion of the current phase of this process.
- Each nation will be considered individually, on a case-by-case basis.
- The decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the Alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto.

- All members, regardless of size, strength or location, should be full members of the Alliance, with equal rights and obligations.

As NATO proceeds with enlargement, the United States will seek to ensure that NATO continues to adhere to the principles that have made it the strongest and most successful Alliance in history. The first of these is commitment to democratic values. Although specific criteria for membership have not been determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington Treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949. New members must be democratic, have market economies, protect freedom and human rights inside their borders and be committed to responsible security policies outside their borders. As President Clinton has stated, "countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply."

A second key principle is the need to preserve solidarity. NATO, even with an enlarged membership, must continue to work by consensus. New NATO members will not be expected to agree on everything. But they must be willing to hammer out differences on security matters in a spirit of cooperation. For the maintenance of Alliance unity, a commitment to building consensus is essential.

Third, NATO must remain committed to an effective collective defense. New members must be prepared to defend the Alliance and have the capable, professional military forces to do it. At the same time, NATO must be prepared to come to the defense of any new member. In the U.S. view, an important implication is that new members must commit to joining

the integrated military structure of the Alliance. Participation in that structure is critical to preserve the military effectiveness of the Alliance.

A closely related principle is the need to strive toward interoperability of military forces. While full interoperability cannot be expected—and indeed does not exist even among current NATO members—the forces of new members must be capable of operating with NATO's forces, at least at a minimal level of efficiency. This means being open with defense budgets and plans, having common defense doctrine and procedures, and commonality on some equipment, especially communications equipment.

As previously suggested, the best way to prepare prospective members to become effective contributors to NATO is active participation in the Partnership for Peace. NATO enlargement and PFP are thus not alternatives to each other; they are complementary processes. They are both part of a mutually supporting, seamless whole that must work together to achieve our vision of an expanded Alliance coupled with a robust partnership.

Cooperation with Russia

Another key element in the new architecture is strengthening cooperation with Russia. Russia is preeminent by its size, geostrategic importance, and military potential among the states emerging from communist tyranny, and is sure to have a major influence on Europe's security. An active and constructive security relationship with Russia is critical to building a stable European future. If the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the enduring strategic problem



NATO Information Service Photo

Russia's Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev visiting NATO Headquarters in Brussels, May 23, 1994.

of integrating the former communist states, especially Russia, into a stable European security system.

To this end, the United States and its allies are pursuing strengthened relations with Russia on a bilateral basis, as well as in various multinational fora. Russia is already involved in most aspects of the emerging architecture. It participates actively in the OSCE and worked closely with the United States in upgrading that organization. Russia has signed an ambitious partnership agreement with the EU. It is a candidate for membership in the Council of Europe and the OECD. The United States supports deeper Russian participation in the Group of 7 industrialized nations and is sponsoring Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization, successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For the first time since 1945, Russia is participating, as a member

of the Contact Group on Bosnia, in a multinational negotiating team presenting a unified position on a difficult European security issue.

As part of these European ties, the United States and its NATO allies have agreed with Russia to develop relations between the Alliance and Russia, in parallel to NATO expansion, both within PFP and outside it. The need for a special effort toward Russia is inherent in Russia's importance in European security. Indeed, if NATO expansion and PFP are to succeed in their goal of helping to ensure a more stable and secure Europe for all Europeans, a close, enduring, and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia is absolutely essential. Of course, we face challenges in defining and developing this relationship. Although Russia has joined PFP, many Russians still harbor a negative attitude toward NATO and its policies. This reaction reflects Russian misconceptions concerning NATO's process of enlargement, and historical habits of regarding NATO as Russia's "enemy." Through cooperation with NATO, Russia will see that the Alliance is no enemy, that a stable Central Europe is in Russia's interest, and that the United States and its allies are working to avoid the divisions that existed in the past.

The first steps in building a new NATO-Russia relationship have already been agreed to in principle—active Russian participation in PFP commensurate with that nation's importance and capabilities, and implementation of the plan for cooperation in a wide range of areas outside PFP. Beyond that, we are considering how we could establish a new longer-term NATO-Russia relationship in time, through some type of formal agreement. The precise nature of such an agreement, as to form

and content, remains to be determined. It could well involve substantially enhanced consultation procedures on issues affecting European security. It would also likely involve mutual guarantees of peaceful relations. In the months ahead, we hope the Alliance and Russia can achieve an understanding on the direction in which the NATO-Russian relationship should evolve.

The goal of such an arrangement will be to ensure, without compromising either NATO's or Russia's right of independent decision, that each is fully aware of the other's concerns and that there are no "surprises" on issues of mutual concern. We intend to develop such an arrangement in parallel with progress on NATO enlargement. However, neither Russia nor any other nation outside the Alliance will have a veto over that process. Enlargement and development of the NATO-Russia relationship are complementary yet separate priorities.

EU Integration and Expansion

An expanded European Union will be another important element of the new European security architecture. For more than forty years both Democratic and Republican Administrations have supported peaceful European integration. The EU not only has achieved deeper economic integration, but also has taken significant steps toward strengthening its political and security identity.

