


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF
CONTRACT # DABT65-93-D-0002, DELIVERY ORDER 0037

TO

MISSION CONTRACTING ACTIVITY
AND
BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY (BCBL)
COMBINED ARMS CENTER



BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY (BCBL)
BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED COMBAT
TRAINING CENTER ROTATION (BCFR) PROGRAM

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FINAL REPORT
FROM BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (WARFIGHTER)
JUNE 1995


August 1, 1995

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5300

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**BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY BCBL
BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED COMBAT TRAINING
CENTER ROTATION (BCFR) PROGRAM
FINAL REPORT
FROM BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (WARFIGHTER)
JUNE 1995**

"The view, opinions and findings contained in this document are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation."

BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ROTATION (BCFR) PROGRAM



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FINAL REPORT FROM BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (WARFIGHTER) JUNE 1995 OF THE BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ROTATION (BCFR) PROGRAM

August 1, 1995

WHERE TOMORROW'S VICTORIES BEGIN

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SECTION 1

EVOLUTION OF THE BATTLE COMMAND COMBAT TRAINING CENTER FOCUSED ROTATION (BCFR) PROGRAM

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Battle Command Focused Rotation (BCFR) program has grown from the need to understand how commanders develop and execute battle-focused leadership and battle judgment. Development of a battle command benchmark from which the Army can develop competencies and enabling technologies will ensure the ability to meet future requirements of Force XXI. This effort will ensure that the Army understands and prepares commanders to execute battle command and, concurrently, will maximize the Army's investment in information-age technology. Leaders cannot simply view battle command as a checklist; they must understand it as both an art and a science, based in knowledge and effecting high-payoff actions on the battlefield, and is more than command and control.

The recognition of shortfalls in the current preparation of battle commanders to routinely demonstrate battle command competencies has created the need for the BCFR. The Battle Command Battle Lab (BCBL), in conjunction with the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), will conduct focused rotations to:

- Examine battle command competencies required during planning, preparation, and execution of operations
- Identify information needs and shortfalls and then link the shortfalls to information technology requirements
- Focus on how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command
- Identify systematic problems in the development, preparation, and support of battle commanders and their staff; and identify solutions
- Increase the focus on, and understanding of, the art and concept of battle command.

1.2 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BCFR

In August, 1993, the BCBL received tasking from the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (CG TRADOC), to conduct a program of battle command focused combat training center (CTC) rotations. The program's intent was to correlate what battle commanders do, what we train them to do, and what research is doing to assist them.

Subsequently, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA), announced his Force XXI vision, with its mission for the U.S. Army to begin now to design the 21st century force (Force XXI). The program is to achieve related fielding and support decisions by

the year 2000 to ensure full fielding of the total Army force that is capable of meeting our nation's 21st century challenges.

In response to the CSA vision for Force XXI, CG TRADOC promulgated TRADOC PAM 525-5 (1 August 1994), which underscores the reality that battle command remains a combination of art and science, with an imperative that commanders apply principles, design considerations, and build frameworks for situations and scenarios that are unpredictable. Commanders skilled in the art of military operations, and capable of adjusting rapidly to the temporal and spatial variations of new battlespace, are key to winning on the battlefields of the future. This is, in effect, exercising battle command-- "The art of battle decision-making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions."

It is from this background that the program has evolved, with its requirement to understand how to, and to enhance the ability to, determine battle command competencies, to identify information needs and shortfalls with a focus on teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command, and to increase the focus on and understanding of the art and concept of battle command. This evolution continues with the creation of a battle command course, as directed by the Commander, Combat Arms Command (CDR CAC).

1.3 PURPOSE

The purpose of the BCFR program is to examine battle command competencies required during planning, preparation, and execution of a BCTP warfighter exercise (WFX) and CTC rotation. It will require assessing unit operations to identify information needs and shortfalls, linking shortfalls to technology

requirements, and focusing on how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command. The BCFR program will provide a benchmark from which battle command competencies and enabling technologies can be institutionally adjusted and will provide insights across the domains of doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) that will contribute to validation of the Force XXI concept. This document is the basis for laying out the educational strategy, from entry level through precommand course, to support the BCBL BCFR program.

1.4 CONCEPT

The BCFR concept implements the planning, integration, and execution of requirements necessary to accomplish the BCBL BCFR program. Requirements include identifying battle command competencies and shortfalls; identifying information flows and shortfalls; understanding the battle commander's development process; recommending solutions; and improving battle command execution, development, and support. Technical and functional requirements include improving educational, psychological, and sociological understanding of the cognitive processes, behaviors, information flows, and patterns of learning needed to successfully practice the art of command; identifying requirements for the development of an education strategy and enabling technologies that will improve the development and performance of battle commanders; and providing input and recommendations that will reconcile observed battle command competencies, information flows, and development processes with the challenges posed by the digital battlefield systemic problems identified during the project.

Battle command as a separate combat function in our doctrine is as new as the publication of FM 100-5, *Operations*, in June 1993. However, commanders have practiced battle command throughout the history of warfare. Its introduction is the result

of a deliberate process that the Army has undertaken to adjust, in an evolutionary but timely manner, to significant changes. The aim of the battle command concept is to distinguish the essence of command (what the commander does) from its implementing functions (the hardware, technology, and organizations that commanders use). Focus on the commander will prevent us from being captured by the current worn-out C2 engine (with its fixations on command posts, large tactical staffs, and current programs) as we move into the information age.

Battle command is the art of making battle decisions, and leading and motivating soldiers and units into action. It includes the commander's ability to visualize the current and future states, then to formulate concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. It is a dynamic and iterative process. The current vision of battle command assumes fundamentally competent commanders, who have the necessary intuitive sense of operational units and soldiers and are able to visualize the battlefield.

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Research planning identified and formulated nine hypotheses, based on the BCFR mission statement. Three hypotheses address competencies, five address information shortfalls, and one addresses teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command. Continuing the development of hypotheses and getting them "about right" is critical to successful development of the data collection methodology. The nine hypotheses form the foundation and basis for success of the BCFR program and are developed into the three areas of battle command.

- Competencies

- Information shortfalls
- Teach, coach, mentor.

The following hypotheses represent the current basis of BCFR validation efforts of battle command strengths and weaknesses.

HYPOTHESES: COMPETENCIES

- H-1: The following tasks, identified in FM 100-5, *Operations*, pages 2-14 and 2-15, adequately and accurately describe what battle commanders need to be able to do:

-Lead	-Decide	-Visualize
-Build teams	-Assimilate information	-Communicate
-Anticipate	-Motivate	-Direct
-Demonstrate physical and moral presence		

- H-2: Intuition, habit, self-discipline, and self-motivation are required to successfully command in battle.
- H-3: Effective battle command techniques and procedures can be developed.

HYPOTHESES: INFORMATION SHORTFALLS

- H-4: Commanders systematically manage key information requirements
- H-5: Commanders follow through when they receive key information.
- H-6: Information leakage occurs in the information acquisition and delivery system established by a commander. (Integrated into hypothesis 4.)
- H-7: Information shortfalls at the point of a commander's decisions can be identified.
- H-8: Information flows both vertically and horizontally in high-performing units.

