UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COALITION SUPPORT OPERATIONS: MISSION OR COLLATERAL ACTIVITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

United States Army Special Forces Coalition Support Operations: Mission or Collateral Activity? By MAJ Peter E. Davis, USA, 91 pages.

This study investigates the United States Army Special Forces role in coalition support operations since the Goldwater/Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The issue presented is combined operations in a coalition environment are extensive and deserve more attention than they have received.

This thesis determined that coalition support should be classified a collateral activity of Special Forces. Coalition support operations should receive recognition in Joint and Army Special Operation Force's (SOF) doctrinal manuals as a collateral activity related mostly to foreign internal defense (FID). The relationship to FID is based on the current doctrinal definition of train, organize, equip, advise, and assist indigenous forces. Specific concept plans, operations plans, and mission letter taskings from theater special operations commands to apportioned Army Special Forces units are adequate to generate Mission Essential Task List (METL) training. This will permit the appropriate Special Forces Group to develop required expertise to support this collateral activity.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
C3	Command, Control, and Communication
CAS	Close Air Support
CENTCOM	Central Command
CINCCENT	Commander and Chief Central Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CST(s)	Coalition Support Team(s)
CSAR	Combat search and Rescue
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
JTF	Joint Task Force
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time Available
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NBC	Nuclear Biological and Chemical
NGO(s)	Non-governmental Organization(s)
OPSEC	Operations Security
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SA	Security Assistance
SALF	Saudi Arabian Land Forces
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)
SANG	Saudi Arabian National Guard

SEAL	Sea Air and Land (Navy Special Operations Unit)
SF	Special Forces
SFG(A)	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> Although the U.S. Military has been involved in numerous coalitions during conflicts in this century, our track record for incorporating coalition lessons learned has been deplorable. With the Gulf War's validation of coalition warfare as the most likely form of conflict involving U.S. forces, the Army must ensure that its doctrine and organizational structure reflect this reality.[1]
>
> Mark B. Yates, Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm

Numerous Special Forces coalition operations have taken place since the Gulf War, to include the current U.S. operation in Haiti.[2] This thesis researches and proposes a solution for this deficiency in United States Army doctrine.

Significance of this Study

The problems of combined operations in a coalition environment are extensive and deserve a great deal more attention than they have received. This thesis is a step forward in solving a complex problem that the U.S. military is sure to face in the future. The ad hoc, take it out of hide method is no longer acceptable.

Traditional military roles have become blurred, requiring a new approach to planning and fighting. The worldwide interests and objectives of the U.S., coupled with political and economic constraints, dictate that the U.S. military will be involved in coalition operations in the future. Advances in technology and the potential aggressors understanding of the weakness of a continental United States (CONUS)

based force, will bring with them the potential for less reaction time in which to form and develop coalitions, creating increased cohesion problems. These conditions necessitate adjustments to doctrine and perhaps organizations to meet this emerging need with acceptable risk.

Background

Special Forces (SF) have often been called upon in the past to provide language qualified, culturally-oriented trainers and leaders to assist in the development of a foreign country's armed forces. In many ways, this is the logical product of the original mission for which Special Forces was created in 1952: training friendly resistance forces behind enemy lines.

Forty years of combined planning and exercises, interoperability and integration created workable alliances in Europe and Korea. This was not the case in the Middle East in August 1990. From the start of the U.S. and coalition buildup in Saudi Arabia, General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), faced the task of holding together an ever changing and frail coalition of forces. His mission was to bring this coalition up to reasonable standards of military effectiveness and make sure it worked together as a team. It was a formidable job, and CINCCENT turned to his most flexible force to do the job: Special Forces.

After its arrival, the 5th Special Forces Group (5th SFG) quickly took over the coalition warfare mission from a small Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) detachment. The mission inherited by the 5th Group was vague, open-ended, and deceptively simple. It was to provide

liaison and conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations with Saudi Arabian Land Forces (SALF) and on order conduct similar operations with other Pan-Arab forces. The concept of operations included conducting defensive-oriented training. This included close air support (CAS) and indirect fire support so that, if necessary, Saudi and other forces could call upon U.S. firepower if attacked.

Training Saudi Arabian and other coalition forces would be of long-term benefit to the allied effort. However, the possibility of an immediate Iraqi drive to the south, putting the coalition ports at risk, was a distinct danger. To fill the gap, Special Forces were placed forward along the border with Saudi paratroopers and border police. These combined teams were equipped with Close Air Support (CAS) radios to call friendly aircraft if needed. In addition, General Schwarzkopf was concerned that he had no reliable ground intelligence about what was happening or could happen along the entire open length of the Saudi-Kuwait-Iraq border. Very early, the 5th SFG was ordered to establish combined border surveillance patrols with Saudi airborne units. Daylight hours were spent conducting visual reconnaissance missions from within border forts called Markaz. At night mounted patrols helped to deter border incursions and locate refugees, as well as provide early warning of enemy attack. For several months, the only U.S. early warning forces on the ground between the Iraqi army and the major ports and airfields were Special Forces.

These combined special reconnaissance patrols provided critical warning needed by the CINC. In addition, they gathered up refugees, deterred enemy patrols, and provided a means to deliver CAS to Saudi

military forces. This was highlighted when the Iraqis attacked at Khafji in February, when they provided the necessary early warning to coalition forces. Special Forces served as trainers and guides for the Saudi forces on procedures to conduct a passage of lines through U.S. and coalition forces defensive lines. Living and working with the Saudis, these combined special reconnaissance teams performed a valuable and difficult service under less than pleasant conditions.[3]

While the combined Saudi-U.S. Special Forces border patrols were securing the northern border of Saudi Arabia, much of the rest of 5th SFG was planning to dispatch teams to support other coalition partners. This was necessarily a dynamic process. Initially the mission was to support the Royal Saudi Arabian Land Forces (RSLF) and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG).

The reconstitution of the Kuwaiti Army was then directed to 5th Group. It was not long before the arrival of Egyptian, Syrian, Omani, Moroccan, Bahraini, United Arab Emirates, and Qatari troops placed a greater burden upon the U.S. command structure. Eventually it was necessary to send teams to French units as well.

Increasingly, 5th Group was forced to reorient teams, split them up even further and spread them out over the theater. By the time the allied buildup was complete, the 5th Group had 109 teams assigned down to battalion level to nearly all the coalition forces. The nature of the coalition warfare mission expanded to the point that the term Foreign Internal Defense (FID) seems inadequate and incomplete. The operation stretched the resources of the 5th Group to the breaking point. The operational tasks assigned SF teams were as varied as the

units themselves. The teams initially assessed the capabilities of the units they were assigned to and tailored training programs. The Pan-Arab units required a great deal of assistance in calling for close air support, fighting in an NBC environment, and coordinating large unit maneuver; especially in conjunction with nearby U.S. units. SF personnel conducted training in staff planning, combined operations, armored and mechanized warfare, human rights, the law of land warfare, and basic civil affairs.

Special Forces groups are not equipped with the mobility to keep up with conventional units on a conventional battlefield, especially in the desert with heavy armored forces. The 5th Group lacked sufficient vehicles to cover the wide range of units and lacked enough tactical FM radios to link them in any coherent fashion. Special Forces Groups are configured for long-range AM, burst transmissions and satellite use, not conventional short-range FM communications. (See figure 1.)

During Desert Storm, Special Forces teams constantly monitored the movement of friendly forces. They especially monitored those along unit boundaries with other national forces; passing information to other teams and ensuring that movements were deconflicted with other allied forces. SF teams often led the way through minefields and helped coordinate the turning movement towards Kuwait City.

SF teams moved with the first Kuwaiti and Saudi units into Kuwait City itself. Despite the prohibition of U.S. units to move past 6th Ring Road in Kuwait City, Special Forces soldiers were given special permission to stay with their Arab units. "They had come this far with them and they were not about to leave at the end."[4]



CAPABILITIES

C2 AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS

- Function as the Army component of a JSOTF when augmented by resources from other sources.
- Establish, operate and support SFOB and three FOBs.
- Provide up to three c2 elements (SFODs B) to support conventional headquarters.
- Train and prepare operational elements for deployment.

OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

- Infiltrate and exfilitrates specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.
- Conduct operations in remote and denied areas for extended periods of time with little external direction and support.
- Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous military and para military forces.
- Plan and conduct unilateral operations.
- Train, advise and assist U.S. and allied forces or agencies.
- Perform other SO as directed by the NCA or unified commander.

LIMITATIONS

- The SF Group depends on the resource of the TA to support and sustain its operations
- The SF group cannot conduct conventional combined arms operations on a unilateral basis. Its capability is limited to advising or directing indigenous military forces conducting this type of operation.
- The SF group cannot provide security for its operational bases without severely degrading its operational and support capabilities.

Figure 1

Special Forces detachments took the lead in advising and assisting Kuwaiti military forces in urban clearing operations to capture remaining Iraqis and to restore internal security. These detachments, along with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations augmentation, worked with the Kuwaiti military to coordinate and provide basic humanitarian services, report manmade obstacles, and allow coalition forces to occupy their respective embassies. Finally, Special Forces units assisted in the transition of security and restoration responsibility to the government of Kuwait.

It would be overstating the case to insist that Special Forces provided the critical element in the ground war. Yet it is not too pretentious to state that the hard work and the daily contact with coalition forces by Special Forces personnel ensured that the philosophy of effective coalition warfare was turned into a reality. Two heavy allied corps of Pan-Arab forces were effectively integrated into the command, control, communications, and intelligence structure of the combined forces. These corps surely would have been considerably less effective had it not been for the Special Forces.

Scope

The great success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm heightened the awareness of coalition operations for military, economic, and political reasons. Strategists suggest that future coalition operations have become the norm rather than the exception. "The global interests and responsibilities of our Nation inevitably dictate that far more often than not our forces will be engaged in alliance and coalition activities."[5]

Fire, famine, plague, and pestilence. These could be the four horsemen of the Apocalypse. Or they could be the next four missions assigned to U.S. military units chosen from around the globe. It is a sign of the changing times, as the American armed forces continue the restructuring begun after the collapse of communism a few years ago. Since then, the military has found itself delivering humanitarian aid in the wake of one natural disaster after another, or keeping the peace after civil unrest, more often than it is called on for its traditional role in armed conflicts. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations. These types of operations have marked the U.S. armed force's history throughout its existence. However, the frequency in which they are conducted today and their coalition nature justify incorporation in this work.

Senior military officers also recognize this need, as documented in Field Manual 100-5 "Operations" dated June 1993. Unfortunately, little has been done to incorporate coalition operations into updated doctrine since the Gulf War. Lessons learned documents and after action reports from Desert Shield and Desert Storm suggest that Special Forces are the correct force to conduct coalition support at the tactical level.

Primary Question

Should coalition support operations become a mission or a collateral activity for U.S. Army Special Forces?

Secondary Questions

1. How were U.S. Army Special Forces used as a principal coalition warfare instrument in the Persian Gulf War?

2. What other forces or agencies could have accomplished these coalition support operations?

3. How can U.S. Army Special Forces coalition capabilities be enhanced?

4. What is the emerging significance of coalition support operations to the U.S. Army Special Forces?

Assumptions

United States Army Special Forces will be a viable force in the future.

Coalition Warfare will increasingly be necessary in future Wars and Operations Other than War (OOTW).

Limitations

The focus of this thesis is U.S. Army Special Forces coalition support in the Persian Gulf War and military operations other than war since then. This research effort examines the accomplishments of these operations and evolution of what the U.S. military is now primarily referring to as coalition support. Coalition support will be analyzed at the tactical level, concentrating on the most recent doctrinal manuals and pertinent writings since this war. However, the relatively short time since the Gulf War may cause some informational constraints.

Definitions

Coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose (Joint Pub 1-02 dated 23 March 1994).

Coalition Warfare. Those tasks undertaken to facilitate the interaction of coalition partners and the U.S. military (General Carl Stiner, Army Magazine, April 1993: 30).

Collateral Mission. A mission other than those for which a force is primarily organized, trained, and equipped, that the force can accomplish by virtue of the inherent capabilities of that force (Joint Pub 1-02 dated 23 March 1994).

Combined Operations. An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission (Army FM 100-5 Operations dated June 1993).

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application (Joint Pub 1-02 dated 23 March 1994).

Force Multiplier. A capability that when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment (Joint Pub 1-02 dated 23 March 1994).

Liaison. That contact or inter communication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (Joint Pub 1-02 dated 23 March 1994).

Delimitations

This thesis will not delve into pre-Gulf War coalition operations. To do so would open up other questions that would detract from the main objective of this research. Although previous information is relevant, I am confining it to post-Goldwater/Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.[6] The data collected will be from open sources only. This thesis is not prescriptive in relation to the stated problem, but the conclusions bear merit and consideration for future doctrinal development.

Summary

> The key to maintaining a wartime prospective is the ability to look beyond peacetime concerns. Leaders must develop units with this warfighting focus as the cornerstone of all activity. They must recognize that there will be little time to learn new skills or to adapt to a battlefield environment once conflict begins.[7]
>
> US Army Field Manual 100-15

It is envisioned that future conflicts will arise with much less warning time. This is due to many factors, such as technological advances and the general instability of the world since the fall of the former Soviet Union. The Secretary of Defense's Final Report to Congress on Desert Shield and Desert Storm stated, "Next time there might not be such a long period to develop a coalition."[8] The importance of enhancing U.S. coalition warfare capabilities is paramount for quick implementation. In light of the reduction of U.S. Armed Forces and its CONUS basing in the future, maximizing the proven synergistic potential of Special Forces in coalition support is prudent.

This chapter provides a framework on the role U.S. Army Special Forces played in conducting coalition support operations during

Operations Desert Shield and Storm. In addition to this general framework, this chapter established the purpose and significance of this study. The following chapter reviews existing literature on this subject, and chapter three explains the research and analysis methodology. Chapters four and five contain the analysis portion of this thesis, and chapter six provides the conclusion and recommendations. Hence, the framework is established for answering the research question.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

> Given America's widespread network of military alliances, support to coalitions is an important function, That includescoordinating military and paramilitary operations across theoperational spectrum and encouraging military cooperation at alllevels of operations. Other tasks include assessing, adapting andintegrating coalition tactical doctrines to meet operationalrequirements, and training, advising, assisting and organizingcoalition forces.[1]
>
> Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. (Retired)
> Non-Combat Roles For the U.S. the U.S. Military in the Post Cold-War Era

The purpose of this chapter is to review existing literature on coalition warfare support since the Persian Gulf War, providing a foundation for this thesis. Four major categories of literature are discussed: doctrinal manuals, books, articles, and unpublished works such as speeches, theses, and papers. Thoroughly researching these four categories of literature identified many pertinent works.

Doctrinal Manuals

Coalition Warfare is a term that is most significant at the strategic or operational levels of warfare. The significance of the term is that it establishes a psychological environment of national level policy and attitudinal commitment of two or more nations to employ armed forces in combined operations to achieve shared coalition objectives. The effectiveness of combined operations is determined by

the extent to which commanders and staffs are able to professionally cooperate to achieve those objectives. At the tactical level of conventional operations, soldiers and leaders interact with their coalition partners on a personal, one to one basis versus political basis.

Desert Storm brought to the surface a number of issues that are slowly working their way into doctrine. They manifest the sensitivities over operational discretion of the warfighting commander and combat efficiency of his forces and resources. These concepts resound in FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations (Draft).

This manual, Combined Army Operations addresses combined warfare and its future implications. Although FM 100-8 (Draft) recognizes the contribution of Special Forces during Desert Shield And Desert Storm, it falls short in recommending Special Forces' continued use in this activity. This position is perplexing, particularly with all the recommendations regarding liaison teams. The prescribed requirements of language ability, knowledge of U.S. and the partners' tactics, techniques and procedures, area orientation, sensitivity to customs and way of life, describe the inherent capabilities of Special Forces soldiers.

The keystone United States Army Field Manual 100-5, "Operations" dated June 1993, addresses the potential problems of operating in a coalition environment. It asserts that: "Few linguists have both the language expertise and depth of understanding to cross both language and doctrinal boundaries and be fully understood."[2] This manual reveals pertinent parallels between joint and army publications.

FM 100-5 recognizes that dedicated liaison and linguist teams are a vital resource commitment. This manual, along with Joint Publication 3.0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations," provides a descriptive doctrine to guide commanders and their staffs in the field while FM 100-8 attempts to present a prescriptive solution for combined operations. It accomplishes this by providing recent historical examples and a checklist for to assist commanders and their staffs.

Joint Publication 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations" dated October 1992, reflects Special Forces' contribution to the Gulf War coalition.

> "SOF must be prepared to conduct SO under conditions of coalition warfare. SOF may be required to execute unilateral operations or apply their unique characteristics to provide liaison to coalition partners and, by doing so, facilitate interoperability between US and allied forces. As evidenced during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the role that SOF played in support of the campaign objectives by training, working, and going into combat with the majority of the coalition nations was one of the keys to campaign success."[3]

SOF's unique capabilities in language training, their regional orientation and the rate of forward deployments, and focus on independent small unit actions make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support coalition warfare objectives.

Army SOF doctrinal manuals FM 31-20, "Doctrine for Special Forces Operations," and 25-100, "Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces," have not been updated since the Gulf War. Planned updates will incorporate coalition support in as nebulous fashion as it is in Joint Publication 3.05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures." The intended revision of the doctrinal manual for Special Forces operations, FM 31-20, contains the following passage for Combined and

Coalition Support. SF units have capabilities which have proven invaluable in supporting the efforts to form or execute a combined or coalition operation. Desert Storm and Desert Shield offer examples, where SF organized into Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) which collocated with allies and provided a key command, control, and communication (C3) link to synchronize combined efforts. The accompanying CSTs provided advisory support, training, global positioning down-links, and secure communications between the supported forces. "SFODs are also able to confirm the situation on the ground, assist in fire support planning and overall coordination between U.S. and coalition partners."[4]

The overall contribution of recent doctrinal manuals to this research is significant. These Army field manuals and joint publications identified the deficiencies in past doctrine by updating publications since the Gulf War. However, U.S. doctrine in coalition operations is embryonic. Basic terminology conflicts in joint and Army publications, not to mention definitions used by the United Nations. By not suggesting responsibility to accomplish the coalition support mission they have identified gaps for corrective action.

Books

Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War is a work of great relevance to this thesis. The overall focus is on the accomplishments of the soldier and rarely strays above the operational and tactical levels. One particular excerpt about a Special Forces A team's mission of reconstituting a Kuwaiti Armor Brigade states, "and in the process became part of the glue that held the Coalition together as part of the overall CENTCOM effort."[5] The final part of this book deals

with operation Provide Comfort that is valuable for the MOOTW analysis portion of this thesis. This work exemplifies that coalition support should become a mission or gain recognition as a collateral activity.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. The chapter on SOF contains a wealth of information pertinent to this thesis. It is a synthesized version of lower level after-action reports. It provides a factual foundation to substantiate the analysis and conclusion portions of this thesis.

John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress, conducted an assessment of U.S. special operations forces for U.S. Senators Nunn and Cohen in 1993. Special Operations Forces: An Assessment published in 1994, is a thorough and unrestricted study of the force. It is written to aid military officers, civilian experts, and laymen alike in their efforts to grasp the subject concerned. Collins makes the assertion that special operations doctrine designates coalition warfare as a collateral mission.[6] During the research of all pertinent joint and Army doctrinal manuals, this point was found to be incorrect.

These previously mentioned books equip the reader to better appreciate the significance of coalition warfare. Their themes are not specifically about coalition warfare, but the impact of coalition warfare on past and future operations are representative. These books provide a good transition to the literature highlighting the significance of this thesis.

Articles

Several articles are applicable to the study of this thesis. Among these is an article published in Military Review entitled "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm." The author Mark B Yates provides an outstanding first-hand account of coalition warfare in Desert Storm. Specifically, he states that: "The linkages employed with liaison teams and with SOF augmentation teams offer a successful example for further study."[7]

Articles of the same quality and relevance are "Special Operations in Desert Storm" and "Five Imperatives of Coalition Warfare, in "Special Warfare Magazine." These articles provide a summary of the SOF contributions during the Gulf War. The themes of these articles recognize the magnitude of the effort put forth by the 5th Special Forces Group in conducting its coalition mission. The authors U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs office, and John Fenzel III echo the potential problems discussed in other literature. These research articles also bring to light fundamental principles along with their applications that have been productive to success.

Speeches, Monographs and Lessons Learned

The following sources have proven extremely valuable to this work. They have provided a through understanding of the thought processes that are prevalent today.

Remarks made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, James R. Locher III: "Versatility Protects SOF" The Honorable Mr. Locher presents an interesting perspective for SOF in his speech. It echoes the SOF glue analogy of

Special Forces being the glue that held the coalition together in Desert Shield and Storm. It is a beneficial reference for this thesis.

"USSOCOM Challenges: Risk, Ambiguity, Diversity, Opportunity": General Carl Stiner's, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee 5 March 1992. This speech provides an overview of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It focuses on the Special Forces role in coalition support in force projection operations and military operations other than war. The fundamental principle of SOF being combat multipliers is extremely relevant.

In December 1992, the National Defense University sponsored a symposium entitled, "Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era." Then Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and now CINC USSOCOM, spoke about SOF's role. He specifically used coalition warfare as the main thrust of his speech concerning traditional and non-traditional roles. This speech is significant to this thesis because it gives the current perspective of the USSOCOM CINC towards coalition warfare.

The monograph "United States Army Special Forces: Versatile Element in the Future Security Environment," provides great insight into the coalition capabilities of Special Forces. Of particular interest to this project is the author, Colonel Florer, who was the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) fellow. Colonel Florer currently holds the position as the Director of Training and Doctrine at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. His monograph is particularly relevant because it analyzes Special Forces in coalition

support operations in Desert Storm and the MOOTW environment of operation Provide Comfort.

"Opening Pandora's Box: The U.S. Army in Combined Contingency Operations." This SAMS monograph articulates the need to improve the U.S. Army's capability to plan and execute combined operations. It buttresses this foundation by analyzing three past U.S. combined operations, including Desert Shield and Storm. The author William A Gregory asserts that the coalition having the luxury of six months "of unencumbered time in which to plan, prepare, and rehearse for combat operations,"[8] may not be enjoyed by coalitions of the future. He writes of the serious ramifications of not having as much time for planning in future combined operations and exercising care in incorporating too much of the Desert Shield and Storm success into future doctrine.

William A Gregory also reveals his bias for the importance of liaison in the scheme of combined operations. He concludes with: "The Army must devote additional efforts to the identification, selection, and training of liaison officers in all functional areas."[9] This monograph dated 1991 is supported by a conference in 1994: on "Standing Up Coalitions" sponsored by the National Defense University. These works substantiate a basis for this thesis; to create or assign the mission of coalition support.

"Establishing Theater Command and Control in a Coalition of Nations" a SAMS monograph, by Barry A Maxwell, is primarily oriented towards the operational and tactical levels of war. However, the issues of liaison and cultural differences (particularly the language barrier) are pertinent towards the research of this thesis. Wartime advisory and

assistance is a phrase the author uses to describe the requirement for doctrine in order to advise and assist the other members in a coalition. This monograph provides insight into the questions identified earlier.

"Coalitions, Command and Control: Essential Considerations," a SAMS monograph by Joseph A. Moore is focused at the operational and strategic levels of war. This monograph reiterates the common deficiencies found in doctrinal manuals. This project also brings up the issue of cultural and language differences. It tells of how the U.S. supplied language trained liaison teams to coalition partners, down to battalion level, during Desert Shield and Storm.

Of all the volumes of lesson learned documents, the most valuable to this thesis is, "Roles and Missions of Special Operations Forces (SOF)." This executive summary about SOF during Desert Shield and Desert Storm is a critical source for acknowledged facts and in reinforcing the validity of this thesis. As this thesis will point out, many of the recommendations have yet to be implemented; particularly in expanding Special Forces doctrine "to articulate procedures to be used when supporting a U.S. commander in establishing and commanding a coalition force."[10]

Summary

This literature search has brought to light the dilemma that exists over this issue today. Guidance on coalition support operations is now scattered throughout joint and Army doctrines. Current literature corroborates the need to develop doctrine to fill the void in tactical doctrine for multinational operations.

Over 60 sources are assembled for research of this thesis. They provide a sufficient balanced and comprehensive summary of the literature. Research conducted did not find any work that compares coalition support in Desert Shield/Storm with any operations before or since then. However, numerous sources mentioned also provide auxiliary material for analysis of coalition support in MOOTW. The plan for using this literature to answer the research question, "should coalition support operations become a mission or a collateral activity for U.S. Army Special Forces?" is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

> We will never know with certainty how an enemy might fight or precisely what demands might be placed on our own forces in the future. The contributions of allies or coalition partners will vary from place to place and over time. Thus, balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected.[1]
>
> National Security Strategy, July 1994

The evolving roles and missions of the U.S. Armed Forces create significant doctrinal issues at all levels. The objective of this work is to assemble those issues pertaining to coalition support that still require resolution; from the non-parochial perspective of what best serves combat effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to explain my research plan and methodology.

The plan is to apply the special operations imperatives to coalition support to assess its merit for classification as either a Special Forces mission or a collateral activity. The rationale for using these imperatives is that they represent an accepted guide for the successful employment of Special Operations Forces.

Special Forces units apply these imperatives during mission preparation to scrutinize assigned missions or collateral activities. Special Forces doctrine is based on three sets of concepts. These concepts are the principles of war, the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and the Special Operations

imperatives. The literature discussed in the previous chapter is the foundation for the analysis. Operations conducted since the Goldwater/Nichols Military Reorganization Act of 1986 are the medium. Pursuant to categorizing coalition support as either a mission or collateral activity, a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages between mission and collateral activity is critical.

> While the applied principles of war characterize successful SO, the SO imperatives listed below prescribe key operational requirements. SOF operators must incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution if they are to use their forces effectively. The SO imperatives do not replace good judgment and common sense. Experienced SOF operators have developed an intuitive appreciation for these imperatives. The imperatives help less experienced operators think through problems and make better decisions. They also help conventional commanders and their staffs better appreciate the nature of SO and improve the integration of SOF into their operations.[2]
>
> FM 25-100, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces

Understand the Operational Environment

"SOF operators cannot dominate their environment. They must assess and understand all aspects of the environment-political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographical, and military-before acting to influence it."[3] Leaders must expect vague missions, opposing interests and objectives, and lack of unity of command, and attempt to overcome these handicaps.

Recognize the Political Implications

"SOF operators must not anticipate a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. Many SO are conducted to advance critical political objectives."[4] Special Forces missions frequently support military missions for attainment of an overall

nonmilitary objective. Special Forces commanders must recognize the political implications of their mission. This is true throughout the operational continuum.

Facilitate Interagency Activities

"When participating in interagency and often combined effort, SOF operators must strive for unity of effort but recognize the difficulty of achieving it."[5] Special Forces commanders must attempt unity of effort when missions involve interagency or combined operations. They must take every opportunity to facilitate the successful synchronization of often complex mission structure.

Engage the Threat Discriminately

"SOF operators have limited resources they cannot easily replace. Their missions often have political implications."[6] Therefore, commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ their forces.

Consider Long-Term Effects

"SOF operators must place each problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context."[7] A short-term solution to a long-term problem many times has a detrimental effect. Special Forces units must often contend with legal and political constraints not imposed on conventional forces because of the sensitivity of their missions.

Ensure Legitimacy and Creditability of Special Operations

"There are significant legal and policy considerations to many SO, particularly in conflict situations short of war. In modern

conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support."[8] Legitimacy is a guiding factor in all operations in which support is provided to a government. Special Forces missions must be credible and legitimate as viewed by foreign indigenous elements, the international community, and the United States populace.

Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects

"All SO have significant psychological effects."[9] Some missions are undertaken specifically to produce certain psychological effects. Special Forces commanders must control these effects to achieve the desired result, and they must integrate psychological operations into all of their missions.

Apply Capabilities Indirectly

"The primary role of SOF, in combined operations, is to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost."[10] Special Forces commanders must apply their capabilities indirectly so as not to assume the primary role, and to maintain legitimacy of the operation.

Develop Multiple Options

"SOF operators maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. They must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution."[11]

Ensure long-term Sustainment

"U.S. funded programs can be counterproductive if the population becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. SO policy, strategy, and programs must therefore be durable, consistent, and sustainable."[12]

Provide Sufficient Intelligence

"SO depend on detailed, timely, and accurate intelligence."[13] Special Forces intelligence requirements demand much more of the intelligence community than do conventional forces. This is because Special Forces teams lack the combat power, reinforcement capability, and sustainment capability of general purpose forces.

Balance Security and Synchronization

"Security concerns often dominate SO, but compartmentalization can exclude key personnel from the planning cycle. SOF operators must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution."[14]

"Special Forces commanders must incorporate the special operations (SO) imperatives into their mission planning and execution. Although developed to guide SOF they apply to any unit, organization, agency, or activity."[15] To be considered for classification as a mission or a collateral activity for Special Forces; Coalition support must satisfy the above imperatives.

Evaluation of mission vs. collateral activity with respect to the principles of war and MOOTW will allow deduction of the implications. The analysis portion of this thesis will lead to the answer of the research question. The criteria used for this step of the process are the principles of war. (See figure 2.)


PRINCIPLES OF WAR
• OBJECTIVE
• MANEUVER
• OFFENSIVE
• MASS
• ECONOMY OF FORCE
• SURPRISE
• SECURITY
• UNITY OF EFFORT
• SIMPLICITY
SO IMPERATIVES
ECONOMIC
MILITARY
INFORMATIONAL
POLITICAL
NATIONAL POWER PRISM

Figure 2

> The nine principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. The US Army published its first discussion of the principles of war in a 1921 Army training regulation. The original principles adopted by the Army, although slightly revised, have withstood the test of time. Today's force-projection Army recognizes the following nine principles of war.[16]
>
> FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.[17] Objectives for Special Forces are as often political, economic, or psychological as they are military. Special Forces can be assigned objectives that lead directly to accomplishing national and theater political, economic, or psychological objectives.

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.[18] Special Forces may be employed as part of a strategic defense and hostile activities may force Special Forces to assume a tactical defensive posture. However, at the operational level, Special Forces provides the commander offensive capability.

Mass

Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.[19] Special Forces cannot mass, bringing overwhelming combat power against a target, except at the lowest tactical level. Special Forces commanders compensate for lack of fire power by using or becoming combat multipliers; including surprise, superior training, unconventional tactics, and assigned indigenous forces.

Economy of Force

Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.[20] Many Special Forces missions are designed as an economy of force to allow the concentration of conventional forces in another area. Special Forces operations can divert enemy forces to secondary theaters that prevent them from concentrating their effort against the friendly conventional main force. When used with indigenous forces against the enemy, Special Forces are particularly effective in the economy of force role.

Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat firepower.[21] Special Forces do not employ maneuver in the same sense as conventional forces. Special Forces units usually lack the tactical mobility and reinforcement capability with respect to the enemy force. Special Forces compensate for lack of maneuver by anticipating enemy reactions and preparing for these reactions.

Unity of Command

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.[22] For conventional forces this means having one commander responsible for each objective. While this is also true for Special Forces, the commander is often not military. Many Special Operations are interagency or intergovernmental activities in which the military has only a supporting role. In these cases the Special Forces commander

must ensure that his efforts are synchronized with the overall objectives. At the tactical level, where mission is a unilateral Special Forces mission, unity of command must be maintained.

Security

Never permit the enemy to aquire unexpected advantage.[23] Security is often the dominant factor in Special Forces missions, as opposed to conventional operations, where it is a supporting concern. Due to the nature of Special Forces mission, compromise has diplomatic and political ramifications. Therefore every effort must be made to exercise security of operations.

