


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

NATO'S 21ST CENTURY MISSION -- EXPANSION TO
THE EAST TO INCLUDE POLAND: INCENTIVES AND
OBSTACLES

By
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December 1994

Thesis Advisor:

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The central issue defining the European security debate concerns the future of Central and Eastern European countries currently outside of any durable military or political security arrangement. Since 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has begun to reexamine its historic role within the context of maintaining the Alliance's historic role. Based upon the 1949 Washington Treaty and the 1967 Harmel Report, members have agreed to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation...founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." NATO has accomplished this goal by adhering to the dual approaches of attempting to settle disputes by political means while maintaining a strong military deterrent. The Atlantic Alliance's *raison d'être* into the twenty-first century will hinge upon its ability to take on new missions and new members. There now exists a necessity to "export" NATO's core principles eastward in an attempt to secure the progress of democratic and market reforms. Moreover, security guarantees must be offered to Central and Eastern European states (the Visegrad Four and particularly Poland) because there still exists tangible Eastern risks.

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POLAND: INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's twenty-first century *raison d'être* will include a re-examination of its missions and membership as it attempts to fulfill the historic goals of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Currently (and according to the Washington Treaty) the Atlantic Alliance is designed to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation...founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." If NATO intends to exist into the next century, rather than providing for only the 16 nations security, it must now *export* these ideals and security guarantees beyond its current borders into Central and Eastern Europe. Using the Harmel Report as an historic reiteration of the Atlantic Alliance's function—ensuring Alliance stability by pursuing political solutions and a strong military deterrent—NATO must resolve the perception of the Central Europe security vacuum, thereby ensuring the democratic and market reforms of these nascent free societies. Though the obstacles and costs associated with incorporating only one CEE state (Poland) is staggering, the price of ignoring the problems will be much greater in the future.

The debate over NATO's future course will continue to be a source of debate regardless of the Alliance leader's decisions. NATO's evolutionary development since 1949 and the Alliance's ability to adapt to the changing European security environment provides ample precedents for new members and new missions. Far from the perception of being a stagnant organization, NATO has formulated new policies and missions to address current security realities and keep the Alliance's main goal always illuminated. Since 1989, the Atlantic Alliance has presented a series of declarations that reflect the core goals in the Washington Treaty and the Harmel Report. The declarations presented in London (1990), Copenhagen (1991), Rome (1991) and Brussels (1994) are all indicative of NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era. These declarations have become the basis on which NATO has conducted a rapprochement with the states of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. These pronouncements have also been the conceptual starting point for NATO to reconstitute its force structure and redirect its resources and attention. Each declaration is part of an initial response to the changing security realm. Furthermore, they have produced substantive mechanisms to deal with the complexities of European security. They include the creation of the NACC, the PfP program and the CJTF initiative.

But expanding NATO membership or reexamining its future mission would serve little purpose without justifying the existence of external threats to warrant such

an enlargement. Therefore it is necessary to examine risks to CEE states that might endanger their fledgling democratic-market societies. Though the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization no longer exist and therefore no longer pose an immediate threat to NATO, evidence suggests that Russia possesses adequate resources to pose a direct risk to its Western neighbors. Examining several factors lends one to conclude that Russia's objectives and initiatives over the past few years warrants the inclusion of some CEE states (the Visegrad Four and particularly Poland) into the NATO security structure. The shift of President Yeltsin's foreign policy from "benevolent fraternalism" to "confrontational nationalism" is enhanced in Russia's military doctrine, and its military, diplomatic and economic relations with its neighbors. For NATO to fail to take up the task to "export" its historic commodity of stability would spell the end to the once mighty alliance and acquiesce to Russian sensitivities.

Though some NATO members view expansion as an irrational proposition--the financial costs would be great, Russia would be displeased and Alliance cohesion would be jeopardized--Germany and increasingly the United States view enlargement as a "when" not "if" scenario. NATO members who oppose enlargement in the near term view such a move as provocative to Russia and furthermore not warranted because they insist there is no tangible "Eastern risk." Future deliberations at NATO Headquarters will revolve around the issues of a credible threat to warrant expansion, as well as Russia's reactions and the turmoil and political costs associated with enlargement. While most discussions concern the willingness of NATO members to add new members, Poland can improve its situation vis-à-vis Western integration by complying with general guidelines delineated by NATO leaders. These include improving civil-military relations and transparency of the armed forces, adapting to NATO's military force structure and armaments, maintaining economic stability and improving infrastructure. Additionally, Poland would use selected land forces--like it currently does--and its naval forces to demonstrate a willingness to participate in multilateral and multinational operations currently in progress. Finally, NATO expansion must be examined by weighing the positive and negative aspects as well as the implications for the United States and NATO.

TERMINOLOGY

ACE	ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
APEC	ASIAN-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ASW	ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
AWACS	AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
BALTOPS	BALTIC OPERATIONS (MARITIME EXERCISES HELD ANNUALLY IN BALTIC)
CDU	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
CEE	CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
CFE	NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
CIS	COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
CJTF	COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE
CMEA	COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON)
CNAD	CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS
CPSU	COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
CSBM	CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURE
CSCE	CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
EBRD	EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
EC	EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
EEZ	ECONOMIC EXCLUSION ZONE
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
FDP	FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
FRG	FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
GATT	GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
NAC	NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NACC	NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NBC	NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
NPT	NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
PFP	PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
PHARE	POLISH-HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE RECOVERY
SACEUR	SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
SACLANT	SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

SAR	SEARCH AND RESCUE
SEJM	POLISH PARLIAMENT
SHAPE	SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
START	STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
STU	SECURED TELEPHONE UNIT
UNPROFOR	UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
US	UNITED STATES
USSR	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
VHF	VERY HIGH FREQUENCY
VISEGRAD	REFERS TO A REGION ENCOMPASSING POLAND, HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
WEU	WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
WTO	WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

[The North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO, for its part, is in no danger of losing its political identity. It is an increasingly important institution with respect to Eastern Europe, a process that began with the July 1990 London Declaration invitation to former Warsaw Pact adversaries to establish diplomatic liaison missions at NATO and extended to the Rome Summit's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC is linked to NATO's governing bodies and includes diplomats from the new democracies of Eastern Europe and new states in the former Soviet Union.¹ Facing perhaps its greatest challenge since its creation in 1949, NATO stands at an historic crossroad. The way NATO responds will likely determine whether or not NATO will continue to exist and how stable Europe will remain. Though NATO's classic role of deterring the Warsaw Pact has vanished, NATO remains a transatlantic European security alliance capable of providing stability for Central and East Europe in a sea of uncertainty, anchoring the flanks to Europe, embedding unified Germany in a multilateral structure, and creating confidence through its defense planning functions.²

By 1994 the central issue in the current European security debate had become whether the Atlantic Alliance should include such Central and Eastern European countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO members began a redefinition of the Alliance's historic mission that draws upon the vision of a European order redefined in the 1967 Harmel Report, and later articulated in a series of declarations beginning with the London Declaration in 1990. As of late-1994, the question remains whether NATO faces risks in the East that could evolve into a new threat and whether the mere supposition of such a risk constitutes an expansion of NATO. As long as Russia exists as a nuclearized power and the driving force behind the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) latest offer to former Soviet republics for inclusion in an Eastern military alliance, whatever impressions of danger that its power might convey, collective defense in Europe remains essential. Modern European history, as well as events of the past few years, illustrates the time-honored reflex of states to balance against one another will continue for the foreseeable future. Within this context of states balancing against each other, there also exists in Central and Eastern Europe a security vacuum, a gray area, in between Russia and Germany's Eastern frontier. From this standpoint, Poland, the

¹Philip Zelikow, p. 22.

²Jeffrey Simon, *Orbis*, Winter 1993, p. 35. Simon is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University.

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia have all expressed the hope for swift entry into the NATO Alliance to resolve concerns of their unenviable position within the security vacuum. This paper will analyze what NATO means in 1994, if Poland should be considered for membership and what would be the justification and circumstances allowing such an expansion eastward.

This study traces the events which led to the formation of the 1949 Washington Treaty and the subsequent events which led to the 1967 Harmel Report and the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 which ultimately led to the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The Harmel Report was a politically significant restatement of the Alliance's vocation to pursue political as well as military purposes. This dual track approach (military and political dimensions of the Atlantic Alliance) is the foundation for much of the current discussion and the basis for NATO's direction into the twenty-first century. For now the Poles have accepted the reality that there currently does not exist unanimity within the Alliance to support Poland's immediate inclusion into NATO. However, the Polish government views the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative as the first steps towards full integration in NATO, which will (the Poles hope) serve to fill the perceived security vacuum throughout East Central Europe. The Poles are resigned to working through the outlines of the Partnership for Peace initiative as long as it spells eventual membership. One observer aptly noted the dilemma that now faces Poland as it attempts to secure membership in the Atlantic Alliance:

Adrift somewhere between the prosperous West and the confused, sometimes threatening hodgepodge of states, led by Russia, that make up the former Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe are desperately seeking a security blanket to make it through the lonely night of their wrenching transformation from enforced membership in the Warsaw Pact to capitalism and democracy. That night became even lonelier and potentially longer on December 12, [1993] when Russian ultranationalists, led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and spouting claims to the old Soviet empire, won more votes than any other party in elections for the lower house of Russia's new parliament.³

One critical factor that this work attempts to offer is a set of prescriptive guidelines to accelerate Poland's accession into NATO. This guideline far from being inclusive only to Poland's bid, would serve as litmus test for other "Partnership" hopefuls. As no NATO member has yet to offer a specific list of criteria or timetables for

³John Pomfret. *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*.

eventual membership, this thesis suggests an initial starting point in that discussion and offers a prescriptive approach for Polish leaders to follow. Since 1989, strategic discussion has also centered upon the redefinition of NATO's historic mission – providing stability and protecting western civilization – to exporting stability and conducting "out-of-area" military engagements. The Gulf and Bosnian Wars have demonstrated NATO's commitment to go "out-of-area" when an international dispute has threatened the security of its members; the question remains of whether or not NATO faces a credible threat from the east. As long as Russia exists as a center of vast military power with nuclear weapons, whatever impressions of danger that its power might convey, there is an essential role for collective defense in Europe. The bipolar world that existed throughout the 1980's has given way to a multipolar world and its unstable characteristics. Poland continues to express a profound interest in securing membership in the Atlantic Alliance. First and foremost, their desire is based upon protecting their fragile democratic and market reforms from the imperial designs or catastrophic effects of an eastern neighbor. Irrespective of Polish desires, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program will serve as the mechanisms and initial steps towards full integration in NATO and the means to resolve the perceived security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴ George Kennan clarified the debate over NATO's current situation and the acknowledgment that tensions still exist between East and West. He wrote:

Do the changes now taking place in Russia and Eastern Europe mean the end, if they are carried through, of NATO's usefulness as we have known it in the past? The answer to my mind is, 'Of course not.' What we have before us is not the end of the East-West military confrontation in the center of Europe, but simply the possibility of a reduction of its dimensions, its intensity and the dangers it presents for some time to come.⁵

After 1989, debate over the future of NATO has split into four distinct camps; from the opinion that NATO should cease to exist, or that it should maintain its *status quo* organization, to the view that NATO should broadly expand to include all of the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union. In any event, *The Economist* aptly stated that an expansion of NATO would take much time and money while the

⁴David B. Ottaway, p. A 46. Mr. Ottaway writes that solving the current security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by expanding NATO would ward off the threats of resurgent Russian nationalism and regional ethnic conflicts.

⁵George Kennan's comments are cited by Francis H. Heller, p. 434.

"all-for-one-and-one-for-all" promise, has to be credible, or the Alliance may lose its effectiveness and fall apart.⁶ NATO's *raison d'être* began nearly fifty years ago when the Soviet Union, acting upon what it perceived were the agreements of Yalta, utilized the Red Army to annex large portions of Central and Eastern Europe. Like the thoroughbred that leaps out of the starting gate upon hearing the starter's gun, the Western Europeans and the Americans created a political-military alliance as a result of the postwar actions and statements by Joseph Stalin. He declared, "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."⁷

With the end of the Cold War, the past European structure lost its bipolar nature and emerged as a multipolar one that is inherently less stable. While the war in the former-Yugoslavia is proof, the probability of war erupting in Eastern Europe and along the Russian periphery is more pronounced, therefore it is in every countries' interest to utilize political-military organizations like NATO to dampen the prospects of war.⁸ Thus it is the foremost job of NATO in the future to have the capability to manage crises of extended length and conflict and not just solely to wage a nuclear volley.⁹ More peripheral yet no less important, NATO's creation came at a time when the French required more than verbal commitments to prevent yet a third German trek across their Eastern frontier in the twentieth century. It was this generally held belief circa 1946-47 that French statesman began to look at Germany as either a future willing partner in an economic-military union or as a future adversary in Western Europe.

NATO's mission in 1949 was: providing for Western stability by preventing the invasion of an eastern neighbor and incorporating Germany into a European union as a means of preventing its isolation and the necessity to unilaterally rearm. Since 1949, NATO's core mission has been to safeguard freedom, common heritage and Western civilization while simultaneously containing and deterring a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe. The most remarkable aspect of NATO's success has been its ability to achieve its basic goals by a continuing process of transformation in spite of the need to

⁶*The Economist*, 18 September 1993, p. 22.

⁷Joseph Stalin cited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Josef Joffe. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 49. Waltz quotes Josef Joffe in, "After Bipolarity: Eastern and Western Europe: Between Two Ages," in *The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union*, Adelphi Paper No. 247 (London: IISS, Winter 1989/90), p. 71.

⁸Stephen Van Evera, p. 49.

⁹Volker Rühe, p. 136. Rühe is Germany's Minister of Defense.

find consensus among a sixteen member coalition. One of the most contentious issues regarding the merits of expanding NATO to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is whether an Eastern threat poses a danger great enough to warrant such expansion.

In military terms, Russia remains as the region's strongest power...Perhaps the major worry of the authorities in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and to a lesser degree Poland, is the prospect of large numbers of uprooted hungry and angry refugees surging westward from the former USSR to escape from economic misery and possibly more direct physical danger. Civil strife and the collapse of orderly government in any of the Soviet successor states could set off such a calamity.¹⁰

No NATO member (with the possible exception of Germany) believes that an Eastern threat persists that requires the early integration of certain CEE states, namely the Visegrad countries.¹¹ The "Eastern threat" as viewed by Western and Central Europe takes on numerous forms. The main elements include some factors already manifest and other possibilities likely to occur: a revival of ultranationalist Russian leaders -- both political and military figures -- fomenting and capitalizing upon public dissatisfaction; civil war originating east of the Polish-Slovakian-Hungarian-Romanian frontier and spreading westward; economic disintegration -- for instance, a substantial drop in the value of the ruble, or an increase in unemployment or inflation -- that forces millions to seek minimum living standards in the West; nuclear disaster as a result of a weapon-handling accident or a power plant failure; and finally the risk of uncertainty that accompanies a nuclear superpower's quest to completely overhaul its political and economic systems. Douglas Hurd acknowledged this possibility stating,

If the Russians fail, I believe they will export their problems. Instead of taking their pigs and pig iron to market, they will take themselves; leave their homes and look for a brighter future in Western Europe. Germany is already coping with a wave of new immigration from the East. If we do not take action, this could turn into a tidal wave and drench the whole of Europe.¹²

The manifestations of these "risks" or "threats" are illustrative of the relations Russia conducts with its neighbors. To illustrate or demonstrate the existence of an Eastern threat, the analysis must focus on how Russia conducts foreign policy with the

¹⁰Otto Pick, *NATO Review*, April 1992, p. 27-28.

¹¹The term "Visegrad countries" refers to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

¹²British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. *NATO Review*, June 1993, p. 11.

Baltic states and Ukraine. Moreover, Russia's continued use of the Kaliningrad Oblast and its dominant role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suggest that many Russians support efforts to seek and maintain a greater sphere of influence beyond Russia's current borders. The developments indicate, at least to Western and Central Europeans, a continued Eastern risk. The risk to Central and East European democratic and market reforms to date are increased because of instability. Democracy in its infancy cannot be nurtured in such an insecure environment,

What happened in Czechoslovakia in 1938 illustrates one kind of danger that may confront even a well-established and prosperous free-market democracy. When external demands clearly outstrip indigenous capabilities - when a severe disequilibrium between threats and capacities exists - no political or socioeconomic system will be up to the task.¹³

An Eastern risk exists because of numerous state-sponsored and subsidiary variables working independently or in unison. These factors and their influence on Russia's relations with its neighbors constitute an Eastern risk. Central and Western European leaders perceive a revival of Russian imperial aims -- championed by Russian nationalists -- as one of the consequences of Russia's political chaos. Many Central Europeans judge that Russia's nascent democracy is not a model for a stable government. Central Europeans, particularly the Poles, agree with Horace's assessment that, "*...nam tua re agitur, paries cum proximus ardet....*"¹⁴ Skeptics regarding early NATO expansion ask: "Why enlarge NATO when a clear and present risk to the Alliance does not exist?" Opponents of an early expansion of NATO also contend that including some Central European states in an enlarged NATO and not others would demonstrate the extent to which the Alliance is willing to offer protection. In effect, to include the Visegrad countries and exclude Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics might indicate Western acquiescence to their incorporation in a Russian sphere of influence. The unwillingness to "draw new lines" in Central and Eastern Europe when NATO's members do not perceive an imminent Eastern threat is one of the current European security dilemmas.

Russia is still an inherent risk to Central and Western European security for numerous reasons, not all of them associated with the threat of military coercion.

¹³Daniel N. Nelson, p. 157.

¹⁴Horace as cited by Richard A. Brayon, p. 127. The phrase reads, "when your neighbor's house is on fire, you are in danger yourself...."

Primarily, Russia is a risk because of the chaotic nature of its young democracy, the subsequent rise of ultranationalist leaders, and their influence on shifting Boris Yeltsin's and Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy stance from a pro-Western stance to a moderate conservative outlook. Russia's heavy-handedness appears not only in the form of military coercion, but economic, diplomatic and psychological pressure. Second, Russia's diplomatic, economic and military persuasion towards its neighbors in the Baltics and Ukraine makes it likely that Russian leaders will continue this course of action in Central Europe. Third, Russia utilizes the Kaliningrad Oblast and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as mechanisms to garner greater influence beyond its borders. Fourth, Russia is a risk to NATO and Central Europe because of the possibility of civil war originating within Russia or along its periphery and spreading further westward. The risks also include the possibility that economic deprivation or a nuclear accident could lead to a massive migration of people westward. Finally, Russia's present foreign policy includes objectives and initiatives regarding NATO expansion. These initiatives are discussed within the context of demonstrable Russian desires to reacquire regional and global influence.

II. BACKGROUND

NATO today provides political-military assets unrivaled on the Eurasian land mass. Along with the evolving nature of NATO's mission, the two most well-known organizations designed to meet the changing nature of the Alliance include the NACC and the Partnership for Peace program. As Secretary General Wörner stated, "NATO will not be kept alive solely by nostalgic memories of past historic achievements, nor by purely philosophical reflections on common values and destinies." Instead Wörner insists, "the primary, future mission of NATO will be to project stability to the East."¹⁵

A. DEBATE OVER NATO'S FUTURE COURSE

Concurrently, there are four distinct arguments for the future course of NATO's existence. An analysis of these arguments fits succinctly within the broader discussion of NATO's future role and its most likely future composition. The arguments that run the breadth and width of the political spectrum for NATO's future course include: First, a status quo arrangement whereby no expansion of members nor a greater mission role is advocated. Second, a scaled down NATO that not only disassociates itself from out-of-area conflicts but also favors decreasing membership to include only core continental participants such as: Germany, France and Britain. Third, other pundits favor NATO completely disbanding, observing that the lack of a credible Soviet-Russian threat makes a military alliance costly and unnecessary. Fourth, others favor some sort of expansion of NATO that would include a few members or membership open to any country that requests it, including an expanded role in historically "out-of-area" regions.

The first argument, that "NATO is no longer relevant in a post-Cold War World" because the Soviet Red Army no longer exists, is ignorant of the most recent Russian political developments and the implications of a Europe without a credible military alliance to fill the security vacuum. One argument for eliminating NATO was that,

The alliance was no longer needed now that the threat of Warsaw Pact attack was fading...and that NATO's continued existence as a military alliance would be de-stabilizing by posing a potential threat to the USSR [now Russia] from across the neutral East European buffer zone that would divide the two sides.¹⁶

¹⁵Secretary General Manfred Wörner in a speech delivered in Brussels, 10 September 1993, p. 4. Wörner's opening remarks gave little doubt of his opinion to expand NATO membership and the necessity to take on new missions. He stated, "The slogan 'out-of-area'...or 'out-of-business' is out of date. We *are* acting out-of-area and we very much are *in* business," p. 6.

¹⁶Richard L. Kugler, p. 496. Kugler is a senior analyst at the Rand Corporation.

There is a threat from Russia that emanates from its domestic instability and imperial mindset of maintaining a sphere of influence and veto over Central and Eastern Europe security issues. This argument, though once in vogue immediately after the events of 1989, has all but disappeared with the introduction of the Bosnian War, the 1991 Moscow coup attempt and the resurgence of Russian nationalism.

The second argument, that "NATO can only exist if it scales down its membership and concentrates on the core issue of protecting against a Russian threat," fails to take into account the likelihood of future conflicts along NATO's periphery. This approach fails to recognize the geopolitical implications of a retrenching United States and the certain problems that would arise from such an endeavor. Owen Harries – the editor of the *National Interest* – offered four reasons why NATO should stay within its historic borders:

- NATO expansion does not account for Russian susceptibilities and interests and envisages no role for Russia in Eastern Europe;
- Because of the West's collective and pathetic half-hearted tries to stop the Bosnian crisis, a proposal to expand NATO suffers from a massive credibility gap;
- Guaranteeing Central and Eastern Europe's security would inevitably include massive peacekeeping and peacemaking roles not formerly accomplished;
- As a result of such operations, Alliance signatories would be forced to unanimously support operations that could lead to numerous casualties while providing few tangible returns.¹⁷

Though Harries makes a credible case against an expanding NATO, he fails to take into account the evolving nature of the Alliance nor does he appreciate the fact that NATO has already gone "out-of-area" as was the case in the Gulf War and now in Bosnia offering "no-flight" zones. Though he does not specifically mention it, other advocates of a smaller NATO fail to realize that the absence of Americans would certainly prompt the Germans to protect themselves with nuclear weapons. In the end, the process of increased instability in a multipolar Europe will be hurried along if the United States leaves or is forced out of the European continent.¹⁸

¹⁷Owen Harries, pp. 41-53.

¹⁸Stephen Van Evera, p. 34.

The third argument that, "NATO membership and its historic mission must remain *status quo*," is perhaps the most dangerous option for NATO's future. Precisely because it offers no new strategic endeavors and promises not to upset the current balance, many respected scholars have advocated just such a role. Grand theorists like Henry Kissinger state that successful organizations like NATO must continually change and evolve as international situations warrant. Events such as the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and the Bosnian War are primary examples of NATO's need to meet different challenges that directly threaten peace and stability in Western and Central Europe. Failing to restructure NATO's primary mission responsibilities by incorporating new members that promote both free-markets and democracy will undoubtedly spell the imminent demise of the world's most successful military alliance.

The geopolitical ramifications associated with an aggressive Russian foreign policy and military doctrine combined with a resurgent nationalist sentiment cannot be correctly dealt with by maintaining a stagnant alliance. Editorials in *The New York Times* have stated that expansion of NATO now or in the near future is the wrong policy to pursue. The editors seem to place a naive sense of trust in Russia's good nature. Proponents of NATO as a status quo organization believe that, "In joining NATO, it makes no sense for East Europeans to start a fire...What the remnants of the former Soviet Empire most need now is reassurance not deterrence."¹⁹ Though he favors future expansion of NATO to the East in the future, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle noted that at least one good reason for not expanding NATO just now was the complexities associated with the United States offering Article 5 guarantees (including the nuclear guarantee) to Poland:

...the credibility of its underlying guarantee [Article 5 of the NATO Treaty] that 'an attack against one is an attack against all' cannot be extended without the plans and resources to back it up - and that will take time...An offer of interim associate membership sufficient to calm understandable anxieties in Eastern Europe would have been appropriate.²⁰

There are two views that advocate NATO expansion. Primarily, "Limited NATO Expansion...Only Poland and the Czech Republic maybe Slovakia and Hungary." Secondly, "Broad NATO Expansion...The Vancouver to Vladivostok Solution." Both arguments suggest that NATO's future success as a vibrant alliance is possible only by

¹⁹*The New York Times*, 25 October 1993, p. A 12.

²⁰Richard Perle, p. A 17.

enlarging its membership East and taking on new missions like peacekeeping and peacemaking. If NATO does not address the primary security challenges facing Europe today, it will become increasingly irrelevant. NATO must go "out-of-area" or it will go "out-of-business."²¹ This argument seems to enjoy popularity among many one-time cold-warriors who perceived a lack of Western resolve as a *carte-blanche* for Russians to define their sphere of influence as extending to the German-Austrian border. In the 1990's NATO's role is like it was in 1949: the maintenance of peace and stability throughout Western Europe. Along with the question of expanded NATO membership is the tandem question of NATO going "out-of-area." Instead of battling the Communist Red Army, and Warsaw Pact troops, NATO's future mission will explicitly answer the task of providing security to once "out-of-area" regions (i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina). Among the most vociferous proponents of such an approach to an expanded mission is Lady Margaret Thatcher. In her memoirs, Thatcher pondered:

Ought NATO to give more thought to possible threats to our security from other directions? There is no guarantee that threats to our security will stop at some imaginary line across the mid-Atlantic. It is not long since some of us had to go to the Arabian Gulf to keep oil supplies flowing...potential threats to NATO territory may originate more from outside Europe. Against that background, it would be only prudent for NATO countries to retain a capacity to carry out multiple roles, with more flexible and versatile forces.²²

To this end, the London and Rome Summits in 1990-1991 were responsible for initiating NATO's focus on becoming more of a political alliance with an increasingly activist diplomacy toward the East.²³ Noted Richard Kugler:

In past years, NATO's plans had focused on direct physical threats to member borders; the mandate to respond to these threats stemmed from the collective defense provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty...Any thought that NATO could ignore 'out-of-area' operations was given a rude shock in August 1990.²⁴

²¹Ronald D. Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, p. 31. These men are senior analysts at the Rand Corporation.

²²Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*, pp. 812.

²³Richard L Kugler, p. 498.

²⁴Richard L. Kugler, p. 500.

The London Summit produced a declaration calling for, "smaller forces, many at lower levels of readiness; enhanced flexibility and mobility to replace the old static linear defence...reliance on multinational forces...[and] reduced reliance on nuclear weapons increased..."²⁵ The argument for an expanded NATO to all interested CSCE states is advocated namely by Russia as a means of subverting NATO's authority and helping reestablish a dominant Russian role in European security institutions. However, those who advocate an Alliance that extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok ignore the deleterious effect such an enlargement would have on the cohesion among members. For this reason, NACC and the Partnership for Peace initiative were instituted so as not to immediately dilute the effectiveness of the Alliance and so as not to isolate Russia.

B. NATO'S EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1949

To prove that NATO has not outlived its utility, an examination of the Alliance's evolutionary development is necessary to determine its ability to adapt to the changing security environment. By acknowledging an existing Eastern risk and detailing proactive declarations altering the Alliance's mission, NATO will be following an historic track laid out over forty-five years. Phase one involved the critical contribution of a collective security system based upon a defensive posture to halt Soviet aggression. This process, much like balancing theory previously discussed, was the initial process of international states dividing into bipolar spheres.

During this phase, the Alliance in response to multiple international incidents sought after and incorporated several new members (Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955). Phase two began in 1956 with the *Three Wise Men's Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO*. Though articulated in the initial charter, this report became the catalyst for greater cooperation between NATO signatories on every aspect of policy making. At the behest of the Report's authors, greater political consultation was strongly encouraged in order to formulate concurrent policies to stem Soviet aggression in the post-Stalinist period, wherein the Soviets, "Intended to challenge the west in other regions of the world."²⁶ As a result, the act of consulting in all levels of economic and political policy making has been the core element of the Alliance's success. Along with this key element of greater political

²⁵Michael Legge, p. 13. Mr. Legge is NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy and Chairman of the Strategy Review Group.

²⁶*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*, p. 31.

consultation, a series of military policies was pursued to meet Soviet aggression including massive retaliation against a first-strike Soviet nuclear attack.

The third phase of NATO's changing mission occurred on December 1967 with the unanimous members' approval of the Harmel Report.²⁷ This report advocated the strategy of deterrence and defence whereby adequate military capabilities would be increased to meet this objective. Further, the report advocated the first-ever steps towards disarmament, détente and crises resolution through peaceful means between East and West. This report has also been referred to as the Harmel dual approach to dialogue and defence. The fourth phase, gradual détente was aided by the Federal Republic of Germany's policy of *Ostpolitik* with its Eastern neighbors.²⁸ The main objective in this phase between 1969 and the end of the 1970's was to offer a credible nuclear defense while simultaneously pursuing détente and the initial SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty agreements in 1972.

The fifth phase was marred by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its failure to adhere to the tenets of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Brezhnev made no secret of his intention to ignore the main tenets of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. He stated, "No one should try to dictate to other people, on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, the manner in which they ought to manage their internal affairs."²⁹ Another event that galvanized a chilling of relations between NATO and the Soviet Union was the creation of the independent trade union "Solidarity" and the Soviet Union's attempt to achieve a satisfactory outcome through the use of diplomatic pressure and the threat of military intervention. As a cohesive unit, NATO responded to both of these actions of expansionism of Soviet hegemony on its periphery with a series of non-military actions. The close coordination among NATO members was the result of the much-touted "close consultation" idea of the Harmel Treaty among its signatories. In both cases NATO members agreed unilaterally to impose non-military steps against the Soviets and thus affected, "A whole range of areas of cooperation [between NATO members and the Soviet Bloc]...."³⁰

²⁷Originally referred to as the *Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance*.

²⁸NATO: *Facts and Figures*, p. 77. "[*Ostpolitik* was] designed to improve its relations with its Eastern neighbours, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany likewise set itself the task of establishing a modus vivendi with the German Democratic Republic...The allies assured the [FRG] that all these initiatives had their sympathetic support."

²⁹Leonid Brezhnev cited by Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, p. 287.

³⁰NATO: *Facts and Figures*, p. 105.

The sixth phase of NATO strategic development has been the restructuring and downsizing of NATO troop, equipment and armament levels as a primary result of Gorbachev's failed policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* which precipitated the fall of Communism. These two policies helped speed up the collapse of Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union and forced another round of restructuring the mission of NATO. The events from 1989 to the present have forced NATO to further redefine its historic mission and have served as a catalyst for a future discussion regarding the necessity of a collective security organization on the Eurasian continent. This last phase has been the most critical period for the Alliance since its inception because of the lack of a clearly defined goal or mission and the dispute over the validity of a credible Russian threat. The most popular and articulated strategy (though not formally agreed upon) establishes a broad outline for defense through the increased mobilization of troops and equipment as well as the flexibility to respond to other security challenges.

C. ALLIANCE THEORY

In determining the essential features of the most appropriate future of the Atlantic Alliance (that NATO must expand its membership and go "out-of-area") one must also examine the theory of alliance building to determine what effect, if any, this proposition will have on the balance of power and NATO's character. A discussion regarding NATO would be incomplete without an overview of the theory of alliance building as it relates to the specific aspects of NATO's creation (i.e., balancing and bandwagoning). Considering the theory of alliance building, the obvious realization is that NATO formed when it became clear that an eastern threat (the Soviet Union and the Red Army) represented a direct challenge to the frontier countries of Western Europe. The formative course for establishing an alliance was the act of balancing several Western European countries against what they perceived was a common enemy to their way of life (e.g., democracy and capitalism). The Brussels Treaty of 1948 (representing Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Britain) was the initial act of countries balancing against the threatening expansion of the Soviet Union.

Bandwagoning (the act of smaller states joining the weaker of two superpowers so as to have more influence within the alliance) as it relates to both the NATO and Warsaw Pact was never illustrative of either side's genesis. Instead, the phenomena that occurred closely resembled the balancing of two great powers against each other along with a collection of smaller yet important states comprising either alliance. The concept of balancing was most indicative of the division of power into a bipolar world after

1948. The success of the Alliance has been based upon an involuntary schism between the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Kenneth Waltz, an expert on balance of power theory writes that,

One should...look for instances of states making internal efforts to strengthen themselves, however distasteful or difficult such efforts might be. The United States and the Soviet Union following World War II provide such instances: the United States by rearming despite having demonstrated a strong wish not to by dismantling the most powerful military machine the world had ever known; the Soviet Union by maintaining about three million men under arms while striving to acquire a costly new military technology despite the terrible destruction she had suffered in war.³¹

Waltz concludes by adding that, "we find states forming balances of power whether or not they wish to...Bandwagoning and balancing behavior are in sharp contrast."³² In the case of the schism between former allies at the war's end, alliances formed not as a result of bandwagoning but rather balancing. Whereas the Soviet's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was seen as expansionist and brutish, America's presence as one of NATO's founders has been referred to as an "empire by invitation." This act of balancing, as John Mearsheimer correctly concludes, is a problem-ridden enterprise whereby the, "United States, as well as the Continental states, will have to balance...against any emerging aggressor to offset the ganging up and bullying problems that are sure to arise in post-Cold War Europe."³³ Josef Joffe sums up by stating that, "The Alliance now faces the greatest threat to its existence ever. Having 'won' the Cold War, it has lost its foe, its role...[and hence its *raison d'être*]."³⁴

The NATO organization vis-à-vis Russia can be examined using structural realism as a context for the state of current affairs (i.e., individual states striving to retain their relative position in the international system through a system of defensive and offensive maneuvers).³⁵ Each state bases its individual structure relative to other states, based upon their rank on prescribed conditions. Waltz delineates these factors that determine rank and international stature as: size of population and territory, resource

³¹Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 125.

³²Kenneth N. Waltz, pp. 125-126.

³³John Mearsheimer, p. 54.

³⁴Josef Joffe, p. 47.

³⁵Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 49.

endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.³⁶ As the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev recently stated, "Russia remains a superpower – and not only as measured by nuclear and missile strength, but by its natural resources, technological skills and strategic geography...Russia is destined to be a great power, not a junior one."³⁷

Using these criteria, the Soviet Union's and now Russia's relative strength still ranks it as a superpower relative to other individual states. According to Waltz's criterion, Western European states continue to unite under the auspices of a collective military structure whose stated priority is the containment of Soviet-Russian influence. Simultaneously, these alliance members protect their own individual rank because they view Russia's superpower endowments as a threat to their future existence. In the case of alliance building, NATO is illustrative of a group of countries uniting into a common political-military organization to balance against a threat. The countries that made up the Warsaw Pact were not so much volunteers as they were coerced into the military alliance by the Soviet Union. To be sure, the leaders of these Soviet satellites were by the late 1940's hard-line Communist dictators whose domestic power base was secured and legitimized by the presence of a strong military presence. Formed in 1949, the NATO Alliance members like the Concert of Europe participants in 1815, was created when there existed a perceived threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the entire European continent. The question in 1994 like that in 1815 is, "What to do when the single threat that precipitated an alliance's creation is no longer present?" In the earlier case, with few exceptions, the countries who formed to stop Napoleon maintained a unified, albeit loose association for nearly 100 years.

³⁶Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 52.

³⁷Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, 18 March 1994, p. A 11.

III. NATO'S HISTORIC MISSION AND *RAISON D'ÊTRE*

The North Atlantic Treaty is the political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic and military fields...The signatory countries state their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming their faith in the principles of the United Nations, they undertake in particular to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area...Under this Treaty, the member countries therefore adopt a policy of security based on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence.³⁸

Therein is the primary reason for NATO's existence and its continuing usefulness in 1994. NATO is something more than an arrangement for common military defense; it has also been utilized to keep post-war Germany in check by incorporating it into a collective security arrangement. It was this fear of the Soviet Union *and* Germany -- a revived, remilitarized Germany -- that produced NATO's precursor, the Treaty of Brussels.³⁹ Mainly though, as a result of postwar Soviet expansion east and west of its frontiers, NATO was created. It was Communist agitation beginning in earnest throughout the world after World War II as well as several provocative incidents that solidified Western resolve to keep Soviet expansion in check. More importantly, however, it was the prevalence of Communist agitation in particular regions, namely in South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as Western Europe that demonstrated the necessity to create a collective security organization. Soviet demands for a territorial share of the Turkish Straits as well as assistance to Greek Communist insurgents made the formation of a Western alliance all the more appropriate.

The wartime coalition that included the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union disintegrated into opposing camps. In response to these Soviet overtures, western Europeans and the Americans undertook a series of steps to stem the perceived tide of communism. First, Britain and France joined in the formation of the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947. In the same year, the United States issued the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan with a primary purpose of offering protection to "freedom loving countries desiring it and financial aid to post-war countries respectively." In 1948, the Brussels Treaty, superseding the Dunkirk treaty included Belgium, the Netherlands and

³⁸NATO: *Facts and Figures*, p. 13.

³⁹Francis H. Heller, p. 440.

Luxembourg as well as Britain and France in a military alliance. Also in 1948, the American Congress passed Resolution 239, otherwise known as the Vandenberg Resolution which "cleared the way" for the United States to constitutionally join in a military alliance with western Europe.⁴⁰ By the end of 1948, negotiations were already well underway for establishing a North Atlantic defense alliance. Adrian Hyde-Price condenses this turbulent four year period which was already surfacing when Winston Churchill delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech in Independence, Missouri, in 1946. Hyde-Price writes,

1947 was the decisive year in the cold war division of Europe, and by 1949, the central features of the bipolar world order were in place. Events in this period followed each other with dizzying rapidity. The Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947) was followed by Marshall Aid (5 June 1947), and given political and conceptual form in Kennan's famous article on 'containment' (July 1947). Communists were expelled from governments in the West in the spring of 1947, and the Soviets responded by establishing the Cominform in September 1947 (with its theoretical underpinnings provided by the 'Two camps' theory of Andrei Zhdanov) and the CMEA on 25 January 1949. In February 1948 Czech Communists seized power in their 'elegant coup', and from late 1948, Stalin's heavy-handed attempt to regiment the 'Peoples' Democracies' behind the banner of the CPSU led to the rift with Tito and the Yugoslav communists. The formation of NATO in April 1949 and the establishment of two separate German states in May and October 1949 signalled the completion of this initial period of bloc-building.⁴¹

Adrian Hyde-Price attributes the failure of the "Big Three" wartime coalition to remain together after World War II to the varying interpretations of the results of the conferences at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. He writes,

The attempt by the wartime allies to agree to a common approach to the post-war reconstruction and reordering of Europe – especially of Germany – ran aground on the divergent interests of the leading protagonists. Their varying national priorities led them to pursue differing policies in Europe, and even when they could agree on common goals (for example, 'democratisation', 'decentralisation' and 'denazification' in Germany, or 'free elections' in Eastern Europe), their different national perspectives and ideological assumptions led them to pursue diverging policies.⁴²

⁴⁰NATO: *Facts and Figures*, pp. 10-11.

⁴¹Adrian Hyde-Price, pp. 29-30.

⁴²Adrian Hyde-Price, p. 25.

Finally, in April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. by twelve signatories.⁴³ NATO's historic mission and reason for existence are best expressed when viewed from the perspective of the Western leaders who, at the time, became suspicious of Soviet motives in postwar Europe:

The defeat of the two great military and industrial powers, Germany and Japan, had left an immense vacuum to the East and West of the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of such exceptionally favourable circumstances, the Soviet Union made full use of the strength of the Red Army to conduct an expansionist policy which was soon to threaten peace and collective security...The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, in his telegram of May 12 addressed to President Truman, expressed his anxiety in the following terms: 'What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American armies have melted, and the French have not yet been formed on any major scale, and when Russia may choose to keep 200 or 300 divisions on active service?' And he added: 'An iron curtain is being drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind'....⁴⁴

Over the past four years NATO has begun a redefinition of its historic mission. Since 1990, this process has involved a series of summits in which Alliance members have begun to shape not only the force structures but the way in which NATO looks at the world and the various threats to members. The single greatest impact of the end of the Cold War has been the renationalization of planning regarding national interests and threat perceptions that affect the cohesion of the security system. To be sure, the Atlantic Alliance was never completely cohesive during the Cold War. However, one Soviet intervention after another (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979) continued to justify the existence of NATO and proved the importance of alliance cohesion against the possibility of a Soviet-led attack on Western Europe. With that threat gone, sixteen countries declared an end to, "the legacy of decades of suspicion...We are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...."⁴⁵

⁴³The twelve original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were: the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, France, Britain, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and Portugal. Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, The Federal Republic of Germany was admitted in 1955 and Spain was admitted 1982.

⁴⁴NATO: *Facts and Figures*, p. 3.

⁴⁵NATO *Transformed: The London Declaration*, selected document No. 38. U.S. Department of State, July 6, 1990, paragraphs 6 & 8.

The four major points of the London Declaration were emphasized by President George Bush in July 1990. First, the Atlantic Alliance extended an offer of friendship to former adversaries of the Warsaw Pact and an invitation to set up liaison offices with NATO in Brussels. Second, the Alliance recognized the necessity to continue to reduce and limit conventional forces in Europe as well as reiterating its eagerness to implement agreements to decrease military manpower and offensive capabilities throughout the Eurasian continent. Third, NATO countries acknowledged that NATO's nuclear strategy of flexible response, in place since 1967, was still a fundamental aspect of nuclear deterrence but resolved to use the nuclear aspect only as a last resort. In addition to this "last resort" declaration, NATO members agreed to discuss future proposals to eliminate short range nuclear artillery weapons indicating the diminished likelihood of war on the European continent requiring tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, NATO leaders promoted the idea of enhancing the role and mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

NATO's meetings in 1990 and 1991 produced the foundations for a revitalized Alliance that could begin altering NATO's strategy and force structure fundamentally in order to reflect a diminished eastern threat and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome in 1991 created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a means of beginning the process of consulting with former Central and Eastern Europe states. Moreover, the meetings in Rome produced a new strategic concept to address the changes that occurred in Europe. This New Strategic Concept reflected NATO's eagerness to enhance dialogue and liaison in diplomatic, military and political fields with Central and Eastern Europe. However, it left unresolved the question of what security guarantees, if any, could or would be offered to the CEE states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a military and political alliance created after World War II as a mechanism to "safeguard the freedom and civilization" of Western Europe and North America. In April 1949, when the Atlantic Alliance was formally established, NATO became the single greatest amalgamation of states aligned against the Soviet Union, surpassing earlier treaties signed in Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels (1947). For the United States, NATO was the first European security treaty that called on American participation in the event of war on the European continent in over 170 years. The other peculiar feature of the Atlantic Treaty was the fact that it was assembled during a time of relative peace. NATO's initial signatories assembled into a political-military alliance because they saw several antagonistic actions by the Soviet Union as a threat to the maintenance of democracy

and free-markets in Europe. In effect, the question to be raised is: Were the numerous post-Cold War NATO declarations -- relying heavily upon the tenets of the 1949 Washington Treaty and the 1967 Harmel Report -- catalysts that helped define NATO's purpose? If so, what were the tangible accomplishments of the declarations?

Most observers of the current security environment in Europe believe that debating the merits of NATO's future requires an analysis of what NATO has been. In essence, one must answer questions like: What are NATO's core values? What are the mechanisms to maintain and enhance its values? How does NATO adapt to changing security realities while retaining its purpose and effectiveness? Though some may speculate on the success of NATO's contribution to Communism's implosion throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the evidence to date indicates that NATO achieved its stated goals in the 1949 Washington Treaty.

Moreover, NATO was successful in adhering to the same values and principles while continuing to adapt the mission functions to achieve the end result. The main tenet of the alliance was above all, the common defense of Western Europe to preserve democracy and stability. The enduring quality of NATO over the past five decades has been its resilience to the changing security environment and the ability of its members to adapt various methods to meet the prevailing circumstances. If one ever doubted NATO's resilient qualities, it is wise to examine how the former Prime Minister of Poland, like every other CEE country, is enamored with its qualities. Hanna Suchocka states that:

The North Atlantic Alliance is the most important element of the new European security system. It is a pillar of security and stability in Europe. And it continues to play this important role which derives from the specific features of NATO: its integrated defence system; the transatlantic partnership between Europe and North America; [and] its real military strength and ability to adjust to new international realities.⁴⁶

NATO displayed its capability to respond politically to changing security environments while steadfastly maintaining an impressive military force. When détente and peaceful coexistence became the *modus operandi* between the two opposing camps, NATO embraced the altered political climate but continued to maintain a strong defensive capability. By reiterating its support for closer relations with the Warsaw Treaty Organization through the 1967 Harmel Report, NATO displayed an ability to change with the times. Concurrently, in 1967, NATO restated its intention to maintain a

⁴⁶Hanna Suchocka, p. 3.

mix of nuclear and conventional forces to deter and contain acts of Soviet aggression. In the 1990's, like the previous Cold War decades, NATO is again faced with a substantially altered security environment. But unlike the Cold War environment, Atlantic Alliance members are not threatened by an overwhelming, massive invasion force coming from the East. However, NATO members still concede that other less-credible yet more pervasive risks continue to justify the existence of a security organization to protect its members.

Granted the threat of a huge Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe is gone. Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance has taken numerous measures to substantially alter the means by which NATO would continue to ensure, "stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."⁴⁷ The first impetus of a need to change, or at least restate the means of conducting the political-military dimensions of the Alliance occurred at the end of 1967 with the Harmel Report. More recently, the Atlantic Alliance has produced several declarations and initiatives that reorient the political-military mission to respond to a non-existent Soviet threat but an abundance of smaller, yet potentially destabilizing, threats to Western European security. NATO's goal of ensuring democracy and stability on both sides of the Atlantic remains the essence of its *raison d'être*.

Indeed, NATO's primary goal remains unchanged, with the exception that NATO now sees itself as an "exporter" of democracy and stability. Nevertheless, the Alliance must now redefine the mission and strategy necessary to best fulfill the long-stated objective. In essence, NATO still serves its intended function but it is currently in the midst of adapting to the momentous changes in a post-1989 Europe. The dilemma that faces NATO are: (1) going out-of-area in order to quell instability on NATO's periphery; (2) expanding to the East in order to ensure the flourishing of democratic and market societies at the expense of antagonizing the Russians; (3) changing the political and military functions and structures in order to respond to an absence of an eastern threat.

The predicament that arises is: How does a military-political alliance that worked so well over five decades continue to justify its existence with the absence of a clear existential threat? The answer is that an examination of the Alliance's critical birth certificate document reveals that no specific threat was ever mentioned. The problem is not merely justifying continued existence but rather defining the new threats that exist and determining the proper means of defending against them. For these reasons, several post-1989 instruments are critical in assessing NATO's future missions and the

⁴⁷NATO: *Facts and Figures*, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, preamble, p. 376.

redefinition of the Alliance's force structure. A senior planning officer in the political affairs division of NATO stated that,

NATO's transformation process since the end of the cold war has indeed created a basis on which to initiate such proactive policies...The beginning of a comprehensive political dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact countries perhaps marked the changing rationale of NATO most clearly: the Alliance is moving from a largely passive provider of deterrence to an instrument of shaping the political evolution of an undivided Europe."⁴⁸

The United Nations Charter is the bedrock of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Incorporating the basic concept of the United Nations Charter, as the premise for the existence of the Atlantic Alliance, gave NATO the international sanction to establish itself. To create such an impressive military and political alliance of nations within a vacuum, without international sanction, would certainly call its validity into question. By adhering to the United Nations Charter, authors of the Washington Treaty sought to minimize any conflict that might arise over the legality of forming such an alliance. Calling upon specific articles as the impetus for such an ambitious alliance, the founders in effect "incorporated" NATO under the auspices of international sanction. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states that all signatories shall strive,

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means...To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights....⁴⁹

Article 1, in effect gives international legitimacy to countries that align in collective defense structures. Article 51 states that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations...."⁵⁰ Article 51 in essence is the international sanction required to afford the Atlantic Alliance the legitimacy necessary to survive five decades. Both Article 1 and 51 are specifically mentioned in the

⁴⁸Michael Rühle, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 13, 1994, p. 316. Mr. Rühle remarked that, "The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the adoption of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative are a visible shift towards a proactive policy of projecting stability beyond its own borders."

⁴⁹*Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, Article 1, from the *Encyclopedia Americana*, International Edition, p. 456.

⁵⁰NATO: *Facts and Figures*, Article 51 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 375.

Washington Treaty and are indicative of the founders' desire to have a *raison d'être* and international sanction to collectively align. An examination of specific NATO Treaty articles as they apply to the expansion of membership and the redefinition of its mission is critical in determining whether or not the Alliance has a precedence for changing its current form. Of the fourteen articles; Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide the best justification for an expanded NATO role.

A. THE WASHINGTON TREATY 1949

NATO's initial legitimacy was the result of the founders' incorporation of the United Nations' Charter articles 1 and 51. The Atlantic Alliance's continued success over the past forty-five years is due in large part to the continuation of specific political and military means created to ensure the Alliance's stated aims. The main statements of the Washington Treaty do not specifically mention a Soviet threat but rather *any* threat to Alliance security. While the signatories to the Washington Treaty reaffirmed the commitment to: "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."⁵¹ Similar to the forty-five years preceding the reduction of East-West hostilities, they also fulfilled this lofty goal through military strength and political savvy. The specific articles of the NATO Treaty enabled NATO to conduct a self-imposed metamorphosis under the aegis of Articles 2, 4, 5 and 10. By adhering to Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, NATO met its primary objective: maintenance of stability and democracy throughout the Atlantic Alliance. Article 2 stated,

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being....⁵²

Article 2, like Article 4, implies that NATO's geographic areas of operation extend beyond the signatories' borders. Article 2 defines the goals, aspirations and obligations between fellow signatories and how exactly to pursue international relations regarding social and economic commitments. Article 2 gets its impetus from Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, whereby the collective security organization will take action to prevent and remove threats to peace. NATO accomplished this by specifically

⁵¹NATO: *Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty*, preamble, p 376.

⁵²NATO: *Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 2, p. 376.

creating a number of civilian and military structures designated to enhance relations and strengthen institutions. These included the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the General Secretariat, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Though this is not close to an all-encompassing list, the point is that the intent of Article 2 was met through the formation of a series of bureaucratic and military directorates and integrated command structures.

Article 3 is critical to future NATO expansion because it forces all signatories to develop and maintain an ability to resist attack. This collective defence and resistance to attack laid the groundwork for a variety of political-military strategies including: massive retaliation, flexible response, deterrence and defence and eventually arms limitation, détente and cooperation on mutually beneficial programs with the Soviet Union. As the debate continues, this article will be rigorously imposed on future applicants (Poland and the Czech Republic) because it requires an economic commitment to upgrade and maintain a military force capable of providing an ability to resist attack.

Article 4 is the second most important article whereby signatories to the Treaty agree to come to the aid of others and protect any other member whose territorial boundaries are breached. Article 4 envisages a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the member countries of the Alliance and provides for joint consultation whenever one of them believes that such a threat exists. Furthermore, the construction of bureaucratic and military command structures facilitated the eventuality of carrying out Article 4 of the Treaty. Article 4 states that, "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."⁵³ By creating a dual structure of civilian and military command, the authors of the Washington Treaty purposely laid the groundwork for each of NATO's members to participate in consultation. The idea of consultation, having worked so well over five decades, would become the cornerstone of a post-Cold War era in which NATO members actively pursue consultative relations with Central and Eastern European (CEE) states as the first step towards warmer relations and integration.

Article 5 is the core of the Treaty whereby member countries agree to treat an armed attack on any one of them, in Europe or North America, as an attack against all of

⁵³NATO: *Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 4, pp. 376-377.

them. It commits them to taking the necessary steps to consider assisting each other in the event of an armed attack. To be sure, a credible guarantee to Central and Eastern European countries today would precipitate a lack of enforcement because NATO is not currently equipped (militarily, economically or politically) to deal with such a scenario. Article 5 is the crown jewel that each of the Central and Eastern European hopes to one day possess. One Pentagon official stated that Poland's ideal situation would be obtaining NATO's Article 5 guarantee and Desert Storm weapons.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty -- commonly referred to as the "Three Musketeer's pledge" of "all-for-one-and-one-for-all"-- is reckoned to be the single-most important article in the Alliance Treaty. Because this clause has come to symbolize the common cause of Western Europe and North America, CEE states are obviously anxious to reap its implied guarantee. Although the specific wording leaves it up to each country to decide whether it is in the best interests to fight alongside an ally under attack, there seems to be little ambiguity that the United States would not have hesitated to protect itself and Western Europe by any means necessary. Article 5 states that, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...."⁵⁴ However, the Article also states that each NATO member,

...in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁵⁵

Article 5's enduring promise of assistance is the single greatest reason why CEE countries want to join NATO and why NATO has chosen to restrict its use to only 16 countries. In contrast to Article 5, Article 6 has been employed by leaders of NATO to prevent "out-of-area" military excursions by members. However, the strictures imposed by Article 6 were never interpreted so narrowly as to block all discussion and debate relating to extra-regional developments. Douglas Stuart aptly points out that NATO's long experience in consultation on international conflicts ranges from:

⁵⁴NATO: *Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 5, p. 377.

⁵⁵NATO: *Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 5, p. 377.

...dispute resolution (e.g., Suez, Angola) to information and consultation (e.g., French Indochina, Cuban missile crisis) to policy coordination (e.g., Falklands, Desert Shield/Desert Storm). This diplomatic activity is authorized by Article 4 of the NATO Treaty...Extra-regional cooperation is also authorized by Article 2 of the Treaty....⁵⁶

This article will invoke NATO countries in the future to consider such out of area actions like air strikes in Bosnia and protecting territory in Poland if Russian expansion extends westward. The article

...defines the area in which the provisions of Article 5 apply. However it does not imply that events occurring outside that area cannot be the subject of consultation within the Alliance. The preservation of peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area can be affected by events elsewhere in the world, and the North Atlantic Council must therefore, as a matter of course, consider the overall international situation.⁵⁷

In other words, the Alliance *can* and *must* be allowed to adapt to changing international situations by consulting and taking military and political action. NATO's use of airpower in attempting to affect the outcome of the Bosnian War is *de facto* recognition of the Alliance's new found mission for going "out-of-area." Though the initial intent of these articles remains intact, their evolution has been part of an eight-tiered process that has characterized NATO's changing mission over the past forty-five years. The crucial point is that NATO has never been a stagnant organization with the stated purpose of deterring Soviet aggression with a single strategy. Instead, it has been in a constant state of evolution since 1949, metamorphosing through a series of conceptual phases. The most recent declarations illustrate the changing course of European security and are the basis for the future of NATO.

The German, British and French defence ministries have all articulated a position regarding Central and Eastern European security. One can compare these statements with the common NATO declarations of the early 1990's and make a direct link to their defense white papers in 1994. It is essential therefore to examine the central elements of NATO's most recent declarations to clarify each country's defense posture as it applies to Central and Eastern Europe. Although then-Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand felt Chancellor Kohl was too quick securing German unification, there was a commonly held perception in Western Europe and North America after 1989 that leaders in NATO capitals were slow to respond to the cataclysmic changes in the

⁵⁶Douglas Stuart, pp. 15-16.

⁵⁷NATO: *Facts and Figures*, p. 14.

international order. Fortunately, the London Declaration, published in July 1990, addressed key issues related to the fast-changing international scene and offered broad guidelines for NATO's response to these developments.

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, like Articles 2, 4 and 5, is relevant to the success of NATO to adapt to the changing security environment during the Cold War and now in the post-1989 era. Article 10 was employed four times over 30 years to extend NATO membership when the perceived threat to the Alliance was great enough to warrant expansion. Article 10 states that, "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic...."⁵⁸ CEE states like Poland that lobby for inclusion in NATO view Article 10 as the singular just cause for membership. The dichotomy that exists however, is that NATO members do not view CEE states as contributing to the security of the Atlantic area, while CEE states see their exclusion as symptomatic of a greater breakdown in European security. In any case, Article 10 is the mechanism NATO will use to implement enlargement.

Far from being a relic designed to deter a clear, existential threat, the Atlantic Alliance has a purposeful future in securing the basic tenets of European security. The dissipation of the Soviet threat does not necessarily mean that other factors do not pose similar risks to Western institutions. NATO's post-1989 declarations provide a path to continued European security. There are still threats that pose dangers to Atlantic stability: mass migration as a result of civil wars and economic deprivations, nuclear disaster, ultranationalist tendencies of Russia's political and military leaders. The Atlantic Alliance is an invaluable component of the present and future European security realm because:

- America's involvement and its nuclear guarantee have proven to be a stabilizing factor throughout Europe;
- The integrated military structure has proven to be the best means of ensuring cooperation and consultation in European security matters;
- The creation of a civilian and military bureaucracy has enhanced political and diplomatic ties between NATO members;
- The Article 5 provision continues to maintain an aura of great value to both the member countries of NATO and the CEE states that want it.

⁵⁸NATO: *Facts and Figures*, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 10, p. 378.

B. THE HARMEL REPORT 1967

The Harmel Report, officially known as *The Future Tasks of the Alliance*, was the first significant reiteration and clarification of the Washington Treaty. The two main tenets of the Harmel Report, like the original 1949 Treaty, emphasize the use of military and political methods to secure Atlantic security. Confronted with an evolving security environment that saw the rise of *Ostpolitik*, détente and peaceful coexistence, Alliance members saw a need to expound on NATO's central elements – military strength and political solutions – but simultaneously encourage closer relations with the Warsaw Treaty Organization. German Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke stated that, "NATO's reaction to the end of the Cold War was immediate: it did not hesitate in implementing the intentions of the Harmel Report philosophy to build bridges to its former opponents." He commented that,

The Harmel concept, named after the then Belgian Foreign Minister and adopted by the NATO Council in 1967 as its general policy guideline with respect to the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, therefore emphasised not only the necessary collective defence of NATO Allies but also the aims of improving understanding and confidence and of building bridges with the Warsaw Treaty states.⁵⁹

The Harmel Report thus endorsed the theme of continuity of maintaining large ground forces to deter any aggression but at the same time encouraged an emerging spirit of détente. In effect, the Harmel Report authors sought to adapt the Alliance's strategy to conform with the warmer political realities but not to compromise its goals. They fundamentally advocated keeping NATO's guard up but pursuing political means to ease East-West tensions. By acknowledging the Alliance's ability to change with the times, paragraph three of the Report stated that, "the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions."⁶⁰ Moreover, paragraph four recognized the change but reiterated the fact that the fundamental problem still existed. Article 4 declared that,

Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension...[T]he Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems."⁶¹

⁵⁹Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO, p. 9.

⁶⁰NATO: *Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)*, paragraph 3, p. 402.

By recognizing an altered "international situation" but not a cessation of the basic "East-West" problems, the Harmel authors implied a willingness to cooperate, but only from the position of military strength. The enduring quality of the Harmel Report and its continuing relevancy to the current European security discussion is the steadfast reliance on military strength. Today when NATO members speak about closer integration with the East and expanding its roles and missions beyond its current borders, it is within the context of the Harmel Report and its adherence to NATO's main functions. Paragraph five of the Harmel Report states,

The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur...[T]he Allies will maintain as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.⁶²...[I]ts second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.⁶³

The Harmel Report's strength was in its reassertion of the main features of the Alliance's purpose and function. First, an acknowledgment that the 1949 Treaty -- featuring the dual approaches of political and military means -- had been successful for nearly 20 years. Second, the goal of ensuring stability and democracy in Western Europe and North America had come about through applying political means and military strength. Third, the Alliance, in order to be successful in the future, must continue to adapt to changing political relations with adversaries. Fourth, that military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. To this end, the Harmel Report continues to be used within the general context of a mutable Alliance strategy that reflects current security requirements. Though détente is no longer used in the 1990's security lexicon, maintaining a strong military force while simultaneously pursuing political and diplomatic solutions remains the foundation of NATO's post-1989 ideal.

The 1967 Report left an indelible mark on the present-day discussions regarding NATO's future course and *raison d'être*. Precisely because NATO leaders return again

⁶¹NATO: *Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)*, paragraph 4, p. 402.

⁶²NATO: *Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)*, paragraph 5, p. 402-403.

⁶³NATO: *Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)*, paragraphs 4 and 5, pp. 402-404.

and again to two fundamental points: (1) Maintenance of a military force and command structure capable of meeting the present security environment. (2) Pursuit of political and diplomatic channels with adversaries and former adversaries to further embrace the security of Alliance members. It is no wonder then that the Harmel Report is still referred to throughout discussions concerning NATO's future and within the context of the London, Copenhagen, Rome and Brussels Declarations.

C. THE LONDON DECLARATION JULY 1990

Six months after the downfall of Communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, NATO produced the first in a series of declarations that responded to the rapidly-changing security environment in Europe. In July 1990, NATO members convened a ministerial meeting in London that commenced a fundamental reassessment of the Atlantic Alliance's strategy, force structure and policies for the future. Like the Harmel Report two decades before, the London Summit restated the main tenets of NATO's existence and offered a road map for the future.

The London Declaration's main points included a reiteration of military and political means to address European security problems; a declaration of an end to hostilities with the Warsaw Treaty Organization; an invitation to CEE states for diplomatic liaison; a proposal for closer military contacts with CEE countries; a proposal to further reduce military arsenals and manpower under the aegis of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) mechanisms; an announcement to field smaller, more flexible forces and a proposal to alter the strategic military strategy. Though this was considered at the time to be an ambitious list of priorities for NATO, coming only nine months after the first breach in the Berlin Wall, many skeptics failed to see the monumental shift in policy and intentions. Outside of Brussels, NATO has rarely been given credit for such a sweeping proposal to overhaul the Alliance's outlook and mission so soon after the first signs of Communism's demise in Central and Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the casual observer might contend that the London Declaration was just an ambitious list of statements of intent with no tangible accomplishments. One can readily see the remarkable number of accrued benefits of this watershed 1990 summit. In paragraph two of the North Atlantic Council London Declaration, the Heads of State reaffirmed, "that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance...."⁶⁴ This reiteration of

⁶⁴NATO *Transformed: The London Declaration*, paragraph 2.

the Harmel Report called for the formulation of political rapprochement with the East. Further clarification of this point in paragraph six stated that,

The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state....⁶⁵

Thus by taking the initiative, NATO under the auspices of the London Summit promoted the first official easing of tensions. Not only did they renounce hostility with the East, NATO offered an invitation to commence diplomatic contacts. Far from being mere political statements, these proposals sprang forth a myriad of new contact forums with unprecedented levels of cooperation. Paragraph seven invited the, "Soviet Union and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council...[and] establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO."⁶⁶

Along with the long-held politico-military dual approach to security, Atlantic Alliance members proposed establishing military contacts to enhance confidence among their enemies. Paragraph eight proposed to, "intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals."⁶⁷ With the basic idea of creating a framework for political and military cooperation, the London Declaration held to the Harmel Report and the Washington Treaty by advocating arms reductions and for restructuring but *not* at the expense of Alliance security.

The authors wrote that, "to reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential." However, in keeping within the confines of this statement, they also reflected an objective to, "conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs [confidence and security building measures] as soon as possible...."⁶⁸ By acknowledging an altered security environment, NATO advocated altering the force structure, readiness requirements a proposal for a new strategic concept. The proposal called for NATO to, "field smaller and restructured active

⁶⁵NATO Transformed: *The London Declaration*, paragraph 6.

⁶⁶NATO Transformed: *The London Declaration*, paragraph 7.

⁶⁷NATO Transformed: *The London Declaration*, paragraph 8.

⁶⁸NATO Transformed: *The London Declaration*, paragraphs 12 and 13.

forces." Moreover, "These forces will be highly mobile and versatile...NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises."⁶⁹

The main tenets reaffirm political and military functions as the basis for Alliance security provided for under the 1949 Treaty's Article 2. The question raised is whether or not NATO has met the original goals of the Washington Treaty in the post-1989 world. Though the inability to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia is constantly raised as a failure of NATO, one could make the point that for the time being, NATO has at least kept the conflict contained and prevented it from spreading to other NATO countries. In any case, the post-1989 declarations that recognized an end to, "a legacy of hostility with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation," have substantially altered the military forces structure and strategic policies to combat future Yugoslav-type crises.

The failure to end the war in Bosnia seems to be more of a result of prostrate western and Russian leadership to agree on a common course of action, then on any of NATO's systemic shortcomings. NATO's improved capability to provide flexible and mobile forces to meet more diverse threats is indicative of the Alliance's success in adapting to the changed security environment. The effort to more closely cooperate on different levels has no doubt led to the on-going success of CEE countries in the transformation of their societies. Juxtaposed against the ambitious declarations of the 1990 Summit, the tangible accomplishments of these statements are illustrated by examples of the altered policy.

During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the Atlantic Alliance -- supported by more flexible forces to adapt to threats other than a massive Soviet land invasions -- upheld the premise of Article 5 by responding to Turkish requests for capabilities to deter an Iraqi invasion. NATO's Secretary General Wörner remarked that during the Gulf War, Alliance response to Turkish requests for allied assistance was to send "an air component of the ACE [Allied Command Europe] Mobile Force to Turkey."⁷⁰ William Taft IV supported Wörner's claim, writing that,

In December, Iraq made statements threatening Turkey. The response of the Alliance was to deploy to Turkey the air component of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force composed of German, Belgian, and Italian aircraft; to deploy additional air defence missiles including

⁶⁹NATO *Transformed: The London Declaration*, paragraphs 14.

⁷⁰Manfred Wörner, *NATO Review*, February 1991, p. 9.

Dutch Patriots; and to reaffirm our commitment to our ally. Turkey was never attacked by Saddam's forces.⁷¹

The London Summit's conciliatory tone and expectations to lower nuclear stockpile no doubt helped the process of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The START agreement signed on 31 July 1991 contributed to the lowest level of nuclear weapons since their inception, reduced Soviet and American strategic arms and expanded the bilateral military transparency between the two countries.⁷² Far from NATO being a static organization, the Atlantic Alliance has illustrated the courage to chart a new course for the evolving security environment.

D. THE COPENHAGEN DECLARATION JUNE 1991

In the second step towards a redefinition of NATO's future mission and strategy, the Copenhagen Declaration reaffirmed the basic premise of the London Declaration with the additional emphasis on ever closer military contacts with CEE states. This reiteration became the *modus operandi* for CEE states to reorganize their military operations along NATO lines and create transparent defense establishments. Stephen Flanagan explains that the Copenhagen Summit was the first articulation of NATO's commitment to develop a security "partnership" with all governments in Europe.⁷³ Expanding upon the London Declaration of closer diplomatic and military contacts, NATO made its first declaratory statement that linked the Alliance's security with that of non-NATO states.

Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us....⁷⁴

In effect, the Copenhagen Summit would set the stage for NATO to not only protect its own stability and Western institutions, like it had done over the past forty-

⁷¹William H. Taft IV, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, *NATO Review*, June 1991, p. 8.

⁷²"Military transparency" may be defined as a set of arrangements designed to provide evidence of the absence of threatening military activities. It may include data exchanges, inviting observers to military exercises, providing notification prior to certain military activities and other "Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)."

⁷³Stephen J. Flanagan, pp. 141-142. In the Spring of 1992, Flanagan was a member of the Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State.

⁷⁴*Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 1991, paragraph 3.

five years, but would now *export* stability eastward. Military cooperation and consultation between NATO and CEE countries was given its biggest boost to date with a statement that championed ever-closer military links. It stated that NATO would implement,

Intensified military contacts between senior NATO military authorities and their counterparts in the Central and Eastern European states, discussions at NATO Headquarters, SHAPE and major NATO commands with military officers from those countries on matters of mutual concern, and invitations to military officers and civilian officials....⁷⁵

NATO members used the Copenhagen Summit to emphasize the continuity of purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. The authors wrote,

NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.⁷⁶

In addition to reiterating the Alliance's purpose and historical goals, members of the Copenhagen Summit reviewed and published a list of tasks that the Alliance should strive to attain. In contrast to speculation that the Alliance was slow to act, this list of tasks appeared less than two years after the initial collapse of Communism in Central and East Europe. In order to fulfill NATO's future security role, the Copenhagen authors listed four fundamental security tasks that have since been incorporated into later declarations:

- "To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes...."
- "To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security...."

⁷⁵*Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 1991, paragraph 9.

⁷⁶*NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 1991, paragraph 1, "The Purpose of the Alliance."

- "To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state."
- "To preserve the strategic balance within Europe."⁷⁷

Finally, the Copenhagen Declaration, in a further clarification of the London Summit, issued a call for the creation of a "European pillar" within NATO. In keeping with the active approach taken by the Alliance after 1989, the ideas of a European security identity and a mechanism -- Combined Joint Task Force -- to support a separate identity came into existence. The genesis of these ideals would be meted out in the 1994 Brussels Summit. These aspirations formed part of the Minister's Final Communiqué that stated,

[NATO welcomes]...efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy...The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.⁷⁸

E. THE ROME DECLARATION NOVEMBER 1991

Coming less than six months after the Copenhagen Summit, the November meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Rome (7-8 November 1991), produced one organization to deal with the changes in the East as well as The New Strategic Concept. Adding to the basic tenets of the London and Copenhagen Declarations, the Rome meeting created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and established the New Strategic Concept. The Rome Declaration further reiterated not just London and Copenhagen but also the Harmel Report calling for closer military and political contacts with the East. It relies upon the relevance of NATO's core functions of political and military means to establish the Alliance's prime role with the establishment of The New Strategic Concept and the NACC. The major objectives were creating a new security architecture, providing a new strategic vision, defining a European security policy and defense role, reiterating the role of relations with the Soviet Union and countries of

⁷⁷NATO's *Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 1991, paragraph 6, "The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance."

⁷⁸Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, *Final Communiqué*, 6-7 June 1991, paragraph 1.

Central and Eastern Europe and supporting the CSCE process. The Alliance reaffirms its *raison d'être*: protection of Western Europe and North America and its institutions of democracy, but it establishes NATO as an exporter of these institutions throughout Europe. NATO's Secretary General commented about the Rome Summit that it was the,

...latest in a series of high level meetings that over the past two years have guided the Alliance's transformation and redefined its role and missions in the new Europe. What is significant about this process of transformation is not simply that it has been completed so quickly...but also that such a far-reaching exercise – involving all those political and military aspects of the Alliance built up over four decades – has been carried out in an exceptional atmosphere of consensus....⁷⁹

Recognizing the stable nature of the Atlantic Alliance, the Rome Declaration went beyond the traditional role of ensuring tranquillity within NATO and boldly stated its intention to act beyond its frontiers in order to project stability. Acknowledging that the world had changed dramatically and adding to earlier NATO statements, the Rome Declaration stated that it was an agent of change, "a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe...."⁸⁰

Continued emphasis on enhancing regional cooperation was highlighted by the Alliance's willingness to define the new security architecture of Europe. The authors of the Rome Declaration used the 1991 summit to promote closer integration with other European security institutions but not at the expense of subordinating NATO's resources to either the WEU or the CSCE. In describing the "new security architecture" the authors stated that NATO is "working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other."⁸¹ This statement gave the impetus for the far-reaching cooperation of WEU and NATO forces to continue to carry out a naval embargo of the former-Yugoslavia. The creation of the New Strategic Concept was introduced as the centerpiece of the future model of the Alliance's core function. It reiterates the position that the East is no longer a threat to launch a massive military attack. The European security identity and defense role reiterated the importance of the Copenhagen meeting

⁷⁹Manfred Wörner, December 1991, p. 3

⁸⁰*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 2.

⁸¹*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 3.

whereby a "European pillar" within the Alliance would take shape. Looking back to the Harmel Report and the Washington Treaty, NATO in 1991 outlined the key elements of the Alliance's Cold War success as being critical to its future existence. It states that,

Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.⁸²

The North Atlantic Conference on Cooperation was created in 1991 in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc in order to offer consultation to any of the newly independent states on regional security matters. Its initial purpose was designed to integrate former Warsaw Pact countries into the wider European discussions covering a broad range of topics. The most notable of these subjects were: arms control, defense cooperation, crisis management, peacekeeping, continued momentum on the CFE (Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty) and consultation and policy coordination with regard to the war in the former-Yugoslavia.

During its initial inception, NACC looked as if it would become the successor of NATO, incorporating all of the former Soviet Union countries with an alliance extending "From Vancouver to Vladivostok." However, as geopolitical realities set in, and the euphoria of newly democratic states gave way to the ruminations of "shock therapy" and the election of ultranationalists, NACC became more of a non-binding forum for over 38 Eurasian countries to coordinate mutual policies without specific security guarantees. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that NACC is becoming "a central element in the grouping web of security ties that bind us together" and that it had to "step up its consultations on political and security issues."⁸³

Another factor that will undoubtedly raise the probability of allowing Poland to join NATO is the large amount of Western aid and investment that has flowed into these countries. With aid amounting to over 25 billion dollars and investment totaling over 4 billion, Western investors are also pressing for security arrangements to protect their investments.⁸⁴ There is a necessity to establish a grand strategy to define NATO's

⁸²*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 4.

⁸³Alfred A. Reisch, 9 July 1993, p. 45.

⁸⁴Barry Newman, p. A 1. Newman notes that "90 big foreign companies have invested over \$2 billion [in the last two years] in Poland without [the assistance] of the EBRD."

U.S. commitment to stability in Central and Eastern Europe and enhance their peacekeeping and peacemaking. Just because NATO is not thoroughly familiar with these roles does not limit its ability to act so in the future. Precisely because Articles 5 and 6 are well-established, NATO has a legalistic rationale for future expansion. This is necessary in order to create a stable political society in Central and Eastern Europe. In the post cold-war era, Europe is definitely more dangerous and less stable with the possibility of Bosnia spilling over into the rest of Europe.

In a recent interview with a Swiss army officer, it was revealed that the Bosnian crisis has created a wave of illegal activities among refugees of the former-Yugoslav Republic throughout Switzerland. He stated that since the war in Bosnia began, there has been a dramatic rise in organized crime by nationals of the former Yugoslav Republic.⁸⁵ The future of NACC will be less an instrument of policy making and more of an organ where European states and states along the Russian periphery can come together and confer on matters of mutual security interests. For the Central and Eastern European countries, NACC is one of a few organizations that will assist hopeful new members of NATO join in a timely and successful fashion. NACC will continue to be a clearinghouse for discussions relating to CFE arms control, crisis management, peacekeeping and proposals for peacemaking.

The future of NACC will be less an instrument of policy making and more of an organ where European states and states along the Russian periphery can come together and confer on matters of mutual security interests. For the Central and Eastern European countries, NACC is one of a few organizations that will assist hopeful new members of NATO join in a timely and successful fashion. NACC will continue to be a clearinghouse for discussions relating to CFE arms control, crisis management, peacekeeping and proposals for peacemaking. Inasmuch as political dialogue would increase between NATO and CEE states, there would be no future subordination of NATO's collective defense capability. Paragraph five reiterates that:

The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor...its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure...and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces...[NATO's] military forces will adjust to [its] new tasks, becoming

⁸⁵Colonel Hans Wegmüller, Swiss Army. In an interview conducted 15 February 1994, Colonel Wegmüller acknowledged that the Bosnian War has precipitated a rash of criminal activities throughout Europe and especially in Switzerland.

smaller and more flexible...Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced....⁸⁶

The achievement of these aggregate goals were highlighted by Douglas Stuart who wrote that the meetings between NACC participants and NATO members,

...helped to maintain the momentum for approval and compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and other arms control agreements. They [NACC meetings] have also provided a forum for consultation and policy coordination relating to ongoing crises in the former Yugoslavia and in portions of the former Soviet Union.⁸⁷

To be sure, by 1992, tangible and residual accomplishments had already been produced as a result of the earlier declarations. With regards to relations with the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, NATO pledged practical assistance to CEE countries because of the practical notion that NATO's security is based with all others. This concept merged the new security architecture with a new strategic vision in order to define common ground for a revised European security policy. They completed this through the addition of the wording in paragraph nine which stated that NATO,

...will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.⁸⁸

This concept of "inseparable linkage" with the East, in conjunction with pledges to institutionalize consultative and cooperative mechanisms with CEE states was the impetus for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC's birth certificate is thus seen as having been the ideal behind paragraph eleven whereby NATO intends, "to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues."⁸⁹ The invitation to Central and Eastern Europe to attend a December 1991 meeting became the initial starting point of the North Atlantic

⁸⁶*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 5.

⁸⁷Douglas Stuart, p. 17. The author contends that, "While it is true that some member governments [Poland] would have preferred direct membership in NATO to partnership through the NACC, no one who monitors these developments can fail to be impressed with the progress that NACC has made in institutionalizing pan-European security cooperation in such a brief period of time."

⁸⁸*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 9.

⁸⁹*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 11.

Cooperation Council (NACC). According to the Rome Declaration, NACC was developed to provide the following activities:

- Annual meetings with the NAC at the Ministerial level in the NACC;
- Periodic meetings with the NAC at the Ambassadorial level;
- Additional meetings with the NAC at the Ministerial-Ambassadorial level.

It followed then that the establishment of NACC meetings would be comprised of NATO subordinate committees to include political, economic and military committees. Jeffrey Simon notes that,

On balance NATO has been responsive in a short time; but is it enough? The CEE states believe that more than meetings are needed to secure European peace. Because NACC expanded to 36 members rapidly, it is in danger of being 'neutralized' as a security institution.⁹⁰

Under the auspices of NACC and the establishment of political, economic and military committees, consultations and cooperation between former adversaries would be greatly enhanced. According to paragraph twelve,

[NATO's]...consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes.⁹¹

Within this context, NACC has been used as a consultative forum bringing members of NATO and CEE states together to discuss a wide range of issues. Namely the Council has been instrumental in disseminating information on a variety of security matters that include limiting nuclear weapons stockpiles, Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) matters, CFE provisions, CSCE matters and topics related to START negotiations. While the Alliance continues to reduce manpower and conventional weapons levels, there remains an emphasis on flexibility and mobility to meet an altered yet still lethal threat. The threat may be as obvious as a Soviet land invasion or as diffuse as the "threat of uncertainty." Nevertheless, politically and diplomatically, the Alliance articulated a forum whereby CEE states could come together to be integrated to NATO institutions in the form of NACC. NACC and the Strategic Concept are the descendants of the Harmel Report and the Washington Treaty. As Gebhardt von

⁹⁰Jeffrey Simon, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 39.

⁹¹*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 12.

Moltke points out however, the NACC is not intended to supplant or duplicate the CSCE or distract the Alliance from its primary tasks. He writes that the NACC,

...was established on the principle that it would be a complement to the CSCE and not a substitute for it. Although there are common elements in the objectives of the two institutions in relation to security and admittedly a certain degree of overlap in their activities, NACC's primary role was to assist the post-Communist reform process in the area of defence and military matters and to address the specific security issues resulting from the previous four decades of Cold War rivalry.⁹²

Manfred Wörner enumerates a number of activities that came about through the implementation of the NACC. These programs will enhance the cooperation between CEE states and the West and expedite their integration into Western institutions. Specifically they are:

- Defence production conversion;
- Air traffic management;
- Peacekeeping planning and development of exercises;
- Defense procurement management;
- Civil emergency planning;
- Cooperation to "Westernize" Civil/Military relations;
- Cooperation on scientific matters;
- Information exchanges.⁹³

Additionally, as a forum for consultation and European cooperation, Wörner gives credit to NACC for functioning as a conduit to help resolve of numerous security problems. Specifically, he lists the following conflicts discussed in the NACC since its inception:

- The question of the Russian troops' withdrawal from the Baltics;
- The Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) dispute;
- The implications of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹⁴

The "Contact Group" made up of Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States recently met in Brussels, in December 1994 at the ministerial level to try mediate an end to hostilities in Bosnia. By introducing NACC and the New Strategic

⁹²Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, p. 11.

⁹³Manfred Wörner, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, No. 2/94, p. 6.

⁹⁴Manfred Wörner, *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, No. 2/94, p. 6.

Concept as mechanisms to cope with an altered security environment, NATO not only dealt with the realities, it provided a means to offer new successes. The Rome Declaration acknowledged the primary purposes of NATO yet devised means to cope with ever-changing conditions. The declaration stated that,

The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe....⁹⁵

Moreover, John Kriendler, a senior NATO official, offers other contributions that the Alliance has offered as part of its restructuring of post-Rome declarations. Specifically, in implementing the naval blockade in the territorial waters off the former-Yugoslavia, by mid-June NATO ships had challenged over 12,000 ships, stopped 803 vessels, diverted and inspected 176, and detected nine violators. Additionally, air assets including AWACS and NATO fighter aircraft have enforced a no-fly zone over Bosnia.⁹⁶ The Rome Declaration, in proving its willingness to encourage cooperation and consultation with its "new partners," created a new security architecture, a new strategic vision with a European security policy and defense role by incorporating CEE states in the process without excluding other worthwhile institutions (CSCE and WEU). Diplomatic liaison -- initially begun under the London Summit and later encouraged by the Copenhagen and Rome Summits -- has led to high-level exchanges between NATO and CEE countries that has fostered closer relations.

F. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT NOVEMBER 1991

The Strategic Concept, borne out of the declarations of the Rome Summit, made the possibility of conducting "out-of-area" operations more likely. By de-emphasizing massive mobilization forces to counter a Soviet threat, the New Strategic Concept gave rise to the idea of using smaller forces to combat an expected increase in the number of smaller, more-elusive threats. Specifically, NATO's changing mission is to meet the same goal of stabilizing Europe while simultaneously accomplishing the following objectives under the aegis of the Strategic Concept.

⁹⁵*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 20.

⁹⁶John Kriendler, *NATO Review*, June 1993, p. 19.

NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe....⁹⁷

The New Strategic Concept called for ending the hostile relationship between NATO and the East as well as changing from bulky Cold War era forces to highly mobile and flexible units. This New Strategic Concept has been the foundation upon which Central and East European states have tailored their own forces to facilitate integration into the Atlantic Alliance. The New Strategic Concept, designed by and for NATO members, reflects a more diffuse threat coupled with fewer Western military resources. It can be characterized by the following excerpts:

- "All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West...."
- "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe...."
- "The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe."
- "To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary...."⁹⁸

Michael Mihalka writes that, "The French also had a plan that competed with the partnership proposal." In the French proposition, "They had proposed a security conference on minority problems, which was meant to meet European concerns about

⁹⁷*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 16.

⁹⁸*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraphs 2, 10, 36 & 47.

stability and security in the East."⁹⁹ In 1993, French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur proposed an initiative that would accelerate Western integration of CEE states by first addressing and resolving ethnic and national disputes that could erupt in a crisis similar to that in the former-Yugoslavia. The particular elements of the Stability Pact as outlined by Balladur include:

- "Diplomatic measures to prevent ethnic and national conflict;
- Each European nation signing bilateral and limited multilateral accords to resolve problems;
- The Pact would be the centerpiece of the European Union's diplomatic efforts to integrate Central and Eastern European countries in western institutions.¹⁰⁰

In 1993, the President of the European Community (now the European Union), stated the purpose of the French proposal as viewed by the entire European Community as,

...another exercise in preventive diplomacy and joint action under the common foreign and security policy. It has the virtue of concentrating on minorities and borders but does not ignore the fact that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have no real security guarantees at present.¹⁰¹

The pact has been embraced by the European Union and NATO. The EC now the EU adopted the charter in 1994 as part of an overall strategy aimed at diffusing ethnic and national tensions and also as a means of differentiating the so-called civilized West from the anarchic East. Most CEE countries opined a less-than flattering perspective of the document, claiming that it patronized the eastern countries, ignored similar problems in Western Europe and was a sublime attempt to keep the East divided and segregated from the West. The importance of mentioning the Balladur Stability Pact within the wider discussion of NATO expansion East concerns France's self-assigned role as a leader in EU diplomacy.

Inasmuch as the French would like to deal with CEE issues using French proposals like the Stability Pact, they would prefer their fellow Europeans not to

⁹⁹Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, pp. 6-7. Mihalka cites a speech by Prime Minister Balladur made in December 1993 explaining the utility of the Stability Pact in Eastern integration.

¹⁰¹Speech of President Delors at IISS Conference, Questions Concerning European Security, Brussels, 10 September 1993, p. 9.

endorse purely American initiatives. As evidence of France's attachment to the Stability Pact as a means of promoting French initiatives and quelling ethno-national disputes, the NATO Brussels Declaration included a reference to the Pact's utility. According to the January 1994 Declaration: "As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, and will contribute to its elaboration...."¹⁰²

Generally, "Atlanticists" favor integrating the East through the use of the NACC mechanism resulting in closer cooperation and consultation on politico-military matters. The French and other "Eurasianists" keep CEE countries at arm's length until they can peacefully resolve a myriad of ethno-national disputes, which EU countries fear could involve the West. Furthermore, although "All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West," the members still realized the passing of one threat did not negate future risks. The Strategic Concept states that, "In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multifaceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."¹⁰³ In perhaps the most implicit recognition of the existence of an Eastern risk, paragraph 14 reads,

Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰²*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 11.

¹⁰³*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 9.

¹⁰⁴*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 14.

Acknowledging the changed threat and the new possibilities NATO stated that,

Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.¹⁰⁵

Finally, in an effort to further reform the forces into more flexible and mobile units, the Rome authors set out to specifically advocate such a future policy.

NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security.¹⁰⁶

Klaus Kinkel concluded that the early 1990's had produced a number of quantitative results as a consequence of NATO's forward-looking summits. He remarked in October 1992 that, "A review of the last two years will show what has been achieved" as a result of the London, Copenhagen and Rome Summits:

- "The Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed at the CSCE Summit in November 1990, points the way towards cooperative security structures...
- START has been supplemented by an agreement [to reduce] nuclear short-range systems...
- Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)...came into force."¹⁰⁷

Secretary General Wörner furthered Kinkel's claim when he commented in December 1992 that NATO has,

...achieved a drastic reduction in nuclear stockpiles; the adoption of a new strategy, command structure and force structure, the formulation of a new concept of multinational forces; new types of crisis management exercises, and now participation in peacekeeping.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 15.

¹⁰⁶*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 60.

¹⁰⁷Dr. Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸Manfred Wörner, December 1992, p. 3. Wörner notes that despite the perception that the Alliance had failed to change with the times, NATO has taken on several new roles and missions to meet the new, diverse threats. First, "as an instrument of crisis management in the context of the new international order." Second, "as the cornerstone of a security community encompassing both East and West." Third, "as an

The New Strategic Concept along with the declarations since June 1990 have placed NATO in the position where it has offered to support United Nations missions and CSCE operations to protect humanitarian relief efforts through the use of heavy weapons, close air support and the monitoring of airspace with NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Michael Rühle adds that,

NATO's enforcement with the Western European Union (WEU) of the UN maritime embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and NATO's enforcement of the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia have shown that NATO's capability to orchestrate complex multinational military operations is unique and can serve a wider purpose than only defending member nations' territories. Moreover, NATO's air-strike decisions of 1993 and 1994 indicate that the Alliance can react to threats other than a direct attack by an enemy.¹⁰⁹

As further evidence of the Rome Summit's effectiveness in carrying out the concepts first described in the London and Copenhagen Declarations, the Commandant of the NATO Defense College listed several initiatives begun since 1991. These include the following outreach activities begun by NATO's Defense College since 1991 serving namely CEE states:

- Special courses for CSCE members;
- The international research seminar on Euro-Atlantic as the "primary vehicle for closer academic/research relations with the newly emerging democracies;"
- The NATO symposium focusing on the role of military forces in CEE states;
- The conference of commandants was expanded in April 1992 to include commandants of defence colleges in CSCE countries;
- The NATO Reserve Officers Course (NAROC) familiarizing CEE countries with NATO organizations and information for new reserve approaches;

element of stability in Europe from which the new [market economies and] democracies in Central and Eastern Europe will also benefit." Fourth, "as an instrument to support the verification and implementation of arms control." Fifth "as a possible instrument to organize a credible defense [in order] to protect Europe from the dangers of the proliferation of missile technology."

¹⁰⁹Michael Rühle, p. 317.

- The General/Flag Officers course to familiarize CEE states with NATO organizations, specifically SHAPE and AFCENT;
- The College's Fellowship programme offering a three-month fellowship to a NACC country;
- The College's Field Studies Programme offering study-familiarization trips in NATO countries.¹¹⁰

G. THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION JANUARY 1994

The Brussels Summit in 1994 proposed three far-reaching programs: (1) Partnership for Peace, (2) European Security Identity, (3) Command Joint Task Force (CJTF). Each of these programs was designed to meet the current security realities and to prepare the Atlantic Alliance for the challenges of the twenty-first century. These included integrating willing CEE states into western institutions, promoting a European defense identity to guarantee "European" mechanisms to deal with European problems and creating a combined joint task force (CJTF) to supplement this process.

Though it is difficult to assess the quantitative results of each of these three programs because of their contemporaneous nature, they add a significant contribution in conjunction with the New Strategic Concept, as main conduits of NATO's future course. While admitting the general will of CEE states to join NATO, the Atlantic Alliance members stopped short of immediate expansion for fear that it might destabilize the European security realm. Inasmuch as the Brussels Summit maintained a cautious course regarding the immediate expansion of NATO, the three initiatives put forward represent another clear indication of NATO's transformation of the strategic goals while adhering to the original Alliance's goals.

1. The Partnership for Peace Initiative

The Partnership for Peace initiative has its origins in what some have cynically deemed "The Era of Talbottism."¹¹¹ President Clinton's January visit to European capitals included numerous speeches enumerating the benefits of the Partnership For Peace initiative. In his initial Brussels speech, Clinton said,

¹¹⁰Lt. General Richard J. Evraire, Commandant, NATO Defense College, pp. 16-17.

¹¹¹The "Era of Talbottism" refers to a period early in President Clinton's administration (approximately the first two years) in which Strobe Talbott's "Russia First" policy had the support of most top administration officials. Some of the administration's most out-spoken critics referred to this policy as appeasing Russia and precipitating "Yalta II," vis-à-vis the other Central and Eastern European states.

