

PARAMETERS

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Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force
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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE . . ."

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

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From the Editor

In this and subsequent issues we continue the quest for wisdom in matters pertaining to armed interventions and peace operations.

Operations in Troubled States

Martin van Creveld examines changes underway in state functions in many parts of the world. He assesses the role of the state as a fighting entity; as the product of 19th- and 20th-century social programs; as the beneficiary and victim of technology, economic change, and the media; and finally as the guarantor of public order. He synthesizes these characteristics in assessing the concept of the state as an organizing principle.

Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink define and describe a predictive model for examining troubled states when developing national policy regarding intervention in those states. They propose to use a cluster of "societal indicators" to identify and measure state decay whenever national security policy options include intervention by US forces acting alone, in a coalition, or as part of a UN operation.

Paul M. Belbutowski examines the challenges of dealing with individuals from non-Western civilizations in terms of human culture and the concept of time. He encourages strategists to consider the profound differences between these objective features of any civilization and their own assumptions about them when planning or conducting intervention operations.

Ralph Peters believes that operations in cities are inevitable in future interventions and describes ways in which the services might prepare for them. He proposes adjustments in procurement, organization structures, equipment, and training to prepare for operations in metropolitan regions.

Germany: Strategy, NATO, and Peace Operations

Christian E. O. Millotat looks at strategic opportunities that have followed the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the rediscovery of maneuver space as an operational factor. He underscores the need to overcome constraints that were inherent in Cold War operational planning and exercises, and he identifies a way ahead as the new NATO strategy revitalizes the operational art.

Karl-Heinz Börner describes and analyzes the implications of the 1994 ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court that permits the German Federal Armed Forces to participate in military operations outside of

NATO territory. His review of the implications of this change includes its salient effects on the German Federal Armed Forces themselves.

Robert H. Dorff examines the political dimensions of the decision that allows the German military to participate in operations outside of NATO territory. His survey of political and public reactions to the decision is set in the evolution of German foreign policy since unification.

Antulio J. Echevarria provides a context for understanding the renaissance in NATO and German concepts of the strategic defensive through his profile of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke. His analysis of Moltke's career highlights the latter's influence on generations of German army officers, including the development of the General Staff during the 19th century.

Rounding Out the Issue

Harold R. Winton analyzes the evolution of Army and Air Force warfighting concepts between the end of the Vietnam War and the start of the 1990-91 Gulf War against Iraq. His research reveals the high degree of pragmatism involved as each service responded to the other's doctrine and equipment requirements during the final years of the Cold War. Unexamined in this adaptation of a much larger body of research is the prospect for continued cooperation without the unifying influence of an overwhelmingly powerful hostile state.

Review Essays include "Looking Back at the Bomb," by James E. Auer and Richard Halloran; Norvell B. DeAtkine's "The Middle East: Contradictory and Less Predictable;" "Strategic Reading on Northeast Asia" by Donald W. Boose; and "Trends in National Security Issues" by Russ Groves.

Book Reviews include Bernard E. Trainor on *The Old Man's Trail*; James J. Wirtz's assessment of Colin Gray's *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power*, and Steve Metz on Robert S. McNamara's *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*.

The Information Highway

The Army War College has established an Internet home page; its address is <http://carlisle-www.army.mil>. We will be uploading information about the journal, an index, and copies of articles and review essays in the coming weeks. As we are starting with the most current material, it could be a year or more before the entire collection is available.

On a related topic, we will soon publish an article that evaluates a variety of Internet locations that may presently be of value to strategists or that have the potential to be of interest. The article, prepared by members of the Strategic Studies Institute, will reside permanently on their part of the War College home page where it can be updated as changes occur. — JJM □

The Fate of the State

MARTIN VAN CREVELD

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The State, which since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has been the most important and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is dying. Wherever we look, existing states are either combining into larger communities or falling apart; wherever we look, organizations that are not states are taking their place. On the international level, we are moving away from a system of separate, sovereign, states toward less distinct, more hierarchical, and in many ways more complex structures. Inside their borders, it seems that many states will soon no longer be able to protect the political, military, economic, social, and cultural life of their citizens. These developments may lead to upheavals as profound as those that took humanity out of the Middle Ages and into the Modern World. Whether the direction of change is desirable, as some hope, or undesirable, as others fear, remains to be seen.

In this article the state of the state will be discussed under five headings. Part I looks at the state's declining ability to fight other states. Part II outlines the rise and fall of the welfare state. Part III examines the effects of modern technology, economics, and the media. Part IV focuses on the state's ability to maintain public order. Finally, Part V is an attempt to tie all the threads together and to see where we are headed.

Part I. The Declining Ability to Fight

The principal function of the state, as that of all previous forms of government, has always been to fight other states, whether defensively in an attempt to defend its interests or offensively to extend them. Usually a state that was unable to do this was doomed to disappear. The best it could hope for was to lead a sort of shadowy existence under the protection of some other state, as Lebanon, for example, does under Syrian tutelage; even that existence was likely to be temporary.

Conversely, the need to fight other states has played a critical role in the development of the state's most important institutions.¹ This includes the government bureaucracy, whose original function was to levy taxes for the

purpose of waging war; the note-issuing state bank, an early 18th-century invention designed specifically to help pay for Britain's military effort during the wars against Louis XIV; and of course the regular armed forces. In most states, the latter continued to take up the lion's share of expenditure until well into the 19th century.²

Driven largely by the need to fight other states, the power of the state expanded from 1700 on. The number of bureaucrats (the word itself is an 18th-century neologism) multiplied, and the amount of statistical information at their disposal increased, as did the share of GDP that was extracted by government. Technology drove war, and war, technology. International competition intensified until, during the second half of the 19th century, it reached the point where much of the world had been turned into an armed camp. Each of the so-called great powers was looking anxiously over its shoulder at all the rest to see which one was the most threatening, and which one, being less so for the moment, could be drawn into an alliance.

Most important of all, the French Revolution led to the nationalization of the masses and, with that, to a drastic change in the role of the state in the popular consciousness. Hobbes, Locke, and many of their 18th-century successors saw the state simply as an instrument for maintaining public order and permitting a civilized life; to quote a rhyme by Alexander Pope: "Over government fools contest/What is best administered is best." Now it became an end unto itself, an earthly god in whose honor festivals were celebrated, monuments erected, and hymns composed and sung.³ It was a vengeful god who, according to his greatest prophet, Georg Hegel,⁴ fed on blood and periodically demanded the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands if not millions—for their own highest good, needless to say. In retrospect, nothing in the history of the modern state is more astonishing than the willingness, occasionally even eagerness, of people to fight for it and lay down their lives for it.

The climax of these developments was reached during the years of total war between 1914 and 1945. Acting in the name of the need to protect or extend something known as the national interest, states conscripted their populations and fought each other on an unprecedented scale and with an unprecedented ferocity. Nor was it merely a question of soldiers killing each other in the field. At the grand strategic level, both 1914-18 and 1939-45 were conducted by attrition; this gave states time to mobilize not only troops but civilians (including

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“Nothing in the history of the modern state is more astonishing than the willingness, occasionally even eagerness, of people to fight for it and lay down their lives for it.”

women and children) as well, putting them to work in fields and factories. Under the direction of such figures as Walter Rathenau in Germany, David Lloyd George in Britain, Georges Clemenceau in France, and Bernard Baruch in the United States, the state assumed control over finance, raw materials, transportation, labor (including professional qualifications and wages), and even the calorie intake of their citizens. Most of these controls were demolished after 1918, only to be reinstituted on an even greater scale after 1939.

Thanks to the unprecedented mobilization of demographic, economic, industrial, technological, and scientific resources, the two World Wars together, and each separately, dwarfed all the armed conflicts that had taken place in the past. More important to our purpose, mobilization warfare accelerated—if it did not create—technological progress.⁵ All through World War II in particular, tens of thousands of scientists were engaged in research and development, producing devices that ranged from radar to the electronic computer and from the jet engine to the first ballistic missiles. The climax arrived on 6 August 1945 when the first atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, killing an estimated 75,000 people.

At first, nuclear weapons were thought to have put unprecedented military power in the hands of the state; after a few years, though, it began to be realized that they did not so much serve the objectives of war as put an end to it.⁶ As the power of nuclear weapons grew—from 20,000 kilotons in 1945 to 58 megatons in 1961—and their numbers increased, wherever they made their appearance large-scale interstate war came to a halt. First the superpowers; then their close allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact; then the USSR and China; then China and India; then India and Pakistan; then Israel and its Arab neighbors. Much as they hated each other, they each in turn saw themselves with their horns locked and unable to fight each other in earnest.⁷

Without exception, what large-scale interstate wars have taken place since 1945 have been waged either between or against third- and fourth-rate military powers. The Korean War, which originally was simply a civil war between the two parts of a country split into half; the five (or six depending on the way one counts) Arab-Israeli wars; the three Indian-Pakistani wars; the Chinese-Indian War; the Chinese-Vietnamese War; the Falklands War, so small that it is often referred to as a campaign; the Iran-Iraq War; the Gulf

War; and most recently, the war between Ecuador and Peru—all these serve to prove the point. Since 1945 no two first-rate states, meaning such as were armed with nuclear weapons, have fought each other; by some accounts they have not even come close to fighting each other.⁸

Even more striking than the marginalization of the belligerents was the declining scale on which war was waged. Though the world's population has almost tripled since 1945, and though its ability to produce goods and services has increased many times over, both the size of armed forces and the number of the major weapon systems with which they are provided now amount to only a fraction of what they were in 1945. For example, the forces mobilized by the coalition in the Gulf were just one-seventh of the size of those deployed by Germany for its invasion of Russia in 1941. In most places the shrinking process is still under way. Not a day passes without some new cuts being announced. And in the face of the potential for nuclear destruction, there is not much chance of the mass forces of World War II being rebuilt in any kind of foreseeable future.

Part II. The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State

As the state lost its ability to expand at its neighbors' expense—a handicap confirmed by the Charter of the United Nations, which, as the most subscribed-to document in history, prohibits using force to annex territory—it turned its energies inward. It lies in the nature of a bureaucratic construct that it should seek to control and regulate everything; in so doing it created the welfare state.

The beginning of the story is in the period 1789 to 1830. First came the French Revolution, which, exported across the length and width of Europe, broke up the ancient feudal and ecclesiastic institutions; by atomizing society, it put the state in a much stronger position than ever before. Next came the industrial revolution. Starting in Britain, it brought with it economic freedom, unbridled capitalism (including its worst manifestations—a total lack of planning, widespread poverty, and inhumane exploitation), and the invisible hand. The influence of such figures as Adam Smith and Friedrich List caused one nation after another to dismantle internal and external economic controls and switch to free trade; with the Manchester School firmly in control, during the first half of the century the motto was *laissez faire*.

After 1850 or so, the prevailing mood began to change. One reason for this was a number of inquiries, some of them official, that were launched into the state of the working class and that brought to light the often shocking conditions in which working people lived.⁹ Another was the military competition mentioned in the previous section; with the most important states increasingly dependent on mass armies consisting of conscripts and reservists, their rulers felt they could no longer afford to neglect the populations that provided those armies. Finally there was the steady, if often stormy, movement toward democratization and the rise in many countries of socialist parties. The former made it necessary,

in the words of one English parliamentarian, "to educate our masters." The latter attracted a growing number of voters and openly threatened violent revolution unless something was done to improve the lot of the masses.

Be the exact reasons what they may, the first Factory Acts were passed in Britain during the 1840s over howls of protests by the owners and their spokesmen. The laws' purpose was to put limits on working hours—initially those of women and children—and to institute at least some safety controls. Imitated by many countries, originally the new laws only applied to a few industries considered particularly dangerous, such as mining. Later they were extended to others such as textile and metalworking plants. Among the last to be reached were agriculture, domestic service, and small-scale light industry, particularly in the form of sweatshops. These were affected, to the extent that they were affected at all, only during the early years of the 20th century.

Once the state had begun to supervise the conditions of labor—including the establishment of labor exchanges, another early 20th-century development—it soon sought to do the same for education and public health. The pioneer in the former field was Prussia; following beginnings made in the reign of Frederick the Great, something like universal—although, as yet, not free—elementary education was achieved in the years after 1815 when Prussia became a much-imitated model and educators from all over the world flocked to see how it was done.¹⁰ In the rest of Europe the real push was provided by the war of 1870-71. The French in particular looked for an explanation; unable to agree on the causes of the defeat, in the end they pointed a finger at the schoolmaster. Around 1900 the "utopian vision"—the phrase used by the British Fabian socialist Beatrice Webb—of universal elementary education had been achieved in all the most advanced countries.

Advances in public health were made necessary by urban growth and were initially decentralized. In Britain, Germany, and to a growing extent the United States, laws were enacted that entrusted the task of providing better sanitation, better disease controls, to local authorities and municipalities; they also took over from the church and private charitable organizations by providing at least some hospitals for the indigenous ill. In the most advanced countries, ministries of health were established during the first two decades after 1900. Their task was to supervise those countries' entire health systems, including both medical practice and training; in addition, many of them also provided various programs, such as inoculation and prenatal care, that were compulsory, free, or both.

Like state-run education, state-run welfare was originally a German invention.¹¹ The 1880s found Bismarck worried about the progress of the Social Democratic Party. This caused him to institute the so-called "Revolution from above" and the world's first schemes for unemployment, accident, sickness, and old age insurance. Between 1890 and 1914 his example was followed by others through much of Western Europe and Scandinavia. Seen

from this point of view, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was anything but an anomaly; instead it was simply an attempt to grab one particularly backward country by the neck, institute universal welfare at a single stroke, and extend state control to the point where civil society itself almost ceased to exist. Only the United States, with its tradition of free enterprise and rugged individualism, resisted the trend and, as a result, found itself lagging behind. In the land of the dollar it took the Great Depression and 13 million unemployed to make first the New Deal and then social security during the 1930s.

Still, what really made the modern welfare state was World War II. As had already been the case during World War I, governments took responsibility for running many aspects of their citizens' lives, including even the number of inches of hot water they were allowed to put in their tubs; but this time they did so with no intention of giving up their power after the war had ended. In one developed country after another, extensive health programs covering the entire population—as under the British National Health System which served as the model for many others—were established. To this were added a vast variety of ancillary programs, such as free or subsidized meals for children and the elderly, cheap housing, vocational training and retraining, and education. The latter often led to free education up to, and in some instances including, the university level.

These developments led to a huge increase in the number of bureaucrats per population and per square mile.¹² By the end of the 1950s the number of ministries, which during the state's formative years in the 17th and 18th centuries had usually stood at four, had risen to something nearer 20 in most countries. To the minister of justice, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of war, and the minister of the treasury (sometimes, a first or prime minister as well), were added ministers for interior affairs, police, agriculture, transportation, communications, education, health, labor, welfare, trade and industry, aviation, energy, and tourism. Some countries thought it necessary to have a special minister responsible for the infrastructure. Others considered they could not do without one for sport and leisure, whereas during the 1970s and 1980s many cabinets came to include a portfolio for ecological matters and women's affairs.

To pay for these programs and these ministries, it became necessary to raise taxes—particularly direct ones—until, in countries such as Britain and Sweden, marginal rates of income tax could reach 90 percent and more. Taxation, though, was only part of the solution. The nationalization of industry had been demanded by socialist parties ever since the time of the *Communist Manifesto*. The way ahead had been shown in Britain by the creation of the Electricity Board in 1926; next, France during the premiership of Leon Blum (1936-37) nationalized its arms industry. Following World War II, in one European country after another entire sectors of the economy were taken out of private hands and put into those of the state.¹³ The exact identity of the industries in question varied. Often they included mass transportation such as sea, air, and rail; telecommuni-

***“What really made the modern welfare state
was World War II.”***

cations, energy, banking, insurance, mining (particularly for coal and oil), and critical branches of manufacturing such as steel, shipbuilding, aviation, and military equipment. Initially it was hoped that the profits of these industries would be made to work for the community at large rather than for their shareholders alone. In practice it did not take long before many of them, run on electoral principles rather than business ones, turned into albatrosses that were grossly overstaffed, incurred enormous losses, demanded vast subsidies, and hung like chains around the state's neck.¹⁴

In retrospect, the turning point in the history of nationalization and the welfare state came during the second half of the 1970s. Until then the trend toward greater state control had been increasing steadily. Even in the United States, always a latercomer in such matters, “big government” made its debut during the 1950s; in the 1960s the Kennedy and Johnson administrations declared “war on poverty” and presided over a vast expansion of various social programs.¹⁵ Then, in one country after another a reaction set in. It was motivated partly by the immense losses attributable to many nationalized industries; partly by the drastic increase in unemployment—and consequently in the cost of insuring against it—brought about by the oil crisis; and partly by the desire to cut the burden of taxes, which was regarded as stifling economic enterprise. On top of all this the welfare state had become a victim of its own success. The more it sought to help disadvantaged groups such as the aged or single parents, the larger the number of those who claimed the benefit of its services and the greater also the addition to the national debt.¹⁶

By this time the naive belief in the virtues of an “impartial” state bureaucracy that had inspired political scientists from Hegel to Max Weber¹⁷ was long since dead. Instead of representing rationality, bureaucracy was coming to be seen as its antithesis; instead of being an instrument of social progress, it was now perceived as an obstacle to change of any kind.¹⁸ During the late 1970s there emerged a number of political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan whose goal, loudly professed, was to roll back the power of the state. “Standing on one's own feet” and “getting government off our backs” became the rallying cries under which some of the most important states set out to dismantle themselves; even though, in many places, progress—if that is the correct term—was greater in words than in deeds.

All through the 1980s the movement back to the 19th century gathered momentum. Late in the decade it was given a tremendous boost by the collapse

of the USSR. For 70 years, communism had provided an alternative model in which the state, for all its manifold and perceived shortcomings, claimed to have eliminated the worst forms of poverty and promised security from the cradle to the grave; now the system's sudden demise left East Bloc states naked and their respective civil societies poorer than ever. Not only was laissez faire capitalism able to reemerge as the only way toward a better future, but it no longer felt obliged to apologize for its seamier sides, such as gross inequality, ever-present insecurity for both employers and employees, and the colossal waste resulting from the business cycle on the one hand and unplanned development on the other. To the contrary, many of the advocates of the new supply-side economics regarded those features as potentially useful tools toward the all-important goals of low inflation and steady economic growth.

As the last years of the century approached, not even those countries that were loudest in their praise of capitalism had made significant progress in reducing their bureaucracies, much less in cutting taxes as a percentage of GDP.¹⁹ On the other hand, in virtually all countries some of the juicier morsels of the economy had been sold off and others deregulated, to say nothing of the cuts that, with or without the aid of inflation, were effected in the real value of numerous social programs including, not least, the quality of education. The homeless people appearing on the streets of cities everywhere offered visible proof of the fact that the post-World War II trend toward a narrowing of social gaps had been reversed; it became a matter of policy for the state to take more and more but give less and less. No wonder that loyalty to it—as manifested most clearly in the willingness to do conscript service and fight if necessary—declined.²⁰ In the United States under the Carter Administration, even the attempt to register young males for an eventual call-up met with opposition.

Part III. Modern Technology, Economics, and the Media

Meanwhile, and often going almost unnoticed, technology also had performed an about-face. The role played by print in the establishment of the state cannot be overestimated; after all, where would any government be without forms? Next, the telegraph and the railways enabled states to bring their populations under control and to cast their networks over entire countries, even continents.²¹ Nor were rulers satisfied when the time it took to travel from the capital to the provinces (for example, from Paris to Bordeaux or Toulouse) was reduced from weeks to days or hours. The role of technologies such as telephones, teleprinters, computers (first put to use in calculating the results of the US census), highways, and other systems of transportation and communication was even greater than that of their predecessors. Without them it would have been impossible for the state to contemplate the task that it had undertaken since the beginning of the 19th century: to impose its control over every part of society from the highest to the lowest and almost regardless of distance and geographical location.

From the beginning, though, much of modern technology bore a Janus face. On the one hand it gave governments the tools with which to dominate their countries and populations as never before. On the other it tended to transcend national borders, crossing them and turning them into obstacles to domination. This was because, unlike its pre-1800 predecessors, much of modern technology can operate only when, and to the extent that, it is grouped into systems. A plough, a hammer, a musket, or a ship can do its job even in the absence of others of its kind; but an individual railway station—or a telegraph apparatus, or a telephone—is simply useless on its own. In such systems what matters is the network of tracks, or wires, or switchboards, that connects each unit with countless others. Even more crucial is the central directing hand which, sorting out routes and priorities, enables them to communicate with each other at will, in an orderly manner and without mutual interference.

As the history of both telegraphs and railways shows, most of the early technological systems were launched by private entrepreneurs. However, in most countries the demand for economic efficiency or military effectiveness soon caused them to be taken over by governments. Either this was done by way of outright ownership, through nationalization and the establishment of a state monopoly, or else by means of regulations designed to ensure that they would be available in wartime. Still, there were limits to the extent that governments could control this technology without at the same time reducing its cost-effectiveness. A railway net designed exclusively for meeting the needs of a single country—such as the broad-gauged one constructed by Imperial Russia and later passed to the USSR—provided some protection against invasion but also acted as a barrier to Russian trade with other countries. The same applies to various attempts to build autonomous electricity grids, highway systems, or telephone networks, to say nothing of fax machines and computers.

In theory each state was free to exercise its sovereignty and build its own networks, ignoring those of its neighbors and refusing to integrate with them. In practice it could do so only by incurring a tremendous technological and economic cost. The current plight of North Korea is a perfect case in point; the price of isolation was inefficiency and an inability to maximize the benefits of precisely those technologies that have developed most rapidly since 1945—communication (including data processing) and transportation. Conversely, in order to enjoy those benefits, states had to integrate their networks with those of their neighbors. What is more, it was necessary for them to join the international bodies whose task was to regulate the new technologies on behalf of all. The first such body was the International Railway Committee, which traces its origins to the 1860s. A century later they numbered in the hundreds, and the only way for any state to avoid becoming entangled in their coils was to doom itself to something like a pre-industrial existence.

These technological developments brought about a decisive change in the nature of the global economy.²² The interwar period had been characterized by attempts to build self-contained empires; now, the most successful states were those which, like Germany and Japan and South Korea, were most integrated into the world market. By and large the more one exported and imported—in other words, maximized one's comparative advantage—the greater one's economic success. As more and more stock exchanges were opened to foreign investors and capital, a greater and greater percentage of a state's assets, and those of its citizens, was likely to be located beyond its borders. Conversely, inside those borders more and more wealth was likely to be controlled by persons and corporations based elsewhere. During the 1980s economic statistics began to recognize the change by separating GNP from GDP. Generally the gap between the two provided a good index for the economic performance of any particular country; for example, 40 percent of all Japanese goods are now being produced outside Japan.

Another blow to state control implicit in the shift toward a global economy was that governments gradually lost their grip over their own currencies. If a nation was to participate in international trade, its currency had to be convertible, as free as possible from administrative controls. But freedom from administrative controls put it at the mercy of the international market. Gone were the days when, as during the period 1914-1939, most governments tried to create closed monetary systems and lay down the value of their currencies by fiat. Gone, too, were the Bretton Woods agreements which lasted from 1944 to 1971 and which pegged the various currencies to a US dollar which was itself pegged to gold.²³ Governments did not lose all influence over their currencies; they still controlled the money supply as well as interest rates. Nevertheless, the values of these currencies became subject to wild fluctuations that were often beyond the power of central banks, or even combinations of central banks, to regulate. Their inability to do so put a premium on hedging, on holding at least some of one's assets in foreign currency. The merry-go-round leading to less and less government control continued.

Finally, the unprecedented development of electronic information services seems to mark another step toward the coming collapse of the state. Traditionally no state has ever been able to completely control the thoughts of all its citizens; to the credit of the more liberally-minded among them, it must be added that they never even tried. Though the invention of print greatly increased the amount of information that could be produced, the ability to move that information across international borders remained limited by the need to physically transport paper, as well as by language barriers. The first of these problems was solved by the invention of radio. The introduction of television, which relies on pictures instead of words, to a large extent eliminated the second. During the 1980s cable and satellite TV, as well as videotape, became widely available and capable of providing near-instant coverage of events on a global

scale. With the advent of computer networks and the consequent democratization of access to information, the battle between freedom and control was irretrievably lost by the latter, much to the regret of numerous governments.

