Intelligence and the Defensive Culminating Point--Piercing the Fog.
Abstract
This monograph examines Carl von Clausewitz's theoretical concept of the defensive culminating point and the ability of Army doctrine and its's analysis system--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield--to determine an enemy's courses of action under the conditions of culmination. The paper first defines culmination accurately, particularly defensive culmination and includes a discussion of the factors That lead to this state. Although Clausewitz's On War will form the basis for this definition, sources including U.S. Army doctrine and current writings on the topic are also studied. From this definition the monograph next employs the Battle of the Bulge as a case study for operational defensive culmination. This battle tests Clausewitz's theoretical concept against an actual operation and demonstrates indicators and intelligence methods that assist in predicting defensive culmination. The paper then analyzes the current intelligence estimate process for its ability to detect and anticipate defensive culmination. The monograph concludes with an assessment of the utility of current doctrine to identify defensive culmination. The study also develops indicators of culmination drawn from both the theoretical definition of culmination and the practical example found in the Battle of the Bulge.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA300130
Entities
People
- Stephen C. Duncan
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College