

CUBA AFTER CASTRO: WHAT MILITARY FORCES WILL  
BE NECESSARY TO EXECUTE  
U.S. POLICY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the United  
States Army Command and General Staff College in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., East Stroudsburg University, East Stroudsburg, PA, 1982

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS  
1995

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
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This thesis analyzes the current situation and scenarios for future events in Cuba. It looks at current U.S. diplomatic and economic policies and their effects on future developments within Cuba. The thesis investigates possible U.S. objectives in Cuba, after the current regime departs, and derives possible U.S. Armed Forces missions to support U.S. objectives. Finally, it proposes potential U.S. forces' composition and organization to execute U.S. policy. The thesis concludes that there are two possible scenarios for U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba. One is an "intrusive humanitarian relief and nation assistance operation," and the other a permissive involvement based on an arrangement or agreement with a Cuban Transitional Unity Government or faction involvement in a Cuban civil war. To truly be successful in Cuba any intervention must be combined, interagency, and joint. In both scenarios a combination of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces under a Joint Task Force including civil agencies for interagency and intergovernmental coordination should be deployed.

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

CUBA AFTER CASTRO: WHAT MILITARY FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY TO EXECUTE U.S. POLICY? by Major Michael S. Rose, USA, 99 pages.

This thesis analyzes the current situation and scenarios for future events in Cuba. It looks at current U.S. diplomatic and economic policies and their effects on future developments within Cuba. The thesis investigates possible U.S. objectives in Cuba, after the current regime departs, and derives possible U.S. Armed Forces missions to support U.S. objectives. Finally, it proposes potential U.S. forces' composition and organization to execute U.S. policy.

The thesis concludes that there are two possible scenarios for U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba. One is an "intrusive humanitarian relief or nation assistance operation" and the other a permissive involvement based on an arrangement or agreement with a Cuban Transitional Unity Government or faction involved in a Cuban civil war. To truly be successful in Cuba any intervention must be combined, interagency, and joint. In both scenarios a combination of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces under a Joint Task Force including civil agencies for interagency and intergovernmental coordination should be deployed.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Recently we have watched the unraveling of Castro's Cuba. Almost daily during the summer of 1994 we saw television reports and read newspaper articles about the considerable exodus of Cubans bound for the U.S. These people took tremendous risks to leave Cuba, almost all were leaving in ramshackle rafts and homemade boats that were of questionable sea worthiness. The willingness of these people to make such a perilous voyage showed the depth of the economic and social problems in Castro's "Socialist Paradise." Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent loss of Soviet subsidies in 1989 there has been a spiraling decline in Cuba's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Many analysts place the decline at between 34 and 51 percent.<sup>1</sup> Further exacerbating Cuba's economic problems are its dependance on a single crop, sugar, for hard currency. The 1993-94 sugar cane harvest was one of the worst harvests in decades, only 4 million metric tons. This harvest follows a 4.2 million ton harvest last year.<sup>2</sup> In 1991-92 the harvest was 7 million tons.<sup>3</sup> As Castro lamented at the 4th Party Congress in 1991, the disappearance of the Soviet Union for Cuba was "like the sun not rising." Conditions in Cuba were already creating a steady stream of immigrants, currently up to 1,500 a day when an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Cuba on controlling

immigration. As of June 1994, food consumption in Cuba had fallen well below the World Health Organizations goal of 2,600 calories a day.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Problem

If the current regime crumbles and there is a total collapse of the Cuban economy, government and society, the stream of migrants could turn into a torrent. Some estimates run as high as two million.<sup>5</sup> This torrent of migrants would quickly exceed the capabilities of both the federal and state governments in the U.S. A massive Cuban migration would not just impact on the U.S., but could potentially destabilize the entire Caribbean.

It would be nearly impossible to predict how the end of the Castro regime will come about but most Cuba-watchers are predicting its demise. "The situation has grown so bad that most political observers today assume that the regime is in its 'final hour.' Cuba is 'collapsing' and the only real questions are when and how Fidel will go and what will replace him."<sup>6</sup> The manner in which the Castro regime finally loses power will determine the degree of chaos that follows. There have been reports of an August 5, 1994 clash between stone-throwing protesters and Cuban police in Havana.<sup>7</sup> Based on the social decay and economic decline that have already occurred coupled with the fall of the government, the situation could become extremely chaotic.

A massive Cuban migration is not the only potential problem the end of the Cuban regime could foster. There is the possibility of large-scale violence as forces inside Cuba contend for power. The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are an important key to peaceful or violent change. According to Edward Gonzalez, if the Castro regime

begins to fall and chaos reigns, the FAR has three options: one, to support the regime, two, to defect and support a new unity government, or three, the worst scenario, split into factions and start a civil war. In his article "The Cuba Contingency" Geoffrey Demarest quoted sources alleging it is also possible that in a last ditch effort to keep power, Castro would attack the U.S. The most likely target would be the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay.<sup>8</sup>

Any of these actions by Castro or the Cuban people would require a U.S. response. Exactly what form the U.S. response would take is hard to predict. The problems in Cuba are multifaceted and some may not be effectively influenced by the diplomatic and economic instruments of power. It would be prudent for the U.S. Armed Forces to begin looking at missions the National Command Authority may ask us to execute. Once missions are identified the U.S. Armed Forces can prepare, plan, train, and organize to accomplish those missions in support of U.S. National Security objectives.

#### Significance

Based just on Cuba's proximity to the U.S. and its population, the problems in Cuba would be significant. The north coast of Cuba is only 90 miles (145 kilometers) south of Key West, Florida. The island nation's population is 11 million. Cuba is the largest country in the Caribbean.

The coming crisis in Cuba is not something the Clinton Administration can ignore and hope it goes away. U.S. security and foreign policy considerations coupled with domestic considerations will cause the current administration to become "engaged." The current

problems in Haiti will pale in comparison. The U.S. must act decisively in Cuba if it hopes to retain world leadership. The U.S. will lose tremendous credibility if it is seen as weak willed and unable to control events in Cuba. What will countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East think of our credibility if we are unable to influence events in a small destitute island 90 miles from our border?

A crisis in Cuba and the resulting requirement for military forces could put the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy goal of being able "to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts" at risk. Due to the down sizing of our Armed Forces we could not control complete chaos in Cuba and still have sufficient forces to fight two major regional conflicts.<sup>9</sup> This is not only a U.S. problem; the downfall of the Castro regime could have repercussions throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. Cuban migration, arms smuggling and narcotrafficking would hit the less developed and fragile democracies of the region especially hard.

U.S. domestic politics will almost certainly be affected by how the U.S. responds to a Cuban crisis. Cuban Americans are a well organized and financed political force, which will work hard to shape the U.S. response to any Cuban crisis. Equally important is how the U.S. population as a whole views U.S. involvement in Cuba. There will undoubtedly be tremendous public pressure for the U.S. government to do something as evidenced by recent events in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. It is apparent Cuba will not go away, as demonstrated by the current administration spending several weeks dealing with the latest immigrant problem. This problem will be insignificant by comparison to the problems associated with a collapse of the Castro regime.

### Background

Cuba was discovered by Christopher Columbus on October 29, 1492. The Spanish began to settle Cuba in the early 1500s. By 1589 Havana had become the capital of Cuba and Spain's chief port in the New World and remained so over the next 200 years. However, the remainder of the island of Cuba was of little interest to the Spanish Crown and was not extensively developed.

By the early 1700s an agricultural society was taking shape in Cuba with the help of slaves imported by the English from Africa. By the early 1800s tobacco and sugar already were major export crops. Cuba had become "an economically viable Spanish possession with 'king sugar' as the major booster of the island development."<sup>10</sup> The Haitian Slave Revolt of 1796 provided a large influx of 300,000 French refugees. The French brought with them more advanced sugar technology, managerial skills and coffee.

The 1800s was a period of increasing prosperity although the Spanish Crown still had its heavy hand of taxation on Cuba. Trade with the U.S. became a major factor in the Cuban economy at this time. From 1832 to 1843 there were several slave uprisings in Cuba all of them were brutally put down by Spanish forces and militia battalions loyal to Spain. These slave uprisings did have the effect of increasing the antislave sentiment in Cuba. Also from 1848 to 1851 there were three separate efforts to annex Cuba to the U.S. There was little support for such an annexation in the U.S. outside of the Southern States. The slave states versus free states debate was raging in the U.S. and addition of another slave territory was not possible.<sup>11</sup>

The Cubans fought two wars against the Spanish from 1868 to 1880. "The main complaints against the crown were excessive taxation, a huge Cuban foreign debt, discrimination against Cubans for government positions, royal absolutism, and lack of the basic freedoms of speech and press and the right of assembly."<sup>12</sup> The Ten Years' War started in October, 1868, and ended with the Pact of Zanjón in 1878. According to the pact the Spanish crown retained power but agreed to enact reforms. The Ten Years' War was extremely destructive with terrible losses, approximately 50,000 Cubans and 208,000 Spanish lost their lives.<sup>13</sup> The next war, La Guerra Chiquita (The Little War) resulted from Spain not enacting reforms as promised in the Pact of Zanjón. It was started in August 1879 by veterans of the Ten Years' War. This war ended in defeat of the Cuban rebels. However, the cause of Cuban independence remained strong and the stage was set for the War of Independence 15 years later. Slavery was abolished in Cuba by royal decree in 1886.

Cuba's War of Independence began on February 24, 1895, and ended August 12, 1898, with the surrender of Spanish Forces to the United States ending the Spanish-Cuban-American War. In accordance with the treaty signed by Spain and the U.S., the U.S. installed a military government in Cuba on the same day the Spanish administration withdrew. The U.S. maintained a military government in Cuba until May 20, 1902. The U.S. only withdrew after Cuba ratified the Platt Amendment as a permanent addendum to the Cuban constitution. "The Platt Amendment represented a permanent restriction upon Cuban self-determination."<sup>14</sup> It provided that:

Cuba should not sign any treaties that could impair its sovereignty or contract any debts that could not be repaid by

normal revenues. In addition, Cuba had to accept the legitimacy of all acts of the military government, permit the United States to purchase or lease lands for coaling and naval stations, and give the United States special privileges to intervene at any time to preserve Cuban independence or to support a government capable of protecting life, property, and individual liberties.<sup>15</sup>

The Platt Amendment was repealed in 1934. However, in a separate treaty negotiated in May 1903 the U.S. acquired rights in perpetuity to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay which it still retains.

From 1903 until 1959 the political and economic life of Cuba was closely associated with the U.S. Cuba's experiment in democracy was plagued by corruption, fraudulent elections, coups and dictatorships. The U.S. involved itself in Cuban politics on a recurring basis and used military forces on a number of occasions. The U.S. policy toward Cuba was to insure a favorable trade and investment climate for U.S. citizens.

On September 4, 1933, a "Sergeant's Revolt" at Camp Columbia in Havana gained widespread support and turned into a full-blown revolution, which deposed the government in power. The leader of the "Sergeant's Revolt" was Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar. Batista wielded tremendous power as the de facto leader of the Cuban Army. He virtually named the next four presidents over a period of five years. In recognition of his de facto leadership of the Cuban Army the transitional government promoted him to Colonel and Chief Military Commander of Cuba. From his position of Chief Military Commander Batista could influence the politics and government of Cuba. In 1940 Batista was elected President of Cuba. "Batista was a strong president who was able both to neutralize the opposition and to promote social

welfare measures, wage increases and economic growth."<sup>16</sup> In 1944 Batista's candidate for president was defeated and Batista went into political retirement in the U.S.

Batista returned to Cuba to run for president in the 1952 elections, but three months before the election on March 10, 1952 he seized power in a bloodless coup. One can describe Batista's dictatorship as, "Overall his six years in government were characterized by prosperity in exchange for freedom. By the end of Batista's term, repression had reached unprecedented levels."<sup>17</sup> The repression and loss of freedom led to the fall of the Batista regime on New Year's Day 1959.

Fidel Castro and the revolutionary elite assumed power on New Year's Day 1959. This culminated six and a half years of revolutionary struggle by Castro and his followers. His attempt to overthrow the regime by violent means began July 26, 1953. This was the date of the attack on the Moncada army barracks near Santiago de Cuba. The attack by Castro and 165 other men ended in failure. Castro was arrested, tried, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Cuban lawyers, priests, lay catholics and students pressured Batista to pardon those involved in the attack. "In response to these pressures and as a measure of his self-confidence, Batista declared a general amnesty that allowed the return of exiled members of the opposition and freed most political prisoners, including Castro and his followers from Moncada."<sup>18</sup> In July 1954 Castro left Cuba for exile in Mexico.

Castro continued to organize the resistance to the Batista regime while in exile. On December 2, 1956, Castro with 81 men under his leadership landed in Cuba. They were met by government forces and the vast majority of Castro's force was killed or captured. "The two Castro

brothers, Fidel and Raul, Guevara, and a handful of others fled to the Sierra Maestra [mountains] with the help of friendly peasants"<sup>19</sup>

Castro and his revolutionaries continued their struggle from the Sierra Maestra. The revolutionaries continued to increase in strength as Batista's authoritarian regime became more repressive. The Batista regime became more and more unpopular both at home and abroad. "With his army deserting in droves, Batista fled into exile on New Year's Day 1959. The following day Guevara took Havana with the help of 600 revolutionaries."<sup>20</sup>

By the end of 1960 the Cuban government had nationalized all foreign and most large Cuban enterprises. Cuba was well on its way to becoming a socialist state. In May 1960 Cuba and the Soviet Union established diplomatic and economic ties. The U.S. sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion was also crushed by Castro in April 1961. Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and stated the Cuban revolution was socialist in nature in December 1961. In 1962 Cuba was suspended from participation by the Organization of American States (OAS) because of Cuban support for insurgents in Venezuela.

According to James Rudolph in the area handbook Cuba a Country Study, "Castro's acquiescence to Soviet wishes to install nuclear missiles in Cuba proved near-disastrous, as the Soviet Union and Castro himself brought the whole world to the edge of a nuclear war."<sup>21</sup> In October 1962 the Soviet Union and the U.S. had resolved the missile crisis. Cuban-Soviet relations were strained by the missile crisis, since the Soviets solved the crisis without any participation from the Cuban leadership. After the missile crisis relations between the U.S. and Cuba were tense at best and remained that way throughout the 1960s.

The 1960s in Cuba can best be described as increasing radicalization of the economy and consolidation of power by Castro and his inner circle. The Cuban economy moved from the Soviet model of socialism to the more radical Chinese model of socialism then back to the Soviet model again by 1970. "The new policies [the Soviet economic model] of the 1970s were the result of pressures placed upon the regime by the economic debacle, the need to increase popular participation within the politico-economic system, the need to institutionalize the leadership, and additional Soviet demands for more orthodox politics."<sup>22</sup>

There was a slight improvement in relations between the U.S. and Cuba during the first half of the 1970s. However, by 1976 the tension between the U.S. and Cuba had returned due to actions by Cuba and U.S. reluctance to control Cuban exile groups.

During the first two years of President Carter's administration there was a thawing of U.S.-Cuba relations. In 1977 the U.S. and Cuba opened small diplomatic missions known as "interests sections" in each others capitals. However, the discovery of a Soviet Brigade in Cuba in 1979 and the Mariel boat lift in 1980 caused a cooling of relations. Still, the "interests sections" remained in operation. These "interests sections" remain in operation today and are the main conduits for U.S. Cuban dialog.

U.S.-Cuban relations cooled even further in 1981 when the Reagan administration took office. They "perceived the Castro regime as a proxy of the Soviet Union and the source of much of the unrest that had plagued Central America in recent years."<sup>23</sup> The 1980s and early 1990s have witnessed continued tension between the U.S. and Cuba. By the early 1980s the Castro regime had become institutionalized. U.S.-Cuba

relations as characterized by this period could have lasted indefinitely except for the breakup of the Soviet Union and their abandonment of communism.

Since 1989 Cuba has experienced a fundamental change in its economy and foreign relations. According to Edward Gonzales, "Most devastatingly of all, Castro's Cuba was set adrift in a postcommunist world, without an international support system to sustain its economy."

#### Literature Review

There are numerous publications on the current state of affairs in Cuba and proposals on how the U.S. should react to influence the situation. Many scholarly works address the current social, economic, and political situations in Cuba. Most of these works also recommend courses of U.S. foreign policy to influence conditions in Cuba and Cuba's actions. An initial literature search identified over 45 scholarly articles and books written since 1992 on the current state of Cuba's social, economic, political, and military institutions.

There are several key works in the field. They are: The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement by Donald Schulz; Storm Warnings for Cuba by Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt; "The Cuba Contingency" by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest, Castro's Final Hours by Andres Oppenheimer, and Cuba in Transition, Options for U.S. Policy, by Gillian Gunn.

These key works represent a good cross section of thought on Cuba and concentrate on different areas. Dr. Schulz and Gillian Gunn address primarily U.S. economic and diplomatic policies toward Cuba. Both argue that liberalization of current U.S. policies are necessary to

move Cuba in a direction more favorable to U.S objectives. While Gunn would move farther faster than Schulz, both present similar arguments. Gonzalez and Ronfeldt discuss the impact of the current crisis on Cuba and where it may be headed in light of the current crisis. They also suggest possible courses of action for U.S. policy. "The Cuba Contingency" by Lieutenant Colonel Demarest proposes some possible scenarios for Castro's departure, but more importantly discusses possible Army missions in Cuba. Andres Oppenheimer in Castro's Final Hour provides an excellent overview of the current state of affairs in Cuba. Taken together these key works provide the foundation for further research and formulation of initial views on the subject.

Most of the current literature addresses the impending demise of the Castro regime. Most literature predicts the downfall of the Castro regime by the turn of the century based on the plethora of increasingly severe problems in Cuba. Predictions of Castro's downfall are based on the following problems: the continuing downward spiral of the Cuban economy, moral bankruptcy of Cuban social institutions, increasing disillusionment with the Castro regime, and declining support for Castro within the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Another trend within the current literature is the call for revision of U.S. policy toward Cuba, with some advocating a loosening of the strident U.S. policy toward Cuba. Gillian Gunn, a Cuba specialist at Washington's Georgetown University is one of those calling for lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. She was recently quoted in the Washington Post, "Cuba is at a critical turning point. It is more important than ever that U.S. policy be carefully calibrated to nudge the leadership (Fidel Castro) in a peaceful rather than apocalyptic direction."<sup>24</sup> However, there are

other groups calling for a "get tough" with Castro policy including a naval blockade. A recent quote of former Cuban political prisoner, Armando Valladares in the Kansas City Star sums up the feelings of many Cuban exiles, "The exiles don't want any negotiation." He made this comment as other exiles chanted, "Blockade!" and "Down with Fidel"<sup>25</sup>

The Clinton Administration is taking a middle of the road approach. Peter Tarnoff, U.S. Undersecretary of State, recently outlined the administration's Cuba policy on the McNeil Lehrer News Hour. Essentially the Clinton administration's policy is unchanged from previous administrations. The specifics of its policy are that Cubans need to change their political system from within; the economic embargo will continue and some opportunities for cultural exchange will open up. The administration will discuss immigration problems with the Castro regime, but so far is unwilling to discuss issues Cuba wants to address.<sup>26</sup>

Recently, the U.S. and Cuban governments addressed the following immigration issues: legal and safe immigration through the U.S. interests section in Havana, an increased number of U.S. visas to Cuban immigrants up to 27,000 a year, and voluntary return of Cuban immigrants at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base wishing to return to Cuba.

A common consensus among the literature suggests that if the fall of the Castro regime is sudden and unpredicted, extreme violence, chaos, and anarchy will follow. The extreme chaos would have an adverse effect throughout the Caribbean and in the U.S.

As stated earlier there is a myriad of extant works on the subject. These works coupled with historical examples of U.S.

involvement in Cuba and the Caribbean will have great utility in drawing conclusions about future U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba.

#### Research Question

The following research question is an attempt to predict the future based on current trends in Cuba and U.S./Cuban history. This thesis will attempt to form a vision of what U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba will possibly look like and attempt to answer the following research question: What are the most likely composition and organization of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to accomplish U.S. objectives in Cuba?

Before the research question can be answered and a thesis formulated the following precursor and subordinate questions need to be answered. What objectives will the U.S. have in Cuba? The goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Cuba will be the primary factor in determining the missions of U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba. Ideally, it is from National Security goals and objectives that military missions are derived. What effect have the diplomatic and economic instruments of power had in reaching U.S. objectives in Cuba? If the diplomatic and economic instruments of power have already accomplished some U.S. objectives, then it is not necessary to assign military resources to accomplish these objectives. What missions will the National Command Authority assign to the Armed Forces? Once U.S. objectives are identified military strategy can be formulated to accomplish those objectives. The missions of the Armed Forces will flow from the military strategy. Only after missions are formulated can forces be identified to accomplish those missions. What are the best forces to

accomplish missions assigned by the National Command Authority? This subordinate question can be answered by taking into account the type missions to be accomplished. Then compare it to the capabilities of the military services. An analysis can then be made of which service can best perform the mission. What is the best organization for effectively employing U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba? Once missions and forces are identified this subordinate question can be answered. This and the preceding subordinate question will answer the research question.

Of course all of the preceding questions presuppose the U.S. government will always act rationally. However, the history of the U.S. is replete with examples of governments that have acted with a mix of rational, nonrational, and irrational behavior. As the recent example in Haiti shows the U.S. government may formulate policy on the run as events unfold.

#### Research Design/Methodology

Several precursor and subordinate questions were identified in the preceding section. These questions need to be answered before the research question can be answered and a thesis statement formulated. The first question is, What will be the U.S. goals and objectives in Cuba? The Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy and statements made by the president and other high ranking administration officials will provide the answer to this question. However, care must be taken not to accept these stated goals and objectives at face value. These goals and objectives must be analyzed against the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. Three primary objectives listed in the National Security Strategy that could be applied to Cuba

are enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy.<sup>27</sup> The objective of promoting prosperity at home could be achieved by creating a stable Cuba to prevent a torrent of Cuban immigrants flooding the U.S. and creating a market for U.S. goods and services. Promoting democracy has long been a stated U.S. objective in Cuba and is reflected in recent comments by administration officials concerning Cuba.

The following question must be answered to determine what has already been accomplished in Cuba. What effect have the diplomatic and economic instruments of power had in reaching U.S. goals and objectives? Much of the commentary and many articles and books discuss the effect current U.S. diplomatic and economic policy is having in accomplishing U.S. goals and objectives in Cuba. There is a wealth of diverse information in this area and determining which information is correct will take a great deal of analysis and comparison. Logic will be the criterion for the analysis and comparison of information and will be used in judging the information's validity. Ultimately the diplomatic and economic instruments of power may set the stage for use of the military instrument to bring policies and programs to full fruition. Cuba may be similar to Haiti in this respect where diplomatic and economic instruments were used to set the stage for use of the U.S. military either by invitation or through use of force.

What missions the National Command Authority will assign to the Armed Forces are critical to answering the research question. There are some articles on possible missions, such as "The Cuba Contingency" by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest and "Planning for Haiti" by Colonel (Retired) William Mendel and Stephan Stewman. Both articles were

written under the auspices of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Deciding what missions U.S. Armed Forces will be assigned will depend in large part on how effective the diplomatic and economic efforts have been. Historical examples of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and Latin America along with the current Haiti operation "Uphold Democracy" will provide ample examples of possible missions. By comparing the situation in Cuba with examples of other U.S. interventions a likely list of missions should be apparent. Large scale combat operations in Cuba are possible, but noncombat operations are more likely, raising the need for combat support and combat service support units.

Once missions for the Armed Forces are determined it should be fairly simple to determine the best forces to accomplish assigned missions. The recent Armed Forces Roles and Missions Report should be a good place to start in deciding which forces are suited for a particular mission. Analysis and comparison of individual service capabilities and mission requirements will also need to be considered.

The final question leading to answering the research question is, What is the best organization for effectively employing U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba. After determining the best forces to accomplish assigned missions in Cuba, a command and control arrangement must be designed. In all probability any U.S. Armed Forces operations in Cuba will be joint, and in that case current joint doctrine will be used. The crux of the question will be what organization will the Joint Task Force (JTF) be built around. There are several options: a Marine Expeditionary Force, 18th Airborne Corps, a Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF), a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), a

deployable JTF from ACOM or SOUTHCOM, or finally a purely ad hoc organization.

The next chapter will describe how Castro and Cuba arrived at this point in history. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, to quote Edward Gonzalez, "Castro's Cuba was set adrift in a postcommunist world, without an international support system to sustain its economy."

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Donald Schulz, The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement, (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, May 12, 1993) 8.

<sup>2</sup>Reuters World Service, August 8, 1994).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>E.I.U. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Qtr 1994, 3 Jun 1994, p 14.

<sup>5</sup>Geoffrey Demarest, "Thinking About Cuba: Impact on U.S. Army Resources," (Working Paper, August 1994).

<sup>6</sup>Donald Schulz, The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, May 12, 1993), 1.

<sup>7</sup>Reuters World Service, August 6, 1994.

<sup>8</sup>Geoffrey Demarest, "The Cuba Contingency," Military Review, (January 1994), 63.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>James D. Rudolph, Cuba a country study, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government, 1987), 11.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 35.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 45.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 59.

<sup>24</sup>Reuters World Service, August 21, 1994.

<sup>25</sup>Kansas City Star, August 28, 1994

<sup>26</sup>PBS, "McNeil Lehrer News Hour," August 29, 1994, Comments by Peter Tarnoff Undersecretary of State.

<sup>27</sup>U.S. President. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1994), 5.

## CHAPTER 2

### BACKGROUND

#### How Did Cuba Get in This Predicament?

This chapter describes how Cuba and Castro arrived at their current dire situation from the high expectations of the revolution in January 1959, through the trials and errors of the 1960's, the institutionalization of the revolution and Castro in the 1970s, the internationalism of the late 1970s and 1980s, and the fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that precipitated the subsequent decline of Cuba. In 1994, Cuba's economy is in shambles, its revolution is losing much of the ground it gained, and it is increasingly isolated in the international community. Of course the fate of Cuba is inexorably linked to the person of Fidel Castro, and no discussion of Cuba is complete without including him.

#### Castro Consolidates Power

The first two years after the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 were characterized by Fidel Castro and his group of revolutionaries consolidating power. The revolutionaries lead by Castro systematically eliminated the prerevolutionary power groups. These prerevolutionary power groups included the military, political parties, and agricultural and professional associations. The following revolutionary organizations replaced them, the rebel army, the militia, and Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> Only three political organizations

were allowed to operate after the revolution, the 26th of July movement, the Revolutionary Student Directorate (DER), and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). The 26th of July Movement was formed by Castro after his release from prison in 1955. The Revolutionary Student Directorate was formed in 1956. The DER was influenced by Roman Catholicism, was anticommunist, and represented democratic and middle class values. The Popular Socialist Party was in fact the Cuban Communist Party, which had changed its name in 1944 to appeal to more voters. The PSP had opposed Castro and did not support him until just before Batista fled Cuba.<sup>2</sup>

The early edicts of the revolutionaries were made to satisfy the demands of the middle and lower class supporters of the revolution. Wealth and income were redistributed; social services improved, utility rates, taxes, and rents were lowered; and agrarian reform began. "The revolutionary government had kept its promise to the underprivileged masses that rallied behind the new regime, while antagonizing the traditional propertied classes."<sup>3</sup>

By 1960 the revolutionary process had become increasingly radical. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) were established in each neighborhood as a way to control the opposition. "The CDRs became the right arm of the Revolution, reaching down into the neighborhoods in constant vigilance against possible enemies of the Revolution."<sup>4</sup> Castro and the 26th of July Movement continued to consolidate their power and moved the revolution in a more radical direction. In February 1960 Cuba signed the first agreement with the Soviet Union for credits and trade. When the U.S. canceled Cuba's sugar quota in July Cuba responded by nationalizing U.S. businesses operating in Cuba.<sup>5</sup>

### Cuban-U.S. and Cuban-Soviet Relations

The years of 1961 and 1962 were watershed years for U.S.-Cuban and Soviet-Cuban relations. Events during these years would set the course of Cuba's relations with these two countries for the next four decades and sow the seeds of Cuba's current demise. By January 1961 President Eisenhower had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. In April of the same year Castro admitted the socialist nature of the Cuban revolution, and by December he claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist. On April 17, 1961, U.S. supported exiles conducted the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. The invasion failed for many reasons, poor organization, no support from the Cuban underground, and from lack of U.S. support. Castro easily beat the invasion force. "The victory of Castro's forces at the Bay of Pigs had important consequences for the consolidation of Castro's regime, for the disbanding of opposition groups on the island, and for the fueling of propaganda on 'imperialist aggression.'"<sup>6</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs invasion Cuba moved even closer to the Soviet Union and "attempted to apply efficiently a Soviet-style system of politico-economic organization and development planning."<sup>7</sup> Concurrently Cuba undertook campaigns to improve education and health care. Before the revolution education had been compulsory by law, but not in practice, with provisions for some private (church) education. After the revolution compulsory education was enforced and run by the state. A major literacy campaign was undertaken by volunteers and achieved commendable results. By the end of 1961 the illiteracy rate according to the revolutionary government stood at 3.9 percent. The revolutionary government also made a major effort in improving health care. Improvements in both education and health care were concentrated

in the rural areas that had been neglected before the revolution. By 1963 there were 122 rural health centers in operation.<sup>8</sup> Education and health care are often cited as two of the revolutions greatest contributions. However, under current conditions these important areas are suffering declines. According to Andres Oppenheimer in his book Castro's Final Hour after 1989 "Health care--the pride of the Cuban revolution--suffered a rapid deterioration."<sup>9</sup> Here are just two of several examples Oppenheimer cites: "Soviet bloc surgical gloves were washed and reused up to ten times." and more appalling "Often, the emergency room didn't have tranquilizers or antibiotics--only a limited supply of aspirins. You could hear the cries of the victims of burns or other wounds, whose pain could not be alleviated because of a lack of painkillers."<sup>10</sup>

Of course no discussion of Cuba during the early 1960s would be complete without mentioning the "Cuban Missile Crisis." However, instead of describing the details of the crisis, this paragraph will discuss the effects on Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union and the U.S. After the U.S. blockade of Cuba and the ensuing nuclear brinkmanship the Soviet Union and the U.S. resolved the crisis independent of any Cuban participation. Cuban-Soviet relations were seriously strained by the resolution of the missile crisis, because the Soviets and the U.S. resolved the situation with little regard for Cuba's interests or its national sovereignty.<sup>11</sup> Cuban U.S. relations would remain at odds for the next fourteen years until a slight thaw during the Carter administration.

### Searching for the Revolution's Character

Most of the rest of the 1960s saw Cuba move away from the Soviet Union and their model of communism. The government of Cuba became more radical and was influenced by Mao Zedong and China's "Great Leap Forward." Instrumental in this move to the left and radicalization of the revolution was Che Guevara. By 1964 Guevara began to guide Cuban economic development. Guevara's idealistic new economic strategy had three main objectives: "total elimination of the market of 'commodity production', creation of a 'new man', and export of the revolutionary model to other Latin American nations."<sup>12</sup> A cultural and economic revolution was necessary to create a "new man." "The idealistic 'new man' was to be an unselfish, self-sacrificing, frugal, socialized, and egalitarian human being whose training would be achieved through education, mobilization, voluntary labor and moral incentives."<sup>13</sup> There was disagreement within the revolutionary government about how to proceed. There was a group of pragmatic, cautious technocrats that supported the Soviet model, but Guevara's faction was able to win acceptance due to failure of planning and development based on the Soviet model.<sup>14</sup>

The radicalization of the economy resulted in the Law of Agrarian Reform in October 1963 and a new emphasis on sugar. The Law of Agrarian Reform abolished 10,000 middle-sized farms, "the new organization of land tenure proved disastrous to middle-sized cattle and dairy farms."<sup>15</sup> These decisions would come back to haunt the regime due to food shortages after the fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As in the past sugar became the major export crop with the Soviet Unions agreement to take delivery of 24 million tons of sugar from 1965-1970.

The fanatical drive to increase sugar production was extremely detrimental to industrialization since almost all available resources were put into sugar production. The emphasis on sugar production caused a decline in economic growth.<sup>16</sup> In 1968 the revolutionary government acquired all means of production when it launched the "revolutionary offensive" and nationalized all remaining privately owned businesses, 55,600 in all.

The great test of this radical economic policy and the "revolutionary offensive" was the 10-million-ton sugar harvest of 1970, the "harvest of the century." It became clear by early 1970 that Cuba would not achieve its goal of the 10-million-ton harvest, although there was a tremendous mobilization of resources. Cuba did manage to harvest 8.5 million tons of sugar, but at tremendous cost to the country. Production of basic crops had declined, sugar mills and transportation resources went out of operation due to lack of spare parts. Total manufacturing declined because of the diversion of laborers to sugar production. The net result of the "revolutionary offensive" was a decline in economic production and the return to reliance on "king sugar." Castro summed up the 1970 sugar harvest and the conclusion of the "revolutionary offensive" on July 26, 1970 by saying, "Our enemies say we have problems, and in this our enemies are right. . . . They say there is discontent, and in reality our enemies are right. They say there is irritation, and in reality our enemies are right."<sup>17</sup> The failure of the "harvest of the century" and the radical "revolutionary offensive" resulted in Cuba returning to the Soviet fold where it remained until the late 1980s.

### Cuba and the Soviet Union Back Together

During the 1970s Cuba and the Castro regime followed a more conservative line, abandoning the more radical and idealistic practices of the 1960s. There was an increasingly more pragmatic approach based on the Soviet model. This pragmatic approach was caused by the economic debacle, the need to increase popular participation in the politico-economic system, the desire to institutionalize Castro's leadership, and Soviet pressure for a more orthodox approach.<sup>18</sup> Cuba further entrenched itself in the worldwide socialist movement in 1972 by joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance commonly called COMECON. Although Cuba joined COMECON in 1972, it maintained substantial trade with western nations throughout the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s, 40 percent of Cuba's trade was still with capitalist economies. However, in the early 1980s Cuba began to shift toward increased trade with COMECON countries. Cuba could get about 50 percent more for products sold through COMECON than it could get on the open market.<sup>19</sup> "Thus, by 1987 88.5 percent of Cuba's imports came from the socialist countries. The socialist world purchased 63 percent of Cuba's sugar, 73 percent of its nickel, 95 percent of its citrus, and 100 percent of its electronic goods."<sup>20</sup> With these trade figures in mind it is easy to understand Castro's lament at the 4th Party Congress in 1991, that the disappearance of the Soviet Union for Cuba was "like the sun not rising."

The emphasis on the moral incentives of the "new man" diminished and were replaced by central planning and development. Popular participation in the politico-economic system was increased by enlarging the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) membership. "Party membership

had increased from about 55,000 in 1969 to 170,000 in 1973 to 212,000 in 1975."<sup>21</sup> By 1980 the PCC membership had reached 434,000 as reported at the Second Congress of the PCC. Institutionalization of Castro's leadership and the revolution was enhanced by reform of the judicial system, which was placed under Castro's control, rewriting the constitution based on the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and convening of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.<sup>22</sup>

The Cuban Constitution of 1976 described the functions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) which had been the most institutionalized branch of the government since the revolution. The FAR's primary responsibility was and still is defense of Cuba from attack by foreign powers. Their next most important function was diplomatic in nature. The FAR was "contributing to Cuba's internationalist commitment to assist movements of national liberation abroad under the aegis of socialist solidarity."<sup>23</sup>

Throughout the 1970s Cuba's acquiescence to Soviet demands resulted in favorable trade agreements and postponement of Cuban debt and interest payments to the Soviet Union until 1986. Cuba's internal politics after the mid-1970s were characterized by stability.

There was a brief respite from Cuban U.S. hostility in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration. The Cuban and U.S. governments agreed to establish "interest sections." "While well short of formal diplomatic relations, such offices permit countries to have diplomatic personnel in each other's capitals. . . . The interests sections opened simultaneously in September 1977."<sup>24</sup> President Carter allowed U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba by not renewing the ban of travel to Cuba.

However, Cuba's involvement in revolutionary movements around the world, public disclosure of a Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba, and the "Mariel Boatlift" combined to doom this warming of relations. "By the end of the Carter administration, relations with Cuba were little better than they had been at the beginning, and shortly after President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981, he reimposed the travel ban."<sup>25</sup>

With the election of President Reagan in 1980 U.S. Cuban relations deteriorated further. The Reagan administration viewed Cuba as a Soviet proxy and the instigator of unrest in Latin America.<sup>26</sup> "From the day he took office in 1981, Reagan had insisted that relations with Cuba could not be improved until its troops were removed from Africa."<sup>27</sup> By the end of President Reagan's second term U.S., Cuban, South African and Angolan negotiators had signed two accords that provided for Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

Due to U.S. domestic policies President Bush not only continued the Reagan administration's hardline on Cuba, but changed the rules for lifting the trade embargo. The U.S. policy toward Cuba had changed little since Eisenhower broke off diplomatic relations in 1961. The economic embargo, travel ban, and other measures designed to punish Cuba and Castro remained in effect. Also of particular note during the 1980s was the maturation both politically and economically of the Cuban American exile community. Thus as is often the case, domestic politics affects U.S. international policy. The conservative Cuban American National foundation (CANF), contributed to Bush's Campaign early in the primaries. . . . This, combined with generous donations from other

conservative Cuban Americans, meant that Bush arrived in office already predisposed to sympathize with hard-line arguments."<sup>28</sup>

Previous U.S. administrations had based improved relations with Cuba on ending Cuban involvement in worldwide revolutionary movements, removing Cuban troops from Africa, and reducing military ties with the Soviet Union. President Bush raised the stakes even higher by demanding "that Cuba hold free elections, establish a market economy, and reduce the size of its military."<sup>29</sup>

From the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to the present, U.S. Cuban relations have remained stalled in their Cold War state. "When the cold war thawed and the strategic justification for U.S.-Cuban policy evaporated, powerful domestic factors kept it largely locked in place. The cold war continued in the Caribbean, even as it vanished in the rest of the world."<sup>30</sup>

Near the end of the Bush administration's term Congressman Robert Torricelli, chairman of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, introduced, supported, and passed into law the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). The Cuban Democracy Act became law in October 1992. The CDA served to further tighten the trade embargo by prohibiting U.S. subsidiaries outside the U.S. from trading with Cuba. The CDA also restricted ships that docked in Cuba from docking in the U.S. for the following six months. The president can waive the provisions of the CDA if he certifies Cuba is moving toward a free market economy. Under other provisions of the CDA U.S. companies could enhance communications-related trade with Cuba and authorized nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to make humanitarian donations to Cuba. It reduced the travel ban by allowing U.S. residents engaged in educational or religious

activities to travel to Cuba.<sup>31</sup> The international community did not support the CDA. The U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a Cuban resolution condemning the CDA.