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.[24] Surprise is similar for Special Forces and conventional forces. However, where surprise is desired in conventional operations, it is a necessity in Special Forces missions. Due to the small size of Special Forces teams, surprise is an integral part of every operation.

Simplicity

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.[25] Although Special Forces will often use high technology equipment and unconventional tactics, Special Forces plans and procedures must be simple.

There are six principles of military operations other than war; three are derived from the principles of war and three are MOOTW specific. The following are the principles of MOOTW.

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.[26] This principle is borrowed form the principles of war, but is more applicable to coalition support operations in less defined situations than war.

Unity of Effort

Seek unity of effort in every operation.[27] This MOOTW principle is derived directly from the principle of unity of command. This principle is particularly relevant to coalition operations because command arrangements are sometimes ambiguous necessitating liaisons and coordination to achieve unity of effort.

Security

Never permit hostile fractions to aquire an unexpected military, political, or informational advantage.[28] This is the last MOOTW principle derived from the principles of war. It's meaning is the same except it includes civilians and other agencies which might be participating in the operation.

Perseverance

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.[29] This principle requires a long-term outlook on MOOTW.

Legitimacy

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.[30] This principle is especially appropriate to the analysis of coalition support operations throughout the operational continuum.

Summary

The criteria listed above provide the tools to document whether coalition support warrants classification as a mission or collateral activity for Special Forces. There are certain benefits and drawbacks of each classification, which will aid in my examination. During the analysis portion of this thesis each imperative will serve as criteria in making this determination. This dynamic process supports the conclusion by applying fundamental criteria, along with current operational data. The emphasis on post-Goldwaters/Nichols Act operations gives immediate value to today's debate about roles and missions, and what approach the Armed Forces needs in order to accomplish them.

This methodology leads to a determination of whether coalition support should be a mission or a collateral activity of Special Forces. The strength of this process is the corroboration of the conclusion by accepted imperatives, principles of war, and the principles of operations other than war. Thus, this study's conclusion is relevant and timely.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

> Decision makers have repeatedly chosen SOF for a myriad of Coalition actions to solve a broad array of operational problems on a united front. SOF's facility to support multinational warfare, by providing advisory and liaison capabilities to rapidly integrate allied forces into an operable force component, is of prime importance in today's security climate where allies and friendly nations share the responsibility for worldwide peace and stability.[1]
>
> United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement, 1994.

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of the SOF imperatives explained in the previous chapter, applied to coalition support. The SOF imperatives are used as criteria to determine if coalition support warrants inclusion as a mission or a collateral activity of U.S. Army Special Forces. U.S. coalition support activities since the Goldwater/Nichols Military Reorganization Act of 1986 are the scope of this analysis.

Coalition warfare has been considered an effective method of waging war in the past and the same will be true in the future. The advantages of joining forces to fight a common enemy are many, and will be recognized by the belligerent nation(s). Forming a coalition does not always ensure success. The combined military capability of the coalition partners has to surpass the enemy's warfighting ability to win the war.

Given today's security environment, coalition operations represent both the wave of the future and possibly the best response to any emerging threat. As the U.S. armed forces are scaled back and our forward presence reduced, we become increasingly dependent on other nations to assist in preserving our mutual vital interests. U.S. national security strategy recognizes that we will likely handle future crises with hybrid coalitions, composed of both traditional allies and nations with whom we share little history.[2] The U.S. National Military Strategy affirms our readiness to participate in multinational operations under the guidance of international security organizations, ad hoc coalitions, or even independent actions, as dictated by U.S. interests.[3]

Understand the Operational Environment

Coalition forces face many challenges in building an effective and functional organization capable of military action. Accommodations of differences in national goals and objectives will be very important. Reaching agreement on an acceptable common command and control structure will be the first step in establishing a common focus for the coalition. Coping with differences of military capabilities, language, and doctrine will be a significant challenge in any operation.

During Desert Shield and Storm General Schwarzkopf was faced with uniting a diverse coalition of forces to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. He needed to bridge the cultural gaps existing among his forces. He chose Special Forces to achieve the synchronization in operations he required. Special Forces are trained in language and the culture of their area of responsibility (AOR), in addition to

maintaining their technical and tactical proficiency. It was logical to take this concept a step further by having them accompany their coalition partners into combat. Understanding their operational environment was key in the trust achieved by these Special Forces detachments.

The Special Forces' soldiers sensitivity and respect for their coalition partners' culture, religion, political and sociological aspects of their environment proved valuable. Living with their host unit, eating their food, speaking their language, and respecting their culture helped develop the rapport between the two forces that enabled them to accomplish their missions. The difficulty and magnitude of language and cultural problems are often underestimated. Even within the long-standing NATO alliance, language problems occur.[4] There is a high potential for misunderstanding, even after orders and instructions have been translated and distributed. Acronyms, specialized and technical terminology, for which the U.S. military is world famous, exponentially raise the difficulty of communicating.

During Desert Shield/Storm this problem was solved by Special Forces soldiers deploying down to battalion level throughout the coalition forces. Their cultural sensitivity, and knowledge of the of the environment facing them and their counterparts enabled them to process orders and instructions effectively. In the Annual Report to the President and Congress, then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin sums up Special Forces coalition support operations. "SOF are particularly well suited to conventional coalition warfare. One SOF contribution to the Operation Desert Storm campaign was to extend the command and control

system from the Coalition headquarters to all national elements in the field."[5]

Recognize the Political Implications

Special Forces soldiers are trained to understand and recognize the political implications of their actions. The Special Forces soldier is a careerist, carefully assessed and selected after his initial training and service in conventional units. These soldiers' training is far more extensive than their conventional counterparts. Numerous peacetime training missions and real world contingency deployments into their AOR foster a further understanding of the political arena. "In 1993, SOF deployed 13,454 men and women to 101 countries"[6] A large portion of these deployments involved Special Forces personnel.

Coalition support varies widely depending on the needs of a coalition, its composition, and the operational environment. Such support is not limited to Special Forces personnel; other agencies, both military and civilian may be involved. "SOF are moving beyond jointness to become the most practiced of interagency military forces. Virtually all SOF activities are closely coordinated with other governmental agencies."[7]

Special Forces soldiers are people to people experts with a vast amount of experience in working with other militaries. What is more important though is that Special Forces has been the facilitator with non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and governmental agencies to accomplish the mission. "In addition to enhancing relationships between U.S. and host-nation military forces, SOF's language and cross-cultural skills,

combined with finely attuned political sensitivities, strengthen military-to-civilian interaction."[8]

Facilitate Interagency Actions

Special Forces seasoning with interagency activities is principally derived from conducting their Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. "FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions or programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[9] This a joint/combined interagency activity of the U.S. government. The Goldwaters/Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 delineated FID as a special operations activity.[10] Peace operations and counter drug operations are also inherently characterized by a high degree of interagency coordination. Special Forces have historically been employed these type of operations.

Along with extensive U.S. government inter-agency coordination, Special Forces soldiers also assist in the integration of operations into local efforts when appropriate. Such integration requires close coordination with local government agencies and bureaus; local military paramilitary, or police forces, and multinational partners. Special Forces knowledge and experience historically has facilitated such efforts.

Engage the Threat Discriminately

A coalition may support many types of operations, from peacetime engagement (i.e., humanitarian operations and nation-building activity) to peacekeeping efforts, to participation in low-level conflict and

small regional crisis, to an operation similar to Desert Storm. In each case, there are varying levels of national effort, and that of the U.S. military might range from minimal effort to maximum participation. The level of planning and procedures for a coalition depends on where the operation is located on this operational continuum. Each coalition operation has its own distinct personality, with different traits and characteristics. Accordingly, Special Forces' diversification enables them to conduct assigned missions and collateral activities across this operational continuum.

Desert Shield and Storm and Operation Sea Angel are examples from the early 1990's of the possible variety of coalition operations. In brief, the former occurred in response to Iraq's dictator invasion of it's neighbor. There was advanced warning of activity and time to prepare: combined forces conducted air, land, and sea operations; host nation support was extensive; and the command and control was coordinated rather than integrated. The second example, Operation Sea Angel, was conducted in response to a sudden natural disaster in Bangladesh. It was primarily a coastal maritime operation; because the remaining host infrastructure needed specific assistance. The operation was executed from ships and the number of allies was relatively small. The United States conducted the operations at the request of the Bangladesh government, but used Special Forces soldiers with local officials to interact with the people. U.S. on-site participants were mostly Marine and Naval forces; and the primary support role was life preservation, equipment, and transportation.[11]

Because of the nature of ad hoc coalition operations, the U.S. military needs to plan to face an unknown enemy, with unknown allies, in an unknown conflict, and on short notice.[12] This requirement places an especially high premium on comprehensive planning. With the increased tempo the Army faces today, and the extensive missions Special Forces conducts, prudence must be adhered to in commitment of this force. Commanders throughout the Special Forces community are aware of this situation and agree on the necessity of their forces to meet the demanding challenges posed by coalition support operation.[13] However, with the potential of over extension of a particular force, planning and forethought are critical in coping with any potential coalition that may suddenly arise.

Consider Long-Term Effects

Special Forces soldiers must take into account the long-term effects of their missions. The outcome of their missions often have strategic, political, and military ramifications. In addition to geography, there is a specific historical example that affects all nations. "The only thing important for a nation as its revolution is its last major war. Because of the dramatic and pervasive nature of war and its consequences, the experiences associated with it, the diplomacy that preceded it, the methods of fighting it, the alliances that were formed, and the way the war was terminated-will deeply influence the perceptual predisposition's of most citizens."[14] Although it would be over stating their case to say that Special Forces won the Gulf War, it is not overstating that they contributed significantly. The middleast nations of Syria and Israel today are taking part in peace negations

because of their Gulf War experience. Special Forces contribution to the Gulf War consequently assisted in the changed American views and expectations of war, including possible expectations of coalition operations.

Ensure Legitimacy and Creditability of Special Operations

The Special Forces detachments attached to Arab coalition units continually stressed the importance of human rights in order to maintain the moral high-ground against Iraqi propaganda.[15] This maintained the legitimacy of the coalition and Special Forces participation. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Desert Storm were well crafted and made the difference between success and failure concerning world perception. It was the close coordination with coalition partners that reduced any misinterpretations and limited problems to a minimum.

Creating an effective coalition without previously established, viable working relationships is extremely difficult. "Without interaction, different perspectives can lead to distrust, misunderstanding and unnecessary confusion."[16] In modern conflict legitimacy is the most important crucial factor in developing and maintaining domestic and worldwide support. The success of placing Special Forces with every coalition force during Desert Storm the U.S. assured the future use of Special Forces in this type of mission in the future. The legitimacy of the coalition was further enhanced through the successful employment of this force in a nontraditional role but one for which that it was ideally suited.

