

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONTRIBUTIONS TO
BATTLESPACE DOMINANCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


by

ALAN OSHIRAK, LCDR, USN
B.S., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
Approved by:


Mr. John Reichley, M.B.A., M.S.J., M.Ed. , Thesis Committee Chairman


Colonel Anthony A. Wood, B.S. , Member


Lieutenant Colonel E. Wayne Powell, J.D. , Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 2d day of June 1995 by:


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. , Director, Graduate Degree
Programs

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ABSTRACT

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONTRIBUTIONS TO BATTLESPACE DOMINANCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE by LCDR Alan Oshirak, USN,
116 pages.

This study investigates Special Operations Forces' (SOF) contributions to battlespace dominance in support of the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) through "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS). The analysis is based on the 1992 naval strategy contained in ". . . From the Sea," and that strategy's fundamental shift away from "blue water" (open ocean) to "brown water" (coastal littoral) operations as the focus of future naval warfighting.

The NEF is the centerpiece for the new construct. It is comprised of aircraft carrier battle groups with escorts, submarines, and amphibious ships with embarked Marines. In order to project power ashore, the NEF must have battlespace dominance, or temporary control of air, land, surface, subsurface, and the electromagnetic spectrum in order to deny the enemy freedom of action.

This study outlines types of SOF that may support a NEF, contributions that SOF can provide to support maneuver as envisioned by OMFTS, and types of SOF missions that strengthen a NEF toward achieving battlespace dominance.

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I wish to thank my committee for assistance in researching and completing this thesis. The chairman, Mr. John Reichley, provided enthusiastic guidance and focus without which I would have never undertaken this project. The subject matter expert, Colonel Anthony A. Wood, USMC, was an invaluable aid in completing this work. Colonel Wood served as my mentor, provided research material that would have otherwise been unavailable, and had many important suggestions to guide my research. Lieutenant Colonel E. Wayne Powell, USAR, was equally as supportive and encouraging and taught me some of the finer skills of analytical writing during several enjoyable Consulting Faculty visits. My committee was the right mix for this thesis, and I hope their professionalism and dedication to duty is reflected throughout. This thesis is dedicated to my loving wife Kimberly, who bravely attended medical school, a task much harder than completing this thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis proposes a conceptual framework for using Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide battlespace dominance in support of the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) through operational maneuver from the sea (OMFIS). The study uses the definition of battlespace dominance established in both the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper ". . . From the Sea" and in Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1): Naval Warfare.

The Research Question

How can Special Operations Forces provide vital support to the NEF in gaining battlespace dominance through operational maneuver from the sea?

Subordinate Questions

What is ". . . From the Sea," and why is it important to maritime strategy? How do ". . . From the Sea" and NDP 1 define battlespace dominance? How does SOF contribute to the effective use and provision of battlespace dominance? What are the potential roles of SOF in establishing and maintaining battlespace dominance during execution of an OMFIS? What are the future implications of the interface between SOF and the NEF?

Context of the Problem and the Research Question

" . . . From the Sea" is a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper that defines a single vision for the two naval services in terms of a new and dramatic shift in maritime strategy. Implemented in September 1992, it represents the first work of its kind in more than 200 years.

Essentially, " . . . From the Sea" declares a shift in strategic focus away from open-ocean warfare on the sea ("blue water" operations) to a primary warfighting emphasis on littoral warfare orchestrated from the sea in support of regional challenges ("brown water" operations). In so doing, the naval services are attempting to realign strategic thought, doctrine, and employment of naval forces with current national security priorities.¹

" . . . From the Sea" also embodies the increased emphasis on an updated Marine Corps amphibious warfare capability as a principal means of naval power projection. Only an appendix to prior maritime strategic policy, the Marines now play a central role in the projection of naval power in conflicts over international interests likely to occur within the global littoral regions. Brought about by a shift from antisubmarine warfare (ASW), budgetary constraints, and--critically--new global priorities, " . . . From the Sea" scuttles the Reagan era 600 ship cold war Navy in favor of leaner, strategically mobile naval forces that will conduct operations in littoral waters.

" . . . From the Sea" is, by nature, a bold strategy that expands the traditional naval battlefield to include maneuver on the sea, under the sea, over the sea, in the transition ashore, and upon coastal grounds. Maneuver within the naval services, a phrase once employed

predominantly by Marines, is now a term commonly used by both naval services when molding new doctrine. In this regard, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS) was developed as the concept that combines the operations of all naval forces to achieve battlespace dominance and to execute power projection ashore. OMFTS assigns the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) as a cohesive, integrated Navy/Marine force which is task organized to operate forward and respond rapidly on short notice. The NEF includes "the required command, control, surveillance and force capabilities to control and dominate a designated sea-air-land battlespace to project power ashore."² The NEF commander has control of all assigned assets, including submarines. Maneuver operations are characterized by speed and flexibility. Multiple options are critical, and risk analysis is an increasingly common practice. "Selective dominance," "seamless" projection of power on the battlefield, and "decentralized execution" are some of the terms used to describe the use of combat power available to the NEF. The sea is used as maneuver space, where flexibility and exploitation of enemy gaps are keys to success. The overall strategy is driven by events, not time. Speed, tactical surprise, and deception are emphasized. "OMFTS is the ultimate marriage between Economy of Force and Mass: the ocean defends our front while we maneuver 100% of our combat power toward the objective of our choosing."³

In May 1994, two years after ". . . From the Sea," the newly formed Naval Doctrine Command addressed naval warfare in its first document, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare. Concepts broadly outlined in ". . . From the Sea" and various other papers became

official doctrine in NDP 1, the Navy's equivalent of longstanding Army FM 100-5: Operations. The nature of naval forces, how they fight, and visions of the twenty-first century are included. Like ". . . From the Sea," NDP 1 emphasizes the expeditionary role that naval forces will execute in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, NDP 1 retains the traditional roles of strategic deterrence, sea superiority, and protection of maritime trade as central roles for U.S. naval forces. In addition, it underscores the likelihood of challenges from areas of instability in the global littoral regions. NDP 1 also points out that, although the NEF alone has many inherent capabilities, it "cannot perform independently every military function that our nation may require."⁴ Accordingly, in joint formations, naval expeditionary forces can provide: (1) command, control, and surveillance (C2 and surveillance); (2) power projection; (3) force sustainment; and (4) battlespace dominance.

Battlespace dominance is central to the new construct.⁵ It is multidimensional, encompassing air, subsurface, land, space, time, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Ships, submarines, aircraft, and Marine forces are integrated into a single C2 structure within the NEF that can be extended throughout the battlespace whether at sea or ashore. Battlespace dominance is accomplished by establishing "zones of superiority" based on the capabilities of sensors and weapons systems. Power is projected into these "zones of superiority" whether preexisting or established upon arrival in the objective area. Such "zones" are temporary, and may move with operational needs. The inclusion of joint or coalition capabilities can further extend the range and the intensity

of battlespace dominance. In the littorals, the NEF's battlespace must inevitably be coordinated with the battlespaces of other forces, including land and air forces. Beyond the littorals, in the broadened scale of conflict, battlespace dominance will be required to protect forces and project power effectively and decisively.⁶

The ability to project power is the essence of effective crisis response. The Naval Expeditionary Force projects power through establishing and controlling its battlespace. It projects U.S. national influence by deterring aggression, promoting regional security, and providing collective security. In war or conflict, power projection is the ability to take the fight to the enemy through the use of combined arms applying high-intensity, precise offensive power at the right time and place. In the NEF, combined arms includes several modes of firepower: synergistic sea, ground, and air operations; electronic warfare operations; deception and ruses; psychological operations; and special operations. The NEF provides the operational strength to project power through the specific use of sea-based strike aircraft, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's), long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, naval surface fire support, C2 warfare, maritime prepositioning, and embarked Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Forces. All of these, when used in a maritime maneuver environment as described in OMFTS, can influence an adversary's actions by rapidly inflicting insurmountable losses upon him. The NEF's goal, by way of OMFTS, is "to apply the principles of maneuver warfare to the projection of maritime power ashore by taking maximum advantage of emerging technological opportunity."⁷ OMFTS assumes as its most fundamental tenet of national

defense strategy that enemies will be fought outside the boundaries of the continental United States (CONUS). In this regard, landing forces, strike forces, and SOF will act in concert to project power through forcible entry from the sea. Battlespace dominance is necessary to achieve balanced projection of power.

The use of SOF to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of battlespace dominance through OMFTS in support of the Naval Expeditionary Force is the central theme of the thesis. If SOF contributes to the creation of battlespace dominance in support of the NEF's use of OMFTS, then what are the limitations, considerations, and possibilities that this contribution implies? Can SOF be used exclusively to create battlespace dominance? Does SOF have the capabilities, structure, and framework that enable it to accomplish this objective? What does SOF bring to this conceptual framework that other forces do not? How does SOF fit into OMFTS?

Limitations

Limitations are primarily confined to the fact that the naval doctrine articulated in ". . . From the Sea" and NDP 1 is in its infancy. Terms and definitions are, in some cases, extracted from periodicals or White Papers that have not been officially approved. The research is somewhat time dependent as it may be the first in-depth examination of its kind in the growing field of naval doctrine.

Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs) is a series of documents that will translate the vision and strategy contained in the White Paper ". . . From the Sea," into doctrinal reality. NDP 1: Naval Warfare, NDP 2: Naval Intelligence, NDP 3: Operations, NDP 4: Naval Logistics, NDP 5:

Naval Planning, and NDP 6: Naval Command and Control, are currently available.

Operational Definitions

A complete listing of terminology can be found in Appendix B, the glossary. In the interest of uninterrupted reading and clear understanding, key terms are defined as they are discussed.

Battlespace includes every aspect of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of influence and area of interest.

Battlespace dominance is the degree of control over the dimensions of battlespace which enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It permits power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions.

Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) is the application of maneuver warfare to littoral areas. It aims for decisive results by seeking and striking critical vulnerabilities, placing emphasis on surprise, deception, innovation, and the indirect approach.

Naval Special Warfare is a designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operations generally accepted as being unconventional in nature and, in many cases, covert or clandestine. Specially trained forces conduct unconventional warfare, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operational deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal and river interdiction, and certain special tactical intelligence collection operations. In addition, intelligence functions normally required for planning and conducting special operations in a hostile environment are carried out by Naval Special Warfare.

Special operations are conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-Special Operations Forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, calling for clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques plus oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in their degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

Special Operations Forces refer to Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations units under the command and control of U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Delimitations

The thesis will concentrate only on unclassified information and will use documentation available through unclassified military or open source channels. Distribution will be unlimited.

Significance of the Study

Naval doctrine concerning the application of OMFTS is still evolving, with the publication in March 1994 of NDP 1: Naval Warfare. NDP 3: Operations has recently been published. To date, it appears that no fundamental study of any kind exists regarding the use of Special Operations Forces in OMFTS in support of the NEF. Furthermore,

this research serves to fill a significant gap about the future employment of SOF forces, particularly of Naval Special Warfare.

The Research Topic

Focusing the topic was the most difficult stage in the completion of the thesis. Preliminary exploration revealed a myriad of subjects related to amphibious warfare, naval strategy, special operations, maneuver, littoral warfare, and projection of power. Initially, the topic was an analysis of SOF contributions to the success of ". . . From the Sea." Further analysis along with the assistance of the committee fine tuned the topic to an examination of one of the tenets of ". . . From the Sea" and its relationship to OMFTS. Surprisingly, not one source was available that focused entirely on this research topic, while information on ". . . From the Sea" and OMFTS was plentiful. Literature on SOF providing battlespace dominance in support of the NEF was non-existent. The key became synthesizing various periodicals, drafts, and newly published material into the thesis.

The Research Design

As the topic of the thesis is one that has emerged within the last three years, most of the research methodology was based on acquiring information through recently published articles, books, and papers that addressed the subject. Frequently, since the subject developed concurrently with the composition of the thesis, new material was gained first through word of mouth then by getting a draft of something not yet released or published. A large amount of information was obtained from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Naval

Doctrine Command, and through the various doctrinal offices of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Naval Special Boat Squadron Two (SPECBOATRON Two), United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) provided some of the information regarding the use of Adaptive Joint Force Packages. The Department of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in The Pentagon also provided pertinent insight, regarding the use of SOF in support of OMFTS. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) was used to its full capacity, mainly through the review of periodicals involving Navy, Marine Corps, or joint publications.

A prime source for reference material on the latest developments was provided by this research committee's subject matter expert Colonel Anthony A. Wood, USMC. Colonel Wood's past experience as a "founding father" of OMFTS, NDP 1, and numerous other documents relating to ". . . From the Sea" was absolutely invaluable. Furthermore, Colonel Wood provided an excellent means of maintaining contact with those in current positions regarding policy and strategy who greatly influenced the day-to-day developments that affected the timeliness and accuracy of this thesis.

Another prime source of information was the author's personal experiences as a career Naval Special Warfare officer who had served as both a forward-deployed Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) platoon commander and as the Naval Special Warfare liaison to the Amphibious Squadron Commander on two Amphibious Ready Group Mediterranean (MARG) deployments.

Additionally, the author had just completed a joint assignment in the Operations Directorate of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), the functional Special Operations Component (SOC) of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). As a result of the author's warfare specialty, a number of books, periodicals, newspaper and magazine clippings, and memorabilia were available in his personal collection of professional material.

As research progressed, recent events in the military were useful as examples of the validity of the topic. For example, the Adaptive Joint Force Packaging used by the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) to embark the 10th Mountain Division and its helicopters on board the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower in response to the ongoing situation in Haiti showed that an embarked JTF (on board the command ship USS Mount Whitney) could provide adequate command, control, and communications for maneuver forces. SOF was used to secure critical sites throughout Haiti, contributing to the battlespace dominance created by the NEF. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces leaflets announcing the eventual return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide were dropped from AFSOC aircraft throughout Port Au Prince. Navy SEALs permanently attached to the NEF reconnoitered key waterways, bridges, and beaches to provide essential data to arriving amphibious forces in Port Au Prince and Cape Haitien. Special Forces teams were in Haiti, conducting classic operations commensurate with their skills in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

The purpose of the thesis is to explore the contributions that SOF provides the NEF through OMFTS. A conceptual framework is

established in chapter four to provide a clear illustration of how SOF can interact with the strategic vision for naval forces as embodied in ". . . From the Sea." The conclusions in chapter five are not by any means definitive, but instead represent the first known effort to examine this interrelationship. Suggestions for doctrinal and practical applications of this thesis are also in the concluding chapter. This thesis is intended to encourage further research, discussion, and questions toward providing a method of advancing strategic thought in the special operations community and in the naval service. Hopefully, advanced application and deliberation will be the final result.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Navy, ". . . From the Sea," Department of the Navy, September 1992, 2.

²U.S. Navy, "Operational Maneuver . . . From the Sea: The Evolution of Amphibious Warfare Remains a Demand of the Nation and an Obligation of Her Naval Service," Department of the Navy, 28 February 1993 Draft, 6.

³"Operational Maneuver . . . From the Sea," 6.

⁴Naval Doctrine Command, NDP 1: Naval Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994), 50.

⁵". . . From the Sea," 8.

⁶NDP 1: Naval Warfare, 52.