The Clinton administration maintained the same policy toward Cuba that all the administrations since the Carter administration had maintained. "During its first seven months in office the Clinton administration was profoundly ambivalent about Cuba. It frequently went out of its way to avoid alienating conservative Cuban Americans and occasionally used confrontational rhetoric toward Castro."<sup>32</sup> Peter Tarnoff; Undersecretary of State, revealed a piece of the evolving Clinton administration policy toward Cuba in August 1994. He stated, "the administration wanted to see peaceful democratic change in Cuba."<sup>33</sup>

#### Problems in Paradise

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of democracy and capitalist economies in Eastern Europe starting in 1989, the Cuban economy has experienced an implosion. Cuba was extremely vulnerable to the collapse of COMECON. "During 1987-1989 an average 84.2 percent of Cuban imports came from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."<sup>34</sup>

Two critical commodities--food and petroleum--were hit very hard by the decrease in imports. Cuba could not easily replace these commodities on the open market because of the favorable trade terms previously offered by COMECON. Most alternate sources for food and petroleum demanded hard currency, which Cuba does not have. By 1992 Soviet imports had declined by 73 percent and exports by 75 percent. "Between 1989 and 1992 the Cuban Gross Domestic Product had declined by

between 34 and 51 percent."<sup>35</sup> Concurrent with the Cuban economic free fall was the implementation of the Cuban Democracy Act in October 1992 that further tightened the economic stranglehold on Cuba. The Cuban Gross Domestic Product continued to decline by another 10 percent in 1993 with more of the same predicted for 1994.<sup>36</sup>

Day-to-day life has become increasingly more difficult for the average Cuban citizen due to the implosion of the economy. As stated previously, "food consumption has fallen below the World Health Organizations goal of 2,600 calories a day to 1,780 as of June 1994."<sup>37</sup> The magnitude of this problem is described by Gillian Gunn, "Nearly 50 percent of the average Cuban family food purchases had come from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Not only did these goods cease arriving, but lack of spare parts and fuel interfered with Cuba's domestic food production."<sup>38</sup> Cuba's economic crisis and political isolation induced Castro to call for a "special period in time of peace."

#### Cuba's Response to the Disappearance of the Soviet Union

The Castro regime borrowed the term "special period in time of peace" directly from the Soviet Union. This helps to demonstrate how intertwined the Cuban and Soviet systems had become. Even though the break up of the Soviet Union precipitated the Cuban economic and political crisis the Castro regime chose to use the Soviet term which is used in response to a national crisis. In Soviet jargon a "special period in time of peace" "is set by the party, the government, and the military command. The term refers to a time in which the Soviet authorities consider that hostilities may commence."<sup>39</sup> "With this

background, it seems clear that Castro's imposition of a special period responds to a crisis having both economic and broader dimensions, and one perceived by the Cuban leadership as equivalent to general war."<sup>40</sup>

The Castro regime implemented the "special period in time of peace" in the fall 1990. This program had four main thrusts: first, to reduce oil consumption; second, to increase the yield of staple crops; third, to secure foreign investment in Cuba; and fourth, to orchestrate Cuba's reentry to the world economy.<sup>41</sup>

Cuba had no choice, but to reduce its oil consumption after deliveries from the Soviet Union fell precipitously after 1989. "Shipments fell from 13.3 million tons in 1989 to 10 million tons in 1990, 8.6 million tons in 1991, about 6 million tons in 1992 and an estimated 4 million tons in 1993."<sup>42</sup> The Cuban government took extreme measures in response to the oil shortage. "Hundreds of thousands of bicycles and two bicycle manufacturing plants would be purchased from the People's Republic of China. A nationwide project would be instituted to replace tractors and combines with oxen."<sup>43</sup>

The oil shortage has adversely affected agriculture and manufacturing. The sugar cane harvest; Cuba's main cash crop, has declined every year for the last 3 years.<sup>44</sup> Manufacturing has declined due to idling of Cuban factories to save energy. During weekly "special effort days" factories and offices operate without electricity. According to Donald E. Schulz, "Cuba, it seemed was entering an era of spiraling underdevelopment. If it was not exactly going back into the Stone Age, it was at least experiencing substantial deindustrialization."<sup>45</sup>

The effort to increase staple food yields has produced mixed results. While some increases have occurred, they still fall well short of demand. Finding food to feed one's family now consumes a major part of the Cuban Day. "It is not uncommon for shoppers to spend hours each day attempting to purchase basic supplies."<sup>46</sup> Beef and dairy yields are abysmal, mainly as a result of earlier collectivization efforts and the lack of fodder. Most livestock fodder was imported before 1989. Between 1989 and 1992 imports of fodder declined 72 percent.<sup>47</sup>

The campaign to secure foreign investment in Cuba has met with mixed results. Cuban government programs focused on earning hard currency through joint ventures with foreign companies in tourism, nickel mining, and biotechnology.

One of the swiftest ways for Cuba to earn hard currency was through joint tourist ventures (hotels, resorts, and restaurants). "The goal was to increase the number of foreign tourists from three hundred forty thousand in 1990 to one million in 1995."<sup>48</sup> Estimates of Cuba's earnings from tourism in the early 1990s vary widely. Donald Schulz maintains, "tourism would not produce net annual earnings of more than a few hundred thousand dollars within the near future."<sup>49</sup>

Gillian Gunn on the other hand cites statistics showing, "Gross revenue for 1993 is expected to exceed \$500 million. (U.S. Government sources believe that net profits from tourism are less than half of the gross revenue figures.)"<sup>50</sup> Using Gunn's figures would result in earnings of a few hundred million instead of Schulz's few hundred thousand, but in the macro aspect of Cuba's economy it makes little difference. Two points are consistently brought out in the literature concerning Cuba's net earnings from tourism. One, whether the net

earnings from tourism are a few hundred thousand or a few million compared to the 4 to 5.7 billion dollars a year the Cuban economy lost as a result of the demise of COMECON in 1989, tourism earnings are minuscule. Two, Castro and the ruling elite have turned the revolution on its head to accommodate foreign investors.

The effects of the disintegration of COMECON on the Cuban economy have already been examined. However, the extent Castro and the ruling elite adulterated the revolution to entice foreign investment is interesting. The Cuban government has changed investment laws, exempted foreign companies from taxes and customs duties, and abolished some labor laws in the tourism sector. "Labor laws guaranteeing job stability, a longtime source of revolutionary pride, were quietly shelved."<sup>51</sup> In many cases Cubans were barred from tourist hotels, resorts, and restaurants. Tourists were given preferential treatment and allowed to shop in "diplotiendas," stores catering to foreigners and denied to Cubans. Tourism was earning some hard currency to purchase imports, "But the regime's tourism campaign was producing a dangerous social backlash."<sup>52</sup> Castro is creating many of the same conditions with regard to tourism that allowed him to seize power from Batista 35 years earlier.

Nickel exports have the potential to earn significant hard currency. Cuba is currently involved in joint ventures to modernize plants, that will improve efficiency and increase production. Unfortunately for Cuba, international nickel prices have been depressed since 1990. Additionally the Cuban Democracy Act prohibits importation into the U.S. of goods made with Cuban nickel. Once plants are

modernized and if nickel returns to its pre-1990 price Cuba could earn 800 million dollars a year from nickel exports.<sup>53</sup>

Cuba has invested considerable talent and money in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. These industries have shown promise with their development of some world class products. Andrew Zimbalist sums up the prospects for these Cuban industries, "the trick for Cuba seems to lie in marketing. In short, there is some promise in this sector, but the road to progress is fraught with obstacles and uncertainty."<sup>54</sup>

The final thrust of Cuba's "special period in time of peace" is "to facilitate the economy's re-entry in to world markets by undertaking management and selective structural reforms."<sup>55</sup> For the most part these reforms are very limited, but free market in character. Many of the management and structural reforms have come about to encourage joint ventures. However, these reforms have not made their way into the domestic economy. Castro and the ruling elite learned from the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of communist governments in Eastern Europe. They are not ready to let reforms in Cuba get out of hand and threaten their rule. Unfortunately for the Cuban people the reforms needed to pull Cuba out of its current crisis are the things Castro fears the most.

Cuba has become a miserable place to live and its prospects for improving its standard of living without major social, political, and economic change are very poor. It is against this backdrop; of extreme internal and external pressure upon the Castro regime, that the subordinate questions to the thesis will be answered in the next chapter.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>James D. Rudolph, Cuba a Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government, 1987) 39.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 173-175.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 40.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 39-42.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>9</sup>Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 256.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 256.

<sup>11</sup>Rudolph, 46.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 47.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 47.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 47.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 53.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>19</sup>Gillian Gunn, Cuba in Transition. Options for U.S. Policy, (New York: The Twentieth Press, 1993), 28.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>21</sup>Rudolph, 55.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 54-55.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Gunn, 15.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>26</sup>Rudolph, 59.

<sup>27</sup>Gunn, 17.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 20-21.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>33</sup>PBS, "McNeil Lehrer News Hour," August 29, 1994.

<sup>34</sup>Andrew Zimbalist, "Treading Water: Cuba's Economic and Political Crisis," ed. by Donald Schulz (Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1994), 8.

<sup>35</sup>Donald Schulz, The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement, (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, May 12, 1993) 8.

<sup>36</sup>E.I.U. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Qtr 1994, 3 Jun 94, 14.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>38</sup>Gunn, 29.

<sup>39</sup>Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, translated by Peter Dariabin (New York Avon Books, 1965), 245.

<sup>40</sup>Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "The Cuban 'Threat' in the Southern Hemisphere: Goodbye to All That?" (Military Review, December 1991) 78-88.

<sup>41</sup>Zimbalist, 11.

<sup>42</sup>Gunn, 28.

<sup>43</sup>Schulz, 2.

<sup>44</sup>E.I.U. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Qtr 1994, 3 June 1994, 15.

<sup>45</sup>Schulz, 2.

<sup>46</sup>Zimbalist, 11.

<sup>47</sup>Gunn, 30.

<sup>48</sup>Oppenheimer, 286.

<sup>49</sup>Shulz, 6.

<sup>50</sup>Gunn, 31.

<sup>51</sup>Oppenheimer, 287.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 291.

<sup>53</sup>Zimbalist, 12-13

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 11.

## CHAPTER 3

### ANALYSIS

As stated earlier, it would be nearly impossible to predict when the end of the Castro regime will occur and it is not the intent of this thesis to do so. However, the manner in which the current regime departs the scene will determine the character of the U.S. response. "U.S. policymakers would be well advised to concentrate less on how to oust Fidel--an event which will happen sooner or later in any case--than on how to deal with his doleful legacy."<sup>1</sup> The more gradual and less violent the transition the less likely U.S. Armed Forces will be used in a combat role. There are variations of three generally recognized scenarios for the end of the Castro regime. First, the Castro brothers hang on to the very end and finally through their natural deaths or assassinations the regime ends. Second, the current regime gradually relinquishes power to a transitional unity government. Third, Cuban society and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) split into factions and an open civil war result.<sup>2</sup>

The most likely scenario is the Castro brothers will hold out to the very end. They have no interest in giving up power and in fact have spent the last thirty six years eliminating any competition to their rule. "To put it bluntly, Castro's interests [and his brother Raul's] are first and foremost the perpetuation of his own rule. He understands those interests as best served by the existing system."<sup>3</sup>

The least likely scenario is that the current regime gradually relinquishes power to a transitional unity government. This is the antithesis of the first scenario. "Thus, those who speculate on the possibilities of political change growing out of the status quo in an organic fashion--that is through evolution or negotiations--are simply not taking Fidel seriously. Or rather, they are refusing to confront the realities of power and survival."<sup>4</sup> Although this scenario is the least likely, it would be the best case for the U.S. The U.S. could develop options for dealing with Cuba that are not feasible with Castro still in power.

By far the most dangerous scenario would be Cuban society and the FAR splitting into factions and the eruption of civil war. This scenario is described by Gillian Gunn in her book "Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy":

Should there be a violent eruption on the island, some U.S.-based exiles would cross the Florida Straits to aid the regime's opponents. The chaotic outmigration associated with the violence, leading to refugee problems in the United States and possibly in other Caribbean countries, would produce calls for "something" to be done to restore order. Domestic pressure for U.S. military intervention could then escalate to near irresistible levels.<sup>5</sup>

After thirty-four years of coexisting with Fidel Castro it is doubtful the U.S. would attempt to overthrow him during the "final hour." U.S. involvement in Cuba is far more feasible in a post-Castro period. Options for U.S. Armed Forces involvement in post-Castro Cuba are some type of direct intervention in Cuba as described by Gillian Gunn or involvement based on an invitation or agreement or finally some combination of both. U.S. involvement in Haiti in 1994 is one example of how U.S. Armed Forces could enter Cuba. While the arrival of U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti was not preceded by a forced entry, the potential

for conflict was very real. A similar type of agreement or arrangement for U.S. Armed Forces entry in to Cuba may be possible. The agreement or arrangement for U.S. Armed Forces entry in to Cuba may not even be with the existing government, but may be worked out with some faction involved in a Cuban civil war. Another branch of the forced entry option could be a forced entry as part of a multinational peace enforcement operation under United Nations or Organization of American States (OAS) auspices. In the most dangerous scenario described above, the situation in Cuba may deteriorate so badly that the international community would be forced by public outcry to act. The forced entry scenario could involve several branches, a unilateral U.S. Armed Forces operation, a multinational U.S. led peace enforcement operation sanctioned by the UN or OAS or either of these two by invitation from the Cuban government or some faction involved in a Cuban civil war. Likewise the entry of U.S. Armed Forces by invitation, agreement, or arrangement also has a couple of branches. First, in the least likely scenario described above, the Castro regime gradually relinquishes power to a transitional unity government. This transitional unity government then invites U.S.--or more likely multinational forces--into Cuba to assist in nation building and humanitarian assistance. Or some faction in a civil war invites U.S. forces in to Cuba to conduct peace enforcement, humanitarian, and nation assistance operations.

A term coined by Dr. John T. Fishel to describe operations during Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq may very well describe future operations in Cuba. This term is "intrusive humanitarian relief missions."<sup>6</sup> According to Fishel, an "intrusive humanitarian relief mission" takes place "in a hostile environment partly controlled by a

defeated but not destroyed enemy."<sup>7</sup> Because of the hostile environment, security forces are required to insure the safety of the entire humanitarian and nation assistance force. Both Somalia and Haiti are examples of "intrusive humanitarian relief missions." The concept of "intrusive humanitarian relief missions" can also be applied to nation assistance operations. U.S. Armed Forces operations in Haiti during 1994 and 1995 could be characterized as intrusive humanitarian relief missions. Perhaps even more descriptive would be intrusive nation assistance missions. In many of the possible scenarios and branches discussed for Cuba, "intrusive nation assistance missions" are fitting descriptions of what U.S. involvement in Cuba may look like.

Regardless of which scenario or branch eventually plays out in Cuba, humanitarian and nation assistance operations will be necessary. With this in mind, the focus of this thesis will be less on forced entry combat operations and more on nation assistance and humanitarian operations; therefore, it can be of use no matter how U.S. Armed Forces arrive in Cuba. This limitation is clearly not meant to downplay the difficulty or magnitude of a forced entry by U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba. The purpose of this limitation is meant to sharpen the focus of this thesis by limiting its breadth.

#### What are U.S. Objectives in Cuba?

One of the first questions that must be answered is, What objectives will the U.S. have in Cuba? The Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement will be the primary source for these objectives. The National Security Strategy will be supplemented by statements from the President, his

administration and Congress. As stated earlier, these goals and objectives will be evaluated for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.

Arguably all three of the primary objectives of the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy apply to Cuba. They are Enhancing Our Security, Promoting Prosperity at Home, and Promoting Democracy.

The first sentence under the heading of Enhancing Our Security is, "The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans."<sup>8</sup> In a scenario where American citizens of Cuban descent return to Cuba during a civil war and then request help from the U.S. Government, it could lead directly to U.S. military involvement, as described above by Gunn. Also included in enhancing our security is countering, "Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and refugee flows."<sup>9</sup> Cuba has been involved in all three of these transnational phenomena in the past. A post-Castro Cuba would almost assuredly be involved in narcotics trafficking, an enormous refugee flow and possibly terrorism. Any instability in Cuba will be exploited by narcotics traffickers to use Cuba as a transshipment point. The Cuba refugee problem is well known and affects not only the U.S. but our friends and allies in the Caribbean. In the section of the National Security Strategy on Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces, one of the principles that will guide decisions on when to use force is in, "areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies."<sup>10</sup> According to the Clinton administration's National Security Strategy, as detailed under Enhancing Our Security, protecting the lives and personal safety of U.S.

citizens, preventing narcotics trafficking, and controlling refugee flows all have national security implications. All these problems have the potential to exist if Cuba descends into chaos and must be dealt with by the U.S..

The Clinton administration can Promote Prosperity at Home by helping establish a free market economy in Cuba. A free market economy in Cuba will promote prosperity in the U.S. in two ways. The first way will be by assisting in the creation of favorable economic conditions in Cuba. The improved economic conditions will improve the Cuban standard of living which should stem the flow of Cuban refugees. Fewer refugees will lower government expenditures for refugee interdiction and support. These funds can then be used for other domestic priorities.

The second way a free market in Cuba would promote prosperity in the U.S. would be to provide an additional market for U.S. goods and services. While initially this market would not be very large, it would expand and if NAFTA is any indication, Cuba could eventually become a significant U.S. market.

Promoting Democracy in Cuba has been the goal of every administration since President Eisenhower. Promoting Democracy is a primary goal of the Clinton National Security Strategy it states, "All of America's strategic interests . . . are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations."<sup>11</sup>

The objectives of U.S. policy in Cuba will be the three primary objectives of the Clinton National Security Strategy: Enhancing Our Security, Promoting Prosperity at Home, and Promoting Democracy. Significantly, Cuba is the only nondemocratic nation in the Western

Hemisphere, a fact pointed out in the Clinton National Security Strategy.<sup>12</sup>

#### Other Instruments of National Power

Another question that must be answered in the logical progression of answering the reasearch question is, What effect have the diplomatic and economic instruments of power had in reaching U.S. objectives? There is an ongoing debate over exactly how these two instruments of national power should be applied to Cuba. These instruments can be used to reward or punish Cuba's behavior. Succeeding U.S. administrations since Eisenhower's have used these instruments to punish Cuba for its actions. The U.S. economic embargo was implemented against Cuba in February 1962<sup>13</sup> as punishment for a series of Cuban actions viewed by the U.S. as detrimental to its interests. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) passed by Congress in October 1992 is punitive in nature and not only punishes Cuba, but also countries that trade with Cuba.

The CDA is also known as the Torricelli Law named for the Democratic Representative Robert Torricelli who was its chief sponsor in Congress. Some punitive measures of the CDA taken from Gillian Gunn's analysis of the law are:<sup>14</sup>

\*Gives the president authority to deny aid to any country that provides assistance to Cuba.

\*Prohibits trade with Cuba by U.S. subsidiaries incorporated in third countries, though trade related to the establishment of telecommunications appears to be exempted.

\*Prohibits vessels from loading or unloading freight in the United States for 180 days after having carried goods or passengers to or from Cuba, unless they have special licenses.

\*Defines the conditions under which the president may waive the law's restrictions. To do so he must determine and report to Congress that Cuba: has permitted opposition parties to organize; is respecting human rights; "is moving towards establishing a free market economic system"; and "has committed itself to constitutional change that would ensure regular free and fair elections.

\*Increases the penalties for violation of the embargo to a maximum of \$50,000 in comparison with the previous \$10,000 threshold.

The provision of the CDA that prohibits trade with Cuba by U.S. subsidiaries incorporated in third countries was viewed by most countries as extraterritorial imposition of U.S. law. This fact plus the CDAs heavy handed nature lead to overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly for a nonbinding Cuban resolution urging the U.S. to abolish the punitive measures of the CDA. On November 24, 1992, the General Assembly voted 59-3 in favor of Cuba's resolution, only Israel and Romania supported the U.S. with seventy-one countries abstaining. "Several important U.S. trade partners, including Britain and Canada, also passed blocking legislation, prohibiting U.S. subsidiaries in their countries from complying with the CDA."<sup>15</sup>

Present U.S. diplomatic and economic policies appear to be pushing Cuba toward what many see as the most dangerous course of action that was detailed earlier--a total collapse of the Cuban political and economic systems resulting in civil war. Dr. Donald Schulz of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute comments on current policy by saying, "In short, threats, isolation, and punishment are not the way

to promote change in Cuba. They will however, aggravate the current crisis and prolong Cuba's agony."<sup>16</sup>

Gillian Gunn in her book Cuba in Transition quotes the remarks of former CIA director Robert Gates, on the Cuban Democracy Act, "I think we have ended up giving Castro a propaganda coup through that Cuban Democracy Act where he's even gotten some support in South America and Western Europe and Canada because it is both draconian and extraterritorial."<sup>17</sup>

If current U.S. policy toward Cuba is pushing Cuba in an undesired direction with consequences detrimental to the Cuban people and U.S. National Security objectives, then what are the options? Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt put forth three options for U.S. policy and a view different from Schulz and Gunn. Their three options for U.S. policy toward Cuba are: increase the pressure on the Castro regime; continue current U.S. policy toward Cuba; or decrease the pressure on the Castro regime. Gonzalez and Ronfeldt also discuss a branch of the current U.S. policy that would permit selective easing of the economic embargo.

According to Schulz and Gunn, current U.S. policies using the diplomatic and economic instruments of power are not contributing to reaching U.S. National Security Objectives as discussed earlier. In fact, they say it appears that by punishing Cuba the current policy may make accomplishment of those objectives harder to attain and the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces more difficult if employed in Cuba. They believe there is the very real danger that the present policies could push Cuba over the precipice and into chaos resulting in the dreadful scenario described earlier by Gunn. Schulz sums up current U.S. policy

with the following comment, "Put bluntly, we have strengthened the regime and made a peaceful transition to democracy even more difficult."<sup>18</sup> Schulz and Gunn present two very similar prescriptions for decreasing U.S. pressure on the Castro regime. Gunn's are presented here:<sup>19</sup>

- \*Eliminate rehearsals of Cuban invasions in the Caribbean exercises, and invite Cuban military observers to participate in the maneuvers as a sign of good faith.

- \*Accept the judgment of the International Telecommunications Union and suspend Television Marti.

- \*Cease all aggressive rhetoric, especially that which entails violent metaphors.

- \*Implement the Torricelli Law [CDA] in a manner that minimizes the harm done by its sticks and maximizes the small carrots it still contains . . . .

- \*Remove all restrictions on food exports to Cuba, including direct sales to the Cuban government.

- \*Initiate government-to-government talks with Havana on the ideologically neutral area of environmental protection as a confidence-building measure.

- \*Publicly state that despite the language in the Torricelli Law, Cuba does not have to adopt a market economy in order for the embargo to be lifted. President Clinton could indicate that while significant progress toward full democracy must proceed the lifting of the embargo, Washington will accept whatever form of social organization the Cuban people choose.

- \*Coordinate policies with allies in Latin America and Europe, many of whom are uncomfortable with present U.S. policy and favor a more flexible approach.

- \*Distance Cuba policy from the conservative Cuban-American community, thereby diminishing the impression that Washington wishes to install a puppet government of wealthy exiles.

- \*Cease pressure on other countries not to invest in Cuba, as exposure to Western business practices appears to be broadening the worldview of Cuba's economic managers.

Schulz and Gunn take the long term approach and concede that their suggestions for decreasing pressure on the Castro regime may have some disadvantages in the short term. For one, Castro could claim that he had finally bent the U.S. to his will, and that all of the sacrifices by the Cuban people had brought the Yankees to their senses. Another disadvantage is the Castro regime could be bolstered both politically and economically by the loosening of the U.S. economic embargo. However, Schulz argues that decreasing the pressure on the Castro regime may in fact lead to its demise, "The irony of constructive engagement [his term for decreasing pressure], then, is that it might well prove to be a more effective way of undermining the dictatorship than the 'hard line' policies of the Castrophobes."<sup>20</sup>

One of the primary weapons Schulz and Gunn propose to take away from Castro with their revised U.S. policy is Castro's ability to claim he is defending Cuban nationalism from Yankee aggression. "Over the years, he has been highly successful in manipulating the specter of the 'Yankee threat' to mobilize his countrymen behind his leadership and policies. In effect, successive American administrations . . . have repeatedly played into his hands by enabling him to wrap himself in the cloak of besieged nationalism."<sup>21</sup>

Gonzalez and Ronfeldt in their book Storm Warnings for Cuba come to a different conclusion. They put forth two options for U.S. policy as long as the Castro regime remains in control. The first option is, "Staying the course--adaptively--with the evolving containment policy. The second option is, "Easing the embargo selectively, especially with regard to humanitarian matters and information flows."<sup>22</sup> They argue that "the embargo is the single most

influential instrument at the disposal of the U.S. government."<sup>23</sup> In their analysis it may be too early to give up our best bargaining chip and they highlight that in the last couple of years more liberalization has occurred than in the previous thirty years.

Under their first option Gonzalez and Ronfeldt do not argue for strict adherence to past U.S. policies toward Cuba but toward a flexible approach that evolves and adapts as conditions in Cuba change. They readily admit that over the past couple of years U.S. policy "is being relaxed, and made more flexible all around the edges."<sup>24</sup> With their second option they hope to "alleviate suffering among the populace . . . as well as to offer an unthreatening, friendly outreach that may dissuade Castro from hyping 'the U.S. threat.'"<sup>25</sup>

Gonzalez and Ronfeldt pick up where Gunn leaves off and talk about a second branch of planning for Cuba, "preparing for uncontrolled crisis." They discuss loss of control by the Castro regime with many of the apocalyptic predictions made by Gunn also present in their analysis. Their worst case scenario is similar to the most dangerous scenario described earlier, in which Cuban society and the FAR split into factions and a civil war erupts. They also discuss the other two possible scenarios mentioned earlier, the most likely scenario where the Castro brothers hold out to the very end, which they call "stasis and heightened repression." This scenario they believe is transitory and cannot be maintained indefinitely. By means of heightened repression and the manipulation of external threats, therefore, the regime hangs on to power--but perhaps only temporarily."<sup>26</sup> What was described earlier as the least likely, but best case scenario, where the current regime gradually relinquishes power to a transitional unity government they

call "nonviolent change and power sharing." As a precondition for this scenario Fidel Castro is no longer in power. An interesting sequel to the uncontrolled crisis presented by Schulz and Gonzalez/Ronfeldt is Castro's voluntary departure. This will be covered in greater detail after a discussion of "preparing for uncontrolled crisis."

Gonzalez and Ronfeldt present three general tasks the U.S. government and in particular the Departments of State and Defense must deal with in an uncontrolled crisis in Cuba:

*\*Containment of the crisis*, with the aim of damage limitation for both the United States and Cuba.

*\*Alleviation of the crisis*, for the purpose to reducing human suffering among refugees and noncombatants on the island.

*\*Resolution of the crisis*, unilaterally or multilaterally, by diplomatic or other nonmilitary means, and by military means if necessary.<sup>27</sup>

One of the primary objectives they see during the containment phase is preventing the crisis from escalating into an U.S.-Cuban military confrontation. They believe a high state of military alert and readiness will deter or contain possible military incidents. Part of this deterrent may be to prevent Cuban-Americans from going to Cuba to fight against Castro. Also, it is not unthinkable at this point that Castro may welcome a confrontation with the U.S. as a last effort to retain power. Other nonmilitary measures may be necessary to contain the crisis. They highlight the necessity for reliable information from inside Cuba to make informed political, diplomatic, and military decisions. Now is the time to develop these sources, not after a crisis develops. Equally important they stress, "The importance of broadcasting accurate information to Cuba, and, just as importantly, having it accepted as such by Cubans on the island . . . ." <sup>28</sup> They argue

for the continuation of Radio Marti and the improvement of its news programming.

A primary task during alleviation of the crisis will be controlling the immense refugee flow brought on by an "uncontrolled crisis . . . the outflow could easily exceed the size of the Mariel exodus of 125,000 Cubans by 20 or 25 times [2,500,000 - 3,125,000]."<sup>29</sup> In addition to the refugee catastrophe, humanitarian assistance will be required to alleviate suffering and the crisis. Humanitarian assistance may also assist in stemming the tide of refugees by keeping them in Cuba. "From the U.S. side, the relief effort could run the gamut from supplying food, medicine, and clothing to a stricken population, to providing public health, police, administrative, and other government-type services in areas devastated by war or internal chaos."<sup>30</sup>

Resolution of the crisis is bound to be the thorniest of the three general tasks. The difficulty of resolving the crisis will hinge to a large degree on how the crisis was arrived at and to what degree other countries and international organizations will participate in resolution of the crisis. Again, emergence of some type of transitional government without the Castro brothers present would be the best scenario. However, the more likely breakdown of civil society, chaos and civil war will bring calls for U.S. involvement. Gonzalez and Ronfeldt urge a multinational political and diplomatic effort to resolve the crisis, especially using countries with ties to Cuba, such as Spain, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Canada. Should the crisis become so bad that military intervention in Cuba is unavoidable they provide the following warnings:<sup>31</sup>

\*Military intervention should not be undertaken to impose peace on a nation bogged down in war. A peace operation in Cuba should be initiated in response to appeals by the rival Cuban camps to establish a buffer, to provide sufficient observers and monitors to reduce fear of aggression by the opposing sides, and to help create a climate conducive to the reconstruction of Cuba.

\*Military intervention should not be undertaken unilaterally. To do so would stir up Cuban nationalism and memories of the U.S. intervention and occupation at the turn of the century.

\*Thus the forces participating in the peace operation should serve under either a U.N. or OAS mandate, and include military and police units from other hemispheric countries.

\*The duration of the peace operation should not be open-ended; it should have a definite time limit. The longer the multilateral force is on the island, the greater the prospects are for increased armed resistance and casualties, and the greater are the probabilities of political fallout in the countries participating in the mission.

They emphasize that even under the above conditions military intervention should be the course of action of last resort.

A sequel to the "uncontrolled crisis" mentioned by Schulz and Gonzalez/Ronfeldt, is the voluntary departure from Cuba of Fidel Castro. While Schulz contends it is possible before an "uncontrolled crisis," Gonzalez/Ronfeldt view it as a "last-minute deal" to avoid U.S. military intervention and the ensuing loss of Cuban and U.S. lives. Gonzalez and Ronfeldt develop this sequel in more detail and provide the following elements of a deal:<sup>32</sup>

\*The Cuban leader would resign and turn over power to a new Provisional Unity Government composed of reformist leaders from his regime and the opposition. He, together with leading members of the security apparatus and others from his regime who wanted to, would leave the island immediately for asylum abroad.

\*Upon Castro's departure, and the dismantling of the internal security forces, the United States would lift all economic sanctions and help mobilize international aid for Cuba. Cuban exiles would be permitted to return to the island, invest in

business ventures, and participate in politics after they took up permanent residence.

\*Within 18 months, the Provisional Unity Government would hold an internationally supervised plebiscite on a new constitution for a post-Castro Cuba, and on the issue of compensation for nationalized properties previously owned by Cuban nationals. Internationally supervised governmental elections would follow six months later.

\*Upon the installation of the newly elected Cuban government, the United States would immediately transfer sovereignty and control of Guantanamo naval base to Cuba, to be operated as an international seaport and/or free-trade zone. Claims by U.S. citizens and firms against the former Castro government would be settled later by a joint commission appointed by the U.S. and Cuban governments.

Gonzalez and Ronfeldt view this proposal as very speculative, but, ". . . the proposed deal might provide a 'win-win' resolution to the Cuban crisis--for Castro, Cubans on the island, Cuban exiles, and the United States."<sup>33</sup> Using the three general tasks advanced by Gonzalez and Ronfeldt a list of possible missions can be made.

#### Possible Missions

During *containment of the crisis* U.S. Coast Guard and Navy forces will have to blockade the island of Cuba. This blockade will have two purposes: one, to intercept Cuban refugees fleeing the island, and the second purpose, to prevent Cuban-Americans from joining the fighting on the island or turning this crisis into another "Mariel boatlift" by going to rescue friends and relatives in Cuba. Cuban-Americans would exacerbate the crisis by providing boats for the hundreds of thousands if not millions fleeing Cuba. All U.S. Armed Forces, but particularly the Army should be prepared to establish holding areas and facilities for the waves of potential refugees fleeing

Cuba. The Army in particular will be called on, because of its size, installations, and capabilities. The handling of refugees by itself could be a daunting task. Refugees may need to be held in camps for an extended period, until domestic U.S. politics or the situation in Cuba determine their fate. Concurrent with the above operations U.S. Armed Forces in the southern U.S. need to maintain a high state of alert. According to Gonzalez, Ronsfeldt, and other authors, . . . . U.S. military commanders will need to take steps to safeguard military installations in Guantanamo and on the U.S. mainland, as well as possible civilian targets in Florida; defend against surprise attack; and prevent any armed clash between their units and the FAR from precipitating a wider war."<sup>34</sup>

Once the crisis is contained the next task at hand will be *alleviation of the crisis*. Humanitarian assistance will probably be the main focus of this task. According to Army Field Manual 100-5, "Humanitarian assistance operations use DOD personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters."<sup>35</sup> Since initial humanitarian relief missions in Cuba will most likely occur "in a hostile environment" they will follow the model of "intrusive humanitarian relief missions."<sup>36</sup> "Intrusive humanitarian relief missions" require security forces to insure the safety of the entire humanitarian relief force. These missions should be multinational and focused on humanitarian assistance only. The best situation would be a U.N. or OAS sponsored relief mission, where U.S. combat forces do not enter Cuba. U.S. Armed Forces could provide logistics support. However, as crises around the world

show the U.S. must prepare for a full range of options, from unilateral action to a U.N. sponsored multinational effort without U.S. combat forces. Whatever the option executed, some U.S. involvement is inevitable due to politics, proximity, and capability.

The third task *resolution of the crisis* will undoubtedly be the most difficult and involves several possible missions. The most important mission performed by U.S. Armed Forces to Cuba's long term viability will be nation assistance. Two of the hallmarks of nation assistance are that it is interagency and uses host nation resources. "The goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, to develop supportive infrastructure, to promote strong free-market economies, and to provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress."<sup>37</sup> Nation assistance is the umbrella under which the U.S. will support any post-Castro government in Cuba. Recent U.S. experiences in Panama, Southwest Asia and Haiti provide many examples of nation assistance operations.

As mentioned previously any, nation assistance operations will by necessity be interagency. Two civilian organizations that are key to success in nation assistance are the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Both organizations made significant contributions to nation assistance operations in Kuwait, Provide Comfort, Somalia, and Haiti. Initially OFDA will need to be a component of any task force deployed to Cuba. OFDA will be very active in the *alleviation of the crisis* task. Once *resolution of the crisis* begins, emphasis will shift from OFDA to USAID. USAID will be involved in nation assistance operations for the long term, helping to institute democratic changes and introduction of a

free-market economy. It is imperative that USAID is included in planning and execution of nation assistance operations and they are incorporated in the command structure to provide critical interagency coordination.

At some point during Cuba's reintegration into the body of democratic and free market nations Security Assistance may also become necessary. "Through security assistance programs, the United States provides defense materiel, military training, and defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further its national policies and objectives."<sup>38</sup>

U.S. Armed Forces support to Cuban counterdrug operations could be critical to establishing the international legitimacy of any post-Castro government. Counterdrug operations would also assist in accomplishing the U.S. National Security objective of enhancing our security by fighting drug trafficking. U.S. support to Cuban counterdrug operations could take the form of assisting Cuban forces in destruction of drug production facilities and preventing drug exports and transshipment.<sup>39</sup>

If the "most dangerous scenario" as described earlier in this chapter came to pass, Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping operations may be necessary. In the "most dangerous scenario" U.S. Armed Forces may have to conduct peace enforcement operations as a prelude to establishing the conditions for other operations in Cuba. "Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may engage in combat activities."<sup>40</sup> Peacekeeping

forces, possibly from the United Nations or Organization of American States (OAS), could then be introduced to maintain peace between the belligerents in areas of potential conflict.

As a follow on to peace enforcement operations, the U.S. Armed Forces may need to support counterinsurgency operations. U.S. support of Cuban counterinsurgency operations could take the form of support for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). "FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government [Cuba] takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."<sup>41</sup> FID is an interagency effort and controlled by the U.S. Ambassador, or in Cuba's case by the senior State Department official responsible for the country.

In his article, "The Cuba Contingency" LTC Geoffrey Demarest provides a lengthy list of possible missions. This list is especially helpful because missions were determined based on the predicted state of the post-Castro society, economy, military, environment and political system. He is very specific in delineating possible missions. See Figure 1 from his article the "Cuba Contingency."<sup>42</sup>

Important points that Demarest makes in his article are the acceptance or rejection of the U.S. Armed Forces by the Cuban population. The extent to which U.S. personnel of all government agencies are accepted by the Cuban population will be vital to the success or failure of our involvement in Cuba.<sup>43</sup> The U.S. must also be prepared to conduct combined operations in Cuba under the auspices of the Organization of American States or United Nations.

### What Forces are Necessary?

The question, Wwhat are the best forces to accomplish missions assigned by the National Command Authority can best be answered by looking at the previous section on possible missions and recent U.S. experiences in Haiti, Southwest Asia, and Panama. The U.S. response to missions in a post-Castro Cuba will likely be Combined, Joint, and Interagency. Also, as learned in Somalia during Restore Hope nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must be included in coordination. In the future NGOs may become active in Cuba and begin providing humanitarian assistance. Using the possible missions as a framework, the forces necessary to accomplish those missions can be identified.

If the "most dangerous scenario" described earlier happens, Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement operations will be necessary. These type of operations require combat forces. Infantry supported by aviation and possibly artillery would be the forces of choice for Peacekeeping missions. Artillery forces could be used in lethal and nonlethal modes. They could fire illumination rounds to discourage belligerent movements during darkness, conduct counter battery fires or destroy enemy forces bold enough to attack peacekeeping forces. A force based on the situation involving combat, combat support, and combat service support would be necessary for Peace Enforcement operations. Peace Enforcement operations could immediately follow entry operations and set the stage for other missions. Of critical importance in this and all operations is command and control. What the best organization for effectively employing U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba will be discussed in the next section.

Nation Assistance will be a major mission in Cuba and could very well determine the long term viability of Cuba as a democratic, free market nation. Nation Assistance is clearly an interagency mission. U.S. Armed Forces units that can assist in this mission are: civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, and engineers. As operations in Panama, Southwest Asia, and Haiti have shown nation assistance is a very diverse mission and forces must be tailored to fit the situation.<sup>44</sup>

Humanitarian Assistance missions require combat service support units. The focus in these type missions is logistics support, movement of people and supplies, medical support, and emergency repair of critical infrastructure. With these activities in mind the following units would be necessary: quartermaster/supply, transportation, medical, and engineer. Humanitarian Assistance as in "Provide Comfort" often is a joint, interagency, and combined mission and would most likely be the same in Cuba.

An area in post-Castro Cuba where U.S. Armed Forces are sure to be involved is counterdrug operations. As stated earlier a post-Castro Cuba would almost assuredly provide conditions conducive to narcotics trafficking. Again as with most operations discussed here this will be a joint, interagency, and possibly combined mission. Past counterdrug missions have involved intelligence, military police, special forces and aviation units. These are the type units that will be employed in Cuba in a counterdrug role.

Depending on the scenario for U.S. Armed Forces entry into Cuba and the situation they find, counterinsurgency operations may be necessary. Counterinsurgency operations would probably take the form of

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Forces used to execute, FID missions are: civil affairs, combat support, psychological operations, special forces, combat forces, aviation and combat service support. (See Figure 2.)<sup>45</sup>

Security Assistance will not be an immediate mission in Cuba, but at some point during Cuba's reintegration into the body of democratic and free market nations, will become necessary. Initially, Security Assistance to Cuba will be provided through the International Military Education and Training Program. (IMETP). "Mobile training teams, resident instruction in U.S. Army [Armed Forces] schools and similar methods are used to conduct this training."<sup>46</sup>

As a review, a prospective joint force list for Cuba could include: military police from the Army, Navy or USAF, engineers from the Army or Navy, medical units from the Army, Navy or USAF, ground combat forces and associated aviation from the Army or Marines, combat service and combat service support from any of the services and finally special operations forces that would include Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and Special Operations Aviation.

#### What is the Best Command and Control Arrangement?

What is the best organization for effectively employing U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba, is the final precursor question that must be answered before a thesis is formed. Current doctrine and experience gained in Panama, Southwest Asia, and Haiti provide examples of possible organizations. There are several options: a Marine Expeditionary Force, the 18th Airborne Corps, a Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force

(FIDAF), a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), a deployable JTF from ACOM or SOUTHCOM, or finally a pure ad hoc organization.

As stated previously, any operations in Cuba will most likely be combined, interagency, and joint. With this in mind a command and control organization that can effectively employ all these resources must be formed. Based on current doctrine a joint task force (JTF) will provide the framework for any command and control structure. The JTF organization for nation assistance in Cuba will be organized to command and control those forces envisioned in the nation assistance operations. As Fishel so aptly stated in The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, "It must be stressed, however, that the proper organization for restoration operations (or as they are now becoming called, nation assistance operations) cannot follow some cookie cutter approach. Rather the revised doctrine should emphasize the venerable military notion of tailoring to the situation."<sup>47</sup>

A deployable JTF from ACOM with augmentation from SOUTHCOM would be a possible choice for the nation assistance operations in Cuba. Both a Marine Expeditionary Force and the 18th Airborne Corps could be used as JTFs in combat operations in Cuba. However, their focus on combat operations is exactly what mitigates against their use in nation assistance where the focus must be on civil-military operations. Additionally, nation assistance operations in Cuba could go on for an extended period. The last time the U.S. Armed Forces were in Cuba, from January 1, 1899 to May 20, 1902, they remained for three and a half years. It would not be wise to tie-up these strategically important headquarters and forces for that long a period.

It can be argued that many of the missions of nation assistance can be accomplished by a classic Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF). (See Figure 2.) However, it is uncertain what the internal Cuban situation will look like after the demise of the current regime. As stated earlier, FID "is the participation by [U.S.] civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government [Cuba] takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."<sup>48</sup> In a post-Castro Cuba the Cuban government may not initially be able to execute "action programs" due to political instability. Nation assistance operations were initially conducted in similar circumstances in Panama during PROMOTE LIBERTY, for a short time, by a Military Support Group organized along the lines of a FIDAF. Modified FIDAF organizational structures were used in successful nation assistance operations in Kuwait (Task Force FREEDOM) and Northern Iraq (Combined Task Force Provide Comfort). If an element from USAID or OFDA is included in the FIDAF, to assist in interagency coordination, it appears that all the required forces are present. The FIDAF may be a good starting point for designing a JTF or JIATF to command and control a nation assistance mission in Cuba. Fishel makes three points about using a FIDAF concept to organize a JTF or JIATF for nation assistance operations:

First, the concept is much broader than augmentation for security assistance or foreign internal defense. Second, the base of organization should not be tied to any particular combat organization . . . the organization should be built from the kinds of units needed to execute the specific mission in the particular political/military context. Third, . . . the essential criteria for command of this type of organization include broad background, command of other fairly large military units, regional familiarity, and political/military sensitivity."<sup>49</sup>

A recent addition to options for organizing a JTF is the Joint Interagency Task Force. Two JIATFs were recently designated to take over operations of standing Counter-drug JTFs. One such Joint Interagency Task Force is JIATF (East) formerly JTF-4 located in Key West, Florida. JIATF (East) provides a very interesting concept for organizing a JTF for Cuban nation assistance operations. JIATF (East) is a joint, interagency and international task force. It is commanded by a Navy admiral with a Coast Guard flag officer and senior Customs Service official as his deputies "and a staff comprised of representatives from all the U.S. military services, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the Royal Navy."<sup>50</sup> Although this organization is fairly new it appears to be effective in its mission of drug interdiction.<sup>51</sup> The actual services and agencies assigned to JIATF (East) are not as important as the types of organizations, Joint, Interagency, and International. Nation assistance operations in Cuba will be Joint, Interagency, and International (Combined), and as such, a JIATF may be the best way to organize to support operations in Cuba.

Any JTF employed for Nation Assistance operations in Cuba would have some ad hoc aspects to it, but a completely ad hoc JTF would confuse the lines of command and control and "battle handover" from combat to noncombat operations. Cuba is in ACOM's area of responsibility and any combat operations in Cuba would be ACOM's responsibility. For ease of "battle handover" it would make sense to have the same unified command responsible for combat and noncombat operations in Cuba. In view of Cuba's involvement and influence in Latin America and SOUTHCOM's expertise in this area it would be

advisable to have SOUTHCOM augment ACOM or give SOUTHCOM responsibility for the Caribbean.

By using the previously identified forces, which are based on possible missions, and overlaying them on JTFs used in Panama and Southwest Asia, a JTF tailored to the Cuban Nation Assistance operation can be constructed. The JTF headquarters can be arranged similar to any JTF with a commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, staff, special staff, and personal staff. (See Figure 3.)

One possible option for organization of the JTF immediately subordinate to the JTF headquarters could consist of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a Joint Support Command, and a conventional forces "utility division" which will be discussed later.

The JSOTF would command and control a Civil Affairs unit, a psychological operations unit, a Special Forces unit and a Special Operations Aviation unit. The DART would provide much of the expertise and coordination with other governmental agencies (interagency), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In discussing Nation Assistance operations Fishel points out, "One of the major lessons of the Panama experience was that CMO [nation assistance] is interagency business."<sup>52</sup> The Joint Support Command would provide the multiple support functions necessary to support the JTF. These functions would include finance, legal, health service support, personnel administration, maintenance, all classes of supply, public affairs, signal and transportation. The conventional forces could be organized using an idea put forth by Demarest, by organizing them as a "utility division." The "utility division" would command and control

combat and combat support forces. The engineers, military police, intelligence, combat forces and aviation would fall under this organization. (See Figure 4.)<sup>53</sup> While Demarest argues for the establishment of a permanent "utility division,"<sup>54</sup> any of our light, airborne, or air assault divisions could be task organized to perform this mission. Figure 5 depicts the organization described above.

A second option for organization of the JTF immediately subordinate to the JTF headquarters could consist of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), a Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) and Joint Support Command. All four task forces would report to the JTF, who would coordinate their activities.

The JSOTF would command and control special forces, special operations aviation and military intelligence units. The JPOTF would command and control forces involved in psychological operations. The CMOTF would command and control civil affairs units, engineers, military police, aviation, and any other forces the JTF deemed appropriate for the civil military mission. The CMOTF is also where USAID or OFDA would "plug-in" to the nation assistance operation to provide interagency, NGO and IGO coordination. The JSC would be very similar to the first option providing Combat Service Support and medical support. Figure 6 depicts the organization described above.

The next and final chapter will draw conclusions about future U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Mark Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Thinking About the Future" (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 9, 1992), iii.

<sup>2</sup>In almost every book, article, or study some variation of these scenarios are mentioned. It did not matter what the political bent of the author was, these three scenarios transcended liberal and conservative thought.

<sup>3</sup>Mark Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Thinking About the Future," (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 9, 1992) 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>5</sup>Gillian Gunn, Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy, (New York: The Twentieth Century Press Fund, 1993) 72.

<sup>6</sup>Dr. John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 57.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. President. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1994), 6.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>13</sup>Gillian Gunn, "In Search of a Modern Cuba Policy," ed. by Donald Schulz (Greenwood Press: Westport, Ct. 1994), 127.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 135-136.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 133.

<sup>16</sup>Donald Schulz, The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, May 12, 1993) 24.

<sup>17</sup>Gunn, Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy, p 69.

<sup>18</sup>Schulz, 19

<sup>19</sup>Gunn, "In Search of a Modern Cuba Policy," 142.

<sup>20</sup>Schulz, 33.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>22</sup>Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Storm Warnings for Cuba (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1994) 132-133.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 136.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 132.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 133.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 106.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 142.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 140.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 143.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 145.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid 145-146.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 136.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 142.

<sup>35</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 13-5.

<sup>36</sup>Fishel, 57.

<sup>37</sup>FM 100-5, 13-6.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 13-5.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 13-6.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 13-7.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 13-7.

<sup>42</sup>Geoffrey B. Demarest, "The Cuba Contingency," Military Review (January 1994), 59.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>44</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restororation of Panama (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 70.

<sup>45</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, A-8.

<sup>46</sup>FM 100-5, 13-6, 13-7.

<sup>47</sup>Fishel, 70.

<sup>48</sup>FM 100-5, 13-7.

<sup>49</sup>Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 65-66.

<sup>50</sup>Vince Thomas, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired), "Anti-Drug Effort Takes New Twist," Proceedings, November 1994.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Fishel, 6.

<sup>53</sup>Geoffrey B. Demarest, "Beefing Up at the Low End," Military Review, June 1993, 50.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 50.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

This chapter will provide two theses to answer the research question, based on two different scenarios. One scenario involves an "intrusive humanitarian relief [nation assistance] mission," the other humanitarian relief and nation assistance operations under a permissive arrangement or agreement. The two theses will be evaluated using the Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War from Joint Pub 3-0. The Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War are identical to the principles for Operations Other Than War in Army Field Manual 100-5. The principles from Joint Pub 3-0 are: Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy.

The preceding chapters have provided the background and analysis to answer the question: What are the most likely composition and organization of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to accomplish U.S. objectives in Cuba? This question was further limited by focusing the analysis on Operations Other Than War and in particular on nation assistance and humanitarian operations.

#### "Intrusive Humanitarian Relief"

In all likelihood U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba will not occur until the current Castro regime has faded from the scene or is in its death throes. However, U.S. Armed Forces must prepare for a

multitude of contingencies. Possible missions range from a naval blockade, to provision of basic services, through direct combat and counter guerrilla operations. Figure 1 provides an extensive list of possible missions. As discussed previously noncombat operations in Cuba will be combined, interagency, and joint. To some degree nation assistance and humanitarian relief operations may occur "in a hostile environment partly controlled by a defeated but not destroyed enemy."<sup>1</sup> The degree to which Cuba becomes an "intrusive humanitarian relief mission"<sup>2</sup> will depend in large part on which scenario Cuba follows to rid itself of the yoke of the Castro regime. If predictions of the most dangerous scenario come true, with Cuban society and the FAR splitting into factions and the eruption of civil war any "intrusive humanitarian relief mission" will require a substantial security contingent.

In this scenario the composition and organization of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to accomplish U.S. objectives would be heavy in combat forces to provide security for the entire humanitarian and nation assistance force. In this case the JTF for Nation Assistance may look very similar to Figure 5. Immediately subordinate to the JTF are a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a Joint Support Command (JSC), and an infantry division. The JSOTF would command and control civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, and special operations aviation units. The DART would provide the coordination of interagency, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) activities. The JSC would provide the multitude of support functions necessary to support the JTF. The infantry division would provide the bulk of the security forces and combat support forces. Any

of our light, airborne, or air assault divisions could be used as security and combat service forces.

#### Permissive Humanitarian Relief

If the least likely scenario should occur, in which the Castro regime gradually relinquishes power to a transitional unity government, a force with less combat and security forces could be deployed. Should diplomacy strike an agreement or arrangement for U.S. Armed Forces to enter Cuba on nation assistance and humanitarian missions a less bellicose force composition may be necessary.

Figure 6 provides such a force composition and organization to accomplish U.S. objectives in Cuba given a permissive environment. This JTF for Nation Assistance leaves out the infantry division mentioned earlier under the most dangerous scenario due to the lessened requirement for security forces. Immediately subordinate to the JTF headquarters under this organization is a JSOTF, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), and JSC. As discussed previously in chapter 3 the CMOTF is where USAID or OFDA would "plug-in" to the nation assistance operation to provide interagency, NGO, and IGO coordination. The composition and organization of forces under this JTF provide direct command of the CMOTF and JPOTF by the JTF headquarters. These two task forces will be the main effort in a more permissive nation assistance or humanitarian relief operation.

#### Uncontrolled Crisis

A useful framework discussed earlier, for dealing with an uncontrolled crisis in Cuba is Gonzalez and Ronfeldt's three general

tasks: containment of the crisis, alleviation of the crisis, and resolution of the crisis.<sup>3</sup> According to them the first task in an uncontrolled crisis in Cuba will be to contain the crisis. Containment of the crisis will fall primarily on Navy and Coast Guard forces. They must blockade Cuba to intercept Cuban refugees fleeing Cuba and prevent Cuba Americans from joining the fighting or fomenting trouble in Cuba. The logical choice for organizing this operation would be a naval task force under Atlantic Command (ACOM) control. Cuba is currently in ACOM's area of responsibility (AOR). ACOM could also assign its Army component, Forces Command (FORSCOM) the mission to prepare and operate holding facilities, both in the U.S. and at Guantanamo Bay, for the expected influx of Cuban refugees.

After containment of the crisis, the main effort will change to the task of alleviating the crisis. The bulk of the missions to alleviate the crisis will be humanitarian relief and nation assistance operations. The naval blockade of Cuba will continue during this phase, but emphasis will shift to providing basic necessities to Cubans in Cuba to stem the refugee flow. Ideally this task can be accomplished through a multinational effort. "From the U.S. side, the relief effort could run the gamut from supplying food, medicine, and clothing to a stricken population, to providing public health, police, administrative, and other government-type services in areas devastated by war or internal chaos."<sup>4</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, the best situation would be a UN or OAS sponsored relief mission, where U.S. combat forces do not enter Cuba. In this case the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared to support the alleviation task with logistics and transportation assets. However, the U.S. should be ready to conduct unilateral actions if

necessary. In the case of unilateral U.S. action the forces and organization described above and shown in Figure 5 represent a logical choice.

