False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM-1 Warfighting.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the doctrine of maneuver warfare promulgated in FMFM-l Warfighting. This analysis begins by establishing the relationship between military theory and doctrine. Once that foundation is established the author critiques the theoretical origins of maneuver warfare by analyzing the theories of J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hafl, Heinz Guderian, and William Lind. This study concludes from that analysis that the foundation of maneuver warfare---the argument that an opponents moral and physical cohesion will always be shattered by a series of rapid and unexpected actions and that once shattered his remnants can be defeated with relative ease---is without any factual basis, cannot be put into practice, and ignores the practical requirements of warfare. This study then recommends a theoretical construct based on the theories of Hans Delbrueck and Dr. James Schneider to correct those flaws and argues that the strengths of FMFM- 1 can be retained in a new doctrine that is considerate of the practical requirements of warfare. The conclusion offers a number of recommendations to guide the writing of a new Marine Corps capstone doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA301034
Entities
People
- Craig A. Tucker
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College