This partnership will advance a process of evolution for NATO's formal enlargement. It looks to the day when NATO will take on new members who assume the Alliance's full responsibilities. It will create a framework in which former communist states and others not now members of NATO can participate with NATO members in joint military planning, training, exercises and other efforts.¹¹²

The main tenets of Partnership for Peace are the promotion of regional infrastructure projects and economic cooperation, stimulation of foreign private investment and consolidation of democracy throughout the region.¹¹³ Other aspects of the initiative include: crisis management, peacekeeping, search-and-rescue and disaster relief. Though most non-NATO members have signed on to this program that promises no security guarantees or premises of mutual defense, each signatory has had its own agenda for accepting the vague terms. Henry Kissinger noted in regard to these budding Central European democracies,

Refused a security guarantee and offered the placebo of nebulous joint missions, which have not been defined and do not respond to their concerns, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary must have noted the absence of any distinction between Russia, the cause of their anxiety, and themselves, the historical victims of Russian aggression.¹¹⁴

For the Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) the Partnership for Peace initiative, like NACC, is just another instrument that is being used to increase the likelihood of being accepted into NATO. For Russia, their participation is designed namely to be party to any security institution that their neighbors to the West are involved in, lest they be left isolated in Eurasia. For Eastern Europe, Partnership For Peace is akin to applying a bandage where major surgery is required. The Partnership For Peace plan has been considered a "half-measure" designed to placate President Yeltsin and other conservative Russian leaders. Though not initially supported by Secretary State Christopher, Partnership For Peace

¹¹²President Clinton's excerpts from his speech "Binding a Broader Europe." President Clinton's 9 January 1994 speech in Brussels regarding the future direction of the Atlantic Alliance from the American point of view. Although this speech was seen as the first step in a long process towards full integration by Central and Eastern European countries, the initiative did not contain substantive policies or requirements towards this goal. As such, most signatories from former-Warsaw Pact nations saw this proposal as a symbolic placation of Russian sensitivities and acquiescence of their broader sphere of influence in the region. Lastly, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians have asserted that because membership in the Partnership is open to any country the political and military significance of Partnership for Peace is substantially watered-down.

¹¹³David B. Ottaway, p. A 36.

¹¹⁴Henry Kissinger. "Not This Partnership," p. A 49.

became the official American policy and then NATO's current policy at the behest of then Ambassador-at-large to Russia Strobe Talbott.

Partnership for Peace has been criticized for placating Russian expansionists with a "Russia-first-Russia-at-all-costs Policy," selling out worthy NATO prospects and diluting the meaning of the initiative to the point that anyone could be a signatory. To this end, only nine percent of Russians polled had confidence in the ability of NATO as a credible Alliance that included Russia. However, most of the Russian military elite would be alarmed if its Western neighbors were admitted and the Russians were excluded.¹¹⁵ Polish President Lech Walesa though critical of the vagueness of the initiative said, "We are too weak, and we have to accept almost everything, but we don't forecast anything good in this concept." The Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk was even more unimpressed by the "Partnership" declaring, "The Partnership lacks imagination. It doesn't satisfy our needs."¹¹⁶

In the future, Central and Eastern European countries desiring membership in NATO will have to be satisfied with this initiative as a means of gaining NATO membership. Though not pleased with the lack of a firm commitment, these countries seem willing to undertake the kinds of reform necessary to make them viable and valuable partners in a greater NATO expansion. Most experts agree that any effort by the Russians to join the Partnership for Peace initiative would be a calculated attempt by Moscow's foreign policy and military leaders to dilute NATO into something similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and thereby causing its ruination.

NATO members have been torn between two difficult positions. Expansion of NATO could involve numerous negative repercussions for the Alliance. Conversely, exclusion of the CEE countries might cause resentment and result in the collapse of democratic and free-market societies. In any case, there are numerous obstacles associated with NATO expansion that currently outweigh the justification for CEE countries to obtain NATO membership. When he was the Head of the International Security Program, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Professor Trevor Taylor listed seven reasons why NATO should not expand to Central and Eastern Europe:

¹¹⁵Erika v.C. Bruce, p. 8. Ms. Bruce's cites polling information from Mr. Mikhail Lechtshinsky, an analyst and correspondent with *Ostankino* Television in Russia.

¹¹⁶John Pomfret.

- Extending NATO membership would alarm nationalist forces in Russia;
- Bringing CEE countries into NATO would disrupt the Alliance's doctrine, force structure and deployments;
- Admitting that NATO members lack the resources to extend defense commitments eastward;
- Putting membership expansion on NATO's agenda could prove very disruptive for members;
- Realizing that CEE states might be hard to control because their economic and political systems are not firmly established;
- Giving membership to some countries under certain criteria might lead other CEE states to expect the same criteria to apply later;
- Realizing that there is no need to admit CEE states because no overwhelming threat exists.¹¹⁷

Despite the predominance of these judgments, it was widely agreed that some measures had to be taken in order to assure CEE states that the West was serious about eventually integrating them into Western institutions and helping them fill the apparent security vacuum. PfP is a mechanism intended to balance both opposing factors. Western leaders advocating PfP expended little or no domestic political capital by taking this cautious approach. President Clinton in January 1994 defended the American proposal as follows:

I do not view this as some sort of half-hearted compromise. In substance, this is a good idea. It is the right thing to do at this moment in history. It leaves open the best possible future for Europe and leaves us the means to settle for a future that is not the best but is much better than the past.¹¹⁸

Though it displays a general Western desire to integrate the East, PfP offers no specific guidelines for partners to attain membership. Open to any country belonging to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), PfP is sometimes referred to as an American "gadget" or relabeled as "The Partnership for Procrastination." PfP is a sign of NATO's unwillingness to grapple with the issue of central importance: the presence of a security vacuum as the result of the absence of security measures that could plausibly protect Central and Eastern Europe from Russian

¹¹⁷Jeffrey Simon (ed.), *The Challenge of Change*, pp. 204-207. Trevor Taylor offers a concise collection of the best-known objections for NATO expansion. Though this is not all-inclusive, it serves the purpose of delineating a number of problems associated with expansion.

¹¹⁸President Clinton, 10 January 1994.

coercion or aggression. PfP is symbolic of Western reticence to immediately expand NATO. Michael Mihalka writes that, "NATO members generally applauded the partnership initiative. Many of them had been uneasy about offering membership to the East Central European states." Mihalka concluded by quoting the Canadian foreign minister who remarked, "A number of countries have some hesitations about expanding the membership of NATO at this moment."¹¹⁹ Mihalka surmises that,

Among the other major allies, the British and the French, for different reasons, adopted a straightforward, realist view of NATO, seeing it primarily as a security alliance and opposing its enlargement. The Germans, on the other hand, viewed NATO as the kernel of the developing European security order and championed the idea of granting security guarantees to the East and Central European states.¹²⁰

According to one of the chief architects of the plan, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the Clinton administration advocates PfP because:

- PfP "avoids drawing new security lines" in Europe that might prove to be destabilizing;
- PfP "sets up the right incentives." PfP offers partners an alliance based on shared values of democracy and free markets;
- PfP "provides equality of opportunity for all eligible countries," but measures progress entirely on the behavior of individual states;
- PfP puts the question of NATO membership "at the end of the process rather than at the beginning."¹²¹

When compared to the initial views of NATO's members to the Atlantic Alliance's purpose in the early years one sees a unique continuity to the PfP document. Jolyon Howorth, an expert on European security issues, remarked that,

The UK saw NATO, at least in the early years, as a vehicle for the retention of a world role, underpinned by a 'special relationship' with Washington. Germany and Italy saw it as a means of holding communism at bay pending political and economic reconstruction and the emergence of a new international identity as key members of a Euro-Atlantic community. France regarded the Alliance essentially [*sic*] as a transitional structure which would eventually be superseded by a

¹¹⁹Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 4.

¹²⁰Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 5.

¹²¹Les Aspin, pp. 12-13.

European defence or security identity, dominated, naturally, by Paris....¹²²

For mainly national reasons, PfP is a very popular document. Each NATO member can, because of PfP's ambiguity, find something to support its national interests. Partnership for Peace is responsible for creating a framework for military, economic and political cooperation between NATO and partnership members. The recent PfP exercise near Poznan, Poland, in September 1994 is the first of many future exercises to be conducted on a bi-lateral and multilateral level between NATO members and "partners." Not only does this military cooperation strengthen the process of confidence-building measures, it prepares CEE states for eventual multilateral and multinational operations. Both of these activities complement NATO's long-held desire to protect stability in Western Europe but most recently its attempt to export stability. The following objectives were set forth in the framework document for the Partnership for Peace:

- Assistance to produce transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- Assistance to ensure democratic control of defence forces;
- Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to UN, CSCE operations;
- Development of cooperative military relations with NATO for training, exercises, and operations to include peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian missions;
- Development of forces better able to operate with Atlantic Alliance members.¹²³

As a result of the declarations since 1990, the January 1994 Summit reflected the recent years of success acknowledging that because of NATO's attention, "the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament," have been concluded. Specifically, these include:

- The indefinite-unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- The early enforcement of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;

¹²²Jolyon Howorth, p. 3.

¹²³*Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 3.

- The negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- The process of ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and compliance with all of its provisions.¹²⁴

There can be little doubt that the countries that comprise NATO are still facing credible security challenges to their economic and political stability. Governments will continue to debate the advisability of Eastern expansion of NATO in the North Atlantic Council. Several mechanisms will assist the West in addressing the future of Eastern Europe, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace and the Balladur Stability Pact. Created as a means of encouraging CEE involvement in politico-military affairs of NATO, the NACC has been, at the least, useful in the initial process of promoting closer contacts with the East.

As one NATO expert states, "The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has been the most substantial political gesture on NATO's part towards the Visegrad group and other former communist states."¹²⁵ These Visegrad countries, though upset by not being offered full membership immediately, have come to accept NACC and PfP as vehicles to gain eventual access into NATO. NACC and PfP have become the forum for collaboration and consultation between former adversaries and NATO, emphasizing closer contacts in the fields of civil-military relations, defense policy transparency, defense conversion and peacekeeping.¹²⁶

2. The European Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO, supporting the idea of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -- with American approval -- announced its intention to strengthen the European Defense Identity.

We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity [that]...will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence.¹²⁷ [Moreover, NATO supports] strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union....¹²⁸

¹²⁴*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 18.

¹²⁵Paul Latawski, p. 40.

¹²⁶Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 2.

According to a defense journal, the CJTF arrangement is the best possible solution in an era of changing military and political security arrangements in Europe. The CJTF structure calls "upon the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic to designate a notional general officer and HQ staff that could be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure."¹²⁹ The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) provides the,

...flexibility that would be required to allow NATO and non-NATO forces to act together in peacekeeping and other contingency operations. Using a 'building block' approach, command elements could be detached from major NATO commands for operations under NATO or, where NATO decides not to become involved, under WEU auspices.¹³⁰ [NATO endorses] the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.¹³¹

Lastly, under the plan European (NATO) countries could use NATO assets like intelligence resources and radar reports while North American units would be excluded, pending political decisions, from entering a European conflict.¹³²

While the goals of CJTF and PfP are explicit and can be seen as hedging against possible future problems in the East, their implementation might have immediate, unwitting, and unwanted regional implications. PfP could undermine CEE sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors into competitors; it could also erode domestic support for the region's democratic reformers, fragile civil-military relations, and sub-regional security perceptions and expectations.¹³³

¹²⁷*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 4.

¹²⁸*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 5.

¹²⁹Barbara Starr, p. 32. Starr interviewed Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, U.S. representative to the NATO Military Committee. General Christman believes that, "Part of the concept is that CJTFs could be activated for operations either under the control of NATO or the WEU. A key reason for the formation of the CJTF plan was that NATO political authorities wanted to ensure that if the USA and Canada opt out of an operation, there would still be a mechanism to ensure a viable European-run security operation."

¹³⁰Manfred Wörner, *NATO Review*, February 1994, p. 4.

¹³¹*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 9.

¹³²Steven Greenhouse, 16 January 1994, p. A 5.

¹³³Jeffrey Simon, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 40.

The point of detailing the evolving mission of NATO over forty years is that the Alliance has successfully expanded its membership and changed its historic mission roles in order to adequately respond to the changing international scene. This is characteristic of the transformation that alliance theory assumes when great powers evolve and change to meet different requirements in order to preserve their rank. For NATO to debate the issue of expansion, there is a necessity to detail the existence of an Eastern risk to warrant such a future enlargement. For NATO to retain its historic mission and provide a *raison d'être* into the twenty-first century, it must take on new members and new missions while simultaneously identifying current and future threats. To be sure, the current dilemma remains, "Can Russia in 1994 still be considered a threat?" For several reasons, Russia must still be considered a threat to NATO and more directly Central and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) and NATO must consider expansion as part of its historic mission and *raison d'être* into the twenty-first century.

IV. ALLIANCE MEMBER'S VIEWPOINTS ON NATO'S FUTURE

No doubt because of their proximity to Central and Eastern Europe, Germany and its leaders have been the most outspoken proponents of an enlarged NATO. Foremost among these are the German Defense Minister Volker Rühe, who recently stated that, "If we don't export stability, we are going to wind up importing instability."¹³⁴ These other varied extracts are indicative of the Atlantic Alliance's peculiar members and the uncertain future of NATO as it grapples with the issue of Eastern expansion:

The United States wants influence with the minimum commitment, while most Europeans prefer American resources accompanied by a light political touch. It is still hard to work out quite what France wants. Perhaps, in the post-Mitterrand era, Paris might move to reconcile the contradiction inherent in its adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty....¹³⁵ In prosperous years, it [Germany] is the first up; in lean years, the last down (and not all that much down). Italy is too tired, skeptical, unruly, and confused to count. Victorious Great Britain has seen its arrogant pride fade away along with its wealth, power, and prestige. France, of course, firmly and loudly proclaims itself Number One, but too firmly and too loudly at times.¹³⁶ Among the other major allies, the British and the French, for different reasons, adopted a straightforward, realist view of NATO, seeing it primarily as a security alliance and opposing its enlargement. The Germans, on the other hand, viewed NATO as the kernel of the developing European security order and championed the idea of granting security guarantees to the East and Central European states.¹³⁷

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, new European security implications surfaced immediately. In 1991, when the Warsaw Pact collapsed there was serious debate whether NATO should still exist. The abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow, coming in the wake of armed conflict in Yugoslavia, greatly alarmed both western Europe as well as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. These events in the east not only justified NATO's future existence, they prompted Central European calls for closer political and military links with NATO.¹³⁸

¹³⁴Stephen Kinzer, p. A 6.

¹³⁵*The Independent*, 22 August 1994, p. 13.

¹³⁶Luigi Barzini, p. 69.

¹³⁷Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 5.

¹³⁸Alfred A. Reisch, 9 July 1993, p. 38.

Desiring not to be locked inside another security vacuum, these same Central and Eastern European (CEE) states began to lobby for membership in NATO. In effect, these CEE countries were looking to NATO for security guarantees to ensure the future existence of budding democracies and free markets against a revitalized Russian threat.

The mechanism allowing future members into NATO requires a unanimous vote from each of the 16 participants. Furthermore, each of these 16 countries must submit the proposal for expanded membership before a legislative body for ratification. Therefore one Alliance member, no matter how influential, could not permit expansion unilaterally. If NATO expansion occurs in the future, it must first be agreed upon by the most influential members to even discuss the matter. Therefore, it is essential to gauge the opinion of the Alliance's main protagonists in order to fully understand the issue of expansion. If NATO does expand, it will occur under the auspices of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty that stipulates a unanimous consent of members. Although in principle each country in the Alliance has an equal voice in the North Atlantic Council, some voices are more equal than others and thus deserve special attention in this thesis. The countries to be analyzed include the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the Southern tier states.

While the CEE states clamor for NATO's Article 5 protection and for Desert Storm-type weapons, many in the Alliance hold that there is no credible eastern military threat to warrant such security guarantees. Instead of an immediate or plausible threat, diffuse risks threaten some members more directly than others. The renationalization of threat perceptions has lowered Alliance cohesion as countries take a national view of their security interests. In other words, expert observers in NATO see domestic concerns and the specific national security concerns as tantamount to an overall threat to the Alliance's political cohesion. This has been the result of losing a credible threat that could have destroyed them all.

As NATO emerges from the first five years of restructuring, its purpose and force structure continue to be influenced by the national characteristics of its members, including each country's historical experience, geo-strategic location in North America and Europe, and political traditions, as well as domestic concerns. These national traits influence policies regarding the two issues of expansion and Partnership for Peace (PfP). During the Cold War, NATO's members set national problems aside, to a noteworthy extent, for the greater good of Alliance cohesion in the face of the Soviet threat. Since the perception that an overwhelming threat of a land attack by Russia does not exist, leaders in each of the major Western countries have felt it necessary to define security interests not with regard to Alliance cohesion but rather with regard to what directly

threatens national interests. In light of a survey of the majority of Alliance members' views and given the lack of what Western Europeans view as a credible, looming threat, it appears that NATO expansion will be a very slow process.

More than ever, the opinions regarding expansion and PfP of the various Atlantic leaders will reflect the national interests and historical experiences of each state as well as the current political and social environment of the day. Western European governments, relatively weak in recent years owing in part to an economic recession, see no sense in wasting political capital by trying to convince voters that an Eastern threat is credible enough to warrant security commitments to buoy former communist countries. However, as the economy improves and national interests coincide with an effort to expand NATO, countries may be expected to view Partnership for Peace and NATO expansion in a more favorable light.

The Central and European (CEE) countries, particularly the Visegrad Four (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) can cite numerous examples of threats from the East. They could also easily prove that a security vacuum not only exists in Central and East Europe but is detrimental to overall European security and especially to their fragile democratic and market economies. The most important battle CEE states face is proving a necessity for union that will convince NATO and non-NATO Europeans to accept new commitments at a time when Western Europe's and North America's leaders are consumed with domestic political concerns. As Machiavelli observed,

...indecisive republics never choose beneficial policies except through force, for when there is doubt their weakness never allows them to arrive at a decision; and if that doubt is not removed by some form of violence which drives them on, they remain forever suspended in a state of indecision.¹³⁹

Therefore, there is a necessity to analyze opinion among NATO member states regarding Eastern expansion from the standpoint of national characteristics including: political personalities, domestic political matters, the historical experience, geo-strategic location, national threat perceptions and idiosyncratic national qualities. The study examines the extent to which historical legacies combine with geo-strategic location and national interests and how these factors have worked in conjunction with important NATO declarations to give a uniquely national characteristic to each member's outlook

¹³⁹Niccolò di Bernardo Machiavelli, *The Portable Machiavelli: The Discourses Book I*, chapter XXXVIII, pp. 251-252.

on NATO expansion and the Partnership for Peace. All members of the Atlantic Alliance must agree on any changes to the Alliance's membership, roles, missions and outlook on European security.

The core of NATO expansion is the examination of strategic interests and the national character of each country. In other words, if a country has no overwhelming security concerns, it probably does not have a strong position and looks to the Partnership for Peace mechanism as the best possible non-binding, non-committal policy. In that sense Partnership for Peace is a politically acceptable document because it pledges an ambiguous form of cooperation and integration without committing resources or political capital. The connection is between individual NATO member opinions regarding expansion and PfP, their interests and national character.

A. THE UNITED STATES

During the Bush Administration, NATO took a series of redefining steps aimed at responding to the tumultuous events that occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As far as NATO expansion to include Poland and the other Visegrad states was concerned, the Bush Administration seemed intent on pushing for closer ties with the East. However, up until 1992, there was little serious discussion about incorporating CEE countries into NATO. All of this began to change, however, with the aftermath of the Soviet coup in 1991 and the rise of ultranationalist forces in Russia who championed the popular idea of reconstituting the Soviet Empire and reasserting Russia's dominance in its historic sphere of influence – Central and Eastern Europe.

The personality of President Clinton plays a considerable role in the cautious American response to NATO expansion. The Clinton Administration, as seen by other Alliance members, has displayed less interest in maintaining a U.S. presence in Europe than previous administrations. Stanley Sloan points to several incidents that have led many in Europe to question the reliability of the Americans. As examples of the United States, "Tilting away from Europe" he lists:

- "President Clinton's renewed recriminations aimed at France and the UK" for opposing his proposal to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia and conduct air strikes on Serbian targets;
- "Secretary of State Christopher's assertion that 'Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world' and that Washington had been too 'Eurocentric' for too long;"
- The November 1993 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit where unnamed "senior Administration diplomats and trade officials"

implied that APEC relations "were becoming more important than those with Europe."¹⁴⁰

The Economist went farther, condemning the Clinton Administration for sending "bad signals" to Europe over the last two years:

For sending a series of shivers down Europe's spine, Bill Clinton's administration has only itself to blame...Too often officials with their minds elsewhere (usually on domestic policy) seemed careless of old friends...Mr. Clinton has allowed relations with Western Europe to suffer badly; less by design than through a combination of naiveté and neglect.¹⁴¹

Critics of the Clinton Administration are most vociferous when the President claims not to have an influential voice in the future of NATO. Clinton raised their ire when he stated that, "I think [the Poles] have virtually assured that they are at the front of the line as NATO will be expanded...We just have to get together and work out the details." Clinton went on to say that, "It's not for me as the American president to say what the details should be."¹⁴² The election of President Clinton has produced the first traceable signs of an American retrenchment from Europe. To be sure, the NATO infrastructure fund was cut by Congress while President Bush was still in office and troop levels set at 100,000 were negotiated well before Clinton took office.

However, there has occurred a perceptible shift in American administration attitudes away from Europe and towards other regions. The domestic political situation (billions of dollars of federal debt and government downsizing) in the United States makes it nearly impossible to advocate additional resources to integrate and improve militaries of Central and Eastern Europe. The President appears to have surrounded himself with advisors who have as a primary objective maintaining cordial relations with Russia. No one can argue that the American view on NATO expansion is nearly mute in comparison to pre-1989 presidential initiatives. The trend is seen as an effort not to engage in Europe but rather to turn attention westward. Henry Kissinger recently wrote that,

Part of the reason for the decline of what was once the most vital American policy is that NATO has come to be taken for granted as part of a landscape that needs no further tending...[T]he generation of American

¹⁴⁰Stanley Sloan, pp. 27-28.

¹⁴¹*The Economist*, 12 March 1994, pp. 21-24.

¹⁴²President Clinton, 12 July 1994.

leaders which has reached prominence in the last decade and a half has been drawn mostly from the South and the West, where there are fewer emotional and personal ties to Europe...American liberals...have frequently felt let down by democratic allies which practice a policy of national interest rather than of collective security and reliance on international law....¹⁴³

The idiosyncrasies of the American character (sometimes isolationist, sometimes interventionist) combined with a historical experience that make it less-than-enthusiastic in European affairs. Luigi Barzini asks,

Is the United States a fundamentally interventionist or a determinedly isolationist country?...[T]he United States can be both things, isolationist and interventionist, but one never knows which it will be and when.¹⁴⁴...At times the United States (as seen by foreign observers, anyway) still behaves as the small, peace-loving, homespun, philosophic Republic it used to be, which could afford to propose or proclaim any desirable, noble, or crackpot idea -- the Open Door policy or the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war -- because nobody would take it very seriously and nothing much happened....¹⁴⁵

The national experience of the United States as a liberal democracy with competing strains of isolationism and interventionism over the past century illustrates the current American dilemma in Europe. Particularly as a result of an emerging liberal strain of thinking that developed during the Vietnam War, American policy makers of this post-war generation deprecate the use of force and the implementation of *Realpolitik* and instead emphasize economic harmonization as a comprehensive means to global peace. President Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, recently reiterated this view in the op-ed section of *The New York Times*. He wrote,

Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, and they make for reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse their citizens' rights or wage war on one another. The Administration has made a good start at building security and economic institutions designed to create the conditions in which democracy can flourish.¹⁴⁶

The security institutions founded in the Cold War era, however, still serve a vital function but do not fit into the scheme of the Clinton administration's liberal conscience.

¹⁴³Henry Kissinger, p. 819.

¹⁴⁴Luigi Barzini, pp. 241-242.

¹⁴⁵Luigi Barzini, pp. 252-253.

¹⁴⁶Anthony Lake, 23 September 1994, p. A 17.

For this reason, one sees the current administration turning from military organizations like NATO to more global-economic ones like the UN, GATT and APEC. Michael Howard, while not directly addressing the current administration, does elaborate on the 1960's liberal conscience view of President Clinton and his top advisors on eastern expansion. "By the 1960s," Howard writes, "many liberals...were growing uneasy about the [international] situation. The vast military establishment with its industrial ramifications and its horrific weapons-systems; the dubious allies shored up by arms and dollars...."¹⁴⁷

The geo-strategic location of the United States makes it more inclined to look farther west (Asia) and towards North and Central America. This geo-strategic location of the United States has much to do with the current westward orientation of the current American administration. Rather than engage in nineteenth century debates over balance of power, *Realpolitik* and *Machtpolitik*, to the detriment of Russian-American relations, the U.S. is decidedly more enthused about fostering greater economic ties to Asia, which in turn promotes greater American prosperity. The geo-strategic location of the United States in the 1990's does not facilitate, according to the Clinton Administration, American engagement in Europe the way it did during the Cold War. Asia with its booming economies is more apt to get American attention. Therefore, no bold American initiatives toward Europe should be expected until at least 1997. There no longer is a pressing need to relive the historical experiences of World War I, World War II and the Cold War when it is thought that global economic harmonization is more beneficial to maintaining peace.

Thus, U.S. threat perceptions have changed, with an emphasis less on balance of power and maintenance of an American military presence in Europe and more on enforcing human rights in the Western Hemisphere. All of these elements have combined to make the United States an ambivalent Atlantic partner. One manifestation of this reluctance to get involved in European affairs is the PfP. Furthermore, notions of collective security are replacing the strength of the alliance because of the liberal notion that alliances presume confrontation. Henry Kissinger writes,

The American objection to NATO membership for the Visegrad countries is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection to alliances -- because they were based on the expectation of confrontation -- President Clinton has used the occasion of a NATO summit in January

¹⁴⁷Michael Howard, p. 129-130. Howard writes about the new "Concert of Europe" that then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to resurrect as a means of balancing the Atlantic Alliance, "American liberals watched this process with a kind of stunned bewilderment...."

1994...President Clinton put forward a scheme which he called the Partnership for Peace. It invites *all* the successor states of the Soviet Union and *all* of Moscow's former East European satellites to join what amounts to a vague system of collective security.¹⁴⁸

Strobe Talbott and Peter Tarnoff see a quick expansion of the Atlantic Alliance as threatening to Russia, financially expensive to the United States and filled with potential political pitfalls, including the incorporation of Yugoslavia-like situations. *The New York Times* portrayed Strobe Talbott's role in the formulation of the "Partnership" proposal as pivotal. Michael Gordon writes that Secretary of State Christopher was persuaded against offering Visegrad countries immediate membership in NATO,

...after Strobe Talbott, the journalist turned policy maker who was named this week as Mr. Christopher's deputy, intervened. On the weekend before a critical Cabinet-level meeting in October, Mr. Talbott, who has been Ambassador at Large to the former Soviet republics, typed a memo on his home computer arguing against NATO expansion and sent it to Mr. Christopher. Within days, Mr. Christopher and Defense Secretary Les Aspin were flying to Europe to explain the go-slow approach endorsed by Mr. Talbott.¹⁴⁹

Gordon goes on to write that Talbott and Tarnoff led a faction in the Clinton administration that strongly opposed expansion. He writes,

Mr. Talbott, the Administration's foremost booster of Mr. Yeltsin, and Peter Tarnoff, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. They insisted that letting some Eastern European nations into the alliance would undermine the prospects for Russian reform...Mr. Talbott's intellect, bureaucratic skills and long friendship with President Clinton made him a formidable force.¹⁵⁰

Lastly, in making the case for keeping Central Europeans out of NATO, Talbott lobbied hard to show a potential destabilizing effect of such an action. Gordon states,

In his memo, Mr. Talbott argued that if NATO were opened, some Eastern European nations, like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, would be admitted soon since they have done the furthest to implement democratic reforms. But Russia and the Ukraine, where reform efforts are less advanced, would be left outside for years. This, he argued, would encourage Russian fears that NATO was committed to a policy of

¹⁴⁸Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 824.

¹⁴⁹Michael R. Gordon, p. A 1.

¹⁵⁰Michael R. Gordon, 2 January 1994, p. A 1.

containing Russian power and also complicate efforts to persuade Ukraine to give up its nuclear arms."¹⁵¹

PfP has numerous attributes that its proponents proclaim throughout receptive European capitals. PfP requires minimal U.S. commitment to eastern Europe while simultaneously demonstrating to NATO partners that the U.S. is still engaged in proposing security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. PfP is not hostile to Russian interests. PfP is ambiguous enough that both partners and NATO members can glean any specific meaning to fit their purpose. PfP's invitation to "one-day join NATO" is an offer no Central and Eastern European country could turn down, even though it never stipulates how a country would achieve NATO membership. PfP is an offer no NATO member could refuse, including Germany, lest they create a policy dispute and hasten an American withdrawal. PfP gives breathing space to governments of Europe who fear immediate alliance enlargement would drain domestic resources. PfP is relatively "cost free." For all of these reasons NATO members have warmly embraced it.

With the election of President Clinton, all foreign policy matters were subordinated to his bold domestic agenda. Moreover, the new team of foreign policy experts seemed more concerned with dealing primarily with Russia than with NATO Europe. This so-called "Russia first policy" was guided by Talbott, the translator of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs and a co-editor of *Time* magazine, who made several prognostications and statements regarding to the Soviet Union that seemed to illustrate his "Russophile" tendencies and his lack of understanding for NATO's purpose. Robert Zoellick, former undersecretary of State and deputy chief of staff at the White House during the Bush administration, commented that,

In his own determined way, Ambassador Talbott is one of [a] few high foreign policy officials who has charted a course in his area of interest and fought to stick with it. The problem is that there has been no strong counterbalancing force making the case for a European policy separate from our Russian calculations...We are now witnessing a policy that places our anxieties about threats to a Russian leader *ahead* of our commitment to the alliance and to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁵²

The Economist also noted Talbott's "romantic fascination with Russia," remarking that, "If a cautious adjustment of [Clinton's] hitherto Russo-centric strategy is taking place, it falls far short of the wholesale reordering some people want." Moreover, "As

¹⁵¹Michael R. Gordon, p. A 4.

¹⁵²Robert B. Zoellick, p. 28.

communism collapsed he said the Soviet threat had never been as serious as it was cracked up to be: 'The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were right all along'.¹⁵³ Talbott engineered the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, which has further endowed the Clinton Administration with the reputation of seeing foreign policy matters, especially European matters, as suitable for "benign neglect." That reputation was reinforced when then-deputy director for the State Department Peter Tarnoff, in response to Europe's wave of nationalistic wars, declared that the world of the future would have many more nations and many more national wars, and it would not be the responsibility of the United States to come and settle each dispute. He stated in an off-the-record talk with reporters at the Overseas Writers Club on 25 May 1993:

...our economic interests are paramount. The U.S. must 'define the extent of its commitment and make a commitment commensurate with those realities. This may on occasion fall short of what some Americans would like and others would hope for.' [As this applies to future Bosnian-like conflicts] 'we simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence...to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive results'....¹⁵⁴

Though this sentiment does not contradict a widely held view by an isolationist American public, the mere utterance of such a future pragmatic approach sent shock waves through European capitals as a harbinger of America's waning interest in European matters. It is no wonder then that the State Department has claimed widespread support from allies for PFP. Stephen Oxman has stated,

[PFP]...has the enthusiastic support of all of our allies and has now been widely welcomed in the East. But some in this country and abroad have objected that the Partnership is a halfway measure which does not go far enough to ensure the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and that it falls short because it does not offer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe early NATO membership. I disagree....¹⁵⁵

The problem with the Partnership for Peace is not so much the concept of a pay-as-you-go, go-slow-approach. Its weakness is the implication that a disengaged America neither accepts its responsibilities as a major international force nor feigns an interest. Partnership for Peace was the ideal document for nearly all of the West

¹⁵³*The Economist*, 12 March 1994, p. 36.

¹⁵⁴Heinz A. J. Kern, "The Clinton Doctrine: a New Foreign Policy." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 June 1993, p. 19.

¹⁵⁵Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Stephen A. Oxman, 1 February 1994.

European capitals whose leaders, not universally popular among the voters, could embrace a bland document that did not pledge them to quickly accept new members or to fund their programs aimed at gaining membership. Secretary of State Warren Christopher adamantly supported the initiative when he said, "this new Partnership for Peace will in no way erode NATO's core capabilities or undermine, in any respect, its responsibilities for the collective security of the NATO countries."¹⁵⁶ Earlier, he had said, "NATO is not an alliance of convenience, but an alliance of commitment. Expanded membership must strengthen, not weaken the ability of the Alliance to act."¹⁵⁷ The Poles have seen PfP as a gimmick. In a Warsaw newspaper, a Polish writer charged that,

Clinton and Strobe Talbott, the author of Clinton's foreign policy, will not propose that Poland be accepted into NATO faster (which the U.S. Senate wants). The U.S. Administration is afraid that this could put relations with Russia in jeopardy and could create another 'hot spot' quite unnecessarily.¹⁵⁸

American reticence has been viewed positively by the French as a part of necessary evolutionary process for Europeans to reclaim the initiative in security matters. Other Europeans will go along with the Partnership for Peace so as not to hasten an American withdrawal. It is important to analyze the role the American Congress has played in shaping the debate over NATO expansion because many congressional leaders have spoken out on the necessity for eastern expansion of NATO. Congressional leaders in both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been instrumental in pushing the Clinton Administration into a more activist role supporting East Central European membership in NATO. In the Senate, Senator Richard Lugar (R) Indiana; Senator Hank Brown (R) Colorado and Senator Mitch McConnell (R) Kentucky, have all been outspoken in their condemnation for Clinton's PfP initiative and the necessity to offer concrete criteria for eventual membership. President Clinton has piqued Senator Lugar's ire, suggesting that PfP is the mechanism for Eastern membership without specifically addressing criteria. Clinton stated that,

[PfP]...is the beginning of a process that will not only eventually lead to an expansion of NATO, but much more importantly, gives us a chance to have a secure and unified Europe in which, for the first time, all nation

¹⁵⁶Secretary of State Christopher, 7 January 1994.

¹⁵⁷Secretary of State Christopher, 2 December 1993.

¹⁵⁸Tomasz Wroblewski, p. 3.

states really do respect the territorial integrity of one another.¹⁵⁹...Partnership for peace is not NATO membership. But neither is it a permanent holding room.¹⁶⁰

Senator Richard Lugar in his critical appraisal of the PfP plan stated that, "In many respects, Partnership for Peace epitomizes the Administration's ad hoc approach to European security problems. It is a band-aide offered in place of corrective surgery."¹⁶¹ "The basic flaw in Partnership for Peace is its underlying premise -- the avoidance of line-drawing. This is a really an attempt to avoid choices and thus to avoid the establishment of clear policy objectives."¹⁶² Finally, with the recent Republican victories in the House and Senate as well as the promotion of Ambassador Holbrooke to a senior position in the State Department, U.S. policy towards expanding the Alliance seems to have reversed earlier trends set by Talbott and Tarnoff.

B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Germans officially welcomed the Partnership for Peace as the first step *towards* the inevitable expansion of NATO. PfP is the correct first step, but the Germans are very eager to continue the process from initial ambiguity to providing a set of standards, criteria and timelines for eventual membership of Central and Eastern European countries. The *White Paper 1994*, (Germany's defense statement) clearly states the intention not to make PfP an indefinite holding area for CEE states. The main concern for German security planners is incorporating at the very least the Visegrad countries in order to provide a stable front that borders Germany's eastern frontier and the need to stabilize fragile democracies. Within the German coalition government, an almost schizophrenic attitude has emerged. On the one hand, Helmut Kohl is taking a moderate position, the defense minister aggressively is pursuing early expansion while the foreign minister is warning about the implications of early membership.

His ambitious Defense Minister, Volker Rühe, takes a very hard, line partly championing immediate expansion because of his CDU affiliation and mostly because he is using the issue of NATO expansion as a means of creating a name for himself in the German and international press. Meanwhile, as part of the coalition, the Foreign

¹⁵⁹President Clinton, 7 July 1994.

¹⁶⁰President Clinton, 12 January 1994.

¹⁶¹Senator Lugar, 9 December 1993, p. 9.

¹⁶²Senator Lugar, 1 February 1994, p. 5.

Minister, Klaus Kinkel, a leader in the Free Democratic Party, takes a very conciliatory tone, attempting to support the American PfP position and to assuage any fears Russia may have about NATO expansion eastward. In all, the official German government position supports the American PfP initiative because it keeps Germany from having a policy schism with Washington. Second, it keeps the U.S. in Europe and simultaneously subverts French attempts to play a greater leadership role. Third, it does not upset the Russians. Fourth, PfP supports a German moral obligation to correct past wrongs towards its Eastern neighbors.

German foreign policy regarding an expanded NATO is based upon the country's historical geo-strategic position in Europe as well as the current social-political realities facing the ruling government. Chancellor Kohl's political, military and economic standing is maintained through a careful balancing act between competing domestic concerns and Germany's position as a regional power. The current German policy concerning the maintenance of a balance in Europe involves the careful maintenance of a German-American Atlantic cooperation. Germany's policies therefore are based upon the primary consideration of maintaining the Atlantic link and thus all policies flow from that.

Primarily, German historic interests derive from: (1) The geo-strategic location between Russia-Central and Eastern Europe and France. (2) The necessity to maintain strong ties with Russia, France and the United Kingdom lest they return to a 1914 or 1939 scenario where for many reasons they became divided and enemies. (3) The historical interest in stabilizing or at least having a say in Central European affairs, a kind of modern-day *Zwang nach Osten*. Jolyon Howorth notes that, "Germany's overriding preoccupation in the immediate future will have to be with her Eastern neighbours. But three points should be noted here. The first is that such a concern derives more from a sense of *Zwang nach Osten* than from *Drang nach Osten*, or, as Gregory Treverton has put it, "more the pull of perceived obligation than the push of imagined destiny."¹⁶³ (4) Since 1945, a necessity to conduct foreign policy so discreetly so as not to damage relations with the United States or European partners.

Based on these recent historical interests, the current German eastern policy and view of NATO's future may be summarized as follows: (1) Eastern expansion of NATO but not at the expense of alienating the Americans or alarming other European powers (namely Russia and France). (2) The maintenance of a viable American military and

¹⁶³Jolyon Howorth, pp. 13-14. Howorth quotes from Gregory Treverton's 1992 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The New Europe," 71/1, p. 100.

diplomatic presence (100,000 troops). In addition to the American viewpoint, the German position on expansion of the Atlantic Alliance is the most influential opinion among NATO members because it is most directly affected by developments in the East.

Germans have invested billions of dollars in CEE economies. If the Germans perceive a lack of resolve to incorporate East Central Europe into NATO and the European Union structures, they can be expected to raise the issue in the following years as Europe moves towards closer integration. For the past forty years, Germany has relied upon integration with other allies to form a common defense. The rejection of an assertive nationalistic or "singular" policy has been repeatedly confirmed by German statesmen since the end of the Second World War. Germany's preference to work in conjunction with fellow allies has made it a strong "team player" that stresses multilateral diplomacy and multilateral actions in a wide realm of political and military fields.

Within the context of national threat perceptions, Germany sees the expansion of NATO as providing a number of beneficial results. First, Germany sees the expansion of NATO, including at least the Visegrad countries, as bringing stability farther east and at least pushing any near-term instability farther from its eastern border. Second, Germany views expanded membership as beneficial to Russia because the Alliance would act as a moderating factor for CEE countries and a tool to ease the concerns about the security vacuum. Third, Germany recognizes that an extension of the NATO Alliance is really an extension and future commitment of American involvement on the Continent. Though NATO is comprised of sixteen sovereign states, German officials recognize the weight that the United States can bring to future European security. Finally, German leaders prefer an American presence that balances a French one. Elizabeth Pond, a expert of German affairs notes that,

President Bush's unstinting support for unification in 1989-90 showed the Germans the benefits of maintaining an alliance with a large, distant friend who is not as burdened by European history as are Germany's neighbors. The French-German relationship will always form the core of the European Community, but the Germans will also need, for a long time to come, a less parochial counterweight to Paris and London.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴Elizabeth Pond, p. 116. She adds that, "To be sure, West German enthusiasm for America and NATO could be abnormally colored at this point by gratitude for Washington's stalwart support for unification against the French and British (and Soviets). But there probably will continue to be numerous issues in which German stakes will coincide more closely with American than with French or British interests, and Germany will value its augmented influence in European councils arising from its American connection in NATO," p. 122.

Although the issue of WEU/NATO congruence has not yet been resolved, Germans recognize that membership of the Visegrad countries into only the WEU security alliance and not NATO, would immediately signal an American loss of prestige and presence. German leaders see the enhancement of NATO's mission and expansion of its membership as providing three general benefits:

- A "multinational European framework" that has worked successfully for forty years;
- The ideal way to ensure future "American engagement" to European stability;
- A means of quelling Germany's need for renationalizing of its threat perceptions.¹⁶⁵

Ronald Asmus suggests that Germany's interest in facilitating Eastern stability is through the use of NATO membership. He states,

Eastern Europe and Russia top the list of Germany's 'vital interests,' replacing France. Moreover, when asked to identify the greatest 'critical threats' to Germany's 'vital interests' in the years ahead, Germans name threats in the East -- the spread of nationalism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic and regional conflict, and emigration. This growing public recognition of Germany's interest in the East might be termed Germany's new 'Zwang nach Osten.' It does not reflect any aggressive German intent, but rather a defensive and pragmatic realization that Germany is most vulnerable to the rise of nationalism and instability on its eastern borders.¹⁶⁶

It is this reason why most observers claim that without cooperation from the European Union or NATO in the future Germany might be forced to proceed on its own and offer limited security assurances. Kelleher and Fisher note, "with a strong interest in the future of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Germany could be forced to assume a leadership role in the region, if the European Community is unable or unwilling to do so."¹⁶⁷ The German Defense Ministry views PfP not as the sole mechanism for expansion but rather the first step that facilitates quick membership of

¹⁶⁵Stephen F. Szabo, p. 13.

¹⁶⁶Ronald Asmus, p. 71.

¹⁶⁷Kelleher & Fisher, p. 170. The authors also imply that Helmut Kohl's moderate position on Eastern expansion is a reflection of the Chancellor's realization that there is a minority of Germans who might be troubled by Germany financially overextending itself. They write that some Germans fear, "the dual financial burden of domestic unification and assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, [fearing that] both may erode the economic strength that has been the primary source of German pride and influence in the postwar period." P. 172.

Central and Eastern Europe. The *White Paper 1994* states, "The 'Partnership for Peace' is an important and useful step along the road to leading new partners towards the West's security institutions. It is no substitute for expanding the Alliance."¹⁶⁸ Advocating a more ambitious policy than the Chancellor, Volker Rühe, Germany's Defense Minister, is said to voice opinions that Helmut Kohl espouses but is in no position to publicly state. As members of the Christian Democratic Union, Kohl and Rühe have both been more outspoken on integration of CEE states than the Foreign Ministry, which is headed by a coalition partner, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the Free Democratic Party. The FDP is not as interested in Eastern expansion because it wants to avoid upsetting Russia and Europeans that believe NATO and German influence are filling the void left by Russian troops too quickly.

Germany's historical interest in keeping the United States engaged in European affairs forces the government to support PfP as an initial strategy, in order not to further divide the American-German position. Germany seems willing to go along with most American proposals, either tacitly or otherwise, which would commit America to Europe for the future. As with other NATO members including France, German leaders see several benefits in retaining an American presence. In addition to political benefits associated with an American presence, the United States offers several strategic assets that are critical to maintaining a credible military force within NATO. Gerard Berkhof outlines several American resources that makes its presence critical to the present success of NATO. He writes,

As a defence alliance NATO is still the most flexible organisation. The strategic assets of the United States – nuclear weapons, advanced conventional cruise missiles and stealth bombers, sea-based air and heavy transport planes and, above all, a world-wide intelligence-gathering capability – are essential for the defence of European territory and of great value in dealing with contingencies at the lower end of the violence scale.¹⁶⁹

Domestically, there is little support for the CDU to advocate financial commitments to CEE states while Germans have experienced a decrease in their standard of living as a result of incorporating East Germany. This position could change if Kohl was elected to another term; if the economy experienced an incremental improvement, thereby providing greater resources; or if a new American president

¹⁶⁸*White Paper 1994*, p. 54.

¹⁶⁹Gerard C. Berkhof, p. 12.

advocated quick NATO expansion. CEE integration will cost Germany billions of *deutschmarks* over several years while there is less money in the German Central Bank as a result of economic development of Eastern Germany. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been an early proponent of expanding the Alliance east in the near-term. He is eager not to show an overwhelming desire to integrate the eastern systems because of the enormous costs associated with military integration. Furthermore, his opinion is further muted by his attempt not to appear over-ambitious in the realm of foreign adventures, lest he incur the distrust of France and other countries. Finally, he realizes that being too far out in front on the issue would distance himself from the Americans, a situation that most Germans would prefer to avoid. Kohl's concept of NATO expansion is outlined in the 1994 *German Defence White Paper*. In the White Paper, the Chancellor's moderate opening statement on Central and Eastern European integration is contrasted by R  he's blunt call for specific actions for closer ties. Specifically Kohl writes,

Today, the most effective way of serving stability on our continent is to support the fledgeling democracies of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe in their efforts to consolidate a free and democratic order in their states and societies and to establish efficient and competitive market economies...this involves the prospect...of drawing closer to the existing Western communities.¹⁷⁰

Volker R  he, more adamant on the issue, states that, "indicating that it is willing to admit new members, NATO is making a major contribution to the stabilization of Eastern Europe. Integration and cooperation are the foundations of...European stability."¹⁷¹ The two varying statements are less a testament of a schizophrenic CDU position and more illustrative of the extent with which a German Chancellor can diverge from a vague Alliance agreement (PfP) and propose bold foreign policy initiatives in the name of a newly reunited German Republic. In other words, R  he's ambitious position probably indicates the unstated intentions of the Chancellor articulated by someone other than the Chancellor. Germany cannot be too pro-American during an election campaign. Neither can the ruling party afford to support PfP exercises in Germany during an election year. As one American defense observer remarked, "Kohl's government does not want to risk their slim lead in exchange for a

¹⁷⁰German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, writing in the Foreword section of the *White Paper 1994*, pp. VI-VII.

¹⁷¹German Federal Minister of Defense Volker R  he, writing in the Foreword section *White Paper 1994*, pp. VIII-IX.

bunch of Polish-speaking soldiers tromping through Bavaria in the summer." Germany can also not be too pro-American for fear of upsetting the French and Russians.

Rühe's adamant "expansion soon" stance must be put within the context of domestic German politics. He is actively pursuing an international issue that keeps his prominence nearly parallel to that of the Chancellor. Second, his ambitions to become Germany's next chancellor, after Kohl, sometimes leave his position at odds with the mainstream CDU line. Whenever Rühe has the opportunity, he offers undivided support for NATO expansion. Recently he proclaimed that,

We [NATO] cannot afford to delay decisions until perfect visions of Europe have been designed. The Atlantic Alliance must not become a 'closed shop. I cannot see one good reason for denying future members of the European Union membership in NATO.¹⁷²

Rühe also recently said that Germany in the past "has contributed the lion's share of the aid...we cannot pay the bill for the rehabilitation of Eastern Europe...What is required is a great collective effort, an all-European solidarity pact for the states in the Eastern part of our continent." Klaus Kinkel advocates a middle-of-the-road approach that stresses the importance of not diverging from Washington's PFP initiative.

The main position of Kinkel and the CDP is that Germany should help resolve the security dilemma in Central and East European but not at the expense of isolating Russia or other cautious NATO members. According to Alfred Reisch, Foreign Minister Kinkel reportedly stated that Germany wanted to help assure security for East European countries but at the same time make sure that such steps did not make Russia feel isolated. NATO, Kinkel said, "would declare that it was open to new members 'in principle' but confine its specific proposals to ways of increasing mutual cooperation."¹⁷³ Michael Mihalka asserts that President Yeltsin's authoritarian methods to quell the coup attempt in October 1993 cut short Kinkel's support for early membership of Central Eastern European states. He wrote,

...the role that Kinkel was willing to accord Russia in NATO's policies went far beyond what any other NATO member was willing to concede. Reacting to Russian concerns, Kohl also expressed the opinion that the enlargement of NATO now belonged to 'a further-off future'.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷²Volker Rühe, *Survival*, p. 135.

¹⁷³Alfred A. Reisch, 25 March 1994, p. 25.

¹⁷⁴Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 8.

C. FRANCE

France does not favor immediate NATO expansion for a variety of reasons. Primarily, prompt membership is contrary to the Balladur Stability Pact that calls for delaying western integration until positive diplomatic resolutions to ethno-national problems were completed. Second, France's Gaullist tendencies leave it suspicious of Atlantic schemes to immediately expand NATO, preferring instead European security solutions to Atlantic ones. In effect, the French are seeking to "deepen European security not to widen the Atlantic Alliance."¹⁷⁵ Third, France views expansion as enhancing Germany's de facto influence over CEE countries as a result of its geo-strategic location. Fourth, France views NATO expansion as implying a continued American presence that includes a nuclear deterrent and additional political and diplomatic initiatives further subverting French influence. Unless France rejoins NATO's integrated military command structure, enlargement of the Alliance and America's continued presence in Europe would upgrade the status of SACEUR/SHAPE. Fifth, France views the transfer of resources from the southern tier (where France believes a more immediate risk exists) as antagonistic to Russia and also a waste of valuable NATO assets. Sixth, France perceives enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance as a step towards integrating CEE countries into the European Union, precipitating an influx of cheap agricultural goods. Lastly, French officials realize that enlarging NATO requires substantial financial resources from all the major NATO capitals -- a likelihood not welcome by either French leaders or the public. Dr. Holger Mey writes that,

...the French stressed the importance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, in order to prevent NATO from playing a bigger role in European security affairs, while the argument here is that one must emphasize NATO's core function: defense of its members, in order to maintain the organization's strength and continuous relevance.¹⁷⁶

Echoing the reticence of French leadership to expand NATO promptly, the current French Foreign Minister has been less-than-enthusiastic for the proposal. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé stated in October 1993, "Before entering into the process of enlargement, let us make the existing institutions work. For that we have the North Atlantic Cooperation Council." In September 1993, the French Defense Minister "gave only qualified support" to NATO expansion advocated by the Germans. He stated that "The process has started and we on the French side will certainly not raise

¹⁷⁵Paul Latawski, p. 41.

¹⁷⁶Dr. Holger Mey, 1993, p. 244.

any obstacle in this expansion." The defense minister added that "he did not think that all" Central and Eastern European states were "equally ready for membership, and he expressed concern" about how other CEE countries might react if they were excluded.¹⁷⁷ By January 1994 Alain Lamassoure, France's European Affairs Minister, proclaimed his support for the cautious Partnership for Peace proposal and his opposition to immediate expansion.¹⁷⁸

French foreign policy goals regarding NATO expansion, are a manifestation of its historical experience and national interest. These include: (1) promoting the realization of a French world vision that has France as the dominant European power and is thus reliant upon American retrenchment and German and British acquiescence of the French "special leadership role" in Europe; (2) maintaining a presence and a leadership role in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria; (3) advocating foreign policies that do not expend French financial reserves; (4) championing the Balladur stability pact proposal in order to stem any possible ethnic or national wars from being imported from CEE states.

France makes the point that by extending guarantees to Central and Eastern Europe, NATO might be only importing additional sources of disharmony and strife westward. The main point is that France is very concerned about the risk of bringing Eastern Europe's problems west when in fact the proper course is to gradually integrate and bring these countries up to the same standards as Western Europe. "Forming or extending alliances will not solve any problems, especially those of minority borders, which have re-emerged with a vengeance, forming potential sources of grave crises."¹⁷⁹ For all of these reasons, French leaders are not enthusiastic about enlarging the Alliance immediately or even in the near term.

France's policy of Eastern expansion reflects its ambivalence about supporting expansion at the expense of its visionary policy of a greater European leadership role. The ambiguity of the Pfp Initiative and its failure to spell out specific guidelines and requirements for prospective members accentuates the French desire not to compromise its national interests and ideals. The caution of the British and Americans about extending security guarantees to CEE countries is repeated by France's Minister of Defense in the 1994 White Paper:

¹⁷⁷François Léotard cited by Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 7.

¹⁷⁸French European Affairs Minister Alain Lamassoure cited by Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹*Livre Blanc sur la Defense 1994*, p. 35.

The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, with whom a number of agreements have been concluded in a few years, will enjoy higher priority in the allocation of resources and military cooperation...The establishment of closer relations between the armed forces and the defence ministries of these countries and our own, the multiplication of concrete links at all levels, as well as joint training and exercises, are elements that will gradually reinforce both the democratic evolution of these countries' defence systems and the feeling of solidarity between France and these States.¹⁸⁰

France prefers the Partnership for Peace initiative for several key reasons. First, PfP does not imply or explicitly state a leading American role in European security decisions. Second, PfP is virtually cost-free, and requires very little from France's limited resources. Third, PfP advocates a "go slow" approach in order to have CEE countries improve their policies on minority issues in accordance with the Balladur Stability Pact. Fourth, no substantive statements call for the diversion of resources away from NATO's Southern tier to Central and Eastern Europe.

In order for France to maintain what has been described as its "self-assigned status as the world's third military power," the proposed "deepening" of the EU which many French politicians tirelessly defend might be undermined by additional NATO members. Therefore, in keeping with France's grand ideals, French leaders are, nevertheless, not overly enthusiastic about immediate or even eventual expansion of the Alliance.¹⁸¹ The French concept of deepening European institutions and simultaneously downplaying all but American nuclear guarantees has been the underlying French policy since the early 1980's. "The principal change in French Alliance policy under Mitterrand has been the emphasis throughout the past decade on deepening West European security and defense cooperation...."¹⁸² The French dilemma is attempting to balance the necessity for the American nuclear deterrent as a last resort under Article 5 while continuing to resist a subordinate role in Europe. By advocating the use of NATO structures to integrate the East, France sees its leadership role

¹⁸⁰*Livre Blanc sur la Defense 1994*, pp. 39-40. The most telling aspect of this passage is that it remains the most aggressive statement regarding NATO expansion. The key word is "gradually," implying that NATO expansion is not an immediate proposition.

¹⁸¹David S. Yost, "France," p. 272.

¹⁸²David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," pp. 149-150. Additionally, Yost maintains that, "The French want to retain a U.S. military and nuclear presence in Europe, but not on their soil. Mitterrand sometimes conveys the impression that he would like to retain the United States as a 'last resort' security blanket for France, but feels it imperative to diminish West European dependence on the United States."

diminished because it would occur under the auspices of SACEUR. Margaret Thatcher noted this problem writing,

What these new approaches will require, however, is a recognition from the French political élite that any stable European balance of power will require the more or less permanent presence of the United States in Europe. And that is a recognition that so far French presidents have been prepared to grant only in private.¹⁸³

Thus, if the French accept the use of NATO structures, they essentially undercut their own leadership role and, in effect, return to the Alliance's integrated military structure. As one observer explains, "French participation in multinational units, including US forces under SACEUR's authority, would amount to a return to NATO's integrated military structure."¹⁸⁴ The French insistence to be Europe's leader, Barzini states, and the need of other European states to keep the United States engaged creates a never-ending turmoil. He writes,

The insistent crowing from the dungheap, the demand that France be treated always as the foremost nation after the two superpowers, surely the first in Europe, the sometimes incoherent and contradictory foreign policy, complicate any relations with it as never before. Relations with it are further embroiled by the fact that it is admittedly true that it is still, in many ways, Numero Uno in continental Europe, whatever that may mean, and that Europe would be inconceivable without it.¹⁸⁵

Though France has had an historic distrust for Alliance partners, it has nevertheless been forced to rely upon them since the early nineteenth century. Along this same line, France's on-going dilemma with the United States concerns the preoccupation it has with the role Americans play on the continent. France's view towards NATO expansion therefore is contingent namely on how enlargement of the Alliance transforms French authority with the rest of Europe. France's preoccupation with its perceived "first rank grandeur" is the single most important factor affecting the French outlook regarding NATO expansion.

France sees as its most immediate threat emanating from the Maghreb and the potential for instability as a result of Islamic fundamentalism. In listing France's new sources of vulnerabilities, one sees the absence of Alliance-specific threats and the emergence of national threat perceptions. France views terrorism, extremism of

¹⁸³Margaret Thatcher, p. 815.

¹⁸⁴David S. Yost, "France and West European defense identity," p. 331.

¹⁸⁵Luigi Barzini, p. 125.

religious and nationalistic types and drug traffic as the main threats to its national security. France's southern coast is perceived as the entry point for these destabilizing factors. Instead, French leaders see no point offering security guarantees and diverting limited resources to CEE countries when the only quantifiable threat exists along France's southern periphery. Like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, France is more concerned about the more immediate risks associated with Islamic extremism in Algeria than any near term Eastern threat.

To be sure, France keeps its attention focused on matters as they occur in the East. Instability as a result of a mass exodus from Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco is a more likely scenario for French officials than massive refugee movements from Central and Eastern Europe. To devote resources and attention away from the Southern tier -- a natural consequence of expanded NATO to the East -- would inevitably raise concerns about NATO's willingness to respond to a Southern threat. There is some thought in western capitals that once President Mitterrand leaves office in 1995 that the Gaullist defense policies of the 1960's will at least be reexamined within the context of current and future European security realities. In France's case, immediate Alliance expansion is deleterious and PfP is the most practical approach to the current European security environment. For France, PfP is the best interim solution because it does not give specific requirements for membership and thus force NATO countries into specific concessions.

D. GREAT BRITAIN

Britain has a very pragmatic approach to NATO expansion in the Alliance. The ruling conservative government recognizes, like the Germans and the Italians, that keeping the Americans engaged in Europe requires British acquiescence to U.S. initiatives. In order to guard against any leading French role, Britain, Italy and Germany do not advocate views too disparate to those of the Americans for fear of alienating ambivalent American leaders. Second, British officials believe that immediate integration of the CEE states (particularly the Visegrad countries) would be too destabilizing to Alliance cohesion. Third, the long-standing policy of widening the EU in order to keep continental influence subdued is not compatible with the idea of broadening NATO membership. Finally, the argument of a moral obligation to make up for the perceived mistakes and policies prior to World War II does not play a decisive factor in influencing British decision-making. The British government opposes immediate membership of Central and Eastern European countries for the following reasons:

- Fear that Alliance cohesion would deteriorate with the immediate accession of new members;
- Belief that the British public would not support programs that funneled financial resources away from the U.K. that would be necessary to integrate CEE states;
- Judgment that no overwhelming threat exists to CEE states.

The British support PfP as a adequate first step towards integrating CEE states because it ensures future American engagement in Europe. British officials are very skeptical of immediate NATO expansion, mainly on the grounds that Alliance cohesion (more members and less agreement) would be seriously compromised. The utilitarian British view the extension of the Alliance as a dual proposition. Primarily, new members should clearly have to enhance the security of the organization. Secondly, adding new partners should not detract from Alliance cohesion and lead to the transmogrification of NATO into something resembling the CSCE. British Defense Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind has argued that, "Membership of NATO involves responsibility as well as rights and cannot be seen as a political statement or as a means of enhancing the security of any one individual country."¹⁸⁶ Rifkind, like other British leaders has argued that NATO is not a club but a security organization requiring sacrifices and resources of each member state.

Sherard Cowper-Coles points out that Britain's first priority when creating the Atlantic Alliance was to ensure European stability by means of a permanent American presence. Along with numerous apprehensions concerning immediate enlargement, Britain warmly embrace the PfP initiative because it corresponds with fulfillment of British security priorities. Cowper-Coles writes that, "The UK's contribution to collective defence in Europe and beyond has been heavily influenced by judgments of what has been required to satisfy American expectations of Britain and to maintain the UK's place in the Alliance."¹⁸⁷ Britain's historical unwillingness to "Die for Danzig" has been supplanted with a noticeable hesitancy to guarantee, at least immediately, the

¹⁸⁶Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6. Mihalka citing David White's "Caution Urged on NATO Expansion," *Financial Times*, 23 September 1993 writes that during the January 1994 NATO summit, Rifkind restated the practical British approach declaring that, "a decision to extend NATO's territory and commit our troops to the defence of new borders cannot be taken lightly...Any hasty decision about who does and does not belong to NATO risks creating a new division in Europe. We do not want to set Russia's teeth dangerously on edge."

¹⁸⁷Sherard Cowper-Coles, p. 145. Cowper-Coles contends that the 1994 Brussels summit confirmed, "the Alliance's slow metamorphosis from a club concerned mainly with the collective defence of its members' territory to one preoccupied with the collective promotion of its members' wider security interests."

security of Gdansk.¹⁸⁸ The ruling conservative party headed by Prime Minister John Major maintains the view that immediate NATO expansion is too disruptive to Alliance cohesion and not warranted by any overriding threat to CEE security. Moreover, rushing to expand NATO only exacerbates European instability where there is a lack of prescriptive mechanisms to accomplish integration of CEE countries. In a standard display of British mindfulness of the many complexities associated with immediate enlargement, the Secretary of State for Defense stated in the 1994 Defence Estimates that,

The overall aim [of PfP] is to improve security for the whole of Europe and not to create new lines of division in Europe...All the defence and security co-operation in the world will not help if eastern Europe degenerates into economic and social chaos.¹⁸⁹

In December 1993, Malcolm Rifkind reiterated Britain's official policy on the possibility of expanding the Alliance stating that,

...it will depend on certain criteria that render them homogeneous with the alliance: the strength of their democratic institutions and the maturity of their armed forces...For the time being, our objective is to avoid creating new divisions in Europe that could encourage Russia to think it has a free hand in the neighboring countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁰

Britain's pragmatic approach to involve the Americans in European matters is still the prevalent strategy among the defense and foreign ministers. Similar to the period preceding the end of World War II, Britain cannot afford the burden of maintaining European order on its own. Michael Howard writes that the, "American withdrawal from an international system which the British now knew they could never have the strength to manage was seen in London as the ultimate disaster."¹⁹¹ Therefore, PfP is the most practical approach because it proposes the creation of a slow, balanced integration process. Moreover, PfP promotes continued strong ties with the U.S. and does not incur British financial obligations.

¹⁸⁸Paul Latawski, p. 41.

¹⁸⁹*Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994*, paragraph 7, p. 14.

¹⁹⁰British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind cited by Michael Mihalka in an interview conducted by the Italian newspaper *Il Giornale*, 17 December 1993, p. 6.

¹⁹¹Michael Howard, p. 119.

Finally, having been accepted by Russia, PfP is viewed as the best means of slowly incorporating the East while not drawing lines or aggravating Russian leaders. The British position as argued by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in September 1993 was that the expansion of the Alliance was simply pragmatic and that, "despite the apparent softening of Yeltsin's position, NATO should not be quick to enlarge and 'drive Russia back into some sort of opposition'."¹⁹² Similarly, according to Michael Mihalka, "New members should enhance the security of the alliance as a whole." In his opinion, "concerns about possibly greater European security through the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European states in NATO did not enter British calculations."¹⁹³

The 1994 British Defence Estimates is another example of Britain's cautious approach and deference for the complexities associated with incorporating the CEE states into NATO. Thus, Britain's current government has supported PfP as the most adequate mechanism to slowly incorporate the East. An excerpt from the 1994 Defence Estimates states that,

The NATO Allies said they expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to their east, as part of an evolutionary process, and taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.¹⁹⁴

Domestic problems, certainly the economic recession throughout Europe over the past few years, has had an impact on NATO's unwillingness to take on new members and incur costly measures to integrate Central and Eastern Europe. David Greenwood writes that, "During the 1980s, financial and manpower constraints made it increasingly difficult to sustain all-round competence and commitment in a credible way...."¹⁹⁵ A final aspect of the British experience is that the U.K. has historically shied away from committing financial and military resources to the Continent unless the situation was grave enough to warrant such an effort (i.e., Napoleonic Wars, W.W.I, W.W.II and the Cold War). Again, British pragmatism and skepticism towards continental involvement acts to restrain it from offering immediate membership to CEE countries. This reflects not only British sensibilities but willingness to accept American initiatives to preserve U.S. support.

¹⁹²Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, pp. 5-6.

¹⁹³Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6.

¹⁹⁴*Statement on the Defense Estimates 1994*, paragraph 6, p. 11.

¹⁹⁵David Greenwood, p. 281.

The Labour party, for the most part, has kept its opinions on NATO expansion quiet. One British observer claims that the reason for this is both the strategy of Labour's leader, Tony Blair, and an unsaid political maxim. Blair, in his bid to become Britain's next Prime Minister, has made a point of keeping Labour's initiatives ambiguous, fearing a skeptical electorate that might find disfavor with a specific view. From a general political standpoint NATO expansion, not being a hot topic of conversation on either side of the House of Commons, is not worth expending political capital. One might suspect that after failing to offer security guarantees to CEE states earlier in the century, British leaders might feel a sense of moral responsibility to right past wrongs. However, the British moral obligation to incorporate CEE states because of the results of Yalta and Munich does not enter into the formulation of practical British security estimates. Again, the pragmatic British approach might consider circumstances *in extremis* that would compel NATO to expand eastward. However, expansion for the sake of expansion does not serve current Britain's security interests.

E. ITALY

Italian leaders support the prudent American position on NATO expansion for three reasons. First, Italy does not want NATO resources diverted to Central and Eastern Europe while a war is being waged in the former-Yugoslavia and Islamic fundamentalism is threatening regional stability along the Italian periphery. Second, Italy's chaotic domestic political scene and financial problems preoccupy leaders and prevent them from supporting costly plans for integration. Third, Italy has a historic policy of keeping the United States engaged in Europe by supporting American policies like Partnership for Peace. The four-year-old battle in the former-Yugoslavia, the ongoing revelations of widespread government corruption, the economic malaise and Islamic fundamentalism to the south, leave Italy's leadership and the Italian public too distracted to worry about integrating CEE states. Furthermore, there is a sense that like the Germans and the British, the Italians prefer not to scrutinize American proposals lest they hasten the withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees. Luigi Caligaris is mindful of the vital role the United States plays in the northern Mediterranean, noting that, "If...US forces were to disappear or be reduced in the southern region, the isolation of southern countries would become much more severe."¹⁹⁶

As early as 1982, Italian defense experts began the process of addressing Italy's specific threats on a national and sub-regional level. With the realization in the late

¹⁹⁶Luigi Caligaris, p. 78.

1980's that a Soviet-led invasion was no longer likely, Italian leaders sought to shore up what they perceived as deficiencies in Italy's national defense posture from regional Mediterranean threats. Luigi Caligaris notes that in shifting from alliance concerns, to Italian national concerns, Italy recognized that its own threat perceptions required attention equal to Alliance concerns. He writes, "An alliance the size of NATO cannot provide the kind of guidance that is needed by each nation." In 1982 Italian leaders reorganized Italy's defense posture to address both national and Alliance threats. Specifically the defense committee proposed:

- A "reorganisation of the defence posture to enable Italy to meet both the Warsaw Pact threat" and other threats against the south and the Italian peninsula;
- An "increase in bilateral politico-military relations with other southern countries" within the Mediterranean context;
- An improvement in the "politico-military assistance to countries which had a stabilising role in the Mediterranean;"
- An "increased contribution to peace-keeping operations."¹⁹⁷

Since then, this defense model has become the *leitmotiv* of Italian defense debates.¹⁹⁸ Caligaris observed that this socio-economic approach to Italian defense planning throughout 1988 continued to be the dominating factor in all parliamentary defense discussions. In addition to threats to NATO stability, Italy's geo-strategic position leaves it exposed to a myriad of crises associated with the Mediterranean. The New Strategic Concept, favoring flexibility and mobility over cumbersome forces, favorably suits Italy's security concerns. Though the Strategic Concept is a post-Cold War invention, the idea of highly mobile forces to address a variety of threats has been advocated by Italian defense planners since the early 1980's.

Caligaris writes that, "In the Mediterranean at large, the answer to both national and international security problems would be for Italy to adopt a defence posture based on quick reaction and strategic 'inter-service' mobility."¹⁹⁹ This was the view of Italian policy makers in the 1980's, years before the New Strategic Concept enumerated this idea of flexible units. Within this context, it is easy to see why Italians view immediate

¹⁹⁷Luigi Caligaris, p. 78.

¹⁹⁸Luigi Caligaris, p. 83. From the "Modello di Difesa secondo la proposta del Governo," presented by Secretary of Defense Lelio Lagorio at the Defense Commission of the Chambers of Deputies, 14 April 1981, in *Annuario 1981-1982* (Rome: ISTRID), pp. 192-193.

¹⁹⁹Luigi Caligaris, p. 78.

expansion of NATO -- and the northward diversion of forces -- as creating an inherently more dangerous security situation not only in Europe but along the Italian perimeter. Maurizio Cremasco notes,

Italy because of its geographic location, military commitments in NATO, and political and economic relations with the riparian nations, is 'by necessity' a Mediterranean country...Although Italy will continue to be a loyal ally, NATO decisions will be examined more closely in the context of Italy's specific national and international interests, and Italy's specific military requirements will be given more weight.²⁰⁰

Thus, Italy regards NATO expansion and the PfP initiative through the same myopic national interest spectrum as the other major NATO countries. In effect, Italian leaders ask: How much will it cost Italy to incorporate the East? How does this affect the status of NATO resources on Italian soil vis-à-vis threats from Northern Africa and the former-Yugoslavia? Does the lack of a clear Russian-eastern threat warrant the division of resources away from a proven hotspot? The obvious answers to these questions, based on factors affecting Italian security interests, are readily apparent. First, immediate integration would be too costly to Italians regardless of the price, with no discernible benefits. Second, rechanneling NATO resources from the Southern tier to Central and Eastern Europe is antagonistic to the Russians and, more importantly, inherently a poor step to take in light of the numerous Mediterranean threats. Third, no existential Eastern threat currently poses a danger great enough to justify immediate incorporation.

Italy's poor financial position, as a result of the long recession, high inflation, unemployment rates and corruption, have left Italy's leaders and the public cynical about diverting scarce resources to CEE states. All of these economic woes along with the continuing scandals throughout the Italian government have distracted the Italian public from the issues like integrating CEE states. As Joseph Rallo suggests, "To assess decision making in key sectors including defense, one must define the shifting themes of Italian domestic politics," (impermanence of postwar governments (50), public debt and resurgent organized crime).²⁰¹ PfP is the appropriate type of non-binding, ambiguous formulae that does not force Italy to deal, at least for the moment, with matters of secondary importance. PfP allows Italy's leadership to manage what they

²⁰⁰Maurizio Cremasco, pp. 195 & 229-230.

²⁰¹Joseph Rallo, p. 313. Rallo notes that replacing past defense postures has been the "New Italian Defense Model" which still addresses Italy's defense needs through Active Prevention supporting both national and Alliance security policy.

regard as the more pressing matters of NATO and Italian security (i.e., containing the war in the former-Yugoslavia, keeping Islamic fundamentalism in check, improving the economy by keeping resources in country, maintaining a functioning government in the wake of the corruption scandals and maintaining an American presence in Europe to counter French and German influence). The Permanent Representative of Italy on the North Atlantic Council recently stated that,

The issue of the Alliance's expansion could prove difficult to resolve...there will have to be a comprehensive process of change, to be implemented gradually and with political insight. In this context, the American proposal for a *Partnership for Peace*, open to all NACC members and other European countries, has already received widespread attention and support.²⁰²

Italy's historical link to the United States assumes that the Italians will continue to go along with American proposal like Partnership for Peace in order to secure nuclear guarantees and a continued conventional presence to contain the Bosnian War. In conjunction with an Italian reliance on a sustained American presence, Maurizio Cremasco lists three principles of Italian security policy: (1) cooperative military relations with the United States "inside and outside the NATO framework" and the continued faith in the deterrence ensured by American nuclear forces; (2) the acceptance of NATO's New Strategic Concept, no longer a flexible response strategy, in order to combat diverse threats and (3) the strict acceptance of NATO's military planning and commitments.²⁰³ Italy's continued support for an American leadership role in Europe is as much a function of the United States' nuclear deterrent as an Italian unwillingness to be subordinates in a French-German dominated Europe. Carlo Jean writes that,

Italian security policy is shaped by two major factors: Italy's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and in Europe; and the country's geopolitical position...Another constant in Italian foreign and security policy is the fear of being isolated from Central-Northern Europe through de facto or formal establishment of so-called 'directorates.' Italy has expressed doubts about the formation of a French-German axis in Europe.²⁰⁴

²⁰²Giovanni Jannuzzi, pp. 13-14.

²⁰³Maurizio Cremasco, p. 213. *The New Strategic Concept* that replaced the policy of flexible and graduated response is one aspect that Italy has greatly supported. The Concept compliments Italian efforts to advocate flexible, mobile responses to threats originating along Italy's perimeter.

²⁰⁴Carlo Jean, pp. 547 & 551.

Compounding this anxiety was a recent proposal by Germany, France and Britain that the EU should initiate "separate tracks" on the way towards European integration, conspicuously leaving the Italians out of such an arrangement. This proposal has, nonetheless, elevated concerns among Italian leaders that Italy might find itself excluded from the center of European political, military and economic decisions unless it supports American-sponsored initiatives. Marta Dassù and Marco De Andreis explain that most Italian political parties favor the position held by the last government, that immediate NATO expansion is unnecessary. Like most political parties,

[The Democratic Party of the Left "PDS"] agrees with the former government on the risks of isolating Moscow...if NATO enlarges to the Visegrad countries...the Democratic Party of the Left supports a faster political integration of the Visegrad countries, while the Northern league advocates a yet to be defined 'Europe of regions'...But NATO's short-term enlargement toward the East is not seen with favor in Rome, for a variety of reasons ranging from Russian concerns, to a reluctance to extend concrete defense commitments...Therefore it should not come as a surprise if the Italian diplomacy finds President Bill Clinton's 'Partnership for Peace' a good compromise solution to the thorny problem of NATO's relations with its eastern neighbors.²⁰⁵

F. THE SOUTHERN TIER STATES

The Southern tier states of the NATO Alliance (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey) all perceive immediate expansion eastward as inevitably requiring scarce military resources to be diverted away from an area where the threats are far greater in number. To enlarge the Alliance immediately would only serve to antagonize Russia and direct attention away from the shores of the volatile Mediterranean. Furthermore, these countries contend that Central and Eastern Europe is no longer the foremost area where NATO's security interests should be focused. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, an expert on Mediterranean affairs, cites numerous destabilizing influences that threaten NATO's Southern tier. Among the most prominent threats to NATO's Southern flank are cultural and religious diversity (Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Catholics); the Yugoslav war; demographic expansion in Northern Africa; high unemployment; civil war and Muslim fundamentalism. De Vasconcelos writes that, "The stability of the Maghreb is a key concern to countries such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, notably because of its geographical proximity...."²⁰⁶ Experts insist that the threats along the Maghreb deserve

²⁰⁵Dassù & De Andreis, pp. 5, 10, 11.

the lion's share of resources and NATO security commitments as opposed to any perceived "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe.

The United States presence in the Mediterranean, with the exception of combating state-supported terrorism, enforcing U.N. naval sanctions and occasional displays of naval diplomacy, does not share the same security concerns as the Southern tier states along the Maghreb. As a prelude to further American withdrawal from Europe, James Lacey predicts a diminished U.S. presence in the Mediterranean. He writes, "Economic and political initiatives related to North-South relations in the Mediterranean will be left chiefly for Europe, and primarily the Southern Region members of NATO, to pursue."²⁰⁷ The process towards greater national and regional cooperation on security matters resulted from a diminished Soviet threat. Lacey notes that,

As the former Soviet Mediterranean Fleet diminishes in relevance and NATO security in the Mediterranean (traditionally defined) lapses into history, the Mediterranean interests of France, Italy and Spain will acquire greater prominence...In this connection, Italy and Spain have urged the establishment of a distinctly Mediterranean approach to regional issues....²⁰⁸

While the Southern European NATO allies -- Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey -- increasingly view the south as the greatest security concern to NATO and their own national security, they do not necessarily conclude that NATO is the sole instrument to address the threat. In fact, the threat to NATO's Southern tier -- North African/Middle Eastern radical fundamentalism linked with nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation and advanced delivery systems -- will continue to exist into the next century. At a recent meeting of NATO defense ministers in Seville, Spain, the Defense Minister from Spain, Julian Garcia Vargas, urged NATO to shift its historic attention from Central and Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean. Of equal importance was the concurrence of American officials. The *Defense News* reported that,

²⁰⁶Alvaro de Vasconcelos, p. 29. De Vasconcelos is the Director at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon.

²⁰⁷James Lacey, pp. 83-86. The author reinforces his central point by offering an example of Canada's vital interest in establishing an "Arctic Zone of Cooperation" and the Southern region's preoccupation with establishing a Mediterranean version of the CSCE. Both initiatives, he believes are, "illustrative of a more pervasive reality: growing interest in sub-regional constructs as either subsets of or eventual alternatives to large structures like CSCE."

²⁰⁸James Lacey, p. 88.

The NATO alliance must shift its strategic focus southward to address the potential security problems of political instability across North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean region, says Spanish Defense Minister Julian Garcia Vargas. Vargas said he wants NATO's political and military experts to help define the outlines of a new Mediterranean security plan based on confidence-building measures with North African countries. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry agreed during an informal NATO defense ministers meeting in Seville, Spain, Sept. 29-30 that NATO's 'main security front has swung away from Central and Eastern Europe to its southern flank'.²⁰⁹

While the threat increasingly becomes a "domestic" concern, these nations will devote more time and resources to addressing these risks as they pertain to their *own* security.²¹⁰ Turkey's Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, reflects the reluctance of NATO members to expand membership at a time when the Alliance's Southern tier -- unlike Central and Eastern Europe -- is threatened by a variety of non-military and quasi-military threats. Turkey like the other fifteen members, increasingly sees its security concerns from a more national level. Çiller states that,

Relations with the newly free and newly independent states are matters of enormous importance to our Alliance. Yet, there are other matters...in other guises, which demand our attention as well...Turkey's role in the Alliance must increasingly be defined by its position at the geographic epicentre of post-Cold War changes profoundly affecting the security Alliance members....²¹¹

²⁰⁹*Defense News*, p. 2.

²¹⁰Jeffrey Simon, "Why NATO Should Expand to the East," p. 8. Dr. Simon contends that "Coupled with advanced delivery systems -- which have shrunk the air/spatial dimensions of warfare -- North African and Middle Eastern developments increasingly will have an impact on European security."

²¹¹Dr. Tansu Çiller, Prime Minister of Turkey, pp. 4-5.

V. THE RUSSIAN FACTORS

A. DOMESTIC FACTORS & RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Russian elite views on Russian foreign policy and NATO expansion fall into categories represented by five political factions. In 1994, few Russian officials believe that NATO expansion is in Russia's best interest; most contend that in fact enlargement is a provocative step by Western and Central European states to isolate Russia.²¹² Four of these five groups have had a noticeable impact on the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy regarding NATO expansion vis-à-vis the protection of Russian national interests abroad. Evidence suggests that President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have shifted their foreign policy objectives from an "enlightened" pro-Western stance to a more pragmatic pro-Russian approach. Alexei Arbatov lists four Russian foreign policy groups in a 1993 journal article. According to Arbatov, these groups vary in numbers and motivations – political, ideological, institutional – and transcend boundaries of civil/military, parliament, academic and cultural communities, media and public organizations. The caveat for adhering to such an all-inclusive list is that support for specific policies within each group fluctuates as a result of Russia's economic fortunes. In essence, as the Russian economy has worsened, members of the more pro-Western groups have adopted more conservative and nationalistic positions.

1. Pro-Western Group

When Arbatov wrote the article, he placed Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev and Yegor Gaidar within the pro-Western camp. At the time, these officials and politicians advocated "conspicuously pro-Western policies" that favored "economic determinism and universal democratic values" while neglecting the "geo-political and strategic facets of international relations."²¹³ Between August 1991 and mid-1992, pro-Western ideas dominated Russian foreign policy and were reflected in the concessions Moscow made on arms control and regional disputes. The perception created – that this pro-Western policy acquiesced to Western demands and served Western interests – was linked to Russia's declining domestic situation by more conservative elements. In March 1994, Richard Nixon noted that,

²¹²Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5. Regarding the integration of foreign policy views, Crow notes that "a series of tough choices have been made in Moscow leading to a harmonization of the interests of Russia's diplomats, soldiers, and politicians. The achievement of a consensus is borne out by the way agreement was reached in the spring of 1993 on a foreign-policy concept and in the fall of 1993 on a military doctrine."

²¹³Alexei Arbatov, p. 9.

The most disturbing development since the December election has been the sea change in Russian's foreign policy. The rhetoric of...Andrei Kozyrev has shifted 180 degrees. Before the election, he was too pro-American for his own good. Now he has changed his emphasis on universal human values and commonality of interests with America to a renewed Russian superpower role and the need for Moscow to chart its own course. It is without question a change of the head, not the heart. He has read the election returns and is reacting like any other politician.²¹⁴

Arbatov submits four reasons why Russia's foreign policy after the August 1991 coup began to adopt a more nationalist tone:

- The policy failed to identify generally or specifically Russian national interests and priorities.
- The leadership concentrated its efforts on relations with the United States, the World Bank and the defense of human rights, instead of dealing with its relations with its immediate neighbors.
- The leadership gave an impression of easily conceding on international matters like the sanctions in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya as well as the weapons allowed under START II.
- The leadership failed to build a domestic consensus for its foreign policy initiatives.²¹⁵

Within the past year and a half, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have adopted policies between the centrist position and the moderate conservative group with a nationalistic tone. A change in leadership to a more conservative figure or economic collapse could lead Russia to a more nationalistic foreign policy orientation.

2. Moderate Liberals

Russian moderate liberals are viewed as being more realistic and pragmatic towards Russia and the West than are members of the pro-Western group. They emphasize the necessity to promote distinct Russian foreign policy and security objectives based not on lofty human rights goals but on Russia's geo-political position and the transitional nature of its domestic situation.²¹⁶ Advocates of this position now include Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin as well as Gregory Yavlinsky, Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Lukin and young general officers. The difference between the moderate

²¹⁴Richard Nixon, p. A 19.

²¹⁵Alexei Arbatov, pp. 18-22.

²¹⁶Alexei Arbatov, pp. 10-12.

liberals and the pro-Westerners is that the former place the highest priority on Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics. Additionally, this group views Western models of economic and political development as acceptable. However, these standards must be tailored to address the unique qualities of Russia. Lastly, moderate liberals believe relations with the West can be cordial but must include a hard bargaining stance and must not always lead to Russian acquiescence.

3. Centrist and Moderate Conservatives

Observers also see signs of the centrist and moderate conservative philosophy within Yeltsin's current foreign policy. The centrists and moderate conservatives have been supported by the military high command, industrial managers and the federal bureaucracy. According to Arbatov, centrists and conservatives cannot reconcile themselves to the loss of the Soviet Union, though they reportedly do not favor reunification by military force. Centrist-conservatives favor relations with the West, but not at the expense of Russia's role as a great power within its "sphere of influence." This group is suspicious of the West's motives for "assistance" and opposes excessive economic and political reliance on Western aid packages. Finally, this group advocates the preservation of substantial military power and considers nuclear weapons relevant to "the modern international and Russian security agenda."²¹⁷

4. Neo-Communists and Nationalists

Sometimes referred to as "red-browns" or "hurrah-patriots," this faction of neo-Communists and nationalists is partially composed of former anti-Communists, dissidents and fascists. Prominent members of this group include Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Sergei Baburin. Linking domestic issues with foreign policy decisions and forcing President Yeltsin to take a more conservative stance is their most notable achievement. Arbatov writes that,

...more respectable representatives of this group are quickly gaining in political power, taking advantage of President Yeltsin's domestic failures, foreign policy weaknesses and, most of all, his reluctance or inability to strike a deal with the moderate conservatives, which is pushing them to alliance with the right wing.²¹⁸

The neo-Communists and nationalists aspire to protect the interests of ethnic Russians abroad and to revive the Russian empire and Russia's superpower status role not on the basis of Communism but of Great-Russian nationalism. Among their beliefs

²¹⁷Alexei Arbatov, pp. 12-13.

²¹⁸Alexei Arbatov, p. 13.

is an under-current of fundamentalist Russian Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism. They advocate the reconstitution of the Soviet Union by foreseeable means and intervention in Ukraine, Crimea and the Baltics in order to protect Russian nationals and Russian interests.²¹⁹ Neo-communists and nationalists promote alliances with outlaw states, the end of UN sanctions against the Serbs, and a crash military build-up to support bold foreign initiatives. This is one of the most dangerous factions because its popularity is based upon the exploitation of Russia's declining living standards. Supporters include: state-industrial labor, lower-middle classes, pensioners, Russian refugees from former Soviet republics and military personnel returning from Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, neo-Communists and nationalists have among their ranks a large group of supporters in the Ministry of Defense, Security and Internal Affairs as well as prominent spokesmen in the Russian Duma.²²⁰

The rise of ultra nationalist elements in Russia during the past three years is illustrative of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's recent rise in popularity. This recent phenomenon has been important for three reasons. First, Zhirinovsky's message is well received by a broad spectrum of Russians, including most importantly the security services and the armed forces. Second, though his outrageous remarks have gotten much international press coverage, his calls for the annexation of Finland and Alaska are almost as appealing to Russian nationalists as his message of reestablishing Russian influence in its "near abroad."²²¹ Third, his message is threatening because it contains simplistic solutions and antidotes to the Russian imperial malaise that appeals to the "immature" Russian voter. One scholar views Zhirinovsky's base support group as,

...devoted to the goal of revival of the Russian empire and Russia's superpower role, not on the premises of communism, but on those of Great-Russian nationalism, a fundamentalist version of the Russian

²¹⁹*The Economist*, 21 May 1994, p. 61. Reflecting a shift to the right among Yeltsin foreign policy advisors, *The Economist* noted that, "In January [1994] Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, announced that it [protecting ethnic Russians] is 'one of Moscow's main strategic interests' to meet this responsibility...Extreme nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, call for recolonisation. Alexander Rutskoi, a volatile former vice-president who also seeks the presidency, argues that the former republics which 'call themselves sovereign and independent never had their own statehood, never in their history. They were all parts of Russia, a great power.' Ergo, they still should be."

²²⁰Alexei Arbatov, pp. 13-14.

²²¹This Russian euphemism was coined when the Soviet Union broke up into various republics and independent states. The term applies to Central and Eastern Europe generally, Central Asia and Russia's Southern flank specifically and any other areas along Russia's periphery that were once in the sphere of Soviet influence.

Orthodox religion, anti-semitism, and a vigorously anti-Western political crusade.²²²

Vera Tolz, commenting on the strong Russian voter turnout for Vladimir Zhirinovsky, wrote that, "The results show too, that society is still immature, with voters being seduced by promises of easy solutions to Russia's problems."²²³ Ms. Tolz stated that Zhirinovsky's success will undoubtedly make relations with Eastern Europe more complicated. Secondly, close observers maintain that President Yeltsin has wisely used the Zhirinovsky card to induce greater Western concessions, promising cooler relations if ultranationalists succeed in coming to power. This Byzantine maneuver has been played up by Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to help block any attempts to expand NATO. Their point is: "If you don't allow us latitude in the "near abroad" [and Central and Eastern Europe] then the Russian voting public will elect even more conservative elements and jeopardize democratic and market reforms." The West for its part seems to have bought off on this "Russia-first" policy fearing the rise of a Zhirinovsky-like Russian President, while simultaneously turning a blind eye to Russian diplomatic coups in Serbia and Central and Eastern Europe. Pavel Felgengauer described the ultranationalist power base as composed of reactionaries from the state-industrial base, pensioners, impoverished urban lower and middle classes and "tacit sympathizers in the ministries of defense, security and internal affairs."²²⁴

Zhirinovsky's threats have raised expectations among Russian military leaders and civilians that Russia might undertake such actions. Though his threats to reclaim Finland, Alaska and Ukraine and to partition Poland between Russia and Germany may seem too preposterous to warrant foreign concern, history has taught Central and East European countries to take such rantings seriously.²²⁵ The ramblings of this "buffoon" took on new significance when the Liberal Democratic Party -- Zhirinovsky's party -- received 25% of the Russian vote in the December 1993 election and took 64 seats in the

²²²Alexei Arbatov, p. 14.

²²³Vera Tolz, pp. 2-8. Ms. Tolz also commented that as a demagogue and populist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky promised to stop conversion of military-industrial projects and sell 30 billion dollars worth of arms to international clients each year to combat unemployment, institute public executions for persons involved in criminal activities and provide cheap vodka for Russian businessmen.

²²⁴Pavel Felgengauer's "Army is Neutral for the Present Moment," in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 30 October 1993 cited by Alexei Arbatov, p. 14.

²²⁵Kevin Fedarko, p. 40. Fedarko writes that, "He [Zhirinovsky] has threatened to restore Russia's imperial borders, annex Alaska, invade Turkey, repartition Poland, give Germany 'another Chernobyl,' turn Kazakhstan into a 'scorched desert' and employ large fans to blow radioactive waste across the Baltics."

parliamentary elections.²²⁶ The polling data suggest that the Liberal Democratic Party's success in December 1993 was actually a protest vote for better domestic policies. Yet one cannot separate Zhirinovsky's foreign policy objectives from his domestic agenda on the grounds that people voted for him simply to improve their domestic condition.²²⁷ Even without Zhirinovsky, other demagogues have appealed to this disheartened segment of the population. One Russian "right-wing" intellectual quoted in a recent issue of *The New York Times Magazine*, reiterated this view:

Zhirinovsky is not the point...He is simply a vehicle to express our anger. For Russia right now the most important thing is to find a feeling of national unity to overcome this crisis. Today the main factor is a total decline of national sentiments. We must have a leader who can unite Russia and Russians again. Zhirinovsky may disappear, but these ideas will not.²²⁸

Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andrezj Olechowski stated that Poland could not disregard the December elections in Russia because Zhirinovsky's agenda includes the "restoration of the former Soviet Empire, and given how many votes he got we can no longer write his opinions off as a bad joke."²²⁹ Vaclav Havel has been more direct, raising the possibility that,

...in Russia forces still enamored of the imperial ambitions of the former Soviet Union would temporarily gain the upper hand: chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces. Leaders of that stamp would protest vigorously that NATO was admitting former Soviet satellites and thus moving closer to the Russian borders.²³⁰

²²⁶Kevin Fedarko, p. 43. Fedarko adds that in April 1994, at the Fifth Party Congress of the Liberal Democratic Party, 340 deputies unanimously elected to give Zhirinovsky absolute power of the party's leadership until 2004 and nominated him as Russia's next president.