⁷"Operational Maneuver . . . From the Sea," 5.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The contribution of SOF to battlespace dominance in support of the NEF through OMFTS is a subject that has not been individually studied and documented in writing. However, the articles, books, and papers that contributed to development of the thesis fall into five general categories. The first describes what ". . . From the Sea" or OMFTS means and the immediate implications regarding the Navy and/or Marine Corps. The second is littoral warfare in its relationship with OMFTS. The third concentrates on the employment of SOF. The fourth category deals with national security strategy and joint concerns. Finally, the fifth addresses battlespace dominance. Much of the material, with the exception of general background information, was written within the last three years.

". . . From the Sea"/OMFTS

A variety of work exists regarding the exploration of ". . . From the Sea" and "Operational Maneuver From the Sea." As one would expect, the articles and papers are found mainly in periodicals relating to the Navy or Marine Corps. However, some writings are found in joint publications, such as Joint Force Quarterly. All of the analyses concentrated on the conventional implications of implementing OMFTS. In related subjects there are several books that address the question of

maritime sea power in the "blue water" sense, several that address maritime littoral warfare as it pertains to the Marine Corps, and several hundred that address the question of conventional battlefield superiority. There are a few publications for which SOF is the topic, but the majority are regarded as somewhat fictitious by the SOF community.

Perhaps the best source of information is the results of war games conducted by Navy and Marine Corps commands over the last two years. They reveal important insight into the strengths and weaknesses of OMFTS and actually serve to guide writers of current naval doctrine.

An invaluable source of information is the expertise of the research committee subject matter expert, Colonel Anthony A. Wood, USMC. Colonel Wood is a "founding father" of ". . . From the Sea" and NDP 1: Naval Warfare, and maintains many of his references and contacts from his time spent at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Another noteworthy source is the result of two years of the author's personal experience while serving as a SEAL platoon commander and Naval Special Warfare liaison officer to the Amphibious Squadron Commander on back-to-back six-month Mediterranean deployments. The experiences gained over the course of many amphibious exercises plus four months of Operation Provide Comfort, while serving on a daily basis with the Marine Corps, cannot be overstated.

A review of SOF-orientated trade journals indicates that OMFTS has been a topic of concern, particularly with COMNAVSPECWARCOM's Full Mission Profile featuring a short article on the subject of Naval Special Warfare and the future under the OMFTS strategy. However, the

article fails to address the nature of the fundamental role of SOF in the implementation of OMFTS. It only states the need for such a review along with the current status of documentation regarding recent strategy.

The Navy and Marine Corps White Paper ". . . From the Sea," is a cornerstone document for this thesis. This paper announced the Navy and Marine Corps as full partners in joint operations and declared the littorals as battlespace. Naval Special Warfare is briefly mentioned in a list of notional forces available to the Unified Commander. SOF is mentioned in a similar list as part of a potential joint or combined task force that can compose the Expeditionary Force Package. The paragraph concerning command, control, and surveillance states that "particular emphasis will be placed on the ability to collect intelligence through covert surveillance early in crisis." The paragraph on power projection cites the requirement for "mobility, flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness." SOF is mentioned as a component of the NEF, and is considered one of the elements of power projection.

The future of ". . . From the Sea" within the naval service is somewhat limited, however. In his article "Time for a '. . . Sea' Change" in Proceedings, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral J. M. Boorda notes that ". . . From the Sea" is being updated and slightly revised to include naval forward presence as a tool necessary to achieve victory in a regional conflict. "Forward . . . From the Sea" was officially approved on 19 September 1994 and includes the same ". . . From the Sea" operational capabilities of battlespace dominance, projection of power,

C2 and surveillance, and force sustainment as functions of the NEF.

"Forward . . . From the Sea" also promotes naval littoral warfighting.

In his article "The Wave of the Future . . . From the Sea" in Joint Force Quarterly, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II introduces his model for joint interoperability, using the successes of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) naval and SOF integration with other services as examples. Admiral Kelso also points out the validity of positioning a joint task force (JTF) headquarters at sea vice on land. Published in the summer of 1993, this article represents one of the first commentaries from naval senior leadership published on the meaning of ". . . From the Sea."

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy Jr., uses similar language in "Complementary Capabilities from the Sea" in Joint Force Quarterly, as Admiral Kelso's article in calling for joint interoperability. General Mundy also points to forward presence, crises response, and the stabilizing and enabling capabilities found in MAGTF's as key to supporting national military strategy. The projection of power ashore through the use of naval forces is an enabling factor for follow-on joint forces. Discussion of battlespace dominance as a precursor for projection of power, however, is absent.

"Today's Challenge for Fleet Sailors and Marines: OMFTS," an article by CDR Terry Pierce in Proceedings, is a capstone article that introduces the OMFTS concept and cites important historical battles that emphasized OMFTS. Pierce explores the relationship of maneuver and amphibious warfare, and provides insight into the evolutionary process of doctrine.

"Naval Expeditionary Warfare," a brief presented by Colonel Anthony A. Wood of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, plus his "Operational Maneuver From the Sea: Concepts," the results of an OMFTS wargame, were extremely worthwhile in defining the various thoughts that ". . . From the Sea" and OMFTS propose. Each of Colonel Wood's articles recognize the need for SOF-like forces to ensure the success of the strategy, but do not define any fundamental roles or relate SOF with battlespace dominance.

Jan Bremer's Proceedings article "Naval Strategy Is Dead" argues convincingly that Naval forces are ideal for the uncertain threat marking a post-Cold War international system. He points out that ". . . From the Sea" relegates preparations to fight for command of the sea to a secondary concern. The foremost task at hand, Bremer maintains, is to control events on land. Thus, control of littoral waters matters only for the ability to project power ashore. Although the article has some excellent points, battlespace dominance is only mentioned insofar as it overturns the traditional relationship between sea control and power projection. The article never mentions other forces, such as SOF, that contribute ground, naval, or air assets to win the coveted ground battle which ". . . From the Sea" supports.

"Introduction To Amphibious Operations," by Captain Thom Ford and Colonel Anthony A. Wood, both of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, is an excellent base document for describing the complexities of amphibious operations as performed by the NEF. The authors describe the relationship of the NEF to battlespace dominance and note that battlespace dominance is a condition for success of

amphibious operations. The use of SOF to provide battlespace dominance for the NEF, however, is not mentioned.

NDP 1: Naval Warfare, is the first official version of the new maritime strategy. Formally signed in May 1994, it briefly identifies Naval Special Warfare capabilities but does not elaborate, in any of the tenets specified throughout the work, upon exactly who will conduct the diverse missions associated with OMFTS battlespace dominance.

Commander Tom Katana's "SEALs to the Carriers" in Proceedings describes the arduous predeployment workup cycle conducted by SEALs who deploy on board an aircraft carrier in support of the Commander, Carrier Group (COMCARGRU). Katana also details the types of missions that SEALs might be called on to execute. The "Strike Platoon" of SEALs can support direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions and offer a flexible and viable force option. Although Katana maintains that SEALs can support the projection of power and certain types of interdiction, he fails to consider the possibility of SEALs contributing to battlespace dominance.

Littoral Warfare

"Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare," an article by General Carl E. Mundy Jr. in Joint Force Quarterly provided the most updated view of the state of strategy as employed by naval forces in forward presence, crisis response, stabilization, and enabling. A copy of the memorandum provided to then President-Elect Clinton by General Mundy provides similar advice in the use of Marine expeditionary forces.

"Combatant Craft Have a Role in Littoral Warfare," by Rear Admiral George R. Worthington in Proceedings outlines the benefits of

using the newly commissioned coastal patrol (PC) class ships organic to SPECBOATRONs. Worthington's views are unique, as his former position as Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM) allows him to focus on supporting littoral warfare from a Naval Special Warfare perspective. He argues that the integration of the PCs into naval strategy has not yet reached consensus. Indeed, the PCs (along with the developing MK V high speed surface craft) do play an important role in support of the NEF through OMFTS. They have the ability to deliver and recover Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SOF in the littoral regions, with the flexibility and speed that OMFTS prescribes for success.

Similar parallels are drawn by Lieutenant Commander Frank J. Murphy in "Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown Water Operations" from the Marine Corps Gazette. Murphy cites the mind-set of today's Navy as key to winning the battle of littoral warfare. He calls for modernization of equipment, training and education, and support infrastructure in order to adapt to OMFTS. Murphy accepts that battlespace dominance must be obtained and maintained so that expeditionary forces can be introduced rapidly and decisively. He cites mine countermeasures (MCM) warfare as a formidable challenge to the ability to achieve and maintain sea control and project power. However, he does not call for the use of SOF in providing battlespace dominance, projecting power, or assisting in C2 and surveillance activities.

A brief article in Armed Forces Journal International by Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "New Ship Takes US Navy To A Higher Level," documents the 170 foot Cyclone class coastal patrol ships (PCs) currently in use by NSW SOF. The article contains a brief description of the

characteristics of the vessels, and a short interview with Rear Admiral Raymond C. Smith, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command. Rear Admiral Smith's comments are particularly useful, as they demonstrate the utility of the PC class ship in littoral regions.

Two articles from the Naval War College address littoral warfare. "Operational Considerations in Littoral Warfare" by Commander Steven D. Kinney and "Essential Characteristics of Naval Doctrine" by Commander Archer M. Macy both explore the fundamentals of successful littoral fighting. While Kinney stresses the mobility and combined arms capabilities, Macy emphasizes the use of joint forces in contingency operations. Neither mentions the use of SOF forces as a means to supplement their proposals.

In "Blue-Green Is a Primary Color" in Proceedings, Colonel W. C. Gregson states that in today's strategic spectrum, the Navy-Marine Corps team must be integrated, especially for coordination of amphibious operations using air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) with air support from fixed- and rotary-wing assets. However, in his argument for change, the article mentions neither the utility of integrating SOF into complex situations nor the need to project power and establish battlespace dominance prior to attempting amphibious operations over the beach.

Agostino von Hassell's Strike Force: U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations provides a good description of the forces and assets available to the USMC, especially in the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). Although not SOF, certain Marine units can perform selected SOF-like missions. The book yields good background information and candid photographs illustrating the MEU's capabilities.

"The Gator Stumbles," an article by Commander T. J. McKearney in Proceedings, details concerns about infringement upon exclusive zones of responsibility, supporting SOF or air interdiction into the amphibious objective area (AOA). Unfortunately, McKearney's "zones of responsibility" do not correspond with the "zones of superiority" defined in NDP 1 or in ". . . From the Sea." Nor do McKearney's "zones" deal with the time or space requirements of battlespace dominance. Commander McKearney's best attempts at describing the provision of battlespace dominance as a precursor for power projection through combined operations "lie in a vague area best described as 'battlefield management'." ¹ The article provides an interesting template for C2 for the NEF, but fails to account for SOF providing battlespace dominance in support of C2 and surveillance operations.

One article does address NSW employment in a brown water environment. "NSW Combatant Craft in the Littoral," an essay in Full Mission Profile by Lieutenant Commander P. F. Van Hooser, Commanding Officer of Special Boat Unit Twenty, explores the basics of NSW surface craft responsibilities in the coastal littorals. Van Hooser points out that a variety of missions using NSW craft may contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the NEF. This article serves as an excellent initial source of information regarding Special Boat Unit capabilities. However, it considers only NSW surface assets as potential providers of maritime battlespace dominance and fails to address the extensive range of roles and contributions built into SOF expertise.

Employment of SOF

Most of the information available concerning SOF capabilities is passed through the strainer of the author's personal experiences and career expertise as a Naval Special Warfare Officer. A plethora of articles exists regarding SOF, of which precious few portray SOF with extreme accuracy. However, some do offer unique insights and serve well for consulting in the name of research.

Perhaps the best article for anyone not acquainted with SOF comes from John Collins in Joint Force Quarterly titled, "Where are Special Operations Forces?" Collins successfully navigates through the maze of SOF C2 structures, notable accomplishments, and the essence of SOF. He also identifies problem areas and recommended solutions. This work serves as invaluable assistance in locating SOF among the military services, but hardly addresses issues concerning naval warfare.

An expanded version of Collins' view of the state of the U.S. special operations community is found in Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, in which he conducts an exhaustive review of SOF. Without the bravado of other SOF related articles and books, Collins succeeds in pinpointing SOF strengths and weaknesses better than any one source to date. The assessment, however, does not focus on using SOF in temporary roles as potential providers of battlespace dominance.

"Roles and Functions of U.S. Special Operations Forces," by John Collins in Special Warfare, explores the six SOF primary mission areas and evaluates the assignment of these roles to SOF. Collins offers a good discussion of the redundancy of certain missions among SOF, as well as dissecting the readiness and capabilities of each SOF component.

This article provides excellent insight into the primary mission areas, and whether or not these missions are best suited for certain forces.

"Secret Warriors," by Douglas Waller of Newsweek, offers views of how SOF was employed during the Gulf War, as does his book The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers. Waller offers some insight to the potential for using SOF in areas relating to OMFTS, especially in his descriptions of NSW forces conducting demolition raids on Kuwaiti beaches to deceive Iraqi forces into believing that an amphibious invasion was imminent.

General Wayne A. Downing's 1994 "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee" provides an excellent update on recent developments within the SOF community. The statement provides useful information ranging from increasing SOF employment by region to the expanding capabilities of theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs). Additionally, the statement provides official insight into the direction of joint integration efforts, such as adaptive joint force packaging and future joint training efforts.

General Downing's presentation to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in January 1995, offered other insights into his views on employment of SOF. As Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), General Downing foresees the world as one saturated with opportunities for SOF, mainly falling into a range of low- to mid-intensity conflicts. He reviews current scenarios in Operation Provide Democracy in Haiti and lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. In both cases, he claims SOF was properly used in support of CINC objectives and within SOF limitations and objectives.

In a similar fashion, General Downing's article "Special Operations Forces: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges Today" in Special Warfare discusses SOF strengths as evidenced by continual employment in an increasingly unstable global environment. Embracing the changing requirements of the new world order, he argues, makes SOF more attractive to policy makers and strategists who can deploy a highly trained force that can operate across the spectrum of military operations, and can adapt rapidly as new threats and opportunities arise.

United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement of 1994, an invaluable aid, lays out the structure, organization, plans and policies of USSOCOM. It is an excellent reference manual that gives a country-by-country summary of declassified SOF activities in 1993. The statement also addresses global and regional strategies, missions, and future technological development.

Several books provided historical accounts of SOF in conflicts ranging from Vietnam to Kuwait. Thomas Donnelly's Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, Douglas C. Waller's The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers, Orr Kelly's Brave Men . . . Dark Waters and Never Fight Fair, Kevin Dockery's SEALs In Action, and David C. Martin and John Walcott's Best Laid Plans profile various SOF missions, both successes and failures. Additionally, Mike Walsh's SEAL!, T.L. Bosiljevac's SEALs: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam, and Darryl Young's SEALs, UDT, Frogmen: Men Under Pressure all offer first-hand accounts of NSW operations, mostly during the Vietnam War. All of these books provide an outstanding source of documentation regarding the

use of SOF in low-to-high-intensity missions. They also are a superb reference of select high profile missions conducted by SOF.

Michael E. Haas and Dale K. Robinson's Air Commando! 1950-1975: Twenty Five years at the Tip of the Spear provide the best available historical account of psychological and gunship operations by Air Force commandos from World War II's China-Burma-India Theater through the end of the Vietnam War.

Daniel P. Bolger's "Special Operations and the Grenada Campaign" in Parameters illustrates the use of SOF in SR, DA, and PSYOP missions during Operation Urgent Fury. Bolger accounts for thirteen SOF missions and provides an analysis of the successes and failures associated with each. This provided one of the few documented sources of SOF exploits in Grenada that, according to sources who participated in NSW SOF missions, was close to the mark.

Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones' "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Urban Freedom" in Special Warfare provides an excellent review of missions conducted by PSYOP forces in recent conflicts. As commander of the 4th PSYOP Group, Colonel Jones' work offers several examples of how PSYOP SOF can contribute to battlespace dominance.

The Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War by the Department of Defense contributes a variety of examples and missions that were conducted by both maritime and SOF during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the chapter on maritime affairs, amphibious operations and counter-mine operations are discussed in depth. Similarly, Appendix J of the final report discusses select unclassified

missions conducted by SOF. These include SR, DA, and PSYOP tasks in support of the theater SOC and the embarked NEF commander. Although the report does not link SOF to battlespace dominance in order to project power, it does provide examples of how SOF can be used to support the NEF or the CINC's objectives.

National Security/Joint

Admiral Paul David Miller's "A New Mission for Atlantic Command" in Joint Force Quarterly provides excellent information on the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging, the selective tailoring of forces (SOF in particular), and deploying them on U.S. Navy vessels. These concepts have already been practiced repeatedly with joint SOF forces in the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) area of responsibility and provide a template for the future deployment of SOF C2 afloat.

In "US Atlantic Command: Focusing on the Future" in Military Review, Admiral Miller reiterates the value of adaptive joint force packaging, arguing that it will improve the efficiency and timeliness of support to combatant commanders by tailoring forces to meet specific mission requirements. He continues to advocate the concentration of capabilities rather than traditional relationships with specific units, so that the same units and forces will not be identified for all contingencies. This article provides the template pioneered by USACOM to mix forces best adapted to mission requirements in unusual and nontraditional ways. This idea applies to using SOF to support the NEF in creative ways, and advocates using tailored force packages to project power abroad.

In "The Military After Next" in Proceedings, Admiral Miller specifically identifies SOF as pivotal players in tailored Adaptive Joint Force Package missions requiring their skills. Admiral Miller's employment of SOF in this role is indeed groundbreaking in an attempt to best meet the unified CINC's requirements. His vision also applies to the use of SOF in support of the NEF and provides the first architectural guidelines for using a SOF sea-based command and control structure to support operations ashore. These operations could conceivably include the provision and maintenance of battlespace dominance.

Admiral Miller's statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee provides additional insight to his vision for adaptive joint force packaging. "A national kit of capabilities" is composed when tailored forces are used together to support designated missions.² Admiral Miller's proposed use of SOF is well documented in various periodicals, such as those already reviewed.

"The Way Ahead" by the Honorable Lawrence Garrett III, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, and General Alfred M. Gray, was written in 1991 in Proceedings as a precursor to ". . . From the Sea." It was the first to set developmental course of the OMFTS strategy, and provides the focus for future developments.

"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" from the White House provides the basis for our national security outlook from which OMFTS derives its objectives. Similarly, the "National Military Strategy of the United States of America" outlines the military views of flexible and selective engagement.

"Fighting Joint" by Rear Admiral Leonard P. Picotte in Proceedings highlights the need for joint integration in littoral fighting and expeditionary warfare. He also explores the roles of C2 and support infrastructures that are necessary to support the NEF. Admiral Picotte's article offers a balanced view of expeditionary concerns, but does not address SOF in his discussion of competency regarding battlespace dominance. Nor does he mention SOF in his list of requirements concerning force planning, mission execution, or flexibility.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, lays the foundations and considerations that apply to joint campaigning. SOF is recognized as a provider of "powerful operational leverage" and can "ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a conflict in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring."³ Further, the document identifies that "innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach by conventional action."⁴ Finally, there is some discussion of synergism relating to civil affairs and psychological operations. These (and other) joint doctrinal statements, combined with the emphasis of concepts already described in NDP 1 and ". . . From the Sea," are among the primary elements of the foundations for this thesis.

Several recent articles describe the growing threat to naval expeditionary forces abroad. Among them is Philip Finnegan and Robert Holzer's Navy Times piece entitled "Iran moves catch U.S. eye: New antiship missiles pose threat to Navy ships." In a brief report, the

authors identify Iran in arming key islands in the Straits of Hormuz with Silkworm or CS-801/802 Sardine antiship cruise missiles. This report, dated 20 February 1995, reflects the recent threat developments in a significant chokepoint in which the NEF or SOF may potentially operate to promote U.S. national interests.

Finally, a strong summation of joint warfare is "The New Joint Warfare" by Frederick Strain in Joint Force Quarterly. Strain's point is that joint warfare, in the wake of the Gulf War, is now upon us and thus requires redefinitions of campaign phasing, interdiction, close air support (CAS), and maneuver. This source serves as a good model for redefining warfare on a joint basis and incorporating specific capabilities into the mix of battle.

Battlespace and Battlespace Dominance

Several service manuals address the notions of battlespace and battlespace dominance with conflicting results. ". . . From the Sea" mentions battlespace when defining littoral waters, the environment for future naval operations. Seaward battlespace presents the challenge of sea control functions, whereas landward battlespace comprises that inland area which ". . . can be supported and defended directly from the sea."⁵

Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, defines battlespace as "All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum the encompass the area of influence and area of interest."⁶ Battlespace dominance is defined as:

The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It permits power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions.⁷

The naval definition of battlespace dominance incorporates a three (versus two) dimensional aspect. Battlespace is neither fixed in size nor stationary, and it can travel with the NEF. The naval capstone document, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" is vital to this thesis because it elucidates the method that the NEF uses to project power ashore. The Hot Wash-Up, Initial Impressions and Final Reports from various iterations of the "Secnav 1994 Operational Maneuver From The Sea War Game" provide excellent insight to results and lessons learned through wargaming both lesser and major regional contingencies against OMFTS and ". . . From the Sea."

Admiral William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses the importance of "battlefield dominance" in his book High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World.⁸ Explaining his vision of the future role of naval forces, Admiral Owens foresees surface combatants as keys to extending the link of sea-based and land-based data and communications capabilities in support of a ground campaign. However, there is no mention of using SOF or other ground forces to contribute to the C2 and surveillance capabilities of the NEF, or as relevant contributors to establishing battlespace dominance.

Captain Thom Ford's paper, "The Services Must Come to Terms on Battlespace," from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, is an excellent source of information comparing the various service definitions of battlespace and battlespace dominance. It also takes a brief look at joint doctrine and what the responsibilities of the joint

force commander are in terms of battlespace control. Captain Ford keenly addresses the disparity among the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force ideas respectively found in FM 100-5: Operations; NDP 1: Naval Warfare; FMFM 1: Warfighting; and AFM 1-1 Volumes I and II: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.

Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk's "Battle Space, A Commander's Tool on the Future Battlefield" gives a ground conventional force commander's perspective of the selective use of battlespace in a modern campaign. Although notably two dimensional and stationary in comparison with the naval view of battlespace, the article does provide a good background with historical examples on how the effective use of battlespace was achieved in past conflicts. Funk fails, however, in describing the dominance of that battlespace, and further assumes that anyone (including the infantry squad leader), can command and control his own battlespace.

In summary, there is no known published source that addresses potential SOF contributions to battlespace dominance in support of naval expeditionary forces. Although many excellent sources exist that adequately address one or more of the general categories in support of this thesis, none provides a study on how to effectively integrate SOF, OMFTS, and battlespace dominance in support of a NEF.

Endnotes

¹T. J. McKearney, "The Gator Stumbles," Proceedings, January 1994, 39.

²Paul David Miller, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 03 march 1994, 5.

³Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, November 1992), 7.

⁴A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, 12.

⁵"... From the Sea," 6.

⁶Naval Doctrine Command, NDP 1: Naval Warfare, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994, 72.

⁷NDP 1: Naval Warfare, 72.

⁸William A. Owens, High Seas: A Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 113-114.

CHAPTER THREE

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THE NEF

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities.¹ This chapter explores the specially trained forces and their unique skills that make up Special Operations Forces (SOF). This chapter also identifies the distinguishing qualities and characteristics of SOF that potentially contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the NEF through OMFTS.

SOF Capabilities Across the Spectrum

The unique qualities of SOF personnel are determined by the requirements of their missions. Special operations are defined as:

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces.²

Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring oversight at the national level. Often clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques are used to conduct SOF missions.

Due to their small size, self-reliance, and ready deployability, SOF is employable when high profile, conventional forces are politically, militarily, and/or economically inappropriate. SOF capitalizes on speed, surprise, audacity, and deception in ways that

minimize risks of escalation and maximize returns when compared with the orthodox applications of military power that emphasize maneuver and massing firepower. Aircraft, artillery, or armor can demolish a critical command and control facility at a particular time, for example, but SOF could magnify the physical and psychological effects considerably if they blew up the site while top commanders were inside or just prior to an incoming air strike. Conventional sea, land, and air forces normally patrol specified sectors intermittently, whereas Special Operations Forces conducting reconnaissance may remain in hostile territory for weeks or months collecting information that otherwise would be unobtainable.³ SOF is a highly specialized surgical force that is used selectively to achieve specified results.

SOF may be most effective in conducting economy of force operations. This generates strategic advantage disproportionate to the resources they represent. With relatively few people and unique capabilities, SOF can expand the range of options open to commanders or national decision makers. SOF's regional orientation incorporates language skills and cross-cultural understanding of the political situation which is unparalleled in the U.S. military.

SOF is capable of conducting direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), psychological operations (PSYOP), foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), and civil affairs (CA) missions.

Of these seven missions, three are most applicable to naval expeditionary warfare. They are direct action, special reconnaissance, and psychological operations.

Direct action (DA) missions are short duration, small-scale offensive actions that may require raids, ambushes, or direct assault tactics. These actions may include standoff attacks from air, ground, or maritime platforms, designating or illuminating targets for precision guided munitions, support for cover and deception operations, or conducting sabotage inside enemy territory. Typical operations include attack on critical targets (material or personnel) or interdiction of important lines of communications (LOCs). They also entail location, capture, and recovery of personnel and material, or seizure, destruction, and neutralization of critical facilities in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival.⁴

Special reconnaissance (SR) missions complement national and theater collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time sensitive information of strategic or operational importance. SR missions put "eyes on target" that can detect, identify or verify and, if necessary, target enemy assets. SOF may conduct SR unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. Other examples of SR missions are target acquisition of enemy C3 systems, collection and reporting of critical information about the movement of enemy forces, plus meteorological, geographic, demographic, and hydrographic reconnaissance to support specific objectives, and post-strike reconnaissance.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) concentrate on inducing or reinforcing foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to U.S. objectives. This involves radio and television broadcasts, leaflets, pamphlets, or loudspeaker systems employed in a psychological campaign designed to

influence the enemy. PSYOP may also use certain AFSOC assets to effectively transmit messages.

SOF can conduct highly specialized missions throughout the spectrum of military operations in low, medium, or high-intensity conflicts. Low-intensity conflicts (LICs) are SOF's primary operational area. Usually localized in Third World countries, LICs fall below conventional war but above the routine, peaceful competition among states. LICs frequently involve undeclared conflicts featuring protracted struggles or conflicts among competing principles and ideologies. Examples of LICs are Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, or Operation Provide Democracy in Haiti.

SOF can also operate in medium (or mid) intensity conflicts (MIC), which incorporate conventional forces minus the use of weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear weapons). Medium-intensity conflicts are usually declared actions, but not considered war. In general they occur over a relatively short period of time, and involve only one nation. Forces are tailored to the mission. Examples are the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf.

Finally, SOF can perform in high-intensity conflicts (HIC). These may call upon all types of military forces, involve weapons of mass destruction, be protracted wars over the course of several years, and involve multiple nations. Examples are the American Civil War, World War I, and World War II.

Types of SOF

Each service, except the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, has SOF. Although the Marine Corps can perform select SOF-like missions, it does not fall under the administrative control of USSOCOM. The types of SOF discussed herein are principal units that may influence the provision of battlespace dominance to the NEF through OMFTS.

U.S. Army active and reserve component forces include Special Forces (SF), Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and PSYOP and Civil Affairs units. All U.S. Army SOF fall under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Numbering approximately 30,000 soldiers, it is the largest of the three SOF service components.⁵

Special Forces, or "Green Berets," fall under Special Forces Groups that are regionally oriented to specific areas of the world. The groups are divided into three battalions, each with one support and three operational companies. Each company is composed of a headquarters element and six operational detachments (ODs) of twelve personnel. The principal operating unit of Special Forces is the ODA, or "A Team." SF units are capable of conducting DA and SR missions. Some SF assets are prepositioned under the control of the regional SOC. Special Forces personnel possess language training and cultural familiarity, further enhancing their regional orientation.⁶ Superior language and cultural skills define SF, allowing personnel to "work with the natives."

U.S. Army Rangers are rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized to conduct highly complex DA missions. Able to deploy battalion size units within six hours of notification, they specialize in seizing and securing airfields, port facilities, communications

centers, C2 facilities, and critical chokepoints on lines of communications (LOCs).⁷ Rangers are capable of deploying by land, sea, or air to conduct DA missions at the company, battalion, or regimental level. Due to their superior training, motivation, and organization, the Rangers are perhaps the finest light infantry in the world.

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) units are specialized Army aviation assets dedicated to the conduct of special operations (SO) activities. Units are organized into both single aircraft type and composite battalions that provide a mix of light and medium lift and limited light attack capabilities. SOAR can operate in virtually any condition, day or night, and at extended ranges (due to internal and external fuel loads). SOAR units can conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, electronic warfare (EW), and support airborne C3 for SOF elements. They can also conduct operations from maritime platforms.⁸

Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces possess the unique ability to influence the enemy through nonlethal means. Using highly specialized equipment designed to transmit messages, PSYOP forces are task organized into elements that support joint or service SOF and conventional forces. PSYOP forces specialize in electronic warfare (EW) and, when working together with AFSOC assets, can influence a broad spectrum of electromagnetic signals.

U.S. Navy Special Operations Forces, called Naval Special Warfare (NSW), consist of Sea-Air-Land Teams (SEALs), SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and Special Boat Units (SBU). All U.S. Navy SOF fall under Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM),

located in Coronado, California, and number approximately 5,900 personnel.⁹

SEAL teams are maritime multipurpose combat forces that conduct a variety of special operations missions in all operational environments. Operating in sixteen-man platoons, SEALs primarily perform maritime SR and DA missions in support of joint and fleet operations. Able to infiltrate and exfiltrate by virtually any means, SEALs offer an array of capabilities to the NEF commander. SEALs can also integrate NSW command and control organizations into fleet task forces to fulfill specific requirements.

SDV Teams are a maritime combat force that use submersible systems called SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) to conduct SR or DA missions. When used with a dry deck shelter (DDS) on the back of a modified submarine, SDV's can clandestinely penetrate almost any harbor to conduct antishipping attacks and raids. The SDV is an excellent platform from which hydrographic reconnaissance data can be gathered.

Special Boat Units employ, operate, and maintain a variety of special operations ships and craft, such as high speed boats (HSB), rigid inflatable boats (RIBs), and coastal patrol ships (PCs), to conduct coastal and riverine interdiction. Great mobility and speed allow SBUs to carry out challenging SR and DA missions. SBUs also have the capability to participate, to a limited degree, in very shallow water mine countermeasure (VSW MCM) operations by locating, identifying, and marking floating surface mines.

U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOC) provide the fixed and specialized rotary-wing capabilities for SO missions. All

U.S. Air Force SOF fall under AFSOC, and number about 11,500 personnel. The crews and aircraft provide surgically precise, multitarget firepower and specialized infiltration and extraction of SOF. They may also conduct specialized SR and interdiction missions, and select missions as a CINC may direct.¹⁰ AFSOC aircraft can also support unique missions in an operations other than war (OOTW) environment.

AFSOC fixed-wing assets are comprised of AC-130 gunships, MC-130 Combat Talons, and EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft. AC-130s are capable of acquiring and engaging static or moving surface targets at night and/or in adverse weather. They are equipped with side firing 105mm, 40mm, and 25mm guns slaved into fire control systems. MC-130s can provide low-level, long-range infiltration and extraction of SOF. EC-130s provide a broadcasting capability primarily for PSYOP missions. They can also perform communications jamming in the military spectrum and intelligence gathering.¹¹

Certain AFSOC rotary-wing assets, such as MH-53J Pave Low III and the MH-60K Black Hawk, are equipped with enhanced weapons systems that enable them to conduct certain DA missions. MH-53Js have terrain following/terrain avoidance radar and precision navigation instruments that permit them to conduct precise, long-range infiltrations and extractions.¹²

Types of SEALs

The NEF commander relies on various types of assets to support the projection of power ashore. Those assets must dominate the battlespace from which they plan to operate prior to projecting power. SOF may provide capabilities that can be used to influence the

battlespace. Assets that are afloat offer the most readily available means of influencing battlespace dominance. However, some assets may be deployed from other locations in support of the NEF and still maintain sufficient connectivity to conduct operations. This subchapter deals with the types of SEALs that are available to the NEF to influence and enhance battlespace dominance.

SEALs are routinely deployed on a six month rotational basis as part of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping to the Pacific, European, and Central Commands. The main mission of these NSW forces is to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance missions in support of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Other missions may include selected SR or DA missions ashore at the discretion of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Otherwise, SOF might be chopped in support of the MAGTF to help prosecute selected attached targets farther inland. SEALs on the ARG are under the operational control (OPCON) of the Commander, Amphibious Squadron (COMPHIBRON).

Beginning in June 1992, the first designated SEAL "Strike Platoon" from the Mediterranean ARG was sent OPCON to the USS Saratoga carrier battle group. Since then, SEALs routinely deploy on carriers within the same theaters as their ARG counterparts. SEALs on carriers support battle group power projection, interdict maritime movement by boarding ships suspected of violating of certain international or unilateral sanctions, and they provide a force multiplier option that extends and enhances the battle group commander's ability to achieve battlespace dominance.¹³

SEALs also deploy on a routine basis to one of four overseas units permanently assigned in the Northern and Southern European, Pacific, and Atlantic Theaters. These units, known as Naval Special Warfare Task Units (NSWTUs), are a permanent staff that commands and controls SEALs and SBU assets deployed to support theater plans. Although under the control of the theater SOC, SEALs may be dispatched to support the NEF should the need arise. This type of transfer of SOF between warfighting CINCs has been demonstrated repeatedly in exercises as recent as Bright Star 94.¹⁴ The NSWTU serves in support of the CINC's objectives by providing a ready package of forward deployed NSW assets that are regionally oriented and highly trained for likely theater contingencies.

SEALs that can be used in support of the NEF may come from CONUS. During the 1989 Operation Just Cause, SEALs were deployed from their home station in Norfolk, Virginia, to conduct SR and DA missions in Panama. In similar circumstances, SEALs from San Diego, California, were deployed to augment NAVCENT (Naval component of the Central Command) during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These two examples illustrate the flexibility and versatility inherent within SOF. Although NSW forces on hand provide the fastest response, SOF can be imported from within theater, from other naval assets such as certain carrier battle groups, or from CONUS to support the NEF.

SOF Command and Control

SOF that is used to support the NEF must have a viable C2 capability in order to be effective. Communicating and transmitting information of real time value is the backbone of special operations.

SOF must have a deployable or in place command and control network that is tailored to SOF's special needs.

As mandated by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols) of 1986, all SOF based in CONUS are assigned to USSOCOM who exercises combatant command (COCOM) over those forces. OPCON of those forces is exercised by USCINCSOC through subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFC), service component commanders, or functional component commanders (such as SOCs). Each warfighting CINC has a SOC. Each SOC draws SOF from predesignated forces that are regionally oriented, and are either permanently deployed in theater or stationed in CONUS. The SOC then provides C2 through a task organized JSOTF to plan, rehearse, and execute the operation, regardless of location. OPCON of the JSOTF may be passed to other subordinate commanders as designated by the theater CINC, such as the NEF.

When SOF is provided OPCON, TACON, or in support of service or joint force commanders, appropriate SOF C2 assets are attached to the controlling headquarters to provide liaison and expertise regarding employment of SOF. Examples of such an arrangement include a SOC assigned NSWTU in support of fleet amphibious or strike operations, or a Ranger battalion under the OPCON of an Army corps to seize an airfield.¹⁵ Permanently deployed SOF headquarters, such as NSWTUs, provide the personnel and expertise to execute such assignments. Essentially, when SOF are sent by a CINC to support the activities of the NEF, the appropriate C2 follows. That SOF C2 organization is equipped to communicate with national and theater systems to acquire intelligence from national level assets. Hence, SOF C2 can effectively

operate in support of a NEF from either an embarked or land-based headquarters.

NSW assets deployed on ARGs or with carrier battle groups have an NSW TU as their headquarters. The assets normally are comprised of one or two SEAL platoons and an SBU detachment of two boats per platoon. The NSW TU oversees NSW operations and provides liaison and expertise to the Commander, Amphibious Squadron (COMPHIBRON) for an ARG, or the Commander, Carrier Group (COMCARGRU) in the case of a carrier battle group. In both cases, the NSW TU has access to national level intelligence assets, can communicate via message traffic or through satellite communications, and can deploy with the SEAL platoon or SBU detachment to provide the on scene C2 linkup until additional SOF arrive. This places SOF NSW assets in a forward deployed status, collocated in most cases with the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (normally a Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC)).

SOF Employment in Theater

In addition to deploying SOF NSW assets on a routine basis, joint SOF can be deployed as an organic asset of the NEF. As was demonstrated in Operation Provide Democracy, Admiral Paul David Miller's (former CINCUSACOM) concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging engages air and land forces, ". . . with options to operate from either a carrier or amphibious ship deck (jets, helicopters, Marines, SOF, and C4I)." ¹⁶ SOF in the future is likely to be employed in a joint structure of which the NEF is an integral part of the force projection package. Further, SOF can combine in special teams to support the NEF, or, the NEF can draw from SOF assets in theater or in CONUS. Almost all SOF

assets can deploy on ships, except for certain fixed-wing AFSOC assets (but each AFSOC fixed-wing aircraft has an air refueling capability, thus creating longer legs for a given mission).

Joint SOF in support of the NEF also provides excellent C3 capabilities, can be tailored to the mission, has self-contained medical support, and can operate in austere sea, air, or land environments. Joint SOF gives the NEF maximum flexibility with minimal investment. Further, joint SOF can readily adapt to joint C3 structures that depend on reliable communications to conduct missions. Through its trained personnel and updated equipment, SOF provides services and specific assets unavailable to conventional forces.

SOF's flexibility, versatility, and unique military and cross cultural skills enable them to function effectively alone or as part of a larger force. Their singular capabilities maximize strategic advantage while minimizing risk. SOF complements the framework of virtually any force structure involved in conflict at all levels worldwide. With capabilities ranging from DA and SR missions to nonlethal PSYOP campaigns, SOF offers a range of options to strategic and operational planners.

The NEF may be the first force deployed in response to regional conflicts. Since the NEF can function in a broad range of assignments based on OMFTS, it must provide the initial enabling capability for joint and combined operations. In the age of increasing sophistication and lethality in a warfighting environment, the NEF must use all available means to selectively dominate its battlespace in order to prepare for effective projection of power ashore.

The unique capabilities, organization, and effectiveness of SOF suggests that they have a substantive role in influencing the creation of battlespace dominance in support of the NEF. The NEF provides C2 and surveillance, force sustainment, battlespace dominance, and projection of power. Joint campaigns will require control of the sea in order to prosecute objectives based on land. Projecting power from the littoral regions through OMFTS relies on the establishment of battlespace dominance in multiple zones to give the NEF a wide range of combat options. SOF may be the force of choice to fill the gaps currently unaddressed by conventional forces, or they may act as an enabling force that pulls larger, conventional units ashore based on real time reporting SR missions. SOF may be required to augment a well-rounded OMFTS strategy based on the concepts of battlespace dominance and projection of power ashore from the littoral region.

SOF have demonstrated a unique range of joint capabilities that may be used by the NEF. How SOF contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the NEF through OMFTS will be explored in the next chapter.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement, 1994, 3.

²Posture Statement, 3.

³John M. Collins, "Where Are Special Operations Forces?" Joint Force Quarterly, Number 2 (Autumn 1993), 8.

⁴Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, October 1992), II-5,6.

⁵Posture Statement, 9.

⁶Joint Pub 3-05, A-1 to A-4.

⁷Joint Pub 3-05, A-4 to A-5.

⁸Joint Pub 3-05, A-5 to A-6.

⁹Posture Statement, 9.

¹⁰Posture Statement, 9.

¹¹Posture Statement, A-4 to A-8.

¹²Posture Statement, A-6 to A-7.

¹³Tom Katana, "SEALs to the Carriers," Proceedings, June 1993, 61-63.

¹⁴From the author's personal experiences as the lead SOF planner for this exercise.

¹⁵Joint Pub 3-05, III-1 to III-7. SOCCORDs may be used to facilitate C2 arrangements between SOF units and corps headquarters.

¹⁶Paul David Miller, "The Military After Next," Proceedings, February 1994, 44.

CHAPTER FOUR

BATTLESPACE DOMINANCE AND THE NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

"... From the Sea" (FTS) is a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper that defines a combined vision for the naval services as the basis for a dramatic shift in the national maritime strategy. FTS realigns naval strategy with current national security priorities as first announced by the President in August 1990.¹ Replacing the maritime strategy of the 1980's that advocated open ocean warfare against Soviet ships and submarines, FTS emphasizes the unstable littoral regions of the world as sites for future naval power projection in support of U.S. interests.

The centerpiece of the new naval philosophy is the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF), operating across the spectrum of conflict. The NEF is a cohesive and integrated Navy and Marine force which is sized and task organized to operate forward and respond rapidly on short notice. It operates in both low- and mid-intensity contingencies and is capable of executing opposed forcible entry in high-intensity contingencies.

Due to its range of capabilities and superior tactical and strategic mobility, the NEF plays a central role in safeguarding national interests. NEFs are logistically self-sustaining and can be sized and tailored for operational requirements. As a result, the NEF will often be the first force to project (or threaten to project) U.S.

national power in short warning low-intensity contingencies. FTS posits that the NEF will project power in the littoral waters. To support this transition of power from sea to shore, the NEF has the required C2 and surveillance capabilities to dominate a designated sea-air-land battlespace.

The NEF projects power ashore through the application of maneuver, using a concept called "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS). OMFTS meshes the tenets of maneuver at sea, amphibious warfare, and maneuver ashore into a single concept of naval "maneuver warfare."² OMFTS embodies a fundamental aim (to collapse the enemy's will to fight); and in so doing considers the enemy's critical vulnerabilities, territorial surfaces, force gaps, and operational tempo. OMFTS applies these concepts for the projection of power ashore using the sea for both operational and tactical level maneuver.³ In a major regional contingency, OMFTS is employed by naval forces to achieve an operational-level objective in support of a major CINC campaign goal. Such an objective may be an enabling operation introducing follow-on forces early in a campaign; likewise, it may be an operation, such as the assault at Inchon, Korea, which cut the enemy's lines of communications (LOC) during the Korean War, or it may combine aspects of both.⁴

OMFTS also emphasizes the use of tailored Marine landing forces integrated within task organized fleet elements as central to the projection of naval combat power from the sea. On the mid- to high-intensity battlefield, OMFTS envisions a single, seamless operation from commitment of the NEF through success ashore. In such operations, the

principal arm of decision is power projection through the amphibious assault. In future operational maneuvers from the sea, specialized forces inserted ashore prior to the amphibious assault, such as SOF reconnaissance units, will "pull" conventional forces to gaps in enemy defenses and force dispositions identified through real time intelligence. Conventional forces will exploit these gaps through the projection of precision fires in a designated battlespace. The superior strategic and tactical mobility inherent in the NEF maximizes flexibility of action. The NEF becomes a maneuver force that can shift forces and exploit gaps to dominate the battlespace. OMFTS is the chief maneuver tool by which the NEF confronts a challenging and often varied set of combat circumstances.⁵

Tenets of FTS and NDP 1: Naval Warfare

The NEF accomplishes its distinct roles and functions according to FTS and Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare. While FTS realigned certain strategic priorities, the NEF retains the roles of deterrence, sea superiority, and protection of maritime trade. According to FTS and NDP 1, the NEF provides C2 and surveillance, force sustainment, battlespace dominance, and the projection of power.⁶

Although all elements of the naval strategy are complementary and necessary, battlespace dominance (BSD) is the essential condition that enables power projection ashore through operational maneuver from the sea. Achieving BSD permits friendly operations but denies an enemy both freedom of action and knowledge concerning the disposition of friendly forces. Achieving and maintaining control of battlespace is the central goal in order to project power. Because BSD is selectively

achieved by the NEF, it is temporary, and is always mission dependent. It relies on the use of time, distance, and assets available for successful projection of power at the geographic points, at the precise moment, and under those conditions most favorable to success.

The NEF's C2 and surveillance capability provide the neural framework by which it executes and coordinates all operations. C2 and surveillance refer to "the gathering, processing, and distribution of information vital to the conduct of military planning and operations."⁷ Because the need to process, receive, and exchange information internally is immense, the NEF must rely on consistent C2 and surveillance capabilities over broad distances in order to promote unity of command and efficiency of decision making. Reliable, real time intelligence is essential to the success of C2 and surveillance efforts.

Although BSD is a prerequisite for successful power projection, provision and maintenance of BSD frequently overlap, or help sustain, projection of power. The NEF is afforded a full range of options in projection using any of a number of forces or systems. These include carrier based strike aircraft, MAGTFs, long-range sea-launched Cruise missiles, naval gunfire support (NGFS), C2 warfare, and SOF.⁸

Battlespace Dominance as a Principle of OMFTS

BSD relies on the principles of flexibility, speed, and freedom of action. BSD is multidimensional and includes air, surface, subsurface, the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, land, and space. Selectively dominating these dimensions is essential to the survival and effectiveness of the NEF. The NEF requires the use of many assets in order to control its battlespace. It may use ships, satellites,

submarines, aircraft, and ground forces and an array of electro-magnetic capabilities integrated into a C2 structure that can be extended throughout the battlespace. The NEF employs these assets to control the multidimensional aspects of BSD. Critically, CINC assets may also be employed in support of the NEF.