Though the role of the various information services in the collapse of the former Eastern Bloc cannot be measured, it was certainly very large.²⁴ Indeed, even as these lines are being written, the future of Russia and its fellow republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States will be determined partly by the way the media will represent developments inside them. Conversely, states such as China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are imitating the late East Germany, doing what they can to prevent their populations from being corrupted by these developments. The social, economic, and technological price that these states pay for their self-enforced isolation is considerable. In the long run, their struggle almost certainly will be hopeless.

Part IV. Maintaining Public Order

As governments surrender or lose their hold over many aspects of the media, the economy, and technology, and as public ownership as well as welfare programs stagnate or retreat, one of the principal functions still remaining to the state is to protect its own integrity against internal disorder. Thus the question that must be asked is whether they have been successful in this task; is it being mastered, and can they be expected to accomplish it in the future?

So far this article has concentrated on the developed countries. However, at this point it is useful to invert the order, starting our survey with undeveloped ones. It is a characteristic of many traditional societies that the right to resort to violence, instead of being monopolized by an all-powerful state, is diffused in the hands of family heads, tribal chieftains, feudal noblemen, and the like, each of whom is responsible for policing his own subjects and for fighting off challenges by the rest. Conversely, the extent to which so-called Third World countries have succeeded in demolishing other organizations and concentrating violence in their own hands is one very good index of their progress toward modernization.

To look at many developing countries today, that progress has been either slow or nonexistent. As a recent article in the *Atlantic Monthly* has pointed out,²⁵ in much of sub-Saharan Africa the state has already collapsed, often before it was able to properly establish itself. Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire all have been torn by civil war or, at the very least, disorder on a scale that approximates it. On the Mediterranean littoral the position of Egypt and Algeria is scarcely better, confronted as those states are by the formidable challenge of Islamic fundamentalism, which in recent years has led to the deaths of thousands and which shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, in the southern extremity of the continent, it is touch and go whether South Africa will be able to make progress toward a peaceful multiracial society or be torn apart by the war of all against all.

***The net effect of modern technology "has been
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organizations that are not sovereign
and are not states."***

From Japan to Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, some Asian states have been enormously successful in maintaining internal order and protecting the lives and property of their residents. Not so others such as Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and, most recently, Pakistan; all of these are now confronted with a loss of control that ranges from riots and clashes between opposing gangs to full-scale civil war. China, too, is not immune. It is true that the coastal regions are making unprecedented economic progress; however, Beijing does not seem to be capable of dealing either with the 30-year-old Tibetan uprising or with the challenge of Muslim separatists in the undeveloped far west of the country. Against this background much of the Chinese leaders' opposition to liberalization may be attributed to the fear—which is certainly not unfounded—that the outcome may be anarchy of the kind that all but destroyed China between 1911 and 1949.²⁶

Finally, in Latin America the ability of the state to guarantee internal law and order has, given the lack of a proper technological infrastructure and the immense gaps between rich and poor, always been in doubt. While some parts of the continent, such as Chile, are making good progress toward modernization, many others are clearly lagging behind and may be becoming less orderly rather than more. To adduce just two examples that have made headlines during the last few months, the government of Mexico has lost control over the southern part of the country, whereas that of Brazil is even now using the army in an attempt to reconquer its own former capital of Rio de Janeiro. In still other places it is the druglords who exercise de facto power. In countries where repeated assassinations of public officials take place, there can be no expectation for the rule of law or the kind of stability necessary for economic growth.

What makes these facts all the more disturbing is that, so far from remaining limited to Third World countries, the disorder seems to be spreading. The chaos that overtook Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia following the collapse of communist rule is well known; current conditions in these countries resemble those of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) more than they do anything that we would expect from a well-ordered modern state. Nor, to judge by the experience of Spain in the Basque country and of Britain in Northern Ireland (to say nothing

of the recent Tokyo poison gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing), does it appear that First World countries are in principle immune to threats of this kind. Many of them are challenged by organizations which, whatever their goals, are capable of commanding fanatical loyalties and unleashing them against the state; these organizations, incidentally, often take better care of their members than the state does.

Attempting to deal with nongovernmental organizations resorting to violence, many modern states have found themselves in a quandary. On the one hand their most important weapons and weapon systems—including not just nuclear ones but most conventional ones as well—are clearly too powerful and indiscriminate to be of much use against those groups. On the other hand, should they use the terrorists' own methods against them, there exists the clear danger that they will turn into terrorists themselves. Under these circumstances many First World governments have chosen to diddle. They counter the challenge without much resolution and pretend that since the number of casualties is often smaller than that which results from ordinary motor traffic, the problem is merely a nuisance. Others have given way and decentralized, as Spain did in the case of Catalonia; or else they are even now preparing to share control over some of their provinces with others, as are the British in Northern Ireland.