To maintain its legitimacy, Special Forces conduct of coalition support operations must be derived from a mandate authorizing the

conduct of operations. Legitimacy also reinforces the morale and espirit of the coalition force. Legitimacy may be the center of gravity of a coalition, consequently it must be protected at all levels. Special Forces can synchronize coalition efforts at the tactical level, in order to maintain and protect the legitimacy of the coalition together with their mission. Training on law of land warfare and basic human rights was the most beneficial training conducted by Special Forces in executing their coalition support mission during Desert Storm, therefore maintaining the coalitions legitimacy.[17]

Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects

Coalition support operations have significant psychological effects. This is true throughout the spectrum of conflict and can influence popular support for the operation. "Convincing people to fight, and getting them to do it well, is one of the more essential and less noticed aspects of maintaining an armed force".[18] The psychological results of coalition support missions must maintain the legitimacy and creditability of the government they are supporting. If the tactical side of a mission is a success and the psychological side is a failure, the mission can result in failure.

While conducting coalition support operations during Desert Shield and Storm, Special Forces detachments were faced with myriad issues in anticipating and controlling psychological effects. Long, isolated months in the desert, competing political agendas, rumors about atrocities being committed in Kuwait by the Iraqis, and smoke from burning oil wells were just some of the issues SF soldiers had to contend with while operating with their partners. Some could be

anticipated, and plans were made to circumvent their effects to positive perceptions. However, those that could not be anticipated were handled correctly, for the most part, by SF soldiers.

The training that SF did with their partners "had a significant impact on readiness"[19] and consequently a positive effect for the coalition as a whole. The Arabs in particular were much relieved following initial intensive training in protective measures against the chemical threat Iraq possessed.[20]

Apply Capabilities Indirectly

Applying capabilities indirectly is the essence of coalition support operations. Special Forces are adeptly trained for this approach from early in their initial SF entry training. It is key to their success to facilitate the partner's accomplishments of the tasks, missions, or objectives. This is how the important contribution of Special Forces as force multiplier is validated. Intelligence sharing, training programs and exchanges, and humanitarian assistance efforts all constitute presence and bolster mutual confidence in our ability to execute coalition support in any region.

During Desert Shield an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) from 5th SFG(A) conducted coalition support operations with the 35th Kuwaiti Armor Brigade. They trained the Kuwaitis on mine-clearing, Iraqi defensive tactics, aircraft and armored vehicle identification, and tank killing techniques. When the Kuwaitis received Yugoslavian M-84 main battle tanks the Special Forces soldiers taught them how to operate and maintain them. When the 35th Brigade led the entire Joint Forces Command-North's attack back into their homeland, the ODA went with them;

not as trainers but as advisors.[21] Their behind the scenes efforts successfully reinforced and enhanced the Kuwaitis effectiveness and credibility as a fighting force; by allowing the Kuwaitis to assume primary responsibility for the success of the effort.

Develop Multiple Options

"Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations."[22] During Operation Provide Comfort, Special Forces elements initially were to provide combat search and rescue (CSAR) in the event the Iraqi decided to interdict the air operations. Soon after their arrival in Turkey, SF were tasked to assess the conditions in Iraq and organize the refugees so that food distribution, sanitation, and medical aid would be efficient. The outpouring of relief efforts from eleven countries in various forms and private relief organization necessitated a coalition of forces. The U.S. military took the lead, with Special Forces conducting the on the ground organization and the focal point to insure the ad hoc coalition worked to complete the mission. The above example is typical of the operational flexibility and ability to develop a broad range of options possessed by SF soldiers.[23]

Upon the liberation of Kuwait, the Special Forces advisors with their Kuwaiti combat units began to expand their role beyond that of advising. With the help of Kuwaiti resistance fighters (who remained in the city during the entire occupation), SF soldiers instructed the clearing of booby traps and minefields, and otherwise assisted in the city's recovery. Truck loads of documents from Iraqi headquarters were evacuated as well as numerous flatbeds full of ammunition the Iraqis had

stored in the city.[24] The two recent examples above show the diversity SF soldiers have in reacting to changing situations in coalition support activities throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Ensure Long-Term Sustainment

SF personnel engaged in coalition support activities must avoid advising and/or training their assigned partners in tactics, methods that are beyond their capabilities to learn and sustain. U.S. doctrine must be modified to fit the culture, education level, and equipment of the coalition partner. Initial assessments are critical for the successful accomplishment of coalition support operations in order for SF personnel to correctly apply their talents in preparing for the operation. The seven combat functions of command and control, maneuver, fire support, intelligence, air defense, mobility and survivability, and logistics are an efficient beginning for assessing a coalition support partner's capabilities and limitations and for building a long term effort.

The functions addressed above are used to analyze coalition operations because they produce a more efficient structure than other representations, such as missions or operations. The seven functions are easily understood and apply across the range of military operations. The functional structure provides a means for examining all types of missions and operations with the same basic elements. Ensuring long-term sustainment is an SF philosophy that may turn an ad hoc coalition into a formal alliance (i.e., Kuwait and United Arab Emirates).

Upon arriving at their assigned coalition partner's location, SF assessed their level of readiness using the training philosophy stated

above. SF developed a relevant capability for each function. A training program was then developed. Training included individual, and collective and leader development culminating in combat rehearsals. SF teams also coordinated tactical operations, provided essential information necessary to ensure operation control of Coalition forces, and provided fire support coordination. Execution of these and other activities ensured that Coalition forces were well versed in the key skills necessary to operate in a lethal and highly technical environment.[25]

The most recent military operation of the U.S. is "Provide Democracy" which includes SF teams serving as liaison for the new Haitian military and multinational forces. "SF teams are serving as liaisons to the multinational forces deployed to Haiti to take over the peacekeeping mission from the U.S. military. These teams will train with the international forces in their home countries, and then deploy with them to Haiti."[26] This is an outstanding illustration of SF in a coalition support environment applying the imperative of ensuring long-term sustainment.

Provide Sufficient Intelligence

Special Forces provided selective intelligence to their counterparts during Desert Storm in order to reinforce their capabilities. Conversely, one of the most valuable sources of tactical intelligence is that which can be provided by the host nation partner. Certainly with regard to terrain, weather, and information concerning the political leanings of the populace, this is a resource that must be fully exploited where possible. In coalition support operations efforts

must be made to use the experience of the coalition partners who have previous experience operating in a given location; especially if that army has established a good working relationship with the local populace. Trained SF personnel can facilitate the use of these resources by first recognizing their potential and then passing the information up, down, and laterally.

"Commanders of combined units should rapidly establish a system that takes advantage of each nation's contributions and provides all units an accurate intelligence picture."[27] The degree of dissemination will vary depending on the coalition's membership. In Desert Storm there was no preplanned system or mechanism to govern the release and dissemination of essential military intelligence to other than our traditional allies.[28]

Balance Security and Synchronization

Striving to balance security and synchronization in coalition operations, doctrine, training, and organization can be more important than actual numbers and types of weapons involved. Doctrine has tremendous influence on an Army's ability to successfully conduct maneuver with large forces, especially those of different nations. Maneuver with large forces requires the ability to sustain high tempo operations over an extended time to synchronize movement and employment of large forces and diverse weapons systems. It demands a thoroughly professional core of leaders and trainers. In contemplating conducting combined operations, the commander must take a careful look at his force, its doctrine, and the extent of training to accomplish the mission. If his examination reveals a force not trained or equipped to

conduct combined operations, he should consider alternatives and remedies to accomplish the mission.

The success of the coalition forces in Desert Storm is testimony to the accomplishments of Special Forces in training and integrating those units into the overall plan. SF teams working down to battalion level provided the theater commander with his ground truth; unit location, status, capabilities and intent insured leadership would be available at any point in the battle if the coalition forces needed it. SF teams assisted in the flow of intelligence and information throughout the battlefield and prevented numerous fratricide incidents between U.S. air and ground forces and bordering allied units. The teams were in place to sort out boundaries, pass information laterally and horizontally, provide close air support, and ensure that the CINC's intent was understood and passed to the proper location; despite the many changes in operations typical of the fast paced battlefield.[29] (See figure 3.)

Summary

If the past is indeed an indicator of the future, than U.S. Army Special Forces will have great use in future coalition support operations. This chapter established that coalition support warrants classification as either a Special Forces mission or collateral activity. The evidence clearly shows that Special Forces made a critical difference in Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, and continue to contribute to the overall U.S. effort on Haiti. Desert Shield/Storm exemplifies Special Forces' success in their ability to integrate with and contribute to the efficiency of a coalition. They were essential

to CINCCENT's campaign plan and in meeting his political as well as military objectives. During Provide Comfort, Special Forces became a coalition partner in a generally ad hoc organization where individual initiative and leadership made the difference.

This chapter began with the purpose of determining whether coalition support warrants classification as a mission or collateral activity for Special Forces. Emphasis on post-Goldwaters/Nichols Military Reorganization Act operations has validated this to be correct for the modern employment of Special Forces. Through an analysis of these operations and the SOF imperatives the study proved to be conclusive. The evidence shows Special Forces to be a versatile as well as useful element available to the Unified Commanders-in Chief for employment in a coalition support role.

The next chapter will analyze whether coalition support should be classified as a mission or collateral activity of Special Forces. The principles of war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) are the evaluating criteria. Advantages and disadvantages will be discussed. The answer of the primary research question will be the outcome.


ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COALITION
C²I²
CONTROL MEASURES
COORDINATION
COMMUNICATION
INTENT
INTELLIGENCE
LOCATION
ACTIVITIES
INTENTION
CAPABILITY
REPORT
ASSESS
METT-T
VS BOSS
TRAIN
ADVISE
ASSIST
LANGUAGE
CULTURE
NO PROFESSIONAL
NCO CORPS
ENVIRONMENT
MIXED EQUIP
& DOCTRINE
TECHNOLOGICAL
SOPHISTICATION
PROVIDE/
FACILITATE
U.S. SPT
• CAS
• LOG
• NET
• INTEL
DEVELOP
UNIT
CAPABILITIES
• INDIVIDUAL
• COLLECTIVE
• COMBINED
• OPD/NCOPD
HUMAN RIGHTS
COMBAT REHEARSALS
ENHANCE COALITION UNIT'S
BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS

Figure 3

CHAPTER FIVE

Analysis

> The growing heterogeneity of war will make it vastly more difficult for each country to assess the military strength of its neighbors, friends, or rivals. War planners and war preventers alike face unprecedented complexity and uncertainty. Hyper-diversity also places a premium on coalition warfare (and coalition-based deterrence of war).[1]
>
> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War

INTRODUCTION

Military planning is now keyed to capabilities, not threats. After almost fifty years of a Soviet threat, the military must return to a method of planning which addresses a world full of unforeseen dangers. The best way to plan for the unknown is to identify the types of tasks that the military will be assigned, not to guess about the specifics. A capability of growing importance is the interaction with coalition forces.