The principles of BSD apply across the spectrum of conflict. The NEF must execute low- to mid-intensity operations either as a component of the joint task force (JTF) or as its principal element. It can execute mid- to high-intensity operations, such as an opposed assault, employing OMFTS as part of a CINC's campaign plan.⁹ In either case the NEF must be able to conduct sustained operations within its battlespace. By employing the principles of OMFTS it can project power ashore and exploit success in order to support the larger campaign or operational concept.

The battlespace surrounding the NEF is neither fixed nor tied to a consistent series of figures. Instead, it is composed of temporary "zones of superiority" that are established and may move with the force. It can then close as dictated by the operational concept of employment of the NEF. These "zones" are used to establish a particular dominance in a designated time and space. They may reach out for hundreds of miles to protect other entities, such as land masses, amphibious groups, or merchant shipping.¹⁰

The NEF may exercise BSD while en route as well as once in the area of operations (AO). The application of all its components enables the NEF to be multidimensional with regards to BSD. The NEF controls battlespace by using an offensive derivative of the composite warfare

commander doctrine. This doctrine allows the NEF commander to weigh all his assets when orchestrating the main effort. The CINC may use the NEF in combination with other joint or coalition forces to achieve BSD, or to act in support of U.S. national interests.

The NEF establishes the conditions necessary for projecting power via zones of superiority. These differ in terms of the medium involved, duration, location, and specific objective. Multiple zones may exist when specific task forces are separated from the main force. The establishment and closing of zones are based on employing the capabilities of specific weapons and systems according to a carefully developed plan. The plan is designed to maximize friendly capabilities, minimize enemy strengths, exploit enemy vulnerabilities, and employ surprise and deception.

BSD is achieved and sustained selectively through a careful mix of complementary forces which include SOF. Adequate BSD will be achieved only when the NEF commander judges that he can project power ashore in an assigned NEF mission within an acceptable level of risk.

Battlespace Dominance Illustration

The ideas and principles of BSD can best be illustrated by using a simplified scenario. Country X is hostile towards the U.S. and following a short sharp deterioration in relations, the National Command Authority chooses to protect the threatened national interests by projecting power against country X. Joint SOF assets are assigned to the NEF, which is forward deployed in international waters. Also assumed is that the United States has the use of an air base in a country that borders country X. The NEF has the full complement of Navy

and Marine Corps assets, including several aircraft carriers, fast attack submarines capable of lock in/lock out (LI/LO) operations, and an embarked Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF FWD). Country X has a 2,000 mile coastline but no air force or aircraft with military capabilities.

The CINC's campaign strategy calls for the NEF to be the instrument of force. Since the NEF is in the vicinity of country X, it initially takes position fifteen-to-twenty miles from its coastline, in the littoral region. In addition to employing national intelligence assets, the NEF commander sends out reconnaissance assets, including fixed and rotary wing aircraft, as well as SOF, to get his "eyes and ears" out to find gaps or enemy weaknesses. The NEF commander intentionally deploys his SOF ashore in a large area of operations (AO) to avoid unintentional compromise of his plan. Since the NEF can conduct an amphibious landing overnight with nearly 150 miles of coastline as a possible landing site, SOF are dispatched over the horizon (OTH) by surface craft (RIBS, Mk V SOCs, and/or PC's), submarine (dry deck launch or lock out), or rotary wing assets to conduct multiple and simultaneous SR missions ashore. Other SOF surface assets are dispatched to detect and mark surface mines that may be planted near intended coastal insertion points or in possible shipping channels planned for use by the NEF. Meanwhile, SOF special reconnaissance elements ashore are communicating real time intelligence with their JSOTF HQ (or NSWTU) located on board the NEF flagship.

Conversely, the NEF commander may elect not to dominate all the battlespace, in a deliberate attempt to deceive or confuse the enemy as

to friendly capabilities and intentions. In the case of the coastal radar, a diversion may be created in other areas to prompt a misuse of enemy assets or, simply, confusion. Similarly, SOF in outlying areas away from the intended main points of attack may conduct direct action (DA) missions on other enemy installations not essential to the friendly campaign plan in order to create diversions as part of the larger deception plan. SOF may also be used to falsely establish an artificially large force in the mind of the enemy commander. This is accomplished through the selective use of deception and PSYOP broadcasts insuring that the enemy "receives the news" that a larger force is present.

Another diversion may be an explosive demonstration on a selected beach to convince the enemy that an amphibious landing at that location is imminent. The imaginative use of SOF in these ways suggests several alternatives to contributing to BSD in support of the overall campaign plan of the NEF commander. As suggested by the examples, SOF has potential roles in contributing to the creation and maintenance of BSD in support of the NEF through the application of OMFTS.

SOF SR missions ashore can identify a variety of problems that may present difficulties for the NEF commander's plan. First, SOF may discover a coastal radar site on a bluff overlooking a beach landing site for a possible amphibious landing. Second, SOF may observe large concentrations of enemy forces near a major chokepoint. Third, SOF may identify a probable surface to surface Silkworm missile site with mobile launchers that could target the carrier or one of the NEF's other surface ships. In a final example, SOF could uncover a potential enemy

command and control and communications site that appears to be the hub of enemy activity.

The NEF commander elects to use SOF to contribute to BSD by prosecuting these targets. First, against the coastal radar site, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft based near country X may selectively jam the air detection capabilities of the site, while SEALs are used to conduct a DA mission to blow up part of the facility. If SEALs cannot get close enough to plant demolition charges, or strike the site with standoff weapons systems, they may call in AC-130 gunships based in the nearby country, or carrier based strike aircraft, to destroy the target. Second, against large concentrations of enemy forces, leaflets are dropped to persuade them to surrender prior to commencing hostilities. Failing response from the leaflets, SOF calls in carrier based aircraft to conduct air interdiction missions. Meanwhile, SOF positioned near enemy weaknesses or gaps alert the NEF commander, who in turn sends in Marine air and ground assault forces to exploit the situation. Third, in the case of the Silkworm missile site, SOF identifies a threat to the NEF that avoided detection by U.S. national level assets. SOF conducts a follow-on DA mission, or directs tactical aircraft to conduct an air interdiction mission to destroy the site, or may conduct a DA mission to destroy the launch capabilities of the system. Last, against the C2 site, with prior EC-130 jamming, SF or SEALs conduct a DA mission or direct aircraft as before to destroy the target.

Potential SOF Roles and Battlespace Dominance

SOF can be used to target or influence specific areas of the warfare spectrum to assist the overall NEF effort at BSD. In this

section, the warfare areas of air, land, surface, subsurface, EM spectrum, and preassault and advance force operations will be examined for potential SOF roles in achieving or influencing NEF battlespace dominance.

SOF contributions in the air include contributing to, or achieving, air superiority or air supremacy. In no- or low-air threat environments, where the enemy has few practical means of countering air attacks, SOF AC-130 gunships can provide several uninterrupted hours of surgical firepower from a variety of weapons systems. This capability of conducting close air support (CAS), armed reconnaissance, air interdiction, convoy or helicopter escort, or surveillance makes the AC-130 a unique and extremely capable platform from which OMFTS could benefit.¹¹ The AC-130 is also effective as a fire support platform for ongoing DA, SR, or other select SOF missions. In addition, AC-130 gunships, with highly sensitive surveillance capabilities, can provide real time C2 and surveillance information. This form of data supports friendly maneuvering units, while simultaneously informing them of enemy disposition. Employment of AC-130s in recent conflicts like Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia exemplify the value of such an aircraft.

The MC-130E Combat Talon aircraft can infiltrate and exfiltrate SOF using all-weather, night, long-range low-level routes, and is undetectable by the most advanced enemy radar systems. Airdropping SOF behind hostile lines in order to conduct deep SR missions is an option available to the NEF commander. SOF positioned well forward can

forewarn of movement, disposition, and possible intentions, or even target key personnel and installations for attack in coordination with the NEF's main effort.¹² SOF may also use MC-130E aircraft to assist in relaying real time communications to the NEF's reporting center.

Rotary-wing SOF assets can also provide unique contributions to the NEF. The MH-53J Pave Low III helicopter is a nighttime, all-weather, precision aircraft capable of aerial refueling capability, and terrain following/terrain avoidance. With it, the NEF commander can reasonably expect to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF almost anywhere within his AO with little risk of detection. The MH-47E Chinook and the MH-60K Black Hawk can conduct similar all-weather night missions in support of SOF missions. All SOF helicopters are equipped with weapons and navigational systems to enhance their fighting capabilities.¹³

BSD on land is influenced by SOF primarily through SR and DA missions. SOF ground forces (SF, Ranger, SEALs) are used in DA missions with the assistance of friendly C2 and surveillance assets, and fire support. SOF land forces can directly engage the enemy, call in fires, or execute a combination of the two. SOF is also effectively used with great surprise and speed against an unprepared or untrained enemy. An example is the raid and recapturing of Qurah Island by SEALs, the first Kuwaiti territory liberated by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm.¹⁴ Once secured, the island was used as a staging area for other NSW reconnaissance and DA missions. Another example of using SOF land forces is the H-hour Ranger assault and capture of Rio Hato airfield in Panama as part of Operation Just Cause.¹⁵

SOF may also be effectively used on land to conduct SR missions. SOF SR missions can complement national and theater intelligence collection assets at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, through border reconnaissance and deep penetration missions to obtain specific, time-sensitive information. SOF may be the only means available to provide positive identification of certain types of targets, such as land based precision guided sea skimmer missiles, including the Silkworm, or the CS-801 or 802 Sardine.¹⁶ In 1987, Silkworms threatened the free passage of oil aboard tankers transiting the Straits of Hormuz. During Operation Earnest Will, SOF provided NSW units which played important roles in not only securing sea lines of communication, but denying the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps the opportunity to harass commercial shipping, and preventing the re-seeding of mines in the northern Persian Gulf.¹⁷ Additionally, in the Persian Gulf region, SOF was used during Operation Desert Storm to search and locate Iraqi Scud sites that were invisible to satellite photography because the launchers were hidden underneath highway overpasses as allied satellites passed overhead. SOF located, positively identified, and targeted those sites for destruction by directing allied air strikes.¹⁸

Similar logic may be applied to SOF SR missions searching for enemy artillery or land based missile sites capable of firing laser guided ordnance that may target the NEF. The threat from Silkworm or Sardine antiship missiles makes the NEF vulnerable when transiting critical choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz. Ships can be lased from land based sites occupied by mobile artillery camouflaged or hidden

as the Scud missiles were during Operation Desert Storm. Human verification (i.e., SOF), not overhead imagery, may be required to correctly and adequately identify, target, and neutralize the threat from mobile surface-to-surface land based missiles and artillery before the NEF is engaged.

Surface SOF assets contribute to achieving or influencing BSD. A technologically inferior enemy with few naval surface assets should present little to no real threat to SOF's exclusive surface assets. For example, NSW coastal patrol ships, Mk V special operations craft, rigid inflatable boats, and other patrol boats can maintain complete BSD against a foreign Navy which has limited surface assets. Opposite an enemy that is better trained and equipped, SOF NSW surface assets complement the response of the NEF to small-scale surface threats, as was demonstrated in Operation Earnest Will. Additionally, NSW surface craft can conduct SR or selected DA missions, as well as infiltrate and exfiltrate SOF in virtually any maritime environment. These SR and DA missions also include detecting, identifying, and destroying select surface mines. Further, NSW surface assets expand the electronic connectivity of the NEF through vectoring operations with naval surface and air platforms. Able to operate in restricted waters, NSW craft can provide early warning, contact validation, and CSAR coverage in the initial phases of an operation.¹⁹ The use of SOF surface assets is exemplified in this passage from the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:

NSW units conducted security missions along the Kuwaiti coast from 23 August to 12 September. Navy SEALs and Navy SBU detachments conducted nightly patrols off Al-Jubayl Harbor while Marine Corps maritime pre-positioned ships unloaded. Beginning in October, SEAL platoons maintained a continual presence north of Ras Al-Khafji. These platoons provided real-time intelligence and coordinated close air support. For example, in late January, SEALs photographed

the Iraqi minelayer, T-43, while it was actively laying mines in Kuwaiti territorial waters. Additionally, four hours after the Coalition air strikes began on 17 January, SEALs called in CAS and destroyed the Iraqi border station, 400 yards north of the Saudi-Kuwait border.²⁰

Below the surface, SOF provides the NEF with unique capabilities which augment OMFTS. With some success, SOF NSW forces can detect, locate, and destroy subsurface mines in very shallow water, that is, from twenty-one feet and shallower. This capability, to be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, complements the overwhelming superiority of the NEF in undersea warfare. Other SOF capabilities include the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), which provides covert underwater transport, and allows SEALs to conduct DA demolition attacks against enemy shipping, oil platforms, and piers. Further, SEAL platoons can conduct DA and SR missions against maritime targets in port or at anchor. These combat swimmers allow the NEF to surgically attack enemy shipping before it gets underway. Disabling a ship or blocking a harbor or channel for twenty-four hours or more may prove significant in the CINC's overall campaign plan. An example of SOF conducting underwater missions is the use of SEALs to destroy not only enemy fast patrol boats guarding entrances to the Panama canal, but Manuel Noriega's yacht, thwarting his escape during Operation Just Cause.²¹

SOF may also impact on the EM spectrum, using specialized assets to contribute to BSD. Through the EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft, SOF can provide broadcasting capabilities for PSYOP missions, perform communications jamming, and gather intelligence. The spectrum includes AM/FM radio, shortwave, television, and military command, control and communications (C3) channels. Deception and manipulation capabilities

are also possible.²² With enemy C3 nets under control of U.S. forces, the NEF commander can completely dominate the battlespace in terms of the EM spectrum. Propaganda supporting the NEF campaign plan may be introduced to create confusion or deception. Or, nothing may be attempted other than to selectively jam enemy communications. With the military technical revolution in full swing, the EM spectrum is potentially the greatest area of SOF contributions to BSD.

The use of SOF to influence BSD may also be realized in the area of preassault or advance force operations. These operations are frequently conducted prior to an amphibious assault. SOF NSW forces routinely conduct hydrographic reconnaissance prior to every Marine amphibious landing in a denied area, and thus are critical to the success of the operation. SOF may also conduct SR missions ashore that identify gaps for future exploitation by the NEF. SOF can be employed over a large area in order not to compromise the landing plan to maintain tactical surprise. SOF would therefore "pull" the landing force to the best location as events developed, in accordance with the premises outlined in OMFTS. An example of SOF conducting advance force operations prior to an amphibious landing is Operation Overlord in June 1944, where NSW forces conducted hydrographic surveys and destroyed obstacles on the beaches of Normandy, France, prior to allied forces coming ashore.²³

Potential SOF Roles in C2 and Surveillance that contribute to BSD

SOF may also influence C2 and surveillance areas that may potentially contribute to BSD. These areas are intelligence and reconnaissance "pull," near real time targeting, battle damage

assessment (BDA) and restrike missions, and command and control (C2) warfare.

SOF can provide excellent intelligence through its reconnaissance assets and "pull" maneuver units and thereby respond to enemy weaknesses. Through SR missions, SOF can convey real time intelligence across its reliable communications network. SOF C2 supports this function well, as SOF has state-of-the-art communications equipment, well-trained personnel, and a joint staff that integrates into any existing command structure, such as the C2 framework for the NEF or the theater CINC. Further, most SOF units conduct SR missions, and those personnel are trained to assess, observe, and record the enemy's disposition. In sum, the contribution to BSD from intelligence and reconnaissance pull is noteworthy, as SOF is joint, flexible, rapidly deployable, and can be tailored to the mission.

In addition, SOF can provide rapid assessment, targeting, and battle damage assessment (BDA) to carrier strike operations, thus facilitating and, in some cases, directing the rapid restrike of targets. SOF can communicate with and control the application of fires from air, sea, or land based platforms. Therefore, SOF can direct CAS, NGFS, AC-130 gunships, and air interdiction operations. Targets can be illuminated with lasers to direct precision guided ordnance. Plus, SOF can operate unsupported for days in hostile, harsh environments with the enemy unaware that U.S. forces are nearby. SOF located in key locations deep behind enemy lines offer excellent BDA to strike operations; whereas pilots may not be able to return to their target to survey damage. SOF located near critical targets offer the added advantage of

on-scene rescue personnel for carrier based strike aircraft, should they be shot down nearby. All these factors contribute to BSD through the ability of NEF to selectively control critical airspace and operate at will in denied areas with reduced risk.

SOF may also contribute to the destruction of enemy C2 by employing several means of C2 warfare. They are operations security, jamming, military deception, and destruction of enemy C2. Operations security is built into the framework of SOF, with information closely guarded as a matter of routine. Jamming may be accomplished by EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft disrupting or displacing enemy transmissions. Military deception is best accomplished through SOF small unit actions, ranging from diversionary raids to explosive charges simulating beach preparations for an amphibious landing. An example of SOF using military deception is during Operation Desert Storm, when six SEALs planted delayed charges and set up lane markers on a beach in Kuwait City which deceived two Iraqi divisions into thinking that an amphibious invasion was imminent.²⁴ SOF may also destroy, or assist in destroying, enemy C2 through DA raids, or by directing air assets in close air support or air interdiction roles. An example of SOF assisting the destruction of an enemy C2 site was Operation Eager Anvil during Operation Desert Storm. In the first action of the allied attack, MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters led AH-64 Apache helicopters to destroy two key Iraqi early warning radar control sites. This opened a corridor for follow-on F-15E and F-117 bombing attacks on Baghdad.²⁵ The destruction of enemy C2 by SOF can be a major contribution to the selective domination of the battlespace in the EM spectrum as well as in

the air, land, surface, and subsurface areas of responsibility. SOF may play other roles, such as roles in power projection, that influence BSD through OMFTS.

Potential SOF Roles in Power Projection that contribute to BSD

SOF may offer significant contributions to the provision of BSD through the projection of power in several key areas. They are over the horizon (OTH) operations, influencing enemy centers of gravity and the will of the people, and the identification and destruction of sea mines.

SOF can support the requirement for the NEF to launch an OTH operation without compromising the landing plan. OTH operations are launched from at least fourteen nautical miles away from the beach in order to remain invisible to the unassisted enemy eye that might be watching. Because SOF NSW forces routinely train in this task, conducting a surface OTH infiltration at night in heavy seas is possible, all the while maintaining communications with the NEF and providing updated intelligence on location of friendly and enemy assets. SOF NSW forces have night vision devices that assist night infiltration, as well as a global positioning system (GPS) on board all NSW surface craft. SOF OTH operations may launch well ahead of the NEF's arrival, using surface PCs with a 2,000 nautical mile range. This way SOF infiltrates days ahead of the arrival of the naval task force. NSW long-range communications would provide critical data on hydrographic suitability of potential beach landing sites, meteorological data, geographic data, and disposition of enemy forces. SOF may also conduct OTH using other modes of infiltration, such as fixed or rotary wing air, subsurface, or a combination of any of these.

SOF can directly target or indirectly influence the will of the people when projecting nonlethal power. Through extensive PSYOP campaigns, the use of announcements, leaflets, and TV and radio broadcasts can persuade civilians and combatants alike to reconsider their hostility against the United States. Examples of the use of PSYOP are the "Voice of the Gulf" and leaflet drops that warned entrenched Iraqi soldiers of upcoming B-52 bombing raids on their positions unless they surrendered immediately.²⁶ Another example is the use of leaflets announcing the intentions of American troops in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.²⁷

In the maritime arena, SOF may provide detection, avoidance, and neutralization capabilities to the NEF against sea mines. With some degree of success, SOF NSW assets can detect surface mines in certain areas such as harbors, ports, channels, or shipping lanes through cautiously patrolling the designated areas in NSW surface craft. Once located, mines are identified, marked, and destroyed if possible. In addition, SOF can conduct very shallow water mine countermeasures (VSW MCM) to detect, identify, mark, and destroy underwater or surface mines with some reliability. Although a high risk operation, VSW MCM infringes on the enemy's use of the battlespace by rendering some of his mines inoperable or incapable of destroying their intended targets. The detection and avoidance of sea mines gives the NEF commander the option to operate freely on the seas and to project amphibious power through OMFTS at will.

In summary, SOF offers several potential contributions to BSD in the following key warfighting areas: air, land, surface, subsurface, EM

spectrum, and advance force operations. Through the contributions of SOF in C2 and surveillance and in power projection, many possibilities exist for SOF to influence BSD. The final chapter of the thesis will draw conclusions on the contributions of SOF to BSD through OMFTS in support of the NEF.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Many dangers face the United States in the post-Cold War era. Regional conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increased ethnic and nationalistic competition, mass population shifts, religious fundamentalism, territorial disputes, the deterioration of the global environment, the increase of narcotics production, trafficking, and consumption, the tenuous economic strength of developing nations, and the search for democracy and reform in countries seeking a new lease on their troubled pasts dictate that military force will continue to be a key instrument of power for the United States in the years ahead.¹

Because of strategic mobility, rapid response, versatility, and flexibility to task organize, it is likely that naval assets would be among the first means called on by the National Command Authority to preserve or enforce U.S. interests abroad. The Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) would be the primary instrument to project power from the sea, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) can play an essential role in contributing to NEF battlespace dominance and power projection and the success of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS).

Special Operations Forces contribute to battlespace dominance (BSD) across the spectrum of conflict. SOF may conduct missions in the air, on land, at sea, undersea, or through electronic means using a variety of platforms to support the operational plan. SOF may also

influence BSD through contributions in pre-assault or advance force operations in support of naval expeditionary forces.

As a separate entity, SOF can expand or contract battlespace. SOF can operate remotely and unassisted in almost every medium of concern to the NEF, with reliable command, control, and communication (C3) links to facilitate real time reporting or targeting. Pushing SOF out well ahead of the NEF or branching out in an established area of operations provides a network of sea-air-land communications to develop new areas of interest, or simply to monitor access routes into existing areas of interest to the NEF.

SOF offer unique contributions that apply in a world of increasing entropy. Unlike conventional forces inflexibly defending the proverbial Fulda Gap, SOF can balance a campaign by providing adaptability, versatility, and a variety of options to a JTF or NEF commander engaging in a rapidly changing operation. In essence, SOF provides a combined arms aspect to naval warfighting through its expertise in jointly integrated special reconnaissance, direct action, and psychological operations. Further, SOF can play an important role in ensuring well coordinated allied operations, providing what Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf described as "the glue that held the coalition together" during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.² Finally, SOF acts as a force multiplier in support of conventional forces, thereby increasing the efficiency of the overall effort.

Combining the capabilities of the NEF and SOF offers other advantages. The NEF-SOF C3 interface is complemented by enhanced links that tie ground truth estimates with battle damage assessments provided

by on scene SOF to the NEF commander. This information can be used to exploit enemy gaps. Additionally, SOF can enhance the targeting efforts of friendly forces by locating, identifying, marking, and guiding precision munitions to their intended targets. Having real time information provided by SOF to the NEF may ultimately lead to shorter engagement times, increased probability of kill, and fluidity of action. Finally, due to enhanced intelligence, targeting, and reporting, the interface between SOF and the NEF can be used to develop operations with minimal collateral damage and reduced casualties.

The NEF-SOF interface has unlimited potential. With the military technical revolution in full swing, it is certain that advances in technology will amplify existing C3 nodes and data transmission capabilities. A battlefield without technical boundaries will be the end result. Under these assumptions, SOF may be the best bet against the inflation of time and resources. In order to fully realize this potential, SOF should be integrated and incorporated into a series of fundamental doctrinal and practical applications that serve to educate and instruct present and future generations of military professionals.

Doctrinal Applications

Doctrinal applications of the NEF-SOF interface need not be limited in scope. In the achievement of BSD, SOF can discreetly and clandestinely operate in support of the NEF in low-intensity conflict. SOF can operate independently or in concert with conventional forces, can effectively integrate within existing C3 structures on naval platforms, and offer unique capabilities to the overall missions of the NEF. In high-intensity environments, SOF offers a variety of options

that influence BSD to the NEF throughout air, land, surface, subsurface, EM spectrum, and advance force operations. Strategists must explore each medium in order to fully exploit the potential benefits to naval commanders.

The NEF-SOF interface should be included as warfighting strategy in joint doctrine, and discussed in mid to senior level seminars and in formal military educational institutions. It is important that joint publications emphasize at strategic, operational, and tactical levels the potential for increased SOF interplay in naval expeditionary warfare. Target publications would be Joint Pub 3-0: Operations; Joint Pub 3-05: Joint Special Operations; and Joint Pub 3-05.3: Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures. Joint schools, such as the Armed Forces Staff College, will improve their curriculum by encouraging discussions on the innovative use of SOF within a naval framework. Additionally, each service should be certain that SOF and its connection to naval warfighting is well integrated within existing doctrinal publications and presented at mid and senior level service command and general staff schools and war colleges.

It is imperative that the United States Special Operations Command, in conjunction with the Department of the Navy and the Naval Doctrine Command, take the lead in publishing and fielding doctrinal writings that explore potential SOF contributions in support of naval expeditionary forces. NDP 1: Naval Warfare, and NDP 3: Operations, should be updated with language espousing the NEF-SOF interface. Additionally, changes are long overdue to specific naval warfare publications such as NWP 3-05: Naval Special Warfare. Today, they must

incorporate potential Naval Special Warfare contributions to naval expeditionary forces.

Marine commanders should consider the use of SOF to enhance Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) campaign strategies and air-ground interfaces. Field manuals such as FMFM 1: Warfighting, FMFM 1-1: Campaigning, and FMFM 1-3: Tactics need to represent SOF as allies in conducting complex maneuvers from the sea. Efforts such as increased SOF participation in ARG amphibious exercises during blue-green water pre-deployment workups will foster greater interoperability and facilitate C3 architectures. Marine representatives at USSOCOM and theater SOCs should continue to promote greater awareness and understanding of complementary capabilities.

Naval Special Warfare Command is obliged to continue its study and discussion of potential strategies and deployment structures of NSW forces that contribute to the success of the NEF. Lessons learned from recent deployments should be compiled in a database studied by naval strategists and expeditionary planners. NAVSPECWARCOM and NSW officers alike must continue to explore new and creative uses for embarked SEAL, SDV, and SBU forces in support of expeditionary operations within a joint framework.

Continued cooperative efforts between the United States Army Special Operations Command and the Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, with the appropriate Army battle labs must ensure that Army Special Operations Forces are well integrated into operations that originate from the sea. Publications such as FM 100-5: Operations; FM 100-15: Corps Operations; FM 100-20: Military Operations in Low

Intensity Conflict; and FM 100-25: Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces would do well to reflect potential SOF contributions to battlespace dominance in support of naval warfighting.

Air Force Special Operations Command working closely with the Departments of the Air Force and Navy can explore new ways to support naval operations. In this light, basic Air Force doctrinal publications, such as AFM 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Volumes I and II, should contain references to the potential of integrating Air Force Special Operations Forces into a role that more soundly contributes to battlespace dominance in support of naval expeditionary forces.

Practical Applications

The theater unified command, in close coordination with its functional Special Operations Command, is the focal point for implementing SOF at all levels of a theater campaign plan. Theater CINC operations orders and contingency plans can rely on SOF as critical elements in the projection of power from the sea. Future exercises envisioning substantial sea based forces must involve all theater service components, with the principles of OMFTS as baseline premises. In addition, computer simulations and command post exercises should invoke increased SOF play with naval expeditionary forces within a joint C3 structure.

SOF will be a key player in future joint exercises and therefore must deploy as part of the NEF, in order to apply their multifaceted capabilities as an integrated part of the NEF. Accordingly, increased participation in future exercises should lead to more clearly defined

performance objectives in operations, especially with the potential to substantially reduce the vulnerability of task force ships in early stages of conflict. It is important that battle force commanders explore expanded roles for embarked SEAL and SBU detachments on routine deployments with CVBG and ARG shipping. AFSOC and ARSOF assets must conduct exercises with deployed NSWUTUs as Adaptive Joint Force Packages. Augmenting these packages with SOF qualified officers serving on the NEF commander's staff within a modified composite warfare concept is essential.

In support of NEF operations, NSW forces should strive for complete integration into overall exercise or campaign objectives, and be prepared to enhance the operational picture available to the NEF commander. First, the NSW community must continue to operate and exercise in conjunction with every asset that may be assigned to a NEF, for example, on fast attack submarines and aircraft carriers. Exercises need to enhance the interface between SOF and other NEF or joint C3 assets when planning select SOF missions. Second, it is critical that NSW attempt to align newer and more capable SBU surface craft, such as the patrol coastal class ship and the MK V high speed boat, with frequent amphibious exercises and routine ARG deployments. Certain SBU surface craft offer enhanced protection to the NEF in overseas locations near established NSW units or naval bases. Third, select SBU riverine craft, through increased participation in NEF exercises, may extend brown water battlespace previously unknown or not available to NEF strategists. Fourth, SEAL Delivery Vehicle mission profiles can continue to develop the unique advantages inherent with the vehicle to

pre-emptively engage enemy surface assets prior to the arrival of NEF shipping. Last, NSW should maintain rigorous pre-deployment SEAL platoon workup schedules with fleet support in mind, designed in support of NEF battle groups in varied configurations.

United States Army Special Operations Command must continue to integrate its forces into naval warfighting, such as in Adaptive Joint Force Package exercises. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) must also continue to use their unique skills in support of operations from the sea, as evidenced in the initial stages of Operation Provide Democracy in Haiti. Further, all ARSOF rotary-wing assets should endeavor to be certified in deck landing qualifications on board appropriate naval vessels. ARSOF should continue to participate in interoperability exercises that deploy SOF ground units from sea based locations.

Air Force Special Operations Forces would benefit greatly from increased operations in maritime environments. Rotary-wing assets should be qualified to conduct deck landings on certain navy platforms, whether underway or in port. Fixed-wing assets, especially AC-130 gunships, need to be incorporated into the advanced play of OMFTS driven scenarios and operations. In light of this, AC-130s are well advised to frequently exercise C2 and surveillance links with NEF C3 platforms and naval airborne assets. Additionally, conventional forces will benefit from experiencing the capabilities inherent in AFSOC assets while on exercises. AFSOC can complement and enhance the air-ground interface with SOF.