Meanwhile, from the White House to 10 Downing Street, the residences of presidents and prime ministers as well as entire government quarters have been transformed into fortresses. Private security has turned into a growth industry par excellence; in the United States alone it is said to employ 1.6 million people (as many as the number of active troops) and to cost \$52 billion a year, far more than all US police departments combined.²⁷ Feeling themselves exposed, more and more individuals and corporations are either renting protection or setting up their own. While one does not want to exaggerate the problem, unquestionably all of this is symptomatic of the state's faltering ability to hold on to its monopoly over violence—or, in plain words, to protect its citizens' lives and property.

Part V. The Outlook

At a time when new states are being born almost daily, paradoxically the fate of the state appears sealed. The growth in numbers may itself be a sign of decay; what everybody has is worth little or nothing. Furthermore, far from safeguarding their hard-won sovereignty, most new states do not even wait until they have been properly established before they start looking for ways to integrate with their neighbors. A good example is provided by that unique political construct, the Commonwealth of Independent States. Another is the eventual Palestinian state. Its leaders are even now talking of cooperation with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt—in fact with anyone who can help them transcend the limits of their own people's small size.

Contrary to the fears of George Orwell in 1984, modern technology, in the form of nuclear weapons on the one hand and unprecedented means for communication and transportation on the other, has not resulted in the establishment of unshakable totalitarian dictatorships. Instead of thought control we have CNN and, which many regimes consider almost as dangerous, Aaron Spelling; instead of unpersons, Amnesty International. The net effect has been to make governments lose power in favor of organizations that are not sovereign and are not states.

Some of these organizations stand above the state—for example, the European Common Market, the West European Union, and, above all, the United Nations, which since the Gulf War has begun to play a role akin to that of the medieval popes in authorizing or prohibiting a state from waging international war. Others are of a completely different kind, such as international bodies, multinational corporations, the media, and various terrorist organizations some of which can barely be told apart from gangs of ordinary criminals. What they all have in common is that they either assume some of the functions of the state or manage to escape its control. All also have this in common: being either much larger than states or without geographical borders, they are better positioned to take advantage of recent developments in transportation and communications. The result is that their power seems to be growing while that of the state declines.

To sum up, the 300-year period that opened at Westphalia and during which the state was the most important organization in which people lived—first in Europe, then in other places—is coming to an end. Nobody knows the significance of the transition from a system of sovereign, territorial, legally equal states to one that takes greater cognizance of the new realities; it is likely to be eventful and, as is already the case in many places, quite possibly bloody. Still, it is worth recalling that the state's most remarkable products to date have been Hiroshima and Auschwitz; the former could never have been built by any organization but a state (and the most powerful one, at that), whereas the latter was above all an exercise in bureaucratic management.²⁸ Whatever the future may bring, it cannot be much worse than the past. For those who regret and fear the passing away of the world with which we are familiar, let that be their consolation.

NOTES

1. Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: Free Press, 1994).
2. For some figures see P. Flora, ed., *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1875-1975* (London: 1983) vol. 1, part iv, p. 441; also Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 153.
3. See, e.g., George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975); also E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford, Calif.: 1976).
4. See Steven B. Smith, "Hegel's Views on War, the State, and International Relations," *American Political Science Review*, 77 (September 1983), 624-32.
5. See above all Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949).

