Systemic Problems Within the Army During the Indian Wars (1865-1881).
Abstract
This study investigates the Army's post-civil war systemic problems during the Indian wars within the time frame from 1865 to 1881. It examines the areas of leadership, doctrine, training and equipment. The study considers the Sioux Indians and their allies along with Indians who supported the Army during its campaigns in the West. With the Civil War now in the past, the Army appeared to be in a position to annihilate the Indians. The Indian wars, however, lasted for three decades. This effort focused on the reasons for the Army's inability to quickly end conflict with a foe lesser in size and equipment. Problems in our present Army compare to the Army of 1865. After the Civil War, drastic force reductions occurred as seen in recent years. The Army in 1865 had problems adjusting its doctrine and resources to contend with new and smaller adversaries. Very similar difficulties today are the source of complaint by modern leaders. Post-Civil War struggles with doctrine, training the force, force structure, and leadership are clearly challenges we face today. This study, therefore, additionally intends to draw parallels which provide lessons learned for consideration by current leaders.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA299302
Entities
People
- Alan T. Mabry
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College