The Maastricht Treaty in 1991 provided for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and requested that the WEU elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications. The EU has already designated certain areas, such as humanitarian aid for Bosnia

and the Middle East peace process for joint action. The EU's intergovernmental conference in 1996 will review Maastricht Treaty provisions and discuss, *inter alia*, options for developing the WEU's relationship with the EU and institutionalizing issues related to further EU expansion. In January 1995, the EU accepted Austria, Sweden, and Finland as new members.

The West Europeans' desire for a European security and defense identity has led to deeper relations between NATO and the WEU. EU members that are members in NATO form the strong European Pillar of the Alliance. The new CJTF initiative, as discussed above, will allow the use of NATO assets in "Europe-only" WEU contingencies.

Future expansion of the EU and WEU can be integral to strengthening security and stability in Europe, but there is a

need for complementarity with the process of NATO enlargement. Divergence in WEU and NATO membership could lead to asymmetries in the security commitments of the two organizations and create "backdoor" security guarantees for non-NATO members.

Strengthening OSCE

Security in Europe today means resolving conflicts, many of them centuries old, before they escalate into warfare as Bosnia has. This is why we have strengthened mechanisms formerly associated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We are also making vigorous use of its norms, ensuring full implementation of its commitments, and increasing political and material support for its conflict prevention activities. The OSCE is not only the "Conscience



White House Photo

President Clinton attending the CSCE/OSCE Summit in Budapest, December 5, 1994.

of Europe," it is also the only Pan-European security body. This provides it with a special role as a unique forum for addressing issues important to its members.

Under the leadership of the United States, a significant evolution of the OSCE, beyond the adoption of a new name, was started in December 1994 at the Budapest Summit. OSCE members developed a comprehensive framework for the future of conventional arms control, established uniform non-proliferation principles among the 52 member nations, and pledged greater political and material support for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the preventive diplomacy missions, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Furthermore, Russia and the OSCE as a whole agreed to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and to provide an OSCE peace-keeping mission there once a political agreement is reached. All of these achievements are important steps on OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization with greater capabilities, operating without regard to old Cold War dividing lines.


These decisions complement our efforts at NATO, and the efforts of the European Union to pursue cooperative, integrated security structures for Europe. The OSCE, NATO, and the EU each have unique, necessary roles. The functions as well as the structures of the OSCE, NATO, and the EU are entirely different, and shall remain so; each will retain its separate authority, even as their roles complement each other. We must also develop new methods to identify and deal with future potential "Bosnias" by addressing at an early stage the causes of conflict. We are bolstering the OSCE so it can prove its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading democratic values and legitimizing human rights.

Bilateral Relations

Maintaining Existing Bilateral Ties

The United States has a strong interest in maintaining the valuable bilateral relationships we have built over the past fifty years with our NATO allies. As the only other non-European member of NATO, Canada has made important and long-standing contributions to European security: it has been a part of the CSCE/OSCE since its inception in 1973; it is a signatory of the CFE Treaty; and, even though it no longer has forces permanently stationed in Europe, its troops make up a substantial part of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. We enjoy political, economic, military and cultural connections with this transatlantic region that are not surpassed by those we have with any other nation or area. Furthermore, our common support for democracy, capitalism, human rights, and the rule of law underpins our shared strategic interests. These ties and shared values are the real bedrock of the North Atlantic Alliance.

In addition to being friends and allies, the nations of Western Europe are also vital bilateral partners of the United States. Thus, for example, in keeping with our long-standing "special relationship" with the United Kingdom, we routinely consult the British on a bilateral basis when considering our response to a new or emerging international crisis. Likewise, Germany is a crucial partner of the United States and, since its reunification, has been a key player in bringing the emerging democracies of the East closer to the West. Similarly, by drawing on their own historic and cultural connections, the Nordic countries have taken the lead in supporting the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are working in concert with the United States,



DoD Photo by Stikkel

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry being greeted by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl before taking part in the departure ceremonies of allied troops from Berlin, September 8, 1994. General George A. Joulwan, SACEUR, is in the background.

Germany and Great Britain to help the Baltic states develop independent defense forces and a joint Baltic Battalion for participation in international peacekeeping operations.

Our bilateral relationships with Western Europe are also essential to the pursuit of shared goals outside Europe. France, for example, is in the forefront of nations willing to commit troops and other national resources for international peacekeeping operations—as demonstrated in the Middle East, Rwanda, and Somalia. Belgium and the Netherlands have also made significant peacekeeping contributions in crises worldwide. Similarly, Italy's decision to allow U.S. forces unlimited use of its military facilities during the Gulf War greatly contributed to our success there, as did Spain's provision of essential logistical support and Portugal's

willingness to permit broad access to military facilities at Lajes Air Base in the Azores.

Growing instability in North Africa and our continued interest in the Persian Gulf make our traditional ties to Greece and Turkey all the more important. As the ongoing Operation Provide Comfort II demonstrates, Turkey is a formidable American ally and staunch NATO member in a region that is a crossroads of cultures and continents. The U.S. facilities at Souda Bay in Greece make a substantial contribution to our conduct of naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean, and have been frequently used as a transit point for humanitarian aid.

