Operational Deception: U.S. Joint Doctrine and the Persian Gulf War.

Abstract

This monograph examines U.S. Joint doctrine for operational deception (Joint Pub 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception). The monograph provides information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and how these concepts can be used when planning operational deception. The monograph provides historical examples of operational deception by briefly examining deception operations in the Napoleonic Era, WWI, WWII, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The monograph compares unique Joint deception concepts with the deception operations performed by USCENTOOM in the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also compares Joint doctrine for operational deception with the earlier doctrines of the four U.S. Services. The monograph concludes that USCENTCOM's operational deception in the Persian Gulf War is in concordance with subsequent Joint doctrine. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting operational deception. The monograph suggests changes to Services' doctrine for military deception.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1995
Accession Number
ADA300711

Entities

People

  • Henry S. Larsen Iii

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Air Strikes
  • Aircrafts
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Artillery
  • Command And Control
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of Defense
  • Doctrine
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Marine Corps
  • Military Science
  • Operations Security
  • Psychological Operations
  • Second World War
  • United States Central Command
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies