

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESSION OF KIM JONG IL FOR
US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESSION OF KIM JONG IL FOR US
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164 pages.

This study analyzes the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea threatens vital US interests in Northeast Asia and challenges US regional and global leadership. In order to properly respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, it is essential to understand the man who will dictate North Korean actions--Kim Jong Il.

The study examines Kim Jong Il's background, training, experience, personality, leadership characteristics, and the challenges he will face. The analysis of Kim Jong Il indicates that he is a rational actor who has and will continue to act in a rational manner in pursuit of his desired ends.

The framework for analysis is the Strategic Estimate Process. Alternative courses of action are developed using the four elements of national power. The study identifies the strategic implications of probable North Korean actions and recommends appropriate US courses of action on the basis of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability in achieving US objectives in support of US interests.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. KIM JONG IL--THE NEW EMPEROR.....	19
3. A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUE.....	68
4. SCENARIOS AND ANALYSIS OF US COURSES OF ACTION.....	116
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	129
APPENDIX	
A USER'S GUIDE TO THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE PROCESS.....	144
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	153
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	164

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

East Asia is rapidly emerging as the center of gravity of the world's economic and security realms. The sheer volume of East Asian commerce makes the region critical to the economic well-being of the United States (US). In 1960, the East Asian economies comprised 4 percent of the world's gross national product (GNP). By 1991, the East Asian economies comprised some 25 percent of the world's GNP, and by the year 2000, East Asian economies are projected to account for one-third of the world's GNP. For the US, whose two-way trade across the Pacific reached \$361 billion in 1993, over 50 percent more than its transatlantic trade, East Asia is of critical importance.¹ Within East Asia, the stability of Northeast Asia and especially the Korean Peninsula is vital for the US and its allies, but there are numerous threats to regional security. The interests of China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States all converge on the Korean Peninsula. The focal point for the stability of Northeast Asia is the Korean Peninsula, and on the Korean Peninsula many of the concerns of the US are currently focused on North Korea. Therefore, this thesis will be devoted in great measure to that country. One of the most significant threats to regional security is posed by the continued efforts of North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. The

impacts of nuclear proliferation by North Korea are significant for both the regional and global interests of the US.

The number of nuclear weapons that North Korea may possess is unclear, but it is readily apparent that North Korea has failed to comply with the inspection requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has removed fuel rods containing plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor. At the minimum, the US believes that North Korea may have separated sufficient plutonium to make one or two nuclear bombs.² North Korea may already possess crude nuclear weapons. Even if the US can not prevent the North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is in the best interests of the US and its regional partners to slow down or cap the North Korean nuclear program.

A nuclear North Korea poses clear dangers to regional stability. With nuclear weapons, North Korea can (1) use nuclear weapons to destroy US and/or South Korean forces in the course of an invasion of South Korea, (2) threaten to use nuclear weapons to discourage the US from taking part in the defense of South Korea or to dissuade Japan from providing the bases essential for the US to play an effective role in defending South Korea, (3) provide components or entire systems of nuclear weapons to any of a number of countries throughout the world, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq, and (4) use nuclear weapons as a basis for blackmailing regional nations into providing economic assistance.³ Any leverage that a small nation, such as North Korea, might acquire through the possession of nuclear weapons and related delivery means poses a potential threat to US national interests.⁴ Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea could initiate a regional

arms race, with South Korea and Japan developing their own nuclear capability as a deterrent to North Korea.

The US and its allies have given considerable attention to the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and are pursuing efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Key to these efforts are attempts to get North Korea to live up to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires North Korea to submit to verification inspections by the IAEA. The US is currently pursuing a strategy of deterrence and engagement in dealing with North Korea.

The strategy focuses on diplomatic efforts to convince the North Koreans that a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula is in everyone's interest and particularly in North Korea's interest. The diplomatic effort is drawing on allies, regional players, and world opinion to demonstrate to North Korea that the world community is united on the issue of non-proliferation. The deterrence aspect of the strategy highlights South Korean and United States' preparedness to respond to any rash acts on the part of North Korea.

Efforts by the US and its allies to resolve successfully the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue have been significantly complicated by the death of Kim Il Sung, the only leader North Korea has known since the end of World War II. The death of Kim Il Sung on 8 July 1994 resulted in the succession to power of his son, Kim Jong Il. The untimely death of Kim Il Sung and leadership change in the middle of US efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea has further complicated US-North Korean relations.

Little is known about Kim Jong Il and the strategy he will pursue in dealing with the United States. However, he is widely perceived as an unstable leader who is unpredictable and subject to mood swings. Kim Jong Il's involvement in previous North Korean terrorist operations causes many observers to regard him as dangerous, irrational, and very probably unstable. Kim Jong Il's close ties to the North Korean nuclear program (the development of nuclear weapons has always been a high priority project for Kim Jong Il) also damages his credibility abroad.⁵ It is difficult for the international community to understand how North Korea can justify the massive expenditures necessary for a nuclear weapons program when the country is incapable of adequately feeding its own people. Kim Jong Il's reputation as a playboy, his background in making propaganda films, his lack of experience in international relations, and his lack of military service have convinced many analysts that he is not qualified to lead North Korea and does not have the charisma to succeed his father.⁶ Misunderstandings and misperception often lead to conflicts, and this statement is particularly true when dealing with a closed society where the accuracy of the information on intentions is questionable at best.

Despite his lack of international credibility and rumors of military and political opposition within North Korea, Kim Jong Il has successfully consolidated his leadership position. Kim Jong Il's successful consolidation of power is not surprising since North Korea has a long tradition of ignoring international opinion and no viable opposition has emerged in North Korea. Regardless of his background, the US will have to deal with Kim Jong Il. At this time, he is in

charge of North Korea and will dictate the North Korean response to US foreign policy.

In order to properly shape US foreign policy, it is necessary to develop an understanding of North Korean interests and objectives. In a totalitarian state such as North Korea, the leader will be the one who shapes those interests and objectives. In order to effectively develop a foreign policy that will achieve US objectives, the US must first develop an understanding of Kim Jong Il, his interests and objectives, and the factors, both internal and external to North Korea, that will shape his ideas and actions.

Kim Jong Il's policies and strategies will be shaped by his perception of North Korea's interests and objectives. Kim Jong Il's policies and strategies will also be shaped by the domestic pressures he faces as he attempts to further consolidate his power, economic conditions in North Korea, and the legacy of his father. In addition, his interests and objectives will be influenced by the training he received to prepare him for leading his nation. In order to properly adapt to the change in leadership in North Korea, it is necessary for the US, in the words of Sun Tzu, to "know the enemy."⁷ Accordingly, this thesis examines Kim Jong Il's strategic impact on US foreign policy with regard to North Korea.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

The primary research question this thesis answers is as follows:

What are the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea?

Subordinate Research Questions

In order to answer the primary research question, it is necessary to answer the following subordinate research questions: (1) What preparation did Kim Jong Il receive to groom him for a leadership role? (2) What are the domestic pressures facing Kim Jong Il? (3) What are Kim Jong Il's interests and objectives? (4) What is current US foreign policy towards North Korea? and (5) What is Kim Jong Il's likely response to current US foreign policy towards North Korea?

Assumptions

In order to facilitate the research necessary for answering the primary and subordinate research questions, it is necessary to make several assumptions. The assumptions upon which this research is based are as follows: (1) Kim Jong Il will be able to fully consolidate his power and assume his father's place as the leader of North Korea; (2) Kim Jong Il's interests and objectives can be determined by examining his lifestyle, education, and preparation for assuming leadership; (3) Sufficient information is available to accurately identify and assess the domestic pressures Kim Jong Il faces; and (4) Kim Jong Il will dictate the North Korean response to US foreign policy.

Key Terms

In order to prevent any ambiguity in the use of language, the following key terms are used as defined in this thesis:

Foreign Policy. Pattern or patterns of actions designed to attain specific objectives abroad.⁸

Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons or the technology necessary for the construction of nuclear weapons to nations or groups that currently do not possess nuclear weapons or related technology.

Strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.⁹

Rational Actor. A decision maker who seeks the most efficient means to get what he wants.¹⁰

Feasibility. An assessment of whether or not the given resources (means) are adequate to execute the strategic concept (ways).¹¹

Acceptability. A cost-benefit analysis comparing the resources required (means) and the benefits to be achieved (ends) to determine whether or not a given option will be supported by the national will.¹²

Suitability. An assessment of whether or not a given option will attain, promote, or protect identified US interest(s).¹³

Limitations

The primary limitation arises from the nature of the topic. The US and its regional allies are continuing efforts to engage North Korea

in meaningful dialogue and resolve the nuclear proliferation issue. Thus, the relationship between the US and North Korea is continuously evolving and changing, with new developments occurring constantly. This in turn makes it difficult to separate true interests and objectives from posturing and negotiating ploys.

Delimitations

The primary sources of information for this study are unclassified articles and books. This is a necessary constraint in order to narrow the amount of information available and to avoid the complications involved in preparing a classified thesis. Research will be limited to information published in English and Korean publications translated into English. Classified evaluations of Kim Jong Il and North Korean interests, objectives, and intentions are not used. There is very little information available on Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il rarely meets with foreigners, so there are few primary sources available that discuss Kim Jong Il. The primary information available on Kim Jong Il is contained in secondary sources. The unclassified nature of the thesis and the lack of primary source information results in opinions being drawn and conclusions formed that are based on the available information, thus limiting the usefulness of the thesis.

Research Design

The analytical model employed in this thesis is the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Strategic Estimate Process.¹⁴ There are five reasons why the CGSC Strategic Estimate Process is a useful model for answering the question, "What are the strategic

implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea?" First, it provides a prescribed, logical framework for a strategic estimate with predetermined subjects which cover all areas necessary for a complete analysis. The use of the standardized format insures that nothing will be omitted inadvertently. Second, the Strategic Estimate Process methodology organizes information and judgments in a coherent fashion. The model is useful for (1) generating options in a crisis situation at the strategic level and (2) performing long-range strategic analyses of geographic regions or portions thereof.¹⁵ Third, the use of the Strategic Estimate Process model identifies the various considerations necessary to thoroughly examine all factors affecting the synthesis, ensuring that no factors will be overlooked. Fourth, although the Strategic Estimate Process is a doctrinally approved methodology, the Strategic Estimate Process methodology is not used as an approved template but rather as a malleable tool. Users can tailor the methodology to their personal and organizational analysis styles and requirements.¹⁶ Fifth, the Strategic Estimate Process is the tool that is taught at the Command and General Staff College. This model, or a variation thereof, is used by the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified and specified commands to analyze real world situations.¹⁷ Repeated use of the Strategic Estimate Process model by the organizations listed above proves its validity and the Strategic Estimate Process is an accepted aspect of the joint doctrine of the US Armed Forces. Background on the Strategic Estimate Process appears in the Appendix.

The Strategic Estimate Process is in essence a doctrinal framework for the rational actor model. The rational actor model assumes that decision making is a process of means-ends calculation. The nation as a rational, purposeful, and unitary decision maker will select the action among alternatives that will maximize the attainment of national goals and protection of national interests.¹⁸ The concept that nations act in accordance with their national interests traces its roots back to the pessimistic realism of Machiavelli in the 15th century.¹⁹ For Machiavelli, nothing was more significant or moral than the interest of the state (in his case, the Italian State), so immoral ends could be employed for the attainment of national interests. Like Machiavelli, Clausewitz also viewed nations as making decisions based on their national interests. Clausewitz felt that all state behavior was motivated by a need to survive and prosper. A decision by the state to go to war, then, was a rational decision to safeguard the state's interests.²⁰

According to Graham Allison, the rational actor model is the model most frequently used by analysts to explain foreign policy.²¹ Foreign policy analysts use national interests as the prime motivating factors for state interactions. Foreign policy can thus be explained by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments acting in a rational manner.²² In the rational actor model, rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choices within specified constraints.²³ A rational decision maker, or a rational actor, is one who seeks the most efficient means to get what he wants.²⁴

In applying the Strategic Estimate Process to determine the strategic implications of the succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea, a variant of the rational actor model is used to evaluate North Korean actions. The variant of the rational actor model specifically applied to North Korea focuses explicitly on an individual leader, Kim Jong Il, as the actor whose preference function is maximized and whose personal characteristics are allowed to determine the nation's direction.²⁵ This modification to the Strategic Estimate Process is in keeping with the assumption that Kim Jong Il will dictate the North Korean response to US foreign policy. Kim Jong Il's weighting of goals and objectives, tendencies to perceive (and to exclude) particular ranges of alternatives, and the principles Kim Jong Il employs in estimating the consequences that follow from each alternative are the basic framework for North Korean decision making.

The Strategic Estimate Process begins with the identification of the problem and the statement of assumptions. The major international players are examined (whether friendly, hostile, or neutral) and their interests, objectives, elements of power, strengths, and weaknesses are identified. Probable courses of action are then identified, based upon both the literature review and the interests, objectives, elements of power, strengths, and weaknesses of the major international players. Based on the probable courses of action, feasible scenarios and policy options are developed and tested against the scenarios.

The Strategic Estimate Process is particularly appropriate for the study of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea because of the many changes that have occurred in the environment, the

uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong Il, and the many international players involved in Northeast Asia. The international players are identified by the literature review and include the US, South Korea, North Korea, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), China, Japan, and the United Nations (UN).

Alternative policy options which draw on one or more of the national elements of power flow from the analysis performed in the Strategic Estimate Process. The various options resulting from the continuous strategic estimate process are evaluated on the basis of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. Feasibility involves an evaluation of whether or not the action can be accomplished by the means available. Feasibility is an assessment of the strategic concept (ways) given the resources available (means). The feasibility assessment determines whether mobilized and useable instruments (resources) are adequate to execute the option. Acceptability involves an evaluation of whether or not the consequences of cost are justified by the importance of the effect desired. Acceptability is determined through a cost-benefit analysis, comparing the resources required (means) and the benefits to be achieved (ends). Acceptability thus involves a determination of whether the option will be supported by the national will. Suitability involves an evaluation of whether or not the attainment of the objective will accomplish the desired effect. Suitability results in a determination of whether or not the option will attain, promote, or protect the identified US interest(s).²⁶ The evaluation of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability is based primarily upon the analysis and judgment of the author. Options judged

to be feasible, acceptable, and suitable are analyzed as possible courses of action. Recommendations for US strategic policy flow from the comparison and evaluation of possible courses of action and are based on the overall knowledge and assessment by the author of the situation.

The literature review focuses on gathering the essential information for the Strategic Estimate Process. Research for this thesis is divided into five areas described below.

1. Kim Jong Il's lifestyle as well as the education and preparation Kim Jong Il received to prepare him for a leadership role is examined. The research identifies his progression within the Communist Party hierarchy, the breadth of his training experience, and the particular expertise Kim Jong Il possesses. The research also examines the intensive propaganda effort involved in positioning Kim Jong Il for hereditary succession and the factors that led to his choice as the logical successor to Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il's personality is evaluated based on the information available. Articles and books written in the last ten years on Kim Jong Il and the North Korean leadership transfer provide the necessary data.

2. The conflicting interests that Kim Jong Il must reconcile as he consolidates his power are examined. Specifically, the sources of potential domestic challenges to his leadership are identified and examined. Kim Jong Il's strengths and weaknesses are analyzed, emphasizing the sources of his power and the potential threats to his continued leadership of North Korea. Articles and books on the North

Korean power transfer published in the last ten years provide the necessary data.

3. North Korean interests and objectives in previous years and Kim Jong Il's current interests and objectives are identified and examined by reviewing articles and books published in the last ten years. The evaluation includes an examination of available information on Kim Jong Il, his personality, and likely future scenarios involving the US and North Korea.

4. US foreign policy towards North Korea as expressed by the Clinton administration is examined. Speeches and policy statements by the Clinton administration and the Clinton administration's most recent national security strategy (February 1995) provide the necessary data.

5. Possible responses by Kim Jong Il to US foreign policy initiatives are identified and examined. Current literature on the subject and insights gained from identifying US interests and objectives, Kim Jong Il's interests and objectives, and the interests and objectives of international players in the region contribute to the examination process.

Research relies on articles and books published within the last ten years. Information is drawn from both professional publications and publications covering recent events, such as newspapers, media reports, speeches, and lectures.

Significance of the Study

Several books and articles have addressed the dynastic transfer of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. These books and articles have

addressed the problems that Kim Jong Il would encounter in consolidating his power based upon various scenarios for when the actual power transfer would take place. These assessments have been generic in nature and have focused on the short and long-term prospects of Kim Jong Il remaining in power. None of these assessments, however, have been performed from the perspective of the current world situation. The dynastic transfer of power is occurring simultaneously with the crisis over nuclear non-proliferation. In addition, North Korea has been deprived of the support it traditionally received from its communist allies by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the economic liberation of China.

The delinking of most-favored-nations (MFN) trading status from human rights abuses has also drawn China into greater dialogue with the West, expanding the gulf between North Korea and China. In addition, the spectacular growth of economies throughout the Asian world has resulted in North Korea falling farther and farther behind the regional powers, South Korea, and smaller Asian states. None of these occurrences was foreseen or accounted for in previous assessments. None of the assessments considered a scenario where Kim Jong Il would simultaneously be consolidating his power base and responding to international pressures to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The simultaneous succession of Kim Jong Il and North Korean proliferation of nuclear weapons is a unique situation that was not anticipated and has not been evaluated in any previous assessment or research.

Answering the primary research question provides guidance on how the US should conduct its foreign policy in light of the current situation. Determining how Kim Jong Il is likely to respond to current US foreign policy provides guidance on how US strategic objectives may be achieved. Evaluating Kim Jong Il's response to US foreign policy provides direction for modifying US strategy to achieve nuclear non-proliferation.

Endnotes

¹Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern, "The Myth of the Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 81.

²Albert Wohlstetter and Gregory S. Jones, "Breakthrough in North Korea?" The Wall Street Journal, 4 November 1994, A14.

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⁴Frederick R. Strain, "Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence: A Policy Conundrum," Parameters, Autumn 1993, 94.

⁵Yossef Bodansky, "Kim Jong-Il Consolidates Power," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 30 June 1994, 8.

⁶Byung-joon Ahn, "The Man Who Would Be Kim," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 94; Taeho Kim, "Kim Jong-il--North Korea's New Leader," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, 422, 424.

⁷Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

⁸U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Joint and Combined Environments, C510 Course Syllabus (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 August 1994), 18.

⁹U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 232.

¹⁰Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), 30.

¹¹Joint and Combined Environments, 33-34; Robert D. Walz, "A User's Guide to the Strategic Estimate," 1995, Unpublished Paper, Strategy Division, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 7.

¹²Joint and Combined Environments, 33-34; Walz, 7.

¹³Joint and Combined Environments, 33-34; Walz, 7.

¹⁴Joint and Combined Environments, 303.

¹⁵Joint and Combined Environments, 2.

¹⁶Joint and Combined Environments, 2.

¹⁷Joint and Combined Environments, 2.

¹⁸Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Denver, CO: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1986), 49.

¹⁹Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," Parameters, Winter 1994-1995, 4.

²⁰Carl von Clausewitz as interpreted by Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," Parameters, Winter 1994-1995, 5.

²¹Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 10-13.

²²Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 49.

²³Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 30.

²⁴Anthony Downs as cited by Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Denver, CO: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1986), 49.

²⁵Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 37.

²⁶Joint and Combined Environments, 33-34; Walz, 7.

CHAPTER 2

KIM JONG IL--THE NEW EMPEROR

The Rise of Kim Jong Il

The succession of Kim Jong Il as the absolute ruler of North Korea in July 1994, following the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, marked a triumph of nepotism on a scale of which other communist leaders might have dreamt but which none until then had dared attempt.¹ The transfer of power to Kim Jong Il was the culminating point of more than twenty years of careful planning and preparation. A new emperor rules in North Korea, and it is essential for the US to understand the man who now guides North Korea on the road to nuclear proliferation.

North Korea is a tightly closed society, making it very difficult to obtain direct information about the workings of government, the policies of its leaders, or the rise to power of Kim Jong Il. Nevertheless, it is possible to piece together a picture of Kim Jong Il's early life and his developmental years. Kim Jong Il was reportedly born in Samarkand in the Soviet Union on 16 February 1942, the eldest son of Kim Il Sung and his first wife, Kim Jong Sook.² Upon the liberation of Korea from the Japanese in 1945, Kim Jong Il returned to North Korea with his father, mother, and his younger brother, Kim Yu Ra. Kim Yu Ra drowned in a pond in 1948, the same year that Kim Jong Il entered the Namsan People's Elementary School in Pyongyang.³ Kim Il

Sung also had a daughter, Kim Kyung Hee, by his first wife. Kim Kyung Hee is currently the Minister of Light Industry.⁴

Kim Jong Sook died in 1949 and Kim Il Sung subsequently remarried, having two sons and two daughters by his second wife, Kim Sung Ae. Kim Jong Il was raised primarily by his stepmother. During the Korean War Kim Jong Il stayed in Manchuria, returning to North Korea in 1952. Kim Jong Il resumed his education at Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute, North Korea's special elite school reserved exclusively for the privileged children of high ranking party officials.⁵ Kim Jong Il graduated from Namsan High School in 1958, and was sent to the East German Air Force Academy. After only a year at the East German Air Force Academy, he returned to North Korea and entered Kim Il Sung University as a Sophomore in the college of politics and economy. Kim Jong Il graduated from Kim Il Sung University in 1963 and began his political career.⁶

Kim Jong Il's personal and career development reflects the importance accorded to the first son of Kim Il Sung.⁷ From his earliest years his ideas were lauded and he was given important duties. The North Korean media placed great emphasis on Kim Jong Il's theoretical writings while he was at Kim Il Sung University. Upon entering government service, Kim Jong Il's first position was as a member of the Organization and Guidance Bureau of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung's younger brother, Kim Yong Ju, was the director of the bureau. In his first assignment, Kim Jong Il reportedly acted as his father's personal secretary.⁸ It has also been reported that in his first assignment he acted as a bodyguard for Kim Il Sung.⁹

In 1969, Kim Jong Il was promoted to deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Bureau. In 1970, he became director of the Culture and Arts Department of the KWP. He was further elevated to the position of director, Propaganda and Agitation Department. In later years, the period from 1964 to 1971 was often referred to as Kim Jong Il's "student period for learning politics."¹⁰

Exactly when Kim Il Sung chose to pursue hereditary succession cannot be determined, but there are indications that the process was underway in the early 1970s. South Korean sources point to the Sixth Meeting of the League of Socialist Working Youth (LSWY) of North Korea as the first sign of Kim Il Sung's plans for his son. Kim Il Sung is thought to have made a statement at the LSWY meeting in June 1971, indicating that the older generation must let the post-liberation generation carry the torch of the revolution. This statement implied that Kim Il Sung's successor must be someone from the younger generation (Kim Jong Il's generation) rather than someone only a few years junior to Kim Il Sung.¹¹ Until that time, Kim Yong Ju, Kim Il Sung's younger brother, was considered the most likely successor. Kim Yong Ju held the sixth most powerful position in the KWP in 1971, but he was demoted in 1974 and lost all power by 1975. Kim Yong Ju's fall from grace highlights the carefully executed change of generations within the leadership of North Korea in the 1970s. In addition to Kim Yong Ju, many active cadres in their mid-forties and fifties were replaced by much younger people in their thirties and early forties.¹² This step was clearly taken to increase support for Kim Jong Il, but undoubtedly it also led to considerable bitterness for the cadres in their forties

and fifties who were passed over. It is likely that latent generational tensions have built up since it became apparent that Kim Il Sung intended to make Kim Jong Il's generation the main players in the North Korean leadership.¹³

Following the LSWY meeting, the Central Committee of the KWP held a closed session on 22 December 1972. According to one report of the session, two old and faithful comrades of Kim Il Sung, Kim Il and Choe Yong Gon, proposed that Kim Jong Il be groomed as the successor. The rationale for proposing Kim Jong Il as a successor was the need to avoid the turmoil that befell Russia in the leadership conflict following the death of Stalin. The wisdom of designating a successor was later reinforced by the power struggle China experienced in the Cultural Revolution, which the North Koreans feel occurred because China failed to decide on Mao's successor.¹⁴

The first official recognition of Kim Jong Il as the designated successor to Kim Il Sung came in September 1973 at the Seventh Plenum of the Fifth Congress of the KWP. Although the meeting was unpublicized, Kim Jong Il was elevated to a position of power as the secretary in charge of organization and propaganda-agitation of the KWP. In a closed society such as North Korea, mass organization and propaganda-agitation is extremely important. The promotion would prove crucial in enhancing the image of Kim Jong Il, who at that time was largely unknown to the North Korean population.¹⁵

The choice of Kim Jong Il as the successor and his elevation to head the Propaganda and Agitation Department was not a guarantee of his status as the future leader of North Korea. Kim Jong Il's elevation was

instead the beginning of a long process to overcome both visible and invisible barriers to making Kim Jong Il a crown prince in a supposedly classless society.¹⁶ Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union expressed reservations about a North Korean hereditary succession. In addition, there was internal resistance within North Korea that would have to be overcome as Kim Jong Il was not widely known and did not have the charisma, experience, or revolutionary credentials of his father.

Prior to the designation of Kim Jong Il as the successor, actions were taken to clear the way for hereditary succession. Kim Il Sung revealed his intention to follow hereditary succession indirectly. The 1970 edition of *Dictionary of Political Terminologies*, published by the North Korean Academy of Social Sciences, defined "hereditary succession" as:

A reactionary custom of exploitive societies whereby certain positions or riches may be legally inherited. Originally a product of slave societies, it was later adopted by feudal lords as a means to perpetuate dictatorial rule. . . . The custom is still followed in capitalist societies, where land owners and capitalists rely on it to dominate the working class, just as feudal aristocrats did earlier.¹⁷

Significantly, "hereditary succession" was simply deleted from the 1972 edition of the *Dictionary of Political Terminologies*.

In late 1972 Kim Il Sung began a project to renew membership in the KWP. This project involved loyalty checks consisting of an ideological examination for all 1.6 million party members. On the basis of the ideological examination, a large number of older party members were expelled and younger persons swearing loyalty to the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il leadership were recruited into the KWP, swelling membership

to the 2 million mark.¹⁸ Critics of the campaign to build a power base for Kim Jong Il disappeared from public view in rapid succession, including very senior members of the party: Kim Jong Kyu, a vice-president of North Korea, LT GEN Yi Yong Mu, Chief of the General Political Bureau of the People's Army, GEN Yi Ki Sol, Commander of the Fifth Corps of the People's Army, and numerous other senior cadre members opposed to dynastic succession lost their positions and influence.¹⁹

In 1973, Kim Il Sung had Kim Jong Il assume control of the Three Revolutionary Teams (TRT). Kim Il Sung had founded the TRT to raise the people's level of education, increase the use of technology, and intensify the ideological indoctrination of the people. The TRT was a tool which Kim Il Sung created to expand his power and to eliminate incapable bureaucrats (and those who opposed Kim Il Sung). By giving Kim Jong Il control of the TRT, Kim Il Sung gave his son a base upon which to build his political power, a mechanism for improving his administrative skills, and a means for developing credibility.

After his designation as the official successor at the Seventh Plenum in 1973, Kim Jong Il became a member of the Political Committee (later renamed the Politburo) of the Central Committee of the KWP at the Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Congress in February 1974.²⁰ The Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Congress also marked the beginning of an image building campaign for Kim Jong Il.

Kim Jong Il's rise to power suffered a brief setback in 1976. Kim Jong Il reportedly played an important role in the 18 August 1976 incident at Panmunjom, in which two American officers were killed by

ax-wielding North Korean soldiers. The incident sparked a strong protest and show of force by the US and resulted in Kim Il Sung expressing regret at the unfortunate incident. The language that Kim Il Sung used to express his regret was far more moderate and conciliatory than his usual anti-American stance and was as close to an apology as possible for North Korea. Shortly after the Panmunjom incident, Kim Jong Il dropped out of sight for two and a half years.²¹ Appearances would seem to indicate that Kim Jong Il, who was blamed for endangering North Korea by exposing it to a potential countermove by the US, was recalled by his father to receive more political schooling and to serve an additional apprenticeship under a father's watchful eye.²²

The Panmunjom incident may have placed Kim Jong Il's status in serious question and increased resistance to his succession. An unconfirmed report in the Japanese newspaper *Toitsu Nippo* in February 1978 claimed that lieutenants and supporters of Lee Yong Mu, director of the General Political Bureau of the People's Armed Forces of North Korea (PAF), had attempted to crash their vehicle into the car in which Kim Jong Il was riding. According to the article, Lee's lieutenants wanted to remove Kim Jong Il because of his alleged responsibility for the Panmunjom incident.²³

Although the report was not confirmed, three factors tend to support the report and the uncertainty of domestic support for Kim Jong Il. The first factor was the total disappearance of Lee Yong Mu and many other senior military leaders. The second factor was an agitation rally for the PAF on 30 November 1977, at which Kim Il Sung set forth ten specific instructions for military personnel to obey. The third

factor was the promotion of O Kuk Yol, a classmate of Kim Jong Il's at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute, to the position of Chief of Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA). These three developments can be viewed as measures for the removal of military opponents to Kim Jong Il and the installation of his supporters as military leaders.²⁴

Kim Jong Il did not appear in public and no references were made to him in the media between August 1976 and September 1979. In spite of his apparently diminished status in the late 1970s, Kim Jong Il reappeared by the time of the Sixth Congress of the KWP in October 1980. Kim Jong Il emerged from the Sixth Congress as the second most powerful man in North Korea, being the only person other than Kim Il Sung to be appointed to the three most important party organizations. At the conclusion of the Sixth Congress, Kim Jong Il was second in the ten-member Secretariat, fourth in the five-member Presidium to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KWP, and third in the ten-member military commission. The Sixth Congress also marked a change of generation in the North Korean leadership, with 70 percent of the members elected to the Central Committee being new members.²⁵ The Sixth Congress constituted an official declaration of Kim Jong Il's consolidated status and an unambiguous recognition of Kim Jong Il as the crown prince chosen to succeed his father.²⁶

By the end of 1982, domestic acceptance of a hereditary succession seemed to have stabilized, and the North Korean media effort began to focus on foreign reactions toward Kim Jong Il's rise to power.²⁷ In June 1983, Kim Jong Il made an initially unpublicized trip to China at the invitation of Hu Yaobang. Kim Jong Il's trip to China

went a long way towards legitimizing his leadership. The statement of Kim Jong Il's domestic legitimacy was made on Chinese territory and he was formally introduced to the Chinese.²⁸ The recognition of Kim Jong Il by the Chinese undoubtedly silenced potential opponents of a dynastic succession and enhanced Kim Jong Il's image as a viable and legitimate leader. In addition, the trip to China appears to have influenced the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union publicly recognized Kim Jong Il within three months of the public announcement of his trip to China.

In 1984, Kim Il Sung made an extended visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, demonstrating his confidence in entrusting the nation to Kim Jong Il. Kim Il Sung's six week absence attested to Kim Jong Il's status, particularly since prior to this point no decision could be made in North Korea without Kim Il Sung's consent.²⁹ On 7 August 1984, Kim Jong Il was officially identified as the successor to Kim Il Sung.³⁰ Since this time, the role of Kim Jong Il has been significantly enhanced in nearly all aspects of North Korean politics, economics, and society. During the 1980s, Kim Jong Il gradually assumed responsibility for key aspects of North Korean policy, ranging from intelligence and terrorism, to the development of nuclear weapons, to the scientific-technological modernization of the country.³¹ In the early 1980s, Kim Jong Il became personally responsible for terrorist and special operations, and he is known to have approved both the October 1983 Rangoon assassination attempt (killing 17 key officials of the South Korean government and wounding several others, including the South Korean President), and the mid-air bombing of KAL flight 858 (killing 115 passengers).³² These actions marked an increased role for Kim Jong

Il in North Korean foreign policy. Kim Jong Il's enhanced status was further driven home in 1985, when the name of the *Kim Il Sung Thought Institute* was changed to the *Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il Thought Institute*.

Kim Jong Il's primary entry into formal responsibilities for overall government took place in the early 1990s.³³ In December 1991, Kim Jong Il was appointed Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA); he was awarded the rank of Marshal in April 1992. In August 1992, the ideological posture of Kim Jong Il was put on an equal footing with the ideology of Kim Il Sung, marking a new phase in the development of the traditional Juche doctrine. In April 1993, in the aftermath of the initial crisis over North Korean nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il was elected Chairman of the National Defense Committee, placing the national command powers officially in the hands of Kim Jong Il.³⁴ By all indications, Kim Jong Il has successfully consolidated his power upon the death of his father and is firmly in control of North Korea.

The Choice of Hereditary Succession

In order to develop an appreciation for the constraints that Kim Jong Il must operate under, it is necessary to examine the reasoning behind Kim Il Sung's choice of hereditary succession. Kim Il Sung's choice of hereditary succession is unparalleled in the Communist world, since Communists view hereditary succession as incompatible with Marxist ideology. Kim Il Sung, however, had witnessed history. He had seen the aftermath of Stalin's death in the Soviet Union. After his death, Stalin was reviled and his teachings abandoned. In addition, Stalin's death touched off a power struggle, since the Soviet Union did not groom

a successor to Stalin. Thus, the fundamental question facing Kim Il Sung was how to ensure that his goals would be pursued without interruption following his death. The solution that Kim Il Sung chose was hereditary succession. By naming his own son as his successor, Kim Il Sung sought to avert a potentially disruptive succession struggle, a free-for-all that could be potentially disastrous in the face of threats from South Korea and the US.³⁵

Future events would only serve to reinforce in Kim Il Sung's mind the wisdom of settling the succession issue by naming his son as successor. Mao's death in 1976 and the subsequent power struggle and abandonment of Mao's teachings served to further drive home the need for a designated successor that enjoyed the support of the Communist Party leadership. Kim Il Sung and North Korea viewed the Cultural Revolution in China as the outcome of a power struggle when the country did not decide on Mao's successor.³⁶ Thus, following Stalin's death in the Soviet Union and Mao's death in China, power struggles ensued and the ideology established by the deceased leader underwent significant revisions. Mao's death and the subsequent turmoil in China emphasized to Kim Il Sung the need to ensure that his son's position as successor, and guardian of the Kim Il Sung legacy, was secure. Likewise, the movement towards liberalization in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the reunification of East and West Germany and the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, once again highlighted the vulnerability of Kim Il Sung's own ideology and the need for a strong successor to perpetuate Kim Il Sung's legacy. Hereditary succession

fulfilled Kim Il Sung's need for a successor who would perpetuate his ideology and legacy.

Hereditary succession has historical precedents in Korean society. Under the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), Korea had a highly centralized power system with participation exceedingly limited and with power of appointment and dismissal concentrated at the top.³⁷ An heir, the crown prince, was designated in advance from among the ruler's sons and was educated during the preparatory period to be an exemplary future king in keeping with Confucian philosophy and principles. The crown prince was required to demonstrate unswerving loyalty to the king and, since the king was his own father, it was required that the heir treat the king with unlimited filial piety.³⁸ Based on historical precedent, then, Kim Il Sung sought to avoid a power struggle, ensure the continuation of his policies, and secure his revolutionary immortality by passing his power to a new emperor--his son Kim Jong Il.

The principal rationale behind the idea of hereditary succession comes from the desire to perpetuate the ongoing revolution from generation to generation.³⁹ Perpetuating the ongoing revolution requires the continuation of Kim Il Sung's Juche ideology. Juche ideology is in effect an artifact of the 1940s and has not changed significantly in the intervening years.⁴⁰ For the North Koreans, Juche is more of a state of mind than it is an idea. The term literally means "being subjective where Korean matters are concerned, putting Korea first in everything." The goal of Juche is a subjective, solipsistic state of mind, the correct thought that must precede and then determine correct action.⁴¹ Juche ideology focuses on self-reliance as the means

for attaining the destiny of the nation. As such, Juche is intimately intertwined into the very being of the North Korean people. Juche is the symbol of the nation and the leader is both the source and interpreter of Juche ideology.⁴² The leader is the center and the source of all good ideas. The mantle of leadership has now passed to Kim Jong Il, so Kim Jong Il is responsible for guiding the nation and the people of the nation are expected to respond with loyalty and devotion, reflecting the Confucian ideas of the relationship between a parent and a child.

The basic revolutionary ideology of North Korea, Juche, has not been realized. In order to realize the Juche ideology, the younger generation will have to continue the efforts to achieve self-reliance. Kim Jong Il leads the younger generation, so it is his task to continue the revolution and achieve self-reliance. In order to further support hereditary succession, North Korea has developed what is commonly referred to as "leadership theory." According to North Korean "leadership theory":

The revolutionary cause of the working people is derived only from a great leader. The people are obligated to submit themselves totally to the leader by carrying out his teaching unconditionally and by accepting his authority absolutely.

However, attainment of the revolutionary goals of the great leader requires a long period of time. Thus, the leader's cause must be pursued from generation to generation. And the succession problem must be rightly resolved until the great task of the revolution is carried out. Failure to solve this problem in the right manner will entail serious consequences affecting the survival of the nation.

The successor should not be selected from the contemporary generation but from the new generation since that is the generation he will eventually lead. He must be carefully prepared for takeover, mastering the thought and theory of the leader. For that reason, he must be chosen in advance.

In addition, the successor must possess the highest level of leadership ability.⁴³

According to the North Koreans, Kim Jong Il is the individual who meets all of these criteria. It is Kim Jong Il's responsibility to ensure that the Juche ideology of self-reliance created by Kim Il Sung is carried forward into the next generation.

The Image Building Campaign

Kim Il Sung and the North Korean leadership developed a rationale and a leadership theory to justify hereditary succession. The problem then was to convince the North Korean people that Kim Jong Il was the leader who best fit the mold. The Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Congress in February 1974 marked the start of a concerted effort at image building for Kim Jong Il. The image building campaign focused on building both a leadership image and a personality cult around Kim Jong Il. The image building campaign can be divided into three distinct phases. The first stage lasted from the Seventh Plenum of the Fifth Congress to the Sixth Congress in October 1980, the second stage ran from 1980 to 1984, and the third stage has lasted from 1984 to the present.⁴⁴

During the first stage of the image building campaign, Kim Jong Il's name was not used by the government media. Instead, Kim Jong Il was referred to as the "Party Center." The use of a code name for Kim Jong Il indicates that the North Korean regime considered the succession matter very sensitive. Morgan Clippinger developed three hypotheses explaining why the North Korean government media used a code name for Kim Jong Il. The first hypothesis is that Kim Il Sung feared adverse

foreign reaction to a communist hereditary succession. In fact, through 1980 the North Korean regime made every effort to conceal Kim Jong Il's successor status. The second hypothesis is that Kim Il Sung desired to avoid domestic criticism of Kim Jong Il by giving him a mysterious code name. Placing Kim Jong Il's name into official publication would have given political enemies an easy target, whereas "Party Center" is an indirect reference and is not easily criticized. The third hypothesis focuses on Kim Il Sung's desire for undivided attention and authority; a direct buildup might have created a competing line of authority, forcing Kim Il Sung out of the media limelight and into a "lame duck" status.⁴⁵ Whatever the reasons for using a code name, there were clear benefits to not referring to Kim Jong Il directly. First, the code name lent an air of mystique to Kim Jong Il, placing him, in essence, on a spiritual plane, very similar to the status of the Japanese emperor in the 1930s.⁴⁶ Second, using a code name permitted Kim Jong Il to conduct his work of guiding the KWP in relative anonymity, giving him more time to develop his power base and to gain the experience required to one day lead the country.⁴⁷

The image building in the first stage was designed to bestow on Kim Jong Il a measure of authority and legitimacy as the truly worthy "sole" successor to Kim Il Sung.⁴⁸ Kim Jong Il lacked the revolutionary credentials that had up to this point constituted a requirement of admission to the top leadership of the North Korean regime. This lack of credentials made it necessary to create an image that would prove to the North Korean people that he had the leadership qualities necessary to be Kim Il Sung's heir and the supreme leader of North Korea. In

order to create this image, the media portrayed Kim Jong Il as a man who was unswervingly loyal to Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader, who perfectly embodied his ideas, outstanding leadership, and noble traits, and who brilliantly upheld Kim Il Sung's grand plan.⁴⁹

The second stage of the media campaign ran from 1980 to 1984 and marked the formal designation of Kim Jong Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung. In the second stage, both Kim Jong Il's code name and his real name were used by the government media. The code name was used in describing his guidance activities and his instructions for economic, administrative, and cultural affairs, whereas his real name appeared mostly in connection with international developments and foreign visitors to North Korea.⁵⁰ The attention that Kim Jong Il received in foreign-related articles highlighted the efforts of the regime to legitimize Kim Jong Il's status.⁵¹ The predominant use of Kim Jong Il's name in relation to external rather than internal events strongly implied that the North Korean regime was still very sensitive about potential domestic resistance to his succession to leadership.⁵²

The second stage also marked the first time that the North Korean media acknowledged Kim Jong Il's co-leadership with this father by printing his name in boldface type.⁵³ This important change occurred in October 1981. Prior to this time, the personality cult of Kim Il Sung had not allowed anyone to share the media spotlight with Kim Il Sung. The new status afforded Kim Jong Il signified Kim Il Sung's readiness to transfer power to his son.⁵⁴

The third stage of the media image building process began in 1984 and has been marked by increased efforts to intensify the Kim Jong

Il cult and to extend his influence over North Korean society and politics.⁵⁵ One way in which Kim Jong Il's influence has been extended is by the use of guidance tours, which are used to project the image of wise leadership. Kim Il Sung favored on-the-spot guidance in his tours of plants, factories, collective farms, and mines. Kim Jong Il, often accompanied on his guidance tours by powerful figures of the North Korean government and the party, favors practical administrative guidance or working guidance. Ideological education and economic achievement are the two main targets in Kim Jong Il's various guidelines. Since 1984, references to Kim Jong Il's guidance tours markedly increased, while references to Kim Il Sung's guidance tours correspondingly decreased. The language used to describe Kim Jong Il's guidance tours contained expressions such as "benevolent," "wise," "energetic," and "revolutionary," terms that had previously been used to describe Kim Il Sung's guidance tour activity.⁵⁶

Kim Jong Il's Power Base

Kim Jong Il's power base is comprised of four elements: the KWP, the military, the graduates of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute, and members of the Three Revolutionary Teams (TRT).⁵⁷ Kim Jong Il's position within the KWP is firmly established. Kim Jong Il holds the title of Supreme Commander of the KPA and is Chairman of the National Defense Committee, but his credibility with the armed forces has suffered because he has never served in any of the armed forces. Accordingly, a great deal of effort has been devoted to ensuring the loyalty of the military to Kim Jong Il. Large scale changes within the military were made at the Sixth Congress. The primary purpose of these

changes was to shift power from the older generation to Kim Jong Il's generation within the military. The minimum age limits for company, battalion, and regimental commanders were set aside, allowing the appointment of numerous officers between the ages of 32 and 40.⁵⁸ According to South Korean sources, between January and April 1983, more than 500 North Korean Air Force and Navy officers were purged.⁵⁹ In 1985, O Chin U and O Kuk Yol were promoted, respectively, from general to marshal and from lieutenant general to general. Both men were known to be faithful supporters of Kim Jong Il. In addition, nine lieutenant generals known to support the succession of Kim Jong Il were promoted to general in 1985.⁶⁰ Between April 1992 and early 1993, Kim Jong Il further consolidated and demonstrated his control over the military through the replacement of some 664 generals.⁶¹

The strongest element of Kim Jong Il's power may be the TRT members. The Three Revolutions are ideological, technological, and cultural. TRT teams consist of from twenty to fifty party cadres, government economic organization staff members, students, technicians, and scientists.⁶² Members of TRT teams are drawn principally from the younger generation. The total number of members is believed to be about 46,000.⁶³ TRT teams are dispatched to provide guidance to local cadres in carrying out ideological, technological, and cultural revolutions.⁶⁴ In particular, the task set for the TRT teams is to lend the cadres assistance so that they may discard conservatism, empiricism, and other outdated ideas and successfully carry out their work as required by the Party, thus causing the economy to develop at a faster and more satisfactory pace.⁶⁵ The TRT in essence served as the primary

instrument of power consolidation for Kim Jong Il. One of the major purposes of the TRT teams, apparently, was to build up a power base for Kim Jong Il, replacing older cadres when necessary with younger, pro-Kim Jong Il elements.⁶⁶

The TRT movement provided Kim Jong Il with a unique opportunity to consolidate his power within the KWP while at the same time establishing his leadership with the younger generation. By using the TRT, Kim Jong Il has gained three important advantages. First, the TRT provides Kim Jong Il with a network for acquiring information.⁶⁷ The TRT is able to gather information from all segments of society under the guise of loyalty to the Three Revolutions espoused by the national leadership. Second, the TRT provided Kim Jong Il the opportunity to hone his leadership skills and develop managerial expertise.⁶⁸ Third, Kim Jong Il introduced and advanced his own image as a leader through his guidance of the TRT movement.⁶⁹

Challenges to Kim Jong Il's Leadership

The first steps to prepare a path for the succession of Kim Jong Il were taken over two decades ago. Since 1980, Kim Jong Il has been the second most powerful man in North Korea. Throughout his rise to power, Kim Jong Il was sheltered from potentially fatal challenges to his leadership by the protective mantle of his father. Kim Il Sung, through his charisma, shrewdness, and sheer ruthlessness in dealing with political opponents, was able to secure the leadership of North Korea for his son. The death of Kim Il Sung, however, has removed the protective shield that Kim Jong Il has enjoyed for so long. Without the protective mantle, challenges will arise and Kim Jong Il will have to

deal with them without being able to draw on the experience and support of his father.

Most leaders of the world have risen to power because of their life-long efforts in politics on behalf of national independence or by a revolutionary experience in which they demonstrated their leadership, but Kim Jong Il has played no such role in North Korea.⁷⁰ Despite all the media buildup and efforts to create a charismatic image, Kim Jong Il cannot enjoy the same credibility and stature as Kim Il Sung. The demise of Kim Il Sung will result in challenges to the power of Kim Jong Il.

Older Cadres

The first group that poses a potential threat to Kim Jong Il is older generation cadres, particularly those in their fifties and sixties.⁷¹ In his rise to power, Kim Jong Il has bypassed two generations of North Korean leaders: his father's contemporaries, currently in their seventies and eighties, and those in the generation immediately after his father's generation. The cadres currently in their fifties and sixties undoubtedly anticipated that they would succeed Kim Il Sung's generation. The hereditary succession and elevation of the younger generation to power dashed those expectations and most likely created much bitterness and resentment. Being subordinated to a much younger leadership in a society that reveres and honors seniority undoubtedly created additional animosity. While those feelings may have been suppressed in Kim Il Sung's lifetime (in order to ensure survival), this pent-up resentment will surface now that Kim Il

Sung is gone. Kim Jong Il cannot be confident that his leadership will be accepted and that he will enjoy the support of the older generations.

Korean Workers Party

Kim Jong Il's power base within the KWP is firmly established and dissident elements have been purged from Party membership, so for the immediate future there will be no active, organized opposition to Kim Jong Il within the KWP. Individual party members, however, will likely resist leadership by Kim Jong Il. Some of the leading cadres may accept Kim Jong Il, but they may prefer a different power structure or a different course of economic or social reform.⁷² In this regard, it is important to note that a 1992 amendment to the Constitution of North Korea gave the Supreme People's Assembly the right to recall the president.⁷³ In addition to challenges by members of the KWP with conflicting views, Kim Jong Il could also be challenged by members of the KWP who have their own political ambitions and wish to replace him as the leader of North Korea.

People's Armed Forces

The military is a source of power and support for Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il recognized the importance of the military early on and carefully developed his influence within the armed forces. Some commanders installed by Kim Jong Il are likely to remain loyal to him, but junior and mid-level officers may be less than enchanted with Kim Jong Il. Reports in early 1993 indicated that the North Korean military, reportedly unhappy with the proposed power transfer, was grumbling over the fact that a man with only one month of military

training at a university, and who had never fired a gun, would be their supreme commander.⁷⁴ There has been no outward sign of opposition in the military since the death of Kim Il Sung, but the support of the military is vital if Kim Jong Il is to remain in power.

Family Rivals

In an attempt to strengthen Kim Jong Il's position and to help him deal with the completion of the succession process, Kim Il Sung attempted to unify his family around Kim Jong Il.⁷⁵ Kim Il Sung recalled Kim Pyong Il, Kim Jong Il's half-brother, from his position as ambassador to Bulgaria so that he could provide support to Kim Jong Il. Kim Sung Ae, Kim Jong Il's stepmother, was brought back from a position of relative obscurity to head the North Korea Women's League. Kim Yong Ju, Kim Il Sung's younger brother, also made a reappearance on the North Korean political scene in 1993. Although it is unclear whether or not Kim Yong Ju is still capable of an active role in political life, his reappearance on the North Korean political scene is a clear gesture of family unity and an acknowledgement of Kim Jong Il's victory in the power struggle to succeed Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il's position is further bolstered by having his closest crony, his brother-in-law Chang Song-taek, in key positions. The CIA lists Chang Song-taek as holding two key posts simultaneously: director of the TRT department within the KWP Central Committee and the president of the Central Bank.⁷⁶

Although Kim Il Sung positioned family members to support Kim Jong Il, the family poses potential threats to him. Relations between Kim Jong Il and his stepmother have never been good. His half-brother, Kim Pyong Il, poses a clear threat since he also carries the Kim Il Sung

blood line. There may also be other relatives in the background who were not favored by Kim Il Sung and who have no love for Kim Jong Il.

Kim Jong Il recognizes the threat posed by his family. Reports indicate that Kim Jong Il delivered a special instruction to high-ranking cadres in charge of internal security to carefully watch this "side branch of the flock."⁷⁷ This statement was a clear reference to Kim Sung Ae and her children by Kim Il Sung. Without a major revolt or a deepening of the economic or nuclear crisis, however, the objections or challenges of the family would be disregarded because Kim Jong Il's family members have long been isolated from the center of power and organizational forces.⁷⁸

Intellectuals

North Korean intelligence agency personnel familiar with developments in South Korea and the rest of the world, as well as intellectuals in the party who have some reservations about personality cults and ideological dogma, could form a part of the resistance to Kim Jong Il.⁷⁹ The conflict between pragmatists concerned with economic reform and political ideologues will continue to intensify as the North Korean economic situation worsens. This conflict will be particularly evident in the younger generations. Members of the younger generations are known to have weaker ideological and revolutionary traits than members of the older generation, who experienced Japanese rule, the Korean War, and absolute poverty.⁸⁰ Self-reliance as contained in Juche ideology is an outdated idea in a world of interwoven economies, and many intellectuals may well recognize the inappropriateness of Juche ideology in light of economic conditions in North Korea. Kim Jong Il,

however, must continue to support the ideology of Juche, at least initially, because his legitimacy rests in large part on his role as the standard bearer of Kim Il Sung's legacy.

The Masses

A final potential source of opposition to Kim Jong Il is discontent at the mass level.⁸¹ In North Korea, the criteria for the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige lies in a family's background and political character. All people are classified into one of three categories--the core, basic, or hostile class--according to their family background and loyalty to the KWP. The core stratum consists of Party members, officials of the Administration Council, general-grade officers of the military, revolutionary fighters during Japanese rule and their families, the families of those killed in battle during the Korean War, and the families of the cadre officers of the KWP, administration, and military.⁸² The core stratum enjoys special access to education, rations, living quarters, and medical services and attains qualifications for joining the KWP.

The basic stratum consists of the fundamental masses of North Korea's socialist system, ordinary workers, cooperative farm members, and the families of ordinary office workers.⁸³ People in the basic stratum have the opportunity to become technicians and lower level officials. A very limited number of people from the basic stratum can be elevated to the core stratum.

The hostile stratum is the stratum of the alienated people and includes the families of past landowners and capitalists, the families of public officials under Japanese rule, religiously active persons, the

families of those who escaped to South Korea or served in the South Korean armed forces during the Korean War, persons harboring counterrevolutionary thoughts, and the families of prisoners of war, purged people, and criminals.⁸⁴ People in the hostile stratum are assigned to perform hazardous work and heavy manual labor and are unable to advance to college or join the KWP.

As is readily apparent, the classification scheme ensures that the Communist Party is the ruling class. What is significant, however, is the distribution of the population within the different strata. In 1984, the core stratum accounted for 28 percent of the population, the basic stratum for 45 percent, and the hostile stratum for 27 percent.⁸⁵ As these percentages demonstrate, there is a significant percentage of the population that the North Korean system and Kim Jong Il cannot trust.

Although North Korea is supposed to be a classless society, discrimination on the basis of class is the norm and, more importantly, the North Korean people are aware of it. As the people become increasingly aware of unequal treatment and the disparity between strata (which will be compounded by a continuing worsening of economic conditions), their skepticism and discontent will grow and in time develop into sentiments critical of the system. This skepticism and discontent will pose a significant threat to Kim Jong Il.

The Economy

Perhaps no other issue is as critical to Kim Jong Il as the economy. North Korea's economic crisis has been widely reported in the international press. Until the early 1970s, North Koreans lived better

than South Koreans.⁸⁶ Since the 1970s, however, the South Korean economy has exploded while the North Korean economy plodded on and, in recent years, actually shrank. According to the National Unification Board in South Korea, North Korea experienced its first negative growth, minus 3.7 percent, in 1990.⁸⁷ North Korea's economy has shrunk between 4 and 5 percent annually for the past four years.⁸⁸ Production facilities are operating at less than 40 percent of capacity because of mechanical troubles, a shortage of raw materials, and an energy shortage.⁸⁹ In 1993, North Korea's per capita gross national product (GNP) fell to \$904, compared with \$7,466 in the South, vividly illustrating the growing gap between the North and South Korean economies.⁹⁰

North Korea's economic difficulties have been accelerated in recent years by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the gradual opening of China. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia stopped selling oil and other products to North Korea at prices below the going rate in the world market and began demanding payment in hard currency for deliveries of oil and machinery. China is now North Korea's principal source of oil and imported food, much of which is supplied on cheap credit.⁹¹ China has also started to demand payment in hard currency, compounding North Korea's economic problems.

The most pressing problem brought about by North Korea's economic woes is not the lack of raw materials and energy that has crippled the North Korean economic base. The most pressing problem is the food shortage. Food shortages have caused rioting and looting in North Korea; in 1992 at least four or five cases of food rioting

occurred in North Korea, and these are only the cases that the outside world is aware of.⁹² According to the Korean Residents League for Democratic Unification, an anti-Pyongyang Korean residents organization in Japan, a total of about eight thousand people plundered food at thirty-six places in North Korea in late June and early July 1991.⁹³ About four thousand KPA troops were mobilized and sent in to quell the riots, but when the soldiers sided with the rioters, three thousand political security troops were brought in to restore order.⁹⁴

The food shortage is long standing and shows no signs of improvement without outside assistance. Food rations were reduced in 1989 and a campaign restricting the population to two meals a day is being enforced. North Korea's production of cereals, including rice, barley, wheat, maize, and millet, has dropped from about 5.1 million tons in the mid-1980s to 4.2 million tons in 1992.⁹⁵ In an effort to alleviate the food shortage, North Korea has been importing foods, particularly grain, for the last several years. Although it was not widely known, North Korea imported \$200 million of grain in the first ten months of 1993; 250,000 tons of grain was imported on humanitarian grounds from the US alone.⁹⁶ In addition, North Korea has invented unique food substitutes, such as "okksal rice," "mixed noodle," and "speed warfare powder."⁹⁷ "Okksal rice" is distributed mainly in urban areas and consists of corn powder and flour pressed into the shape of rice. "Mixed noodle" is distributed mostly to the residents of mountainous areas and is a mixture of bark powder, corn powder, and potato powder. "Speed warfare powder" is distributed to workers at

factories or other industries and is steamed corn powder made to be dissolved in water and drunk.

Oleg Davydov, first secretary of the former Soviet Ministry, states that the North Korean people often recall with nostalgia the early 1970s, when they had rice and meat in relative abundance.⁹⁸ The economic difficulties of the country are linked closely to Kim Jong Il. According to Nam Myong Chol, a former North Korean student who defected to South Korea, the people complain that they lived well enough in the early 1970s, but the economy began to decline in the mid-1970s when Kim Jong Il rose to power. The people, therefore, believe that the country is experiencing economic difficulties because a "senseless child rules the country."⁹⁹

The economic problems of the country, manifested in fuel and food shortages and an underutilization of industry, cannot be resolved overnight. According to Izider Urian, Romanian ambassador to Korea, one of the major causes of Romania's popular uprising of 1989 was that the people's living standard turned from bad to worse during Nicolae Ceausescu's reign, and the people blamed Ceausescu for their plight.¹⁰⁰ The economic problems in North Korea are of such a magnitude that Kim Jong Il and the KWP cannot ignore the possibility of an uprising by the people, fueled by accumulated discontent and resentment.

Kim Jong Il's Personality

Politics in a dictatorship begins in the personality of the dictator.¹⁰¹ Certainly the personality of the political leader, as well as ideology, patriotism, aspirations of the people, external factors, and a myriad of other variables impact on the politics of North Korea.

In the final analysis, however, it is Kim Jong Il who makes the decisions that shape North Korea's future. In order to evaluate North Korean decision making and foreign policy, then, it is necessary to attempt to understand Kim Jong Il. Unfortunately, reliable information on Kim Jong Il's life and personality is scarce, and most speculation on his leadership style is unpromising and unverifiable.¹⁰²

Kim Jong Il was reared by his stepmother, Kim Sung Ae, and has not been on the best of terms with his half-brothers and half-sisters. Many North Korean observers agree that Kim Jong Il's defective family life has had a negative impact on his personality.¹⁰³ Kim Jong Il was reared as the pampered and indulged son of a ruthless tyrant, Kim Il Sung, and he developed an early love for wine, women, and movies. He personally participated in the making of over one hundred films.¹⁰⁴ While his film making activities have led some analysts to downplay his capabilities, film making provided Kim Jong Il with an avenue to create the family legacy that he would one day inherit, to demonstrate correct political thought to Kim Il Sung and senior party cadres, and to develop a firm control of the propaganda instrument of the state.

The early lifestyle and behavior of Kim Jong Il were outrageous. He was described in the mid-1980s as a "swaggering hothead" and his guards described him as a "playboy with a fussy temperament."¹⁰⁵ He had frequent drinking bouts and maintained mansions and residences in virtually every recreation spot for the North Korean elite.

In recent years, Kim Jong Il has settled down in the Pyongyang area, where he has a central villa filled with the latest consumer goods and "lavish items of comfort" from the West. He has a collection of

thousands of Western-made movies, primarily action and pornography films. Kim Jong Il has become a primary client of the "amusement group" and "happiness group" originally set up for his father; he has an active and diverse sex life.¹⁰⁶

Kim Jong Il has been shrouded from public view for most of his career. Few outsiders have met Kim Jong Il, and those foreigners who have met with him hold differing opinions of the man. In an unconfirmed report, one analyst has stated that on being informed that Moscow had decided to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, Kim Jong Il threw an ashtray at the Soviet ambassador to North Korea.¹⁰⁷ Another senior Soviet official who met Kim Jong Il on several occasions characterized him as "unstable and bizarre."¹⁰⁸ In contrast, another Russian diplomat who has met Kim Jong Il described him as always confident, well briefed, and able to meet with Russian visitors without notes. The Russian diplomat characterized Korean officials as obsessed with secrecy and unable to make decisions alone. Kim Jong Il, however, was different. "He could tell you what had happened yesterday and what they were planning tomorrow. It was a mark of his confidence, his lack of fear of his father."¹⁰⁹

Two South Koreans who were abducted by Kim Jong Il in 1978, movie maker Shin Sang Ok and his wife, actress Choi Un Hi, described Kim Jong Il as "arrogant, tempestuous, and temperamental."¹¹⁰ Two recent defectors from the North Korean ruling elite have provided new insights into Kim Jong Il's leadership style. Young Whan Koh, a former North Korean counselor at the embassy to Congo and Kim Il Sung's French interpreter, stated that Kim Jong Il has had decision making authority

for all policy issues connected with the party, administration, and military affairs since the early 1980s.¹¹¹ While Kim Il Sung had well-established leadership and was generally revered by the people of North Korea, Kim Jong Il inspires fear and awe from his followers.¹¹²

The other defector was Young Sing Kim, a senior architect and a classmate of former Premier Yong Hyong Muk. Young Sing Kim argues that there is no such thing as a reformist or conservative in North Korea. Party officials, even those with high-ranking positions, are nothing more than "common people" with no real authority. Young Sing Kim likened Kim Jong Il to a "God who supervises governmental affairs." Significantly, both defectors shared the view that, should North Korea's economic conditions worsen, it is likely that Kim Jong Il would divert people's frustrations into a "war for unification" rather than see the people rebel against him.¹¹³ Analysts in Seoul agree that he could be more adventurous--and therefore more dangerous--than his father, who had first-hand experience with leading North Korea through a war with the US. The information provided by defectors is difficult to evaluate. Defectors may be providing information that they feel the interviewer wants to hear or they may be lying. In addition, the information that the US receives is not based on interviews conducted by US intelligence agencies but rather on filtered information provided by South Korea. Nevertheless, defectors represent one of the few sources of information on North Korea and Kim Jong Il.

The lack of information concerning Kim Jong Il's personality alarms analysts, especially since North Korea's nuclear program is widely attributed to the personal initiative of Kim Jong Il.¹¹⁴ The

development of nuclear weapons has always been a high priority project for Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il was behind both North Korea's acceptance of IAEA inspections, essentially in order to gain international legitimacy and encourage the flow of high technology to the North, and North Korea's sudden withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 12 March 1993, once it became clear that the IAEA inspectors were getting too close to the nuclear weapons program.¹¹⁵ Kim Jong Il is also thought to have been behind the North Korean move to withdraw from the IAEA in June 1994, a move that contributed to the apparent resolution of the non-proliferation question by the Geneva Accords signed in October 1994.

Compounding the uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong Il's personality are rumored health problems that could potentially affect his decision making ability. Kim Jong Il is known to have diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart problems.¹¹⁶ There are reports that Kim Jong Il has suffered brain damage. Supposedly Kim Jong Il suffered brain damage in September 1993 in a traffic accident, when he crashed his car while speeding, possibly while drunk. According to Chinese medical experts, including brain surgeons, Kim Jong Il suffered damage to his skull bone in the car accident.¹¹⁷ These injuries were in addition to lesser (but still severe) head injuries that Kim Jong Il allegedly suffered around June 1993 as a result of falling off a horse.¹¹⁸

Serious head injuries can affect an individual's behavior. According to Yossef Bodansky, Chinese medical experts suggested at the time of the second incident that, as a result of his head injuries, Kim

Jong Il suffered from a "serious disease of his psychoneurotic system."¹¹⁹ Western medical experts indicate that such a succession of blows to the brain may result in the dropping of brain cells, early atrophy, or even some shrinking of the brain. Such a condition can lead to mood swings in the individual, with a very unstable individual displaying a greater tendency to lose his temper and overreact. Based on this analysis, Kim Jong Il would be expected to display increasing irrationality, instability, and an increasing tendency to gamble.¹²⁰

The possibility that Kim Jong Il's medical condition could impair his decision making ability is certainly of concern, but reports of Kim Jong Il's brain injuries have not been positively confirmed and are of a speculative nature. The possibility that these reports are part of a deception effort by the North Koreans designed to increase the uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong Il in the minds of US and regional leaders cannot be discounted. The advantage of portraying Kim Jong Il as unstable is that world leaders would be more likely to be willing to make concessions rather than risk an irrational act by an unstable leader that would plunge the world into another war on the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Jong Il's Leadership Ability As Determined By Character Traits

A frequent criticism of Kim Jong Il that is voiced by analysts and observers of North Korea is that Kim Jong Il lacks the ability to lead North Korea following the death of his father. Kim Jong Il's leadership ability is hard to judge, particularly on the amount of information available, but Kim Jong Il's personality and behavior

patterns offer clues as to his character traits. The famous British general, Field Marshal Viscount Slim, considered leadership to be an extension of one's personality and identified six characteristics essential to lead: courage, will power, judgment, mental flexibility, knowledge, and integrity.¹²¹ Of the six characteristics, integrity is the most important; the other five characteristics operate within integrity. All six characteristics are attuned to character. Examining Kim Jong Il in light of these six characteristics yields a picture of Kim Jong Il's leadership ability.

The first characteristic is courage. Little information is available on Kim Jong Il's behavior, but the information developed on his personality indicates that he is willing to take risks to achieve his desired ends. Kim Jong Il's involvement in the 1976 Panmunjom incident, the attacks on South Korean diplomats in Rangoon, and the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 all involved calculated risks. Kim Jong Il's actions in precipitating the confrontation over North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, an action which almost led to renewed war on the Korean Peninsula, would also suggest that he has the courage of his convictions.

Kim Jong Il clearly possesses strong will power. Kim Jong Il's key role in the development of nuclear weapons, despite economic conditions in the country, and his ability to draw concessions from the US and its allies through repeated confrontation and conciliation are indicative of a strong will. The fear that Kim Jong Il engenders in the North Korean population supports the position that he is ruthless in

dealing with opposition, which supports the conclusion that he has strong will power.¹²²

The third characteristic is judgment. As former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett observed to Robert Kennedy, "Good judgment is usually the result of experience. And experience is frequently the result of bad judgment."¹²³ Since being designated as Kim Il Sung's successor in the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il has had ample opportunity to exercise bad judgment and learn from experience. As demonstrated by the 1976 Panmunjom incident, Kim Jong Il has exercised bad judgment in the past. With more than twenty years of tutorship from his father, Kim Jong Il has received sufficient guidance to recognize his errors, take corrective actions, and develop good judgment. Uncertainty surrounding his physical health and mental condition raises doubts about his decision making abilities, but North Korean actions to date seem to indicate that Kim Jong Il possesses sound judgment developed during years of learning at his father's elbow.

Kim Jong Il's mental flexibility is hard to judge. The fact that Kim Jong Il is open to new ideas is evident from his late night debates with his most trusted subordinates on key issues.¹²⁴ Kim Jong Il's exploitation of the international condemnation of North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and the 1993 Team Spirit exercise to create a major regional crisis, allowing him to use the national emergency to consolidate his control over the military, also reflects mental flexibility. North Korea's reversal of its position on joining the UN

also reflects an ability to adjust to international realities. Based on the available information, Kim Jong Il appears to possess mental flexibility.

Kim Jong Il possesses the knowledge required to execute his duties. Twenty years of tutorship from his father and exercising control of day-to-day government decisions in recent years have given Kim Jong Il the requisite knowledge for his position. Kim Jong Il was carefully trained and groomed for his future position, receiving the best preparation possible in North Korea. In addition, Kim Jong Il has the best minds in North Korea at his disposal. Kim Jong Il's personal knowledge and the knowledge base he can draw on are sufficient to see him through any contingency.

Integrity is the most important of the six characteristics and, in Kim Jong Il's case, is the hardest to assess. The external perception is that that North Korea lacks integrity. This perception is based on the well established North Korean pattern of making agreements and then reneging on them. There is a big difference, however, between the actions of a state and the actions of an individual (between collective and personal integrity). States will do what they have to do in order to protect their political independence and the physical security of their citizens.¹²⁵ The pattern of the North Korean government, however, is not the focus of this integrity assessment: the focus is Kim Jong Il. There is no information that directly corresponds to Kim Jong Il's record on integrity; only anecdotal information is available. The anecdotal information suggests that Kim Jong Il acts with integrity, at least to some degree, towards his trusted

subordinates. In late night discussions in Kim Jong Il's informal "kitchen cabinet," free exchange of opinion and ideas is reportedly encouraged.¹²⁶ The free exchange of ideas between Kim Jong Il and his most trusted advisors implies that the advisors can rely on Kim Jong Il not to take reprisals against them for expressing their candid opinions. However, these trusted advisors also reportedly display cronyism and flattery in their relations with Kim Jong Il.¹²⁷ Thus, while Kim Jong Il does display some signs of integrity in relations with his trusted subordinates, it is difficult to assess Kim Jong Il's integrity.

Although the information available is limited, Kim Jong Il appears to possess, to varying degrees, the six characteristics Field Marshal Viscount Slim identified as essential for leadership. The leadership characteristics identified by Field Marshal Viscount Slim, however, are a Western model of leadership. It is worthwhile, therefore, to discuss Kim Jong Il's leadership from an Eastern perspective.

Kim Il Sung legitimized his leadership from an Eastern perspective by creating an ideology for North Korea and intertwining it with Confucianism. Kim Il Sung created a national ideology for North Korea, Juche, that mixed North Korean communism and autarky with a heavy dose of Confucian values.¹²⁸ Confucianism sets forth an idealized bond between father and son as the model for all human relations, including those between ruler and ruled. Just as it is the absolute duty of the Confucian son to revere the father, so it is the absolute duty of the Confucian subject to revere the ruler. By blending Juche ideology with Confucianism, Kim Il Sung was able to assume the role of vanguard of the

proletariat and father-emperor of the nation.¹²⁹ Kim Il Sung successfully transferred the duty and obligation owed to one's parents to a duty and obligation owed to the state, the state being embodied in the person of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung was depicted and accepted as the benevolent father figure of the North Korean people. The loyalty of the population transferred to the new father figure, Kim Jong Il, upon the death of Kim Il Sung.

Filial piety, the strongest of emotional bonds in Korea, places a duty and obligation on the children to honor, revere, and obey their parents.¹³⁰ By constantly displaying loyalty to his father and to his father's ideology, Kim Jong Il reinforces his leadership position and demonstrates his worthiness to lead. Kim Jong Il's legitimacy as a leader is further reinforced by continued propaganda portraying him as a benevolent father figure and a worthy successor to Kim Il Sung. From the North Korean perspective, Kim Jong Il, the dutiful son and father-emperor, demonstrates leadership qualities in keeping with Juche ideology and Confucian tradition.

The degree to which Kim Jong Il's leadership ability has been developed is unclear, but from both the Western and Eastern perspectives Kim Jong Il possesses the leadership ability required for his position. Kim Il Sung, a canny leader who survived more than forty years of Cold War politics, would not have allowed his son to succeed to the leadership of North Korea if he had any doubts concerning his son's leadership abilities or character traits. Kim Il Sung would have had no hesitation in finding a new successor if Kim Jong Il had not measured up to his father's standards.

Kim Jong Il As A Rational Actor

The information available on Kim Jong Il's lifestyle, personality, leadership, and health is scarce and paints an incomplete picture. Examining Kim Jong Il's past actions and the domestic pressures he faces, however, tends to support a conclusion that Kim Jong Il is a rational actor. A rational actor is a nation, or in the case of Kim Jong Il an individual, who seeks the most efficient means to get what he wants.¹³¹ Rationality refers to a consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.¹³² The decisions and actions that Kim Jong Il has taken in his lifetime indicate that Kim Jong Il has always sought to get what he wants using choices calculated to achieve his desired ends.

During his developmental years, Kim Jong Il was closely associated with North Korean terrorist activities. His involvement in the 1976 ax-murder at Pammunjom, the 1983 Rangoon bombing, and the 1987 bombing of a civilian airliner appear irrational and immoral from a Western perspective. In evaluating Kim Jong Il as a rational actor, it is important to view him in the context of his culture. What is rational in one culture may appear to be wholly irrational to one from a different culture.¹³³ From Kim Jong Il's perspective, however, his actions were perfectly rational. Kim Jong Il had no revolutionary credentials and, since North Korea was not at war with the US, no way to attain revolutionary credentials. Although his activities with the North Korean propaganda apparatus may have given him some credibility, it was certainly not sufficient to mark him as a man of vision and action worthy of succeeding his father. The Rangoon bombing incident in

particular has been seen as an attempt by Kim Jong Il to be credited as a tough revolutionary, a qualification that was lacking from his list of accomplishments.¹³⁴ Only by proving his willingness and ability to confront the US and its allies could he prove his worth. Kim Jong Il's terrorist activities clearly entailed some risk, but the results indicate that Kim Jong Il correctly ascertained the likely US and South Korean response to his actions. An additional benefit of his terrorist activities was to establish a reputation within North Korea as an individual to be feared, a useful reputation to have if you anticipate resistance to your succession one day.

While Kim Jong Il's involvement in terrorist activities may appear both immoral and irrational to some outside observers, from Kim Jong Il's perspective his actions seem highly rational and reflect an astute analysis of the response his actions would elicit both outside and inside North Korea. From Kim Jong Il's perspective, the US is a paper tiger, incapable of taking serious action to counter a terrorist attack. South Korea, in turn, is a puppet of the US. Thus, launching terrorist attacks on the South Korean government and symbols of the South Korean government poses minimal risk of retaliation. As for morality, Kim Jong Il's actions can best be viewed as the actions of a crown prince who need not concern himself with moral issues. As Machiavelli would agree, nothing could be more moral than the interests of the state (or, in this case, the individual). Power rather than morality is the crux of decision making when interests are at stake.¹³⁵

The pattern of North Korean actions, both before and after the death of Kim Il Sung, would also support the conclusion that Kim Jong Il

is a rational actor. Kim Jong Il has been intimately involved with the decision making process since the early 1980s and, since the death of his father, has been the final authority in all aspects of North Korean foreign policy. Recent major North Korean decisions, such as entry into the UN, development of nuclear weapons, and direct talks with the US are all indicative of pragmatic actions to achieve objectives crucial to the national interest, such as improving economic conditions in North Korea and ensuring the succession of Kim Jong Il. Likewise, decisions following the death of Kim Il Sung also reflect a pragmatic approach to problems and a shrewd assessment of likely US responses to North Korean actions. Using the Geneva Accords as leverage, North Korea succeeded in forcing the cancellation of the annual US/Republic of Korea Team Spirit military exercise. North Korea's expulsion of Polish diplomats in early March 1995 was also a calculated, pragmatic act designed to force the US to deal directly with North Korea.

Kim Jong Il's leadership of North Korea is secure for now and the near-term future. Kim Jong Il's future, however, is inexorably tied to his ability to improve the economic conditions in North Korea. Domestic pressures and potential challenges to his legitimacy will force Kim Jong Il to pursue a pragmatic policy aimed at improving economic conditions within his country. Kim Jong Il's pursuit of a pragmatic policy does not mean that future dealings with North Korea will be easy, but rather that Kim Jong Il will be forced to follow a course of action that will lead to economic improvement. Leaders of states, like most people, learn from experience, and, like most people, respond to external pressures based on their personality attributes, experiences,

and training. Thus, Kim Jong Il's personality attributes, leadership characteristics, experiences, training, and the current domestic situation in North Korea, support the contention that Kim Jong Il is a rational actor and will continue to be a rational actor in the future.

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CHAPTER 3

A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR

PROLIFERATION ISSUE

The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea is a complex issue involving a number of competing interests in the region.

Intertwined with the issue of nuclear proliferation is the unresolved war between North Korea and the United Nations. Although an armistice agreement was negotiated and enacted, the Korean War has never formally ended. In addition, the issue of the future reunification of North and South Korea is closely related to nuclear proliferation by North Korea. The possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea affects regional stability and complicates efforts to reunify North and South Korea at some point in time.

The death of Kim Il Sung and the uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong Il's competence and character have created a period of grave uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula. The death of Kim Il Sung came at a critical moment when the US had just resumed talks to prove whether North Korea would be willing to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for diplomatic recognition and economic assistance.¹ Kim Il Sung's death placed the issue in the hands of Kim Jong Il. Although an agreement was reached and formalized, the Geneva Accords that were signed in October 1994 represented a moral victory for North Korea. The value of the Geneva Accords to the US and its allies will be determined

by future North Korean behavior. The Geneva Accords, while listing a number of elements that would be essential to the resolution of the nuclear issue, places North Korean compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a rollback of North Korea's nuclear program on the back burner while providing North Korea with desperately needed economic assistance.

The Korean Peninsula is a unique area with a global importance that belies its small size. The Korean Peninsula is a strategic crossroads, where the interests of China, Japan, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS--the successor state to Russia) intersect, and where the US still keeps 37,000 troops forward deployed to deter another war.² Including both North and South Korea, the interests of six nations are directly tied to events on the Korean Peninsula. The role of the US in balancing the interests of the other nations is unique. In this century, China, Japan, the CIS (Russia), and Korea (accounting for both North and South Korea) have, at one time or another, been occupied by or fought a war with each of the other three nations. The nations involved in these disputes have looked to the US as the ultimate arbitrator of their disagreements.

The issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea once again thrusts the US into a role where it must work to preserve regional stability. This time, however, the ramifications of a failure by the US to successfully resolve the issue are not regional in nature, but potentially global. If North Korea is successful in circumventing the NPT, the stage will be set for other third-world nations to move forward with their own programs to develop nuclear weapons. While it is

true that nations, such as Pakistan and Israel, have developed nuclear weapons in the past, North Korea would become the first third-world nation unfriendly to the US, and with a proven national policy that embraces terrorism, to develop a nuclear capability. The US has been and remains determined to preserve the integrity of the NPT. While the US recognizes that the NPT has some deficiencies, it is still the best instrument available to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT is scheduled to come up for renewal this year and, while certain adjustments may have to be made to the treaty, the current US policy is to uphold the treaty in its present or revised form as strongly as possible.³

The fundamental issue confronting the US is the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea is a problem that challenges American authority as leader of the nuclear control regime by threatening support for and, ultimately, the continuance of the NPT.⁴ The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea poses a threat to US strategic and regional interests, threatening to undermine American global leadership and, potentially, resulting in a regional arms race or a second Korean War that would destabilize the region. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea is the crux of the problem facing the US.

US National Interests

US national interests on the Korean Peninsula must be viewed in terms of the broader US regional and strategic interests in Northeast Asia and the Pacific as a whole. The US National Security Strategy adopted in February 1995 is a strategy of enlargement and engagement.

The strategy of enlargement and engagement is a three-pronged strategy with each of the overriding national interests represented. US national interests are defined as: (1) enhancing US security, (2) promoting prosperity at home, and (3) promoting democracy.⁵ The US national interests as set forth in the National Security Strategy are extremely broad and lack sufficient definition to be used as input for analysis. In order to provide a framework for analysis, then, it is necessary to move a step below the national security interests and examine the national security objectives and the regional security objectives for East Asia and the Pacific.

The national security objectives flow directly from and support the national security interests. Drawing on the most recent National Security Strategy, subordinate to the national security interest of "Enhancing US Security" there are six national security objectives: (1) maintaining a strong defense capability, (2) combating the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, (3) controlling arms, (4) conducting peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution, (5) maintaining a strong intelligence capability, and (6) developing a long-term policy to minimize environmental risks. National security objectives that fall under the national security interest of "Promoting Prosperity at Home" include (1) enhancing American competitiveness, (2) developing partnerships with business and labor, (3) enhancing access to foreign markets, (4) strengthening macroeconomic coordination, (5) providing for energy security, and (6) promoting sustainable development abroad. The national security interest of

"Promoting Democracy" has one major national objective: enlarging the community of democratic free market nations.⁶

The regional security objectives for East Asia and the Pacific assist in more clearly defining the US National Security Strategy. The regional objectives for East Asia and the Pacific are (1) combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia, (2) developing multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities, and (3) supporting the wave of democratic reform sweeping the region.⁷

As can be seen from the preceding discussion, the most recent National Security Strategy of the US does not contain a concise statement of national security interests, objectives, and their relative priorities. Rather, the US National Security Strategy has been criticized for being a vague political science exercise which fails to establish national security priorities.⁸ Based upon the US National Security Strategy, however, it is possible to identify relevant US objectives that are applicable to the current problem posed by North Korea. US objectives that are relevant are (1) combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (2) promoting democracy by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations, (3) promoting regional stability and cooperation in conjunction with our allies, and (4) ensuring access to economic markets that are necessary for national prosperity.

In examining the relevant US objectives in the context of the problems posed by North Korea, it is possible to develop a rank order. The US objectives in rank order are (1) combating the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, (2) promoting regional stability and cooperation in conjunction with our allies, (3) ensuring access to economic markets that are necessary for national prosperity, and (4) promoting democracy by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations. Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the first priority because it has a direct impact on the security of our allies and of our soldiers and civilians living in the region. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will have global repercussions and will erode the credibility of the US as a world leader. Promoting regional stability and cooperation is the second priority because it involves elements of enhancing national security and of securing national prosperity. By promoting regional stability and cooperation in conjunction with our allies, the US will establish the conditions necessary for peaceful commerce and interaction between nations. Ensuring access to economic markets that are necessary for national prosperity, such as the markets of Northeast Asia, is necessary to promote prosperity at home. The fourth priority, promoting democracy by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations, is a long-term objective and is of secondary importance when compared to national security and prosperity.

Examining the US objectives reveals a potential conflict between the objectives. Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction may entail activities that could threaten regional stability and cooperation rather than promoting regional stability and cooperation. Direct military action and economic sanctions to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction would undoubtedly heighten regional tensions and, in

the short term, threaten regional stability. However, combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction takes precedence over regional stability and cooperation. The rank ordering of US objectives, then, makes the number-one priority combating weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula. Actions taken to deter aggression and adventurism by North Korea fall behind efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction.

The US National Security Strategy places clear constraints on the means to be used to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The stated regional goal is to integrate, not isolate, the region's powers and to find solutions, short of conflict, to the area's continuing security challenges.⁹ Integrating the region's powers and finding solutions (short of conflict) to the area's security challenges is in keeping with the overall national security strategy of engagement and enlargement and rules out armed conflict initiated by the US. The US National Security Strategy also further defines exactly what is meant by "combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" by setting forth a long-term objective of a non-nuclear, peacefully reunified Korean Peninsula.¹⁰ Thus, the long-term goal of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, but also to roll back any North Korean development of nuclear weapons. In short, North Korea must be influenced to give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons program by means short of conflict.

Essential Assumptions

The analysis of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea in the context of the succession of Kim Jong Il to leadership of North Korea assumes that: (1) Kim Jong Il will successfully consolidate his leadership position and remain the leader of North Korea in the short term (5 years), (2) US national security policy will continue to reject conflict as a potential solution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (3) The proliferation issue can be resolved independent of the long-term goal of the reunification of North and South Korea, and (4) Regional nation states are rational actors.

Instruments of US Power

By applying the four instruments of national power--diplomatic, economic, military, and informational--the US can attempt to promote an outcome to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea that is favorable to US interests. The four instruments of national power are most effectively employed when their effects are synchronized as part of a coherent, integrated national strategy designed to achieve specific national objectives. In order to develop an integrated strategy, however, it is first necessary to evaluate each of the instruments of power independently to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each instrument of national power, identify any limitations on the use of a specific instrument of national power, and to assess the anticipated effectiveness of each instrument of national power in producing a resolution favorable to US interests.

Diplomatic

The US has employed primarily diplomatic and economic power up to this point in its efforts to convince North Korea that nuclear proliferation is not in North Korea's best interests. The diplomatic power of the US has been used primarily to offer the North Korean's political inducements as rewards for future behavior in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation. As part of the Geneva Accords, the US offered a range of concessions in exchange for North Korea essentially "capping" its nuclear weapons program. The primary diplomatic inducement was a continuation of the establishment of low-level diplomatic links between North Korea and the US. The basic focus was to get the best deal possible to freeze further nuclear weapons proliferation by North Korea and to foster a new set of diplomatic and economic relations.¹¹ The US diplomatic efforts and the Geneva Accords seem to have the intention of reducing North Korea's fears of the US and building North Korean confidence in the US.

The main target of North Korean diplomatic efforts is the US. As part of its strategy, North Korea has actively sought direct talks with the US since the early 1970s. North Korea in the past, however, did not have sufficient diplomatic power to force direct talks with the US. The possession of nuclear weapons has provided North Korea sufficient diplomatic power to bring the US to the negotiating table. North Korea is a xenophobic society, isolated from the remainder of the world. The sole source of North Korea's diplomatic power is North Korea's nuclear capability.¹² Using nuclear weapons, North Korea was able to draw the US into talks and has been able to use nuclear weapons

as leverage to elevate the level of negotiations over diplomatic exchange.¹³

To date, US efforts to deal with nuclear proliferation by North Korea are best characterized as reactive as opposed to proactive. North Korea has been extremely successful in playing its nuclear card, and the US has compromised or made concessions rather than challenge North Korea. North Korea, not the US or South Korea, has been in firm control of the diplomatic agenda.¹⁴ Arguably, the US has failed to employ effectively its diplomatic instrument of power in dealing with North Korea. Often acting unilaterally, the US has not drawn on the expertise and support of its regional allies in seeking a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.

Options available to the US in the employment of its diplomatic power include (1) strengthening the partnership for security, interdependence, and democracy between South Korea, Japan, and the US as a means of confronting North Korea with a unified front, (2) bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on China (in conjunction with diplomatic pressure from South Korea and Japan), influencing China to exert its considerable influence with North Korea to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (3) bringing diplomatic pressure on the CIS (in conjunction with diplomatic pressure from South Korea and Japan), convincing the CIS to use whatever influence it still has over North Korea to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (4) tying future diplomatic relations to verifiable efforts by North Korea to meet the safeguards established by the IAEA, (5) pursuing diplomatic efforts in the UN and regional forums to build consensus for UN/regional sanctions

against North Korea, and (6) building a coalition within the UN to oppose North Korea with diplomatic, economic, informational, and, if necessary, military power. The US still enjoys a position of credibility within the region and can use its diplomatic power to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on North Korea. The US and South Korea can continue to use the reduction of US troop levels and the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula as political leverage in dealing with North Korea.

Economic

The US is well positioned to bring economic power to bear against North Korea. North Korea's economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises and units, which are generally known to be suffering from low efficiency and chronic deficits.¹⁵ Improving economic conditions in North Korea must be a top priority for Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il must produce tangible results, of which the most important is improvement in the North Korean standard of living, in order to demonstrate and further solidify his fitness to lead. The most logical way to bring economic pressure to bear on North Korea is through economic sanctions. Economic sanctions, however, are of dubious value against North Korea; North Korea has been under economic sanction from the West since 1953 and the North Korean economy has remained intact.¹⁶ North Korean trade with the outside world is negligible and is primarily routed through China and Japan. Japan has indicated that it will not impose economic sanctions unless there is a UN resolution supporting economic sanctions. China favors diplomatic action over economic sanctions. North Korea shares borders with both China and the CIS, making economic sanctions difficult

to enforce unless China and the CIS are willing and able to close their borders with North Korea. In addition, North Korea has indicated that it will consider the imposition of economic sanctions as an act of war and respond accordingly. Of course, all that exists at the present time is a cease fire, but economic sanctions could make the cease fire more tenuous or result in a resumption of hostilities. Thus, economic sanctions will have a limited effect on North Korea, will be difficult for the US to build a consensus on imposing, and will run a clear risk of escalating the confrontation over nuclear weapons into open conflict. The value of economic sanctions, however, lies in the symbolic unity of purpose that sanctions represent. Economic sanctions are thus an option, but they entail risk.

An additional way that the US can apply economic power against North Korea is to tie economic assistance to specific North Korean actions. US economic power is well suited to this "carrot and stick" type of approach. The Geneva Accords provided North Korea with 50,000 tons of oil a month and may ultimately provide North Korea with two modern nuclear reactors. Unfortunately, the economic assistance was not tied to any significant actions on the part of the North Koreans. To be effective in achieving US objectives, economic assistance must be contingent upon specific, verifiable actions on the part of North Korea.

The US can also use its economic power to improve and foster economic ties with its allies and friends in the region. Loan guarantees, preferred trading status, and economic assistance can all be used to develop unity of effort and bolster friends and allies in the region. Economic power can also be used to influence regional actors,

such as China and to a lesser extent the CIS, to use their influence with North Korea. The continued improvement of economic relations between China and the US, Japan, and South Korea could be made contingent upon Chinese efforts to play a meaningful role in convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and a similar approach could be used to secure the support of the CIS. Friends and allies in the region can also be provided security assistance in the form of loans and military aid in order to bolster the ability of the US and its friends and allies to deter North Korea.

Military

The US National Security Strategy envisions seeking solutions to regional security challenges that fall short of conflict. In relation to military power, the US has followed a fairly consistent policy since the Korean War. First, the US supports the South Korean military to counter possible attacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and maintains troops in South Korea for that purpose. Second, the US will act swiftly if the DPRK begins a war against South Korea. Third, the US will support an increase of South Korean defense capability under the mutual defense treaty between the US and South Korea.¹⁷ In short, the US is following a military policy of deterrence coupled with enhancing the military capabilities of South Korea and other friends and allies in the area.

The cornerstone of a regional defense capability lies with the bilateral defense treaties between the US and South Korea and between the US and Japan. A trilateral relationship does not exist and is probably not feasible now or in the near future given the history of

relations between the Koreans and Japanese, but the bilateral defense treaties come close to functioning as a trilateral arrangement.

Averting the outbreak of another war on the Korean Peninsula is a key security objective for the US. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea is also a key security objective, but the global ramifications of nuclear proliferation makes preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea a higher security objective than averting another war on the Korean Peninsula. Both security objectives require the adoption of such a resolute posture by South Korea and the US that there will be no doubt in the mind of Kim Jong Il and the North Koreans that South Korea and the US, in conjunction with friends and allies in the region, will respond militarily to any hostile action by North Korea. Measures that can be taken to convey this message include increasing joint exercises between the US and South Korea, increased security assistance to South Korea in the form of modernization and technology transfers to update South Korean military capability, technology transfers to friends and allies in the region, such as Japan, to improve regional capabilities, increased intelligence gathering and improvements in the sharing of intelligence data between the US and South Korea, continued forward presence of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, increased naval presence in the region, and rapid deployment exercises. Some of these measures, such as improved intelligence gathering and sharing, security assistance to modernize the South Korean Armed Forces, and continued forward presence of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, are already in effect or

can be instituted immediately. The remainder of the measures can be instituted in response to provocative North Korean actions.

A key point that must be reemphasized with Kim Jong Il, albeit in a subtle manner, is that South Korea continues to fall under the US nuclear umbrella and that South Korea and the US will respond swiftly and decisively to North Korean aggression. During his July 1993 visit to South Korea, President Clinton clearly stated that the US commitment to South Korean security remained undiminished and that the Korean Peninsula remained a vital US interest.¹⁸ Recent US actions, particularly the Geneva Accords, create the impression that the US is unwilling to risk a military confrontation to achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. The Korean War in 1950 was in part caused by confusing American actions.¹⁹ Likewise, unclear American signals led Saddam Hussein to conclude that the US would take no action if Iraq invaded Kuwait. Wars have often been fought as a result of misunderstanding and miscommunication; it can not be allowed to happen in this instance.

In applying the instrument of military power, it is important for South Korea and the US to understand that, in the North Korean view, the annual Team Spirit exercise is a threat and thus poses an obstacle to the ultimate peace process.²⁰ North Korean reaction has always been hostile to the annual Team Spirit exercise and the willingness of the US and South Korea to cancel Team Spirit for the past two years calls into question the need for the exercise. The advantage of the annual Team Spirit exercise to the US and South Korea, however, is that it forces North Korea to heighten its readiness posture (due to a potential threat

to North Korean security), thus putting additional pressure on the North Korean economy. The discontinuation of Team Spirit exercises is a bargaining chip that can be offered to the North Koreans without seriously degrading defensive capabilities. However, it is highly doubtful that North Korea will give up nuclear weapons in exchange for a discontinuation of Team Spirit exercises. Other joint and combined exercises will continue to provide the necessary training for combined operations by the US and South Korea. In exchange for canceling Team Spirit, however, the US and South Korea should look for a similar gesture of goodwill on the part of the North Koreans.

While the US possesses the military power to pursue a military action to destroy key North Korean nuclear installations and capabilities, the use of military power for such a purpose is not very attractive. Even assuming that circumstances provide a legal basis and a degree of international backing for the effort, and even assuming that the action involves acceptable risks to the personnel involved, military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear program will not be an attractive alternative.²¹ The use of military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear program is an unattractive alternative for three reasons: (1) North Korea possesses a significant conventional military capability that could be used for retaliatory strikes, (2) military action may simply be unable to achieve the desired objective, and (3) military action poses the danger of radiological consequences.²²

Strikes by the US against North Korean nuclear facilities, such as the Yongbyon reactor, would undoubtedly lead to retaliatory strikes by North Korea. North Korea possesses significant conventional military

forces and, short of a land invasion, could retaliate with air or missile attacks against Seoul or against South Korean nuclear power plants. North Korea's large special forces could also launch a campaign of unconventional warfare targeting South Korea's nuclear power plants, infrastructure, economic institutions, or conventional forces. North Korea also possesses the capability for launching terrorist attacks against both the US and South Korea. Military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear program could easily escalate into a second Korean War. While the US might be able to deter retaliation by North Korea through the threat of further escalation, the effectiveness of such threats would be uncertain.²³

Military action by the US may simply be unable to accomplish the desired objective. North Korea observed the ability of the US to launch precision strikes during the Persian Gulf War and has undoubtedly taken steps to disperse, protect, and disguise nuclear facilities. Despite the best intelligence efforts, large portions of Iraq's nuclear weapons program escaped detection and were not targeted by the coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Given the nature of the terrain, North Korean air defense capabilities, and the quality and quantity of intelligence available on North Korea, it is highly unlikely that military action would be able to destroy all of North Korea's nuclear facilities or capabilities.

The third factor weighing against the use of military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear program are the potential radiological consequences. Attacks on nuclear reactors and nuclear facilities will release radioactive elements into the atmosphere. Radioactive releases

cannot be controlled, running the risk of radioactive fallout affecting our allies and friends in the region. Such an occurrence would be a media coup for North Korea, who would exploit its informational element of power to charge the US with waging unconventional warfare and to undermine international support for US efforts.

Military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear program has clear limitations and is not supported by the US National Security Strategy, but it should not be eliminated from the list of options for countering North Korean nuclear proliferation. The threat of force in and of itself can be a useful tool to support diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, provided that North Korea perceives the threat of force as viable and not simply a bluff.²⁴

Informational

The US has significant informational power that can be brought to bear against both North Korea and other regional nations. The closed nature of North Korean society means that, internally, North Korea is not vulnerable to information. However, any efforts at an economic opening will provide opportunities to apply informational power to the North Korean domestic environment. North Korea rightly fears the influence that outside information can have on its people and society.

Externally, North Korea is highly vulnerable to informational power. Informational themes that can be directly targeted at Kim Jong Il are (1) the cohesion and solidarity of the US, Japan, and South Korea in opposing North Korean nuclear proliferation, (2) that a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is in the best interests of all parties, including North Korea, (3) the benefits that North Korea would obtain from

compliance with the NPT, and (4) the willingness of the US, the UN, South Korea, Japan, and the international community to assist North Korea and seek peaceful resolution of long-standing disagreements. Informational power can also be directed against China in an effort to convince China to use its influence to secure North Korean compliance with the NPT. The themes to be targeted at the Chinese are (1) that a nuclear-free North Korea is in China's best interests, (2) continued proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea will result in economic assets being used to counter North Korea, making the assets unavailable for investment in China's economic programs, and (3) the increase in regional and global stature China would enjoy as a key player in securing regional stability.

The US can also use its informational power to garner support for the US position in the international community. In this application, informational power would be used to highlight North Korean activities that violate the NPT. An excellent example of the use of informational power in this respect was the use of satellite imagery by the US to focus world attention on North Korean nuclear facilities and the credibility gap between official North Korean statements and actual conditions on the ground. Such an application of informational power would embarrass North Korea and should only be used when the US requires international support for UN sanctions or, possibly, UN support for military action.

Domestic Context

In assessing the use of US instruments of power, it is important to evaluate fully the potential domestic influences that must be

considered in the decision making process. In evaluating the instruments of US power, two domestic influences stand out above all others: the national will and Congress. The national will must be behind any efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue. The use of diplomatic and informational power to work toward resolution of the nuclear proliferation issue will be supported by the national will. The use of diplomatic and informational power typically entails little risk of the commitment of national treasure in the form of American citizens. The use of economic power, short of sanctions, will also meet little resistance from the American people, provided that the US does not commit itself to bearing the majority of the costs involved in providing economic assistance to North Korea. The use of the military instrument of power, short of conflict, would also most likely be supported by the national will. Whether or not the American people are willing to support US military strikes or measures likely to result in the escalation of the conflict into a second Korean War remains to be seen. Without sufficient provocation by North Korea in the form of an overt act against American citizens or military action against South Korea, it is doubtful that the American people would support the use of military power in a conflict role.

Congress will conduct its own assessment of the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of US foreign policy and the use of US instruments of power. Congress is already reviewing the Geneva Accords and there are indications that Congress views the Geneva Accords as paying North Korea, and handsomely, for returning to obligations North Korea willingly accepted under the NPT and then violated. Criticism

from the Republican Party focuses on the perception that the Geneva Accords serve to prop up a regime hostile to the US that is closer to collapse than at any time in the past 40 years.²⁵

Other Relevant Actors--Interests, Capabilities, and
Likely Courses of Action

The other relevant actors in the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea are the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the United Nations (UN), South Korea, and North Korea. These six actors have specific interests, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely courses of action regarding North Korea's proliferation of nuclear weapons that have the most direct influence on the ability of the US to further its regional and strategic interests. These six actors are most directly involved in Northeast Asia and have the most vested interests in the outcome. There are other regional actors, such as ASEAN and countries such as Singapore and Taiwan, that have strategic interests in the resolution of the nuclear proliferation issue, but these actors have not been historical players in events on the Korean Peninsula and are not directly involved in the issue of North Korean nuclear proliferation.

People's Republic of China

Since Napoleon, Westerners have been predicting that once the Chinese dragon awoke, the world would shake. After almost a century of false starts, China seems firmly embarked on a course of explosive economic growth and military assertiveness that will reverberate throughout Asia and the world.²⁶ The rise of China, if it continues, may be the most important trend in the world for the next century.²⁷

Chinese influence in Northeast Asia is on the rise and China has significant national security interests on the Korean Peninsula, making China a key player in US efforts to resolve nuclear proliferation by North Korea.

Chinese foreign policy toward East Asia has been shaped by four major strategic objectives: (1) the deterrence of Soviet military attack and the containment of Soviet influence in Asia, (2) the use of foreign capital, machinery, technology, and expertise to aid China's "Four modernizations" program to develop agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense, (3) the promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (4) the reunification of China, with the recovery of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other "lost territories."²⁸ The deterrence of Soviet military attack and the containment of Soviet influence in Asia was China's top priority throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980s and the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union resulted in a reorientation of priorities. Since the 1980s, China's top priority has been the use of foreign investment and expertise to aid the "Four modernizations" program.²⁹

Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula include security, economic prosperity, regional stability, and alliance commitments. China views the Korean Peninsula as vitally important to its security, and therefore desires a Korean Peninsula free of strife and chaos, with the peninsula serving as a buffer zone.³⁰ Korea has historically served as a buffer zone against the Japanese, and the Chinese fear of a resurgent, militaristic Japan shapes Chinese objectives on the Korean

Peninsula. Stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region as a whole are important for Chinese economic prosperity. China wants to avoid hostile entanglements with the US and Japan, who provide major assistance in China's economic modernization. For economic and security reasons, the Chinese would prefer a gradual unification of the two Koreas rather than an absorption of the North by the South.³¹ A rapid reunification would result in North Korea becoming a magnet for South Korean investment, investment that China needs for its own modernization.

Regional stability is important for Chinese economic prosperity and security. China does not want a nuclear Korea.³² Likewise, China does not want North Korea to collapse. Unification brought about by a North Korean collapse would result in instability. Additionally, if unification were successful, nationalist sentiments of ethnic Koreans living in China could be aroused, potentially posing internal security problems. China is committed by treaty to support the defense of North Korea, but in reality China has attempted to persuade North Korea to adopt a more flexible approach on nuclear and related issues.³³ China would like to maintain a neighbor with a compatible political structure, or at the minimum one that does not pose a threat to China's political structure.

China's predominant tools in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue will be diplomatic, informational, and possibly economic. China possesses significant influence with North Korea by virtue of their alliance and the economic relations between China and North Korea. China can thus influence, to some degree, Kim Jong Il. China will use

informational power to push for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue, opposing the use of economic sanctions. China opposes economic sanctions. The most commonly heard reasons for Chinese opposition to sanctions are that sanctions would (1) have no effect on the North Korean economy (since North Korea is not dependent on foreign markets and trade), (2) have a negative effect on the open-minded individuals among the Korean leadership, and (3) be difficult for China to enforce, since most of the trade with North Korea occurs in the northern provinces where the Chinese central government has little control. In reality, however, China opposes sanctions for more pragmatic reasons. North Korea is China's principal regional ally and supporting sanctions against North Korea would seriously damage the alliance relationship. The trade between North Korea and China, albeit small, is beneficial for China's northern provinces and the Chinese central government has no desire to curtail the trade with North Korea and harm the economies of the northern provinces.

China possesses significant military power and would be a formidable military opponent. Moreover, China has been pursuing efforts to modernize its armed forces in recent years and has been seeking to increase its influence in regional affairs. Even though China is a major military power, it is unlikely that China would take military action towards either the US and its allies or North Korea, unless China felt that its own security was threatened.

China's primary weakness is its reliance on the US, Japan, and South Korea for investment and expertise to fuel its modernization effort. China's strengths are military power and the influence it has

with North Korea. While China maintains a close relationship with North Korea, the Chinese advocate that North Korea will not submit to foreign pressure--including Chinese.³⁴ The Chinese perspective is that neither threats nor pressure will work. Thus, China's most likely course of action is to continue to oppose economic sanctions and to let the US, IAEA, North Korea, and South Korea work out their differences.³⁵ An added benefit China derives from this course of action is the loss of prestige and loss of credibility the US will suffer if it is unable to resolve the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue. China's emphasis on seeking a diplomatic solution and its unwillingness to support UN sanctions in the Security Council could undermine US efforts. At a minimum, the US will have to demonstrate the failure of diplomacy and provide definitive proof of an active North Korean nuclear program or a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal prior to seeking Chinese support for sanctions, and even then Chinese support is doubtful.

Japan

The relationship between Japan and the two Koreas has been shaped by Japan's pre-1945 legacy of militarism, imperialism, and colonialism. Both North and South Korea view Japan with distrust, and there is a general fear in the region of a militarily resurgent Japan. Japan's growing prominence in Asian economic affairs, however, and the collapse of the Cold War security structures have generated mounting pressure for Japan to take a more active role in addressing the region's political and security agenda.³⁶ Japan's ties with the Korean Peninsula have been overwhelmingly with South Korea. By 1993, two-way trade between Japan and South Korea totaled \$31 billion, and some 2.6 million

Japanese and South Koreans traveled to each other's countries for pleasure or business.³⁷ In most respects, the relationship between Japan and South Korea is stronger than at any time in the history of relations between the two countries.

Japan's relations with North Korea have been more distant than relations with South Korea. Efforts to open political relations with North Korea, begun in 1990, have stalled over the key issues of Japanese compensation for wartime actions damaging to Korea, North Korea's adherence to the NPT and IAEA inspections, and Japanese requests for information concerning Li Un-Hye, a Japanese woman allegedly kidnapped to provide language instruction for North Korean agents.³⁸ Even though Japan and North Korea do not maintain diplomatic relations, millions of dollars flow from Japan to North Korea. The flow of funds, estimated at \$500 million (or more) every year, comes from the 100,000 or so pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in Japan.³⁹ The flow of cash and other material (food, vehicles, etc.) is a crucial factor in keeping the North Korean government afloat.⁴⁰

Japanese interests in the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue are predominantly related to national security, although economic prosperity, regional stability, and the Japanese alliance with the US are also interests. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea poses an external threat to Japanese security due to North Korea's advanced missile program. Recent testing of the Nodong-1 missile served as a vivid reminder that Japan can be reached by nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.⁴¹ In addition, Japan faces an internal threat to its security from pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in Japan. Japan does not

have significant trade with North Korea, but a disruption of regional stability will affect Japanese economic conditions. In addition, continued nuclear proliferation by North Korea could force Japan to devote considerable national resources to building up Japanese defense forces and developing a Japanese nuclear capability. Japan also senses an opportunity to play a major role in the economic rehabilitation of North Korea, which would provide opportunities for Japanese businesses. Since Japan relies on the US for defense from North Korean aggression, Japan has little choice, at least in the short term, but to support US efforts to resolve the nuclear proliferation issue.

Japanese objectives in its policies toward the Korean Peninsula are fairly clear. First, like other major powers in the region, Japan desires a non-nuclear Korea and a reduction in tensions between North and South Korea. Second, Japan appears to be moving toward a two-Korea policy, fearing the nationalist potential that a unified Korea would possess and sensing the economic opportunities that may come about in North Korea.⁴² In the past, Japan has relied only on economic power to ensure world peace and security; now it is no longer limiting itself solely to economic means, but it is expanding its range to include military means. The Japanese government argues, however, that it has no national will to use military power to threaten or attack another state.⁴³ The Japanese Constitution still constrains the use of Japanese forces, so military power, except for defense and limited peacekeeping operations, is not a viable Japanese option.

Japan's most likely course of action is to continue to support diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear proliferation issue. Japan

favours the effort to induce change in North Korea by increasingly involving North Korea in the affairs of the region as opposed to subjecting North Korea to isolation.⁴⁴ Japan will use its diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of power in this capacity. While Japan will support UN sanctions if such a course of action becomes necessary, it will do so reluctantly, fearing domestic reprisals.⁴⁵ Japan will not support sanctions that are undertaken outside the auspices of the UN.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The events that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of the CIS, and the dramatic transformation in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang were a tremendous shock to North Korea.⁴⁶ Formerly one of the Soviet Union's staunchest allies and able to play Russia off against China in order to secure economic assistance and military weaponry, Pyongyang has been shunned since the late 1980s when Moscow shifted its focus to building closer relations with Seoul, which eventually culminated in 1992 with the Russian recognition of South Korea. CIS interests on the Korean Peninsula include security, economic prosperity, and regional stability. From a security perspective, Moscow has clear and compelling reasons to seek resolution of the nuclear proliferation issue. Like China, Moscow views Korea as a buffer to counterbalance Japanese influence. Although Moscow has a mutual security treaty with North Korea, there is little doubt that Moscow no longer considers the treaty, or at least Article I providing for Russian assistance in the event of war, valid.⁴⁷ The strategic alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang no longer exists, and the CIS wants a nuclear-free

Korean Peninsula. Moscow wants North Korean compliance with the NPT and IAEA inspections, and has indicated that it will support UN sanctions if diplomatic efforts fail.

The economic interests of the CIS are closely tied to South Korea. South Korea has provided substantial economic assistance to the CIS. The CIS debt to South Korea stands at \$1.47 billion, and the poor economic situation in the CIS makes it unlikely that the debt will be repaid soon.⁴⁸ In the future, it is highly likely that the CIS will seek South Korean economic assistance for economic developments in Siberia. Formerly a major source of both weapons and economic assistance for North Korea, the CIS no longer accepts North Korean commodities but rather insists that trade transactions and technology transfers be settled in hard currencies. In the economic arena, the CIS is more closely tied to South Korea than to North Korea. Economic relationships also make regional stability a vital interest for the CIS, with the CIS favoring a separate North and South Korea in the short term that will ultimately lead to a single unified Korea.⁴⁹

In the future, the primary focus of the CIS will be on strengthening its relations with South Korea. The CIS will likely play a constructive role on the Korean Peninsula, seeking to reduce tensions, supporting a nuclear-free Korea, and participating in any Northeast Asian security dialogues.⁵⁰ The poor relations between the CIS and North Korea, as well as the CIS's domestic and economic problems, will limit the CIS's ability to influence North Korean actions. Future relations between the CIS and North Korea are likely to become bilateral and multilateral and to develop in a direction that moves away from the

traditional emphasis on the security of the Socialist Bloc to an emphasis on valuing the economic aspects of the relationship.⁵¹ The willingness of the CIS to support sanctions in the UN Security Council, however, would strengthen US efforts to resolve the nuclear proliferation issue with North Korea.

United Nations

The interests of the UN on the Korean Peninsula are regional stability, the fostering of economic development, and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Korean War was fought under the auspices of the UN, so North Korea does not view the UN as a neutral player and probably harbors lingering distrust of UN agencies and motives. The IAEA, a subordinate of the UN charged with the inspection of nuclear programs, has proven to lack sufficient capability to monitor adequately nuclear programs. The UN Security Council has failed to act forcefully on IAEA findings and rulings, graphically demonstrating the Security Council's unwillingness and inability to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Events in North Korea support the conclusion that agreements such as the NPT and institutions such as the UN can not be relied upon to help bring order to a dangerous world without the support and assistance of global and regional powers. The message thus sent to nations such as North Korea and other rogue states is that nuclear weapons are an equalizer; the possession of nuclear weapons means that other states will respect you and leave you alone.⁵² This lesson has not been lost on Iran, Algeria, Libya, and a host of other nations and groups.

Despite the limited ability of the IAEA and the UN to affect North Korea's nuclear program, the UN still offers the best hope for uniting world opinion behind any actions taken by the US and its allies and friends in the region. UN resolutions will provide legitimacy for any action on the part of the US and its allies and friends to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. UN informational power can be used to influence the world's perception of North Korean actions and to galvanize world opinion against North Korea. A UN resolution approving sanctions against North Korea would facilitate the mobilization of the economic element of power of the US and its allies and friends in the region, overcoming the resistance to economic sanctions expressed by Japan. China will remain a stumbling block in the UN Security Council, so US efforts will have to focus on continued diplomatic efforts. If diplomacy continues to prove unfruitful, however, China may be forced to support economic sanctions. Although UN approval is not required for the US to take military action, a UN resolution would lend legitimacy and credibility to military action. Without US leadership, however, the UN is unlikely to take any action to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

South Korea

In the long term, South Korea's government believes that unification will come one day, and the official South Korean policy is to pursue unification. South Korea, however, wants to contain the cost by unifying gradually. A study by the Korean Development Institute estimated that if unification came in 2000 and if the North had spent much of the 1990s copying China's economic liberalization, South Korea

would have to invest around \$90 billion in the North in the following decade, mainly on infrastructure.⁵³ If, on the other hand, North Korea followed an isolationist policy until 2000 and then collapsed, the South Korean government would have to invest \$230 billion. This poses somewhat of a dilemma for South Korea, since the possession of nuclear weapons could lead to increased North Korean expenditures for infrastructure revitalization. A nuclear North Korea, however, is South Korea's worst nightmare. Clearly it is in South Korea's interests to assist in the economic reform of North Korea.

Officials of South Korea's National Unification board envision reconciliation with the North moving through three stages. First, diplomatic contact would be used to build mutual trust. Second, the South would invest in special zones in the North, creating pockets of industry that could survive full unification. When the economic gap between North and South narrowed sufficiently, the third and final stage, full unification, would be initiated.⁵⁴ The initial stage of establishing economic contacts was proceeding nicely, but North Korea's nuclear program derailed the inter-Korean dialogue.

The official position of the South Korean government is one of fundamental cooperation and moderation towards North Korea. The South Korean rationale is that if North Korea is provoked through economic sanctions, a military confrontation could develop, running the risk of flinging the Korean Peninsula into a devastating war. The South Korean government thus favors a policy of the "carrot" approach, using carrots such as US diplomatic recognition, guarantees of economic assistance,

and the cancellation of military exercises, such as Team Spirit, to coax North Korea into abandoning its nuclear development program.⁵⁵

If North Korea does not respond to the offers, however, the South Korean government advocates the use of the "stick," with Team Spirit exercises continuing and economic sanctions being imposed. The use of the "carrot and stick" approach is the essence of South Korean policy. Other elements that can be used to induce North Korea to become compliant include the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan, the US, and other Western nations and the provision of economic support.⁵⁶

South Korean national interests at stake in the North Korean nuclear proliferation include national survival and security, economic prosperity, regional stability, and alliance commitments. Since national survival and security are at risk, South Korea remains adamantly opposed to any arrangement whereby North Korea is permitted to retain a nuclear capability. In this respect, the South Koreans feel that the Clinton administration acted in a hasty manner in negotiating the framework agreement that became the Geneva Accords.

In pursuing its stated policy, South Korea will be able to draw on all of the instruments of national power. In regard to the diplomatic instrument of power, South Korea can act in coordination with its ally, the US, to establish a unified position in the face of North Korean nuclear proliferation. In addition to securing US efforts to pursue diplomatic efforts to convince the PRC, the CIS, and Japan to play positive roles in the effort, South Korea should apply its own diplomatic resources to the same end.⁵⁷ South Korean economic

assistance to both the PRC and the CIS can be used as leverage to persuade these two nations to play positive roles in the resolution of the nuclear proliferation issue. South Korean economic power can be exploited to provide carrots to North Korea in the form of South Korean economic assistance (and assistance from other sources) in exchange for clearly defined North Korean actions. South Korean economic power can also be used to secure the diplomatic assistance of neighboring nations and, if required, as leverage to build support for economic sanctions and military action.

South Korea can use its informational power to build internal domestic consensus supporting the government's position on nuclear proliferation by North Korea to counteract North Korean propaganda that attempts to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US. South Korea can also use informational power to improve ties with Japan, both domestically and internationally. South Korean informational power can be used to focus international attention on North Korean actions and, if required, attempt to convince the Chinese to support economic sanctions.

South Korean military power is already used in a deterrence role, with the majority of South Korea's military forward deployed on the DMZ. Recently, however, questions have been raised concerning weaknesses in South Korean ground forces. A report generated three years ago by the US commander in Korea at the time, GEN Robert W. Riscassi, identified a number of weapons systems the US believed South Korea should have to deter an invasion from North Korea, including long-range counter artillery radar, night vision devices for aviation units, and an electronic information-gathering system.⁵⁸ In addition, a report

prepared in November by the US General Accounting Office describes a South Korean army demoralized due to low pay scales for noncommissioned officers and a lack of funding.⁵⁹ South Korea should thus focus on correcting deficiencies within its army to improve its ability to deter North Korean aggression.

Additional steps that South Korea can take to exploit its military power are increasing exercises with the US and requesting US technological assistance in the form of Patriot missiles, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). While these steps may be provocative, they will increase the deterrence value of South Korean forces.

The short term South Korean objective is to establish a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula by preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea. South Korea's long-term objective is the reunification of North and South Korea under a South Korean form of government. The most likely South Korean course of action is to seek greater coordination with the US and attempts to influence the US to adopt a more forceful carrot and stick approach with North Korea. South Korea will continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella for protection against a North Korean nuclear attack, but will advocate the adoption of a firmer stance against North Korean diplomatic blackmail and will resist US pressure to compromise with North Korea on the nuclear proliferation issue. South Korea will remain willing to pursue diplomatic opening with North Korea and will be willing to provide economic assistance, but only in exchange for definite North Korean commitments and actions indicating North Korean abandonment of its nuclear program. South Korea

will seek inspections of North Korean facilities in the short term. In the long-term, South Korea will assume a greater role in relations with North Korea and, once the nuclear proliferation issue is resolved, will seek to take the lead role in dealing with North Korea.

North Korea

Kim Jong Il is currently faced with three main problems: (1) maintaining the current North Korean system based on Juche ideology, the source of Kim Jong Il's legitimacy, (2) resolving the domestic economic problems that plague North Korea, and (3) falling behind in the conventional arms race with South Korea.⁶⁰ Kim Jong Il is faced with a fundamental dilemma: his political success or failure depends ultimately upon his ability to raise the standard of living of the North Korean people, but the economic opening to the outside world required to improve economic conditions threatens Kim Jong Il's absolute control over the North Korean people and the basis of his legitimacy--Juche ideology.⁶¹ The answer to Kim Jong Il's dilemma is nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can prove to be a significant premium in maintaining North Korea's current system, a source of national pride exploitable by Kim Jong Il. The poor North Korean economy can be justified as a necessary sacrifice to pay for nuclear weapons.⁶²

The vital North Korean interests that have led to the nuclear proliferation issue are the survival of the ruling regime, national security, and the desperate need to improve economic conditions in North Korea. The advantages that North Korea derives from possessing nuclear weapons are readily apparent. First, nuclear weapons provide Kim Jong Il a means of preserving North Korean totalitarianism and the communist

system, replacing the security guarantees formerly provided by its traditional allies. Second, nuclear weapons provide Kim Jong Il with a bargaining chip that can be used to gain economic assistance from foreign nations or, through foreign sales, can provide much needed cash to the Korean economy. Third, nuclear weapons have provided Kim Jong Il with sufficient diplomatic power to engage the US in unilateral talks, driving a wedge between the US and South Korea. Fourth, nuclear weapons provide North Korea with a means of increasing its prestige among other radical states. Fifth, nuclear weapons provide North Korea with means of countering South Korea's growth in conventional military forces that is shrinking the gap between the conventional military capability of North and South Korea. Sixth, nuclear weapons are cheaper than maintaining a large standing army, allowing North Korea to allocate more resources to improving economic conditions in the country.

The advantages North Korea gains from possessing nuclear weapons and the nature of the development of the North Korean nuclear program make it unlikely that North Korea is willing to exchange nuclear weapons for economic assistance. The history of the North Korean nuclear program emphasizes North Korea's longstanding desire to develop nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear program did not develop overnight; it came about as the result of shrewd strategic planning and years of effort and sacrifice. It is unlikely that the North Korean regime would have allocated the resources for such a long and expensive effort if the leadership had not believed that nuclear weapons would affect the balance of power with South Korea and the US. In the final assessment, it seems highly unlikely that Kim Jong Il would negotiate away an

instrument that was perceived to offer possible dominance in North Korea's struggle with South Korea, that enabled North Korea to directly engage the US and garner economic assistance, and that would guarantee the survival of both Kim Jong Il and North Korea during a period of adversity.⁶³

North Korea has been exceptionally successful in playing its nuclear card to separate the US from South Korea. The period that North Korea chose to announce its withdrawal from the NPT was carefully timed to capitalize on a potentially weak period in US-Korean relations. North Korea made the declaration of its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993, less than two months after the Clinton administration took office and less than one month after the Kim Young Sam administration took charge in South Korea.⁶⁴ Since 1974, Pyongyang had consistently called for government-to-government dialogue between itself and the US to negotiate the political and military issues of the Korean Peninsula and to convert the armistice into a peace agreement. Using the threat of nuclear proliferation, North Korea was finally successful in securing US consent to bilateral high-level talks that excluded South Korea. Ultimately, North Korea successfully used the threat of nuclear proliferation to secure economic assistance without making any significant concessions in its nuclear program.

Although North Korea maintains a large conventional force, North Korea's substantial military power is not useful in the security environment that has materialized. Changes in the former Soviet Union and China impose significant limitations on outside military support for North Korea in the event of a crisis.⁶⁵ North Korea believes that the

military balance on the peninsula is shifting in favor of South Korea. North Korea uses roughly 22 percent of its GNP for defense spending while South Korea is using approximately 3.8 percent.⁶⁶ South Korea's 3.8 percent, however, represents \$10 billion, while North Korea's 22 percent is only \$5 billion. Moreover, sustaining current levels of military spending in the face of a deteriorating economic situation is becoming more difficult for North Korea. In addition, Pyongyang has evaluated the cause of the demise of the Soviet Union and has reached the conclusion that the US induced the Soviets into excessive military spending, leading to domestic economic failure and collapse. The fear of being forced into excessive military spending, leading to economic collapse, explains North Korea's paranoid response to US military activity in South Korea, particularly the annual Team Spirit exercise.⁶⁷

In the current environment, conventional forces are unlikely to be used in a military attack. Likewise, Kim Jong Il and the North Korean leadership are pragmatic enough to recognize that North Korean use of nuclear weapons would result in the destruction of North Korea. Nuclear weapons, however, protect North Korea from the threat of attack by the US and South Korea. In addition, nuclear weapons will make it more difficult for South Korea to respond to North Korean terrorism. In effect, nuclear weapons become a shield for terrorist activities. In applying its military power, then, North Korea will use conventional forces and nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Terrorism will be used by North Korea as the main form of military power, since terrorism poses the lowest risk of escalation to war.

North Korea has no economic or informational elements of national power to speak of, with the possible exception of the UN as a forum for North Korean informational propaganda. North Korea's diplomatic power derives solely from North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, which give North Korea the ability to intimidate and bluff other nations into consenting to North Korean demands. Thus, North Korea's strength lies in its possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea's greatest weakness is its economy and lack of allies.

From Kim Jong Il's perspective, the US under the Clinton administration lacks the will, staying power, and diplomatic expertise to handle a near-term crisis on the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁸ North Korea's most likely course of action, then, is to continue to exploit the inability of the US to counter effectively the North Korean nuclear program. Kim Jong Il will continue to follow a policy of seeming conciliation followed by brinkmanship in an attempt to wring larger and larger concessions from the US while cutting South Korea out of the diplomatic actions. North Korea will continue to demonstrate a willingness to reach agreement on principles, but will not tie itself to agreements based on specific finite actions. Since nuclear weapons are the source of diplomatic leverage that provides security and economic assistance, North Korea will continue pursuing a clandestine nuclear program. Finally, recognizing its severe economic problems, North Korea will pursue a gradual economic opening following the Chinese model of economic development. North Korea's short term goal will be to ensure the survival of Kim Jong Il's regime. North Korea will use nuclear weapons to squeeze economic concessions from the US and its allies.

North Korea's mid-term goal will be drive a wedge between the US and South Korea, fracturing the alliance relationship that has prevented North Korea from attaining its long-term goal. The reunification of North and South Korea under North Korean terms, and under North Korean leadership, will remain the North Korean long-term goal.

Deductions

Based upon the analysis of all the players, the major powers, South Korea, and the US all seek a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. China and Japan are willing to pursue the use of the diplomatic instrument of power and constructive use of the economic instrument of power, but balk at the use of economic sanctions. Japan would be willing to support reluctantly UN sanctions, but without considerable diplomatic efforts and economic inducements China would not support economic sanctions. China's position on the UN Security Council will enable it to block UN sanctions, requiring a concerted effort on the part of the US, South Korea, and Japan using diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of power to sway China to support sanctions. South Korea will be hesitant to pursue excessively provocative actions using military power, fearing a disastrous war on the Korean Peninsula. The major powers do not agree on a long-term end state for the Korean Peninsula, with Russia, China, and Japan favoring a two-Koreas policy. The US and South Korea support peaceful unification as the ultimate goal. Based upon North Korean efforts to directly engage the US and drive a wedge between South Korea and the US, North Korea views US alliances in the region as the strategic center of gravity. This assessment is accurate and is in keeping with the tenets of Sun Tzu. According to Sun Tzu, the best

offensive strategy is to attack your enemy's strategy; the next best is to disrupt his alliances.⁶⁹ The US, South Korea, and Japan do not have a coherent strategy for opposing North Korean nuclear proliferation. The US strategy of deterrence and engagement borders on appeasement and appears to be based on an underlying assumption that the North Korean economy is in significant danger of collapse. Disrupting the US alliances in an effort to prevent the formulation of a coherent strategy and engage the US is an appropriate action for North Korea. The strengths of the US and its allies in the region are diplomatic, economic, and informational power. Although the US possesses significant military power, the fear of provoking North Korea and concerns about initiating a second Korean War make the use of military power beyond a minimal deterrent level an unattractive option. Thus, the lack of resolve to use military power is a weakness for the US and its allies.

The North Korean strategic center of gravity is the support of the North Korean people for Kim Jong Il's government. To maintain his legitimacy, Kim Jong Il must continue to adhere to and promulgate his father's Juche ideology while simultaneously improving the North Korean economy. The North Korean economy is Kim Jong Il's greatest challenge; a failure by Kim Jong Il to improve economic conditions in North Korea threatens to turn the North Korean people against him. North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons program are the solution to Kim Jong Il's dilemma, providing a mechanism for improving the North Korean economy without the appearance of undue reliance on outside assistance.

Nuclear weapons are the sole source of North Korea's diplomatic power, providing North Korea the ability to directly engage the US and wrest economic assistance from the US and its allies. Nuclear weapons allow North Korea to possess a military power and influence exceeding that offered by its conventional military forces alone. Nuclear weapons will allow North Korea to reduce conventional force costs by providing a cheap substitute for conventional forces (nuclear technology), enabling Kim Jong Il to decrease military expenditures and allocate greater portions of the GNP to economic development. In addition, nuclear weapons allow North Korea to use terrorism as a military option.

Nuclear weapons provide Kim Jong Il with the capability to protect his strategic center of gravity. North Korea's strengths are its diplomatic and military elements of power. North Korea's weaknesses are its economic and informational elements of power. North Korea's lack of regional allies willing to provide significant assistance is a weakness that can be exploited by the US.

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CHAPTER 4

SCENARIOS AND ANALYSIS OF US COURSES OF ACTION

The two scenarios examined here are considered the most likely based on the analysis of the relevant actors and their interests, capabilities, limitations, and most likely courses of action. The first scenario, Scenario A, is an intransigent North Korea pursuing a continual cycle of conciliation and brinkmanship. North Korea employs the threat of nuclear weapons as an all-purpose instrument of diplomacy to ensure the survival of Kim Jong Il and his regime while simultaneously trying to wring the maximum amount of economic concessions from the US and its allies. North Korea continues to pursue unilateral talks with the US and pursues a clandestine program to continue the development of nuclear weapons. Scenario B is a limited economic opening of North Korea following the Chinese model. Due to a worsening economic situation, North Korea actively seeks limited foreign investment while seeking to retain its nuclear weapons and nuclear program. North Korea, however, will agree to abide by the provisions of the NPT and agree to IAEA inspections provided sufficient economic incentives and security guarantees are provided by the US and its allies. Scenario A, conciliation and brinkmanship, is considered the worst-case scenario in terms of US interests and objectives.

A range of US courses of action (policy options) are proposed and evaluated for each of the two scenarios. The desired end state from

a US perspective is a nuclear-free reunited Korean Peninsula under a democratic system of government. The measure of success is the abandonment of nuclear weapons by North Korea, North Korean compliance with the NPT, and North Korean acceptance of IAEA inspections. In both scenarios, the current US policy (engagement and enlargement within the framework of the Geneva Accords and using methods short of conflict) is presented as Course of Action 1. From the analysis of US interests and elements of power, the interests and elements of power of the other relevant actors, and the strengths and weaknesses of North Korea, two additional courses of action have been developed for each scenario. The courses of action, which are distinguished primarily by the elements of power employed to achieve US objectives, are not mutually exclusive. The courses of action can be implemented either separately or in combination, either concurrently or in sequence, providing greater flexibility in achieving the desired end state.

Scenario A: An Intransigent North Korea Pursuing a Continual Cycle of Conciliation and Brinkmanship

Course of Action 1: Engagement and Enlargement Using Diplomatic and Economic Power

The US will continue its official policy of engagement and enlargement, pursuing unilateral high-level talks with North Korea and working to implement the framework of the Geneva Accords. This course of action assumes no congressional interference with the provisions of the Geneva Accords. In the Geneva Accords, North Korea promised to dismantle in 9 to 10 years its two old graphite reactors and to stop work on two other reactors, promised to permit inspections of nuclear

sites, and purportedly committed to send 8,000 spent fuel rods laden with plutonium out of the country to have the plutonium reprocessed when the new reactors provided under the accord are nearing completion.

Specifically, the US will take the following actions:

1. In conjunction with its allies provide North Korea with: two new 1,000-megawatt light-water reactors that will take 9 or 10 years to complete; 50,000 tons a month of free oil until the new reactors come on line; upgrade North Korea's power grid.

2. End existing trade restrictions.

3. Establish bilateral diplomatic relations with North Korea.

4. Pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

5. Persuade the UN to give North Korea special dispensation to delay real inspections of nuclear facilities.¹

Course of Action 2: Increased Use of Diplomatic, Economic, and Informational Power

The US will actively encourage a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue by developing a coherent policy in conjunction with its allies and increasing the use of diplomatic, economic, and informational power. Specifically, the US will take the following actions:

1. Synchronize its policies with South Korea to prevent North Korea from using brinkmanship on the Korean Peninsula as a pressure tactic against US diplomacy.

2. Include South Korean and Japanese incentives in coordination with US incentives in exchange for specific actions on the part of North Korea.

(a) In Phase I, the US will exchange liaison officers, lift the economic embargo, provide food aid, coordinate a first round of South Korean investment and trade, and coordinate the exchange of liaison officers between North Korea and Japan in exchange for North Korean compliance with the NPT, North Korean agreement to IAEA inspections, and a freeze in construction of nuclear facilities.

(b) In Phase II, the US and Japan would normalize relations with North Korea in exchange for conventional arms reductions (commensurate with South Korean arms reductions).

(c) In Phase III, the US and its allies would offer major infrastructure projects and aid packages in exchange for North-South cross-recognition and further reductions by both sides (including the US) of conventional forces.

3. Use economic and informational power, in conjunction with Japan and South Korea, to get China involved as a player in the process, using Chinese influence to facilitate agreement on specific US and allied incentives in exchange for specific North Korean actions.

Course of Action 3: Use of Diplomatic, Economic, Informational, and Military Power

The US will apply diplomatic, economic, informational, and military power in a carrot and stick approach, pressuring North Korea to abide by the NPT and to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Within the framework of the Geneva Accords, the US will respond to North Korean attempts to pressure the US through brinkmanship on the Korean Peninsula by the following means:

1. Employ US, South Korean, and Japanese economic power to influence Beijing to use its influence with North Korea and, if Beijing's efforts are unsuccessful, to secure PRC support for economic sanctions.

2. Introduce a UN resolution imposing economic sanctions on North Korea.

3. If unsuccessful with UN sanctions, persuade Japan, South Korea, and Russia to impose economic sanctions on North Korea.

4. Conduct joint military exercises with South Korea and increase naval presence off the coast of the Korean Peninsula to place a continuous strain on the North Korean economy.

5. Declare intentions to honor bilateral treaties with South Korea and Japan, but disavow any intention to use offensive action against North Korea.

6. Use informational power to emphasize the intransigence of North Korea and build an international consensus condemning North Korean actions.

Scenario B: Limited North Korea Opening with North Korea Seeking to Retain Nuclear Weapons But Open To Negotiation Due To Worsening Economic Conditions

Course of Action 1: Engagement and Enlargement Using Diplomatic and Economic Power

The US will continue its official policy of engagement and enlargement, pursuing unilateral high-level talks with North Korea and working to implement the framework of the Geneva Accords. This course of action assumes no congressional interference with the provisions of the Geneva Accords. In the Geneva Accords, North Korea promised to

dismantle in 9 to 10 years its two old graphite reactors and to stop work on two other reactors, promised to permit inspections of nuclear sites, and purportedly committed to send 8,000 spent fuel rods laden with plutonium out of the country to have the plutonium reprocessed when the new reactors provided under the accord are nearing completion.

Specifically, the US will take the following actions:

1. In conjunction with its allies provide North Korea with two new 1,000-megawatt light-water reactors (that will take 9 or 10 years to complete), 50,000 tons a month of free oil (until the new reactors come on line), and upgrade North Korea's power grid.
2. End existing trade restrictions.
3. Establish bilateral diplomatic relations with North Korea.
4. Pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.
5. Persuade the UN to give North Korea special dispensation to delay real inspections of nuclear facilities.²

Course of Action 2: Increased Use of Diplomatic, Economic, and Informational Power

The US will apply diplomatic, economic, and informational power in an effort to foster peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue. Specifically, the US will take the following actions:

1. Reject unilateral, high-level talks with North Korea, insisting on negotiations between the North Korea on one side and the US-South Korea on the other.
2. Strengthen bilateral security arrangements with Japan and South Korea through increased diplomatic consultations.

3. Apply diplomatic power to persuade the CIS and China to exercise their influence with North Korea in an effort to persuade North Korea to be more flexible in negotiations.

4. Introduce a UN resolution calling for North Korea to comply with the NPT and accept IAEA inspections.

5. In conjunction with Japan and South Korea, offer an exchange of liaison officers between all three nations and North Korea.

6. Offer food aid in exchange for the reprocessing of the 8,000 plutonium laden fuel rods in a foreign nation outside North Korea.

7. Use informational power to emphasize the intransigence of North Korea and build an international consensus condemning North Korean nuclear proliferation.

Course of Action 3: Increased Use of Diplomatic, Economic, Informational, and Military Power

The US will use increased diplomatic, economic, informational, and military power to increase pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear proliferation efforts. Specifically, the US will take the following actions:

1. Consult with Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing on the range of possible economic sanctions against North Korea. Build consensus for the suspension of investment and trade activities with North Korea by these four nations.

2. Open dialogue in the UN Security Council to focus world attention on the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Urge the UN Security Council to establish a fixed end date for North Korean

compliance with the NPT, after which the UN should implement economic sanctions.

4. Offer to upgrade South Korean defenses with Patriot missile batteries, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and JSTARS (capable of monitoring North Korean troop movements).

5. Seek Japanese cooperation in severing Japanese-North Korean trade and preventing asset transfers from Japan to North Korea.

6. Reiterate US commitment to the defense of regional allies.

7. Use informational power to emphasize the intransigence of North Korea, to build an international consensus condemning North Korean actions, and to highlight the military preparedness of the US and its allies.

Evaluation of US Courses of Action

Scenario A

Course of Action 1 commits the US to a long-term solution to the nuclear proliferation issue, but it minimizes the ability of the US to achieve an end state supportive of US interests and objectives on the Korean Peninsula. The establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations will improve communication and the end of trade restrictions will allow for a limited economic opening of North Korea. No restrictions have been placed on the free oil the US is providing North Korea and the US can exercise no control once the oil is in North Korean hands, meaning the oil could be redirected for military use. The greatest problem with Course of Action 1 is that the US receives North Korean promises to "freeze" old reactors and to permit future inspections, but there is no

way of guaranteeing that North Korea will not simply break its promises as it has in the past.

Analyzed in terms of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability (see Appendix for definitions), Course of Action 1 is neither feasible nor acceptable, but it is suitable. Congress and the American people will be reluctant to accept a policy of appeasement. Course of Action 1 will promote US interests and objectives. The action can be accomplished given the means available, but there are no provisions for tying US incentives to reciprocal North Korean actions designed to reverse North Korea's nuclear proliferation. Course of Action 1 may not be acceptable to the American people. The costs are excessive and the benefits seem to be minimal. Course of Action 1 is appeasement, offering North Korea a carrot but postponing by 5 to 10 years any North Korean action required in exchange for the carrot.

Course of Action 2 is suitable, feasible, and acceptable. By coordinating US efforts and the efforts of allies in the region and setting specific incentives and corresponding North Korean actions, Course of Action 2 will lead to the desired effect. Course of Action 2 does not give the North Koreans something for nothing. Course of Action 2 will be expensive, but the cost is acceptable given the ultimate objective of North Korean compliance with the NPT.

Course of Action 3 is suitable, acceptable, and feasible. Course of Action 3 will protect and foster US regional alliance relationships. Course of Action 3 includes the strengthening of South Korea with offensive and defensive weapons and naval demonstrations off the coast of the Korean Peninsula. These actions may prove provocative

to North Korea, but they will be acceptable to the American people. Course of Action 3 is feasible; the resources are adequate to execute the option.

Comparing Courses of Action 2 and 3, Course of Action 2 provides a more structured framework for tying incentives to North Korean actions. Course of Action 3, however, contains a military option that may be necessary to apply pressure to North Korea. In Scenario A, Course of Action 2 and Course of Action 3 should be applied sequentially.

Scenario B

Course of Action 1 is the same in both Scenario A and Scenario B. As previously stated, Course of Action 1 is neither feasible nor acceptable. The majority of the American people and Congress are unlikely to support a course of action that is, in essence, appeasement, sacrificing US resources in exchange for some future action on the part of North Korea based on a promise that North Korea may not honor. The resources are not adequate to achieve the end. North Korea is unlikely to succumb to limited diplomatic and economic incentives in exchange for its nuclear weapons, particularly since North Korea has been so successful in wringing concessions from the US.

Course of Action 2 is feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Course of Action 2 protects the US strategic center of gravity, US alliance relationships, by countering North Korean efforts to drive a wedge between North and South Korea and by strengthening relationships with both South Korea and Japan. Course of Action 2 attempts to use Chinese and Russian influence with North Korea and draws on the strength

of the UN. Course of Action 2 stops short of seeking UN sanctions, but given Chinese resistance to UN sanctions it may represent the best possible result.

Course of Action 3 is feasible, acceptable and suitable. Course of Action 3 optimizes the use of diplomatic, economic, and informational power and uses military power in a manner that should not be viewed as overly provocative by North Korea, but that improves the security of South Korea. Course of Action 3 seeks UN establishment of a deadline for North Korean compliance with the NPT, an action that China may be amenable to, and also provides for economic sanctions in the event that the compliance deadline passes.

Comparing Course of Action 2 and Course of Action 3, Course of Action 3 makes the best use of US and allied elements of power and best capitalizes on the strengths of the US, China, Japan, and the CIS. In Scenario B, Course of Action 3 best supports the achievement of US objectives in the region.

Recommended Course of Action

Scenario A most closely approximates the current state of relations between the US and North Korea. Despite economic conditions in North Korea, Kim Jong Il will continue to control the North Korean people and will pursue a cycle of conciliation and brinkmanship, attempting to gain concessions from the US and South Korea by using nuclear weapons to play on fears of a second Korean War. In the absence of a coordinated strategy and firm resolve on the part of the US and its allies, Kim Jong Il will continue to get his way, reinforcing his behavior and undermining the relationship between the US and South

Korea. In order to break the cycle of conciliation and brinkmanship, the US should sequentially apply Course of Action 2 and Course of Action 3 as outlined for Scenario A, integrating the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements of power of the US and its allies to modify North Korean behavior.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to analyze the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea. The methodology used was the Strategic Estimate Process, a form of the rational actor model. In applying the Strategic Estimate Process, the assumption was made that Kim Jong Il would dictate the North Korean response to US foreign policy. An examination of Kim Jong Il's background and the domestic influences Kim Jong Il faces supports this assumption. In answering the primary research question, five subordinate research questions were identified and examined. The five subordinate research questions provided the input necessary to answer the primary research question.

Subordinate Research Questions

What preparation did Kim Jong Il receive to groom him for his leadership role?

Kim Jong Il, as the eldest son of Kim Il Sung, received the finest education available in North Korea. Entering government service in 1963, for the next 31 years Kim Jong Il received positions of increasing responsibility in the North Korean government. Selected as the successor to Kim Il Sung in 1972, Kim Jong Il was groomed for the leadership of North Korea for almost 22 years. During this time, Kim

Jong Il was mentored not only by his father, Kim Il Sung, but also by experienced senior cadre within the North Korean Communist Party. Despite several miscalculations along the way, most notably his involvement with the Panmunjom ax-murders in 1976, Kim Jong Il was not found wanting by his father. Kim Il Sung was a shrewd and cunning individual who survived the dangerous power politics of the communist world for over 40 years. Kim Il Sung would not have permitted an unqualified or incapable leader to succeed him, particularly since Kim Il Sung was relying on his successor to perpetuate the Kim Il Sung legend and ideology.

In preparation for his leadership role, Kim Jong Il was the object of a carefully orchestrated media build up. Domestic opposition to his succession was eliminated and his supporters and key family members were placed in positions where they would be able to support Kim Jong Il's ultimate succession. Since 1980, Kim Jong Il has been the second most powerful man in North Korea, enjoying the status of the crown prince of North Korea. For over a year before the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il exercised the national command authority of North Korea. Kim Jong Il was carefully groomed for his leadership role. His training exceeds that of many world leaders; his capability and drive should not be underestimated.

What are the domestic pressures facing Kim Jong Il?

Kim Jong Il's power base is comprised of four elements: the KWP, the military, the graduates of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute (a school for children of the elite members of the KWP), and members of

the Three Revolutionary Teams. Of these four elements, the Three Revolutionary Teams are the strongest element of Kim Jong Il's power.

Potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership include older cadres who were shunted aside to make way for Kim Jong Il's generation, members of the KWP who may oppose Kim Jong Il based on differences over the best direction for the country to follow, members of the People's Armed Forces opposed to Kim Jong Il, family rivals, intellectuals, and members of the disenchanted and disenfranchised masses. The biggest challenge facing Kim Jong Il, however, is the economy. Unable to draw on support from China or Russia as in the past, Kim Jong Il faces alone an economy that has shrunk almost 20 percent in the last four years. Food shortages, energy shortages, and material shortages plague the North Korean economy. The economy is thus Kim Jong Il's primary domestic challenge. Kim Jong Il's political success or failure depends ultimately upon his ability to raise the standard of living of the North Korean people, making the economy his number one priority.

What are Kim Jong Il's Interests and Objectives?

Kim Jong Il is faced with three main problems: (1) maintaining the North Korean system based on Juche ideology, the source of Kim Jong Il's legitimacy, (2) resolving the domestic economic problems that plague North Korea, and (3) falling behind in the conventional arms race with South Korea. Isolated from the rest of the world and without strong allies willing to support North Korea with economic subsidies, Kim Jong Il faces a difficult situation. In this difficult position, Kim Jong Il's interests are the survival of his regime, national security, and the need to improve economic conditions in North Korea.

Kim Jong Il's objectives will be to retain his nuclear weapons, to use his nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to wring economic concessions out of the US and its allies, to seek a limited economic opening along the Chinese model, and to engage the US in direct talks as a means of driving a wedge between South Korea and the US. Kim Jong Il will seek to retain nuclear weapons in order to facilitate the achievement of his objectives.

What is current US foreign policy towards North Korea?

Current US foreign policy towards North Korea is to pursue a strategy of enlargement and engagement, using diplomatic and economic power to persuade North Korea that its best interest is to give up its nuclear weapons program. The US seeks a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and is willing to move toward increased political and economic relations with North Korea if North Korea lives up to its obligations under the NPT and agrees to IAEA inspections.

As US foreign policy has been developed in the Geneva Accords, however, the US is following a policy that borders on appeasement. The US has committed to a framework agreement that provides North Korea with significant incentives, but that requires nothing beyond North Korean promises in return. Given the importance of nuclear weapons to Kim Jong Il, it is doubtful that current US foreign policy will be effective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear program.

What is Kim Jong Il's likely response to current US foreign policy towards North Korea?

Kim Jong Il will view US foreign policy as an attempt at appeasement, which he will interpret as a sign of US weakness. Kim Jong

Il already perceives that the US under the Clinton administration lacks the will, staying power, and diplomatic expertise to handle a near-term crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Il has observed US actions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti and he will have deduced from these instances that he can use the threat of nuclear weapons to intimidate the US into making concessions. Kim Jong Il's most likely course of action is to continue to play upon the US fear of nuclear proliferation and a second Korean War, and he will pursue a strategy that alternates between conciliation and brinkmanship, wringing the maximum possible economic concessions out of the US and its allies.

Kim Jong Il will play his nuclear card for all it is worth, exploiting the Western perception that he is unstable and unpredictable. Capitalizing on the Geneva Accords, Kim Jong Il will continue to pursue a clandestine nuclear program to further develop his nuclear capability. If backed into a corner, Kim Jong Il will resort to terrorism to extricate himself, capitalizing on and lending fuller credence to his dangerous, unpredictable, irrational aura. Kim Jong Il will use his nuclear weapons as a shield to prevent reprisals for his terrorist actions.

Primary Research Question

The primary research question this thesis sought to answer is: What are the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il for US foreign policy towards North Korea? Kim Jong Il has been extensively trained for his leadership role. Kim Jong Il faces no significant domestic opposition, so he is free to chart his own course provided that he continues to support the Juche ideology established by

his father and that he makes improvements in the North Korean economic situation. Despite opinions and assessments to the contrary, Kim Jong Il is a rational actor. While his actions may not have always conformed to Western concepts of morality, he has always used the most efficient means to get what he wants. Kim Jong Il should not be underestimated. He is a formidable opponent who has carefully assessed US resolve and capabilities. Precipitating the nuclear proliferation crisis at a well chosen time, Kim Jong Il has forced the US to react to North Korean actions, thus seizing the initiative in the diplomatic arena.

There are five conclusions that can be drawn concerning Kim Jong Il's future conduct. First, Kim Jong Il will not give up his nuclear weapons or nuclear program; he will clandestinely pursue the perfection of nuclear weapons while repeatedly drawing the US to the brink of war. Second, Kim Jong Il will use nuclear weapons to wring the maximum concessions from the US and its allies, undermining US leadership and separating the US from South Korea. Third, Kim Jong Il will use his nuclear capability to secure the survival of his regime and to control the rate of North Korea's limited economic opening along the Chinese model. Fourth, Kim Jong Il will pursue his strategy over an extended period, seeking to wear down the US and break the US national will to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. Fifth, Kim Jong Il will seek to use nuclear weapons to facilitate the ultimate unification of Korea on North Korean terms, resorting to terrorism, intimidation, and nuclear blackmail to achieve his desired end state.

Kim Jong Il has been able to exploit the differences between the US and its regional allies. Kim Jong Il, however, is a rational actor.

Faced with firm resolve by the US and its allies, Kim Jong Il will be forced to choose between the ultimate failure of his regime or modifying his behavior to acquire the economic assistance needed to remain in power. Nuclear weapons are the means by which Kim Jong Il will seek to improve economic conditions in North Korea, improve his standing with the North Korean military, and thus secure the survival of his regime. Nuclear weapons are Kim Jong Il's primary source of diplomatic power. The importance of nuclear weapons to Kim Jong Il makes it highly unlikely that he will completely abandon nuclear weapons or trade nuclear weapons for economic assistance. Kim Jong Il's survival is intimately linked with North Korea's nuclear capability. It will require a supreme effort by the US and its regional allies to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. The strategic implications of Kim Jong Il's succession for US foreign policy towards North Korea are: (1) the US must develop a unified strategy with South Korea and Japan for countering North Korean nuclear proliferation, (2) the US must counter North Korean brinkmanship by clarifying US resolve, (3) the US must enhance military capabilities to the point where Kim Jong Il will view the use of North Korean nuclear weapons or conventional military forces as an unacceptable alternative, (4) the US and its allies must use diplomatic, economic, and informational power to persuade the CIS and China to use their influence to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation, (5) the US must build consensus in the UN for economic sanctions against North Korea, (6) the US and its allies must link economic assistance to specific North Korean action, and (7) the US must

abandon its short-term perspective and adopt a long-term approach towards countering North Korean nuclear proliferation.

The strategic implications of Kim Jong Il's succession necessitate specific actions by the US and its allies. The US must develop a unified strategy with South Korea and Japan for countering North Korean nuclear proliferation. Kim Jong Il is manipulating the lack of a unified strategy on the part of the US and its regional allies to undermine US efforts to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. Differences in the US and South Korean approach to countering North Korean nuclear proliferation have been highlighted by North Korea's refusal to accept South Korea reactors on security and technical grounds. Washington insists that North Korea understood that the reactors would be provided by South Korea under the Geneva Accords and insists that North Korea accept the South Korean reactors. Privately, however, State Department officials are prepared to allow North Korea a face-saving option by packaging the reactors in a way that would obscure South Korea's involvement.¹ Seoul, however, remains adamant on a high-profile, lead role in the project and says that it is ready to declare the agreement a failure and seek economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang does not yield.²

The US, South Korea, and Japan have clearly not developed a unified strategy and have failed to reach agreement on ends, ways, and means for achieving the desired strategic end state. The failure to develop a unified strategy has allowed Kim Jong Il to pursue a strategy designed to separate the US from its allies. The first step the US must take is to develop a unified, coherent strategy with South Korea and

Japan that will return the initiative to the US and its regional allies. Giving in to North Korean demands for reactors from a source other than South Korea will further undermine US leadership in the region and reinforce Kim Jong Il's perception of the US as a paper tiger. If the US and South Korea, as part of a new unified strategy, agree to offer North Korea a face-saving alternative to South Korean reactors, the US and South Korea should require a specific North Korean action in exchange.

The US must counter North Korean brinkmanship by clarifying US resolve to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. Although President Clinton has publicly expressed US resolve, US concessions have undermined US credibility. US negotiators have allowed North Korea to stall talks, defy and frustrate inspections, and violate agreements.³ Experienced South Korean negotiators have told the US repeatedly that North Korea views concessions as weakness and reacts favorably only to clarity of intent backed by power.⁴ The US must remove ambiguity from its actions and clarify its intent by restating US resolve and ensuring that US verbal pronouncements are supported by the actions of the US and its regional allies.

An integral part of demonstrating US and South Korean resolve is to demonstrate sufficient military power to back up the stated intent. The posture of the South Korean military should be upgraded with additional Patriot missile batteries, JSTARS, and Apache helicopters. These are initial actions that can be taken to demonstrate US resolve and to influence Kim Jong Il's perception of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of using military power to achieve his

desired end state. Simultaneously, South Korea can take actions to enhance its ability to counter North Korean terrorist activities. The goal is to convince Kim Jong Il that the use of military power is not a viable option, forcing him to abandon military posturing and pursue diplomatic efforts to secure the economic assistance North Korea needs.

