A Model of Insurgency: Reflections of Clausewitz's 'Paradoxical Trinity' Lessons for Operational Planners Considering Conventional Forces in Unconventional Operations.

Abstract

This monograph addresses the employment of conventional military force against insurgency. First, it provides a model to analyze insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." Secondly, the monograph assesses this model's validity by applying it to the Vietnam War and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes with implications for future planners considering conventional forces in unconventional operations. Although the two world powers failed to direct military operations properly in their respective insurgent environments, this study provides some unique operational planning considerations. These considerations are important since the end of the Cold War has simultaneously caused a reduction in U.S. military forces, and compelled the U.S. to increase its global commitments in a hostile strategic environment.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 19, 1995
Accession Number
ADA300106

Entities

People

  • John C. Buckley Ii

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil Rights
  • Civil War
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Law
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Minority Groups
  • National Security
  • Political Systems
  • Societies
  • United States
  • Violence
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies