No Stalingrad on the Dnieper: The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation, January to February 1944.
Abstract
This study investigates the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation of World War II, an attempt by the Red Army to conduct another encirclement on the scale of Stalingrad. Its outcome, and the lessons learned from it, mark this a significant development in the Soviet art of war. Conducted 24 January to 18 February 1944, Korsun bore witness to increasing Soviet operational proficiency alongside the beginnings of German disintegration. Before Korsun, the Germans had been able, with greatest effort, to maintain a coherent front line; after their desperate breakout from the pocket, their entire defensive effort in the East began to crumble. The Soviets assembled two army groups to carry out the operation, which relied on an unusual degree of operational deception, diversionary attacks, and deep operations by two tank armies. The Germans, wanting to avoid a repetition of the Stalingrad disaster, desperately tried to thwart the Soviets, hastily assembling a relief force of eight armored divisions to extricate the encircled forces. Despite Soviet numerical superiority, most of the Germans managed to break out, though losing all of their equipment in the process. It was to be the last successful large-scale relief operation mounted by the Germans on the Eastern Front. Present throughout this operation were elements of Soviet operational design which would become standard elements of nearly every subsequent operation. Although Korsun Operation was far from being perfectly executed, it served as a Si n ost of the increasing operational capabilities of the Red Army.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA299260
Entities
People
- Douglas E. Nash
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College