Start Marking Sense. Managing the Command's Information.
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph was to illuminate information as both a resource and a process that deserves structured, coherent management at the unit level. The thesis is that lack of such management contributes to needless friction that degrades a unit's ability to perform its mission. The monograph qualifies information as a resource, examines the importance of information to a military organization, and defines five 'information failures' -- insufficient, overabundant, irrelevant, inaccurate, and untimely information -- that disrupt a unit's decision and execution cycles. The Scud-hunting efforts during Operation DESERT STORM are analyzed for examples of delay and mistakes caused by friction due to information failures. The monograph then proposes a framework for managing information as a traditional, tangible resource and process. It further highlights nontraditional properties of information relevant to a 21st century force. The monograph recommends the creation of an information officer position on the commander's staff, similar to a chief information officer in organizations outside the military. This officer would be coequal to the other officers who manage resources and processes on the commander's staff today -- S/G/J1 through S/G/J8. The role of this officer would be to bring unity to what is now a disjointed effort to manage the command's information. This officer is not envisioned as a technocrat but someone who would blend mission, process management, and information technology expertise to assure the unit uses its information to its best tactical, strategic, and organizational benefit.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 17, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA301161
Entities
People
- David B. Pistilli
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College