Final Conclusions

There are worldwide conditions of uncertainty, unstable political climates, and increasing calls for the United States to act either as the world's policeman or as part of a multinational U.N. force. American military forces will continually be tasked to engage in conflict beyond the shoreline of the United States. Naval forces, able to operate at sea with flexibility, versatility, and rapidity, may be required to respond to a variety of political, military, and humanitarian challenges caused by regional predators or natural disaster. In naval operations, the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) will be the main instrument of naval power. The NEF will maneuver and project power from the sea as its principal method of action.

In the complex arena of expeditionary warfare, many complementary capabilities are required for the successful execution of a well designed campaign plan that employs the NEF as its centerpiece. To assist the NEF in effectively and selectively dominating battlespace in mid- to high-intensity environments, Special Operations Forces transcend conventional boundaries. They provide many options and capabilities that contribute to almost any plan which envisions the projection of power from the sea.

The successful commander in future conflicts employing naval expeditionary forces will bring all of his assets to bear in an attempt to control battlespace. In so doing, the use of Special Operations Forces must not be overlooked. Special Operations Forces complement and increase the capabilities of a NEF or a JTF, serve as a strategic adjunct to conventional forces, and can greatly enhance the success of a

NEF when conducting unilateral operations ashore, or in support of ground campaigns.

In an increasingly unstable global environment, forces that can respond quickly to change will be of great national and international value. Forces that can deploy to trouble spots rapidly, immediately work within a joint framework, possess integrated C3 systems, are self-sustaining, and project power in any medium may answer fundamental questions of force location and disposition. In this regard, sea-based forces offer the best of all solutions. With rights of international passage, force disposition, and basing the continuing subjects of political debate, the combination of naval expeditionary forces with SOF is the right mix for an uncertain future.

Someone recently characterized the future with this question: "Where is the capital of Hezbollah?" When the world is able to answer this query with an unchallenged response, naval expeditionary forces or SOF may no longer be required. Until then, the best insurance policy for the United States is clearer than may be readily apparent. It is through the imaginative use of SOF in support of naval expeditionary forces. In sum, SOF contributions to battlespace dominance increase the effectiveness of the Naval Expeditionary Force in operational maneuver from the sea. SOF should be incorporated into all levels of naval warfare, to enhance the projection of power in mediums that benefit strategic, operational, and tactical commanders.

Endnotes

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

PART I-ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADCON	administrative control
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Component
AFSOD	Air Force Special Operations Detachment
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Force
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
BDA	battle damage assessment
BLS	beach landing site
BSD	battlespace dominance
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C3I	command, control, communications and information
C4	command, control, communications and computers
CA	civil affairs
CARGRU	carrier group
CAS	close air support
CHOP	change of operational control
CINC	commander of a unified or specified command
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMNAVSPECWARCOM	Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
COMPHIBRON	Commander, Amphibious Squadron
COMSPECBOATRON	Commander, Navy Special Boat Squadron
CONUS	continental United States
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CVBG	aircraft carrier battle group
DA	direct action
DDS	dry deck shelter
E&E	escape and evasion
EM	electro-magnetic (spectrum)
EW	electronic warfare
FAC	forward air controller
FID	foreign internal defense
FOB	forward operating base
FTS	"...From the Sea."
GPS	global positioning system
HALO	high-altitude low-opening parachute technique
HAHO	high-altitude high-opening parachute technique

HIC	high intensity conflict
HSB	high speed boat
HQ	headquarters
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
LI/LO	lock in/lock out (submarine operations)
LIC	low intensity conflict
LOC	lines of communications
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MEU (SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MCM	mine countermeasures
NAVCENT	Naval Forces U.S. Central Command
NAVFOR	Navy forces
NAVSOC	naval special operations component
NAVSOFF	Navy Special Operations Forces
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NAVSPECWARGRU	Naval Special Warfare Group
NCA	National Command Authority
NDP	Naval Doctrine Publication
NEF	Naval Expeditionary Force
NGFS	Naval gunfire support
NSW	Naval Special Warfare
NSWC	Naval Special Warfare Command
NSWG	Naval Special Warfare Group
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NSWTU	Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
NSWU	Naval Special Warfare Unit
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OD	operational detachment
ODA	operational detachment-Alpha
OMFTS	operational maneuver from the sea
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OTH	over the horizon
PC	Patrol Coastal, (CYCLONE Class ship)
PHIBRON	Amphibious Squadron
PSYOP	psychological operations
RIB	rigid inflatable boat
SBU	Special Boat Unit
SDV	SEAL Delivery Vehicle
SEAL	sea-air-land (Team)
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces Group
SFOB	Special Forces Operations Base
SO	special operations
SOA	special operations aviation
SOAR	Special Operations Aviation Regiment

SOC	Special Operations Command
SOC	[Mk V] Special Operations Craft
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCCORD	Special Operations Coordination Element
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOW	Special Operations Wing
SSN	nuclear powered attack submarine
SR	special reconnaissance
TACON	tactical control
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAFSOF	USAF Special Operations Forces
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, USSOCOM
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
VSW	very shallow water

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

PART II-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advance force. A temporary organization within the amphibious task force which precedes the main body to the objective area. Its function is to participate in preparing the objective for the main assault by conducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, minsweeping, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AFSOC: Air Force Special Operations Command. The Air Force component of a joint special operations command or joint special operations task force. The 11,500 member command includes one active special operations wing, two special operations groups, one special tactics group, one reserve special operations wing, and one Air National Guard special operations group. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

Air Force Special Operations Forces. Those active and reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AFSOD: Air Force Special Operations Detachment. A squadron size headquarters, which could be a composite organization composed of different Air Force SO. The detachment is normally subordinate to an Air Force SOC, JSOTF, or joint task force, depending on the size and duration of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AFSOF: Air Force Special Operations Forces.

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious force. (1) A naval force and landing force, together with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. (2) In naval usage, the administrative title of the amphibious type command of a fleet. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious group. The administrative title of the amphibious command in the naval surface force organization. There is an amphibious group in the Atlantic Fleet and one in the Pacific Fleet. An amphibious group consists of a group staff, amphibious squadrons, and other staff organizations. It includes amphibious type ships, close-support ships, and amphibious training command, and other organizations whose missions are primarily of an amphibious nature or in support thereof. (Extract from ST 100-1) A command within the amphibious force, consisting of the commander and his staff, designed to exercise operational command of assigned units in executing all phases of a division-size amphibious operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. As an entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases:

- a. planning-The period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation.
- b. embarkation-The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping.
- c. rehearsal-The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications.
- d. movement-The period during which various components of the amphibious task force move from points of embarkation to the objective area.
- e. assault-The period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious squadron. An administrative and operational unit. An amphibious squadron may include amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships, dock landing ships, tank landing ships, and amphibious assault ships. Amphibious squadrons provide the principal elements of a transport group for participating in amphibious operations. (Extract from ST 100-1) A tactical and administrative organization composed of amphibious assault shipping to transport troops and their equipment for an amphibious assault operation. Also called PHIBRON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area in which a commander is directly capable of influencing operations. (NDP 1) A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command or control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent, and areas extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. Also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AO: area of operations. A geographical area assigned to a commander by higher authority. The AO usually has boundaries that define it within a larger joint geographical area. (FM 100-5) That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipment are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic region.

AOR: area of responsibility. A geographical area assigned to a CINC or theater commander from which he exercises combatant command of unified or joint forces in accordance with applicable law and the theater command plan. May include the theater of war, theater of operations, the joint operations area, and/or the joint special operations area. (FM 100-5) In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ARSOF. Army Special Operations Forces. Active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Active and reserve component Army Special Operations Forces that are capable of supporting and sustaining Special Operations Forces. The 30,000 member Army Special Operations Command includes active and reserve special forces, special operations aviation, Ranger, psychological operations, and civil affairs units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AT: antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battlespace. All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, and space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and the area of interest. (NDP 1)

BDA: battle damage assessment. The process of determining the essential tactical reconstitution requirements for an attrited unit; the process of determining the combat effectiveness of the enemy after engagement by friendly force. (FM 100-5)

battlespace dominance. The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It permits power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions. (NDP 1)

BLS: beach landing site. A geographic location selected for across the beach infiltration, exfiltration, resupply operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

brown water. An unofficial term, generally used to encompass riverine, inshore, and coastal operations. Riverine is an inland or coastal area, characterized by both land and water, with limited land routes and extensive water surface and/or inland waterways. Inshore relates to coastal areas and is generally used to indicate activities adjacent to the shore (i.e. in very shallow water). Coastal is the least defined term, generally taken to mean over the continental shelf (i.e. a depth of 600 feet or less). (Naval Special Warfare Center Patrol Leader's Handbook)

capability. The ability to execute specific courses of action against particular opposition at particular times and places.

CA: Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non governmental, and

the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

C2. command and control.

C3. command, control, and communications.

C4I. command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

CARGRU: Carrier Group. The carrier group is usually commanded by a rear admiral and consists of one or more aircraft carriers. The carrier group commanders are responsible to the appropriate naval air force commander for the training, material, and operational readiness of their ships. These same CARGRU commanders with their staffs are regularly employed tactically as task force, task group, or task unit commanders under the numbered fleet commanders. Also see COMCARGRU. (Extract of ST 100-1) A naval task force composed of aircraft carriers and supporting combatant ships capable of conducting strike operations. Also called carrier striking force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CAS: Close Air Support.

center of gravity. The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight. (NDP 1)

chopped. Refers to a change of operational control. The date and time at which the responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CINC: Commander in Chief. Commander of a unified or specified command.

clandestine operation. Activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence related activities. (Joint pub 1-02)

close air support: Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. An ad hoc agreement of two or more nations for a common action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Coastal Patrol and Interdiction. A naval special warfare mission which consists of area denial, interdiction, support, and intelligence operations in coastal regions. The principal objective of area denial is to halt or limit the enemy's warfighting capability by denying movement of vital resources over coastal transportation routes. Interdiction consists of detection, classification, tracking, investigation and engagement of lightly armed surface craft and visit, board, search and seizure. Seaward perimeter and harbor security and escort duties are typical support operations. Intelligence operations consist of reconnaissance, surveillance, evaluation, integration, and reporting of information of significance. Coastal patrol and interdiction may be a standalone mission or may support other fleet and joint efforts such as riverine, amphibious assault, blockades and counterdrug operations. (NWP 3-05)

COCOM: combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the service component commander. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish the assigned missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat swimmer. A term used to describe individuals assigned to SEAL units trained to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and obstacle clearance. Also used loosely to describe combat divers, capable of conducting the same missions as well as limpet attacks on enemy shipping, underwater SR missions, or infiltration and/or extraction, while using an underwater breathing apparatus.

combined. Two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined arms. The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate firepower and agility to produce a desired effect on the enemy.

command. Lawful authority and responsibility to organize, administer, and employ assigned or attached forces in performance of designated duties during peacetime and war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

COMCARGRU: Commander Carrier Group. See Carrier Group or CARGRU.

COMNAVSPECBOATRON. Commander, Navy Special Boat Squadron.

COMNAVSPECWARCOM. Commander, Navy Special Warfare Command. The Naval Special Warfare Command is composed of 5,900 active and reserve operational and support personnel, which include Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Teams, SEAL delivery vehicle teams, and special boat squadrons and units. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

COMNAVSPECWARGRU. Commander, Navy Special Warfare Group.

COMPHIBRON: Commander Amphibious Squadron. An administrative and operational unit. An amphibious squadron may include amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships, dock landing ships, tank landing ships, and amphibious assault ships. Amphibious squadrons provide the principal elements of a transport group for participating in amphibious operations.

component commands. The principal subordinate commands of any U.S. unified command.

conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (Joint Pub 3-0)

CONUS: Continental United States. United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within the North American Continent between Canada and Mexico. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional forces. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

covert operations. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

crisis response. The ability to maintain the forces and agility to respond quickly and decisively to regional crises with a range of options. (NDP 1)

CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the expeditious recovery of distressed personnel from a hostile environment during wartime or contingency operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CT: counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

DA: direct action. In special operations, a specified act involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine, or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power's special operations forces in hostile or denied areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demonstration. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

denied area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action operations. Short duration strikes and other small scale offensive actions by Special Operations Forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target; or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, Special Operations Forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions, conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, and conduct independent sabotage. (Joint Pub 3-05)

diversion. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; this can be an attack, alarm, or feint which diverts attention. (Joint Pub 1-02)

dry deck launch. The process of launching combat rubber raiding craft from the deck of a surfaced submarine. A tactical procedure used to quickly launch boats with personnel and equipment in a minimal amount of time, normally two to four boats within five minutes (calculated from the time the submarine surfaces until it completely submerges).

DDS: Dry Deck Shelter. A deep submergence system which is attached to specially modified submarines for submerged launch and recovery of SDVs, SEALs, combat rubber raiding craft, or other NSW equipment. (NWP 3-05)

EW: electronic warfare. Military actions including:

- a) electronic attack: the use of either electromagnetic or directed energy to degrade, neutralize, or destroy an enemy's combat capability.
- b) electronic prosecution: those actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare
- c) electronic warfare support: those actions tasked by an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. (FM 100-5)

exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (Joint Pub 1-02) Any U.S. military formation designed to operate outside the United States during peacetime or war.

FID: foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities all under the command of a commander or commander in chief who may exercise operational as well as administrative control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

focus of effort. The most important task to be accomplished by the force. It is assigned by the commander to designated subordinate units. The commander ensures the success of the focus of effort by providing it the preponderance of support and by alerting reserves to reinforce the focus of effort--or, if necessary, to assume the focus of effort. (NDP 1)

force multiplier. An element that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force thus enhancing the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

FAC: forward air controller. A member of the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in close air support of ground troops. (Joint Pub 1-02)

FOB: forward operations base. In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat which is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities are usually temporary and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip. The FOB may be the location of the JSOTF headquarters or smaller unit which is supported by a main operating base. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward presence. Maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingency operations. (NDP 1)

FTS. "... From the Sea." A Navy and Marine Corps White Paper implemented in September 1992 that introduced a new maritime strategy that declared a shift away from open ocean warfare on the sea to a primary warfighting emphasis on littoral warfare conducted from the sea.

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. The operation may be the commencement of hostilities; the hour at which an operation plan is executed or to be executed (as distinguished from the hour the order to execute is issued); the hour that the operations phase is implemented, either by land

assault, parachute assault, amphibious assault, air or naval bombardment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, operate in or transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hydrographic reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of an area of water to determine depths, beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, and the location of coral reefs, rocks, shoals, and man-made obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

infiltration. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made by small groups or by individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies that contact is avoided. (Joint Pub 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

internal defense. The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint. Activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army, Navy, Marine corps, and/or Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command of operational control over joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the

Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

JSOC. Joint Special Operations Command. The command serves as a standing joint special operations task force responsible for special missions planning, training, tactics, and equipment development. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

JSOTF: joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecialized operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lase. To give off the coherent light of a laser; act as a laser.

LANTCOM. U.S. Atlantic Command.

limpet. A mine used in combat swimmer missions that contains plastic explosive and can be magnetically attached to targets.

limpeteer attack. Refers to a combat swimmer mission that normally uses limpets or plastic explosives.

