A Historical Analysis of U.S. Air Force Tactical Aircrew Error in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
Abstract
This thesis identifies and analyzes tactical aircrew error in the Gulf War and determines various mission effectiveness implications of the errors. From analysis of critical incidents collected from over 400 aircrew members, the study identifies error types, and categorizes them as frequent, common, or infrequent errors. Additionally, the study identifies the percentage of errors associated with the three aspects of mission effectiveness, namely, impact on the combat mission, safety implications, and training implications. The analysis identifies twenty-seven distinct error types. Frequent errors are defined as occurring in over 25 percent of the incidents. They include: (1) Decision making errors, (2) situational awareness errors, (3) procedural errors, and (4) crew coordination errors, in that order of frequency of occurrence. Common errors occurred in greater than 10 percent of the incidents and include: (1) communications errors, (2) pressing too far, (3) regulatory deviation, (4) flight lead errors, and (5) weather related errors. Fifty-two percent of the errors had safety implications, 24 percent had training implications, and 13.6 percent impacted on the mission. Nine and one-half percent could not be reliably classified into any of the three areas.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA299294
Entities
People
- Anthony T. Kern
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College