HYPOTHESIS: TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR BATTLE

COMMAND

- H-9: Battle commanders teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

The analysis effort centered on validation of the BCBL BCFR hypothesis. Researchers used observations and a variety of data collection instruments to collect data. The following paragraphs show how the data collection instruments are focused to support the validation of hypotheses:

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1: The following tasks identified in FM 100-5, *Operation*, pages 2-14 and 2-15, adequately and accurately describe what battle commanders need to be able to do:

- Lead
 - Visualize
 - Communicate
 - Anticipate
 - Assimilate information
 - Demonstrate physical and moral presence
 - Decide
 - Build teams
 - Direct
 - Motivate
-

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOCUS

- Battle command competency
- Battle command decision-making expertise.

HYPOTHESES

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOCUS

Hypothesis 2: Intuition, habit, self-discipline, and self-motivation are required to successfully command in battle.

- Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Hypothesis 3: Effective battle command techniques and procedures can be developed.

- Battle command visualization
 - Battle command initial impressions
 - Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.
-

Hypothesis 4: Commanders systematically manage key information requirements.

- Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.
 - Battle command initial impressions.
-

HYPOTHESES

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOCUS

Hypothesis 5: Commanders follow through when they receive key information requirements.

- Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.
-

Hypothesis 6: Information leakage occurs in the information acquisition and delivery system established by a commander.

- Battle command information.
-

Hypothesis 7: Information shortfalls at the point of a commander's decisions can be identified.

- Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.
-

Hypothesis 8: Information flows both vertically and horizontally in high-performing units.

- Battle command tactics, techniques, and procedures.
-

HYPOTHESES

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOCUS

Hypothesis 9: Battle commanders teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

- Teach, coach, and mentor
- Battle command tactics, techniques and procedures.

1.6 DATA COLLECTION ANALYSIS TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The analytical team collected and reduced the data to show strengths, weaknesses, significant observations, and validated issues. The following are definitions and parameters that the team used to develop the BCTP warfighter rotation results. The team coordinated the parameters with the Army Research Institute (ARI), which agreed that these parameters were the best criteria for this analysis.

Count: Total opportunities to make observations.

Observations: Number of observations (An observation was recorded on an observation card).

Strength: The commander recognized the problem and applied a solution that was successful.

Weakness: The problem was not recognized, or, when it was recognized, the responsible party failed to take proper actions or applied an unsuccessful solution.

Trends: Trends are set by observations that could not be validated by the 80 percent of strength or weakness rule, but were significant in that the observation contained a majority of between 55-79 percent of the total incidents, either as a strength or weakness. Determination of the selection parameter was dependent upon total number of actual observations. Key here is that an incident had to occur in a majority of the observations.

Significant Observation: This is an observation that is, in itself, significant, but that cannot be validated and does not establish a trend. An example would be an observation that had either no strength incidents or no weakness incidents, or had a 50/50 representation of strength and weakness.

Education Solutions: Military education that the Department of Defense provides and prescribes as part of the normal education process for officers or NCOs.

Training: Generally considered to be command post exercises (CPXs), field training exercises (FTXs), CTC rotations, BCTP participation, and participation in other simulations that may

occur in either a garrison or field environment. Officer/NCO personnel development is also considered training.

1.7 OBJECTIVES OF DATA COLLECTION EFFORT

The objectives of the focused rotation functional assessment were to:

- Examine battle command competencies required during planning, preparation, and execution of operations
- Identify information needs and shortfalls and then link the shortfalls to information technology requirements
- Focus on how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command
- Identify systematic problems in the development, preparation, and support of battle commanders and their staffs; and identify solutions
- Increase the focus on, and understanding of, the art and concept of battle command.

To meet the objective of the focused rotation, the collection team designed and utilized the following collection instruments:

- Observer/Controller (O/C) Observation Data Collection Booklet

- Battle Commander Interview Questionnaire
- Battle Commander Supplementary Questionnaire.

The observer/controllers made observations in the following areas during the rotation:

- Display of decision-making expertise
- Demonstration of dynamics and tenets of battle command
- Fundamental knowledge of the art and science of battle command
- Demonstration of techniques and procedures of battle command
- Demonstration of ability to visualize the battlefield
- Systematic management of key information requirements
- Demonstration of ability to teach, coach, and mentor.

During the NTC rotations, five data collectors made the battle command observations at the following locations:

- Brigade (BDE) - 2
- Division Artillery (DIVARTY) - 1
- Aviation (Bde) - 1
- Division Support Command (DISCOM) - 1.

SECTION 2

RESULTS OF OBSERVER/CONTROLLER DATA COLLECTION EFFORT

Based on available data collection events, the following initial analysis results are provided from the observer/controller data collection effort and the interviews. (This initial analysis did not consider data from supplementary questionnaires.)

2.1 EXAMINE BATTLE COMMANDERS' COMPETENCIES (HYPOTHESES 1-3)

Strength:

- Maintains focus on mission
- Establishes and maintains good coordination between fires and maneuver
- Has dynamic battlefield visualization
- Understands unit boundaries
- Asks critical questions

- Demonstrates technical knowledge and expertise in the battlefield operating system (BOS)
 - Fire support
 - Combat service support

- Understands own unit/own slice
- Directs needed actions
- Demonstrates flexibility
- Communicates intent and orders
- Uses doctrinal techniques and methods
- Understands mission, task, and purpose.

Weakness:

- Makes the best use of available resources
- Provides key details in orders (fires, maneuver, full dimensional battle)
- Demonstrates leadership

- Displays conceptualization ability
- Identifies decision points
- Integrates time and space dynamics into a single unifying concept or operation
- Conducts effective rehearsal
- Avoids enemy strengths and attacks enemy weaknesses
- Achieves synchronization
- Shows initiative within higher intent
- Accomplishes the unit's mission
- Demonstrates the conservation of combat power.

Data from previous combat training center rotations showed that battle commanders were deficient in the critical elements of decision-making and battlefield visualization. Data collected during this rotation shows a significant decrease in the areas of decision-making and battlefield visualization; these need emphasis.

Significant Observation: Manages time well.

The above significant observation evolved from an area of weakness in previous observations. That means that the observation appeared an equal number of times both as a strength and as needing emphasis. Rationale for this change is that it resulted from the break in the warfighter, which allowed more time for planning.

2.2 INFORMATION FLOWS AND SHORTFALLS (HYPOTHESES 4-8)

Strength: Agility.

Weakness:

- Crosstalk not present during the mission
- Establishes information flags
- Uses briefing/briefbacks.

Significant Observation: Sets trigger/decision points.

The above significant observation has evolved from areas needing emphasis to the level that it appears 50 percent of the time as a weakness and 50 percent of the time as a strength. This may indicate that during the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation, the brigade improved information flows considerably and the brigade commander placed emphasis on the utilization of trigger and decision points.

2.3 FOCUS HOW WE TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR (HYPOTHESIS 9)

Strength: None.

Weakness: Establishes conditions for teaching, coaching, and mentoring.

Significant Observations: None.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

The results of this data collection event and the follow-on analysis has painted a different and varied picture in the areas of battle command competencies and information flows. However, the underlying weaknesses are strongly supported statistically and subjectively. The following major areas of strength, weakness, and significant observations are provided as conclusions from the assessment of the BCTP rotation.

2.5 MAJOR AREAS OF STRENGTH

- Maintains focus on mission
- Has dynamic battlefield visualization
- Establishes and maintains good coordination between fires and maneuvers
- Asks critical questions

- Demonstrates technical knowledge and expertise in the fire support and combat service support BOSs
- Demonstrates flexibility
- Communicates intent and orders
- Understands mission.

2.6 MAJOR AREAS OF WEAKNESS

The following areas of weakness and significant observations are provided as recommended areas of emphasis for further CTC rotations:

- Provides key details in orders
- Uses available resources
- Demonstrates leadership
- Displays conceptualization ability
- Conducts effective rehearsal
- Identifies decision points of areas, time, and action
- Shows initiative

- Achieves synchronization
- Uses briefbacks/briefing
- Lacks crosstalk during missions.

2.7 MAJOR AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS

- Manages time well
- Sets trigger/decision points.

The major areas of weakness and strength vary in this BCTP report from a CTC rotation. Conspicuously absent as weaknesses are integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the BOSs, including allocating planning time for this level of command--division/brigade rationale level versus brigade level--and this operation's complexity.

SECTION 3

RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS

Results of Interviews - Brigade Commanders (two).

3.1 BATTLE COMMANDER'S COMPETENCIES

- Problem solving, planning, decision-making, visualization, and conceptualization were seen as problems that need special emphasis because of their cognitive nature.
- To place special emphasis on these areas, the following actions were recommended
 - Develop a method for task-saturated training
 - Develop a scenario for a worst day at the NTC and train to it
 - Develop a multimedia interactive automated training module to teach cognitive skills with a menu of items so individual commanders and staffs can train to standards with repetition. This will provide the needed expansion and repetition.
- Training must take the commander and staff away from the home-station environment.

- The following is a seven-step thought process that a brigade commander recommended to help with the decision-making and problem-solving processes.

SEVEN-STEP THOUGHT PROCESS

1. Identify enemy center of gravity - RAG.
2. Identify enemy vulnerabilities - RECON, communications, bypassed forces.
3. Identify friendly center of gravity - AR CO with the Mech TF.
4. Identify friendly vulnerabilities - protection from IF, range at 11M1.
5. Protect our vulnerabilities - get inf into fight, mobility.
6. Attack the enemy vulnerabilities - unmask RAG early, DF and jam FOs, use smoke.
7. Develop the end state.

3.2 INFORMATION FLOWS AND SHORTFALLS

- Systematic management of key information requirements is not done well by more than 50 percent of commanders

- The solution is to:
 - Teach commanders to work with precondition indicators
 - Identify preconditions and then CCIR
 - Include in Officer Leader Development Education Strategy.

Repetition is the only solution.

3.3 TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR BATTLE COMMAND

Training opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring of battle command are available. However, the developing leader must utilize these opportunities. Teaching, coaching, and mentoring are not being done well.

In addition, young leaders need:

- More training opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring
- More experience before assuming command.

The information received through the interviews agrees with the results of the analysis of data collected by the observer/controllers. The key here is that to support training and sustainment of cognitive skills, the Army must place more emphasis on training the commander and staff as a team, using a training system that offers repetition in the thought processes and, thereby, providing experience in this area. The most popular solution is the development of a multimedia interactive automated training module that will enable the commander and staff to train to standards.

SECTION 4
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

This document compiles the result of surveys completed by brigade commanders and gathers their mutual impressions following a warfighter exercise. The following summarizes the results of that survey.

4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN BATTLE COMMAND COMPETENCIES

Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of battle command competencies? Please select one of the three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

NOTE: Only two questionnaires have been returned to date. (Survey population - two.)
--

<u>Systemic Problems</u> PROBLEM-SOLVING AND PLANNING	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-6
1. Recognize and define problems.	1	1		2
2. Gather the facts and make assumptions.		2		
3. Determine the scope of and the solution to problems.	1	1		1
4. Develop possible solutions to problems.	1	1		4

<u>Systemic Problems</u> PROBLEM-SOLVING AND PLANNING	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-6
5. Analyze and compare possible solutions.	1	1		3
6. Select the best solution to the problem.		2		

<u>Systemic Problems</u> DECISION-MAKING	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-15
1. Ability to decide when the decision is appropriate.	1	1		5
2. Recognize the need to decide.		2		
3. Demonstrate the knowledge of what to decide.	1	1		3
4. Demonstrate when to decide.		2		
5. Reflect or understand the ramifications of the decision correctly.	1	1		4
6. Understand the intentions of the next two higher headquarters.		2		
7. Provide unit intentions, concept, and allocation of resources.		2		
8. Identify beforehand those irrevocable actions.	1	1		7
9. Manage time appropriately.	2			6, 1
10. Choose the most appropriate decision-making method (deliberate, quick, combat).		2		
11. Quickly generates a schema and initial plan based on experience.	1	1		1
12. Asks the right questions.	1	1		2
13. Develop a mental model dynamic in space and time.		2		

<u>Systemic Problems</u> DECISION-MAKING	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-15
14. Use mental model to visualize outcomes.		2		
15. Develop a robust and flexible plan.	1	1		8

<u>Systemic Problems</u> CONCEPTUALIZATION	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-9
1. Demonstrate the ability to convey visualization for the whole organization to include the connectivity between current operations and the future plan.		2		
2. Establish connectivity between current operations and the future plan.		2		
3. Concisely portray how the elements of the command will operate together.	1	1		1
4. Include an overall scheme of operations.		2		
5. Portray the coordination required to support the scheme of operations.	1	1		4
6. Portray the sequential "phases" of the operations.		2		
7. State priorities.	1	1		2
8. State acceptable risks.	1	1		3
9. Enable subordinates to act in the absence of orders or unforeseen operations.	1	1		5

<u>Systemic Problems</u> VISUALIZATION	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-14
1. Demonstrate the ability to form a mental picture of the current and future state within battlespace.		2		
2. Form a mental picture of the current/future state based on intents, available information, and intuitions.		2		
3. Form a commander's estimate for terrain, enemy, and friendly forces.		2		
4. Envision organization's future state within its battlespace.	1	1		8
5. Ability to visualize self, enemy, and terrain.		2		
6. Ability to visualize the future.		1		
7. Ability to understand the situation.	1	1		3
8. Accurately know the battlefield elements	1	1		5
9. Accurately comprehend the battlefield elements in time, space, and purpose.	1	1		4
10. Has tactical and technical proficiency.	1	1		1
11. Knows the soldiers.	1	1		7
12. Can appreciate terrain.	1	1		6
13. Understand weapons, equipment and requirements for force sustainment	1	1		1
14. Has proficient knowledge of battlefield relevant objects, attributes, and relationships.	1	1		2

4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN INFORMATION FLOWS AND MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION

Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of information flows and management of information? Please select one of the three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

<u>Systemic Problems</u> INFORMATION ASSIMILATION	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
1. Demonstrate the ability to assimilate available information and selectively comprehend that which is important.	1	1		4
2. Comprehend what information was important.	1	1		5
3. Plan for and identify CCIR.	1	1		3
4. Determine, specify, and communicate which information items were critical.	1	1		1
5. Focus the command on those critical items of information.	1	1		2
6. Demonstrate the ability to quickly assess the current operations in relation to future missions.	1	1		6
7. Assure the unit was tailored to provide CCIR and enhance decision-making.		2		
8. Adapt organization, CCIR, and decision-making tempo.		2		

<u>Systemic Problems</u> COMMUNICATION		Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-12
1.	Demonstrate the ability to receive information and convey that information to subordinates precisely in written and oral form?		2		
2.	Receive information from a variety of sources.		2		
3.	Facilitate an open and honest climate for communication?		2		
4.	Foster the unit's ability to implement implicit communications. How well does unit "know" commander (i.e., familiarity and trust)?	1	1		1
5.	Communicate precise oral instructions?		2		
6.	Communicate precise written instructions?		2		
7.	Communicate vision clearly?		2		
8.	Use doctrinally correct terms?		2		
9.	Use the most effective media to communicate given the situation?		2		
10.	Is use of language clear?		2		
11.	Communicate the purpose and method of achieving the intent of the end state?		2		
12.	Require briefs, briefbacks, and rehearsals?		2		

4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN THE FOCUS OF HOW WE TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR BATTLE COMMAND

Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of teach, coach, and mentor battle command? Please select one of the

three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

Systemic Problems TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR		Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
1.	Ability to establish conditions to teach, coach, and mentor battle command.	1	1		4
2.	Has teach, coach, and mentor capability for interaction generated by cause and effect observations.		2		
3.	Develop opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command in garrison.		2		
4.	Has a general level of battle command knowledge.	1	1		2
5.	Ability to provide focused feedback based on actual performance directed at battle command competencies.	1	1		3
6.	Provide for quality of opportunities to learn the art of battle command.	1	1		1
7.	Provide for the use of virtual, constructive, and live simulations to reinforce battle command competencies.		2		
8.	Focus, one-on-one battle command after action review (AAR).		1	1	

"Cdr's are well-versed in decision-making process. They have good visions, right or wrong, and most can accurately articulate those visions in written or verbal format. The schools do a good job here."

"Cdr's lack the "gut" feeling on what should or should not occur because of reduced troop/field time and or experience. Op tempo often forces cdr's to have hasty AAR's but not time to stop and make corrections. Coaching, mentoring, AAR's are done, but we seldom restart or redo an exercise to solidify learning."

"Cdr's must learn how to "focus" staff and battlefield assets at the decisive point to achieve overwhelming combat power. A solid understanding of systems and their interactions and the ability to synchronize in both time and space to achieve desired end state. Cdr's must learn how to make the best of the current situation without redirecting or rearranging the entire battlefield causing gains to be lost and putting an inordinate pressure on staff's and subordinate cdr's and consequently putting soldiers and systems through unnecessary movements for which the gains are not significant."

BOTTOM LINE:

GOOD:

- AAR process
- Decision-making process
- Doctrine terms and their use.

BAD:

- Synchronization of systems
- Focusing a unit to a desired end state
- Taking time to correct mistakes.

There is not enough data to draw any conclusions from the questionnaires. What is important here is that the only areas on which the brigade commanders agree are the areas that are not perceived as problems. This data is not in agreement with data collected from previous CTC rotations in all three areas: battle command competencies; information flows and shortfalls; and teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

SECTION 5
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM BCTP (WARFIGHTER)

5.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

That the statistical and subjective data did, in the majority of instances, validate the strengths and weaknesses of battle command except for those cases in which there were not enough incidents of observation. Areas of battle command that are shown most often as needing emphasis are using crosstalk, displaying conceptualization ability, identifying decision points, conducting effective rehearsals, practicing synchronization, and establishing conditions for teaching, coaching, and mentoring. However, data from previous rotations provided the basis for identifying commanders' deficiencies in the technical knowledge of, and expertise in, the employment of the BOSs. During this rotation and a CTC rotation, the area evolved as a strength.

The data provided for establishing strength and weakness aspects of battle command permitted significant observations that showed neither strength nor weakness for some aspects but showed an equal distribution of strong and weak performances. Major areas of significant observation are managing time, setting triggers, and identifying decision points. The data from this rotation strongly supported previous analyses of data from NTC, JRTC, and warfighter observations, and from archived NTC and JRTC rotation data.

That the validated data trends and significant observations established and identified during the statistical and subjective analysis of data collected from the rotation data be accepted and integrated into the overall results of the BCFR program. These trends and observations should be used in drawing overall conclusions and recommendations for the development of solutions through DTLOMS, and should increase the focus on understanding the art and concept of battle command.

The following are recommended actions that evolved from the data analysis of this BCTP rotation data:

- Develop a method for task-saturated training.
- Develop a scenario for a worst day at the NTC and train to it.
- Develop a multimedia interactive automated training module to teach cognitive skills with a menu of items so individual commanders and staffs can train to standards with repetition. This will provide the needed expansion and repetition.
- Take the commander and staff away from the home-station environment for training of staff skills.
- Teach commanders to work with precondition indicators.
- Teach commanders to identify preconditions and then CCIR.

- Use training means that provide repetition and build the experience factor.
- Provide more training opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring.
- Provide new leaders with more experience before they assume command.

APPENDIX A

HYPOTHESES AND ISSUES FOR THE BCFR DATA COLLECTION PROGRAM FOR BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (BCTP) ROTATION (JUNE 1995)

The following are recommended issues to be used in the development of data collection instruments to support data collection during a division BCTP rotation. The issues are supported by and integrated into the appropriate BCFR hypothesis.

It is recommended that the data collection booklets be developed for each mission with each booklet containing a plan, prepare and execute phase. This will allow the accurate tracking of events during each event and phase, thus allowing the development of a clearer picture of what was weak and what was strong during each event and phase. Example: If a weakness was noted during planning it could be tracked into the execution phase for further validation.

Hypothesis 1

The following tasks adequately describe what battle commanders need to be able to do:

- Lead
- Decide
- Visualize
- Build Teams

- Communicate
- Anticipate
- Assimilate Information
- Motivate
- Direct
- Demonstrate
Physical and
Moral Presence

Issues:

- Has demonstrated an understanding, awareness, sensitivity, and ability to experience the feeling of soldiers and their families during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Empathy)
- Has demonstrated the process of forming an accurate opinion or estimate based upon available information during three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Judgment)
- Has demonstrated the ability to meet the demands of diverse requirements during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Versatility)
- Has demonstrated the presence, actions, and inspiration necessary for the unit to achieve a purposeful end during the three phases of an operation. (Dynamic - Leadership)

- Has demonstrated the ability to visualize the whole organization, including the connectivity between current operations and future plans during the three phases of an operation. (Dynamic - Conceptualization)
- Has demonstrated the important aspects of battle command decision-making expertise during the three phases of an operation. (Decision Making Expertise)
- Has demonstrated the ability to set or change the terms of battle by action or decision during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Initiation)

Hypothesis 2

Intuition, habit, self-discipline and self-motivation are required to successfully command in battle.

Issue: Has demonstrated the ability to understand the important aspects of situations without having perfect knowledge during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Intuition)

Issue: What type of issues address the individual habits and self-disciplines that indicate potential success as a commander? (Habits and Self-discipline)

Hypothesis 3

Effective battle command techniques and procedures can be developed.

Issues:

- Has demonstrated the ability to integrate time and space dynamics into a single, unifying concept or operation during the planning phase of an operation. (Tenet - Integration)
- Has demonstrated the ability to extend operations in time, space, resources, and purpose during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Depth)
- Has demonstrated the ability to form a mental picture of the current and future state within the battle space during the three phases of an operation. (Dynamic - Visualization)
- Has demonstrated the battle command knowledge and skills needed for planning, preparing, and executing the basic aspects of a tactical operation. (Initial Impression)
- Has demonstrated the adaptability of the decision-making process and leadership style to different situations during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Flexibility)

- Has demonstrated the ability to decide when the decision is appropriate. (Dynamic - Decision Making)

Hypothesis 4

- Commanders systematically manage key information requirements
- Information leakage occurs in the information acquisition and delivery system established by the commander.

Issues:

- Has demonstrated the systematic management of key battle command information during the three phases of an operation. (Key Information)
- Has demonstrated the ability to assimilate available information and selectively comprehend that which is important during the three phases of an operation. (Dynamic - Information Assimilation)
- Has demonstrated the ability to recognize and stop information leakage during the three phases of an operation. (Information Leakage)

Hypothesis 5

Commanders follow through when they receive key information.

Issues:

- Has demonstrated the ability to follow through upon receipt of key battle command information during the three phases of an operation. (Key Information)
- Has demonstrated the speed and action required of battle command during the three phases of an operation. (Tenet - Agility)
- Has demonstrated the decision-making know how or can recognize that additional information is required before reaching a decision. (Key Information)

Hypothesis 6 - Integrated into Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 7

Information shortfalls at the point of commander's decisions can be identified.

Issues:

- Has demonstrated the ability to identify information shortfalls at the point of decision during the three phases of the operation. (Information Shortfall)

- Has demonstrated the ability to know when to ask for specific information--in time and space--during the three phases of an operation. (Key Information)

Hypothesis 8

Information flows both vertically and horizontally in high performing units.

Issues:

- Is information architecture designed to facilitate flow? (Information Flow)
- Has maintained key battle command information flows both vertically and horizontally during the three phases of the operation. (Information Flow)
- Has demonstrated the ability to receive information and convey that information to subordinates precisely in written and oral form. (Dynamic - Communications)

Hypothesis 9

Battle commanders teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

Issues:

- Has demonstrated the ability to establish conditions to teach, coach, and mentor battle command during the three phases of an operation. (Teach, Coach, and Mentor)
- Has developed teach, coach, and mentor capability for interaction generated by cause and effect observations. (Teach, Coach, and Mentor)

APPENDIX B

Date: _____

O/C Name: _____ Rank: _____

Mission: _____

BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY BCFR PROGRAM



BCTP/WARFIGHTER COLLECTION INSTRUMENT

June 1995

===== *WHERE TOMORROW'S VICTORIES BEGIN* =====



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BATTLE COMMAND

THE ART OF BATTLE DECISION-MAKING, LEADING AND MOTIVATING SOLDIERS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS INTO ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH MISSIONS AT LEAST COST TO SOLDIERS AND THE NATION.

TWO VITAL COMPONENTS...




BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED ROTATION REFINED MISSION STATEMENT

BCBL, in conjunction with NTC, JRTC, CMTC, and BCTP conducts Battle Command Focused CTC Rotations to:

- Examine battle commander competencies.
- Identify commander's information needs / shortfalls.
- Focus on how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command.
- Identify systemic problems in the development, preparation, and support of battle commanders. Recommend solutions.
- Promote understanding of the battle command concept and improve the practice of the art of command.

BATTLE COMMAND FUNDAMENTALS: TACTICAL



HOW TO USE THIS DATA COLLECTION BOOKLET

The Battle Command areas of interest are divided into three categories:

- 1) Competencies
- 2) Information Needs and Shortfalls
- 3) Teach, Coach, and Mentor

When an observation is made in any of the three categories, refer to the table of contents and select the appropriate category. Once the correct page/subject is located, mark the OBSV block using one of the symbols in the following key:

+	Strength	The problem was recognized and a solution applied which was successful.
-	Weakness	The problem was not recognized and when it was recognized, failed to take proper action, or an unsuccessful solution was applied.
N	Neutral	Observation was not a significant strength or weakness.

Keep in mind that it is important for each of you to mark all observed aspects of battle command with one of the previous symbols according to the definition stated in the key. If an aspect is not observed, please leave the block blank.

When ever possible, noted strengths and weaknesses should be supplemented with a supporting comment. This is accomplished by inserting a number for the observation, placing that number on the comment page, and recording your comment.

You will be provided a data collection instrument for each mission that a unit performs during the unit's rotations (See 95-08 Mission Sequence Schedule). Initially, three booklets will be provided. Please fill in the following blanks.

Date: _____

O/C Name & Rank: _____

Mission: _____

When the mission is completed, please give the booklet to the Chief Data Collector and a new booklet will be provided.

Questions on information to be collected or how to collect information should be directed to the Chief Data Collector.

Mission Training Plan Tasks and Subtasks

MTP Task Command and Control the Brigade

- Subtask 2 Brigade commander analyzes mission and gives initial guidance.
- Subtask 4 Brigade commander selects a course of action based on the staff recommendation.
- Subtask 6 Brigade commander and staff coordinate and refine the plan.
- Subtask 7 Brigade executes changes in task organization.
- Subtask 8 Brigade performs preparation, and commander and staff perform, supervise, and monitor preparations.
- Subtask 9 Brigade commander sees the battlefield.
- Subtask 10 Brigade leaders command and control the execution.

Examine Battle Command Competencies:

Hypothesis 1: The following tasks identified in FM 100-5, *Operations*, pages 2-14 and 2-15, adequately and accurately describe what battle commanders need to be able to do:

- Lead
- Visualize
- Communicate
- Assimilate Information
- Direct
- Decide
- Build Teams
- Anticipate
- Motivate
- Demonstrate Physical and Moral Presence

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Decision Making Expertise
1		- Maintains focus on the mission
2		- Has dynamic battlefield visualization
3		- Is able to master the time/space and dynamics of the battlefield
4		- Establishes and maintains good coordination between fires and maneuver
5		- Utilizes combat power judiciously
6		- Has a keen understanding of relationship with higher headquarters
7		- Demonstrates understanding of logistics and/or fires concepts
8		- Sets unit priorities
9		- Has the ability to read the battlefield
10		- Provides clear and detailed orders and intent
11		- Fights own battle
12		- Provides key details in orders (fires, maneuver, full dimensional battle)
13		- Has the ability to put METT-T into practice
14		- Makes the best use of available resources
15		- Understands unit boundaries
16		- Develops contingencies in initial COA
17		- Develops detail in the initial COA
18		- Asks critical questions
19		- Uses map as a visualization tool
20		- Takes into account sequence and timing during COA development
21		- Allows for adequate planning time

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Decision Making Expertise
22		- Expresses concern over complexity of tactical situation
23		- Expressions concern about not compromising mission
24		- Considers number of show stoppers during planning
25		- Ensures presence of contingencies in plan
26		- Plans for new situations

No.	OBSV	<u>Empathy</u> : Demonstrates an understanding, awareness, sensitivity, and ability to experience the feeling of soldiers and their families.
27		

No.	OBSV	<u>Judgement</u> : Demonstrates the process of forming an accurate opinion or estimate based upon available information.
28		

No.	OBSV	<u>Versatility</u> : Demonstrates the ability to meet diverse requirements.
29		

No.	OBSV	<u>Leadership</u> : Demonstrates by presence and actions the inspiration necessary for the unit to achieve a purposeful end.
30		

No.	OBSV	<u>Conceptualization</u> : Demonstrates the ability to convey visualization for the whole organization to include the connectivity between current operations and the future plan.
31		

No.	OBSV	<u>Initiative</u> : Sets or changes the terms of battle by action or decision.
32		

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Initial Impressions
33		- Has a fundamental knowledge of the art and science of battle command
34		- Has a good grasp on the contents of FM 100-5
35		- Understands and executes the command estimate process
36		- Demonstrates technical knowledge and expertise in the BOS
37		-- Fire support
38		-- Mobility, counter mobility, survivability
39		-- Air defense
40		-- Combat service support
41		- Conducts intelligence prep of battlefield
42		- Conducts wargaming
43		- Understands enemy doctrine/capabilities
44		- Understands own unit/slice unit capabilities
45		- Has developed the baseline skills for battle command
46		- Sets conditions for battle success
47		- Formulates/communicates intent
48		- Identifies and communicates tasks and purpose
49		- Manages time well
50		- Sees battlespace
51		- Applies METT-T theory
52		- Demonstrates the ability to synchronize the operation
53		- Maintains a running estimate

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

Hypothesis 2: Intuition, habit, self-discipline, and self-motivation are required to successfully command in battle.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1		- Demonstrates intuition
2		- Exhibits good habits
3		- Is self-disciplined
4		- Is self-motivated

No.	OBSV	• <u>Intuition:</u> Demonstrates the ability to understand the important aspects of a situation without having perfect knowledge.
5		

Hypothesis 3: Effective battle command techniques and procedures can be identified.

No.	OBSV	• <u>Flexibility:</u> Demonstrates adoptability of decision making process and leadership style to different situations.
1		

No.	OBSV	• <u>Integration:</u> Integrates time and space dynamics into a single, unifying concept or operation.
2		

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
3		- Demonstrates the ability to assimilate important/ key information
4		- Formulates concepts
5		- Selects critical time/place

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
6		- Prioritizes and allocates resources
7		- Anticipates future action
8		- Recognizes the need to decide
9		- Directs needed action
10		- Communicates intent and orders
11		- Leads by example
12		- Maintains moral and physical presence
13		- Motivates others
14		- Establishes a team work climate
15		- Knows how and when to make adjustments

No.	OBSV	<u>Depth</u>: Extends operations in time, space, resources, and purpose.
16		

No.	OBSV	<u>Decision Making</u>: Demonstrates the ability to decide when the decision is appropriate.
17		

No.	OBSV	<u>Visualization</u>: Demonstrates the ability to form a mental picture of the current and future state within battle space.
18		

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Visualization
19		- Uses doctrinal techniques and methods (science)
20		- Uses intuition, judgment, experience
21		- Forms a mental picture of the current and future state of friendly and enemy forces on the terrain in terms of time, space, and purpose

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Visualization
22		- Combines doctrinal methodologies with intuition, judgment, and experience
23		- Understands mission (task and purpose)
24		- Knows enemy (org and equip, doctrine, wpn sys capabilities)
25		- Identifies enemy strengths, weaknesses, tasks, and purpose
26		- Analyzes terrain using OCOKA
27		- Conducts battlefield area evaluation (BAE)
28		- Conducts physical recon of the ground
29		- Refines OCOKA after terrain recon
30		- Understands effects of terrain on own operations
31		- Integrates results of terrain analysis into plan
32		- Formulates intent consistent with higher (nested intent)
33		- Formulates concept of operations (time, space, and purpose)
34		- Communicates terrain analysis to subordinates
35		- Communicates intent and concept of operations to subordinates (to include purpose and end state)
36		- Develops situation template
37		- Uses the situational template in COA development
38		- Wargames enemy actions (anticipate enemy actions)
39		- Identifies decisive points of areas, times, and actions
40		- Assesses effect of tactical logistic status on mission
41		- Manages existing resources
42		- Issues clear and concise orders
43		- Supervises preparation

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Visualization
44		- Conducts effective rehearsal
45		- Locates himself at the right place to influence the fight
46		- Uses combat information to adjust estimate of enemy situation
47		- Anticipates and communicate changing estimate of the enemy situation (crosstalk)
48		- Modifies his plan based on new estimate of enemy situation or actual effects of terrain (as necessary)
49		- Issues clear and concise fragmentary orders
50		- Avoids enemy strengths and attack enemy weaknesses
51		- Achieves synchronization (mass at critical place and time)
52		- Reacts to fragmentary orders
53		- Shows initiative within higher's intent
54		- Executes contingency plans
55		- Uses the situation template/decision support template
56		- Makes timely decisions
57		- Demonstrates battlefield/tactical patience, as required execute
58		- Did the unit accomplish its mission.
59		- Demonstrates the conservation of combat power

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

Identify Commander's Information Needs/Shortfalls

Hypothesis 4: Commanders systematically manage key information requirements.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
1		- Demonstrates the systematic management of key information requirements
2		· Identifies friendly information requirements
3		· Identifies enemy information requirements
4		· Communicates information requirements
5		· Arranges for delivery of information requirements to commander

No.	OBSV	· <u>Information Assimilation:</u> Demonstrate the ability to assimilate available information and selectively comprehend that which is important.
6		

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Initial Impressions
7		- Manages and uses CCIR
8		- Identifies/disseminates CCIR
9		- Identifies decisive points
10		- Reacts to key information
11		- Sets triggers/decision points
12		- Establishes information flags
13		- Uses briefings/briefbacks
14		- Understands linkage between CCIR, decisions, processes
15		- Understands sources of information

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Initial Impressions
16		- Maintains an awareness of the situation and status of forces
17		- Understands and causes information to flow
18		-- Horizontally
19		-- Vertically
20		-- Iteratively and looping
21		-- Diagonally

Hypothesis 5: Commanders follow through when they receive key information.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1		- Follows through upon receipt of key information
2		- Reacts to combat information
3		- Considers appropriate action upon receipt of key information

No.	OBSV	• <u>Agility</u> : Demonstrates the speed and action required of battle command.
4		

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

Hypothesis 6: Information leakage occurs in the information acquisition and delivery system established by the commander.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1		- Recognizes and fixes information leakage
2		· Applies corrective action

Hypothesis 7: Information shortfalls at the point of commander's decisions can be identified.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1		- Recognizes information shortfall at the point the decision occurs
2		- Information shortfalls
3		· GAPS, missing
4		· Timeliness, accuracy

Hypothesis 8: Information flows both vertically and horizontally in high performing units.