The nine principles of war and the six principles of military operations other than war apply for both general purpose forces (GPF) and Special Forces. However, the nature of Special Forces require a different application of these same principles. This chapter will analyze both sets of principles in relation to the actions taken by the coalition partner. With coalition support conducted across the operational continuum, all principles have equal weight. The advantages and disadvantages are discussed to answer the primary research question;

"Should coalition support operations become a mission or a collateral activity for U.S. Army Special Forces?

Objective

Coalition support operations must strive to facilitate the integration of forces in contributing to the overall objective. "Once a coalition starts to form, it is imperative that the U.S. maintains a robust liaison with essential partners."[2] During the Gulf War, it was incumbent upon the U.S. to cover the Arab coalition partners with Special Forces in order to ensure synchronization of all forces. If combined combat operations are contemplated, then it is vital that coalition support operators rehearse actions to be undertaken in order to avoid tragic mistakes, such as fratricide.

Given that coalitions often have a symbolic component and require much political give and take, Special Forces involved in coalition support operations must pay particular attention to the degree of rapport and diplomacy that is required to appease the sentiments of coalition partners. The requirements of coalition support operations as a primary mission of Special Forces would be great to keep the coalition constantly focused on the objective. Although these tactics, techniques, and procedures coincide with many of the organic capabilities of Special Forces soldiers, sudden changes in focus requires a certain learning curve. Despite concentration on a mission, Special Forces personnel cannot be expected to replicate the pressures of real coalitions in training.

By attempting to influence their coalition partner's actions in terms of objective, Special Forces Coalition Support Teams (CSTs)

promote U.S. goals. The Special Forces organization and its capabilities and operational methods make it ideally suited to conduct coalition support operations. Limiting the organization's versatility in regards to the principle of objective would be a disadvantage of making coalition support a primary mission. This will be due to the long-term operations of coalition support and the degrading of other skills Special Forces soldiers must maintain for other missions.

In regards to the principle of objective, the concentration of Special Forces planners and leaders on coalition support will result in a detrimental impact on readiness. This is due to the increased operations tempo of the U.S. Army as a whole, and the increase of U.S. involvement in coalition operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Ad hoc coalitions with non-traditional allies detract and complicate the achievement of objective. The disadvantages resulting from complex command and control relationships and interoperability tend to make coalition support less desirable as a primary mission than a collateral activity. Analysis of the principle of objective leads to the judgment that coalition support is better suitable as a collateral activity of Special Forces.

Offensive

Placing emphasis on the offensive is the procedure which SF coalition support operations use to enable their partners to gain and maintain the initiative to achieve decisive results. The offensive is the most effective method in which to obtain the established objective of an operation and is the key to victory. Combined training is imperative for successful coalition offensive operations. Coalition

support teams provide the focus and direction to their coalition commander to organize the training. CSTs provide subordinate units mission essential tasks that must be conducted in combined offensive operations, and the tasks, conditions, and standards to be maintained. Because time and resources for combined training are usually constrained, it is extremely important that CSTs provide priorities for combined training that focuses units on those offensive type missions most likely to be performed.

"Army doctrine should reflect that future operations will most likely be conducted with allies or coalition partners. We can not know with any certainty who our coalition partners may be, or where we will be operating."[3] In actual execution, the multi-national battlefield requires special considerations when fighting as a coalition. This is a good argument for the specialization of coalition support operations. Militarily and politically it is important that the U.S. and its allies fight side-by-side against the common enemy. The assignment of forces to the integration of CSTs and missions in ad hoc coalitions must reflect their unique capabilities, and create organizations whose combat potential is not degraded by lack of interoperability. Coalition support as a primary mission of Special Forces would not be advantageous in this manner. Especially in ad hoc coalitions when the target partner would only be an assumption and thus training conducted in preparation may be erroneous. When analyzed in respect to the principle of offensive, the conclusion that CSTs are the mechanism for linking the means to the ends in coalition warfare. Thus, collateral activity is the proper classification for coalition support under this principle.

Mass

Coalition support operations strengthen the principle of mass by providing a greater correlation of forces towards the operational mission. This is accomplished by assessing, advising, and training the coalition partner so they can be assigned a mission consistent with their capabilities. This reinforces the adage of Special Forces being a force multiplier. Special Forces conducting coalition support operations do increase the capabilities of their coalition partners and provide the command and control link of the overall coalition commander. With this added confidence, the overall effort of the coalition can be transferred into the important principle of mass at less cost than committing additional U.S. Forces.

During Desert Shield and Storm the equivalent of two Arab Corps where added to the overall effort. Without the training, advising, and command and control connection provided by Special Forces CSTs this would not have been possible. The genesis of this operation represents an improved military capability of Special Forces, particularly when employed in a systematic, well-coordinated manner.[4] In relation to the principle of mass there are no advantages or disadvantage concluded from this analysis of coalition support operations being a mission or collateral activity of Special Forces. In a contingency environment, working with a partner of convenience, Special Forces can integrate the partner into the overall plan, as they did in Desert Storm.

Economy of Force

Special Forces coalition support teams may be the only force required in certain coalition operations of the future. This can be

construed as the ultimate economy of force. However, this is most unlikely, but does not lower the major contribution it affords the commander in his options to employ economy of force operations. When the use of force is questionable in world conscience, Special Forces CSTs provide the best low profile option if employment of military forces is required.

As diplomatic warriors, Special Forces can operate in the ambiguous world of coalitions, while never losing sight of the U.S. military purpose and maintaining high standards.[5] Most foreign countries view the commitment of U.S. Army Special Forces as a significant contribution to the coalition. If coalition support was a primary mission of Special Forces the increased relations and enhanced readiness of the trained foreign forces constitutes an economy of force. Conversely this would require far more specialized training of the Special Forces detachments assigned this mission. New doctrine and supplemental equipment may have to be provided for its accomplishment. Considering this analysis, coalition support proves beneficial as a Special Forces primary mission.

Unity of Command

The challenge of unity of command is clearly summarized in the Joint Staff publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces: "Sound command organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperablity."[6] This unity, difficult for U.S. unilateral Joint operations to achieve, is an even greater challenge for a coalition operation, particularly one that is ad hoc. The challenge will be to

enter the coalition prepared, rather than leaving each operations commander to attempt to develop it on the spot.

Creating an effective coalition without previously established, viable working relationships is extremely difficult. In coalition operations variances in tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment provide additional considerations that must be planned for. A resounding point is repeatedly made of the necessity to "train as you expect to fight."[7] During recent operations of the U.S. military, (i.e., Maintain Democracy in Haiti) Special Forces coalition support teams conducted advisor and training assistance duties with other members of the coalition.[8]

Training for coalition warfare as we expect to fight is a complicated challenge. Achieving unity of command may be impossible, but nonetheless, a common focus may be gained with Special Forces coalition support teams. They can accomplish this by deconflicting doctrinal and procedural differences among the foreign forces and creating an effective command and control environment. The advantage of coalition support becoming a mission of Special Forces would be the more focused effort their training would take to achieve this requirement. Through cooperation the required coordination will be attained. The emphasis of the Special Forces detachment assigned coalition support as a mission will be much more focused towards a particular unit within a particular country. Maintaining a common focus in a coalition support operation that their assigned partner is involved in requires the maintenance of area orientation, interpersonal skills, and fostering relationships over time through training.

Command and control requirements will be driven by the makeup of the coalition, and this limitation must be recognized. The disadvantage of coalition support being a primary mission of Special Forces in relation to unity of command is in defining the command structure. Correctly analyzing both political requirements and available resources and then designing the most effective and acceptable command structure for the coalition is not in the capabilities of Special Forces. Special Forces are more concerned with mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) on the tactical level of coalition support operations. Training, advising, and providing a command and control link for their coalition partners, thus enhancing their capabilities shortfalls, is more a task of coalition support. Integrating members of a coalition into an agreed upon command and control structure maximizes the focus of efforts on the overall objective. This leads to the belief that coalition support is a collateral activity of the SOF Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission.

Maneuver

"At all levels of war, successful application of maneuver requires agility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations."[9] Special Forces coalition support operations enhance their partner's ability to maneuver by assessing, adapting, and integrating their tactical doctrine, organization, and resources into the operational plan. The flexibility of Special Forces coalition support teams in planning and advising their coalition partner during the execution portion of an operation is an essential part of integrating the principle of maneuver into coalition support operations.

Special Forces CSTs' ability to facilitate interoperability between U.S. and allied forces is an fundamental tool for bridging successful tactical and operational maneuver. The risk of fratricide rises when operating with different forces; thus, reducing this potential problem is on everyone's mind. Special Forces CSTs successfully accomplished this critical task in Desert Storm. They have continued this legacy during Provide Comfort and today in Maintain Democracy in Haiti.[10]

Special Forces CSTs bring with them the ability to adapt and integrate fire support and close-air support from U.S. forces. This is an attractive aspect to the supported coalition partner. The extra combat potency this brings his force adds confidence and shows commitment to their cause, further integrating maneuver into the scheme of operations. This concept is applicable across the operational continuum, closely tying into the principle of economy of force. As stated earlier, the commitment of Special Forces CSTs may be the only ground force required. Combined with their enhancing training knowledge and close-air support capabilities maneuver of the coalition partner may be significantly augmented to accomplish the operational end state.

The advantage of coalition support becoming a primary Special Forces mission in relation to the principle of maneuver would be the focus the Special Forces soldier would have. "One of the major deficiencies Special Forces had in providing coalition support during Desert Shield was lack of practical knowledge of mechanized warfare."[11] Focus provided by mission and area orientation would theoretically eliminate the great train-up period required to prepare for executing

the mission. The complex environment that exists today may necessitate this type of specialization and focus in order for mission accomplishment. One of the repeated warnings resonating since the gulf war is "next time we may not have six months to prepare."[12]

"Special Operations Forces cannot be massed produced."[13] This quotation tells of the distinct disadvantage to coalition support becoming a primary Special Forces mission. Simply put, there are not enough Special Forces units to be assigned a coalition support mission for every potential coalition partner. The process that makes Special Forces so desirable for coalition support is also it's inhibitor. Not only does it take a long time to produce a raw Special Forces soldier (1 year minimum), but it takes many years to season a Special Forces soldier, and for him to develop rapport with his assigned counterparts within his AOR.[14] Rapport is often hard-won among coalition counterparts. It requires overcoming endemic personal prejudices that would otherwise serve as barriers to effective trust and interactions. Therefore, concerning the principle of maneuver, this analysis finds it more advantageous for coalition support to be a Special Forces collateral activity.