All in all, it is impossible to consider American strategy toward Europe as a whole without first understanding the extent to which

this is shaped by our strong, long-standing and still-vital bilateral relationships with our allies in the region. Through the expenditure of untold numbers of American lives and vast resources, through two world wars and throughout the Cold War, the United States clearly demonstrated its own vital interest in the security and stability of this region. Today the allies and friends who stood with the United States over the past fifty years occupy a well-deserved place of honor and respect in the formulation of American policy. And we look forward to building upon this partnership as together we seek to broaden the zone of democracy, security and prosperity across the entire European continent.

Reaching Out Toward The East

Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have struggled to free them-

selves from the habits ingrained by several decades of communist rule. Overcoming the communist legacy within their military establishments has been a particularly difficult task. While the communist system of Party control over the military has been abolished, the channels of civilian control common to the West are as yet very fragile and sometimes uncertain. Under the Clinton Administration, the United States is encouraging military reform in the former communist countries to ensure civilian control of the military, foster greater intraregional cooperation, and "jump start" NATO's Partnership for Peace.

A key bilateral program to assist in reaching PFP goals is the Warsaw Initiative, announced by President Clinton in Poland in July 1994. This program, if funded by the Congress, will provide \$100 million to PFP members in FY 1996. At the same time, we are already reaching to the East through



NATO Information Service Photo

NATO and Partner forces participating in a PFP exercise in the Netherlands, October 21, 1994.



programs such as the Bilateral Working Group meetings, the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), and the International Military Education and Training program, as well as special initiatives in the areas of regional airspace management and defense resource management.

Twice the crossroads of World War, Central Europe is an area of great strategic interest to the United States. In order to reap the benefits of the end of the Cold War and to ensure lasting stability in Europe, we and our allies must work to help ensure the success of political and market reforms in this crucial region.

Over the past five years, all of the Central European countries have worked to make the transition from totalitarian governments to representative democracies with market-oriented economies. They have also sought to secure their newly found freedom primarily through closer association with the European Union and NATO. More recently, they have begun to pursue limited cooperation with Moscow, at least in part to prove that closer ties to the West should not be viewed by Russia as a threat. The consolidation of democratic governments in the region and U.S. efforts to bring these countries closer to NATO are key elements in preventing a security vacuum in the region. Likewise, Central European efforts to establish cooperative relationships with Russia will be key to the enlargement of NATO in a way which expands the security and stability of all Europe.

The success of the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining stable and independent democracies is a key to our aim of a secure, undivided Europe. The United States is pursuing pragmatic security

partnerships seeking cooperation and promoting favorable reform trends. At the same time, we are also engaging in serious dialogue on our differences and hedging against a possible reversal of reform. In addition to promoting overall regional security and stability, this course seeks the security benefits of reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, improving its security safeguards, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology. Recent internal conflicts and political instability within former Soviet states only underscore the importance of this pragmatic approach.

Each of the NIS nations faces its own unique challenges and will receive U.S. support and encouragement for its independence and democratization. Russia occupies a position of particular importance. The United States is pursuing constructive relations with Moscow that will promote Russia's peaceful, democratic evolution, and at the same time, contribute to greater security and stability throughout Europe. An independent and democratic Ukraine is also of great importance to European security, and we are committed to a broad agenda of security cooperation with Ukraine. Our policies will also reflect the importance of regional stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Key Regional Issues

With the end of Communism and the successful conclusion of the Cold War, the threat of major war among the Western European powers is at the lowest level in more than a century. However, these same momentous events have given rise to great uncertainty over the future of the continent:

- A key danger to the security of the region is the prospect for ethnic conflict, as we see today not only in Bosnia but also in such areas as trans-Dniester, the Caucasus and Tajikistan. In the Bosnia case, there is clearly a threat of wider conflict in the Balkans.
- The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union created the risk of hostilities among groups with conflicting territorial claims, such as in Nagorno-Karabakh, and concern over the fate of co-ethnics, for example Russians left in the other NIS.
- The outcome of Russia's ongoing revolution remains to be seen. We have strongly protested some recent troubling developments, such as the operation in Chechnya. Still, Russia is continuing reforms and policies in a wide-range of other areas which the United States on balance considers positive. However, the threat to this reform is significant, with the possibility of a reversal that, over time, could lead to a resurgent, aggressive Russia.
- Another important danger, especially with the breakup of the former Soviet Union, is the increased risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
- In addition, unrest, economic deprivation, and rising Islamic extremism threaten stability on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, with the attendant risk of massive immigration to Western Europe and growing pressures on Western democratic governments.
- Because the vast needs of the emerging democracies far outstrip any one

nation's abilities to provide assistance, coordinated efforts will be needed to support and uphold democracy and market reforms.

- The ever-increasing interdependence of the international economy means that maintaining growth, innovation, and job creation in our own economy will be tied increasingly to the maintenance and expansion of free and fair international trade.
- The dangers from terrorism, drugs, money laundering, and organized crime will likewise require successful cooperation between the United States and its allies.

The end of the Cold War, of course, also presents a major opportunity—if the gains of recent years can be consolidated. To meet this challenge, we are pursuing a comprehensive policy involving political and economic, as well as security initiatives by both the United States and its allies. At the same time, the current period of instability in many parts of Europe makes it imperative that NATO, as the continent's preeminent security organization, maintain a central role in European security matters.

Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures

Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in the arms control arena match what is taking place in the transatlantic region. U.S. and allied efforts to comply with the protocols and confidence- and security-building measures of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Vienna Document 1994 (VDOC 94) set

the highest example for the international community on how to responsibly comply with and participate in the cooperative security arrangements.

The INF Treaty, which removed from Europe and eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, continues to be implemented in Europe and reduces nuclear tension on the continent. The CFE Treaty represents the most comprehensive conventional arms control treaty since World War II. U.S. forces completed their required equipment reduction and destruction a full two years ahead of schedule. In addition, their direct participation in VDOC 94 confidence-and security-building measures, such as unit inspections, exercise observations, base visits, and military equipment demonstrations, continues to help reduce military tensions and suspicions, and improves confidence and stability in Europe.

In looking towards the future, continuing to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will remain high priorities in transatlantic security policies. Implementation of START I and the ratification and implementation of START II, will dramatically reduce U.S. and former Soviet nuclear arsenals. These agreements and the recently agreed permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will not only advance our strategic interests in the region, but will also contribute to the stability of the entire international community. Regionally, the United States intends to remain fully engaged and to support other important arms control initiatives, including the just-ratified Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued implementation of the Open Skies Treaty.

War and Tensions in the Balkans

The breakup of Yugoslavia following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe generated the first major post-Cold War conflict involving cooperative U.S., UN and NATO military operations. This sometimes awkward overlap has yet to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement among the hostile parties, but it has contained the conflict, kept humanitarian support flowing to needy areas and reduced the level of fighting. These accomplishments are significant given the varying national security interests, force commitments and procedures of the individual nations involved. While the vital interests of the United States and its European partners are not directly threatened by conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the partners understand the importance of the issues and the indirect threats to vital areas and interests.

The potential for Balkan wars to spread is well known. The risk of a wider war is particularly dangerous to sensitive relationships in Southern Europe and cooperation between strategic NATO allies. Moreover, preventing ethnic wars which threaten political, social and economic development in new nations is essential to creating a peaceful environment in post-Cold War Europe.

U.S. policy in the Balkans has four specific goals: (1) contain the conflict and limit its threat to our allies and the fragile democracies of Central Europe until such time as the conflict is ended, (2) support the flow of humanitarian assistance and the protection of innocent civilians, (3) mediate cease-fires and agreements toward the goal of a peaceful settlement consistent with the Contact Group plan, and (4) support NATO responses to UN requests for air strikes

or other agreed military support to limit the conflict.

The United States has committed considerable energy and resources to achieve these goals.

- On any one day, 8,000 or more Department of Defense personnel are providing support to NATO operations in the Balkans. Typically, there are 3 or 4 U.S. ships and dozens of aircraft operating over and around the former Yugoslavia.
- The United States has deployed 500 troops with the UNPREDEP mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This military presence is helping to stabilize that country and prevent conflict spillover.
- Another 500 United States personnel are also deployed in Zagreb to staff a hospital that provides medical treatment for UN peacekeepers.
- Through Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, U.S. aircraft participating in the airlift to Sarajevo have flown more than 6,000 sorties and delivered well over 50,000 tons of supplies. The delivery of this important humanitarian aid has been the largest program of air drops since the Berlin airlift.
- The United States has played a leading, constructive role in the diplomatic effort to resolve the issue in the former Yugoslavia through the five-nation Contact Group, other multilateral efforts, and active unilateral contacts.



NATO Information Service Photo

Danish frigate taking part in NATO's Operation SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic, August 1993.

NATO and the UN have emerged as the main mechanisms for coping with the regional military requirements in the Balkans. NATO's military support for UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia is the first combat operation and first out-of-area mission in the history of the Alliance. While NATO's effectiveness should not be judged solely on the degree of success it achieves in the former Yugoslavia, a vigorous role for NATO in the Balkans not only promotes the Alliance's leading role in Europe, but also provides an important means for the members to assert a positive influence in the Balkans. NATO's main goals in the crisis are to help enforce UN security council resolutions aimed at limiting the scope and magnitude of the violence, promoting the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and implementing the arms embargo. It is essential that the conflict be contained not only to limit the destruction of life and property but also to prevent a possible confrontation between neighboring countries, which include our NATO allies.

NATO is making a number of important contributions to limiting the effects of the fighting. These efforts have reduced the level of violence against the civilian population, protected UN forces, and helped secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. NATO operations include:

- Enforcement of the no-fly zone (Operation DENY FLIGHT) restricting the use of air power by the combatants in the conflict.
- Enforcement by naval forces participating in Operation SHARP GUARD of the economic sanctions and the UN arms embargo imposed against parties to the conflict.

- Protection of UN personnel and enforcement of the heavy weapons exclusion zones, if asked to do so, through NATO air power.

All of these efforts show that NATO has unique military and political resources that can be called upon in a crisis. The NATO structure has also shown sufficient flexibility to accommodate the members' differing views on peacekeeping.

The UN, for its part, has dispatched over 38,000 troops from 26 countries to facilitate the work of UN and private relief organizations. UN officials believe their humanitarian mandate means they must maintain strict neutrality. This approach has led to some controversies with NATO, such as over the use of air power, but ways have been found to bridge differences and keep the UN mission in the field.

U.S. policy now is to work through NATO, the UN, and other channels, such as the Contact Group, to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. While acknowledging UNPROFOR's many difficulties, we believe the UN force should remain in Bosnia. The alternative would be a humanitarian disaster. The United States endorses the effort to provide more troops and equipment to make UNPROFOR more effective, and we have made the UN an offer to sell or lease a large amount of U.S. equipment.

Unique Alliance resources and experience in collective action mean there may be other requirements for NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia in the future.

- NATO has offered to assist the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, if a decision is made to withdraw it.
- NATO would probably play a key role in managing a peacekeeping force, if there is a negotiated settlement.

The United States is committed to supporting negotiated peace settlements in Croatia and Bosnia, and this remains our main priority. Our support of NATO's offer to assist the UN if a decision is made to withdraw UN peacekeepers from the area should this prove necessary demonstrates that the United States stands ever ready to assist its allies.

Ongoing Tensions in the Aegean

Two key NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, anchor NATO's southeastern region. They have become more important to the United States since the end of the Cold War.

The stability of these two nations is critical to the region, and to broader U.S. and allied interests. Turkey in particular is now at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent—including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, relations with the NIS, peace in the Middle East, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas. Greece, a member of NATO, occupies a strategic location for command of the eastern Mediterranean sea lanes. Our security assistance programs and those of other NATO partners help the Alliance respond as necessary to events in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East.

We are deeply concerned about growing tensions between Greece and Turkey. Like

the situation in the former Yugoslavia, these tensions pose a threat to broader regional stability and the cohesion of the Alliance. The United States worries that the continuing dispute over air and sea sovereignty in the Aegean and unresolved problems in Cyprus could spark a confrontation that would seriously disrupt the Alliance. NATO's ability to keep the peace among its own members is important for instilling a sense of security in Central Europe and the NIS. Although the problems in the Aegean ultimately must be resolved by the two parties involved, the United States can play an active role in reducing tensions and preventing direct conflict.

Potential Threats Posed By the Rise of Islamic Extremism

The United States shares the concern of southern Europeans that political turmoil in Algeria could escalate into civil war, and that radical Islamic extremism could spread to other North African countries. Growing instability in North Africa may send a flood of refugees across the Mediterranean and strain the political and social fabric in the recipient countries.

The Alliance has committed itself to a dialogue with five North African and Middle Eastern countries—Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. This dialogue is intended to achieve better understanding and to correct any misinterpretation of Alliance objectives and actions that could lead to a perception of threat. A successful start with these countries could lead to later talks with other states. It is important to deepen contacts with the stable and responsible countries of North Africa and the Middle East. The goals of such efforts are to enhance the security of the nations around



the Mediterranean and to improve their relations with one another.

We believe Alliance efforts in the Mediterranean should complement—and not duplicate—initiatives of other fora, such as the EU, the Mediterranean Forum, and the “five plus five” (European countries in the western Mediterranean and the countries of the Arab Union of the Maghreb). The EU, in particular, has a crucial role to play in the region, since the potential for political turmoil is rooted to a large extent in the growing disparity in North-South economic and demographic development.

U.S. Force Structure in Europe

Essential Role of U.S. Forward Presence

U.S. forward military presence in Europe is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in Europe. Simultaneously, the presence of overseas forces strengthens the U.S. leadership role in European affairs and supports our efforts to extend stability to the developing democracies to the East. Overall, the presence of U.S. forces deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassures friends, enhances regional stability, and underwrites our larger strategy of engagement and enlargement.

The forward stationing of these forces in Europe and the day-to-day interaction of our forces with those of our European allies helps to build and maintain the strong bonds of the Alliance. Our forces train with the forces of our NATO allies on a daily basis, creating a degree of interoperability among NATO forces that we do not share with most other militaries of the world. As a result of these routine interactions, we have the ability to conduct high-intensity joint and combined military operations with our NATO allies both in Europe and in other areas of common interests.

The successful DESERT STORM operation to expel Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in 1991 provides the best example of the tangible benefits of forward stationing U.S. forces in Europe to the defense of Western interests

beyond Europe. Because of our close cooperation with the NATO militaries in Europe, we were able to conduct sophisticated, large-scale military operations with the forces of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey. These operations were conducted using NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for everything from doctrine for land warfare to specifications for refueling nozzles for fighter aircraft. The routine military interaction and habits of cooperation facilitated by forward stationing a sizable operational force in Europe made all this possible.

Our forward presence in Europe, and related NATO infrastructure facilities, also greatly assisted essential logistics support for Operation DESERT STORM. In other contingencies as well, forward stationing, by easing the burden on American air and sea lift, can be a critical factor in the capability of U.S. forces to rapidly execute our defense strategy. The U.S. military presence in Europe means that our forces are an ocean closer to areas of potential conflict and have a logistical base to support out-of-area operations.