²²⁷Vera Tolz, p. 7. Tolz cited the *Moskovsky komsomolets* on 18 December 1993 which stated that, "It is doubtful that people who voted for Zhirinovsky understood that his program, with its promise of making the life of every Russian 'dignified and prosperous,' in fact means a war with Russia's neighbors, mass terror in the country, and a return to the distributive economic system."

²²⁸Mr. Shafarevich cited by Michael Specter, p. 56.

²²⁹Dr. Andrezj Olechowski, p. 3.

²³⁰Vaclav Havel, p. E 3.

5. Nationalist Military Professionals

This fifth grouping--not mentioned by Arbatov--has the support of both civilians and the uniformed services. These military men are seen as pragmatic, anti-Western, and opposed to the independence of the Soviet Union's former satellites and republics. They condemn institutions and groups that infringe upon Russia's sphere of influence in the Baltics and Central Europe and advocate aggressive means if necessary. Lieutenant General Lebed is typical of this grouping, whose paternalistic character and brand of Russian nationalism are the foundations of his popularity. Additionally, Lebed is favored to become the next defense minister by two-thirds of all Russian military officers polled in a recent survey, who are "in favour of a strong hand to guide the state and evidently feel that such a hand is presently lacking."²³¹ He is viewed as a defender of Russia, tested in battle and not corrupted by the growth of capitalist enterprises. Lebed is seen as more acceptable and sensible than the bombastic Zhirinovskiy. A putsch or a victory in the 1996 presidential election might lead Lebed to carry out a Pinochet-style domestic agenda and a fiercely anti-Western foreign policy. *The Economist* writes that, "The lesson of last October's [1993] uprising is that a disorganised mob nearly took over the capital. General Lebed and one of his battalions might well succeed where the mob failed."²³²

Lebed supports "stronger" methods to deal with the Baltic States because their citizenship requirements supposedly discriminate against Russian-speaking nationals. His advocacy of authoritarian solutions applies to areas beyond Russia's "near abroad," and into Central and Eastern Europe. His public rebukes against Western diplomats and their proposals have made him ever more popular among the military and ordinary

²³¹John Lloyd. The poll, conducted by the Sinus polling group surveyed 615 senior officers including 60 flag officers. Citing the polling data, Lloyd writes that, "Most officers on or above the rank of major thought that 'without authoritarian rule we cannot overcome chaos'; that 'western types of democracy are not suitable to Russia' and that the 'main foreign policy task must be to re-establish Russia as a great power respected throughout the world'." More ominous were the popular views of these officers regarding Russia's future. "More than half thought that there would be one of the following alternatives: mass uprisings and strikes in different regions; the reassertion of a dictatorship; an explosion in a nuclear power station; or a military putsch. Very few believed in successful economic reforms or full co-operation with Nato...."

²³²*The Economist*, 27 August 1994, p. 48. *The Economist* notes that "A (liberal) newspaper *Novaya Ezhednevnyaya Gazeta*, has predicted that he [Lebed] 'may become the front-running candidate in Russia's presidential election'." *The Economist* cites an interview Lebed gave in *Izvestia* noting that the general made clear his role model is Chile's General Augusto Pinochet. Lebed stated, "But what did he [Pinochet] do? He saved the state from total collapse...and put the army in pride of place. With its help, he forced people to get back to work. The loudmouths were forced, and forced in a brutal manner, to shut their mouths."

Russians. His outbursts towards officials like American Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright have become commonplace. Lebed commented on Albright's statement that Russia's withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldova,

...constitutes 'an issue of primary importance to US foreign policy'...I [Lebed said] categorically oppose [the idea that] some woman, whatever her rank, should make decisions for the Russian state...[Lebed concluded that Albright's comment was] yet another sign that they are openly and unceremoniously wiping their feet on us....²³³

The rise of the ultranationalists in Russia has coincided with the relative decline in the economy after the collapse of Communism in 1991. Nationalists seized the initiative from government "reformers" by linking the Russian public's outrage over what are viewed as "Western" excesses (crime, inflation, unemployment and greed) as a consequence of the government's pro-western concessions on foreign policy.²³⁴ All of these problems were, of course, present under Soviet socialism as well. Russia's ultranationalists have championed domestic policies that couple a revival of Russian greatness with the adoption of a firm foreign policy posture (i.e., reconstitution of the Soviet empire, condemnation of Western leaders and reassertion of Russian strength).

The moderate-liberals and centrists have influenced the pro-Westerners to the point that members of the latter group have been virtually incorporated into the former. Because domestic problems have been successfully linked to foreign politics by each of the groups except pro-Westerners, the Yeltsin government has had to take a more nationalistic posture in order to maintain the support of the public and the military.²³⁵ Some have compared the ultranationalist revival of the 1990's with the nineteenth century movement of the Slavophiles and the debate over Russia's character (an Eastern or Western culture), and the role that Western influences should have in creating a modern Russian society.²³⁶

²³³Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL Inc..

²³⁴Vera Tolz, pp. 1-8. Citing reports in the *Obshchaya Gazeta*, Tolz writes that, "Most observers have viewed the vote for Zhirinovskiy as a protest against the economic policies of Yeltsin and...Gaidar." Tolz also notes that "Zhirinovskiy's supporters complained about the situation in Russia as a whole. 'If, *Izvestiya* writes, 'we discount the three problems perturbing the supporters of all parties and electoral blocs -- inflation, rising crime, and the state of the economy -- then 'weak government' is the main worry of Zhirinovskiy's supporters."

²³⁵Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 37. Mihalka writes that the Yeltsin government, "effectively took up the rhetoric and policies of the centrists and moderate-conservatives whom they had ejected by force from the parliament building. Foreign policy and Partnership for Peace have now become a stage on which Russia's domestic politics are played out."

B. RUSSIA'S AGGRESSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE

Russia's recently published military doctrine or "purposes" explicitly lays the foundations for activities that Russian leaders would consider hostile acts towards the integrity of Russia. Its future involvement in international disputes lays out the necessary preconditions for Russian intervention. Primarily, Russia's military doctrine constitutes,

...a system of views officially adopted in the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on military organizational development, on the country's defense preparation, on the organization of countermeasures to threats to the state's military security, and on the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops for the defense of the Russian Federation's vitally important interests.²³⁷

By their *offensive, defensive or deterrent* character, doctrines both [military and political] affect the probability and intensity of arms races and of wars.²³⁸ While proclaiming that the Russian Federation's interests do not, "impinge upon the security of other states" and that they are "secured within the framework of equitable and mutually beneficial interstate relations," Central and Eastern Europeans with history as a reminder are naturally very skeptical.²³⁹ These statements form a contradictory pattern of first stating that they are not in opposition to other countries carrying out their own foreign policy--in so far as it does not impinge upon Russia's ultimate veto authority.

The preceding excerpts from the Russian military doctrines are indicative of the prevailing Russian wisdom that Alexei Arbatov describes as both aggressive and assertive. As Scott McMichael writes, "the doctrine clearly reasserts Russia's historical position as a Eurasian land power...[T]he new Russian draft doctrine retains much of the framework of Soviet doctrine...."²⁴⁰ The Russian military doctrine is an obvious attempt to dissuade both NATO and Central European countries from expanding the Atlantic Alliance. Most observers believe the doctrine is an implicit warning about the

²³⁶S. Neil MacFarlane, p. 10. MacFarlane observed that the current reaction to pro-Western Russian politicians like Gorbachev and Yeltsin before 1993 is, "characterised by a nationalist desire to recapture the greatness of Russia and a resentment about the secondary role in world diplomacy played in the late Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods."

²³⁷*Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S*, p. 1.

²³⁸Barry R. Posen, p. 16.

²³⁹*Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S*, p. 1.

²⁴⁰Scott McMichael, p. 50.

expansion of military alliances. McMichael writes that the doctrine's statements about, stationing or building up of forces near Russia's borders

...are intended to discourage any attempts by NATO or the to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe or to seek a geostrategic advantage through naval or ground deployments.²⁴¹

The following excerpts from the Russian military doctrine illustrate the aggressive tone that Russian military-political policy has undertaken during the past two years. These extracts, taken directly from the "provisions" of the Russian doctrine provide concrete evidence that Russian leaders believe their area of influence extends throughout Central and Eastern Europe:

- **"The basic existing and potential sources of external military danger for the Russian Federation are...**

- the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security;"

- **"[F]actors which help transform a military danger into an immediate military threat to the Russian Federation:**

- ...the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation to the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces;

- ...the training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other states which are intended to be transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;

- ...the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation (if this is not connected with measures to restore or maintain peace in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council or a regional organ of collective security with the agreement of the Russian Federation)."

- **"Basic Principles of Russian Federation Policy in the Field of Military Security....**

- the maintenance of stability in regions adjoining the borders of the Russian Federation, neighboring countries, and the world as a whole;"

²⁴¹Scott McMichael, p. 46.

- "The aims of military-technical cooperation are:

—strengthening the Russian Federation's military-political positions in various regions in the world...."²⁴²

The Russians in effect are attempting to carve out a specific area of influence for themselves and create a role as sole protector of the Central and East European region. Furthermore, American and West European reaction has been virtually mute. Their silence signals an almost *de facto* recognition of Russia's right to assert its sphere of influence beyond its borders into its "near abroad."²⁴³ Manifest within these excerpts are Russian leaders' perceptions, as they were during the Soviet era, of the outside world as a hostile threat. Central and East Europeans fear this doctrine not merely for what is stated therein, but rather how the Russian military has functioned in accordance with its precepts. Russia's involvement in the "near abroad" (Georgia and Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Moldova and their disputes with Ukraine over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet) are all substantive events that make Europeans along Russia's Western frontiers fear Russian calls for a "right" to a sphere of influence.

C. RUSSIA'S AMBITIOUS FOREIGN POLICY

Russian foreign policy has scored numerous victories over the past two years that are illustrative of its commitment to regain a position as a global leader and hegemonic power in what it terms its "near abroad." The insertion of Russian paratroopers into Serbia without the consent or forewarning to NATO leaders or the United States was substantial symbolism for a country ready to prove its new-found role in its self-stated "sphere of influence." Russia's attempts at subverting the legitimate sovereignty of its neighbor Ukraine has not gone unnoticed. However, American acquiescence to Russian spheres along its southern border has precipitated the feeling among Russian diplomats that their aggressive policies in East Europe can go unchecked. Karen House wrote in *The Wall Street Journal*,

When NATO recently faced an opportunity to extend membership to former Soviet satellites such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it shrank from doing so for fear of upsetting Russia...Russia seeks to embrace the old Soviet empire and insist that much of former Eastern Europe remain a neutralist buffer zone.²⁴⁴

²⁴²Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, pp. 1-10.

²⁴³Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, pp. 1-11.

²⁴⁴Karen Elliott House, 24 February 1994.

Further, it has been the Russian policy of playing upon President Clinton's commitment to Yeltsin's presidency, that they can assert themselves where only a few years ago it would have been unmentionable. Russian foreign policy makers have relied upon their traditional rhetoric that expansion of NATO would aggravate Moscow's traditional fears of encirclement and strengthen Russian opposition to reform. There is a renewed realization that the Cold War was not the only conflict that has distinguished relations between Russia and the United States.

A correspondent with *The New York Times* referred to an 1835 writing by Alexis de Tocqueville who observed about the complex nature of Russian-American relations, "There are now two great nations in the world which, starting from different points, seem to be advancing towards the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans."²⁴⁵ Moreover, Foreign Minister Kozyrev has on numerous occasions, insisted that Russia would not allow itself to be left out of global decision-making.²⁴⁶ A Russian intelligence chief recently stated that an expansion of NATO would force Moscow into "fundamental" countermeasures.²⁴⁷ Russia's new diplomatic initiatives as well as its efforts to end fighting in the former Yugoslavia have prompted Poland to request associate membership in the European Union.²⁴⁸

Russian diplomacy has at times claimed a veto over the foreign policy of its former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe. Having in effect acquiesced, American policymakers have had at times a myopic focus on the continuing goodwill of Russian reformers, being reluctant to embrace a "geopolitical agenda" that might offend Russian

²⁴⁵Thomas L. Friedman, pp. A 1 & A 2. Friedman also notes that the American-Russian competition has a long history of vying for raw materials, economic wealth and security. Friedman's point like that of Senator Lugar's, suggests that Americans should not assume that the absence of the Soviet Union means that the United States no longer has competing interests or that Russia is no longer an international competitor for limited resources.

²⁴⁶Elaine Sciolino, 15 March 1994, p. A 6.

²⁴⁷Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. A 19. Brzezinski was quoting comments made by Yevgeny M. Primakov regarding Russian elite's (military, foreign affairs and security chiefs) reaction to any eastward expansion of NATO.

²⁴⁸Jane Perlez, 13 March 1994, p. A 6. Most Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) will continue to petition for membership in any Western organization that might help their chances at gaining membership in a collective defense arrangement, namely NATO. Russia's bold diplomatic initiatives have even prompted former Communist leaders to speak out in favor of expanded ties to Western European organizations. Perlez, citing an article on 11 March 1994 in the *Wyborcza Gazeta* that, General Wojciech Jaruzelski said that Russia would remain, "a very unstable country" until at least the year 2000. He also said that a "Almost all political parties in Poland, whether on the right or left, think that the guarantees of our [Poland's] security lie in our close contacts with the West...."

sensibilities.²⁴⁹ Russian nationalism has also begun to manifest itself within Russia's political-military relations and as the East Europeans view Russia's treatment of Ukraine they are increasing skeptical of Russia's benevolence. Antoni Kaminski writes,

...a lot in the Russian policies toward Ukraine suggests that Russians have not accepted the loss of this country and that they plan and work toward recovering it. They achieve the aim by using the issue of Crimea, by military provocations (some of them with the use of the Black Sea Fleet), by efforts to isolate the country internationally, and bring it down economically.²⁵⁰

Russian foreign policy in essence seems to imply that NATO forces must not be allowed to incorporate willing countries while simultaneously Russian defense organizations are allowed to go as far West as is possible without actually re-invading Central Europe.

D. RUSSIA'S DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY & ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's relations with its neighbors have been characterized by a series of heavy-handed attempts to reassert its lost authority. The West (particularly the United States) has acquiesced to Russian demands to "contain" instability along the southern flank from Moldova to Kyrgyzstan. Many observers wonder whether Russia will try the same approach to "protecting its interests" in Ukraine and the Baltic States. Russia's behavior in the Kaliningrad Oblast and its leadership role in the CIS are further evidence that it intends to exert Russian influence beyond the current borders to the detriment of other Central and Eastern European states. As late as November 1991, NATO still considered Soviet military power as the single greatest threat to Alliance security. The New Strategic Concept states that,

²⁴⁹Henry Kissinger, 14 March 1994, p. 75.

²⁵⁰Professor Antoni Z. Kaminski. Professor Kaminski is the Director of the Department of Strategic Studies, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, Poland. Professor Kaminski delivered his speech entitled, "Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Sources of Instability" in Washington, D.C. 26-27 April 1993. His implication is that Russian diplomats have been using the 'Us (Russia) or Them (Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics)' strategy to pressure western policy makers into choosing the more populated and nuclear Russia over the less-threatening independent states that neighbor Russia. This 'Russia-first' policy denied to exist by the Clinton administration, has been the general "*modus operandi*" perception shared among CEE states.

From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.²⁵¹

Since 1991, Russia, though altered in form and name, has continued to possess a formidable military capability that poses a threat to NATO members and Central and East European countries in the gray zone between Russia and "The West." The head of the German defence staff, General Klaus Naumann, stated that, "even if existing disarmament treaties were observed, Russia would still have more than 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads and an army of 1.5m men which Mr Yeltsin had promised to supply generously."²⁵²

Economic and political ploys designed to keep its neighbors and Central and Eastern Europe under Russia's influence are also prominent tactics. To be sure, the current Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign initiatives are very similar to the tactics advocated by the most nationalistic leaders only a few years prior. Yet, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev increasingly implement conservative foreign policy initiatives under the clever ploy of "keeping the ultranationalists quiet."²⁵³ Russia's diplomatic and politico-military relations with its neighbors constitute a risk to Central Europe because the heavy-handed techniques (i.e., use of the Russian military, political subterfuge and economic sanctions) displayed in the "near abroad" might soon be used against Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's historical imperial legacy and its current maneuvers suggest a return to the traditional *modus operandi* throughout its historic sphere of influence.

²⁵¹*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 14.

²⁵² Klaus Naumann cited in Bruce Clark, 22-23 October 1994. Naumann was quoted as describing Russia as a country "taking a giant step from feudalism to democracy without ever having gone through the experience of enlightenment. Stability and democracy are linked with economic prosperity, and the Russian economy...is far away from recovery, and hence we should not be too optimistic in our assessment."

²⁵³ Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 3. Crow writes that Zhirinovsky, "has become a scapegoat for policies for which Russian officials would like to avoid responsibility and a foil for those who would like to continue calling themselves liberals." Citing Vitalii Portnikov, a commentator for the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 20 January 1994, who mused that, "Were it not for this remarkable person, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, how difficult it would be for many Russian politicians to preserve their reputations as 'doves'."

1. The Economic Incorporation of Belarus

Belarusian sovereignty has undergone a transformation which many believe spells the end of its status as an independent nation. The action in question is the ever closer relations with the Russian Federation and the Belarusian government's less-than-enthusiastic attitude concerning independence. Two experts on Central and Eastern European affairs claim,

Belarus went much farther than other Commonwealth states in concluding an extensive alliance with Russia. The alliance, confirmed by Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and Russian Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar on July, 20 1992, provided for a unified credit and financial system and a unified ruble zone between the republics. The alliance was cemented by a treaty regulating the coordination of activities in the military sphere, as well as by an agreement on the strategic forces that remained temporarily on Belarusian territory. The two states agreed to a coordinated budget, tax, and credit policy that would be implemented through an interrepublic economic coordination council. In part, the alliance was based on Belarus's high degree of integration with Russia's economy. As much as 70 percent of Belarus's enterprises were said to manufacture products for the Russian market.²⁵⁴

The recent merger of the two countries' political, military and economic affairs has forced Poland to re-analyze its own security interests vis-à-vis Russia. The consolidation of Belarusian concerns under the auspices of Russian control has for all intents and purposes, extended the Russian federation's frontier westward to the Eastern Polish frontier. The same patrimonial attitude that Russia places on Ukraine it also impresses on Belarus. Russia sees Belarus and Ukraine as "younger brothers" in a long-standing relationship. Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky write,

A large segment of the Russian citizenry is loath to part with its self-image as the elder brother, and for them the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and the Central Asian states, some of which have been under Russian patrimony from one to three centuries, will be felt for years to come.²⁵⁵

Poland is paying particularly close attention to the restoration of Russian-Belarusian union precisely because Russia seems ready to sacrifice economic prosperity in order to reconstitute its former-empire. Cooperation with Belarus is the Russian Federation's method of satisfying historical feelings of self-pity, fear of encirclement and

²⁵⁴Diuk & Karatnycky, pp. 263-264.

²⁵⁵Diuk & Karatnycky, p. 231.

loss of empire. Sergey Baburin and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have been particularly active in demanding that Russia reevaluate the current borders and for former Soviet republics to rejoin the Russian Federation.²⁵⁶ Belarus's decision to sign a collective security agreement with the Commonwealth of Independent States was in direct contradiction to its constitution which states that Belarus will remain a neutral country. A leader of the Belarusian Council of Ministers Department of Civilian Rights, Civil Security and Defense Work stated the following rationale for Belarus pursuing a pro-Russian policy as it pertains to the economic and military spheres of security:

- Realignment of "spheres of influence in the world as a result of the collapse of the USSR leaves Belarus with no [security] guarantees..." (An indirect reference to Poland and the Visegrad's attempts to join NATO and the three Baltic states receiving various forms of aid from Western Europe. Though never mentioned the official also recognizes a familiar Polish fear of being within the Central and Eastern Europe "security vacuum" being a "buffer" between Russia and Western Europe.)
- "Belarus has enjoyed a reliable security system for the past seventy years and its destruction now would be senseless."
- The "former-Soviet military-industrial complex was a unified whole that supplied state-of-the-art technology and arms as well as spare parts to all countries party to the [CIS Collective Security Agreement the so-called 'Tashkent Accord']." (This recognizes the Belarus's inability to provide resources or military infrastructure necessary to carry out a complete overhaul of the armed forces. The source fails to mention that the Belarusian military-industrial complex, though much smaller than Russia's, will also benefit from the military alliance and the new markets for Belarusian military hardware that other CIS states offer.)
- "Belarus cannot develop the military sciences on its own." (Ironically, the Ukrainians have succeeded in developing their own military science department. The Department spokesman would be more correct to state that Belarus has neither the will nor any intention of developing its own military science department.)

²⁵⁶Diuk & Karatnycky, p. 245. Diuk and Karatnycky note the recent revival of pan-Slavism, "In early 1992 Sergey Baburin and other leaders of the large Rossiya faction in parliament joined in challenging the current borders of Russia's neighbors, asserting that such borders had been 'arbitrarily set up by administrative and bureaucratic methods' and arguing in support of 'the right of any area outside the Russian Federation to adopt decisions on joining Russia'."

- "Belarus's two military academies cannot meet the country's training needs." (This is due in part to the fact that less than 30% of the officers in the Belarusian military are of Belarus descent and only 20% of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense is Belarusian.)²⁵⁷

Though one could argue about the strength of the Belarusian rationale, the aforementioned statement makes clear the Belarusian bureaucracy has every intention of pursuing a pro-Russian policy regardless of any constitutional conflicts that arise or the international ramifications associated with Russian troops once again bordering on Poland's Eastern border. Belarus's economic malaise is the main element driving it towards a closer union with Russia. This close economic relationship has flowed over into other traditional sovereignty factors such as military integration and politico-military security arrangements. From this aspect, one can see that the closer Belarusian-Russian relationship is critical within the larger context of security matters vis-à-vis Poland because it signals a clear willingness on the part of Russia to reassert an imperial destiny regardless of the financial cost of supporting Belarus's economy. It is this overly-aggressive willingness to reincorporate Belarus that makes Belarusian-Russian relations even more critical than Ukrainian-Russian relations vis-à-vis Poland. Alexander Lukashuk notes that as a result of the "less-than-stellar" performance of the Belarusian economy, leaders concluded a number of bilateral agreements with Russia, mainly economic in content and some conceding military inferiority in exchange for Russian assistance. He writes,

In addition to a close military union, the Belarusian-Russian accords embraced very broad economic cooperation, including the setting up of an interrepublican economic coordination council...while Russia undertook to pay Belarus's share of the former Soviet foreign debt, which amounted to \$3.5 billion.²⁵⁸

Belarus's recent economic agreements with Russia leave it without an independent currency, and without its own sovereign money, Belarus has all but ceded it sovereignty to Russia.²⁵⁹ The Polish Chief of Mission to the United States, Maciej

²⁵⁷Henadz Danilou quoted in *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, 24 March 1993 cited by Kathleen Mihalisko, 23 April 1993, p. 28. Ms. Mihalisko also cited a report in the *Narodnaya hazeta*, 3 March 1993 and noted that a "substantial part of the officer corps does not accept the defense of Belarus's independence as its moral obligation." To the extent that the interests of the arch conservatives coincide with the interests of this Russian-dominated military command, Belarusian sovereignty can be seriously undermined.

²⁵⁸Alexander Lukashuk, p. 68.

Kozlowski, noted that the dangerous signal sent to Central and Eastern European countries is that Russia puts imperial interests ahead of economic interests and that Belarus has lost all pretense of independence without the existence of its own currency.²⁶⁰ This viewpoint is shared by Poland and other countries that have a keen interest in monitoring any forms of Russian neo-imperialism. The experience of Belarus will likely serve as the test-case for Russian diplomats concerned with reconstructing vital frontiers of the old empire. There is no doubt a large portion of the Ukrainian public watching events in Belarus and eagerly anticipating a similar form of Russian economic salvation.

Finally, with Belarus's ratification of the START 1 and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaties in February 1993 the end result may be very different than what Western policymakers had imagined. In a twist of Russian diplomatic maneuvering, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from republics of the former-Soviet Union has opened an opportunity for Russia to provide CIS members with nuclear protection or the so-called "nuclear umbrella." In effect Russia has indiscriminately created a *de facto* alliance that offers a similar NATO Article 5 guarantee to all comers. The most alarming aspect for Poland is Belarus's willingness to link acceptance of security guarantees in the Tashkent Accord with economic union and the Russian Federation's requirement for Belarusian acquiescence to such an arrangement.²⁶¹

The maintenance of good Polish-Belarusian relations has historically depended on a variety of factors including treatment of minorities in the frontier regions, the historical memory within the greater context of a national identity, and the relative

²⁵⁹Chief of Mission, Embassy of Poland to the United States of America, Maciej Kozlowski addressing the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 25 April 1994.

²⁶⁰Kozlowski, 25 April 1994.

²⁶¹The Tashkent Accord created the foundation for former republics of the Soviet Union to join in a military alliance to stabilize numerous conflicts on Russia's periphery. This attempt to form a military alliance is a classic example of a group of countries (former Soviet Republics) in concert with one powerful ally (Russia) to balance against what they believe is a threat: instability along a long frontier as well as the Western alliances of NATO and WEU. Most experts see the Tashkent Accord and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States structures as Russia's first attempt to balance and reintegrate the former republics of the Soviet Union. The deputy chief of the liberal Moscow News recently remarked that, "Reintegration of neighboring countries has meanwhile become the magic formula...this includes...Kiev and Minsk, and nobody will be able to prevent Moscow from reintegrating them." (from *Moscow Interfax* in English, 1445, GMT, 18 March 1994). The main points of the accord include: logistical support from the expansive Russian military-industrial complex in the form of equipment and spare parts, compatibility with other CIS armed forces in terms of communications, weaponry, training and doctrine, and the use of Russian training facilities for officers and technicians. Belarus currently possesses only an outdated military-industrial complex and will rely heavily on Russia to provide 85-90% of the resources necessary to reestablish military forces.

balance of power between regional entities. For the past seventy years the Soviet Union, as the dominant regional power, maintained cordial relations with Poland through the use of the Red Army. With the 1922 annexation of eastern Belarus -- the former *kresy* -- still vivid in the minds of many Belarusian hard-line leaders, there still exists a lingering fear of Polish intentions. One expert on the region commented,

The bitter legacy of the early to mid-20th century lives on in the historical memories of...Belarusians...Compounding this resentment is the lingering fear among these peoples that a Poland free of Moscow's control would sooner or later want to regain control of the former *kresy*.²⁶²

This fear in fact is one argument Poland and NATO officials could leave with Russia. That is, incorporation into NATO would quell fears in Belarus of any Polish revanchist claims and would thus be a mitigating factor in making Central and Eastern Europe more stable. Any remnants of "bad blood" between a free Poland and Belarus run by old-style nomenklatura can be expected to continue as long as they fear friendly Polish overtures as some sort of devious duplicitous plot. Poland's main rationale for improved relations with Belarus concerns the large population of ethnic Poles in eastern Belarus, the fear that economic ruin, a Chernobyl-like nuclear disaster in Belarus or a regional war could result in large numbers of refugees flowing into Poland, that better German-Belarusian-Russian relations might threaten Polish interests, and finally that Russo-Belarusian relations would further evolve into Belarusian acquiescence and thus Russian troops would once again be placed along the Polish frontier.

With territory greater than that of Hungary and a population of 10.2 million people, (13% of which are Russians) and more than 30,000 Russian troops stationed throughout the country, Belarus has enough contributing elements to constitute a security risk to Poland.²⁶³ The current reality in Belarus with regard to its international policy makes the future of Polish-Belarusian-Russian relations precarious. The prospect that Warsaw will soon see Russian troops along its eastern frontier has in fact occurred. Belarus is more firmly than ever a willing appendage of a new imperial Russia. As Russia continues to dictate the terms of economic aid, Belarusian leaders seem more than willing to cede sovereignty in the form of economic, political and military

²⁶²Stephen R. Burant, p. 397.

²⁶³Stephen R. Burant, p. 399. Burant lists the most obvious factors that constitute a Belarusian risk to Polish security. *The Economist* of 21 May 1994, states that Russian troop strength at between 25,000 to 30,000, though this number will surely rise with the recent military cooperation treaties and the returning Russian Army troops from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

concessions to secure a place for the old-style nomenklatura. With Belarus's concessions, Poland has an even greater case for eventual membership in NATO.

2. Relations with Ukraine

The strained relations between Russia and Ukraine are the result of lingering Russian memories of, "Russia's imperial legacy and the additional problem that many, if not most, Russians do not consider Ukraine a legitimate entity, much less an independent, sovereign state."²⁶⁴ Since announcing its independence after a referendum in December in 1991, Ukraine has been under intense pressure by Russian nationalists to renounce its separatist claims. The most caustic statements have emanated from Russia's outspoken nationalist parliamentarians. Statements from the ultra-national portion of the Russian parliament have irritated delicate relations and have delayed future negotiations concerning a whole range of bilateral issues.

The Soviet version and currently-held Russian view of Ukrainian-Russian relations is best expressed in a 1954 document glorifying the historical legacy of the Ukrainian-Russian union. Though forty years old, the document illustrates the past and present "Russian view" that Ukraine has benefited from the union in which Russia serves as the "older brother." *The Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia (1654-1954)* elaborates on the common heritage of the two slavic nations and implies that the imperial identity of Russia is linked to union with Ukraine. As stated by the Russian-dominated Communist Party:

Three hundred years ago, by the powerfully expressed will of the Ukrainian people at the *Pereiaslav Rada* in January 1654, the union of Ukraine with Russia was proclaimed...the Soviet Union is an inspiring example of a country which, for the first time in history, has solved the national question...By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign subjugation and ensured their national development...The reunion of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was the natural corollary of the entire preceding history of the two great kindred Slavic peoples – the Russians and the Ukrainians...these peoples...sprang from a common stock – the ancient Russian people who set up the ancient Russian State of Kiev Rus'.²⁶⁵

Not only do most Ukrainians disagree with the Russian version of historical relations vis-à-vis Ukraine, they believe this mindset makes it impossible for demagogues like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy or Alexander Rutskoi to accept the idea of an

²⁶⁴Roman Solchanyk, p. 27.

²⁶⁵John Basarab, pp. 270-288.

independent Ukraine. The Ukrainian-Russian dispute has been most vividly illustrated by both countries' contention over the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea Fleet. As one observer note, "By mid-1992 a dynamic driving the evolution of the dispute had already been established; claim, counterclaim, crisis and compromise."²⁶⁶ The imperial Russian view has still not reconciled the fact that Ukraine is independent or will remain a separate sovereign entity. Russia's inability to come to grips with the loss of Ukraine and for that matter parts of the old-Soviet Empire, continue to haunt its emergence as a confident Eurasian power. The failure to move on to more pressing agenda items continues to leave Russia's western and northwestern neighbors fearful of future claims of a rightful sphere of influence. It is no wonder then that the three Baltic states as well as Poland and the other Visegrad countries watch Russian policymakers gradually reassert themselves where they were previously voted out in the 1991 move towards independence.

The contentious issues dividing Russia and Ukraine since Ukrainian independence have centered on the status of the Crimean Peninsula, Sevastopol and Simferopol, including Black Sea Fleet assets; the failure to resolve Ukraine's multi-billion dollar debt for the consumption of Russian oil and gas; the status of nuclear weapons in Ukraine; and the inability of Russian leaders to abandon their imperial mindset and repudiate the myth of a common Russian-Ukrainian bond. Russia's unwillingness to accept Ukraine as an independent state provides an illustration of how Russia might threaten its Central European neighbors.²⁶⁷ The recent election of Leonid Kuchma signals Ukraine's first step back into Russia's sphere of economic influence. Kuchma's victory in July 1994 also signifies a willingness on the part of Ukrainian voters to enhance relations with Russia, end the cultural estrangement with Russia and cease the isolation from the Russian/Eurasian world.²⁶⁸ Moreover, his victory is viewed in

²⁶⁶John W.R. Lepingwell, 9 July 1993, p. 51.

²⁶⁷Fiona Hill, pp. 66, 70-71. Hill writes that "Russia has a number of specific strategic objectives in the republic, which include: preventing Ukraine from becoming a rival power center; keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence and within the CIS trading bloc; preventing Ukraine from creating new trading networks that will bypass Russia; stopping Ukraine from claiming its share of the immovable and movable assets of the former Soviet Union; securing the total transfer to the Russian Federation, or the dismantlement, of Ukrainian nuclear weaponry...To ensure its objectives, Moscow has exerted pressure on Kiev on three fronts: economic, security and territorial." The author detailed a few examples of Russian economic tactics: selling crude oil below world prices if Ukraine remained in the ruble zone; and Russia's Central Bank freezing all payments to Ukraine for its issuing credits to Ukrainian firms.

²⁶⁸Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, p. 12.

Central Europe as a harbinger of westward Russian influence. Michael Mihalka recently wrote that,

Poland's fear of a resurgent Russia can only be enhanced by the electoral victories in Belarus of Alyaksandr Lukashenka -- who had been endorsed by the Russian ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy...-- and in Ukraine of Leonid Kuchma, a former missile-plant boss, whose support came mainly from the Russian-speakers in the eastern part of the country.²⁶⁹

An advisor to the Ukrainian parliament says that, "Kuchma's vision of Ukraine makes him prone to deepening Ukraine's relationship with CIS security institutions and to accepting a long-term Russian presence in Crimea." In return for Ukrainian acquiescence, Russia might agree to sell oil and gas more cheaply or to subsidize Ukraine's entry into the ruble zone.²⁷⁰

3. Relations with the Baltic States

Russia's relations with the three Baltic states -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia -- throw light on its possible future behavior towards CEE states. Russia's agreements with each of these Baltic states differ, depending upon the issue, though the common attitude throughout the Baltics is that Russia continues to coerce the states in order to preserve its influence.²⁷¹ The common disagreements that each Baltic state has had with Russia since the early 1990's concern the status of Russian troops and bases within the Baltics; the treatment of Russian-speaking nationals and military pensioners, and the difference between Russia's low living standard and the ever-increasing standard of living throughout the Baltics.

Russia's relationship with these three countries is important within the context of greater European security because it reflects the pathological nature of Russian coercion vis-à-vis these states.²⁷² If Russia uses heavy-handed economic, diplomatic and

²⁶⁹Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 35. Mihalka adds that, "These events illustrate clearly that internal developments within Russia and the CIS can have a profound effect on security concerns throughout Eastern and Central Europe."

²⁷⁰*The Economist*, citing Ian Brzezinski, 16 July 1994, p. 42.

²⁷¹Allen Lynch, p. 12. Lynch writes that, "The foreign-policy debate is not so much over the content of that policy as over what constitutes foreign policy for a Russia that is hardly accustomed to thinking of either its immediate neighbors in the...(CIS) or the Baltic States as truly foreign countries."

²⁷²Fiona Hill, pp. 18, 20. Hill notes that "Russia has used the discriminatory legislation to undertake punitive action, ostensibly to force the amendment of the legislation but also to exact greater political concessions from the republics...[Former Lithuanian President Landsbergis']...pro-Western stance was met by a prolonged shut-off of Russian oil and gas supplies...As a result of his perceived failure to manage the economy and conduct negotiations with Moscow...Landsbergis was ousted."

military tactics to cajole the Baltics into submission, what prevents it from doing the same to Central and Eastern Europe?²⁷³ Russia considers the Baltic states as "newly independent" only since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Baltic countries all dispute this and consider themselves the same states that existed *de jure* since 1918.²⁷⁴ Russia has maintained a consistent policy requiring the Baltic republics to give automatic dual citizenship for Russians abroad, to make Russian one of the official languages, and to support treaties guaranteeing rights of Russian-speakers outside of Russia. Additionally, disputes have arisen from Russian bases and territorial questions over border disputes and the right of free passage through Lithuania to access the Kaliningrad Oblast.

The issue of Russian access through Lithuania is still a problem because evidence suggests Russia has disregarded agreed-upon norms of passage. Recently, in several incidents, Russian military transports transited Lithuania without the permission of the Lithuanian government.²⁷⁵ Lithuanians view the incidents as a reminder that Russia will continue to operate throughout the Baltics with impunity. As in Estonia, nearly 25% of Latvia's population consists of non-natives left over from the Soviet era.²⁷⁶ These two Baltic states have demanded that their inhabitants learn to speak the indigenous language and become citizens within a certain period of time. Russians saw these demands as a provocation and used these issues to stall troop withdrawals and commence punitive economic and political actions.²⁷⁷ Russia was allowed to keep a

²⁷³Dzintra Bungs, p. 28. Bungs writes that, "Many government officials and politicians in Moscow still tend to think of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as part of the 'near abroad' and as a 'sphere of Russia's vital interest' -- designations that Baltic leaders find disturbing, since they suggest that the three countries remain under Moscow's dominance and tutelage. Even more disturbing from the Baltic viewpoint are statements by Russian politicians, such as the ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who are in favor of Russian hegemony over the former Soviet republics in order to revive some kind of empire."

²⁷⁴Dzintra Bungs, p. 25.

²⁷⁵Dzintra Bungs, p. 31-32. Citing the *BNS* and *Interfax* on 22-23 February 1994, Bung writes that on 22 February 1994, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister summoned the Russian Ambassador to Lithuania, "to discuss 'a gross violation of the established procedure of transit through the territory' of Lithuania...The Russian military had not obtained authorization for the transport, nor had permission been granted for the soldiers to carry weapons on Lithuanian territory."

²⁷⁶*The Economist*, 5 February 1994, p. 51. According to the most recent figures, the percentage of the population born outside the country include: 10% in Lithuania, 25% in Latvia and 26% in Estonia.

²⁷⁷Saulius Girnius, p. 30. Girnius writes that, "Russia treated all the Baltic States equally, decreasing or suspending oil and gas shipments...The Duma subsequently decided to place the Baltic States, beginning on 1 July 1994, in the category of countries paying the highest duties on imports of agricultural products and

radar site in Skrunda, Latvia, and two nuclear reactors at the submarine base in Paldiski, Estonia, in exchange for removing all troops by the end of the summer.²⁷⁸ Finally, the territorial issue is also a problem that Russia has used to threaten unilateral solutions.²⁷⁹ Reflecting Baltic and CEE states' concerns, the President of the Republic of Estonia outlined his country's favorable view of NATO as a guarantor of European stability. He wrote,

We in Estonia firmly believe that NATO is now, and will be in the future, the primary guarantor of security on the Continent...Any suggestion that NATO has outlived its usefulness, and that the United States and Russia would form a condominium, jointly assuming responsibility for guaranteeing the security of Europe, represents naivety at best and Cold War era thinking at worst.²⁸⁰

The Baltics and Poland in particular and Central and Eastern Europe in general still perceive the greatest risk to their security from Russia and thus they believe NATO is vital to their security interests. Within one month of the Brussels Summit in January 1994, all three Baltic states and Poland had signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.²⁸¹ Outlining the main concerns of the Baltic states and Central Europe, the Lithuanian Minister of National Defense recently detailed the future threats:

- The growing "instability on the territory of the former Soviet Union: inter-regional, ethno-religious and territorial conflicts as well as social conflicts provoked by a declining economy);"
- The growing "tendencies of authoritarianism and nationalism in the territory of the former Soviet Union above all in Russia;"

said that it would ratify the most-favored-nation trade agreement only if Lithuania agreed to comply with its demands on Kaliningrad transit."

²⁷⁸*The Economist*, "Leaning on the Balts," 27 August 1994, p. 48. Though the Skrunda agreement allows Russia access to the radar site for four more years, *The Economist* pointed out that, "In theory, these bases could provide an excuse for Russian military pressure on the Baltic states."

²⁷⁹Dzintra Bungs, p. 30. Citing *Interfax*, 14 and 15 February 1994, Bungs writes that a Russian negotiator, Lieutenant-General Konstantin Pleshko, stated that, "Russia would soon go ahead unilaterally with the border demarcation, because a delay 'would above all harm the interests of Russia'."

²⁸⁰Lennart Meri, p. 7.

²⁸¹*NATO Review*, June 1994, "Focus on NATO, Signing of Partnership for Peace as at 6 June 1994," p. 6. Lithuania signed the Framework Document 27 January, Poland 2 February, Estonia 3 February and Latvia 14 February.

- The growing threat of crime and "possible disasters at industrial and energy facilities, [including] the smuggling of drugs, guns and radioactive materials and the illegal transportation of certain other goods."²⁸²

Defense Minister Butkevicius stated that Lithuania, can be drawn into these conflicts when they involve its neighbors. He writes that,

Instability and a turning-away from democracy in Russia would not, perhaps, be perceived as directly threatening in Western Europe and North America but merely as alarming. But to us in Lithuania they would definitely appear to threaten us in a most direct way.²⁸³

4. The Impact of the Kaliningrad Oblast on Regional Security

Russia's continued use of the Kaliningrad Oblast as a detached appendage of Russia is another sign of its willingness to play a major role as a geopolitical force in Central Europe.²⁸⁴ Kaliningrad is a potential destabilizing factor because of its relative strategic-military importance and because its economic difficulties might precipitate a massive flow of economic immigrants into Western Europe. Russia maintains a strong presence in the oblast for several reasons: a reminder to Poland of a nearby Russian presence, a continual Russian military presence on the Baltic Sea, and an opportunity to receive hard currency from Western European investors. One defense expert noted that,

Few governments wish to discuss the subject of East Prussia and its capital Königsberg. Germany insists that it has no interests in the region and, therefore, refuses to discuss the subject. Lithuania and Poland do not want to upset the Russians by negotiation, and Russia simply says that there is nothing to discuss. They are all wrong. As one senior German diplomat has noted, 'this is an issue that is going to jump up and bite us all on the backside because we refuse to face it'.²⁸⁵

The Kaliningrad Oblast is symbolic of Russia's attempts to maintain a strategic presence in Central Europe and the Baltic Sea. The Russians perceive Kaliningrad at least for the near future as a substitute for its lost bases in the Baltic states.²⁸⁶ Despite

²⁸²Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8.

²⁸³Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8.

²⁸⁴John W. R. Lepingwell, Autumn 1994, pp. 83-84. Lepingwell, citing the 22 March 1994 issue of the *Komsomolskaya pravda* writes that, "On a visit to the region in March 1994, Grachev stated that Kaliningrad would become a 'special defensive region', suggesting that it will receive special funding and supplies. This build-up of forces is causing concern in the Baltic states and Poland, but does not contravene the CFE limits."

²⁸⁵Phillip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 59.

the withdrawals back to Russia, Polish leaders continue to question the necessity of such a large force. Former Polish Defense Minister Parys asked "why Russia needed such a large concentration of troops in the Kaliningrad *oblast* when Poland has only 220,000 troops to defend its entire territory."²⁸⁷ Kaliningrad's large military capability continues to expand because of the withdrawal of forces from Germany, Poland and the Baltics. In February 1993 the approximate numbers were: "620 tanks, 940 armoured combat vehicles, 695 artillery pieces, 95 rotary-wing and 155 fixed-wing combat aircraft."²⁸⁸ The Lithuanian Defense Minister stated that Lithuania, "is greatly concerned about the presence and reinforcement of enormous Russian military contingents...which surpass defence needs by far and hinder a peaceful development of this territory."²⁸⁹

E. OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

The risks of civil war, economic catastrophe or a nuclear accident are all possibilities that cannot be ruled out as threats to Central and Western Europe. Though the magnitude of each risk depends largely upon the ability of democratic and market reforms to prevail, one cannot rule out such events occurring. Leaders of the Baltic states consider these risks inherently threatening to their independence and believe they originate in Russia.²⁹⁰ The risk of civil war breaking out along Russia's periphery has already been confirmed by the battles being fought in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia-Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Moldova. Containing these conflicts to the immediate area will continue to be a major focus of Russian foreign policy. Civil war has already broken out in the Chechnya region of Russia.

The one-day drop in the value of the Russian ruble by 25% in October 1994, is an example of how economic factors might very well determine the success or failure of a democratic Russia.²⁹¹ Many experts claim that the risk of economic collapse in Russia

²⁸⁶Phillip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 59.

²⁸⁷Phillip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 62.

²⁸⁸Petersen and Petersen, p. 60. The authors note that, "The figures cited above clearly understate the present militarization of the Kaliningrad region. The Polish Defense Ministry has noted that, in addition to the above mentioned units, some of the former Soviet air and ground units withdrawn from Poland have been relocated to the Kaliningrad region...[In Kaliningrad] there are thought to reside some 900,000 to 1 million people...Estimates of the military portion of the total is anywhere from 20 to 30 per cent."

²⁸⁹Audrius Butkevicius, p. 10.

²⁹⁰Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8.

is the single greatest threat to Russia's political future and the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.²⁹² They tie the success of political, economic and institutional transformations directly to the progress of economic reform. Some Russian leaders understand the necessity of maintaining a vibrant economy because of the drastic consequences that economic failure would have in Russia and its neighbors. President Yeltsin's main economic initiatives -- avoiding political tensions by preventing wide-scale unemployment and spiraling inflation -- reflect his unwillingness to conduct drastic reform measures. According to Alexander Rahr, Yeltsin has become hesitant to enact necessary reform policies because of this latent fear.²⁹³ Lastly, François Heisbourg recognized the risks associated with economic collapse, writing in 1991 that the "breakdown of governance in parts of Eastern Europe and the USSR would also create massive displacement of minorities within the affected areas."²⁹⁴

There also remains a risk of a nuclear accident not only in Russia but also in Ukraine and Belarus. Soviet-era nuclear plants, not known for their elaborate safety systems, have not received regular maintenance in years. Additionally, poor nuclear weapons handling and weapons storage practices increase the possibility of a catastrophic accident. Fiona Hill cites numerous Russian claims that called into question Ukrainian procedures for storing and maintaining nuclear weapons. She writes that on 2 March 1993,

Russia announced that Ukraine's nuclear missiles were leaking as Ukraine had refused to permit Russian technicians to gain access to the weapons for maintenance purposes (*Financial Times*, 3 March 1993)...[Russian experts]...alleged that Ukraine was trying to retarget its nuclear weapons and was seeking to override the blocking devices preventing the unauthorized launch of the missiles (*Boston Globe* 15 May 1993)...Kozyrev warned that a 'tragedy worse than the one in Chernobyl'

²⁹¹Richard W. Stevenson, p. A 1. Stevenson writes that, "in the last several weeks, the ruble had been made vulnerable because of fears that inflation would come roaring back if the Government responded to political pressure to increase spending and dispersed cheap loans to ailing factories, mines and farms."

²⁹²Ian Brzezinski, p. 27. The author notes that, "From Warsaw's perspective, Ukraine presents both risks and opportunities. Political and economic failure in Ukraine could unleash a potentially uncontrollable influx of refugees who would be attracted to Poland's relative stability and prosperity. At the very least, they would use Poland as a halfway stop to the West. In the worst case scenario, political and economic failure in Ukraine could lead to its reintegration into Russia; this is likely to involve some form of regional conflict. Hence, Poland would once again find itself alongside an imperial Russia."

²⁹³Alexander Rahr, p. 5.

²⁹⁴François Heisbourg, p. 35. Heisbourg concluded that, "Economic and even environmental prospects in Eastern Europe will play a key role in provoking population movements to the prosperous West."

that was possible if nuclear weapons were not withdrawn from Ukraine by January 1, 1994 (*Interfax* 5 November 1993).²⁹⁵

The Russian comments must be taken within the context of Russia's attempts to manipulate world opinion to make it appear that the Ukrainians are not competent to safeguard nuclear weapons. These pronouncements illustrate the danger associated with neglected Soviet-era facilities, poor weapons storage techniques and alleged attempts to bypass missile security features.

F. RUSSIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION AND THE FUTURE OF POLAND AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Most Russian leaders define their interests and their response to potential NATO expansion, based on a number of objectives and initiatives. Suzanne Crow writes that,

...there has been a virtual consensus among Russian officials that East European membership in NATO is undesirable and should be avoided...Some officials confine themselves to the argument that Russia will be isolated. Others express concern about the intentions of the West and the possible threats posed by the unhindered expansion of the Atlantic alliance.²⁹⁶

The most noticeable change to occur in Russia's foreign policy in the last two years has been the shift from a pro-Western view to a more pragmatic opinion of the world. To be sure, Kozyrev and Yeltsin no longer refer to Russia's neighbors as "a civilized international community, that has learned to value human interests above all else and that is open to mutual association and cooperation."²⁹⁷ In setting a new course, Andrei Kozyrev defined the two "pragmatic premises" of Russian foreign policy: primarily, that "Russia is destined to be a great power not a junior" partner; and second, that Russian partnership with the West does not "negate a firm, even aggressive, policy of defending one's own national interests."²⁹⁸ In conjunction with this pragmatic

²⁹⁵Fiona Hill, pp. 76, 77, 82.

²⁹⁶Suzanne Crow, 15 October 1993, p. 23.

²⁹⁷Andrei Kozyrev in *Izvestia*, 2 January 1992, cited by Bruce D. Porter, pp. 46-47. Porter writes that in January 1992 while addressing the United Nations, President Yeltsin referred to the Western powers as being Russia's "natural allies."

²⁹⁸Andrei Kozyrev, *The New York Times*, 18 March 1994, p. A 11. Kozyrev mistakenly refers to NATO's main purpose as security against Communism. Rather, NATO's main purpose -- during the Cold War and after 1989 -- has been to safeguard freedom and promote stability of the Atlantic Alliance against *any* threat regardless of its substance. He writes that, "NATO is inadequate, for two simple reasons: it no longer confronts Communism as its main enemy, and it does not have Russia as a member."

approach, Stephen Foye listed three concessions that President Yeltsin granted the military leadership for their support in the October 1993 coup attempt:

- More assertive policies in Russia's "near abroad;"
- Calls for alterations in the CFE Treaty;
- Consistent opposition to Central and Eastern European or former Soviet republics from joining NATO.²⁹⁹

Central and Eastern Europeans view NATO's acquiescence to Russian aims in the "near abroad" as the first step in a process to reincorporate former Soviet satellites into Moscow's sphere of influence. Zhirinovsky and Lebed have both succeeded, at least in part, by highlighting any perceived attempt by the West to subjugate Russia. Zhirinovsky recently referred to the Partnership for Peace initiative as a "pro-American, pro-Israel, pro-Zionist" plot.³⁰⁰ General Lebed has been similarly straightforward regarding the former republics and satellites -- the Baltics, Germany and Poland -- and Russia's perceived loss in stature. He stated, "Apparently we had to withdraw. But we pulled out of the Baltic states in a rush, abandoning our compatriots without any legal protection." Referring to the Russian Army's exit from Central Europe, Lebed continued, "And they left Germany like beaten dogs, when their grandfathers entered it as victors."³⁰¹ Lebed's pro-Russian and anti-Western views are held by a large segment of the population. Erlanger points out that,

He [Lebed] praises the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for bringing order, but denies any possibility in Russia of a military coup. He thinks Russia's new borders are arbitrary and won't last, but is vague on where he thinks they should be. He deplores the manner of the Russian withdrawal from Germany and the Baltics -- would he rather have stayed?³⁰²

The Russians, conversely, view NATO expansion as the West's first step to dominate decisions in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the United States, equated NATO expansion to the "rape" of Russia. The *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* echoed the ambassador's concern, suggesting, "that

²⁹⁹Stephen Foye, p. 4.

³⁰⁰Celestine Bohlen, 5 April 1994, p. A 6.

³⁰¹General Alexander Lebed cited by Steven Erlanger, 9 October 1994, p. E 5.

³⁰²Steven Erlanger, 9 October 1994, p. E 5.

Washington was intent on 'methodically ousting Russia' from Central Asia and the Caucasus."³⁰³

1. Russian Foreign Policy Objectives

Russia's current foreign policy objectives and initiatives are a reflection of the domestic political shift from "enlightened humanism" to pragmatic and nationalistic geo-politics. Suzanne Crow lists several reasons why Russia objects to NATO enlargement: (1) Germany's "high-profile" attempt to incorporate the East; (2) suspicion that NATO as an "international gendarme," under the aegis of a UN mandate, might attempt peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in regions of the former Soviet Union; (3) Russia's interests in its historic area of influence in Central and Eastern Europe would be subverted.³⁰⁴ One Russian Defense Council member proposed that Russia retain the "Right to first use of nuclear weapons" was to insure Russia's neighbors were discouraged from joining NATO.³⁰⁵ Based on the author's research and interviews, a compilation of Russian foreign policy objectives includes efforts to:

- Maintain domestic support for foreign policy initiatives by adopting an aggressive-conservative tone;
- Maintain the perception internationally and domestically of Russia as a great power;
- Overcome the psychological loss of the "empire" by reestablishing its influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the "near abroad;"
- Protect Russian interests -- economic, political, military and ethnic -- in Russia, the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe;
- Prevent NATO from interfering with Russia's arms-exporting business and CIS actions;
- Maintain the "near abroad" and Central Europe as an area of historical Russian influence and prestige;
- Prevent the West from creating a "buffer zone" of Central Europe, thereby isolating or weakening Russia;

³⁰³Fred Hiatt, citing *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 March 1994.

³⁰⁴Suzanne Crow, 15 October 1993, p. 24.

³⁰⁵Allen Lynch, p. 15, citing a 4 November 1993 *ITAR-TASS* report which reported that Lieutenant General Valerii Manilov, the deputy secretary of the Russian Defense Council, had stated that, "one of the purposes of Russia's retention of the right to first use of nuclear weapons was to 'hasten the accession to the 1968 [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] Treaty by the states of the CIS and Eastern Europe and...keep them out of the orbit of NATO and the [Western European Union].'"

- Fight any effort to make Russia a junior partner in NATO or any other European security institution;
- Obstruct any attempt to incorporate Central and Eastern Europe into NATO;
- Nullify NATO's political autonomy and military power.

Since the issue of NATO enlargement first arose in 1991, Russia has appealed to the West not to expand NATO for fear that nationalists would use this to lend credence to their xenophobic fears of Western encirclement. Some say this is a tactic designed to protect Russian interests and that it gives Russian diplomats a convenient nationalist bogeyman to hide behind.³⁰⁶ NATO expansion, so the theory goes, would aid hard-liners in proving that the West has a goal of establishing a sphere of influence "as close as possible to Russia's borders."³⁰⁷ The Yeltsin government, under pressure from nearly all major political factions, will increasingly define its role in the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe as the central protector of Russian national interests and Russian nationals. Paul Goble writes that leaders in Russia will "constantly be tempted to use these 'new minorities' as a lever against the other republics -- both as a threat to political elites and economies and as a group that might be withdrawn and thereby hurt those republics."³⁰⁸ Yeltsin and Kozyrev view their political position as directly linked to their advocacy of an aggressive foreign policy. "Anything that attenuates Russia's influence in the region -- including the expansion of NATO -- will be strongly opposed." An editor for *The Wall Street Journal* wrote that "Mr. Kozyrev has reaped public support by hardening his line -- a lesson he is unlikely to forget between now and the 1996 elections."³⁰⁹ In order to out-flank ultranationalists who exploit any sign of foreign policy weakness, Yeltsin and Kozyrev have incorporated a moderate form of nationalist rhetoric. Adrian Karatnycky writes,

...the Yeltsin team faces a stiff internal challenge from popular and powerful anti-Western forces. Support for the restoration of the Soviet

³⁰⁶Celestine Bohlen, 6 January 1994, p. A 4. President Yeltsin's press spokesman warned that, "any moves to expand NATO could 'trigger military-political destabilization in the region. The President of Russia is concerned over the tendency of expanding the bloc. Promotion of such a tendency would contradict the proclaimed intentions to build relations on principles of trust, partnership and balance of forces'."

³⁰⁷Alexei Pushkov, *NATO Review*, February 1994, p. 22. The hard-liner argument is that "the West wants to use Russia's weaknesses to take over at least politically and militarily, the countries which used to be in the Soviet sphere of influence...."

³⁰⁸Paul Goble, p. 64.

³⁰⁹Therese Raphael, 22 June 1994.

Union is widespread in the Russian military, and the Parliament is dominated by anti-Western rhetoric -- from Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's neo-imperialist rantings to the vituperative speeches of Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov, whose party seeks to revive the U.S.S.R. and attacks the U.S. for seeking to impose a worldwide 'military dictatorship'.³¹⁰

To stem these threats, Russian foreign policy objectives in the future will be less "enlightened" and more "realistic." Within the last year, Andrei Kozyrev has implored the West to grant Russia privileges associated with its "superpower" status, and in effect to give it a veto over possible unilateral actions by NATO in areas like the former-Yugoslavia.³¹¹ According to the newly converted centrist-conservative Andrei Kozyrev NATO expansion would endanger Russia's status as a great power and ergo its national interests. Kozyrev stated that Russia's present policy,

...embodies the genuine national and state interests of a great power which recognizes and is implementing its responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council...It is also obvious that the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of vital interest to us...The future of Eastern Europe lies in its transformation -- not into some kind of buffer zone, but into a bridge linking the East and West of the continent...If, however, we began to be seen in Western capitals as something 'unnecessary' or 'dangerous' this would only encourage our 'national patriots' to increase their attacks on current Russian policy and would sustain their chauvinist desires to close off Russia in pseudo-superpower isolation.³¹²

Part of the attempt to revive the perception of Russia as a great power has been the psychological process of accepting the loss of empire. Instead of weaning Russia from this "dependency on empire," Kozyrev and Yeltsin have gone about reconstituting the Soviet Union through less belligerent means. According to the centrist politician Oleg Rumyantsev, Russia "retains the psychological detritus of a superpower." *The New York Times* reported that in a recent poll conducted in Russia, with a sampling of 3,500, 68 percent regretted the breakup of the Soviet Union and the same number believes a union between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is possible.³¹³ Russia's foreign minister

³¹⁰Adrian Karatnycky, 30 August 1994, p. A 13.

³¹¹Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 43. Kozyrev, quoted in an *ITAR-TASS* (in English), 17 April 1994 as cited by Mihalka. Kozyrev said, "What is clear is that we want a more serious and substantive agreement adequate to the relations that should exist between NATO and the superpower of Russia...especially an agreement which will exclude unilateral actions, particularly military ones, in areas where we have to closely cooperate."

³¹²Andrei Kozyrev, *NATO Review*, February 1993, pp. 3-4.

said that, "a 'major psychological adjustment' would be necessary before his fellow citizens could accept the idea of countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining the alliance."³¹⁴ Russia's status as a great power, the effort of its leaders to overcome the psychological affects of the loss of empire and Yeltsin's successes in out-flanking more extreme elements are illustrated in a recent article by a former American ambassador to the CSCE. He writes that Russia's attempts to regain its great power status are "motivated by old-fashioned Russian nationalism and the political necessity for Russian leaders to reclaim their country's world power image following a period of devastating national humiliation."³¹⁵

In Russia, the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe protecting Russian interests includes safeguarding Russian nationals, protecting arms markets and raw materials markets, ensuring border defenses and maintaining influence in regional matters. These objectives are manifest in the efforts to subordinate NATO to the CSCE, legitimize the activities of the CIS, and coerce the Baltics and Ukraine. John Maresca mused that, "Now Russia is once again seeking the diplomatic instruments to confirm what President Boris Yeltsin has unashamedly called Moscow's 'sphere of influence,' and to obtain a recognizant 'Great Power' role in the West."³¹⁶ Moscow wants to stall NATO expansion for fear that the Alliance and Central Europeans could take over lucrative arms markets and that NATO standardization would render the Russian arms industry obsolete. Furthermore, NATO enlargement would threaten unilateral actions taken by Russia and the CIS in the "near abroad." In February 1994, Kozyrev said that Russian foreign policy priorities included

...to eliminate hotbeds of armed conflict along Russia's borders, to reinforce arrangements relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the latest military technologies, and to increase the accountability and transparency of the international arms trade, while unconditionally safeguarding our commercial interests in this sphere.³¹⁷

³¹³Steve Erlanger, 21 October 1994, p. A 6.

³¹⁴Bruce Clark, 23 June 1994.

³¹⁵John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994.

³¹⁶John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994.

³¹⁷Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 38. Mihalka cites Andrei Kozyrev in "The Guideline Is Russia's Interests," *Rossiiskie vesti*, 9 February 1994.

In essence, Moscow wants to maintain trade in arms (competition with Central Europe) and competition with the rest of the world with its energy resources.³¹⁸ In addition to arms competition with the West, Suzanne Crow offers other compelling reasons why Russia wants to discourage any Western "encroachment" in Central and Eastern Europe. She writes that,

...arms sales mean income; bases in the near abroad mean that Russia need not devote huge amounts of resources to re-creating a border defense – a seemingly impossible task; bases mean that Russia need not search for housing and occupation for returning troops; and peacekeeping, ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians in the near abroad, serves the same purpose as bases and offers the additional attraction of perhaps stemming return migration to Russia.³¹⁹

Moreover, by contradicting the efforts to overcome the psychological affects of the loss of empire, enlargement of NATO would damage Russia's historical grip on Central and Eastern Europe. Russia wants to prevent the United States and the West from establishing a buffer in Central and Eastern Europe because of the fear that Russia would then become isolated and weakened. Both Andrei Kozyrev and Pavel Grachev have continually emphasized the importance of not isolating Russia. Grachev said that it "would be unfortunate if the former Warsaw Pact states joined NATO in the near future, because this step would relegate Russia to a much more isolated position."³²⁰

Other prominent Russians have argued that NATO's role as the supreme guarantor of European security would substantially undermine Russia's economic and political interests and weaken and isolate Russia.³²¹ Two senior Russian military officials supported this perception that the West was attempting to isolate Russia, writing in a military journal that the,

³¹⁸Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, pp. 44-45. One of the Russian military's objections regarding membership in PfP and eventually NATO was the issue of standardization of equipment and weaponry. Mihalka writes that, "Some parts of the military thought the program would require the country to scrap its current weapons..." (Andrei Apostolov, "Oleg Lobov: Bulgaria Is Not Interested in Most Modern Russian Weapons Systems," *Kontinent*, 2 June 1994) "in any case standardization among other countries could deprive Russia of its arms markets, an important source of hard currency." (Tamara Zamyantina, "Russia-NATO: Will Partnership Come About?" *Rossiiskie vesti*, 26 May 1994).

³¹⁹Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5.

³²⁰The Russian Defense Minister quoted in *Reuters*, 1 October 1993 and cited by Suzanne Crow, 15 October 1993, p. 22.

³²¹Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 41.

American leadership's attempt to use another approach to preserving the U.S. position on the European continent is quite logical. Its basis may be the 'buffer idea,' the essence of which is the creation (with the dominant influence of the United States) of zones of integration activity in geographically limited regions of Europe. The goal of such actions, on the one hand, will be to fill the 'vacuum of influence' that formed after the breakup of the USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organization and...create the prerequisites for intensifying possible American military intervention if crisis situations worsen...[T]he Baltic region is becoming an arena of foreign policy activity of the United States. The main objective [is] to establish military-political control over a flanking area important for Europe.³²²

Russia's perceives closer Polish-Ukrainian relations and their bilateral trade -- 300 million dollars in 1992 -- as another attempt to isolate it.³²³ Furthermore, according to Russia, NATO expansion could trigger political and military destabilization in the CEE region. Instead, the Russians insist, NATO expansion should be gradual and not endanger Russian interests. One member of President Yeltsin's Presidential Council outlined the conflict between joining PfP and the Russian objective not to be isolated:

- Russia isolates itself by agreeing to "participate, since NATO controls who becomes a full member and when" they can join;
- Russia "cannot afford to be constrained when its own interests do not coincide with NATO's or with those of the Partnership for Peace;"
- Russia "cannot be left out in the hallway while important decisions are made on issues critical to its security;"
- PfP "includes an attempt to block the former Soviet republics' ability to consolidate militarily and politically;"
- "Central European countries and former Soviet republics, in joining the Partnership for Peace and eventually NATO, will push Russia out of their markets as an arms supplier, dealing a serious blow to [the] military-industrial complex."³²⁴

³²²Maj.-Gen. A. Meshkov and Col. A. Nikolayev, pp. 9-11.

³²³Ian Brzezinski, p. 30. Citing a report from Chrystia Freeland in the 12 March 1993 edition of *The Financial Times*, Brzezinski writes that, "many Russians still regard close relations between Poland and Ukraine as a Western -- if not a solely Polish and Ukrainian -- effort to isolate Russia." An advisor to President Yeltsin, Sergei Stankevich, said that "Ukraine falls within Russia's sphere of influence and warned against excessively close political and military relations between Poland and Ukraine."

³²⁴Andranik Migranyan, 24 June 1994.

Russia will continue to insist that it be treated not only as a superpower but also an "equal partner." This objective is associated with Russia's aspiration to protect interests, revamp its world status, out-flank nationalists and subjugate NATO. Suzanne Crow writes,

Russia's complaints about being forced to play the role of a junior partner reveal a sense of humiliation. Bereft of the ornaments of empire (the Soviet republics and Eastern Europe) and mission (communist ideology) and struggling with economic, political, and military difficulties, Russia feels downtrodden and supplicant.³²⁵

Raphael points out that Kozyrev, "must convince the West that Russia is no longer a threat, while convincing Russians that his policy can restore their sense of lost pride and the country's status as a great power."³²⁶ Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin stated his concern over allowing the Visegrad countries into NATO because of what he described as the detrimental effects it would have on European security. He was quoted as saying that "not all the consequences of such a step have been calculated."³²⁷ According to Mihalka, Russia regards Polish attempts to join NATO, and NATO's attempts to expand in the following ways:

- Central and Eastern Europe should be the bridge between Western Europe and Russia;
- NATO expansion East should only occur if Russia is allowed to join;
- NATO in any future form should subordinate itself to the United Nations and the CSCE.³²⁸

³²⁵Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5.

³²⁶Therese Raphael. Raphael writes that Kozyrev "has perceived that it is domestic forces more than international ones that will shape his future. Where he once argued against politicizing the issue of Russian minorities in the newly independent countries, he now has become one of the sharper defenders of Russian minority citizens in the 'near abroad'."

³²⁷Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 38, citing Churkin's interview in *Narodna obroda*, 12 January 1994. Churkin thought it would be impossible to ensure additional European stability while some states [Russia] would be harmed. He thought expansion would require the CFE Treaty to be reopened and that Russia's current domestic situation "dictated temporizing on NATO entry."

³²⁸Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, pp. 35-36.

John Maresca affirms this objective, writing,

Thus the Russians are claiming the exclusive right to deal with problems on the territory of the former USSR through the C.I.S., while simultaneously seeking a major voice on matters in other parts of Europe through a specially recognized Great Power role in the CSCE.³²⁹

2. Russian Initiatives to Prevent NATO Expansion

Russian foreign policy objectives have been promoted through a number of initiatives designed by Russia's leaders. Although they have not publicly articulated them as policies, evidence suggests that these are the most prominent elements. Thus Russian foreign policy initiatives include:

- Use of coercive economic and political tactics on neighbors to protect Russian interests;
- Use of the CIS to balance against NATO and reassert Russian national interests;
- Use of peacemaking, Russian style, forces as an instrument of Russian foreign policy in order to gain international sanction and funding;
- Bargain for a "special status" for Russia in NATO;
- Attempt to make NATO subordinate to CSCE;
- Subvert NATO from taking on new members by joining Partnership for Peace and any other NATO organizations;
- Establish a separate leading role in the Bosnian War talks in order to reassert Russian interests and protect future ventures in the "near abroad."

The centerpiece of obtaining these foreign policy objectives is the use of the CIS organization to weaken NATO's influence in the European security environment.³³⁰ Kozyrev, in an attempt to prevent CEE states from joining NATO, asks incredulously, as if CEE states have no historical memory:

We are not allergic to NATO, but we do not understand discussions to the effect that NATO must give security guarantees to the countries of Central Europe and, in the long term, take them in as members of the alliance. How are these states threatened and by whom?³³¹

According to Kaminski's authoritarian scenario,

³²⁹John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994.

³³⁰Andrei Kozyrev cited in Allen Lynch, p. 14.

³³¹Andrei Kozyrev quoted in *Diplomaticheskyy vestnik*, nos. 5-6, March 1993, originally cited by Suzanne Crow and presently cited by Allen Lynch, p. 14.

Russia may remain on good terms with the West while isolating and eventually subjugating the Ukraine to the point of forcing it to accept a 'federate' relationship. Meanwhile, it could try to isolate Central Europe in European politics. This development could be accepted by the West, as a 'second best' solution. From the point of view of central [E]uropean security concerns this would equal to another Yalta.³³²

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the foremost security institution used by Russia to reassert its influence in the "near abroad," particularly along its Southern flank. The CIS is the formal politico-military structure that Moscow has exploited to promote pro-Russian security policies. Simultaneously, Russia uses the CIS to balance NATO and Western influences in the Baltics and Central Europe. Suzanne Crow writes,

From the Russian perspective, the attempt to gain acceptance of the CIS as an international organization is an important defensive measure aimed a[t] preventing the deployment of other international forces for peacekeeping or peacemaking in what Russia considers its exclusive sphere of vital interests.³³³

This attempt to manipulate the CIS to offset NATO's authority is a debatable proposition. However, Adrian Karatnycky identified Moscow's intention to use the CIS organization to offer nuclear guarantees to former Soviet Republics (excluding the Baltics) and create an institution, similar to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace proposal, that imitates NATO programs and conducts peacekeeping and peacemaking operations under the aegis of a Russian-controlled security arrangement. Karatnycky writes,

In recent weeks, Russia and other former Soviet republics have pressed forward with plans to create a military alliance that mocks President Clinton's Partnership for Peace, doing precisely what that proposal was designed to avoid: creating new Eastern and Western blocs.³³⁴

³³²Antoni Z. Kaminski, p. 7. Kaminski's "authoritarian solution" is one of four possible outcomes of Russia's future towards a market economy. The others are: a "muddling through," an "autocratic regime" and "further disintegration."

³³³Suzanne Crow, 18 March 1994, pp. 37-38. Ms. Crow adds that through "peacekeeping" efforts, Russia is attempting to recapture its influence by maintaining military bases abroad. Therefore international recognition of the CIS would have the following implications: (1) The CIS would become an "organization of consequence in the world." (2) The CIS would serve as an "additional platform" for the promotion of Russian foreign policy objectives. (3) The CIS, pending UN and CSCE sanction, "would be given a free hand, plus funding and support, for the conduct of peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union...."

³³⁴Adrian Karatnycky, 30 August 1994, p. A 13. The author notes that a draft security proposal for the CIS, "calls for the eventual creation of joint armed forces, collective peacekeeping forces and a joint air

In effect, Russia hopes to gain international acceptance utilizing the CIS -- an organization made up of other former Soviet states but dominated by Russia -- to re-Russianize former Soviet republics. Russia is pursuing a Soviet-style domination strategy by stationing thousands of troops beyond its borders and maintaining 30 bases outside Russian territory.³³⁵ Russia is also conducting "peacekeeping operations" beyond its borders in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova in an effort to contain fighting and ensure Russian solutions. By giving legitimacy to the CIS as an international organization, the world community would be granting Russia *de facto* permission to conduct Russian foreign policy under the guise of the CIS along its Southern periphery. Therefore it is quite difficult to distinguish legitimate Russian security concerns from historical imperial designs on "lost" territory. Estonia's President, Lennart Meri looks at the CIS as less of a collective defense organization and more of a Russian attempt to reassert itself in its so-called "near abroad." President Meri suggested that,

In intra-CIS disputes ranging from Moldova through the Caucasus to Tajikistan, the intervention of Russian Federation troops may have exacerbated armed conflict or may have aggravated already existing tensions to the detriment of overall stability. This does not sound like collective defence to Estonia.³³⁶

The CIS was initially designed to be a common association of former Soviet republics sharing a common military infrastructure and common consumer supply; it has become apparent that Russia will dominate the institution's purpose and activities. Specifically, Russia, has successfully pushed through its initiatives using "peacekeeping" and CIS legitimacy as its international sanction. Russia will continue to use the CIS to gain international sanction for operations along its perimeter, and most importantly to reestablish a balance of influence and power against the Atlantic Alliance. However, taken *in toto*, the manipulation of the CIS -- if unchallenged by the West and NATO -- represents an acquiescence to Russia conducting affairs as it sees fit, where it sees fit. The disparity between what the West views as peacekeeping and what the Russians

defense system. In short it seeks to restore a cohesive, coordinated military force under unified protection -- a defense arrangement resembling that of the Soviet Union."

³³⁵Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, pp. 2-3. Crow writes, "But substantive actions, in addition to more nationalistic posturing and rhetoric, are also features of the new foreign-policy approach...Moscow's progress toward maintaining or establishing some thirty military bases on the territory of the newly independent states, Russia's promotion of itself as the first among equals in the...CIS, and its increasing emphasis on the protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the former Soviet republics."

³³⁶Lennart Meri, p. 9.

regard it as is striking. Therese Raphael points out that the Russian word for "peacekeeping" missions "*mirotvorchestvo*,"

...literally means 'peace creating,' or what the West calls peacemaking. When the Red Army 'secured' Central Europe after World War II, it was called *mirotvorchestvo*. This is settlement through force. These 'peacekeeping' missions may be run under the banner of the C.I.S., but almost all peacekeeping troops are Russian, and there is little enthusiasm from the other members for the engagement.³³⁷

In using the CIS to go southward, Russia has displayed a willingness to exert influence to effect a positive "Russian" outcome. "Encouraging Russia to be the only peacemaker in the former Soviet Union weakens prospects for its political and economic recovery...."³³⁸ Obviously balancing against NATO and Western institutions does not necessarily have to take the form of weapon and manpower parity. Instead, NATO is seen as an instrument of political influence in addition to its military functions. Though balancing is not in itself a deliberate attempt to coerce neighbors, it suggests a willingness to assemble a conglomeration of resources against another power (NATO) for some substantive purpose.

If Russia uses the CIS to assemble multiple states under its nuclear guarantee, where does it draw its Western-most borders? Such, a balance between CIS and NATO leaves Central Europe in a gray area -- a modern day *cordon sanitaire*. The act of balancing a Russian-led CIS against NATO to resolve political ambiguities in itself does not increase a threat. The danger comes from a future Russian leader or the current Russian leaders adopting policies that use the CIS organization to coerce smaller states beyond its immediate influence (i.e., the Baltics and Poland) and the West cedes this area to Russia in deference to Russian strategic interests.

The Russians have joined PfP with a special status more elevated than that of their former satellites in CEE and the former Soviet republics.³³⁹ The specific reasons for lobbying for a "special role" and joining the PfP initiative were articulated by Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin. He said joining PfP would enable Russia to: "influence NATO decision-making, so as to avoid unpleasant surprises such as the organization's

³³⁷Therese Raphael, 22 June 1994.

³³⁸Dr. Andrezj Olechowski, p. 11.

³³⁹Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 35. "Throughout negotiations with NATO on Partnership for Peace, Russia pressed for recognition of its special status -- the more formal, the better. It returned time and again to the theme that it should be treated commensurate with its status as a great power...Basically, Russia wants a say equal to NATO's in European security matters."

ultimatum on Sarajevo;" stimulate modernization of the Russian armed forces; and enhance cooperation between NATO and the CIS.³⁴⁰ Alliance members did not grant Russia the "special relationship" it was seeking, but Russia did receive a concession for more consultation. One defense correspondent wrote that the foundation of "Moscow's extra security relationship with the West will be founded on an idea proposed by Douglas Hurd...he suggested...no veto (by Moscow), no surprises (by Nato) and substantive co-operation'."³⁴¹ Russia's desire to obtain a veto over NATO military and political decisions worried many NATO officials who thought this would lead to obstructionism. This fear was realized at the June 9, 1994 Istanbul meeting of the North Atlantic Council. According to a NATO diplomat,

...the Russians 'used their elbows' to prevent any reference in the final statement to the possibility that the Partnership for Peace program would lead to NATO membership. One senior NATO diplomat was disgusted: 'It was a pretty bloody affair. It was absolutely a Soviet exercise, a disastrous performance by the Russians, and it does not augur well'.³⁴²

The dispute since January 1994 over a special role accorded to Russia as payment for its participation in the Partnership for Peace activity is obviously seen by Central and Eastern Europeans as a tactic to dilute NATO. The president of Estonia, Lennart Meri wrote that,

If last December's parliamentary elections in Russia are any indication, however, it may take longer than we would hope to establish in Russia the kind of domestic political culture consistent with NATO PFP standards. Above all, NATO cannot afford to accord a 'special role' to any state in which election results could alter the very direction of democratic change. To do so would not only weaken the Alliance, but would also call into question an axiom of collective security, namely that democracies tend not to go to war among themselves.³⁴³

On one hand, Russia is building up the CIS. On the other, it would like to subordinate the CIS and NATO to the CSCE in order to lessen the power of NATO and receive monetary compensation for actions in its "near abroad." Kozyrev proposed that the "CSCE should be aimed at coordinating activities of the NATO, the European Union,

³⁴⁰Churkin quoted in *Radio Mayak*, 2 April 1994 and cited by Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 42.

³⁴¹Michael Evans, 22 June 1994.

³⁴²Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 45.

³⁴³Lennart Meri, p. 8.

the Council of Europe, the WEU and the CIS."³⁴⁴ Secondly, the Russians want NATO and the CIS to jointly administer Central and Eastern Europe.³⁴⁵ Kaminski claims that the goal of Russia is to,

...keep NATO away from Central Europe while bringing its own defence arrangements [including the Kaliningrad enclave] as close to it as possible. Thus, even facing a catastrophe, Russia may seem to follow its old strategy of using Western resources [to] pursue its struggle with the West.³⁴⁶

One additional way in which the Russian Foreign Minister has repeatedly tried to nullify NATO is his reference to the CSCE as the institution which "won the Cold War."³⁴⁷ These initiatives accomplish two goals. First, Kozyrev's revision of history soothes the psyches of Russians who may have felt they lost the Cold War to the West. Second, it suggests that NATO has been a marginal institution since its inception. If this was true, why is it that Kozyrev and Yeltsin seem so worried about NATO's role in European security matters?

Finally, by subordinating NATO and reasserting Russian interests throughout the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has made the Yugoslav crisis an arena in which to exercise its regained influence.³⁴⁸ Moscow's membership in the "contact group" (Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany) as well as its intervention in February 1994 on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs are indications that it is serious about regaining lost influence in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁴⁹ Many

³⁴⁴Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO...", pp. 3 & 5. In addition to subordinating NATO and the CIS, Kozyrev is brash enough to expect NATO to pay for Russian-led "peacekeeping operations." He suggests, "a possible contribution by our NACC partners to financing peacekeeping efforts by Russia and her CIS partners. Our Western partners could cover a part of expenses for logistical back-up and training of our peacekeeping units."

³⁴⁵Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 36.

³⁴⁶Antoni Kaminski, p. 8.

³⁴⁷Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO....", p. 3.

³⁴⁸Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 36. "Bosnia provides the stage on which Russia's and NATO's role in the emerging security order are played out." Russia's "success in securing the withdrawal of the Serbian heavy artillery from around Sarajevo after the NATO ultimatum in February seemed to confirm...[Russia's special status]...."

³⁴⁹Allen Lynch, p. 10. Lynch writes that, "By interceding on behalf of the Serbian cause and announcing the dispatch of Russian 'peacekeeping' units to Sarajevo, Russia has for the moment achieved a level of influence in the former Yugoslavia that had been denied the USSR after Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin severed links in 1948...Russia and the West seem to be exercising equal influence...."

observers believe Russia's involvement in the Yugoslav war since mid-1992 and its conduct in the "near abroad" foreshadowed, "the rapid resurgence of Russian interest in Eastern Europe since mid 1993."³⁵⁰ John Maresca's reflections about the Russian proposal in Istanbul in June 1994 are noteworthy in this regard. He writes that Russia's new collective security proposition to meet each foreign policy objective,

...would subordinate NATO to the CSCE, thus giving Moscow a veto over NATO actions through the CSCE's consensus procedures and giving Russia the right to be consulted on issues of concern. It also entailed recognition of the Russian dominated...(C.I.S.)...The consistency between the Russian proposals in the CSCE and their previous effort at NATO suggests the main objectives of Moscow's new European policy: to establish the CSCE where they have a veto as the most authoritative body in Europe; to give Russia a privileged role in that group; to achieve acceptance of the Russian dominated C.I.S. as a legitimate international organization and to obtain international blessing and financing for Russia's 'peacekeeping' role in the former Soviet space.³⁵¹

The proposal put forth is that several "Russian risks" still pose security problems for Central and Eastern Europe and NATO. This assessment is based upon several illustrations of Russia's foreign policy being dictated by an increasingly conservative-nationalistic posture. In its relations with its former satellites and former Soviet republics, Russia has displayed a willingness to reaffirm its historical role. In the end, CEE states perceive a Russian risk because the objectives and initiatives of Russia's current foreign policy are guided by domestic circumstances that require an aggressive approach. The increasingly nationalistic tone of the political and military officials serves as a divisive factor with respect to Russian relations with Central and Eastern Europe. Fiona Hill writes,

Russia has a clear but unstated motive for all of these interventions: to reassert control of its former empire. Because of its economic problems, Russia cannot afford the burden of financially supporting its empire, as it has done in the past. Similarly, a weakened Russian Army (and guaranteed Western opposition)

³⁵⁰Allen Lynch, p. 11. Citing Suzanne Crow in the *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 50, 17 December 1993, Lynch adds that Russia's diplomacy in Bosnia "reflects a broader effort by Russia to reclaim part of the Soviet Union's foreign-policy mantle in Eastern Europe as well as along the borders of the Russian Federation."

³⁵¹John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994.

precludes it from using the military to forcibly reconquer the region. Instead, Russia has discovered that exploiting existing regional conflicts and grievances is a very cost effective and convenient way of destabilizing its neighbors and quickly reestablishing Moscow's authority.³⁵²

³⁵²Fiona Hill, p. 86

VI. A PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO ACCELERATE MEMBERSHIP IN NATO: GUIDELINES FOR POLISH MEMBERSHIP

With all of the discussion concerning the expansion of NATO, it seems fair to speak briefly about the numerous steps that must be undertaken by Central and Eastern European countries that want NATO membership.

- – Acceptance of current borders
- –Peaceful resolution of disputes
- –Equal treatment to all minorities
- –Fair elections with democratic transfer of power
- –Civilian control of the military
- –Cooperation of security policies with neighbors
- –Publicly disclosed defense budgets
- –Reconstruction of territorial defense-(updated and integrated weaponry and military doctrine)

Based on these several well-established criteria, Poland is the most qualified applicant to join NATO. However, these countries' expectations for inclusion into the Atlantic Alliance have been met with stiff opposition throughout NATO. Of primary concern to NATO planners and leaders is the prospect of offering security guarantees to Central European countries that have been ruled by proxy from Moscow. Furthermore, these security guarantees would promise a nuclear umbrella and the prospect of stationing troops that would border Russian territory. Along with these geopolitical concerns, the tactical considerations for a greater NATO would be costly, requiring great expenditures to modernize every aspect of the Polish and Czech defense establishments. The Czech Republic has taken substantive steps towards meeting requirements for inclusion in the NATO Alliance, pledging a one percent budget deficit to finance much-needed military improvements to bring them up to NATO standards.³⁵³

Another problem for these two countries was the action of President Yeltsin. In August 1993, he said that Russia had no objections to Poland joining NATO. Later, he rescinded his statement, sending letters to the American President and other Western leaders claiming that Russia could not support NATO expansion unless Russia was also asked to join. Analysts widely believe that Yeltsin was forced to take back his

³⁵³Jane Perlez, 11 January 1994, p. A 6. Ms. Perlez notes that the "Czech Republic's defense budget will rise 12 percent" to over \$1 billion annually in 1994.

statements by conservative military leaders for whose support he counted on prior to the October purge of Russian extremists in parliament. As the official spokesman for Polish foreign policy, Lech Walesa has been very critical of a lack of Western resolve to incorporate Poland into NATO or even the European Union. Though some positive steps have been taken on the latter, Polish leaders are neither happy with nor satisfied with the hollow Partnership for Peace initiative. Lech Walesa recently remarked that along with the Partnership for Peace proposal,

There is Russia, which threatens; there is the organized West, which is afraid, and there are those of us in the middle who say: there's nothing to be afraid of, one should only try to increase the potential of Western Europe, both physically and technically.³⁵⁴

A. ADHERENCE TO NATO'S GENERAL PREREQUISITES

One of the dilemmas of enlargement is the issue over whether or not NATO should delineate specific criteria for future members. To do so, some NATO observers believe, would deal a blow to the legitimacy of Article 10. The rationale goes that establishing criteria would leave NATO open to two outcomes: (1) Countries that NATO might not want to join the Alliance might complete all requirements for membership and demand an invitation. (2) Countries that NATO prefer to be let in would be unable to fulfill the requirements and be prevented from joining. In reality, most observers believe requirements should and will be issued but that attainment of such criteria would not make such countries automatic members. The theory is that the decision to allow new members to join under Article 10 will be a political one, made at the highest levels of government without regard to a country's attainment of specific criteria. However, it remains well within the purview of NATO and any ambitious CEE states to adequately prepare one's country for eventual membership by vigorously attending to the four most touted tenets: Civilian control of the military, economic stability and infrastructure improvements, military force adaptability and economic stability. Though NATO will be most likely forced into conceding a set of specific criteria for CEE states, Poland would benefit from improving in these four areas.

1. Civil-Military Relations Similar to NATO Members

Poland still has a relatively long way towards establishing civilian control of its military forces to anything remotely resembling that of Western Europe. To say that the "civilian" defense minister merely exchanges his uniform with a suit is qualification for

³⁵⁴Jane Perlez, 11 January 1994, p. A 6.

civilian control is ludicrous. An additional problem however, is that Poland has a lack of experienced civilian leaders in defense matters. Generally speaking, Communist countries kept their military knowledgeable elite within the confines of military leaders. The most recent sacking of the Defense Minister, Kolodziejczyk, is indicative of the ambiguity of the constitutional powers between the president and prime minister. The sacking of the civilian minister, prompted in part by the military's dissatisfaction, also illustrated the dominance the Polish General Staff. Moreover, it displayed a failure of politicians and military officers to resolve the civil-military conflicts.

The Economist, in a recent survey of Poland, concluded that the current constitution is a revised version of the 1952 Stalinist model.³⁵⁵ Presently, the stop-gap constitution called the "small-constitution" has yet to resolve the critical issue of who has jurisdiction over the maintenance of the military assets. Polish military leaders have found it difficult adjusting to the new "democratic" norms of post-Communist society. During the Cold War, military officials requested a set amount of money based on their projected budget and were rarely turned down for their requests. With a freely-elected parliament, Polish military officials are forced to justify their expenditures and defend ongoing projects to parliamentarians with little or no experience in military matters. The problem of an out-of-date constitution is that it pits the pro-president military against the anti-military parliament. Furthermore, the absence of a mechanism for a systematic yearly budgetary policy, a lack of resources, a mistrust of the military by the *Sejm* and a group of parliamentarians tasked with overseeing military projects they do not understand lead to a precarious situation. All of this friction creates democratic instability and distrust that inevitably leads to a decline of the military's effectiveness. The Polish defense minister in a televised interview in March 1994 concluded:

What happened to the Armed Forces' budget this year [sharply decreased] smacks of a scandal. There occurred far-reaching interference by the legislative branch with the powers of the executive branch. That is unacceptable. If the [defense] ministry's chief is supposed to bear constitutional responsibility for the Armed Forces' readiness and the readiness of the country's defense system, one must not tie his hands with decisions on where and how money should be spent because this way one will not succeed in creating anything that would make sense or be a logical whole.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵"A Survey of Poland." *The Economist*, April 16, 1994, p. 13.

³⁵⁶Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk appearing on Polish national television, 26 March 1994. Some Western observers might claim that the process Kolodziejczyk loathes is an inherent part of any functioning democratic system. His underlying criticism focuses on the lack of clearly defined authority roles and the

Additionally, Poland's defense minister agrees that the *Sejm* is dominated by a coalition of parties opposed to the President, there is no clear delineation of budgetary authority. The competing claims of budgetary authority is characterized as, the coalition regards the Defense Ministry as the President's protectorate, one part of parliament regards it as under the control of the coalition, another faction sees it as "representative of the old, postcommunist military cadre."³⁵⁷ Kolodziejczyk added that,

...putting in order the legal framework for the Defense Ministry's functioning, and also of the General Staff...requires great effort and is a very urgent issue...in the eyes of the West, we may well be perceived as [a military] that failed to accomplish anything in terms of reform because it continues to be headed by a minister with powers provided for by a 1967 law....³⁵⁸

2. Military Force Adaptability & Armed Forces Transparency

Military force adaptability -- what is often times referred to as "interoperability" - is a goal the Poles should strive to attain, even though NATO has failed to achieve complete or even partial interoperability among its members. Most experts agree that the first step to interoperability and the most critical factor in Poland's successful accession into NATO is the ability to communicate between forces. At the basic level, this means having the capability to speak the same language as NATO forces (English, French and German as primary languages). Secondly, it requires Poland to purchase, lease, and obtain by any means, communications equipment that will allow its forces to communicate in non-secure and secure environments. Attempting to obtain NATO armaments, aircraft and heavy weapons will be a long process regardless of Poland's time frame for membership. Outfitting airfields, port facilities and military bases with NATO standard fixtures will also be a gradual progression. In the interim, Poland must continue to stress the basics: communications equipment and language skills.

absence of responsibility for the authorization and appropriation of the defense budget. In this sense his frustration is illustrative of the Polish military's desire to resolve the constitutional question and get on with the task of rebuilding the military and integrating with NATO.