Security

Special Forces are accustomed to working separate from U.S. conventional military or agency assistance. As a result, security impacts on all they do. Imparting this need to their coalition partner will be a matter of due course. Special Forces unique training in intelligence and counter-intelligence offers a beneficial capability to the supported coalition partner in terms of force protection.

The principle of security is often the dominant factor in Special Forces operations. This is because of the nature of Special Forces operations and the general perception of this unit. A breach in security can affect U.S. national credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the coalition partner, creating the potential for mission failure. The commitment of Special Forces into a coalition support role that is known to the allies' belligerent may act to deter any open aggression. This overt sign of U.S. resolve indirectly increases security.

Always foremost in the Special Forces operator's mind, the principle of security will influence all facets of his actions in providing support to a coalition partner. Reducing their vulnerability to hostile acts or surprises is embedded into their intellectual arsenal. Special Forces CSTs can act as a conduit of intelligence, providing early warning from assets not normally available to the supported country. Their actions will reflect this and the security of the supported coalition partner will be improved. No matter where Special Forces provides coalition support on the operational continuum, security is planned. What better propaganda can a belligerent obtain than declaring he has successfully undermined a Special Forces operation, or worse yet that he has killed a Special Forces soldier?

Coalition support as a primary mission of Special Forces would uphold the principle of security through concentration of effort by these soldiers. This will allow the conventional operational commander the capability to exploit a situation if the enemy commander can be forced to orient his forces in more than one direction; therefore, substantially improving the overall security of the forces involved in

the operation. Taking into consideration this analysis, coalition support is better suited as a Special Forces primary mission.

Surprise

The principle of surprise is similar for Special Forces and conventional forces. However, where surprise is desired in conventional operations, it is a necessity in Special Forces operations. This requirement carries over in the conduct of coalition support operations. "To a large degree, the principle of surprise is the reciprocal of the principle of security."[15] Masking one's ability and intent creates the opportunity to catch the enemy unaware and unprepared. The rapid deployment of conventional forces into a crisis area can eliminate the advantage of surprise. The commitment of Special Forces CSTs to support the allied forces involved can preserve this important principle of war.

Special Forces CSTs enhance their coalition partner's capability by contributing to the principle of surprise through the employment of unexpected factors. These factors may include speed, with which the CSTs can arrive to a crises area to an established partner. Effective intelligence is another factor Special Forces CSTs bring to the coalition partner. Unconventional tactics and methods of operation are a deep-seated attribute of Special Forces and one that they incorporate into the role of coalition support operations. Finally, deception and Operations Security (OPSEC) are key elements to the principle of surprise. Special Forces CSTs bring these essential qualities with them in the conduct of this role.

The successful integration of unfamiliar allies in an ad hoc coalition can constitute surprise for the belligerent. "Such was the

case in Desert Shield and Storm when over thirty unfamiliar allies were effectively integrated into the overall effort."[16] These effects of surprise were magnified when the hostile power could not determine the mechanism of the confusion and, consequently, could not react to counter it effectively. Special Forces CSTs achieve surprise in a more subtle manner than traditionally thought of in the conventional realm. CSTs achieve this by advising and training their partner to exploit the hostile power's misconception of the operational environment.

Special Forces CSTs offer the supported partner an increased technological advantage by linking them with other combat multipliers of the U.S. armed forces. This is a particular advantage of Special Forces having coalition support operations as a primary mission. In view of the principle of surprise, Special Forces CSTs would have more to offer the supported partner if coalition support operations were a primary mission. Surprise being a consequential principle, reinforces this premise in that coalition support operations become a priority effort and focus for Special Forces. "Every improvement in coalition operations that we bring to the battlefield will have an impact on the success of operations and reduce the human toll for our forces, as well as every one of our allies."[17]

Simplicity

The conceptual synthesis and professional military understanding of their partner's capacity to conduct missions allow Special Forces CSTs to effectively simplify the plan. The important factor is that simplicity must be addressed in an ad hoc coalition to have a common focus with all partners. Plans must be simple given language and other

barriers. This must be addressed through conventional and non-traditional conduits. Special Forces CSTs provide an excellent force to implement this.

Special Forces CSTs can simplify the plan to make the collective coalition actions a unilateral operation. Extensive training in U.S. doctrine and knowledge of their partners tactics, techniques, and procedures, combined with their interpersonal skills, allow them to synchronize any plan into an executable mission. Simplicity facilitates understanding at all levels of command and minimizes confusion. Simple plans and orders are especially important when there is a diversity in language among coalition members. Special Forces CSTs provide the operational commander language trained forces. The additional benefit of being culturally oriented with developed inter-personal skills ensures the preparation of clear uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

Apart from traditional aversions, basic organizational problems can confound well-meaning attempts to integrate coalition forces in sustained operations on land. Special Forces CSTs provide a synergistic effect that breaks paradigms of coalition support operations. The manner in which they are able to apply the principle of simplicity to coalition support operations is unique to their long training and maturity. This capability is not available in one organization anywhere else in the U.S. armed forces. Considering this premise it would be advantageous to make support to coalitions a primary Special Forces mission.

The nine principles of war have now been analyzed in respect to actions taken by the supported coalition partner. Now, the six

principles of military operations other than war will be used to analyze coalition support. The advantages and disadvantages are discussed to answer the primary research question.

Objective (MOOTW)

In military operations other than war (MOOTW) the ultimate objective, though possibly hard to define, must also be clear from the beginning. The objectives at the tactical level must be linked with the operational and strategic level in order for every action to contribute to the strategic aim. Any action that does not contribute to the objective is unrelated. Conducting coalition support operations in this context lends to the judgment that this environment mirrors a FID type setting with the only difference being the final objective. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to classify coalition support as a collateral activity when analyzed with the principle of objective.

Unity of Effort (MOOTW)

Inherent in the definition of the principle of war unity of command is unity of effort. The most recent edition of FM 100-5 changed its definition of unity of command to reflect not only war but operations other than war. Notably, achieving unity of effort in an MOOTW environment is extremely difficult. Special Forces CSTs facilitate this unity of effort through military to military coordination and integrating both governmental and private agencies.

The strategic level of a MOOTW environment is ultimately responsible for achieving unity of effort in an operation. However, Special Forces CSTs provide the catalyst to insure that the transition

from operational to tactical takes place, and recommend to the coalition commander methods for improvement. Special Forces have numerous recent experiences in aiding the attainment of unit of effort in diverse MOOTW environments. From Operations Maintain Democracy in Haiti, Provide Comfort in Iraq, and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh, Special Forces CSTs facilitated unity of effort to achieve mission accomplishment. "Although MOOTW is usually a multinational operation it is conducted at the small unit level."[18]

The Special Operations Imperative "facilitate interagency activity" is incorporated into all existing Special Forces missions and collateral activities. It is most prevalent in the FID mission in supporting a country's internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. This involves many agencies outside the supported country's military and may include private relief organizations. This leads to the conclusion that coalition support mirrors FID with the MOOTW principle of unity of effort. Consequently, in analyzing this principle, coalition support is most compatible as a collateral activity of FID.

Security (MOOTW)

In a MOOTW environment, the scope of security is of considerable importance in coalition support operations. "Precisely because it is 'not war but like war', preparing for MOOTW is more ambiguous and thus threats are greater."[19] The value of Special Forces coalition support operations bring to the supported force in intelligence collection and analytical ability cannot be denied. Thus, considering MOOTW, coalition support would be more beneficial as a primary mission. This judgment is

made by also taking into account and analyzing the other capabilities of Special Forces that have been previously mentioned.

The complex security situation in operation Provide Comfort is a worthy illustration of how Special Forces coalition support teams applied the important principle of security during a military operation other than war. "There was the threat of Iraqi military action from Iraqi Army divisions in the area, terrorists' threats, and the threats from the Kurdish Peshmerga."[20] The Special Forces supported coalitions' will, composure, and show of force measures defused several tense incidents forcing an Iraqi withdrawal. The Special Forces supported coalition in Provide Comfort gained security through their military presence and by not allowing the Kurdish Peshmerga to enter coalition controlled areas with weapons. While the security operations were being conducted, the primary mission of humanitarian assistance occurred simultaneously. All these efforts resulted in the saving of countless numbers of Kurds, and created the positive conditions for the refugees to be able to return to their homes.

Restraint (MOOTW)

The principle of restraint is a military operations other than war principle that is pertinent to this analysis. "A single act could cause significant military and political consequences, therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. The desired end state may be jeopardized if there is unrestrained use of force."[21] Rules of engagement (ROE) and restraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence are generally more restrictive in MOOTW than they are in war. One of the leadership dilemmas that exists in coalition support

operations in a MOOTW environment is balancing the need for security and restraint. This includes measures to provide for the physical protection of the forces and the safeguarding of supplies and equipment. If at all possible, ROE on the use of force by U.S. and the supported coalition partner must be agreed upon and clearly stated prior to the commencement of the operation.

This is not an easy task. It requires the CSTs to be negotiators, attuned to the political ideology and social dynamics of the coalition partner. Obtaining agreement on ROE prior to commitment to the assigned mission may not be possible, or the situation may evolve. This will require the revision and enforcement of ROE as necessary. The cross-cultural communication and interpersonal skills of Special Forces soldiers allow them to maintain this sensitivity concerning their partner and the current situation as it evolves.

Special Forces CSTs must train their counterparts how and when to use force when faced with a variety of lethal and non-lethal situations likely to occur in an MOOTW environment. ROE detail use of deadly force, but the vast majority of situations encounted by the coalition's soldiers will require a lesser degree of force. Special Forces CSTs must train and advise their counterparts to use other techniques, such as verbal persuasion, warning shots, and carefully aimed fire to accomplish the mission without escalating the situation. Training must also include the ability to recognize when withdrawal is the better course of action to take.

Operation Provide Comfort provides a recent example of a MOOTW environment where Special Forces CSTs advised their counterparts in the

principle of restraint in respect to ROE. Although the ROE issue was dealt with at the JTF level, the CSTs had the responsibility to insure that they were followed. As explained earlier, this principle has significant military and political consequences. As the security zone expanded into Iraq to allow the Kurds to return to their homes, all forms of restraint had to be employed, to include that against the Kurdish Peshmerga. The coalition forces expanded the security zone, and when confronted with Iraqi soldiers, displayed great restraint along with a show of resolve. This exemplifies the difficult balancing of restraint and the need for security.