LIC: low intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles or competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (Joint Pub 1-02)

littoral. Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces. (NDP 1)

LOC: lines of communications. All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (FM 100-5)

LI/LO: lock in/lock out. The process of launching swimmers from a submerged submarine using a pressurized escape trunk while the submarine is underway and at periscope depth. The process clandestinely infiltrates swimmers from inside the submarine with equipment to the surface and results in swimmers with or without boats that can proceed on a mission. (NWP 3-05 extract)

low visibility operations. Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MAGTF: Marine Air Ground Task Force. A task organization of Marine forces (ground combat, air, and combat service support elements) under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission. The MAGTF will also include Navy support elements. Three types of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces which can be task-organized are the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEUSOC), Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF FWD), and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). (FMFM 1-2)

maneuver warfare. A philosophy that seeks to collapse the enemy's cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation, with which he cannot adequately cope. (NDP 1)

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force. The Marine Expeditionary Force, the largest of the Marine air-ground task forces, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The Marine Expeditionary Force is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MEF (FWD): Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). A Marine Expeditionary Force (forward) is a task organization which is normally built around a regimental landing team, a provisional Marine aircraft group, and a logistics support group. It is capable of conducting amphibious assault operations or a limited scope. During potential crisis situations, a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) may be forward deployed afloat for an extended period in order to provide an immediate combat response. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit. A task organization normally built around a battalion landing team, reinforced helicopter squadron, and logistic support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis situations, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MEUSOC: Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). A forward deployed, embarked US Marine Corps unit with enhanced capability to conduct special operations. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is oriented toward amphibious raids, at night, under limited visibility while employing emissions control procedures. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is not a Secretary of Defense designated Special Operations Force but, when directed by the National Command Authority and/or the theater commander, may conduct hostage recovery or other special operations under in extremis circumstances when designated Special Operations Forces are not available. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MSPF: maritime special purpose force. A task organized force formed from elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) and naval special warfare forces that can be quickly tailored to a specific mission. The maritime special purpose force can execute on short notice in a wide variety of missions in a supporting, supported, or unilateral role. It focuses on operations in a maritime environment and is capable of operations in conjunction with or in support of Special Operations Forces.

The maritime special purpose force is integral to and relies directly on the Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) for all combat and combat service support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military strategy. That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mine countermeasures. All methods for preventing or reducing damage or danger from mines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission. A task that the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense assigns to a unified command. Tasks assigned to subordinate forces.

mobility. A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NCA: National Command Authority. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (May also be referred to as the National Command Authorities) (Joint Pub 1-02)

national objectives. Those functional aims, goals, or purposes of a nation--as opposed to the means for seeking these ends--toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by:

- a) A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations.
 - b) favorable foreign relations position.
 - c) A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.
- (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval campaign. An operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, subsurface, air and amphibious troops, for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NDP: Naval Doctrine Publication.

NEF: Naval Expeditionary Force.

NSW: Naval Special Warfare (SEAL, SDV teams and Special Boat Units). A designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operations generally accepted as being unconventional in nature and, in many cases, covert or clandestine in character. These operations use specially trained forces to conduct unconventional warfare, psychological operations, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operational deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal and riverine interdiction, and certain special tactical

intelligence collection operations, in addition to intelligence functions normally required for planning and conducting special operations in a hostile environment. (NDP 1) A naval warfare specialty which conducts special operations in the maritime environment. NSW emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent, application of force. (NWP 3-05)

NAVSOF: Naval Special Warfare Forces. Those active and reserve component naval forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) The Naval Special Warfare Command is composed of 5,900 active and reserve operational and support personnel, which include sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, SEAL delivery vehicle teams, and special boat squadrons and units. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

NSWG: Naval Special Warfare Group. The organization to which most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. It consists of a group headquarters with command and control, communications, and support staff, sea-air-land teams, Special Boat Units, and sea-air-land team delivery vehicle teams. The group is the source of all deployed naval special warfare forces and administratively supports the naval special warfare units assigned to the theater CINCs. The group staff provides general operational direction and coordinates the activities of its subordinate units. A naval special warfare group is capable of task organizing to meet a wide variety of requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NAVSOC: Naval Special Warfare Special Operations Component. The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NSWTG/TU: Naval Special Warfare Task Group/Task Unit. Task organized elements that provide command, control, and communications for naval special warfare forces deployed in support of fleet commanders, special operations commands of unified and subordinate unified commands, and joint special operations task forces. (Joint Pub 1-02) Command and Control organization tailored to meet the requirements of an NSW operation, contingency, or exercise. (NWP 3-05)

NSWU: Naval Special Warfare Unit. Permanently theater-deployed command element to control and support attached naval special warfare forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval surface fire support. Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units on land. (NDP 1)

numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of the Navy immediately subordinate to a major fleet command and comprising various task forces, elements, groups, and units for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations.

objective. The physical object of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature, the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

OCONUS: Outside the Continental United States.

ODA: Operational detachment, "A" team (USA Special Forces).

ODB: Operational detachment, "B" team (USA Special Forces).

OPCON: operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation. A military action of the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are:

- a) permissive environment: operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.
- b) semipermissive environment: operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations.
- c) nonpermissive environment: operational environment that is under control of hostile forces that have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Joint Pub 1-02)

OMFTS: operational maneuver from the sea. The application of maneuver warfare to littoral areas. It aims at decisive results by seeking and striking at critical vulnerabilities, placing emphasis on surprise, deception, innovation, and the indirect approach.

OTH: over the horizon. Refers to the distance of assets such as ships in a location out of sight, due to the curvature of the earth at surface level, of the unaided eye; normally a distance of fourteen nautical miles. Also refers to the process of conducting a transit in surface craft over a distance equal to or greater than fourteen nautical miles, normally to conduct a mission.

overt operation. The collection of intelligence openly, without concealment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PC: Patrol Coastal. A class of ships with a primary mission of coastal patrol and interdiction, with a secondary mission of naval special warfare support. Primary employment missions include forward presence, monitoring and detection operations, escort operations, non-combatant evacuation, and foreign internal defense. Assigned to special boat squadrons.

personnel recovery. Return of personnel to friendly control with or without assistance as a result of war plans, operations and individual actions on the part of planners' conventional or unconventional recovery forces.

PHIBRON: Amphibious Squadron. See COMPHIBRON or Amphibious Squadron.

power projection. The precise application of offensive military force at a chosen time and place, using maneuver and combined arms against enemy forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations (NDP 1). Also the ability of the nation to apply all or some of the instruments of national power--diplomatic, economic, informational, or military--to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. (Fm 100-5)

PSYOP: psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PSYWAR: psychological warfare. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievements of national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy or to destroy his installations. It ends with planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all services. Rangers can also execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecialized operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

real time. (1) The absence of delay, except for the time required for the transmission by electromagnetic energy, between the occurrence of an event or the transmission of data and the knowledge of the event or reception of the data at some other location. (Joint Pub 1-02) (2) The absence of delay in acquisition, transmission, and reception of data. (AR 310-25)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data

concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

RIB: Rigid Inflatable Boat. A high speed, high buoyancy, extreme weather craft with the primary mission of insertion/extraction of SEAL tactical elements from enemy occupied beaches. There are two types of RIBs currently in the inventory--a twenty-four foot RIB and a thirty-foot RIB. The RIB can operate in light loaded condition in sea state six and winds of forty-five knots.

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Scud. A medium range ground launched surface-to-surface missile. Can be equipped with a conventional high explosive warhead or a special payload such as a chemical agent. Generally inaccurate and can be launched from mobile launch systems.

SDV: SEAL Delivery Vehicle. A battery powered free floating minisub crewed by SCUBA-equipped SEALs. SDVs can deliver a payload of SEALs and demolitions, or conduct reconnaissance. SDVs can be launched from a submarine fitted with a dry deck shelter (DDS) or from a number of surface platforms. (NWP 3-05)

SDV TEAM: Specially trained SEALs and support personnel responsible for operating and maintaining SDV's and dry deck shelters (DDS). Dry deck shelters deliver SDV's are specially trained forces from modified submarines. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

SEAL: Sea-Air-Land. An individual who has completed six months of United States Navy basic underwater demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training, one month of airborne training, and a minimum of six months of an operational assignment at a SEAL or SDV team and meets the approval of his commanding officer is qualified as a SEAL.

SEAL Platoon. A sixteen man group of SEALs consisting of two officers and fourteen enlisted.

Sea-Air-Land team: SEAL team. A group of officers and individuals specially trained and equipped for conducting unconventional and paramilitary operations and for training personnel of allied nations in surveillance and reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and coastal areas. Composed of up to ten SEAL platoons and various supporting departments. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sea control operations. The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of naval operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

slaved. A mechanism under control of and repeating the actions of a similar mechanism. (Webster's College Dictionary)

SBR: Special Boat Squadron. Navy echelon three major command subordinate to COMNAVSPECWARCOM which exercises OPCON of two or more SBUs and CYCLONE class patrol coastal (PC) ships. (NWP 3-05)

- SBU: Special Boat Unit. Special boat squadrons are composed of special boat units that operate and maintain a variety of special operations ships and craft, such as high speed boats, rigid hulled inflatable boats, and patrol coastal ships, to conduct coastal and riverine interdiction as well as support of naval and joint special operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Command subordinate to special boat squadron which employs, operates, and maintain a variety of surface combatant craft to conduct and support maritime special operations. The craft most frequently employed are offshore, open water fast patrol boats and shallow draft riverine patrol craft. (NWP 3-05)
- SF: Special Forces (U.S. Army). U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special Forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped Special Forces units designated in theater contingency plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- SO: special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-Special Operations Forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- SOC: special operations command. A functional command attached to each warfighting CINC. Normally commanded by a brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half). A subordinate unified or other joint command composed of designated Special Operations Forces that is established by a unified or other joint force commander to prepare for, plan, and execute, as directed, joint or single service special operations within the joint force commander's assigned area of operations, or as directed by the National Command Authorities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- SOCCE: Special Operations Command and Control Element. Normally associated with ARSOF units and functions. A liaison team composed of SOF representatives that advise the supported commander on the employment, missions, current situation, capabilities, and limitations of supporting or supported SOF units. Participates in the supported unit's development of the estimate of the situation and concept of operations. Deconflicts SOF missions with conventional forces. (FM 100-25)
- SOCCORD: Special Operations Coordination Element. A small cell of ARSOF staff officers assigned to a conventional unit headquarters. The SOCCORD serves as a permanent link between SOF and conventional unit forces. SOCCORDs are located at corps level headquarters, and may be attached to division level headquarters or a mobile strike force depending on the CINC's objectives.
- SOF: Special Operations Forces. Military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which are designated for special operations, as that term

is defined, and are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SR: special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by Special Operations Forces to obtain and verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. (Joint Pub 3-05)

specified command. A command with a broad, continuing mission under a single commander, normally composed of forces from only one service. (FM 100-5)

standoff weapon. A weapon or weapons system capable of engaging the target from a distance that removes it from the immediate threat of direct enemy fire. Examples are sniper rifle or a mortar.

theater. The geographical area outside the Continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Third World. Refers to those countries with underdeveloped but growing economies, often with colonial pasts, and low per capita incomes. (FM 100-25)

threat. The ability of an enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current of projected mission organization or item of equipment. (TRADOC Reg 381-1)

USASOC: US Army Special Operations Command. The 30,000 member Army Special Operations Command includes active and reserve Special Forces, special operations aviation, Ranger, psychological operations, and civil affairs units. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

USCINCSOC: Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command.

USSOCOM: United States Special Operations Command. Organizes, trains, equips and provides SOF to successfully conduct worldwide special operations in peace, conflict, and war in support of the regional combatant commanders, American ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Composed of USACOM, COMNAVSPECWARCOM, AFSOC, and JSOC. (USSOCOM Posture Statement)

UW: unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held, enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war and peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, when so authorized

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

war. Sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited, with some self-imposed restraints on resources or objectives. Or, it may be general with the total resources of a nation employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake. (Joint Pub 3-0)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that through use or the threat of use can cause large-scale shifts in objectives, phases, and courses of action. (FM 100-5)

APPENDIX C

CHECKLIST

PART III-OPERATIONAL SOF MISSION CRITERIA IN SUPPORT OF THE NEF

NEF-SOF Interface

- a) What is the enemy center(s) of gravity and decisive points?
- b) Can SOF prosecute enemy center(s) of gravity and decisive points?
- b) Is it necessary to extend or enhance battlespace?
- c) Do C3 links need to be enhanced or expanded?
- d) Do areas of interest require further reconnaissance or attention?
- e) Are allied forces well integrated into existing C3 systems?

Use of SOF

- a) Is this an appropriate SOF mission?
- b) Does it support the CINC's campaign plan?
- c) Is it operationally feasible?
- d) Are required resources available to execute?
- e) Does expected outcome justify risk?

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Directorate of Plans and Strategy
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MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
17. Rear Admiral Irve C. LeMoyné, USN
US Special Operations Command
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
18. Commanding Officer
Naval Special Warfare Development Group
1636 Regulus Ave
FCTCL Dam Neck
Virginia Beach, VA 23461-2299
Attn: CDR John McTighe, USN
19. Commanding Officer
Naval Special Warfare Group One
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155
Attn: Capt R. C. Mabry, USN
20. Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific
Camp H. M. Smith, HI 96861-5025
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Directorate of Plans and Strategy
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MacDill AFB, Tampa FL 33621-5101
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APO AA 34007
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Norfolk, VA 23511
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San Diego, CA 92155
Attn: Capt T. Holden, USN
28. Commanding Officer
Naval Special Warfare Group Two
1430 Helicopter Road
NAB Little Creek
Norfolk, VA 23521-2944
29. Capt R. J. McCombie
Senior Navy Representative
USA War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
30. Commanding Officer
Special Boat Squadron Two
NAB Little Creek
Norfolk, VA 23521
Attn: Capt T. Steffens
31. Commanding Officer
Special Boat Squadron One
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155
32. Capt T. Ford
ATZL SWL N/Navy Section
USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1325
33. Seth Cropsey
Marshall Center
Unit 24502 Box 112
APO AE 09053
34. RADM Leonard F. Picotte
Commanding Officer
Amphibious Group Two
NAB Little Creek
Norfolk, VA 23521

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Commanding General
2nd Marine Division
Camp Lejeune, NC 28542
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USACGSC
Dept of Joint/Combined Operations
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
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USACGSC
Dept of Joint/Combined Operations
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
46. The SOF Clearinghouse
HQ USSOCOM/J5-O
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
47. Colonel Stan Florer, USA
Commander USAJFKSWCS
Attn: DOTD
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000

48. LTC Robert Soucy
Commander USAJFKSWCS
Attn: DOTD
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000
49. Dr. Robert F. Baumann
USACGSC
Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
50. Library
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, MD 21402
51. Library
United States Military Academy
West Point, NY 10996
52. Air University Library
Maxwell Air Force Base
AL 36112
53. LTC Ted Davis
USACGSC
Dept of Joint/Combined Operations
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
54. Colonel (Ret) Roger Donlon
c/o John Reichley
DAO-USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
55. Major Micheal Spight
HQ USSOCOM/J-33 CP
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
56. Major Timothy Whalen
The Pentagon
Joint Staff/Directorate of Operations
Special Operations Division/J-33 SOD
Washington, D.C. 20318-3000