³⁵⁷Marek Henzler and Marek Ostrowski, p. 7. Kolodziejczyk stated that, "When it comes to parliamentary opposition, they exploit some decisions that are made, for the purpose of political games and making excessive complaints...[T]he military, without its own will or guilt, was maneuvered into a dispute about the country's political system. The debate on the structure of managing the country's defense system must lead to a preliminary solution...."

³⁵⁸Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk appearing on Polish national television, 26 March 1994. The minister stated that he expected the *Sejm* to, "make a decision on reaching a certain fixed level of GDP within a set time limit, to be spent on the defense budget, and that, thanks to that, we will be able to arrange our implementation potential in a way that would make sense, taking into account our financial capabilities."

The term interoperability, though vague, can be defined generally as the ability of one force to have the capability to talk with another. Whether or not this translates to common armaments and machines is not so much the issue since NATO itself has never achieved perfect interoperability between the sixteen members. A successful communications effort in interoperability between multinational forces, the Allied operation during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, proved that communicating between national forces can be achieved. Robert Staley writes,

Multinational command, control, and communications was made as effective as possible through the use of Secure Telephone Units (STUs), personal computers, fax machines, shared national and commercial satellite resources, and the exchange of liaison teams to overcome language and technological problems...But communicating with Soviet...vessels could be accomplished only by International Mobile Maritime VHF voice links and visual signaling.³⁵⁹

At the most basic level, language education is the foundation for any armed forces to achieve interoperability. Reportedly, the Poles are emphasizing a number of Western European language courses to be set up for military personnel. Informed sources suggest that among other proposals, Poland will establish programs in order to meet the long-term demand for more qualified Western language fluency:

- Language and specialist training of military and civilian personnel;
- 3-month long language courses in Poland (200 persons);
- 6-month long language courses in Poland (100 persons);
- 4-month long courses abroad for English language instructors (60 persons).

The general feeling among western naval experts during the recent Baltops '94 was that Polish naval personnel had an adequate grasp of English, and what they lacked in English skills they made up for in diligent efforts. To be sure, Poles had enough personnel qualified to carry out basic communications drills to operate with thirty-five other naval vessels during Baltops '94. The *modus operandi* for communication amongst the Baltops '94 participants was accomplished via a modified version of VHF, bridge-to-bridge basic communications. This will no doubt change with an infusion of inexpensive commercial and western communications. Acquisition of satellite communications and encrypted systems have not yet been discussed, at least not at an unclassified level. NATO's Conference Armament Directors (CNAD) will be one of many instruments used by the Atlantic Alliance to enhance Central European interoperability. CNAD meetings,

³⁵⁹"Gulf: Mines a Major Problem," cited by Robert S. Staley II, pp. 48-49.

...examined the equipment implications of peacekeeping operations, procurement collaboration with the former Warsaw Pact members now associated with NATO in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP)...Poland [has already received] NATO documents on standardization and quality assurance...participating in workshops on topics such as communications and data handling.³⁶⁰

Both programs have been devised to forge closer cooperation, consultation and integration of former-Warsaw Treaty Organization members.

3. Economic Stability

Maintaining and improving the Polish economy is one of the most critical aspects of Poland's attempt to join western institutions including most importantly, NATO. In order to integrate Central and Eastern countries into western institutions, Alliance declarations have underlined the importance of converting the centralized economy to a market-based economy. The foundations of any thriving market-economy, so goes the current wisdom, is to vigorously enforce low inflation and unemployment rates, privatize state-owned enterprises and increase foreign investment. All of these reforms would theoretically occur in an atmosphere conducive to free-market reforms through the implementation of institutional and legal reforms.

Carrying out reforms to ensure low inflation rates has been the cornerstone of Poland's economic recovery. The main tenets of this effort to harness triple digit inflation rates include: tightening the money supply and terminating state subsidies. Preventing double-digit unemployment rates has been the hardest task for Polish economic planners. In September 1994, *The Economist* wrote that,

More than half of Poland's GDP is produced by the private sector, which employs six out of ten people. Growth last year was 4% and is likely to be 4.5% this year. Exports are booming, up, on central-bank figures, almost 20% in the first half of this year compared with the same period last year, with well over half going to the European Union. Even unemployment has stabilised at around 16% -- still too high, but lower than Spain and not much more than in Belgium...Half the value of debts to western governments was written off three years ago..."London Club" of bank creditors will nearly halve the value of commercial-bank debt [14 September]...Despite progress, the Polish economy is only precariously stable and its transformation is incomplete. Inflation is still too high. The goal for this year is to get annual price increases below 24%, which is bad enough.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰*Jane's Defense Weekly*, 14 May 1994, p. 18.

The Catch-22 arises when inefficient state-run enterprises are closed because of their poor performance while workers are laid off. Poland, unlike the Czech Republic, conducted "Big Bang" economic measures in the late 1980's. As a result, unemployment rates have remained between 12% and 17% for the past few years. This has the effect of creating an aura of unease among Poland's working force. Most economists, however, feel that by conducting bold economic measures up front, Poland has staved off an inevitable long-term malaise associated with maintaining inefficient industries.

The Economist also mentioned that Poland was indeed assisted by the PHARE Project (Polish-Hungarian Assistance Recovery) and that PHARE helped finance the multitude of foreign law firms and banking institutions needed to help Poland privatize. In any event, Poland's "Big Bang" shock therapy and the resulting four factors of transformation have been instrumental in sparking an economic turnaround in only five years. This approach seems to be the most promising for Poland's economic future and one of a plethora of positive steps taken to assist in its bid for NATO membership and full European Union membership.

NATO members and Western European institutions have encouraged Poland to undertake legal reforms to encourage foreign investment. However, there is a substantial segment of the Polish *Sejm* that fears foreign investment will lead to the foreign ownership of Polish business and submit Poland to the whims of foreign investors. Western European leaders contend, however, that the majority of Western aid will come not in the form of grants but foreign investment and business ventures. In order for market-reform measures to take hold in Poland, legal and constitutional reforms must be institutionalized in order to ensure standardization throughout the economy. Legal reforms must take the form of laws and codes designed to encourage market economy. The key reason that the economic sector is discussed so thoroughly with regard to Poland's entry into NATO is the relation between a good economy and a stable, democratic alliance member. *The Economist* also observed that,

Privatisation -- slow to begin if you compare Poland with the Czech Republic or Russia -- has slowed further under the new government...two big problems have emerged. First, Mr Kolodko [Poland's finance minister] is too keen on the state interfering in the running of businesses...The second problem is the Peasant Party...[it] is openly hostile to privatisation...These two problems will not only slow Poland's economic transformation, but could also threaten its precarious macroeconomic stability.³⁶²

³⁶¹*The Economist*, 3 September 1994, p. 52.

One cannot look just solely at military improvements nor political attempts at reform without taking into account the nature of Poland's economy. Additionally, the necessity to finalize a post-war constitution is a necessity not only in defining the clear roles of the executive and the legislative branches as they apply to civil-military relations but also how the constitution supports free markets and the emergence of a capitalist class. Finally, an in-depth look at Poland's economy is essential because of the Catch-22 that Polish leaders must deal with regarding the perseverance of an improving economy and defense spending adequate enough to convince NATO officials of the Polish military's willingness to westernize its forces.

4. Infrastructure Improvements

Before Poland can answer the most pressing questions of NATO integration, the issue of cleaning up the environmental waste left by fifty years of poor Communist industrial practices must be addressed. The task of cleaning up polluted bases where former-Warsaw Pact troops were stationed will cost billions of dollars over the next twenty years. Thousands of chemical and biological weapons as well as the by-products of nuclear weapons were improperly handled and stored and now pose a serious threat to the health of Central Europeans, especially the Poles. Recent discoveries uncovered abandoned chemical and biological warfare weapons haphazardly disposed of and buried on the site of former-Soviet military installations. These weapons once buried have begun to leak and have leached into the soil and the underground aquifers of Poland. This problem presents a risk to any NATO forces either stationed in Poland or conducting exercises in areas contaminated with hazardous materials. Again, this problem must figure into the final political calculus for allowing Poland and other CEE countries membership in NATO. The problem poses a few questions: First, will complete cleanup be required before Poland can gain admittance? Second, taking into account that Poland's economic recovery could not handle the full financial burden associated with full cleanup, will NATO nations be required to pay the lion's share of the costs? Third, will NATO troops be billeted or required to conduct exercises in the vicinity of known hazardous dumps? In light of these questions, NATO officials have already begun efforts to assist in the cleanup.

NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, Dr. Jean-Marie Cadiou writes that the, "heavily polluted military sites formerly occupied by Soviet troops [are]...located very close to urban areas." Furthermore, the high levels "of soil and groundwater contamination...[are a result] of the seepage of chemical

³⁶²*The Economist*, 3 September 1994, pp. 52-53.

weapons or radioactive materials."³⁶³ Only the most serious accidents have yet to be addressed because of the vast extent of the problem and the lack of money and trained personnel necessary to conduct a proper cleanup. Though everyone involved in the cleanup effort considers the CEE problem to be a disaster, to date, only modest sums of financial support from Western countries have been forthcoming. Not surprisingly, the area's worst polluter, (the former-Soviet Union) has offered neither money nor trained personnel to assist in the cleanup. Most of the information regarding these specific cleanup efforts remains classified because of the possibility of political repercussions as a result of revelations that aquifers are radiated or that agricultural land is contaminated. The two most prominent international organizations that have provided most of the financing and technical support for cleanup are NATO and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Some of the more prominent chemicals found in great quantities in the soil, water and air are: airborne particulate matter by-products (ammonia, nickel, cobalt, beryl, lead, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen chloride, lead aerosols, phenol, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carcinogenic benzopyrene, cadmium, fluorine gas and hydrofluoric acid). Waterborne pollutants consist namely of the by-products of raw sewage, mercury, formaldehyde, nitrates associated with livestock manure, and a plethora of dissolved and suspended pesticide solids. Ron Taylor writes that in Poland lead levels in apples and lettuce exceed United Nations health standards by a factor of 10. Over half of Poland's river water is too acidic for industrial use.³⁶⁴

The problem for Poland again is that it lacks the allocation of capital and money to commence a comprehensive cleanup of its polluted areas. The dilemma of developing less environmentally damaging energy sources is neither cheap nor within the strict cost outlays of an emerging economic reform package. Therefore, if NATO does expand east before the cleanup is complete, it can expect to import higher rates of mortality, birth defects, lung ailment and overall physical maladies in greater numbers than currently occur throughout North American and Western European populations. Georgii Golitsyn, vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, detailed a categorization of the link between pollutants and public-health hazards:

³⁶³Dr. Jean-Marie Cadiou, p. 33.

³⁶⁴Ron Taylor, p. 18.

- **Phenol, formaldehyde, sodium dioxide and hydrogen sulfide-**
- circulatory illnesses, respiratory and digestive tract diseases;
- **Particulates, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide-**
- respiratory, skin, heart and blood vessel diseases;
- **Benzopyrene (one of the most toxic substances known to exist)-**
- major carcinogen related to numerous forms of cancer;
- **Various chemicals-**
- cadmium-thinning of the bones;
- fluoride-thickening of the bones;
- lead-anemia and mental retardation;
- organic solvents-lower IQ's and liver disease;
- **Heavy metals-**
- immune system disorders.³⁶⁵

For Poland, the most challenging aspect of correcting their environmental disasters is in forming agreeable policies that accumulate capital and monetary grants, as well as trained personnel to lead the cleanup. Their task must be further clarified by a two-step approach: First, how to clean up the waste that currently exists. Second, how to create post-Communist industrial complexes without adding substantial amounts of pollution. NATO's Science Committee and the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, the European Union's "Polish and Hungarian Assistance for the Reconstruction of Europe (PHARE) and the International Atomic Energy Association have all begun to address the most pressing ecological questions. A recently sponsored NATO pilot study: "Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-related Installation and Activities" evaluated the problems, "caused by the discharge of radioactive as well as hazardous chemical waste into a number of land-locked seas and their drainage areas."³⁶⁶

B. USE OF NAVAL AND LAND FORCES TO EXPEDITE WESTERN INTEGRATION

The former-Warsaw Pact countries that share the Baltic Sea as an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean have all begun a transformation of their naval forces in response to the end of the Cold War. Among the most formidable naval forces was the combination of

³⁶⁵Georgii Golitsyn, pp. 39-40.

³⁶⁶NATO Review, April 1993, p. 34.

Soviet Baltic fleet assets and Warsaw Pact units, that were stationed from Leningrad to ports in East Germany. The members of the Warsaw Treaty used their naval assets in the Baltic Sea in order to protect the Northern flank of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union from invasion.

The former Warsaw Pact navies, bereft of the support mission to the Soviet theater offensive strategy that shaped their forces, are trying to deal with block obsolescence of their naval technology, a lack of budgetary support, a need to enunciate a new mission, and a desire to establish alliances or bilateral contacts with the West -- all at the same time. These small and generally obsolescent navies are reconfiguring for coastal defense and economic exclusion zone policing missions...[T]he major units (corvettes and submarines) of the Eastern European navies will probably not be very active in the next few years due to the cost of operating them, and they are unlikely to be replaced due to the marginal economic situation in Eastern Europe that leaves few funds available for military acquisitions.³⁶⁷

Both the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet coup in 1991 forced a fundamental restructuring of naval forces throughout the Baltic region. From 1991 to the present-day, Russia, the three Baltic states, Poland, Sweden and Finland have all implemented policies to reduce and restructure their naval forces. NATO members, in accordance with declarations made in London and Rome, instituted precepts of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept that fundamentally altered the way NATO viewed the Soviet Union and its former-Eastern European satellites. NATO's London and Rome Declarations and the New Strategic Concept stated that the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe would no longer be regarded as hostile. The intention of the Atlantic Alliance would be to convert from large, cumbersome, function-specific forces of the Cold War to highly mobile, versatile weaponry and strategies that could better accommodate defending against more diverse threats.

The fundamental absence of a clearly defined threat -- like the one that existed during the Cold War -- has altered the maritime security in the Baltic region. The significance to the United States, NATO and Western Europe is the relationship between what the Polish navy wants and what resources it will need to achieve its goals. Poland is modifying its naval missions and force structure to defend the coast and eventually use the navy as a conduit to forge closer integration with western security institutions. This change in the size and mission of the Polish navy will alter the European security balance as well as the Baltic regional balance.

³⁶⁷*Director of Naval Intelligence Posture Statement 1994*, p. 7.

The West will play a large role in assisting Poland to achieve this naval revival by furnishing money, technical support and equipment and technical expertise. The poor material condition of Poland's fleet and the absence of predictable budgetary funding makes the execution of a naval doctrine and new force structure much more difficult. In order to justify its future existence, Polish naval leaders are left trying to define new military and political missions that will ensure the Polish navy's survival into the next century. Poland's efforts to convert its state-run economy to a market economy has forced the Polish parliament to divert most government resources to the most critical parts of society.

The Polish navy has undertaken several measures to promote justification for the maritime service with a coastal defense mission and as a participant in future multinational naval operations. Polish naval officials hope that by engaging the navy in cooperative naval exercises with European states and NATO members, the navy can help Poland attain membership in European institutions faster. Therefore, the revitalization of the Polish navy can be viewed as both a military function of providing immediate security along Poland's coast as well as providing numerous political benefits associated with closer state-to-state relations. In the absence of an existential threat, uncertainty and more diffuse threats have become the substitute. Ken Booth states,

The reduced risk of East-West conflict has made clearer the extent to which the daily lives of people in many parts of the world are threatened by economic instability, political oppression, terrorism, drugs, refugees, and the spread of modern weaponry to the Third World.³⁶⁸

Since 1991, the Polish navy's two main tasks have been to address the navy's role as a coastal defense force and make preparations to become part of NATO's integrated command. Poland's current maritime issues are: reassembling their navy without Soviet-era ships, reorienting the naval strategy away from the Warsaw Pact doctrine, establishing a credible coastal defense to protect its coast while simultaneously promoting security in the Baltic region and using the navy to facilitate Poland's membership in European institutions. As with any successful club, Poland, in order to become a member in NATO, must prove that it offers tangible benefits to an alliance. Baltic regional security will be fundamentally altered by a renovated Polish navy. Poland's contribution to a wide range of regional and international naval operations significantly benefits collective security agreements. The transition of Poland's navy

³⁶⁸Ken Booth. "The Role of Navies in Peacetime: The Influence of Future History on Sea Power," p. 151.

concerns the United States, NATO and Europe because the resources (material, financial and technical expertise) necessary to upgrade Poland's naval forces and integrate the forces and policy along Western European and NATO standards will come from Western nations.

The regional stability in the Baltic area will be considerably altered with a revamped Polish navy. On the positive side, a vibrant Polish navy can be an asset to multinational operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the WEU. To be sure, Poland continues to upgrade and modernize its navy by acquisitions of not only American technology and weaponry but also arms from other western European nations. This is not to say that Polish land forces, currently participating in several United Nations operations, cannot also be used to help speed up western integration. The use of naval forces is advocated as a means of providing coastal defense and also as a cost-effective, highly visible avenue for entry into western defense institutions.

As Polish naval leaders attempt to bring naval standards in line with NATO requirements, there is an increasing urgency to defend their annual budget outlays from a parliament increasingly seen as hostile to the armed forces. The need therefore to redefine military forces and naval forces in particular is especially relevant for Poland. This dynamic has occurred namely as a result of the tight fiscal policy Poland has been forced to carry out in order to bring its economy in line with western European free-markets. Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister, Robert Mroziewicz, stated that Poland's goal was to, "make our defense system fully compatible with NATO standards," in order to gain full membership by the year 2000. Additionally, Poles were to expend 250 billion *zlotys* (approximately 10 million dollars) on "Partnership" activities and maintenance of their mission at NATO headquarters.³⁶⁹

The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1989-1990 spelled the certain end of the postwar Soviet military presence in Europe...Military retrenchment was accompanied by political and diplomatic withdrawals and adjustments as well.³⁷⁰

The cataclysmic events occurring over such a short period of time have created a degree of uncertainty and thus instability. Certainly there was no place where this was more true than the Baltic region. The precipitous demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the WTO in turn caused a security vacuum where Central and Eastern European states occupy a strategic no-man's land between Western Europe and Russia.

³⁶⁹Mroziewicz cited by Edward Krzemien, p. 8.

³⁷⁰James Lacey, p. 65.

"Overnight, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact found themselves without any concept of their own security policies."³⁷¹ While each of these countries is attempting to fundamentally transform their economy from a highly centralized command economy to a market one, fewer and fewer resources have been made available to revamp the outdated military. Herein lies the dilemma: Poland is required to adhere to strict budgetary policies in order to satisfy requirements for western loans, grants and financial aid. Simultaneously, this tight fiscal policy prevents government expenditures on military forces that are required by western military officials to spend a required percentage (1-3 percent) of the GDP on defense. Failure of military leaders to comply leaves western officials skeptical about the Polish military's willingness to gain membership in NATO. The Polish navy during its years in the Warsaw Pact was characterized as composed of Soviet ships with a heavy emphasis on mine warfare and amphibious operations. The 1994 country study of Poland noted that,

During both the communist and post communist eras, the Polish navy received less emphasis and funding than other combat branches. Because the Polish navy usually purchased the simplest and cheapest equipment offered by the Soviet Union, all other navies on the Baltic Sea were considered superior to Poland's.³⁷²

Since 1991, the two warfare areas of the naval forces (amphibious craft and minelaying vessels) that Poland had invested much of its naval budget in was deemphasized. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Poland's *raison d'être* (conducting amphibious and mine warfare operations) vanished and there no longer seemed to be a political will or the economic resources to encourage its existence into the 1990's. In an effort to prevent obsolescence, Polish naval leaders attempted to restructure what remains of their forces. Primarily, the amphibious naval assets and minelaying vessels to be used in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe have been phased out. Second, large surface combatant ships have been eliminated in favor of smaller, more agile coastal patrol craft and fast attack craft. Third, auxiliary units have been dramatically downsized to provide limited resources to the remaining combat-ready vessels. Even with a much smaller fleet, Poland is in the early stages of seeking out missions to justify its continued presence.

³⁷¹Piotr Kolodziejczyk in an interview conducted in July 1994, by Marek Henzler and Marek Ostrowski, *Warsaw Polityka*, p. 7.

³⁷²*Poland: A Country Study*, p. 263.

The Polish fleet has been the hardest hit by the "Big Bang" economic techniques used to radically alter Poland's central economy in a relatively short period of time. Soviet-era ships -- that still make up 95 percent of the fleet -- have not received regular overhauls to update or replace faulty equipment since the mid-1980's. Polish naval leaders used the *Security Policy and Defense Strategy of Poland*, published in November 1992, as the basis for rehabilitating the naval service. It states:

In the event of a war which goes beyond a local conflict, Poland's strategy will be the longest possible resistance in order to repel invasion by inflicting the largest possible casualties on the aggressor, demonstrating the determination to continue our defense, and gaining time for reaction by other countries and international organizations. In the event of a conflict of lesser intensity, military actions will be conducted in order to assure that the invading enemy force will be contained, halted, and destroyed in the shortest time possible. Patrol, security, blockade, anti-diversion and anti-terrorist activity will also be undertaken.³⁷³

This strategy has been the foundation upon which the navy has begun to rebuild. The key elements are providing for Polish security first and then transforming the navy into a force that NATO would see as a beneficial addition to its force structure. According to Polish strategy, Poland "will be able to gain membership in the European Communities after...bringing [its] level of development closer in line with that of Western countries."³⁷⁴ The Polish navy within this context is designed primarily to, "defend the country's sea border, to protect shipping and economic interests in Polish territorial waters and to defend the seacoast in cooperation with the other types of troops."³⁷⁵ According to the current Polish doctrine,

...a small, closed body of water such as the Baltic requires the use of fast powerful weapons systems, as well as compact units, small submarines, enhanced mine-warfare forces, and modern naval aviation. Unfortunately, [the Poles]...can only dream of creating a real naval aviation force.³⁷⁶

³⁷³*Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, November 1992, p. 16.

³⁷⁴*Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, November 1992, p. 13.

³⁷⁵*Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, November 1992, p. 18.

³⁷⁶Andrzej Szafranski, p 7. According to the author, Polish naval aviation assets include: ten Mi-14 PL antisubmarine helicopters, four Mi-14's and four Anacondas plus several obsolete Mi-2 RM's for search and rescue. Because of budgetary restraints, the Polish navy cannot maintain a rotary-wing SAR unit.

Poland has undergone a remarkable transformation of its naval forces in a relatively short period of time. Granted, most of the changes since the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are the result of decommissioning antiquated vessels. The decrease in Poland's amphibious and minelaying forces, signals the intent of the Polish coastal defense forces to do without a strictly offensive capability. While submarine and destroyer strength remain constant, the strategy is a future navy made up of smaller vessels, with an ability to conduct submarine operations. The *Warszawa*, equipped with western electronics, can be used as the command ship for the embarked commander, for training, diplomatic initiatives and as a symbol of a strong Polish navy. The most important trend is the increase in quality and quantity of fast attack craft with missiles, large patrol craft and coastal patrol craft. This is evidence of Poland's realization that smaller is not only cheaper but the only feasible means to carry out new missions. Lastly, both figures illustrate an overall trend to cut vessels from the Polish navy that have exorbitant maintenance costs. The Polish navy is leaner but its remaining fleet assets are not in the best condition because of the meager defense funds available. A Polish defense expert gave his assessment of the Polish fleet, stating the navy is:

...the branch of service with the largest shortfall in technical investment. Almost half of the 70 combatant units and about 60 auxiliary units have by all possible yardsticks exceeded their service lives, and, with an average age of 18 years, the shock core of the force makes the Navy...the oldest in the Baltic.³⁷⁷

In personnel strength, it ranks only behind Germany and Russia but it ranks next to last in equipment strength ahead of Finland and not counting the three Baltic states.³⁷⁸ Poland's surface assets include the *Warszawa*, which is equipped with 1950's electronics and weaponry. As a recommissioned Soviet mod-*Kashin*, the *Warszawa* has outlasted most of its Russian counterparts. The Polish submarine fleet is composed of one submarine too large to operate effectively in the Baltic (Kilo class *Orzel*) and two antiquated Foxtrot class submarines too old to go to sea. The shortages of spare parts from Russia and the CIS as well as substandard equipment and a shortage of trained specialists make all three of these submarines very difficult to get underway. The most recent addition to the surface fleet, the motor torpedo boat *Orkan*, lacks anti-ship missiles because its supplier, East Germany, has since reunified with West Germany. Of the twenty-five minesweepers in the fleet, fifteen cannot operate in sea conditions

³⁷⁷ Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7

³⁷⁸ Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7

exceeding 3 on the Beaufort Scale.³⁷⁹ Fortunately, "the force of search-and-rescue, auxiliary and special-purpose ships is relatively new and fairly well equipped" in comparison to the surface and sub-surface combatants.³⁸⁰

1. Defining New Roles and Missions

The ability of the Polish navy to adapt to the fiscal limitations while simultaneously upgrading and integrating its naval forces will be the determining factor in whether or not it exists into the twenty-first century. Machiavelli wrote,

...it happens that Fortune varies for a single man, for she changes the times while he does not change his ways. The downfall of cities also arises from this fact, for republics do not modify their methods with the times...rather, they are slow since it is more difficult for them to change.³⁸¹

The Polish navy in the twenty-first century has replaced its Soviet-era offensive strategy and like other democratic countries in the Baltic region focused on defensive capabilities of a coastal navy. By protecting Poland's interests in the Baltic, the Polish navy must adapt a Swedish approach to its new naval role: "The Naval Forces' mission is to make sure the enemy cannot make a landing, to keep our waterways free from mines, and to protect our shipping and fishing trade."³⁸² Poland's attempt to be included in European security organizations will require it to look beyond its coastal defense strategy and participate in multinational operations.

2. Three Missions for the Future Polish Coastal Navy

The Polish navy can take on a variety of future roles that could ensure the navy's existence: deterrence at sea, power projection from the sea, cooperative naval diplomacy and constabulary functions. There are three missions that the Polish navy can undertake in order to justify a future purpose and assist Poland in attaining other political aims. These missions are important not solely because they offer stability but also their potential political benefits. By properly maintaining a limited number of high quality naval assets, Polish naval leaders can justify their existence, receive more funding and elevate Poland's international prestige by being a regional leader and

³⁷⁹According to the *Watch Officer's Guide*, p. 253. A number three on the Beaufort Scale consists of winds between "7-10 sea miles per hour (knots)," with a "gentle breeze." The effect at sea, "Large wavelets. Crests begin to break. Glassy-looking foam. Perhaps scattered white horses."

³⁸⁰Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7.

³⁸¹Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, chapter IX, p. 383.

³⁸²*The Swedish Armed Forces*, p. 14.

supporter of multinational operations. Fulfilling these three missions will enhance Poland's coastal defense and increase the prospects of gaining membership in NATO.

Primarily, the Polish navy must be prepared to carry out specific military objectives that correspond directly to wartime operations including search and rescue, mine operations, surface to surface engagements and surface to air operations to protect Poland's coast. Second, there will be political and multinational functions where the Polish navy must be prepared to engage in various peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations (i.e., showing the flag and naval diplomacy). Third, the Polish navy must be capable of conducting constabulary functions throughout the Baltic region that are a means of enhancing Polish security but do not correspond to a direct military threat. These "peacetime operations" include interdicting drug and human smuggling, pollution abatement and monitoring environmental sensitive areas.

The first mission of Polish naval presence will be a strictly military function based upon the premise that exercising and carrying out a warfighting capability is still essential to any coastal navy in order to provide a deterrent effect. The Poles employ patrol craft and fast attack craft to deter a seaborne invasion as the primary means of establishing a credible coastal defense. The three main objectives for Poland's future navy in a wartime environment are: (1) Maintaining small vessels (surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile craft, attack craft and coastal patrol craft), auxiliaries and one or two submarines in order to provide a credible defense while simultaneously not provoking its neighbors. (2) Defending the 461 kilometers of Polish coastline with various seaborne assets as well as mobile, semi-mobile and in-place coastal defenses. (3) Possessing a force structure and naval doctrine that enhances Polish coastal security, Baltic regional security and makes available assets to be used in multinational (UN, WEU & NATO) operations.

The military missions correspond to improving Polish coastal security and using these assets in other "out-of-area" operations. A cornerstone of Polish naval policy is using the benefits of a coastal state to Poland's advantage. The successful employment of a balanced defense: (using mines and controllable minefields; missile torpedo boats; naval air assets; mobile, semi-mobile and non-mobile coastal artillery; missile emplacements; and small diesel submarines perhaps bought from Germany,) can only come about by reliance on a coastal state's assets. Poland's coastal state status derives its strength from what Jacob Børresen describes as three assets:

- The coastal state has the benefit of knowing the local coastal terrain and using it to his advantage;
- The coastal navy has the benefit of operating close to home and having available resources within a relatively short distance;
- The coastal navy has the benefit of operating close enough to home to employ Army and Air Force assets as well as coastal artillery.

The Polish navy in turn can offer numerous assets to Polish land forces in the event of hostilities and is thus a major reason for maintaining and continuously upgrading the fleet. By securing the flanks and rear of the army, especially during an amphibious assault on Polish territory, the navy can delay and obstruct the enemy by acting as the forward line of defense. The navy also provides the army with sea-mobility and can prevent hostile land forces from maintaining a logistical supply. Finally the navy can secure the enemy's lines of communications and prevent reinforcements and supplies.³⁸³ In Poland's case, to provide the best territorial-coastal defense, it is necessary to have a well-rounded defensive fleet instead of a function-specific fleet. Numerous examples from the recent past warn Poland not to rid itself of its primary defensive capabilities. Moreover, to plan a fleet around the certainty of NATO membership would be folly. Instead, a well-rounded balanced defense is Poland's best choice for ensuring against invasion as well as eventual membership in NATO.

There is a vital necessity to maintain and revive Poland's coastal artillery system. Jacob Børresen offers several elements that comprise a coastal artillery defense. According to Børresen, coastal artillery should be composed of a mix of, "fixed, semi-mobile and mobile elements," with a primary task of defending against an invasion from the sea. As a result of the emphasis on amphibious forces in the 1970's, according to Andrzej Szafranski, "during the latter half of the 1970's the coast guard removed the coastal artillery batteries deployed...[along the entire Polish coastline]."³⁸⁴ As financial resources become more plentiful, the Polish navy must rebuild the coastal artillery in order to augment the balanced coastal defense. The promotion of the coastal artillery will be a contributing factor in a combined act of deterrence. Børresen states that, "The

³⁸³Jacob Børresen, pp. 150-151. Mr. Børresen's list is helpful in promoting possible uses of the navy in the event that a land war commences. Being the junior service in Poland, the navy must continually create a role for itself amidst the mindset of a certain land campaign as the single threat. Additionally, these are tasks that Poland could carry out as a member of NATO.

³⁸⁴Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7.

contribution of the Coastal Navy to deterrence consists of its demonstration of sufficient will and ability to act against aggression in terms of violations, infringements or attacks."³⁸⁵

Poland's expertise in search and rescue and mine warfare have the benefit of providing a wartime and peacetime naval assets that provide tangible asset to the NATO naval force structure. By continuing to train and practice these warfare skills, Poles maintain a coastal defense capability that could be used in the event of an international or multilateral operation. The recent ferry disasters along the heavily-traveled ferry routes between Sweden-Poland and Sweden-Estonia (e.g., Ferries *Jan Heweliusz* and the *Estonia*) provide obvious justification for maintaining a viable search and rescue unit. Western observers who took part in Baltops '94 were unanimously impressed with the day-long SAR operations using airborne and surface assets that the Poles orchestrated.

The second level where Polish naval assets will play a decisive role is as part of multinational operations and political purposes. These missions include possessing a force structure and naval doctrine that encourages the navy to act in multilateral operations and in conjunction with alliance missions to involve the entire spectrum of military actions including war, showing the flag, demonstrating expertise in specific warfare areas during multilateral exercises, and preparing personnel and fleet assets to provide naval peacekeeping forces for future multilateral operations under the auspices of the UN, WEU and NATO. Børresen states,

Participation in multinational naval operations overseas requires specialised training, and emphasises the need for the Coastal Navy or having at least some units at its disposal with an open-ocean capacity and which are equipped and trained to co-operate with the navies of the Naval Powers.³⁸⁶

"Showing the flag" as a component of Polish naval diplomacy is used to demonstrate a willingness to engage in collective Baltic Sea security measures. This will take the form of port visits, exercises and exchanges and will underscore Poland's commitment to Western institutions, Baltic security and NATO solidarity. Skeptics who suggest that only large surface vessels like the *Warszawa* command respect of adversaries need only look at the Swedish navy model to be impressed by the small but lethal patrol craft and the expertise of the crew. In selling the idea to the Polish *Sejm*

³⁸⁵Jacob Børresen, p. 170.

³⁸⁶Jacob Børresen, p. 169.

concerning the need of a fleet, there are several reasons why naval forces can function better than ground forces. Ken Booth offers seven assets that naval forces possess in accomplishing politically sensitive missions. Polish naval leaders, in justifying their budget outlays, would be clever to differentiate methods where naval forces could function more decisively than land forces:

- *Versatility* - warship's ability to perform a wide-range of tasks;
- *Controllability* - warship's escalatory potential and withdrawal ability potential;
- *Mobility* - warship's ability to move quickly and independently;
- *Projection ability* - warships as bulk carriers of firepower, troops and equipment;
- *Access potential* - warship's relative access to all littoral areas;
- *Symbolism* - warships as signifiers of a country's intentions and commitments;
- *Endurance* - warship's staying power within visible range or over the horizon.³⁸⁷

Justifying a purpose for Polish naval forces in politically important multinational operations, naval forces perform various functions to enhance a collective effort. In the execution of naval diplomacy, Booth offers five tactics that are well within Polish naval proficiency to conduct:

- *Standing demonstrations of naval power*- Poland would use this tactic in tandem with an international force or as part of an alliance strategy against a belligerent;
- *Specific operational deployments* - The Polish navy must be prepared to conduct long-term naval commitments, as part of a greater multinational force;
- *Naval aid* - Polish naval assets could assist greatly. With expertise in search and rescue and mine clearing operations, Poland's contribution in a hostile environment could be a substantial asset to a peacekeeping or peace enforcing operation;

³⁸⁷Ken Booth, "Naval Diplomacy," pp. 33-36.

- *Operational calls* - Operational calls serve to enhance Poland's prestige vis-à-vis other Baltic states as well as demonstrating their professionalism to other NATO nations;
- *Specific goodwill visits* - Visits to the eight other Baltic countries promote regional security through confidence building measures and good neighborliness.³⁸⁸

Robert Staley II offers numerous alternative roles that naval assets can carry out while conducting peacekeeping operations. Naval peacekeeping operations will take many forms: surveillance, interdiction, coastal sea control, protection of offshore assets and harbor defense/port security and search and rescue. The Center for Naval Analysis listed a number of operations that could come under the title of United Nations naval missions. These operations mentioned do not necessarily have to come under the auspices of the United Nations but could rather be done under the control of WEU or NATO command authority. These activities could be performed by Polish naval units in order to improve regional and international security and bring prestige to Poland and increased funding to the navy. They include:

- Providing humanitarian assistance;
- Intervening for humanitarian purposes;
- Conducting maritime peacekeeping;
- Enforcing maritime agreements;
- Protecting sea and air traffic;
- Interdicting sea and air traffic;
- Making a show of force;
- Responding to aggression;
- Controlling armaments/Conducting demilitarization.³⁸⁹

Other activities might include disaster relief, evacuation of nationals and assistance to refugees fleeing war zones. These self-explanatory operations represent a new era of Polish naval activity that would seek to emphasize extending military operations out-of-area on behalf of international fiat. In the most recent example of Polish officials taking a pro-active stance in promoting international order under the auspices of the United Nations, Poland will be among a group of volunteering nations that will enforce United Nations' mandates in Haiti. President Clinton, in his address to

³⁸⁸Ken Booth, "Naval Diplomacy," pp. 41-45.

³⁸⁹Jeffrey I. Sands, p. 9.

the nation on 15 September, stated, that the United States agreed to, "lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations. More than 20 countries from...as far away as Poland, which has so recently won its own freedom...[has] agreed to join us [the United States]."³⁹⁰ Peacekeeping in the form of surveillance missions within a designated area will namely take the shape of identifying all contacts as either friendly, neutral or unfriendly surface, air and subsurface targets.

For this role, Polish naval assets, with the use of coastal patrol craft, ASW assets and the limited air assets, will be able to perform a limited role. Peacekeeping operations will include interdiction in the form of intercepting, diverting, disrupting or delaying naval vessels suspected of aiding the designated hostile force. Poland's shallow-draft, fast attack craft and coastal patrol craft fleet could play an important role in monitoring operations near the coast or in tidal zones. The recent grounding of a U.S. navy coastal patrol boat in the Haitian bay of Port-au-Prince illustrates the need for Poland's shallow-water draft vessels as another improved dimension to an enhanced peacekeeping force.³⁹¹ The purpose of detailing the various roles that the Polish navy can undertake in a world absent the Warsaw Pact and a single main threat: (1) Justifies the future existence of a Polish navy to skeptics in Polish society and the Polish parliament (*Sejm*) (2) To make the point that Poland's future integration in Western European society (a goal most Poles want to achieve) can be accomplished by using naval assets in a political way that most Poles are unaccustomed. As one naval expert states,

...naval forces have important support functions, such as the transportation and provision of materials and personnel required to undertake basic peace-building...a sea route is frequently the only feasible means of transportation...Naval forces have the capacity, if consent is granted, to impose less drastically on a host nation's culture and sovereignty than territorial forces.³⁹²

The third mission of the future Polish navy will be to combat non-military threats that will consume the majority of the Polish naval leadership's attention during peacetime. "The smallest navies of all will have the least problem in justifying their existence in the years ahead. Policing what in some cases may be extensive EEZs will be

³⁹⁰President Clinton's address to the nation on Haiti recorded by *The New York Times*, 16 September 1994.

³⁹¹Robert Staley II, from Charles A. Ayers, *Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, pp. 51-53.

³⁹²Jeremy Ginifer, pp. 344-345.

an expansive task for some navies."³⁹³ This so-called constabulary function will consist of numerous actions designed to ensure lawfulness within the 12 nautical mile Polish territorial sea, throughout the entire Baltic region, and on the high seas. As A.B. Donaldson notes, "Several types of maritime activity are identified in the [UN Convention on The Law of the Sea]...as threats to the maritime security of all states. Piracy, illegal trafficking in drugs...and unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas...."³⁹⁴ There are other threats that can be added to Donaldson's list:

- Instability caused by the flight of refugees;
- Illegal operations run by organized crime;
- Illegal transportation of humans, radioactive materials and narcotics;
- Damage to environmentally sensitive areas;
- Pollution to the marine environment.

Observing the mandate from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the Polish navy has the authority to enforce the preservation and protection of the Baltic marine environment. Concerning the Convention's authority A.B. Donaldson states,

[It]...has done more than any other instrument to set out broad responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms...[The convention]...also provides a clear legal basis for a state to deny the use of national ports by vessels which fail to comply with relevant pollution or safety standards, and also for arresting violators within territorial and contiguous zones.³⁹⁵

With a Polish fishing fleet that relies upon a constant supply of fish, the Polish naval leadership, could again portray the navy as vital (like the Swedes do) in order to protect the industry. Poland's thriving fishing industry in the Baltic comprised nearly "25 percent of the total catch" in the 1980's, but pollution has seen these numbers drop dramatically.³⁹⁶ Therefore, as a matter of maintaining this important domestic and export market, the Polish navy could justify an increase in defense spending to go towards vessels (like the Flex 300) that contain pollution abatement and monitoring equipment as well as hydrographic devices. Geoffrey Till makes a case for maintaining navies because far from being of singular importance during wartime, their role in

³⁹³Ken Booth, "The Role of Navies in Peacetime," p. 160.

³⁹⁴A.B. Donaldson, p. 3.

³⁹⁵A.B. Donaldson, p. 6.

³⁹⁶*Poland: A Country Survey*, p. 155.

maintaining, "Good Order at Sea" will increasingly be viewed as an integral part of Poland's national interests. Till writes that,

Sea-based resources (oil, gas, fish) have become crucial to the economic success of littoral states and so must be supervised and administered...Domestic societies are increasingly vulnerable to the threats posed by drug-smugglers, illegal immigration...Increasingly it is argued that resource depletion and environmental pollution are the real long-term threat to global security.³⁹⁷

The responsibility to define the Polish navy's future rests with its leaders. By listing the three missions and the way in which the navy's participation can influence political decisions, Polish integration into western security institutions is in part due to naval efforts. Therefore, the rationale for a well-equipped, highly trained and highly mobile force is put forth by the Swedish Defense Ministry, who states that:

The Swedish Armed Forces preserve peace through their very existence. They are intended to convince every nation that an attack would cost far too much to be worth the effort. However, if we are attacked, our armed forces will counter every violation of Swedish territory and prevent the attacker from gaining a foothold on Swedish soil.³⁹⁸

Attaining these goals and the specific three missions of the future Polish navy will not only serve Poland's immediate security concerns and fulfill its constabulary duties, they will add a convincing argument to its list of benefits it brings to western institutions.

3. Altering the Naval Force Structure to Meet the Mission

"The development in weapons technology" Jacob Børresen writes, "has made it possible to pack enough firepower into even the smallest craft, so that small vessels or craft of minor navies may...threaten even the strongest naval units of the Naval Power."³⁹⁹ Not only will this thought be the driving vision of the future Polish navy, it corresponds with the New Strategic Concept for NATO members. In order for Poland to be successful in providing a respectable defense of its coastline and a formidable partner in an expanded Atlantic Alliance that stresses highly mobile and flexible assets, there is a necessity to emphasize small and lethal ships. Maintaining the flagship *Warszawa* as a command ship for the Polish Baltic Sea commander and as a prestigious

³⁹⁷Geoffrey Till, pp. 194-195.

³⁹⁸*The Swedish Armed Forces 1994*, pp. 14-15.

³⁹⁹Jacob Børresen, p. 149.

symbol is justified. The Kilo-class submarine *Orzel*, as well as the two outdated Foxtrot models, are more of an economic burden than any side benefits they accrue.

Of the three Polish submarines existing in 1992[and still in 1994] all built in the Soviet Union, the one *Orzel* vessel is the most advanced; two Wilk-class submarines are older and noisier...Because they were designed for ocean combat, the three submarines maneuver clumsily in the Baltic Sea in comparison with the smaller submarines of the other Baltic nations.⁴⁰⁰

In order to keep Polish submarine sailors proficient in submarine tactics, it is necessary to keep at least one while trying to obtain smaller, more efficient western models. As a coastal navy, Poland needs a submarine force to discourage offensive attacks. However, the current conscription limit of 18 months creates a critical shortage of knowledgeable servicemen. Poles must take another lesson from the Swedish experience:

For operations in [the] littoral environment the conventional submarine has proved and will prove its great effectiveness. The requirements that comes out of operating in shallow waters and the Economic Exclusion Zone can be met by great margin...In low level conflicts the conventional submarine can be used effectively in surveillance or monitoring missions, thus performing it's task undetected and unhampered by bad weather.⁴⁰¹

Poland continues to decommission its old submarines and antiquated patrol and coastal patrol craft over a phase-out period. By concentrating attention and resources on smaller more efficient craft to make up the backbone of the Polish fleet, Poland can effectively pursue its three future missions.

4. Danish Flex 300: A Model for Poland's Future Fleet?

One possible approach that Poland could take in order to upgrade and modernize its naval forces while maintaining proficiency in warfare areas would be to buy mission modular ships like the Royal Danish Navy Flex 300 model. With declining state revenues, the Danish Navy was forced to restructure its naval forces in the 1980's. Flex 300 proponents claim that the program enhances long-term procurement planning while fulfilling many different operational requirements specific to the Baltic Sea region. The Flex 300's strongest point -- highly flexible, mobile and highly armed -- reflects Poland's emphasis on small forces and NATO's New Strategic Concept.⁴⁰² The

⁴⁰⁰*Poland: A Country Survey*, p. 263.

⁴⁰¹Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius, Royal Swedish Navy, p. 12.

modular ship concept was founded on a single hull type outfitted with varying modular packages to accomplish an assortment of missions. According to its proponents, the Flex 300 could respond to any number of threat scenarios by simply replacing different modules. The Danish Minister of Defense, Knud Enggaard stated,

In these times of changes in the European security situation almost all countries are seeking to trim their defence spending...By designing and fitting the Standard Flex 300 ships in such a way that role-dedicated equipment can be quickly changed, the Navy can meet operational requirements with a smaller number of ships than would be needed using single-role (traditional) ships.⁴⁰³

The Flex 300 concept fits perfectly with Polish naval strategy: a ship with various missions at an affordable price.