Military forces are formed, organized, staffed, equipped, and trained for fighting combat operations. Transitioning to a MOOTW mission when restraint of the use of force is paramount to mission success requires a transition period. Special Forces reoriented to "peacetime engagement" soon after the Gulf war. Some may argue that most SOF remained focused on peacetime engagement even during Desert Shield and Storm. However, whereas Special Forces reoriented their focus, as a whole "the regular Armed Forces have not yet made that transition."[22] This premise leads to the conclusion that coalition support would suit the MOOTW principle of restraint perfectly as a collateral activity of FID. The focus of FID today is peacetime engagement. Advising and assisting the supported government's military in how to deal with an insurgency, and the populace as a whole, collaborates the principle of restraint. In fact FID is an operation under MOOTW.[23] It is also important to note that FID is a Congressionally mandated mission of SOF.[24] Thus, in the context of the

principle of restraint, it is beneficial and less disruptive for coalition support to be a collateral activity of FID.

Perseverance (MOOTW)

Perseverance requires a long-term perspective in MOOTW. Short term solutions must be cautiously weighed against long-term strategic aims. Perseverance also supports the view that while some operations may be of short duration, many will be of long duration and may have no clear beginning and end. Perseverance relies on the political and strategic aims remaining constant. In view of coalition support operations with long term partners this principle is relevant. In respect to ad hoc coalitions where partners are not likely, (i.e., Syria in Desert Storm) this MOOTW principle has little relevance.

In countries which have habitual relations both politically and military, this MOOTW principle has particular relevance. The mind-set of the CSTs involved in the operation must be disciplined and focused on long-term goals. In most cases of this type where decisive action is taken, it is perceived as a stepping stone to further national goals and objectives. Special Forces have been involved in operations of this nature since 1952. They were either in the form of Unconventional Warfare (UW) or FID. However, in recent history UW is viewed as too sensitive an operation, both politically and militarily. Thus, FID remains today as a perfect example of perseverance in action.

Provide Comfort II and III which continues today, offers another example of the principle of perseverance. Special Forces CSTs provide support to the multinational force. This analysis points to coalition support being subjugated as a collateral activity of FID. The long-term

commitment with fostered interpersonal alliances built up over the years of working together mirrors that of an Special Forces FID environment. Thus, coalition Support is a natural extenuation of FID in the context of the MOOTW principle of perseverance.

Legitimacy (MOOTW)

The MOOTW principle of legitimacy embodies Special Forces operations. Prior to the advent of this principle, Special Forces doctrine addressed the same concern with its SOF imperatives.[25] One imperative , "Insure legitimacy of Special Operations", addresses this concern directly. This principle and the imperatives are certainly consistent and unified. The principle of legitimacy is mostly concerned with the operation sustaining legitimacy as well as the host government if applicable.

In today's information age it is essential to portray the correct image to maintain political and popular support. In relation to the supported coalition partner, legitimacy must be maintained by influencing his actions in "adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community."[26] This principle also parallels the principle of restraint and the execution of the ROE. Strict discipline and prudent execution of ROE help maintain the operation's legitimacy. Failure may result in fratricide, atrocities, loss of national will, and finally mission failure.

Special Forces CSTs provide a bridge from the supported force to the operational commander to insure policies and intent are understood and accomplished. Provide Comfort, Task Force Freedom, (which helped restore Kuwait City following Desert Storm), and now Maintain Democracy

provide recent examples. Legitimacy is embedded in Special Forces doctrine, specifically in the mission of FID. Analysis of this principle of legitimacy leads to the conclusion that it is neutral to whether or not coalition support is a mission or collateral activity of Special Forces. The ingrained importance of this principle implies that, be it a mission or collateral activity, Special Forces CSTs will strive to maintain the operation's legitimacy. The Special Forces soldier knows that losing legitimacy often results in failure.

Summary

This chapter provided an analysis of coalition support operations with the principles of war, and the principles of military operations other than war. This examination led to the conclusion that coalition support operations should be categorized as a collateral activity of U.S Army Special Forces. Points that stand out from this analysis are that Special Forces activities that contribute to coalition support include: military to military contacts, FID (SA/MTTs), and combined exercises.

The U.S. will continue to deploy Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) tailored to the needs of specific contingencies that have become the norm for responding militarily with a coalition of forces overseas. Little or no reorganization is needed for the coalition support role, since requisite military tasks are very similar to those found in Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense. The following chapter provides the conclusion of this analysis and recommendations for implementation.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

> We have the people, the motivation and the reputation for unconventional thought and action. Now is the time to justify the faith our nation's leaders have placed in us by being in the forefront of change. Now is the time for us to develop new paradigms that will allow us to continue to make significant contributions to the nation's security.[1]
>
> Wayne A. Downing, Special Operations Forces: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges Today

The preceding chapters of this thesis have addressed the research question, the research rationale, pertinent literature, and analysis using the SOF imperatives, the principles of war, and the principles of military operations other than war as criteria. This chapter answers the primary and the secondary research questions. This chapter also offers recommendations for implementation.

Should coalition support operations become a mission or a collateral activity for U.S. Army Special Forces? Chapter four revealed that coalition support warrants classification as either a Special Forces mission or collateral activity. Chapter five determined that coalition support should be classified as a collateral activity of Special Forces. The charts below are a synopsis of chapter five. They exhibit the results of the analysis of the principles of war and military operations other than war as applied to coalition support operations since the Goldwater/ Nichols Defense reorganization Act of 1986.

Principles Of War	Mission	Collateral Activity	Neutral
Objective		X	
Offensive		X	
Mass			X
Economy of Force	X		
Unity of Command		X	
Maneuver		X	
Security	X		
Surprise	X		
Simplicity	X		
Subtotal	4	4	1

Principles of MOOTW	Mission	Collateral Activity	Neutral
Objective		X	
Unity of Effort		X	
Security	X		
Restraint		X	
Perseverance		X	
Legitimacy			X
Combined Total	5	8	2

Figure 4

This data analysis clearly led to the conclusion that coalition support operations should be categorized as a collateral activity of U.S Army Special Forces. Although the principles of war analysis is fairly equally divided, the MOOTW principles clearly point to collateral activity as the correct classification. Understood that coalition support is conducted across the operational continuum, equal weight is given to all principles.

Coalition support operations should receive recognition in Joint and Army SOF doctrinal manuals as a collateral activity related mostly to FID. The relationship to FID is based on the current doctrinal definition of "Train, organize, equip, advise, and assist indigenous forces."[2] Specific concept plans, operations plans, and mission letter taskings from theater special operations commands to apportioned Army Special Forces units are adequate to generate Mission Essential Task List (METL) training, and if required, Modified Tables of Equipment (MTOE) actions. METL driven unit training in support of theater CINC driven requirements permits the appropriate Special Forces Group to develop the required expertise to support this collateral activity.[3]

Chapter one introduced several secondary questions as addendum to the primary research question. These secondary questions can now be answered or have already been discussed in the process of answering the research question.

How were U.S. Army Special Forces used as a principle coalition warfare instrument in the Persian Gulf War? Early in Desert Shield CINCCENTCOM identified the requirement for providing liaison and training and advisory assistance to maintain cohesion among coalition partners. As a result 109 Special Forces teams provided this collateral activity to all the coalition ground forces participating in Desert Shield and Storm.

What other forces or agencies could have accomplished these coalition support operations? Through the conduct of this research it has been determined that only Special Forces could have conducted coalition support at the magnitude required in Desert Shield and Storm.

However, U.S. Navy SEALs have the capabilities to fill this role on a limited scale. Their small size and littoral focus limits them from any large scale operation. The U.S. Air Force recently activated the 6th Special Operations Wing with a mission is to conduct FID. Their organization for deployments mirrors that of Special Forces A detachments. This new organization emphasizes area orientation, language, and specific occupation specialties as do their Army counterparts.[4] Imitation is certainly the best form of flattery. No other agency has been identified in the conduct of research with the capabilities required to conduct coalition support operations.

How can U.S. Army capabilities be enhanced? Operational training and deployments in their area of assignment (AOR) are the primary means in which Special Forces can enhance their coalition support capabilities. Participation in combined exercises and training programs "strengthens collective engagements, reinforces capabilities to conduct multinational operations with alliances and likely coalition partners, and establishes an international sympathetic infrastructure of multinational contacts that may be useful during crisis."[5]

What is the emerging significance of coalition support operations to the U.S. Army Special Forces? Special Forces units assigned to every regional CINC have conducted coalition support operations since Desert Shield and Storm. During Provide Comfort, 10th SFG(A) was instrumental in successful integration of the world's effort in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds. Operation Sea Angel involved the 1st SFG(A) which served as liaison and linguists facilitating cooperation among the countries involved in the disaster

relief mission. Finally, every Special Forces Group is represented in supporting the coalition of forces during Operation Maintain Democracy in Haiti.[6]

Recommendations

As a result of Desert Shield and Storm, coalition support operations are in vogue. The reasons for this are many, including but not limited to political and popular support. It is essential that the U.S. military incorporate lessons learned into future doctrine if applicable. Coalition support operations have proven to be correct for inclusion in the doctrine of the armed forces. It is incumbent upon the leadership of the military forces to insure these lessons are not re-learned by the soldiers of future operations. Below is a list of recommendations with emphasis on this thesis' focus of coalition support operations.

1. Special Forces doctrine, specifically FM's 25-100 and 31-20, should be updated to include coalition support operations as a collateral activity for Special Forces. These manuals serve principally as reference guides to conventional force commanders and their staff. The declaration of this capability in print to the conventional force community will improve SOF integration with conventional forces. "We want conventional commanders to see us as being so valuable that they will not contemplate a mission without asking for our assistance."[7]

2. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) should be written, incorporating pertinent tasks from previously published manuals of FID and UW. Lessons learned and individual unit after-action reports present other excellent sources for this proposed manual. This manual

will serve as a good reference in preparing METL's for those units assigned coalition support as a mission by their theater CINC's. "The major thrust of future doctrine development will be living doctrine based on fluid, strategic environment, and lessons learned from ongoing operations."[8]

3. Finally, joint doctrine should recognize coalition support as a collateral activity for SOF. Delineation should be directed regarding responsibilities in the conduct of this role. To illustrate, U.S. Army Special Forces are primarily suited for supporting land forces, while the U.S. Air Force's 6th Squadron is suitable for supporting indigenous air forces. The Navy SEALs can support land forces in a small context, but are best suited to support forces with a littoral mission.

Summary

Coalition support operations should be added as a separate doctrinal collateral activity for U.S Army Special Forces at the Joint and Service levels. An adaptive military force will build on strengths, pursuing change for a better and improved capability. "The critical importance of developing doctrine for multinational operations-tailored for traditional allies and even unlikely coalition partners will require command emphasis."[9] U.S. Armed Forces future operations for the most part will be combined. With coalition support recognized at all levels as a Special Forces collateral activity, a structure will exist at the appropriate level to properly facilitate the interaction of coalition partners and the U.S. military, instead of organizing ad hoc to accomplish the mission.

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