U.S. security and humanitarian requirements outside the NATO area are now a main determinant of the tempo of operations for forces in the U.S. European Command, whose Area of Responsibility includes not only Europe, but also the Middle East Littoral and Africa. The pace of operations in the U.S. European Command has risen as a result of crises throughout its Area of Responsibility. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, USEUCOM has deployed forces 51 times to over 30

countries. In fiscal year 1994, forces assigned to U.S. European Command participated in six operations, all of them outside the North Atlantic Treaty area:

- **PROVIDE COMFORT**—Underway since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT maintains a security environment which permits humanitarian assistance to flow to the endangered Kurdish population of northern Iraq. This multinational operation includes approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel and conducts 40-50 fixed wing and helicopter sorties per day, on average, from NATO bases in Turkey.
- **SHARP GUARD**—Since April 1993, three U.S. naval vessels and approximately 7,800 personnel participate regularly with NATO allies in maritime enforcement of sanctions against Serbia in the Adriatic Sea, with intermittent support from other assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
- **PROVIDE PROMISE**—About 550 American personnel have been involved in delivering humanitarian aid and supplies to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO bases in Germany and Italy since July 1992.
- **DENY FLIGHT**—Since April 1993, about 1,700 personnel routinely participate with NATO allies in enforcing the ban on military flights over Bosnia, monitoring the United Nations protection areas, and providing close air support to the United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia, when called upon.
- **ABLE SENTRY**—Since the spring of 1993, approximately 500 troops have participated in the United Nations



NATO Information Service Photo

U.S. F-18 participating in NATO's Operation DENY FLIGHT which enforces the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

observer force, now called the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP), in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, providing a stabilizing presence and preventing the conflict in other regions of the former Yugoslavia from spilling over into Macedonia.

SUPPORT HOPE—From June through September 1994, approximately 2,000 USEUCOM personnel deployed to Africa, supported by an additional 2,500 USEUCOM personnel remaining in Europe, organized and carried out emergency humanitarian relief operations for refugees fleeing civil war in Rwanda.

U.S. Military Presence In Europe

A substantial American forward military presence in Europe is necessary to fulfill the various roles outlined above. As the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept states, "The presence of North American conventional and U.S. nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America." Forward deployed U.S. forces

U.S. Military Presence in the European Region



in Europe underpin our commitments to NATO, support the U.S. role in the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program, and ensure a rapid and flexible world-wide crisis response capability.

While U.S. force deployments in Europe remain essential, the number of U.S. forces needed for stability and security has diminished. In response to the dramatic and favorable changes in European security since 1989, we have restructured and drastically reduced our force presence in Europe. U.S. European Command has reduced its forces

by over 200,000 troops since 1989. U.S. Army forces in Europe will have been reduced from 217,000 in 1989 to 65,000 by the end of FY 96 when the drawdown is completed. This represents roughly double the reduction in force throughout the Army as a whole. Army brigades in Europe have been cut from 17 to 4. Air Force presence has been reduced from 9.25 fighter wing equivalents to 2.33 fighter wing equivalents (666 combat aircraft to 168), with a corresponding reduction in the number of personnel. Nuclear forces in Europe have been reduced by over 80% since 1991. Overall, two out of three

U.S. military installations in Europe have been closed, again representing a much greater rate of closure than in the continental United States.

By the end of FY 1996, these force reductions will be largely complete, and for the foreseeable future the force levels involved should be approximately 100,000 U.S. troops. This figure is a sustainable level of U.S. military presence remaining in Europe. The Army component provides substantial elements of two divisions, a corps headquarters and associated assets. The corps assets are especially important since USEUCOM thereby retains specialized capabilities, such as attack helicopters, that are integral to the Army's structure. Both of the U.S. divisions in Europe belong to multinational corps created by NATO as part of the implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept. The United States participates in two of these corps, both with Germany. The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division is assigned to a U.S.-led multinational corps. The corps contains one German division and one American division, and is commanded by the U.S. V Corps commander, who is the sole remaining U.S. Army corps commander in Europe.

The other two-brigade U.S. division remaining in Europe is the 1st Armored Division, which is assigned to a German-led multinational corps. This multinational corps provides a good example of circumstances in which it is very much in American interests to place elements of our forces under the temporary operational control of trusted, competent Allied commanders in order to strengthen the bonds of coalition warfare. In a NATO conflict, this U.S. division would come under the operational control of the German corps commander. But the German-led multinational corps, like all NATO forces in the integrated military command, would ultimately come under the command of the

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—who is also the U.S. CINCEUR.

The 1st Armored Division is dual-tasked: not only does it participate in the German-American multinational corps, it is also assigned to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Like the multinational corps, the ARRC was created as part of the military implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept. Its purpose is to provide NATO the ability to quickly respond in force with a broad coalition of Allied militaries. The only two NATO members which do not commit forces to the ARRC are France, which does not participate in NATO's integrated military command, and Iceland, which has no standing military forces.

The U.S. Air Force units in Europe provide a balanced and flexible force. This force, consisting of 2.33 fighter wing equivalents, can accomplish all traditional Air Force missions, both conventional and nuclear. The combat power of this air component is fully supported by in-place logistics and a robust reinforcement capability. The air component forces are based in all three of Allied Command Europe's geographic regions. They are organized into three fighter wings, an air refueling wing, an airlift wing, and a special operations group.