Although China and the CIS both have an interest in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea, China and the CIS have not contributed to US effort to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. While it is neither possible nor desirable to force China and the CIS and play a positive role in countering North Korea, it is possible to use diplomatic, economic, and informational power to persuade China and the CIS to use their influence with North Korea. The US, South Korea, and Japan can coordinate the use of their respective economic elements of power to persuade China and the CIS to influence North Korea to assume a more conciliatory stance and abandon nuclear proliferation efforts. Diplomatic efforts to influence China and the CIS should be pursued in the UN, in bilateral and unilateral consultations, and in regional forums. Informational power must be used to support economic and diplomatic efforts to persuade China and the CIS to play more positive roles in countering North Korean nuclear proliferation.

The US and its allies must pursue efforts to build consensus in the UN for economic sanctions against North Korea, establishing a fixed date for North Korean compliance with the NPT, after which time economic sanctions will become automatic. Attempting to establish a consensus on economic sanctions will increase pressure on North Korea. Although

North Korea has stated that it views economic sanctions as an act of war, efforts to build a consensus on economic sanctions and a UN vote in support of economic sanctions will increase pressure on North Korea and potentially make North Korea more amenable to diplomatic overtures. Economic sanctions coupled with an improved military posture in South Korea will demonstrate both the resolve of the US and its allies and galvanize world opinion against North Korean nuclear proliferation. Kim Jong Il, as a rational actor, will recognize that he cannot fight the world alone. Likewise, assuming an even more isolated position will only exacerbate the economic conditions that threaten, in time, to undermine the survival of Kim Jong Il's regime. Kim Jong Il will have to seek a diplomatic solution or risk the ultimate downfall of his regime through worsening economic conditions.

The US and its allies must link economic assistance to specific North Korean actions as part of a unified strategy to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. The Geneva Accords in essence rewarded North Korea for acquiring nuclear weapons. The Geneva Accords, while potentially freezing the North Korean nuclear program at current levels (assuming North Korea complies with the provisions of the Geneva Accords), postponed any efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear status for 5 years. Under the Geneva Accords, North Korea was provided fuel in the form of heavy oil on a monthly basis. The influx of heavy oil into North Korea has allowed North Korea to divert other types of oil from domestic to military use, enabling North Korea to conduct its most vigorous winter military exercise in recent years, an exercise offensive in nature and designed to practice blitzkrieg attacks on South Korea.⁵

The heavy oil provided under the Geneva Accords has enabled Kim Jong Il to improve his standing with the army and provided additional energy for economic activities. By conducting offensive military exercises, Kim Jong Il has demonstrated that his actions have not compromised North Korean Juche ideology. In short, Kim Jong Il has outmaneuvered the US and South Korea and enhanced his image in North Korea. Future economic assistance must be linked to specific North Korean actions. Anything less risks significantly damaging US credibility and leadership in the region.

Finally, the US must abandon its short term perspective and adopt a long-term approach towards countering North Korean nuclear proliferation. Time is on the side of the US and its allies. Kim Jong Il must pursue an economic opening. While Kim Jong Il will try to pursue a gradual opening along the Chinese model, he must improve the economic conditions in his country or face the eventual loss of support of the North Korean people and the end of his regime. US actions to date have reflected a short-term focus, seeking to defuse tensions over North Korean nuclear proliferation, but at the cost of US credibility. Nuclear weapons are vital to Kim Jong Il's survival and the economic well-being of the country. As the sole source of North Korean diplomatic power, Kim Jong Il will not abandon his nuclear program. Countering North Korean nuclear proliferation will be a long-term process, requiring a considerable effort by the US and its allies.

Conclusion

US efforts at countering North Korean nuclear proliferation have relied on the proposition that economic incentives would be persuasive

in changing North Korean behavior and bringing North Korea into a more normal relationship with the world and its neighbors.⁶ US efforts have been hampered, however, by a failure to develop a unified strategy in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, a failure to clearly establish intent by both words and actions, and a failure to nullify North Korean brinkmanship by making North Korean use of military force an unacceptable option for Kim Jong Il. The US focus on economic incentives reflects a strategy that does not integrate all of the elements of national power to influence North Korea to change its behavior. Rarely in an authoritarian system do economic goals take precedence over political goals. This is particularly true in the case of North Korea, where the primary political goal is the perpetuation of the Kim Jong Il regime.⁷

Kim Jong Il is a rational actor facing a fundamental dilemma; his legitimacy is based upon his role as the proponent of his father's legacy and the guardian of Juche ideology, but the survival of his regime requires at the minimum a gradual economic opening to the outside world. Nuclear weapons provide Kim Jong Il the capacity to wring concessions from the US and its allies, thus facilitating improved economic conditions and providing a mechanism to ensure the survival of the regime. While North Korea can continue to wrest concessions from the US and its allies, there is no incentive for Kim Jong Il to enter into a more normal relationship with the rest of the world.

Countering North Korean nuclear proliferation will require the US and its allies to develop and resolutely pursue a unified strategy using US and allied diplomatic, economic, informational, and military

instruments of power. The US must accept its responsibilities as a global leader and effectively use of its resources to counter North Korean nuclear proliferation. The US developed a strategy that won the Cold War. Now is the time to develop a strategy that will safeguard vital US interests in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era.

Endnotes

¹Steve Glain, "South Korea's Kim Knows His Audience," The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1995, A8.

²Steve Glain, "South Korea's Kim Knows His Audience," A8.

³James Lilley, "Get Tough With North Korea," The Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1994, A14.

⁴Lilley, A14.

⁵Barbara Opall, "U.S. Oil Spurs North Korean Exercises," Army Times, 27 March 1995, 20.

⁶Robert G. Rich, Jr., Korea and the Challenges of the Post-Cold War Period, (Washington D.C.: Korea Economic Institute of America, 1995), 8.

⁷Rich, 9.

APPENDIX

A USER'S GUIDE TO THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

by

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With apologies to Dr. Steve Metz and LTC Ted Davis
upon whose earlier work this is based

1. Introduction

With the publication of *Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations*, dated 9 September 1993, the military community has for the first time doctrine for the conduct of strategic analysis. However, that doctrine has proved more useful as a format than a methodology for the conduct of the requisite analysis needed to "fill in the blanks." Therefore, this "user's guide" bridges the gap and provides a reference useful for the conduct of strategic analysis. This guide is based on the cumulative experience, complaints, and suggestions of DJCO instructors and former CGSC students. The Joint Pub 3-0 strategic estimate is intended to be a doctrinally approved process. This guide is a malleable tool. Every user should tailor it according to his/her personal analytic style and needs.

2. Mission

a. Mission analysis

In many instances higher authorities provide the problem and assumptions. The problem may be as narrow as the conduct of military operations in a country or as broad as the national security strategy for a CINC's AOR. The first step in mission analysis is to obtain the maximum clarity on the problem and assumptions from higher authorities. Sometimes clarification can be found in documents, such as the NSS, NMS, JSCP, etc. At other times you must pursue clarification through messages, teleconferences, liaison, etc.

Collecting information is a vital step. In fact, the quality of strategic recommendations often depends on the depth and breadth of information the analyst brings to bear on the problem. The more quickly a strategist masters the use of his sources, whether in a library or elsewhere, the better. Government publications such as the *Department of State Bulletin* and *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* can be helpful. At other times the strategist must rely on more abstract sources such as legal precedents, written policy papers, or political speeches such as Bush's Aspen speech. If the strategic problem includes the possibility of conflict, ensure you determine conflict termination objectives.

Next identify relevant U.S. interests. Then determine how they should be rank ordered. The interests can be usually be found in the

relevant strategy documents, such as the NSS and the NMS. However these documents rarely tell the strategist which are relevant to the problem for which the strategic estimate is being done. Nor do these documents prioritize the interests. If higher authorities, as is often the case, do not do this for you, then the strategist completing the estimate must rank order the relevant interests. Often higher political authorities may not explicitly state all relevant interests or objectives. If this is the case the strategist must imply interests, much as the tactician implies tasks. When the relevant interests are rank ordered the strategist must identify if there are any conflicts or contradictions among U.S. interests. It is important to recognize that not all interests can be pursued simultaneously or that pursuit of one may lead to not accomplishing another; thus the importance to rank ordering the interests and objectives relevant to the particular problem at hand.

Identify any assumptions that need to be made. Assumptions obviously weaken the foundation for analysis and recommendations. For our purposes think of assumptions as hypothetical information used in place of required acts which are not available. Thus as a general rule, **the fewer the number of assumptions, the more solid the analysis and recommendations.** Differentiate between essential assumptions and nonessential assumptions. If the assumption is vital for completing the analysis, state it in the mission analysis. If not, hold it for course of action analysis.

Once all the information the strategist can **gather in the time available** is on hand, the strategist determines specified and implied tasks and their priorities. These tasks must be in support of known or assumed U.S. interests, objectives, policies, commitments, or programs. From this the strategist can then write the mission statement.

b. Mission Statement

State the mission in terms of **who** is going to do **what**, **when** they are going to do it, **where** it is to be done and most importantly **why** it is to be accomplished. Frame the why in terms of what interests and objectives the mission is to achieve.

3. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

a. Situation Analysis

(1) Geostrategic Context

(a) Domestic and International context. You have already identified U.S. interests and objectives. What remains for the domestic context is to examine domestic influences on your mission, such as national will, legal constraints, position of Congress, resource constraints, etc. Time permitting, this would include a full analysis of the sources of U.S. power.

In analyzing the international context, the strategist needs to identify the other actors, their interests and objectives. Actors include both state and non-state actors. Once the actors and their interests have been identified, the strategist must determine which are relevant to the problem at hand. To distinguish relevancy, the strategist must ask three questions. Does the actor have an interest in the outcome? Does the actor have the power to influence the outcome? Will the actor likely use power to influence the outcome? Once this is done, you must identify actors with interests which complement or

conflict with those of the United States. If an actor's interests are predominantly complementary with those of the U.S. analyze it as part of the friendly situation. If an actor's interests are predominantly conflicting with those of the U.S. analyze it as part of the enemy situation.

(b) Characteristics of the operational area.

Essentially this is an analysis of the sources of power of all the actors you identified as the relevant actors except for the United States. If you are expecting to conduct military operations, be sure to include the military geography of the area of operations. The focus is on the strategic and operational aspects and the analyst must exercise care that he/she does not conduct a tactical terrain analysis.

(2) Analysis of the Enemy. Assuming the strategic analyst uses Joint Pub 3-0 outline as a format, this paragraph could be a distillation of a separate, exhaustive intelligence summary. This should include an assessment of the relative power to influence the situation of all actors identified as having predominantly conflicting interests with the U.S. and complementary interests with each other. In cases in which conflict is likely, the use of the term enemy is appropriate. In cases where conflict is unlikely, it may prove more accurate to use the term potential adversary. The intent is to identify which instruments of power available to the enemy/potential adversary are strengths and which are weaknesses. This analysis must also include the most likely courses of action they may adopt. Discerning the likely courses of action of potential adversaries is tough. That requires the strategist to think like others, which requires an understanding of culture, values, history, and the like. Obviously, the deeper the understanding, the better the analysis. In the real-world strategic analysis, learning to understand others requires consultation with regional experts, such as FAOs, intelligence analysts, political advisors, economists, etc. if they are available. It may be useful to build a matrix with the actors listed down the left side and the following categories for each actor: Interests/Intent, power available, strengths, weaknesses, and likely COA. This can provide a "snapshot" of many actors. A shell for the matrix is below:

Interests and Capabilities

Actor Interests/Intent	Power Available	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
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It may further prove useful to analyze the military forces available to the enemy/potential adversary. A matrix which may be used for that purpose is shown below:

Forces Available

Actor	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Maritime	Special Ops	Other Forces
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One outcome of this analysis is identification of strategic and operational centers of gravity.

(3) **Friendly Situation.** This should include an assessment of the relative power to influence the situation of all actors identified as having predominantly complementary interests with the U.S. The intent is to identify which instruments of power available to the friendly situation are strengths and which are weaknesses, as well as strategic and operational centers of gravity. This analysis should develop which instruments of power are available to the U.S. and its allies/potential allies to use to protect and/or promote its interests and objectives. The strategist should realize from his analysis of interests and objectives that potential allies may have complementary interests but that they will in all likelihood not be identical. That will lead allies to prefer courses of action not necessarily identical to the preferred U.S. course of action. A matrix similar to that for the analysis of the enemy may also prove useful.

(4) **Restrictions (and/or Constraints).** Ensure that you list and understand those limitations imposed by higher authority. These may be imposed by the priority of your theater relative to more important theaters or they may be imposed because of diplomatic, economic, or informational requirements.

(5) **Assumptions.** Here is where you note the assumptions developed in mission analysis and any other necessary to the preparation of your strategic estimate.

(6) **Deductions.** The foregoing analysis should yield deductions about which instrument/instruments of power of the enemy/potential adversary are strengths and weaknesses. It should also yield similar deductions about friendly instruments. In an ideal world, this should produce an opportunity to design courses of action which applies, predominantly strong friendly instruments of power against predominantly weak enemy/potential adversary's weak instruments. Naturally, you will rarely face an ideal situation, but you should have a solid grasp by this time of which instruments of power are most likely to lead to success.

b. Courses of Action Analysis.

(1) **General.** Determining appropriate courses of action is the most difficult task in developing the strategic estimate. In fact, it is the heart of the entire process. In comparison, all else seems mechanical. At the operational level, when opposing force strength and weapon systems data are available, discerning appropriate courses of action can be tested through wargaming, but at the strategic level this step is more abstract. The options under analysis should all consist of an objective or desired end-state, and an idea regarding the phased application of power resources. Each instrument of power contains inherent strengths and weaknesses which must also be considered. They are summarized in the chart on the next page:

National Power: Advantages and Disadvantages

Element	Advantages	Disadvantages
Economic	Only moderately expensive to use	Slow to affect behavior of target Can cost user as much as the target Effective only if target is vulnerable
Diplomatic	Very cheap to use Few adverse side effects	Ineffective against a determined target
Informational	Very cheap to use	Difficult to determine effectiveness
Military	Usually the most effective and quickest way to affect target	High cost (lives and money) Contingent on national will

The strategist, even the military strategist, should consider all instruments of power. In fact, the JSCP tasks all the CINCs to develop flexible deterrent options recommending the use of all instruments of power for all their OPLANS. Advocating the most readily available instrument of power is always a temptation. However, doing so could have undesirable side effects. Instruments of power are usually more effective in combination than when applied alone. Thus, the strategist must ask the five questions below before recommending the use of a particular instrument, either in combination with others or alone.

First, what will the long term effects be? Clearly the use of a power resource is intended to affect the behavior of a particular target individual, group, nation, or group of nations. Yet the impact on unintended targets involved in the specific problem are just as important. The strategist must consider the effect that the use of a specific instrument will have on perceptions of domestic audiences and the world community. A large nation's use of military power against a small nation may have serious effects on the large nations' image. Thus in special situations the long-term costs of using military power may outweigh the short term benefits.

Second, how quickly must the behavior of the target individual, group, nation, or group of nations be affected? If the behavior of the target must be affected quickly, military power may be more useful than any other. If time is not of the essence, the political costs of military power, which tend to be high, may lead the strategist to consider diplomatic, informational, and economic power.

Third, can the application of a given power resource be sustained? The strategist must consider how long the nation in question can apply an instrument of power and whether the target's behavior is likely to change within that time period. This is a vitally important

consideration for the United States, which tends to experience rapid fluctuations in national will, impatience, and a slow-to-build, quick-to-lose national consensus toward the use of not only military power but other instruments as well. This third question is especially important when the United States is dealing with insurgencies, non democratic states with strong ideologies, failed states, and firmly entrenched leaders who have the will and ability to be extremely patient.

Fourth, what mix of instruments should be used? In a given situation, the strategist must consider that certain instruments are complementary and some are conflicting. The target's behavior can be affected by positive inducements (which reward desired behavior) and negative inducements (which punish undesired behavior). The strategist must be wary of simultaneously mixing negative and positive inducements, because doing so may confuse the target. During the Angolan civil war, the United States demonstrated mixed actions. The United States promised Angola diplomatic recognition if Cuban troops withdrew, but simultaneously was supporting a guerrilla movement that was attempting to overthrow the Angola government.

The planner should be especially cautious when recommending the use of military power, when combat is a possibility. The Clinton administration incorporated principles for employment of military force in the July 1994 National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement.

- National interests will dictate the pace and extent of military involvement.
- As much as possible, U.S. will seek help of allies or relevant multilateral institutions.
- U.S. will consider several important questions:
 - Have non-military means been considered?
 - What type of military capability is required?
 - Is the use of military force carefully matched to political objectives?
 - Is there a reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
 - Are there timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure?
 - Do we have an exit strategy?

Fifth, how should the application of the instruments of national power be phased? Just as a military campaign entails phasing, branches, and sequels, so also should the strategic sequencing of employment of the instruments of national power. The strategist should note that if instrument X does not bring results within a certain period of time, greater reliance should be placed on instrument Y.

(2) Develop Range of Options. While all strategists must understand the integrated use of all instruments of power in pursuit of national interests, the military strategist should be particularly sensitive to the role of military power in an integrated national strategy. This holds for strategic options for dealing with a crisis and for long term regional strategies. The first step is to brainstorm and come up with a comprehensive list of actions (options). Each option should be an action (or nonaction) using a single instrument of power. This list should be composed of multiple actions for each instrument of

power (a wide range of possible options). Once a range of options is developed, define each option in terms of the following questions:

(a) Given the advantages and disadvantages of each instrument of power, should each option be used singly or in combination with other options?

(b) How are the options to be applied (negatively or positively, unilaterally or multilaterally, and so forth)?

(c) When are the options to be applied (phasing)?

(d) Under what conditions are the options to be applied (decision points)?

After a comprehensive list of options has been developed, rank order the list. This procedure begins the most judgmental part of the process. Review C510, Lesson 1 for testing each option using FAS, which is summarized below:

Feasibility: Are mobilized and usable instruments (resources) adequate to execute the option? (Is there a reasonable chance of success?)

Acceptability: Will the national will support the option? (Is the benefit worth the costs?)

Suitability: Will the option attain, promote, or protect the identified U.S. interests and objectives? (Is there a coherent link between military objectives and political objectives?)

More than likely, many options will pass all three tests. However, if only one does, you have your recommended course of action. Now look at the options. If you have two or three that meet the FAS test, these are the courses of action that you must further analyze. If you still have more than three, (as will generally be the case) combine or merge one or more into two or more instruments of power. Where two or more instruments are integrated into one course of action, one instrument will normally be the primary instrument and the others will be supporting. Once you have developed two or three courses of action that appear to meet the FAS test, you can go on the next step.

4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action.

Although the strategic estimate in Joint Pub 3-0 divides the analysis into two steps, CGSC recommends that you combine this into one: analyzing your own course of action against each likely enemy/possible adversary's course of action. What you do here is to wargame the probable effect of each friendly course of action against the enemy course of action beginning with the most likely. As you think through this interactive process assess each course of action in terms of **cost**, **benefit**, and **risk**. This helps quantify the analysis of the relative merits of each friendly course of action. The cost-benefit-risk analysis should be done in priority in terms of:

- Instrument(s) of national power to be used
- National interests of highest priority relevant to the course of action in the particular case under analysis
- Other national interests and objectives
- Long-term interests or objectives
- Interests and objectives outside the given region.

The strategist should use all available tools to conduct this wargaming. If time and or decision aids are in short supply, this is a result of a mental process. If sufficient time and resources are available, computer wargaming will help immensely.

6. Decision (Recommendation)

The decision, or recommendation if the element making the strategic estimate does not have decision authority, is based on the most likely scenario which emerges from the wargaming process and which scored the highest in the cost-benefit-risk analysis. The strategist should also be aware that he may have to caveat his decision or recommendation. A caveat, by definition is a warning. Caveats emphasize that the recommendations are conditional and susceptible to change, and usually related to your assumption. A caveat indicates in precise form a factor or an action on which each recommendation is contingent. Thus, the decision maker knows on what basis he or she may have to transition to an alternative course of action.

Caveats are often derived from assumptions, and they emphasize the criticality of the assumptions. Either explicitly or implicitly, the strategist says, "My conclusions are valid only if my assumptions hold." If events change and assumptions can be proved accurate or inaccurate, further analysis is required. Other caveats deal with timing ("This option is recommended only prior to a United Nations' resolution") or form ("this option is not recommended unless participation by allies can be kept secret").

7. Crisis Estimate Versus Long-Term or Regional Estimate.

The strategic estimate as constituted is best suited for crisis analysis, however, it can be adapted for long term planning or for conducting regional estimates, prior to the development of a CINC's regional strategy. To use it for each case requires some slight differences. As shown on the next page.

Crisis planning versus Regional Planning

Crisis

- Situation itself usually helps indicate the priority of interests and threats.
- Options are usually mutually exclusive. A course of action may call for one or two instruments of power to predominate.
- Desired end-state is often clear and straight-forward.
- Threat usually indicates the focus of effort.

Regional Planning

- Careful analysis required to prioritize interests and threats.
- Nearly every course of action includes all instruments of national power in some form. Analyst decides how far and how fast to escalate toward direct use of military power if it is required at all.
- Desired end-state is more amorphous. Requires strategic vision.
- Analyst must organize the region which requires performing "strategic triage" to indicate problems that deserve priority attention.

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