U.S. Army Intelligence in Support of 100-Hour War: Fact or Fiction/Myth or Reality?
Abstract
The objective of this monograph is to evaluate the performance of U.S. Army intelligence in Desert Shield/Storm. Several limitations or constraints apply. First, the paper is unclassified and, hence, specific details of several important points had to be omitted. The unclassified nature of the paper does not invalidate the conclusions, however, since most if not all of the broad concepts and operations are in unclassified sources. The monograph evaluates Army intelligence performance in light of the new intelligence environment created by Desert Shield/Storm. A unique set of external factors must be understood before an adequate assessment of Gulf War intelligence can be made. Those external factors are considered and their impact on Army intelligence discussed. The last section of the monograph evaluates Army intelligence in Desert Shield/Storm during each phase of the Intelligence Cycle. Each phase is evaluated by the author's subjective evaluation; comments and observations by other authors; and, when available, remarks by those who were in the war. The conclusion places the separate phase evaluations in juxtaposition to the external factors discussed to arrive at an overall conclusion of the efficacy of U.S. Army intelligence during the war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA300877
Entities
People
- David W. Cammons
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College