The U.S. naval component in Europe provides the reception and port facilities to support the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. This force structure includes the ashore support needed to sustain the forward presence of a Carrier Battle Group and a Marine Amphibious Ready Group. In addition, these forces provide ashore maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, special operations forces, theater command, control, communications, as well as computer and intelligence support.

Responsibility Sharing

The Challenge: Finding A New Approach to Collective Defense Requirements

Throughout the Cold War, military contributions were a major measure of achieving an equitable degree of defense burdensharing. The military threat was enormous, immediate and well-understood. However, with the demise of the Soviet system, and the subsequent emergence of a radically different international and regional security environment, there is a need to consider a wider range of defense and security responses than was the case before. Political discourse and terms of reference must go beyond the narrow confines of Cold War-era focal points to encompass and comprehend a more complete range of allied security and defense contributions.

For this reason, the United States has eschewed the term "burdensharing" which has become associated with only one kind of contribution to mutual security, that of Host Nation Support (HNS) for forward-deployed troops. Instead the United States has adopted the term "responsibility sharing" to encompass the whole range of contributions states make to international security: defense spending, alliance and treaty commitments, foreign aid, peace-keeping contributions, and help preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as host-nation support.

The Administration remains committed to increased allied sharing of roles, risks, responsibilities, costs, and benefits of meeting common security goals and objectives. Military and defense efforts remain paramount among factors contributing to peace, security and stability in the post-Cold War

era. Resources and armed forces dedicated to the common defense continue to be the foundation of our cooperative security arrangements with allies.

Host nation support for U.S. forces based in Europe in itself remains an important aspect of responsibility sharing. Such support includes the costs and foregone revenue incurred by nations hosting U.S. forces. For example, Germany provided over \$1.43 billion in HNS in 1993. This consists of both foregone revenue (*i.e.*, waived rents, fees, and charges for land and facilities) and other payments such as labor, utilities, construction, and logistics support. Other European allies make similar contributions.


Some observers have suggested that our European allies should apply the "Japanese model" to their cost-sharing support. The situation in Japan, however, is not analogous to the situation in Europe, and therefore the "Japan model" is neither appropriate nor workable in Europe. Japan's contribution to the common defense consists of two elements, the 65-70 percent of U.S. stationing costs that are paid by Japan, and the overall Japanese defense effort, which is modest in terms of Japan's ability to contribute (1 percent of GDP). For our European allies, the combined effect of increased cost-sharing and sharply reduced military effort relative to ability to contribute would be a drop in annual defense spending from around \$195 billion to \$75 billion, a decline of 60 percent.

In addition to host nation support, we must consider a wide range of allied contributions to the common defense. In fact, we are placing greater reliance on our European NATO allies to take increased responsibility for meeting collective

regional defense requirements. This is an important implication, for example, of the January 1994 NATO Summit initiative on CJTF. As outlined earlier, this concept will allow the use of NATO assets by the WEU in support of crisis management or contingency operations of priority to Europeans, but of lesser importance to the United States.

Practical examples abound of the increased responsibility Europeans are taking for regional and collective security affairs.


A case in point is allied representation in actions designed to support the United Nations' mandates in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Our European NATO allies have provided the majority of forces assigned to execute Operations DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD. Similarly, NATO allies provide significant support to Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. NATO allies (including Canada) have contributed the vast majority of troops to support UN peacekeeping mandates within the FRY.





In other areas, NATO member states have provided significant force contributions to demanding tasks such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Last year, France, Britain, the United States and other nations participated in a *de facto* CJTF involving the transport and delivery of humanitarian and medical relief supplies to war-torn Rwanda. These operations—SUPPORT HOPE and TURQUOISE—are widely acknowledged to have averted a large-scale humanitarian crisis in central Africa. Most recently, European NATO allies participated with U.S. forces in mounting Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the emergency deployment of military assets to Kuwait in the fall of 1994 in response to Iraqi military provocations.

Overall, while the United States is still called upon to provide leadership and to offer prompt and innovative solutions to urgent defense and security problems, we have come to rely more heavily on coordinated but independent allied action in a wide range of political-military arenas. This does not signal an American withdrawal from the international scene, as much as it is an acknowledgment that common defense and security requirements can be met from a variety of alternative sources, allowing us to husband scarce resources and to achieve acceptable results by reliance on our allies and the synergy of combined force activities in pursuit of common goals.



Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, May 25, 1994.

Looking to the Future

For the foreseeable future, most NATO allies—including the United States—plan very little growth, if any, in defense expenditures. Political leaders and military commanders fully anticipate that they will be called upon to meet more and varied defense and security challenges with fewer resources than available in the past. Taking a page from private sector management with downsized assets, effective collective security management in the future will place emphasis on innovation, flexibility, and rationalizing (*i.e.*, achieving the fullest utility from) available resources and capacities.

Simply applying textbook solutions to major defense and security challenges will not be enough. True innovation will come by judicious appraisal of security threats; keen analysis of resource requirements; and timely application of workable solutions to produce desired results in the most effective manner. This is the shape of the future of coalition management within and outside of the NATO context. This is also the setting within which Responsibility Sharing will come into its own.

At the same time that we seek increased support from our transatlantic allies, we need also be mindful of our own national obligations—most notably, support for our military forces stationed throughout Europe, and our financial obligations to the NATO Alliance.

An important aspect of our NATO commitment is U.S. support for the three NATO common budgets—Military, Civil and the Security Investment Program. With no

operating budget of its own, NATO is obliged to seek financial contributions from its constituent members. When pooled, these funds—apportioned from among its members by cost share—ensure that NATO can discharge its mission and program requirements in a timely fashion. In recent years, financial trend lines for NATO common accounts have been on a downward slope. In large part, this trend reflects the demise of the Cold War and the diminution of the immediate military threat. Astute financial management and reform of the system have also produced some marginal savings. But there is no substitute for continuing national appropriations to meet mission and program funding requirements. The United States derives significant political, military and financial benefits from its participation in the NATO Alliance. To assure continued benefits in the future, the United States must meet its financial obligations to the three NATO common budgets.

Progress toward a more peaceful and prosperous world must not be impeded by a weakening of the security framework in Europe whose centerpiece is NATO. The top priority must be to strengthen and adapt U.S. partnerships to meet post-Cold War challenges. The alternative—an erosion of U.S. alliances and trading partnerships—would lead to widespread instability and diminished U.S. influence over international events and decisions that affect the everyday lives of Americans.

Twice in this century, the United States has paid the great costs of learning too late the lesson that European stability is vital to



White House Photo

President Clinton delivering speech to the Polish Sejm (parliament), July 7, 1994. This was the formal announcement of the Warsaw Initiative through which the President pledged to seek \$100 million in financial assistance to PFP members.

our own security. Fortunately, after World War II, the founders of the Alliance paid heed to Santayana's warning that those who do not learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them. NATO's role in winning the Cold War showed the wisdom of a policy of transatlantic engagement, as opposed to the eventual costs of a strategy of isolationism.

We must now build upon NATO and other institutions to create a new security architecture for Europe. The end of the Cold War and the resultant emergence of new democracies has created an unprecedented opportunity for protecting and advancing our interests in Europe through the successful integration of these new democracies with free markets into the community of nations in the "zone of stability and security."

Our strategy contains a number of interlocking elements which mutually support our efforts to pursue our goals in the region. In view of current uncertainties, our strategy must be flexible enough to respond to a wide variety of contingencies.

- NATO must remain at the center of European security. Some European states will push hard to develop a European Security and Defense Identity, but few will increase their capabilities for independent military action. For any major threat—including nuclear threats—the Europeans will continue to look to the United States and to NATO as the principal guarantors of their security.
- At the same time, we must actively pursue our initiatives to adapt NATO to the new realities of the post-Cold War era. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was the centerpiece of the 1994 NATO

Summit and is a key element of our European security strategy. It provides a creative new vehicle for reaching out to the East and it opens dramatic vistas for a future in which Europe breaks with the destructive past. It also is designed to provide a means to help prevent or deal more effectively with future "Bosnias" and other threats to our common security.

- We are also preparing for the enlargement of NATO as new Eastern democracies are added to the Alliance on a case-by-case basis. This process will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It will build on the Alliance's success at enhancing stability in Europe and preventing the renationalization of foreign and defense policies and will strengthen the security of the entire region, including nations which are not members.
- We must simultaneously continue our engagement and cooperation with Russia to help ensure that it continues to pursue the path of democratic reform. A key element of this effort will be to develop and sustain Russian ties with a range of European security organizations, especially NATO, but also OSCE and others. At the same time, we must be prepared to take effective remedial action in the event of a reversal of Russian reforms.
- In addition to our focus on NATO, we are also seeking to develop complementary relationships with other elements of the European security scene, such as the WEU and EU. These relationships will

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strengthen the "European Pillar" of NATO, and strengthen capabilities for common action.

- We are also pursuing a determined effort to strengthen the OSCE both in its historical role as the conscience of the continent and in its new role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
- Similarly, our unique bilateral security ties with Canada are an important part of the overall transatlantic security equation. We intend to keep these ties strong by adapting them to new realities, particularly through a renewed and updated North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) agreement.
- Finally, we must continue to maintain close bilateral security relationships with our European allies and to build such relationships with our new Eastern partners.

Maintenance of our leadership position in the transatlantic community is critical to the success of this strategy. America's unique role as the leading security partner of the world's principal democracies and our unparalleled military assets give us great influence, if we wish to use it. To do so effectively, the United States must retain a significant forward presence in Europe and provide adequate funding support for NATO programs, as well as related bilateral efforts such as the President's Warsaw Initiative.

As President Clinton indicated in Brussels, Europe is at a crossroads. We face great uncertainties but also great opportunities. With the successful conclusion of the Cold War, the vision of a Europe united by a commitment to the principles of democracy and market economies appears to be at last within reach. However, such an outcome is by no means certain, as many difficulties and problems lie ahead. Through our initiatives at the Brussels Summit and our ongoing policies of continued commitment to Europe and maintenance of a strong force presence there, we are in a position to advance our long-sought goals. The strategy outlined above provides a blueprint for doing so. The challenge to us now is to implement it.