Standard Flex 300 *Flyvefisken* concept of building multi-role patrol boats that can be reconfigured for ASW, minesweeping, fast attack craft or even environmental tasks, thanks to highly modularised weapon and sensor fits, is attracting some interest, since it offers the prospect of affordable flexibility.⁴⁰⁴

Accentuating the strengths of historical Polish naval expertise is one way you fulfill the three future missions. The other way is to examine areas in which the Polish navy could make a substantial contribution to Polish security, Baltic regional stability, and prove to be an asset to NATO, UN and WEU naval peacekeeping operations. As part of Poland's closer cooperation with western defense ministries and defense contractors, *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported that the Polish Defense Minister would like to see the Polish "defence industry manufacturing some Western hardware or even producing equipment under licence."⁴⁰⁵ There is much discussion in Europe regarding

⁴⁰²Reiterating NATO's New Strategic Concept, reflects the absence of a Soviet threat and the necessity to restructure NATO's forces and policies to reflect the changes to the European security system. Poland would do well to heed the sea change in NATO force structure since 1990. The message from the New Strategic Concept: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe." Therefore, with the threat more diffuse, overall size and readiness of the Allies' force is to be reduced while flexibility and mobility would be increased. In the spirit of this new concept, future forces would require "enhanced flexibility and mobility...to permit measured and timely responses." From *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 7-8 November 1991, paragraphs 10 and 47, 47C.

⁴⁰³*Standard Flex 300-The True Multi-role Ship*, p. 2. Enggaard states that in addition to military missions, the Flex 300 can be converted to civilian uses like hydrographic survey and pollution abatement.

⁴⁰⁴Geoffrey Till, p. 183.

the possibility that a consortium of nations and industries would converge on Poland to build a vessel similar to the Flex 300. Polish military officials have encouraged an extended range of such contacts.

5. Developing a Relationship with Parliament

In order to justify their continued existence to the *Sejm*, the Polish naval leadership must continue to participate in and organize high visibility operations. Involving the navy in exchanges with wealthier European neighbors and providing national television coverage will increase support among the public and parliament. Naval leaders must establish close liaison with Polish parliamentarians by creating programs designed to foster a better understanding of the navy's purpose. This could take the form of political and media officials invited on over-night cruises to familiarize visitors with a display of basic operations. An analogy that some Polish naval leaders offer to skeptical Polish parliamentarians in order to justify expenditures for the naval budget is the axiom that, "It is wise to build a firehouse *before* a fire occurs." Part of the task of appealing to parliament has been the responsibility of President Walesa.

He recently gave conspicuous support for the naval services by meeting with all senior national representatives after Baltops '94 and appealing on Polish national television for more multinational exercises to enhance regional Baltic stability. One element that links a military organization to the civilian public and freely elected parliament is public disclosure of the armed forces' intentions and what it sees as its tasks. The United States Department of the Navy used the publication of a naval doctrine as a public relations tool to justify its projects. For military leaders long-trained to guard all aspects of the military, including mission roles and force structure, the idea of promoting transparent military budgets and publicly stating military goals and intentions continues to be an alien concept. The greatest contribution publishing of a naval doctrine can have is clarifying complexities of naval strategy and articulating a concise vision of the future. The American naval doctrine clearly spells this out with a series of chapters. The Poles might offer a similar publication for instance:

⁴⁰⁵Tom Bogdanowicz, p. 32.

- *What the Naval Forces Are*: The Nature of Naval Service -- The establishment and character of naval forces (subsurface, surface, air and coastal artillery);
- *What the Naval Forces Do*: Employment of Naval Forces -- deterrence, forward presence, naval operation other than war, sealift for army assets, joint operations and naval operations in war, international prestige associated with a forward deployed navy;
- *How the Navy Fights*: Naval Warfare -- preparation for war and forms of naval warfare;
- *The Future of the Navy*: Command, Control and Surveillance, Power Projection, Force Sustainment -- multinational naval participation, Baltic cooperation and coastal defense;
- *Why the Naval Forces are Critical to Poland's Future*: Prestige, Non-Military (Constabulary) Functions, Improving Regional Security, Contributing to European and International Security.⁴⁰⁶

6. Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and NATO

The future success of the Polish Navy rests on the leadership's ability to integrate into western military institutions and gain international recognition for its part in multinational operations. The *International Defense Review* recently reported that Poland and the Netherlands recently concluded an agreement to enhance naval cooperation, joint naval exercises, and exchanges of personnel and technology. Among the specific areas of cooperation agreed to were: joint mine-countermeasures, search and rescue, bilateral naval maneuvers in the Baltic, exchange of officers to observer national naval exercises as well as maintaining regular working contacts between the Hydrographic Office of the Polish navy and the Dutch naval forces. Lastly, and perhaps most important, the Dutch defense electronics firm *Hollandse Signaalapparaten* expanded its contacts with Polish naval officials for the purpose of possibly upgrading of the *Warszawa's* antiquated electronic suite.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶The Department of the Navy's *Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare*, p. 1. The publication lists four general topic areas. The last set is specific to Polish naval interests, employed within the context of an all-inclusive public document. Printing such a document is a practical application of establishing a transparent military structure. Post-Communist societies and their leaders are not familiar with such practices and are thus very skeptical about letting one's friends and enemies know the details of their forces. This is a mindset that forestalls better relations with the West and presently with the already-weary parliament that continues to have an adversarial relationship with the military. In effect this is one way that the military can "bridge the gap" between the *Sejm* and the armed forces.

⁴⁰⁷Joris Janssen Lok, May 1994, p. 6.

7. Participation in NATO/WEU/ UN Naval Operations

Geoffrey Till explains that, "Politicians use navies to service alliance systems, whether these alliances are permanent or *ad hoc*, bilateral or multilateral."⁴⁰⁸ The Polish navy can play a critical role in fostering closer contact with NATO while serving as a conduit for further military cooperation. As Jacob Børresen asserts, "it pays for the Coastal State in the form of increased international prestige, 'diplomatic currency', to be able and willing to contribute to multinational peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations under the auspices of the UN."⁴⁰⁹ Other Polish proposals to foster closer naval cooperation with NATO countries include: continued participation in future Baltops (including phase II which is reserved solely for NATO countries); Polish, Danish and German mine-sweeping exercises; Polish and French anti-submarine warfare exercises; tactical exercises combined with the visit of Dutch naval vessels; tactical exercises combined with the visit of Belgian naval vessels; SAR exercises between German and Polish naval forces; and peacekeeping training and exercises with Dutch units at the Military Training Center for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Kielce.

Additionally, the Polish Defense Ministry recently hired a high-ranking former-NATO official, German General Henning von Ondarza, who recently retired in March 1994 as the commander in chief of Allied Forces Central Europe. He now advises the Polish government on actions necessary to forge closer integration with NATO. Hiring former-NATO officials as well as having the former admiral of the Polish navy as the Defense Minister greatly assists the Polish naval leadership in promoting its causes in Warsaw and Brussels.

8. Participation in Operations with NATO & The U. S.

In conjunction with an altered naval policy and reduced force structure, Poland sees a future in NATO and western European institutions only through on-going participation in multilateral exercises as a necessary prelude to multilateral operations. Subsequently, Poland has used the annual naval exercises in the Baltic Sea (Baltops) as a mechanism towards forging closer contacts with the West. Baltops '94 was the most recent example of Polish naval assets participating in western exercises while demonstrating its expertise in several warfare areas. In Baltops '94, the Poles contributed two of the thirty-seven ships: ORP *Kaszub* F240 and ORP *Lech* A282. Observers noted that the Poles conducted an impressive and professional show of naval

⁴⁰⁸Geoffrey Till, p. 191.

⁴⁰⁹Jacob Børresen, p. 171.

force throughout the week-long event. One entire day was dedicated to Polish demonstrations in the area of search and rescue. Polish navy SAR assets conducted an exercise (covered by Polish national television) which included helicopter and waterborne personnel recovery and towing a disabled ship. According to informed American sources, the Poles performed the SAR activities in an exemplary manner, impressing both the American and Western European staffs. Consistent participation in Baltops and exercising basic NATO warfare skills is an important part of Poland's attempt to improve interoperability and closer integration. It should be noted that Polish naval assets have conducted operations with NATO forces nearly a year before land forces.

9. Recommendations

- Continue democratic and economic reform, emphasize human rights and the rights of national minorities;
- Be an example and incentive to other regional actors, including Russia;
- Disclose whether or not Poland intends to station German or any other foreign troops in Poland, or if Polish troops could be subordinated under foreign commander;
- Prove to be a net contributor of Alliance security;
- Follow through on democratic and market reforms and finally settle the constitutional problems.

At times, Poland seems to be its own worst enemy in its bid to integrate into Western institutions. The continued inability to resolve the constitutional questions and the resulting power struggles between the president and the prime minister have cast a serious shadow over Poland's efforts to become a vibrant democracy. Second, by fostering good relations with Russia and its neighbors, Poland's actions as a stable regional actor will help convince Russia that ensuring its security is vital to NATO's success. Proving it can be a net contributor to the Alliance's security will enhance Poland's membership chances. This objective takes on many forms. Polish leaders must resolve the constitutional questions prior to entry in any military alliance. Second, Polish leaders must be willing to publicly advocate any arrangement that NATO requires of its other members, including stationing of foreign troops and subordinating its troops under foreign commanders. Though there might be an assumption that Poland can enter or exist within the Alliance on its own terms -- like the special status of France or Spain -- the environment that allowed such previous arrangements does not warrant "special treatment" now.

Additional recommendations for utilizing the Polish navy include:

- Scrap the big, old ships; buy and build small to reflect Poland's coastal defense strategy and the necessity to reflect NATO's New Strategic Concept;
- Buy and build modular mission ships;
- Involve the Navy in all types of exchanges with European neighbors and provide national television coverage;
- Justify existence with high visibility regional and international operations;
- Cooperate and consult with NATO and western navies in all aspects of: training, exercises, multilateral and bilateral operations;
- Volunteer the navy for all naval peacekeeping operations under NATO, UN & WEU auspices;
- Train with the NATO Tactical Publications and invite NATO observers to critique maneuvers;
- Hire retired high ranking NATO leaders to facilitate closer relations with NATO;
- Participate in and host regularly scheduled naval exercises;
- Provide basic western language training for all service personnel, institute language programs on a national level for all grades;
- Increase interoperability by buying western communications equipment;
- Procure communications equipment, American aircraft, ships and armaments;
- Establish closer liaison with Polish parliamentarians by offering familiarization tours;
- Establish programs to take political and media elites on over-night ship cruises.

Poland cannot continue to operate like a Warsaw Pact-era navy in an age of fiscal responsibility, parliamentary over-sight and vastly diffuse threat. Polish naval officials can no longer justify force levels and grandiose ships of an outdated theory of power projection and prestige. To their credit, Polish military officials and naval leaders is in particular have been pro-active in adapting to the new environment. However, more can always be accomplished and the skill of naval leaders in not only adapting to change but anticipating change before it occurs in order to stay ahead. Poles cannot be expected to launch Madison Avenue-type marketing campaigns to win the support of the public and parliament overnight. Indeed, one of the many lessons Poles have learned since the break up of the Warsaw Pact is the necessity to justify one's existence

by continually seeking out new roles and missions and appealing, like never before, to a legislative body that does not automatically grant the military its budgetary requests.

The necessity to redefine a naval mission and create a force structure that reflects political and military realities will do a great service to both Poland and the maritime service. Rather than reinventing the wheel, Poles will find it increasingly useful to look beyond Poland's borders and perhaps beyond the confines of Europe to find models implemented by successful naval staffs. Finally, by redefining the Polish navy to provide a coastal defense, security and international stability are not sacrificed but enhanced by the additional operations Poland's naval force can undertake. Børresen states, "An efficient and well-run Coastal Navy makes an important contribution to local and regional stability not least because it is, by definition, inherently defensive in orientation."⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰Jacob Børresen, p. 174.

VII. NATO EXPANSION: WHAT IS THE BEST POSSIBLE OPTION?

Throughout its forty-five years of existence, NATO has continually evolved in order to meet its stated goals of protecting and promoting stability and democracy within the Atlantic Alliance. It has also been maintained that NATO not only possesses the means to alter its mission and membership, it is almost incumbent upon the organization to change in order to keep its relevancy. Konrad Adenauer once remarked that Germany's fragile democracy and market economy after World War II succeeded because NATO offered it a security guarantee. The same argument is the single greatest argument for admitting Poland, the other three Visegrad states and perhaps Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states.

Lastly, it has been charged that because NATO needs to adapt to stay relevant and Central and Eastern European States need security guarantee to ensure the continued flourishing of democratic and market reforms, NATO expansion is necessary. Regardless whether Russia approves or believes that such an enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance would further support nationalists claims of western encirclement, it seems that to do nothing or hold off making tough decisions only creates a security vacuum and destabilizing realm throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In order to gain a proper perspective of the entire debate, it is important to examine some of the more prominent arguments for and against Polish membership. If Poland is admitted or not into NATO, what will be the ramifications for regional security?

A. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO:

- Regional cooperation decreases between Poland and other neighbors left out of NATO expansion as resentment towards Poland by other members left out of expansion grows;
- Resentment towards Poland by Russia;
- Russia's nationalists use NATO expansion as a sign of western aggression and a good reason to begin the second Cold War or a "Cold Peace;"
- Russia will perceive Poland's inclusion and any Eastern European countries' exclusion as the limit to which the West considers its easternmost influence;
- The cost of Polish integration into NATO will be great;
- Cohesion among NATO members will suffer with any new members;
- Successful collective defense becomes questionable collective security;
- Polish expansion into NATO will require 16 nations approval as well as the support of 16 parliaments and senate support;
- Likelihood that the United States would offer a nuclear guarantee;

- Polish interests will inevitably differ from NATO's and the United States on some issues;
- Expanding NATO to the East will only increase the number of ethnic and national troubles similar to Bosnia;
- The financial aspects of Polish membership in NATO: Who will pay? Who will pay in what amount? How far will improvements go? How will NATO members divide up other resources to non-members?

Eastern expansion of the Alliance to include Poland would most certainly bring more initial negative side effects than positive results. At the outset then, it would seem as if eastern expansion could not rationally take place. The tangible benefits of enlarging the Alliance (i.e., those benefits any national leader would have to justify to taxpayers and parents of children sent to defend a onetime foe) are realistically not present. Most members of the NATO staffs and American policy experts contend that besides extending the zone of Alliance stability, providing Germany with a friendly frontier, and contributing a 200,000 plus army to the NATO force structure. The issue of extending western style democracy, market economies and hence western stability can be examined from two opposite positions. First, that these western institutions most notably NATO could stabilize potentially destabilizing areas is a reasonable proposition.

On the other hand, extending NATO to these areas might in fact infect the west with all of its Byzantine intrigues. No one can discount the possibility that such a scenario is possible. This will be one of the "leaps of faith" that NATO members will eventually be forced to undertake when they make the decision to enlarge. Therefore, the plethora of problems the Alliance is likely to encounter is very much on the minds of the international staffs at NATO headquarters. The question is all the more vexing from the standpoint of NATO policymakers who generally see expansion as inherently good and inevitable but only after a long process of integration. They view quick expansion (like that now proposed by the United States and within some circles in Germany) as inflaming the negative attributes. Therefore, the issue seems to be based most explicitly on the timetable for eastern expansion. This reflects not only a realistic attempt to maintain Alliance cohesion but also to preserve the privileged lifestyle of Western Europe. This suggests a certain degree of cynicism towards NATO members who only want to retain their "piece of the pie" and discourage any new states from joining the elite club. In this sense, Western Europe (including North America) like Central and Eastern Europeans have failed to adequately alter their perceptions in a post-Cold War world.

Among the most contentious debates over eastern expansion is what this will mean to regional security. It has been suggested that NATO would do well to take on new members as a means of balancing against Russian interests, enhancing its mission, providing American engagement on the European continent into the twenty-first century and ensuring eastern stability. However, by including Poland in a first wave of new members, what signal will this send to Russia about how far East NATO is willing to make defensive and political commitments? To include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary while leaving out Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria and the Baltics is *de facto* acquiescence for Russia to reassert an historical influence. It is no wonder then that many NATO policymakers see an immediate drive for new members as inherently destabilizing along Russia's Western periphery. As a by-product of considering some Eastern members and not others, NATO has precipitated a schism in the cooperation between new members and those left out. Polish leaders have long advocated an expansion of NATO to include all of Central and Eastern Europe with the implied exception of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. This point of view fails to adequately respond to the realization that such a move would transform NATO from a collective defense organization into something of a collective security organization.

Furthermore, resentment would follow by Russia whose leaders have consistently challenged any Polish or NATO attempt to expand the membership. Irrespective of the claims that NATO or the United States is attempting to placate the Russians with a "go slow approach," Western leaders must consider the ramifications that such a move would mean to Russian relations and the Russian domestic situation. Some argue that regardless of how it looks to Russians or what the nationalists might do, NATO must expand based on its interests and in the interests of resolving the security vacuum that now exists. Others insist that such a move made now while Russia is "down" would single-handedly create another Cold War division most Europeans would like to avoid.

It is also claimed that enlarging NATO while Russia's domestic situation is tenuous would only aid ultranationalist and nationalist forces in their campaign to prove to Russians that the West is attempting to humiliate and subvert Russia. This is an argument used by both the Yeltsin-Kozyrev camp and some policymakers in the Clinton administration. The other side of this argument is that regardless of what actions the West takes towards Russia -- foreign aid, NATO expansion, CFE Treaty negotiations -- elements within Russia's political strata (namely the ultranationalist and military hard-liners) will try to associate it with a Western scheme to keep Russia down.

Another negative aspect of NATO expansion is the dilemma over who to offer membership to and who to ignore, thereby signaling the extent of Western interest in Central and Eastern Europe. The natural reaction of Russia will be to assume that if NATO offers membership to the Visegrad four, that all other countries like Romania and the Baltics will fall under Russian influence. Though many observers and policymakers stay clear of expressions like "spheres of influence," one cannot ignore that this is precisely the question that will be resolved in the next few years. To minimize the impact of "drawing new lines" and ceding a pro forma "sphere of influence" to Russia, NATO must, when it announces the list of prospective new members, offer future membership to others and offer new bilateral agreements between them and NATO.

Although Polish officials tactfully avoid mentioning the cost associated with Polish membership in NATO, there is every reason to believe that such expansion will cost the Alliance's more wealthy neighbors billions of dollars. At a time when nearly every NATO member is cutting its defense budgets, now seems a hardly appropriate time to convince the electorate that greater defense budgets are required to bring Poland up to speed. No one expects that if Poland is offered membership in NATO it will be able to fund programs necessary to make it a formidable ally. Observers who watch the Polish *Sejm* draw similar conclusions that Polish parliamentarians are not likely to advocate greater state resources to be allocated to defense budgets. While the creation of a new constitution continues to be debated and control of the military is yet to be defined, defense projects are likely to suffer the consequences of the unresolved ambiguity.

Inevitably, cohesion will decrease with the addition of any new members. Regardless of who the new members are, cohesion at all levels of decision making will suffer. Any decisions to be reached by unanimous consent will be further clouded. For instance, a decision to take a more aggressive role in Bosnia will be impacted by the large number of Serbs now residing in Hungary. Cohesion is the single greatest NATO asset that will suffer the most. Most NATO experts contend that the loss of cohesion among the NATO members will throw the Alliance into constant turmoil, unable to carry out even the most minor changes. As a solution, some see changing NATO's unanimous consent rules to two thirds majority on most procedures and only unanimous consent on Article 5 decisions.

Some also see immediate expansion as the death sentence for collective defense as it is replaced by collective security. By adding any new members, NATO loses its "exclusive club" aura and becomes an organization similar to the CSCE. Polish

membership in NATO in the near term would also require the unanimous consent of 16 countries and 16 different parliaments-senates. This is seen as a negative aspect because it precipitates a forum whereby Alliance members are forced to take sides on this contentious debate. No one expects, however, that small countries like Portugal or Spain could derail the wishes of the United States or Germany. However, the issue of expansion could raise the specter of NATO members squabbling amongst each other at a time when other issues like the war in Bosnia have already strained Alliance cohesion.

Other experts insist that expanding NATO would require the United States to give a nuclear guarantee to Poland in order for Article 5 to have any substance. This would require the President of the United States to go before the American people and justify the reasons for such a guarantee, when most Americans are convinced the Cold War is over. Other skeptics of immediate expansion insist that Poland will bring to the Alliance a specific agenda which will inevitably clash with other NATO members. This worries some who believe a Polish agenda would include advocating a confrontational stance with Russia or, at the very least, a more proactive role for NATO throughout the entirety of Central and Eastern Europe.

Most NATO experts and enlargement skeptics believe that by including Poland and the other Visegrad states, NATO will import the by-products of Eastern instability - ethnic war, hyper-nationalism and territorial disputes. In Poland's case, these issues are inconsequential. Poland has a relatively homogenous society and a well-publicized minority policy. Poland has also resolved all of its territorial questions and has no outstanding territorial disputes with any of its neighbors. The financial aspects of enlarging the Alliance is another major obstacle for proponents of expansion. Including only Poland will be a multi-billion dollar proposition, requiring already financially-strapped Western governments to set aside adequate amounts of resources. While most NATO members are in the process of cutting military expenditures, it seems unrealistic to effectively convince the Western electorate that they must contribute more to the defense of former-Warsaw Pact countries

B. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

- Expansion of NATO will enhance stability to the East. Expansion will give Poland guarantees to allow it to develop its democratic and market reforms. Expansion gives NATO its twenty-first century *raison d'être*.
- Expansion will move NATO's Eastern frontier and provide the Alliance with a large land army and small navy for combined joint operations. Poland has land and offers the arena of the next possible war. Poles offer a greater

"collective bloodletting" for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Poles offer the West peacekeeping forces in the form of land forces and naval forces for future multilateral and multinational operations.

- Expansion of NATO provides more room for the Alliance to maneuver in the event of an eastward migration of refugees or Russian land forces.
- Expansion is necessary because Poland is part of the West. Expansion is necessary because the West is morally obligated to bring in Poland.
- Expansion keeps the Americans engaged on the European continent.
- Expansion now is less risky because it will occur during a time of relative peace, during the time of crisis in the East, expansion eastward would be viewed an escalatory move by the West.
- Expansion secures a large Polish consumer base, billions of dollars of foreign investment and a highly educated working force.
- Expansion will facilitate resolution of minority and territorial disputes are best solved by the Alliance's consultative mechanisms.

The most widely-touted reason for extending NATO guarantees is that immediate expansion will enhance the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe by exporting stability. This is by far the most plausible reason for enlarging NATO during a relative time of peace. It is hard to imagine how Western policymakers can sell such a proposition to the electorate. However, the proposition that NATO membership for Poland helps establish the continuity of democracy and free markets is accepted among most European security experts.

Another benefit that Poland would bring to the Alliance is frontier territory that would significantly increase NATO's defensive posture and be used to fight a future land war in Europe. The Poles unabashedly acknowledge that Poland offers the West and particularly Germany an initial buffer zone. Some have suggested that this is a cynical reason to offer Poland membership in NATO, yet the fact remains that Germany would prefer to extend the borders of stability further East. Expansion gives Poland security guarantees that will help protect democratic and market reforms. Polish officials point out that Konrad Adenauer credits NATO guarantees to the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950's as instrumental in its efforts to revitalize the German state after World War II.

Poland should also be admitted into NATO because of the West's moral obligation to right past wrongs of the earlier twenty-first century. Moreover, the argument that Poland as it now exists has a legitimate claim to being a "Western" country. Failing to resolve the perceived security vacuum would run counter to

NATO's post-1989 commitment to enhance stability to the East. Polish membership in NATO would increase the number of troops made available to NATO and other Western-sponsored multilateral and multinational operations. The so-called "collective bloodletting" that the Poles would bring to the Alliance would surely enhance NATO's peacekeeping and war fighting capabilities. Furthermore, Poland has demonstrated a willingness and an acumen for such operations through the use of well-trained troops. Extending NATO also extends the borders farther East where NATO troops in conjunction with Polish armed forces could combat waves of immigrants from the East as a result of civil war, nuclear accident or economic catastrophe. NATO's extensive C4I capabilities could be deployed further East to head off or at least signal early trouble.

Expanding NATO's frontiers under the aegis of an American-sponsored initiative would be a substantive sign to Europeans of a U.S. commitment on the Continent into the twenty-first century. American leaders could derail any European notion that American retrenchment on the European continent if advocated expanding the Alliance within the next five years. Planning to expand the Alliance within the next five years would be fundamentally more stable than attempting to expand after a Russian provocation. Expansion in this regard would be viewed as threatening Russia but as stabilizing the Central and Eastern European region. Most experts agree that expanding during a time of war would be seen as an escalatory maneuver. Security guarantees should be extended to Poland because of the substantial (Western) investment and the large consumer base for Western goods that would be at risk if Eastern instability infected Poland.

C. GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NATO EXPANSION

- Which western countries would benefit from NATO expansion and how would this affect the geo-strategic position?;
- NATO membership after EU and WEU membership;
- Tell those uninvited on first round that they can continue to work towards eventual membership;
- Force Hungary to sign an agreement promising not to veto Romanian membership in the future;
- Increase the importance of the CSCE consultative body in order not to freeze out Russia and its neighbors not asked to join.

Along with talk about expanding NATO to include Poland are the inevitable questions which are raised concerning which specific countries will be asked to join the Alliance. Polish officials generally advocate NATO expansion in a first round to include

the Visegrad Four with some apprehension about including Slovakia. Poland has seen itself as the leader of the four, based primarily on its large population and prominent lobbying position in the United States. The major problem with including only the Visegrad countries is the signal it gives to Russia over the extent to which NATO is willing to protect. The Romanians and Bulgarians, as well as the Baltic States, insist that to expand within the next five years to only the Visegrad, would be tantamount to ceding them to Russia's sphere of influence. Furthermore, these countries see new members of NATO as the primary obstacle preventing their membership in the future. To list but a few examples: Romania is concerned that Hungary would block its membership request in the future. Lithuania is also quietly questioning whether the Poles would endorse its membership in the future. Once expansion has been agreed upon by the Alliance members, the future European security architecture will have been initially cast. Whether or not the members intend it, declaring which countries will be offered membership and those left off the list will automatically create new political fault lines.

The NATO member to benefit directly from Eastern expansion is Germany. Projecting stability East would enhance the security along the German Eastern frontier. Additionally, NATO-sponsored expansion would mean that Germany would not be the sole country to take on the financial and political burden of integrating the East. Moreover, Germany's geo-strategic position would inevitably make it the regional arbiter among the smaller Visegrad states. The United States would also benefit from the standpoint that it would have more influence in the direction of political, military and economic decisions of Poland and the other Visegrad states.

Extending NATO's borders before full European Union and Western European Union membership is extended to Poland would have to be examined. The two arguments are that: (1) Poland must have security first and then economic integration; (2) Poland must have established a sturdy economic infrastructure prior to offering it any security guarantees. Regardless, the issue of NATO enlargement cannot be resolved without considering Poland's membership in EU and WEU. This is not to say that NATO expansion should happen after EU and WEU membership – only that discussions about NATO membership should take place considering each of the different Western European institutions.

For those countries left out of the initial call for new members, Alliance leaders should also issue a set of general guidelines to be met over an extended period of time, with no promise of eventual membership if these countries attain the goals. The acknowledgment that they would not be considered for early NATO membership

should accompany a statement confirming their importance to NATO and offering "substantial" assistance in the event they were attacked or threatened by a neighbor. In order not to leave countries like Romania and Bulgaria isolated from NATO, PfP could still be the best mechanism to encourage these states to adopt Western-style institutions. Hungary might also be forced to sign an agreement promising not to block a Romanian membership proposal if other NATO members thought Romania was ready for membership. Finally, to offset the impending criticism and alarm from Russia, NATO leaders could strengthen the CSCE body to display a continued willingness to consult and debate European security issues.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

- A Leading role in the expansion issue will lead to an American presence in Europe into the twenty-first century and realization, "that the world of the rich and secure is not an exclusive club and it is willing to accept...new members."⁴¹¹

At the end of the twentieth century, the United States is at an historical crossroads. Being on the leading edge of issues like NATO expansion will cast the United States as a continuing dominant force in European security matters. Though there has been an historic strain of isolationism among politicians and the electorate, the United States continues to have a vital interest in maintaining a presence on the European continent in the twenty-first century. Advocating NATO expansion and offering creative solutions to resolve the perception of a Central European security vacuum while simultaneously keeping the Russians engaged are substantive tasks that will illustrate a continued American resolve in Europe. Failure to proceed with a proactive policy would severely limit NATO's future *raison d'être* and U.S. status in Europe.

In this scenario, a Republican presidential candidate advocating integration of CEE states into NATO might persuade other European leaders (Britain, Germany and Italy) to support a more ambitious American position. Britain, Germany and Italy are more likely to support initiatives that imply an American commitment and counterbalance to France's leadership. As recently as September 23, 1994, the American commitment was questioned in the effort to choose a new Secretary General for NATO. *The Washington Post* observed that:

⁴¹¹Dr. Andrzej Olechowski, p. 8.

The United States hasn't really made a commitment to the transformation -- not just of membership but of purpose, identity and strategy -- that expansion would entail. Despite some positive rhetoric from the president and vice president, the gears of government are not grinding very fast to make it happen. The Partnership for Peace that the Clinton administration has offered to other states serves as much to buy time -- which admittedly has its uses -- as to ensure expansion...The fact is that the lead falls not to NATO's top bureaucrat in Brussels but to its principal member in Washington.⁴¹²

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR USING THE HARMEL REPORT

Expansion of the Atlantic Alliance utilizing the concepts of the Harmel Report and the post-1989 declarations is necessary to revitalize NATO and provide for its twenty-first century mission. NATO's *raison d'être* will be reinvigorated through the process of taking on new members. Far from being a solely military organization designed to deter a massive Soviet ground attack, the Harmel Report reemphasized the nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The Harmel Report can be the scaffolding around which a revitalized NATO organization revamps its mission and membership while adhering to the historic mission of "stability guarantor." NATO must continue to offer a credible military deterrent to its members while conducting political rapprochement with the East.

The Atlantic Alliance is attempting to attain these two goals in the post-Cold War era through the implementation of the New Strategic Concept. The political indecision of Western leaders to respond to the Bosnian War, however, has cast doubt on NATO's ability to respond to turmoil. NATO must continue to prepare for the eventuality of large scale conflicts and diffuse threats. Adhering to the principles of the Harmel Report will enable NATO leaders to recognize one of two core functions: preserving military strength. The other core function of the Alliance -- attempting to reach political solutions, must also be utilized. The Harmel Report's emphasis on the political means is preserved through the creation of the NACC, the PfP program, the revival of the European Identity and the Combined Joint Task Forces. For the most part, these institutions enhance military cooperation, but through a political mechanism. NATO expansion must be carried out with special attention paid to the political implications of offering military security guarantees.

⁴¹²"NATO's Leader," *The Washington Post*, 23 September 1994, p. 26.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, recently wrote that there still remains a heavy dose of criticism reserved for NATO members and their lack of will to resolve the war in the former-Yugoslavia. In disputing this cynicism, he points out the vast resources NATO has provided to the UN effort. He writes that,

Within these criticisms, there seems to be some lack of understanding about the high level of commitment already demonstrated collectively by NATO, which has responded positively to every call for support made by the United Nations under the authority of existing Security Council Resolutions...Today, the reality is that NATO integrated forces make the largest single contribution to the international effort in former Yugoslavia. Excluding forces serving directly under UN command, there are now over 100 aircraft, more than a dozen highly capable ships and some 10,000 men and women from Alliance nations conducting NATO integrated maritime and air operations in support of the United Nations effort...In addition, a further 15,000 personnel are contributed directly by Alliance nations to UNPROFOR operations. Thus out of a total of approximately 34,000 personnel now committed in support of UN operations associated with the former Yugoslavia, about 25,000 - that is about three quarters of them - come directly or via the Alliance from NATO nations.⁴¹³

One could categorize the aforementioned declarations, reports and treaty into the following order based upon their chronological and relevant factors that influenced the others.

The Washington Treaty - articulated the goals, purpose and mission of the Atlantic Alliance, backed up with a political and military dimension.

The Harmel Report - reiterated the principles of the Washington Treaty emphasizing the military and political aspects to maintain European stability.

The London Declaration - became the watershed document which restated the premise of its existence in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Harmel Report. However, it cast aside traditional views of the East, extended a hand of friendship to the East and laid the groundwork for a complete overhaul of the Alliance's strategic mission.

⁴¹³Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, *NATO Review*, p 10.

The Copenhagen Declaration - further reiterated the London Summit, emphasized closer military contacts between NATO and the CEE states and listed four fundamental tasks of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Rome Declaration - again reiterated the Atlantic Alliance's long-standing purpose and established the NACC and introduced the New Strategic Concept.

The Brussels Declaration - under the auspices of the NACC, NATO created the PfP initiative, the CJTF concept and the European Identity.

To the extent that these declarations have all contributed to a better understanding of NATO's purpose, they have all been successful. Additionally, the statements made therein, have succeeded in promoting and accomplishing several initiatives rarely credited to NATO. Far from being a decisive factor in redefining Europe's post-Cold War security environment, numerous examples of NATO's utility, as a result of these declarations, have been offered to support the notion that despite press reports to the contrary, NATO is as relevant today as it was during the apex of East-West tensions. The worst case scenario would be to witness the transmogrification of the Alliance into a CSCE institution prostrate from taking military actions without the unanimous consent of an unruly collection of three or four dozen members. Jeffrey Simon concludes that,

NATO has been quite responsive to the Central and East European states in terms of the many discussions held during the short time since those states obtained their freedom. But...the C/EE states clearly believe that meetings are not enough. Moreover, because the NACC has rapidly broadened its membership to thirty-six states, it now suffers the danger of becoming neutralized in the manner of the United Nations and the CSCE. As a credible security institution, NATO retains an essential role in the protection of European peace and stability.⁴¹⁴

Despite the numerous arguments that portend to know the next course for NATO, it seems likely that Russia can no longer be considered a partner in a utopian New World Order. Instead, because of Russia's domestic instability and its newly emboldened foreign and military policy designed to affect a larger sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the rise of ultra-nationalist forces and the raging Bosnian War, NATO must do what it has been doing for the past five decades and adapt to a changing international environment.

The argument presented is that Russia is still a threat by the very nature of its military and foreign policy and that security guarantees are a necessity in order to

⁴¹⁴Jeffrey Simon, *Orbis*, Winter 1993, pp. 31-32.

ensure stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. Though the NACC and the Partnership for Peace initiative are steps in the right direction, they fall short of offering credible and substantive security guarantees and thus create what Henry Kissinger has described as the emergence of a "no-man's-land between Germany and Russia." Accordingly, NATO must, in conforming with its own charter, go out-of-area and expand to incorporate Central and Eastern European nations that are serious about becoming democratic-market economies and provide a stable environment to do it. It is because of the North Atlantic Treaty's articles that an expansion is both legal and within the bounds of precedence.

The Russian view of the Polish navy's revival is at best skeptical of Poland's attempt to integrate into western defense organizations. Russian officials view Poland's efforts as possibly destabilizing to the Baltic region because they fear Russia's isolation from the West, an overwhelming Western dominance in the Baltic, and an increasing effort by the United States to reassert its dominance in the East using Poland and the three Baltic States as staging areas for offensive amphibious operations against Russia. Writing in the Moscow publication *Foreign Military Review*, two senior Russian officers detailed what they believe are substantive efforts by the United States to claim a dominant position in the Baltic Sea.⁴¹⁵

Russians will continue to view any Polish efforts to reestablish a credible coastal defense and subsequent relations with Western institutions as inherently threatening to Russian interests. Regardless of any legitimate Polish security concerns and long-stated intentions to encourage mutually beneficial military and economic relations, there will always be a portion of the Russian political and military elite that will concoct any number of conspiracy theories. The tone of anti-Western and non-Russian xenophobic declarations may well increase in stridency among most factions. Even if Russian leaders tone down their nationalistic rhetoric, Russia will continue to be a competitor with the West, NATO and the United States. To be so naive as to suggest that the Cold War is over ignores the geo-political realities associated with traditional Russian actions. Defense Secretary William Perry, acknowledging a continued competition with Russia, regardless of any rapprochement, stated that,

⁴¹⁵Maj. Gen. A. Meshkov and Col. A. Nikolayev, pp. 9-11. The authors suggest that in the event that a confrontational situation between Russia and the Baltic countries worsen, a maritime component of "reaction forces" would be created. This would include "100 or more ships [and]...Further reinforcement with ships from the Polish Navy (up to 30 ships, including 10-12 guided-missile ships) is not ruled out."

Russia is our partner and our rival, at one and the same time. We must be aware that our relationship contains elements of both...Reality No. 1 is that, even given the very best of the imaginable outcomes in Russia today, i.e. given a fully democratic and market-oriented Russia, this new Russia will have interests different from ours...Reality No. 2 is the very worst of the possible outcomes, and we must be prepared for it. It is possible that Russia will emerge from its uneasy times as an autocratic, militarist, imperialist state hostile to the West.⁴¹⁶

Though most of these threats exist in a semi-dormant, semi-static state, the probability that they could become a problem remains significant. Henry Kissinger notes that, "If Russia is to become a serious partner in building a new world order, it must be ready for the disciplines of stability as well as for its benefits." In other words, Russia is not simply, "entitled to be handed the sphere of influence that Czars and commissars have coveted all around Russia's vast borders for 300 years."⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, as a means of avoiding the next cold war, the United States and NATO must make it abundantly clear precisely where Western interest lie -- to draw lines rather than let others draw them in ways and places that threaten U.S. interests.

The international vice president of Dow Jones & Co., recently wrote that "Eastern Europe and the Baltic States may not remain truly free and independent nations because the West cravenly temporizes today about their status in mere anticipation of Russian displeasure."⁴¹⁸ Along with the aggressive Russian foreign policy and the latest military doctrine, a large showing of support for ultranationalist candidates in the December 1993 parliamentary elections has fueled anxiety among its Central and Eastern European neighbors about Russia's intentions. Coupled with Russian aggressiveness has been an American acquiescence of Russian aims. This is in addition to numerous arguments against expansion of either NATO membership or a broader interpretation of its historic goals. NATO's new goal must go beyond its traditional role like Ambassador von Moltke states, NATO's goal is not only to enhance the projection of stability but to make constructive contributions to the development of security structures integrating the countries of Central and Eastern Europe....⁴¹⁹

Although it would be misleading to label Russia a threat as this term applied to the former Soviet Union, the fact remains that Russia's internal instability coupled with

⁴¹⁶Secretary of Defense William Perry cited by Vladimir Nadein, p. 2.

⁴¹⁷Henry Kissinger, *Time*, p. 75.

⁴¹⁸Karen Elliott House, 24 February 1994.

⁴¹⁹Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, pp. 9-11.

the efforts to redefine its geopolitical role in Central and Eastern Europe makes it ominously threatening to former Warsaw Pact countries. Russia can be still considered a threat for the following reasons: the rise in popularity of ultranationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky; the confrontational nature of the Russian military doctrine; the imperial mindset of current Russian leaders and the nature of Russian foreign policy initiatives. Most NATO experts agree that even without Soviet Communism, there still exists any number of crises on Central and Eastern Europe's periphery that could easily engulf Western Europe and NATO in turmoil. John Kriendler remarked that the passing of the Soviet threat has, "revealed a multitude of crises, active and latent risks...Nationalism in some places is out of control."⁴²⁰ It is also judicious to provide an abbreviated list of conclusions and recommendations for NATO, the United States and Poland:

- Establish a coherent strategy aimed at coordinating the integration of the Visegrad Four (particularly Poland);
- Offer simultaneous economic integration for those countries that have undertaken substantial market reforms into the European Union;
- View expansion as taking a step towards Russia, rather than analyzing the Eastern extension of NATO as provocative to Russian security concerns;⁴²¹
- View "out-of-area" crises as within the sphere of NATO collective defense action;
- Moderate the present "Russia-first" policy. It should become neither Russo-centric nor Russo-phobic but rather "Russo-realistic." This is a policy that provides closer coordination and integration for those countries most serious about establishing democratic and free market institutions;
- Do not grant Russia a special "sphere of influence" and veto power over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- Offer membership to the various Central and Eastern European countries based on their accomplishments towards democratic and market reforms and towards fulfilling the prerequisite steps;
- Offer a specific list of guidelines and timetable for membership;

⁴²⁰John Kriendler. *NATO Review*, p. 16. Mr. Kriendler is Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs & Director, Political Directorate. In order to avert these crises, Mr. Kriendler has recommended adopting bolder NATO initiatives in crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking as well as a greater reliance on NACC to provide consultation with all members on issues of regional security.

⁴²¹Ronald D. Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, p. 37.

- Do not grant Russia a "privileged position or a protector/guarantor status vis-à-vis eastern Europe or Ukraine. Nor can it be given a veto power over Western collective security arrangements;"⁴²²
- Publicly object to the specific portions of the Russian military doctrine that threaten armed conflict if NATO pursues a policy of expanding the Alliance;
- Make PfP a progressive extension;
- Emphasize requirements and rules for all partners;
- Make consultations and perhaps defining joint actions to maintain peace of non-NATO members;
- Emphasize bilateral agreements among PfP and NATO members to increase cooperation/diversity;
- Change requirements for unanimous consent;
- Keep WEU and EU in mind while deciding whether and when to enlarge;
- Avoid establishing a "two-tiered Alliance" whereby some members would have some but not all of the Alliance's security guarantees or merely associate membership.

Though PfP was initially regarded as a "graceful hedge" against making tough decisions on expansion, its utility as a mechanism for integrating CEE states is gaining more support. In the future, NATO must continue to emphasize the progressive nature of PfP in the sense that adhering to the program's broad guidelines will in fact enhance its chances at membership. NATO must not go on record as excluding the possibility of some PfP members never gaining membership. Yet, the *consensus omnium* reflects an unwillingness and incapacity to ever allow Belarus, Russia, Ukraine or the other former Soviet republics to enter NATO in the distant future. Ambiguity in this situation seems justifiable.

NATO should also stress to Russia and any other CEE states left out of near term membership that the NACC, PfP and bi-lateral relations should still be supported at every opportunity. Simply gathering Poland and the other Visegrad states under the Atlantic Alliance's nuclear umbrella does not mean that Europe has to return to a Cold War scenario. Therefore, there exists a fundamental necessity for NATO and Western leaders to continue to promote the utility of NACC, PfP, CSCE and any other "All European" initiative. NATO should seriously consider reworking the unanimous consent rule if it intends to function successfully at any bureaucratic-military level in

⁴²²Senator Richard Lugar, 30 August 1993, p. 66.

Brussels. NATO leaders might consider maintaining a unanimous consent on Article 5 decisions and a two-thirds majority in all other administrative issues. NATO leaders will also have to work with the European Union and Western European Union officials during the selection of new members on a consultative basis. Keeping in mind that EU and WEU membership will play into the calculus of European security affairs. NATO must not establish a "two-tiered" Alliance where some members would have nuclear guarantees and others -- because of the political ramification -- were left out. To do so would be to degrade the legitimacy of Article 5 and the security guarantees each signatory agrees to uphold.

The next two or three years will be critical elections for the presidency of the Russian Federation, the presidency of France, the Bundestag in Germany, the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. It may well be that the results of those elections will be the most important determinant of the future European security framework, rather than the intrinsic logic of the situation.⁴²³

The decision to allow the Central and Eastern European countries into NATO will be a political one and will of course be determined by a *consensus omnium* and not necessarily dependent upon any levels of sustained or achieved requirements by CEE states. Renationalization of threat perceptions and regionalism stand in the way of a unified NATO response to expansion. Regardless of what the United States, Germany or France might advocate regarding NATO expansion, the decision to allow new members will be as a result of unanimous consent in the North Atlantic Council and successful ratification in sixteen legislative bodies. Though countries like Luxembourg and Iceland may have no overriding concerns regarding NATO expansion, some countries -- namely the Southern tier states--will fight hard to keep the Alliance at sixteen members. A joint communiqué by the foreign ministers of Germany and Britain (Klaus Kinkel and Douglas Hurd) reiterated the belief in both countries that American involvement in eastern expansion is crucial for future expansion. They write,

Enlarging NATO is a decision for the Alliance as a whole -- not just for Britain and Germany. All its members, above all the United States which continues to do so much to maintain European security, must give their wholehearted consent...Without a continuing stake by the United States

⁴²³John Roper, p. 11. Roper writes that, "As far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, there appears to be a general wish in Europe, particularly in Western and Central Europe, for its maintenance as an insurance policy against a deterioration of the security environment. There is a wish for a continued United States' presence on the continent of Europe but growing uncertainties in the United States and particularly in the United States Congress as to whether this is an appropriate use of US tax dollars," p. 8.

in European affairs, enlargement of the EU and NATO cannot succeed.⁴²⁴

As long as expansion remains an issue, NATO members will continue to turn to the three basic "C" issues as their rallying cry against immediate NATO expansion: increased *costs*, increased *commitments* and degraded *cohesion*. Support for NATO expansion and a more critical appraisal of the Partnership for Peace charter may only come about through a change in the North American or European leadership, reconstitution of a clear existential threat, or improvement in the overall economic situation that would allow for greater resources to be diverted to CEE countries.

⁴²⁴"Hurd, Kinkel Visualize Enlarged Europe, NATO," p. 1.

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