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1		- Was crosstalk present during the mission
2		- Were shortfalls in information flow recognized

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

No.	OBSV	Battle Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
3		• Vertical/horizontal
4		• Quality versus quantity
5		• In high tempo operations

No.	OBSV	• <u>Communications:</u> Demonstrates the ability to receive information and convey that information to subordinates precisely in written and oral form.
6		

Focus on How We Teach, Coach, and Mentor Battle Command:

Hypothesis 9: Battle commanders teach, coach, and mentor battle command

No.	OBSV	• Aspects of Teaching, Coaching, and Mentoring
1		- Establishes conditions for teaching, coaching, and mentoring
2		-- A student
3		-- A teacher
4		- Questions his own knowledge or judgment after the occurrence of a significant event
5		- Changes in commander's behavior

Record observations using the following key: + (Strength), - (Weakness), N (Neutral)

[illegible]

APPENDIX C

**BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY
BCFR PROGRAM**



**INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE
BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (BCTP)
JUNE 1995**

===== *WHERE TOMORROW'S VICTORIES BEGIN* =====

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BATTLE COMMAND
FOCUSED ROTATION PROGRAM

BACKGROUND

The Battle Command Focused Rotation (BCFR) Program is designed to accomplish the following:

- Section 1 Examine Battle Commander Competencies.
- Section 2 Identify Information Flows and Shortfalls.
- Section 3 Focus How We Teach, Coach and Mentor Battle Command.
- Identify Systematic Problems in the Development, Preparation and Support of Battle Commanders and their Staff
 - Identify Solutions to the Problems
 - Increase the Focus on and Understanding of the Art and Concept of Battle Command.

The BCFR Program will provide a benchmark from which battle command competencies and enabling technologies can be institutionally adjusted and will provide insights across the domains of doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) that will contribute to validation of the Force XXI Concept. This document is the basis for the data collection and analytical effort in support of the Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL) Program.

Name _____ Rank _____

Job Title _____ Telephone _____

Time in Current Position _____

In Which Recent Combat Operations Did You Participate _____

I have divided the interview into three sections or blocks as was described in the background of the program.

Section I

Examine Battle Commander's Competencies

Hypothesis 1: The following tasks identified in FM 100-5, Operations, pages 2-14 and 2-15, adequately and accurately describe what battle commanders need to be able to do:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| ·Lead | ·Communicate |
| ·Decide | ·Anticipate |
| ·Visualize | ·Motivate |
| ·Assimilate Information | ·Direct |
| ·Build Teams | ·Demonstrate Physical
and Moral Presence |

Hypothesis 2: Intuition, Habit, Self-Discipline, and Self-Motivation are required to successfully command in Battle.

Hypothesis 3: Effective Battle Command Tactics, Techniques and Procedures can be identified.

Results of the BCFR Program to date have provided initial impression of Battle Command Competencies and have indicated that commanders need improvements in the following areas. Lets discuss these areas that need improvement to include a recommended solution.

1. Problem Solving and Planning:

Lacks the ability to execute the problem solving and planning processes.

Proposed Solution:

2. Decision-Making:

- a. Lacks the ability to quickly generate a schema and initial plan based on experience.

- b. Lacks the ability to ask the right questions.
- c. Lacks the ability to develop a mental model dynamic in space and time.
- d. Lacks the ability to use a mental model to visualize outcomes.
- e. Lacks the ability to develop a robust and flexible plan.

- f. Lacks the ability to develop a commander's intent to support the next two higher headquarters.

Proposed Solution:

Moving now from decision-making to visualization and conceptualization, we know that in order to "set the conditions for success," a commander must be able to visualize the current and future end state. Areas that we have found that need further emphasis in visualization are as follows:

3. Visualization:

- a. Lacks the ability to visualize self, enemy and terrain.

- b. Lacks the ability to visualize the future.
- c. Lacks the ability to understand the situation.
- d. Lacks the ability to accurately know the battlefield elements.
- e. Lacks the ability to comprehend the battlefield elements in time, space, and purpose.

- f. Is not tactical and technical proficient.

Proposed Solution:

Let's talk now about conceptualization and how it affects the development of the concept of operations and ultimately the plan.

4. Conceptualization:

- a. Lacks the ability to convey visualization for the whole organization to include connectivity between current operations and future plans.

- b. Lacks the ability to develop an overall scheme of operations.

Proposed Solution:

Section II

Identify Information Flows and Shortfalls

Hypothesis 4:

- Commanders systematically manage key information requirements.
- Information leakage occurs in the information acquisition and delivery system established by the commander.

Hypothesis 5:

- Commanders follow through when they receive key information.

Hypothesis 6: Integrated into Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 7:

- Information shortfalls at the point of commander's decisions can be identified.

Hypothesis 8

- Information flows both vertically and horizontally in high performing units.

Now move away from the area of competencies to the information flows and shortfalls in battle command. Initial impressions have identified the following areas with commanders as needing improvement. I would like to have your insights as well as proposed actions in the areas of information assimilation.

1. Information Assimilation:

- a. Lacks the ability to assimilate available information and selectively comprehend that which is important.

- b. Lacks the ability to plan for and identify CCIR.
- c. Lacks the ability to focus the command on the critical/key items of information.
- d. Lacks the ability to ensure that the unit is tailored to provide CCIR.

Proposed Solution:

If a commander can assimilate key information, he should then be able to communicate what is key and necessary. Do you believe we have problems in the following areas of communication with battle commanders?

2. Communication:

- a. Lacks the ability to receive information and convey that information to subordinates precisely in written and oral form.
- b. Lacks the ability to communicate intent.
- c. Lacks the ability to communicate the purpose and method of the end state.

Proposed Solution:

3. Information Flow and Architecture:

Is the Army's information architecture designed to facilitate flow of information?

Proposed Solution:

If we believe that information/decision management begins and ends with the commander, why is there a problem with information flow and shortfalls?

Section III

Focus How we Teach, Coach and Mentor Battle Command

Hypothesis 9: Battle Commander: Teach, Coach and Mentor Battle Command.

Let's now focus on the area of teach, coach, and mentor battle command. Evidence suggests that commanders really have a problem in this area. Let's now discuss some of the initial impressions and issues that have surfaced.

1. Teach, Coach, and Mentor Battle Command:

- a. Lack of training opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command.

- b. Lack of a general level of battle command knowledge.

- c. Lacks the ability to provide focused feedback based on actual performance.
- d. Lacks the ability to provide quality opportunities to learn the art of battle command.
- e. Does not provide for the use of virtual, constructive, and live simulations to reinforce battle command competencies.
- f. Does not utilize focused one-on-one battle command after action review.