The final and presumably most difficult task in an uncontrolled crisis in Cuba is resolution of the crisis. In attempting to accomplish this task it would be wise to heed the advice of Gonzalez and Ronfeldt. They make the following three recommendations for U.S. Armed Forces involvement in Cuba: do not attempt to impose peace on a nation bogged down in war, do not undertake unilateral military action, and any peace operation should have a definite time limit.<sup>5</sup> Gonzalez and Ronfeldt's warnings about imposing peace and not going it alone makes sense. However, their caution about setting definite time limits could lead to failure. By establishing definite time limits the U.S. could encourage adversaries in Cuba to "wait-out" the U.S. presence. A superior method may be to establish milestones or conditions which match the desired endstate. In any event the termination of U.S. peace operations should be event driven. Again the composition and organization of the JTF described above are one possible example of an effective answer to resolving the crisis in Cuba. However, the examples presented are only starting points and the military planner must use the principles of METT-T, mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time to compose and organize forces. According to Joint Pub 3-0, "There is no single C2 option that works best for all such operations. JFCs [Joint Forces Commanders] and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet the specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort."<sup>6</sup>

## Objective

The six principles for Joint Operations Other Than War provide a means to insure the theses pass the "common sense test." The first principle is Objective, Joint Pub 3-0 defines Objective as "Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of evaluating the theses the question is; do the composition and organization of forces provide for accomplishment of U.S. National Security objectives as described in the previous chapter? As discussed earlier the three primary objectives of the National Security Strategy all apply to Cuba. They are: enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy.

Under the heading of enhancing our security the National Security Strategy lists protecting the lives and personal safety of U.S. citizens, preventing narcotics trafficking, and controlling refugee flows as having national security implications. Some supporting objectives that can be derived from the National Security Objective of enhancing our security are: prevent U.S. citizens of Cuban descent from returning to Cuba during a crisis, intercept Cuban refugees at sea and place them in refugee camps, curtail and prevent manufacture and transshipment of narcotics in Cuba, forestall establishment of terrorist groups or bases.

Prosperity at home can be promoted by a Cuba with a free market that will create favorable economic conditions. Favorable economic conditions in Cuba will serve two purposes, to stem the flow of refugees and provide another market for U.S. goods and services. A supporting objective here would be developing infrastructure to support economic development.

Promoting democracy in Cuba has been a long stated U.S. goal, "All of America's strategic interests . . . are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations."<sup>8</sup> Two supporting objectives that will be critical to Cuba's long term viability as a democracy are: "develop sound and responsive democratic institutions" and "provide an environment that allows for orderly political change."<sup>9</sup>

A naval blockade of Cuba would protect the lives and personal safety of U.S. citizens by preventing Cuban Americans from going to Cuba to participate in the fighting or instigate trouble. This would also give diplomats time to contain the crisis without the complication of U.S. citizens' involvement in the crisis. While the naval blockade may not stop the refugee flow it could at least control it and the presence of a naval task force off the shores of Cuba would certainly discourage narcotics trafficking. However, narcotics trafficking would not be a major concern this early in the crisis. It would become more prevalent later in the crisis as the narcotraffickers took advantage of the chaos on the island. Counterdrug operations may become a mission for forces assigned to the JSOTF at a later time. Army forces in the Continental U.S. and at Guantanamo Bay have also been directed by this point to prepare and operate holding facilities for the influx of refugees.

A free market economy in Cuba that creates favorable economic conditions would be the best way for the U.S. to promote prosperity at home. This is where humanitarian relief and nation assistance operations enter the picture. Humanitarian relief operations will provide the basics for day to day life, which should help to slow the refugee flow. Nation assistance should begin when feasible and may go on concurrently with humanitarian relief operations. According to Army

Field Manual 100-5, "The goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, to develop sound and responsive democratic institutions, to develop supportive infrastructures, to promote strong free-market economies, and to provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress."<sup>10</sup>

By their definition nation assistance operations will help to accomplish the National Security Strategy objectives of promoting prosperity at home and promoting democracy in Cuba. Nation assistance operations are the mission of Civil Affairs units. In both instances the JTF for nation assistance in the "intrusive" or permissive scenarios include Civil Military Operations Task Forces (CMOTF). The difference is in the "intrusive" scenario the CMOTF works for the JSOTF. The JSOTF would provide security, intelligence, and aviation support to the CMOTF. Civil Affairs teams could travel with Special Forces teams supported by Special Operations Aviation to accomplish missions "in a hostile environment partly controlled by a defeated but not destroyed enemy."<sup>11</sup> While in the more permissive scenario, the Civil Affairs teams could operate independent of a security force. It appears that either JTF model has the composition and forces to accomplish U.S. National Security Strategy objectives in Cuba.

#### Unity of Effort

Unity of effort will be essential to U.S. success in Cuba. Joint Pub 3-0 states, "Military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature."<sup>12</sup> Due to the combined, interagency, and joint nature of probable operations in Cuba continuous attention must be

paid to unity of effort. Most likely unity of command will not exist as in more traditional military operations. The JTF will need to spend considerable time convincing and persuading NGOs, IGOs, U.S. government agencies, and military forces from coalition partners to support the JTF's objectives.

To truly complicate the unity of effort equation the U.S. Armed Forces may not be in charge, but be a component of a larger State Department, OAS, or UN operation. In either case the composition and organization of forces takes this into account. Special Forces, Psychological Operations units, and Civil Affairs units will bring the language capability necessary to work with the Spanish speaking members of a multinational force. Ideally the multinational force would include countries with ties to Cuba such as Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, and Canada. In both examples of JTFs for nation assistance provisions are made for the interagency connection. The JTF for employment in an "intrusive" environment contains a Disaster Assistance and Response Team (DART) immediately subordinate to the JTF headquarters. In a permissive scenario the JTF combines the interagency connection with the CMOTF immediately under JTF headquarters. The composition and organization of forces in both JTFs provide the forces and structure to accomplish unity of effort regardless of command relationships.

#### Security

"Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage,"<sup>13</sup> is how Joint Pub 3-0 introduces the principle of security. It goes on to state, "In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element,

or group hostile to our interests."<sup>14</sup> The composition and organization for both JTFs take the principle of security very seriously.

Security is provided by the Infantry division and Special Forces unit in the "intrusive" scenario and by Special Forces units in the permissive scenario. Although the Infantry division and Special Forces unit would be the primary security forces all forces deploying to Cuba on a nation assistance or humanitarian relief operation, whether in an "intrusive" or permissive environment must be capable of self defense. As discussed earlier in the "intrusive" scenario the CMOTF and JPOTF work for the JSOTF which would provide security for Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations teams operating "in a hostile environment partly controlled by a defeated but not destroyed enemy."<sup>15</sup> In the permissive scenario the CMOTF and JPOTF would be responsible for their own security unless the situation dictated otherwise.

The proposed JTFs also provide the flexibility to deploy intermediate force levels. For example, in the "intrusive" scenario a brigade or even battalion task force could be employed instead of a division. Again, the size of the force must be tailored to the situation using the proposed JTF as a framework. As Operation "Uphold Democracy" in Haiti recently demonstrated even in a permissive scenario the potential for conflict is very real. Consequently inherent in the composition and organization of both JTFs is the capability to "transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise."<sup>16</sup>

Security is also an important principle for maintaining U.S. public support for any operations in Cuba. Casualties by U.S. Armed

Forces deployed to Cuba, especially in a humanitarian mission would undermine public and political support for operations in Cuba.

### Restraint

Restraint will be a major component of any successful humanitarian relief or nation assistance operation in Cuba. Restraint applies "appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>17</sup> A key element of restraint is the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The U.S. Armed Forces have had considerable experience recently with devising and implementing ROE for noncombat operations. The ROE will vary depending on which scenario U.S. forces encounter. According to the Army Field Manual on Peace Operations, "well-crafted ROE can make the difference between success and failure."<sup>18</sup> The more permissive the environment in Cuba the more restrictive the ROE will be and the greater the restraint. An important point made in Joint Pub 3-0 and very applicable to U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba is, "The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals."<sup>19</sup> Restraining the combat power of U.S. Armed Forces deployed to Cuba will be critical to maintaining the legitimacy of the operation. It is essential that troops deploying to Cuba for "intrusive humanitarian or nation assistance operations" make the mental adjustment from use to maximum force, to use of the minimum force necessary to resolve the situation.

It is difficult to accurately evaluate the proposed composition and organization of the JTFs against the principle of restraint without knowing what the actual situation and ROE will be when the forces are deployed to Cuba. However, few events would trigger a

worse backlash against U.S. involvement in Cuba than U.S. forces overreaction. Restraint by U.S. Armed Forces in Cuba will maintain the legitimacy of the operation on three levels. The first level is legitimacy in the eyes of the Cuban people. The U.S. public must also accept operations in Cuba as legitimate, meaning military operations are not excessive and support stated objectives. And lastly operations in Cuba must be legitimate in the international "court" of public opinion.

#### Perseverance

To be successful in Cuba U.S. Armed Forces must take to heart the principle of perseverance. According to Joint Pub 3-0 forces must "Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."<sup>20</sup> Earlier this century U.S. Armed Forces spent three and a half years in Cuba, administering a military government. In all probability U.S. Armed Forces involvement in the last decade of this century or beginning of the next century will be measured in months if not years. A U.S. commitment to Cuba must be long term. The U.S. Government cannot simply meet its immediate objectives, declare victory and go home. As with restraint the principle of perseverance bleeds over into legitimacy. In order to maintain legitimacy with the Cuban people the U.S. Government must commit itself to the long haul in Cuba. It must convince the U.S. public that accomplishment of its long term objectives in Cuba is worth the sacrifice in both treasure and possibly U.S. lives.

Both JTFs by design do not include strategic headquarters or forces (ie. XVII Abn Corps or Marine Expeditionary Forces MEF). While the XVII Corps and a MEF could be used in combat operations, such as

forced entry, their use in nation assistance or humanitarian relief operations would be inadvisable. They are rapidly deployable strategic forces that should not be engaged in noncombat operations in Cuba for an extended period. These forces should be available for worldwide use after initial operations in Cuba. Also as discussed in chapter 3 their focus on combat operations is exactly what mitigates against their use in nation assistance where the focus must be on civil-military operations.

Tour lengths and rotation policies will need to be worked out for deployed units. Of particular note should be the Civil Affairs units composed primarily of reservists. Many reservists may need to serve on extended active duty. Additionally the U.S. political leadership will need to convince the American people of the necessity for an operation of such long duration.

#### Legitimacy

Legitimacy may be the key principle in the success of the U.S. in Cuba. Joint Pub 3-0 defines legitimacy as, ". . . the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions."<sup>21</sup> Gonzalez and Ronfeldt appear to have the principle of legitimacy in mind when writing about a diplomatic or if necessary a military solution to a crisis in Cuba. They stress the importance of, "enlisting the political and diplomatic efforts of other governments that have ties to Cuba. In particular Spain, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Canada . . . ." <sup>22</sup> It is almost imperative that any operations in Cuba are multinational and sanctioned by the UN or OAS. If the U.S. government and Armed Forces do

not establish their legitimacy from the outset then all subsequent actions may be jeopardized. Demarest calls legitimacy an intangible and states, "The margin of success or failure in any given mission area may depend on subtle changes in the overall emotion Cubans feel toward Army [U.S. Government] presence."<sup>23</sup> JTFs for both the "intrusive" and permissive scenarios include forces that are sensitive to the requirement to establish and maintain legitimacy. Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units are familiar with working in the humanitarian relief and nation assistance arena, and are culturally attuned to the region.

#### Summary

One thing regarding Cuba is certain, at some point Fidel Castro will depart Cuba. In the interim the U.S. Government must use the diplomatic and economic instruments of power to shape the type of Cuba that will remain after Castro's departure. A post-Castro Cuba should reflect our National Security Strategy objectives of enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home and expanding the community of democratic nations. Meanwhile the U.S. Armed Forces must prepare for the multiple contingencies that could occur if the diplomatic and economic instruments of power are less than successful. This thesis has proposed several possible solutions for humanitarian relief or nation assistance operations in Cuba should they become necessary

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 57.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Storm Warnings for Cuba, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994)141.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 143.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 145.

<sup>6</sup>Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, September 1993), V-5.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., V-2.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1994) 19.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1993) 13-6.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) 57.

<sup>12</sup>Joint Pub 3-0, V-3.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Fishel, 57.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 1994) 35.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., V-4.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Storm Warnings for Cuba, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994) 143.

<sup>23</sup>Geoffrey B. Demarest, "The Cuba Contingency," Military Review, January 1994, 60.

# FIGURES

Refugee reception, control and processing  
Ecological cleanup.  
Public health management.  
Security of key installations, notably former  
military bases.  
Prison management and inventory.  
Control and recovery of small arms.  
Inventory/disposition of major weapon systems.  
Mapping support.  
Formation or reformation of public forces.  
Restoration of domestic order, police operations.  
Establishment and enforcement of interim  
landlord-tenant rules.  
Regularization of real property dispositions.  
Provision of basic services.  
Physical infrastructure replacement.  
Protection of US citizens.  
Resistance to criminal organizing  
(probable counterdrug emphasis).  
Control of counterfeiting.  
Self-protection security operations.  
Temporary reinforcement of  
Guantanamo Bay's perimeter.  
Peacekeeping/peace enforcement/conflict  
resolution/war termination.  
Counter guerrilla operations.  
Graves registration.

(Few of the above tasks would be Army-specific; most would involve Army support of other agencies in the form of technical expertise, manpower and equipment).

Figure 1. Possible activities in which the Army might participate after a Cuban political collapse.





Figure 2. Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation






Figure 4. Utility Division.




Figure 5. Possible JTF Organization.




Figure 6. Possible JTF Organization.

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