- g. Lacks teach, coach, and mentor capability for interaction generated by cause and effect observations.

Proposed Solution:

APPENDIX D

**BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LABORATORY
BCFR PROGRAM**



**SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE
BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (BCTP)
JUNE 1995**

===== *WHERE TOMORROW'S VICTORIES BEGIN* =====

Supplementary Questionnaire for Battle Command
Focused Rotation Program

Background

The Battle Command Focused Rotation (BCFR) Program is designed to accomplish the following:

- Examine Battle Commander Competencies
- Identify Information Flows and Shortfalls
- Focus how we Teach, Coach and Mentor Battle Command
- Identify Systematic Problems in the Development, Preparation and Support of Battle Commanders and their Staff
- Identify Solutions to the Problems
- Increase the Focus on and Understanding of the Art and Concept of Battle Command.

The BCFR Program will provide a benchmark from which battle command competencies and enabling technologies can be institutionally adjusted and will provide insights across the domains of doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) that will contribute to validation of the Force XXI Concept. This document is the basis for the data collection and analytical effort in support of the Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL) Program.

Name_____ Rank_____

Job Title_____ Telephone_____

Time in Current Position_____

In Which Recent Combat Operations Did You Participate_____

The following questions have been developed from Hypotheses and issues that have evolved from the results and analysis of data from Phase I of the BCFR Program, which included statistical and subjective data from Warfighter, NTCs, JRTC and archived data from both NTC and JRTC rotations. This questionnaire seeks to provide answers to issues developed from the BCFR objectives.

For each question, please provide a response by checking Yes, No, or No Opinion. Selection of "no opinion" responses: Mark this response if after due consideration, you have no opinion, the question asks about an issue not in your area of expertise, or you do not have enough information to answer the question. If you answer "no" to a question, do not prioritize the issue. All information you supply will be on a non-attribution basis. Results will be compiled across all responses and your personal data will not be revealed. Please feel free to expand on any of your responses and/or add additional comments on the last page. All information you provide is important.

The questionnaire is divided into the following sections:

Section I Identification of systemic problems in battle command competencies.

Section II Identification of systemic problems in information flows and the management of the information.

Section III Identification of systemic problems in the focus of how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

Section I - Identification of systemic problems in battle command competencies.

1. Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of battle command competencies? Please select one of the three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Problem Solving and Planning	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-6
1. Recognize and define problems.				
2. Gather the facts and make assumptions.				
3. Determine the scope of and the solution to problems.				
4. Develop possible solutions to problems.				
5. Analyze and compare possible solutions.				
6. Select the best solution to the problem.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Decision Making	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-15
1. Ability to decide when the decision is appropriate.				
2. Recognize the need to decide.				
3. Demonstrate the knowledge of what to decide.				
4. Demonstrate when to decide.				
5. Reflect or understand the ramifications of the decision correctly.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Decision Making	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-15
6. Understand the intentions of the next two higher headquarters.				
7. Provide unit intentions, concept, and allocation of resources.				
8. Identify beforehand those irrevocable actions.				
9. Manage time appropriately.				
10. Choose the most appropriate decision-making method (deliberate, quick, combat).				
11. Quickly generates a schema and initial plan based on experience.				
12. Asks the right questions.				
13. Develop a mental model dynamic in space and time.				
14. Use mental model to visualize outcomes.				
15. Develop a robust and flexible plan.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Conceptualization	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-9
1. Demonstrate the ability to convey visualization for the whole organization to include the connectivity between current operations and the future plan.				
2. Establish connectivity between current operations and the future plan.				
3. Concisely portray how the elements of the command will operate together.				
4. Include an overall scheme of operations.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Conceptualization	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-9
5. Portray the coordination required to support the scheme of operations.				
6. Portray the sequential "phases" of the operations.				
7. State priorities.				
8. State acceptable risks.				
9. Enable subordinates to act in the absence of orders or unforeseen operations.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Visualization	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-14
1. Demonstrate the ability to form a mental picture of the current and future state within battlespace.				
2. Form a mental picture of the current/future state based on intents, available information, and intuitions.				
3. Form a commander's estimate for terrain, enemy, and friendly forces.				
4. Envision organization's future state within its battlespace.				
5. Ability to visualize self, enemy, and terrain.				
6. Ability to visualize the future.				
7. Ability to understand the situation.				
8. Accurately know the battlefield elements				
9. Accurately comprehend the battlefield elements in time, space, and purpose.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Visualization	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-14
10. Has tactical and technical proficiency.				
11. Knows the soldiers.				
12. Can appreciate terrain.				
13. Understand weapons, equipment and requirements for force sustainment				
14. Has proficient knowledge of battlefield relevant objects, attributes, and relationships.				

Section II - Identification of systemic problems in information flows and management of information.

1. Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of information flows and management of information? Please select one of the three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Information Assimilation	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
1. Demonstrate the ability to assimilate available information and selectively comprehend that which is important.				
2. Comprehend what information was important.				
3 Plan for and identify CCIR.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Information Assimilation	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
4. Determine, specify, and communicate which information items were critical.				
5. Focus the command on those critical items of information.				
6. Demonstrate the ability to quickly assess the current operations in relation to future missions.				
7. Assure the unit was tailored to provide CCIR and enhance decision-making.				
8. Adapt organization, CCIR, and decision-making tempo.				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Communication	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-12
1. Demonstrate the ability to receive information and convey that information to subordinates precisely in written and oral form?				
2. Receive information from a variety of sources.				
3. Facilitate an open and honest climate for communication?				
4. Foster the unit's ability to implement implicit communications. How well does unit "know" commander (i.e., familiarity and trust)?				
5. Communicate precise oral instructions?				
6. Communicate precise written instructions?				
7. Communicate vision clearly?				
8. Use doctrinally correct terms?				

<u>Systemic Problems</u> Communication	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-12
9. Use the most effective media to communicate given the situation?				
10. Is use of language clear?				
11. Communicate the purpose and method of achieving the intent of the end state?				
12. Require briefs, briefbacks, and rehearsals?				

Section III - Identification of systemic problems in the focus of how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

1. Do you perceive that battle commanders today have systemic problems in the following areas of teach, coach, and mentor battle command? Please select one of the three responses by marking with a check (✓). If yes, please prioritize according to the scale under **Priority**, indicating the order the problem should be addressed in an era of reduced funding.

Systemic Problems	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
1. Ability to establish conditions to teach, coach, and mentor battle command.				
2. Has teach, coach, and mentor capability for interaction generated by cause and effect observations.				
3. Develop opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command in garrison.				
4. Has a general level of battle command knowledge.				
5. Ability to provide focused feedback based on actual performance directed at battle command competencies.				

Systemic Problems	Yes	No	No Opinion	Priority 1-8
6. Provide for quality of opportunities to learn the art of battle command.				
7. Provide for the use of virtual, constructive, and live simulations to reinforce battle command competencies.				
8. Focus, one-on-one battle command after action review (AAR).				

COMMENTS

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your responses will help to shape battle command of the future.