6. One of the first to perceive that nuclear weapons would limit war was Bernard Brodie in *The Absolute Weapon* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ., 1946). The best discussion of nuclear doctrine from 1945 to the Reagan years—when attention shifted to disarmament—is Lawrence Friedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).
7. For the way nuclear weapons limited interstate war, first between major powers and then increasingly among the rest, see Martin van Creveld, *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1993).
8. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: the Political History of the Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 616.
9. The most famous inquiry, albeit a non-official one, was Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (St. Albans: 1972; originally published 1844).
10. For the rise of the public education system in Germany, see K. A. Schleunes, *Schooling and Society: The Politics of Education in Prussia and Bavaria, 1750-1900* (Oxford: 1989); for an international perspective on its role in building the modern state P. Flora, "Die Bildungsentwicklung im Prozess der Staaten und Nationenbildung," in P. C. Ludz, ed., *Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte* (Opladen: 1972).
11. See P. Flora and A. J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick: 1981); M. Bruce, *The Coming of the Welfare State* (London: Batsford, 1974); and E. Berkowitz and K. McQuaid, *Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of the Twentieth Century Reform* (Lawrence, Kans.: 1988).
12. For example, France in 1610 had some 25,000 officials, one per 80 in the population. The United States in 1972 had one in 13, a sixfold increase, most of it taking place after 1870.
13. For the state of Britain's nationalized industries during the 1960s, see Graham L. Reid and Kevin Allen, *Nationalized Industries* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 1970; also, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970).
14. For the British side of the story, see R. Kelf-Cohen, *British Nationalisation 1945-1973* (London: Macmillan, 1973).
15. For the creation of the American welfare state, see Roger A. Freeman, *The Growth of American Government: A Morphology of the Welfare State* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1975); also N. and B. Gilbert, *The Enabling State: Modern Welfare Capitalism in America* (New York: 1989).
16. The crisis of the welfare state is discussed, for example, in John Logue, "Will Success Spoil the Welfare State?" *Dissent* (Winter 1985). C. Leaman, *The Collapse of Welfare Reform: Political Institution, Policy and the Poor in Britain and the US* (Lanham, 1986).
17. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: 1952; originally published 1821), pp. 188f; Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittiche (New York: 1976; originally published 1923), pp. 48ff.
18. In the United States, attacks on bureaucracy started with the Hoover Commission Report (Washington, D.C., 1949) and proceeded through J. Landis's *Report on the Regulatory Agencies to the President Elect, US* (Washington D.C., 1960). However, so long as prosperity lasted little was done.
19. For some comparative figures on various countries see *Economist*, 4 September 1993, p. 103.
20. In the Gulf, US strategy was almost entirely dictated by the need to avoid casualties: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: the Inside Story of the Conflict of the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), passim.
21. See H. Innis, *Empire and Communications* (Toronto: 1975).
22. For a good introduction to these problems see Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough, *The World Economy, Trade and Finance* (3d ed.; Fort Worth, Tex.: 1994).
23. For the origins, rise, and fall of the Bretton Woods system see M. D. Bordo and B. Eichengreen, eds., *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform* (Chicago: 1993).
24. Exclusive of East Germany—where 15 million people regularly watched West German television—Western radio stations such as RFE, VOA, BBC, and DW claimed to have almost 100 million regular listeners in 1989.
25. R. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 44-76.
26. Interestingly enough, the language of warlordism is already making a comeback; see A. Waldon, "The Warlord: Twentieth Century Chinese Understanding of Violence, Militarism and Imperialism," *American Historical Review*, 96 (October 1991), 1073-1100.
27. Figures from B. Jenkins, "Thoroughly Modern Sabotage," *Worldlink* (March-April 1995), 16. For two works on the origins and nature of private security in the United Kingdom see N. South, *Policing for Profit: The Private Security Sector* (London: 1982); and I. Will, *The Big Brother Society* (London: 1983).
28. For the effort involved in building the bomb see Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); for the Holocaust as an exercise in bureaucracy above all, Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961).

State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model

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A central assumption of several strategic assessments of the post-Cold War period is that wars involving state collapse and ethnic violence are of low priority for American foreign policy. As a National Defense University (NDU) report stated, conflicts involving troubled states are “likely to be most prevalent but least threatening to US interests.”¹ It advised the military to prepare, in descending order of importance, for (1) “the emergence in the next one or two decades of a military peer competitor from among the major powers,” (2) “major regional conflicts with rogue states,” (3) “quasi-police missions in order to meet transnational threats” stemming from illegal immigration, narcotics shipments, and western forest fires, and—lastly—(4) “engaging selectively in troubled states,” a mission which the military “may prefer to minimize.”²

Actual US military engagements since the end of the Cold War expose the fallacy of this premise. Even the NDU report noted that “the hard reality . . . is that failed states are becoming more common, and the US public often insists on intervention in the face of massive humanitarian disasters.”³ Leslie H. Gelb went so far as to assert that “teacup wars,” as he termed them, are the “core problem of post-Cold War politics.”⁴ His assessment seems closer to the mark, given the incidence of such conflicts and the number of military operations they have required.

Of the 31 major armed conflicts that raged in the world in 1994, all were internal in origin (though some, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia-Herzegovina have had interstate implications).⁵ And in the five years following the end of Desert Storm, the US military conducted 27 overseas operations stemming from ethnic wars or state collapse, ranging in scale from a noncom-

bat evacuation in Sierra Leone in May 1992 to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in September 1994.⁶ President Clinton's decision in 1995 to send 20,000 US troops to Bosnia is merely the latest such engagement.

Policy responses nonetheless continue to be based on the assumption (or hope) that the last intervention will be the final one. Policymakers either ignore or put off dealing seriously with looming crises until the carnage mounts, regional stability is threatened, and they can no longer stand aside. There have been few systematic attempts to develop a generic framework and methodology that enables reasonably accurate assessments of future crises and identifies strategies to thwart or contain them.⁷ This virtually guarantees that when the United States does intervene, it will do so under the most dangerous and costly circumstances.

An early warning and evaluation system is needed to assess crises that are likely to result in state collapse, ethnic warfare, and complex humanitarian emergencies—in short, crises that may require international intervention. Such a system would enable policymakers to minimize military involvement by taking preventive action early and to better prepare for the mission if a military role is ultimately required.

This article is a first step in that direction. It lays out a predictive model that may be used by analysts and policymakers in several ways. First, the model provides a dynamic conceptual framework to compare various conflicts at different stages of violence or conflict resolution. Second, the framework presents a way for analysts to conduct a longitudinal analysis of any single conflict, so it can be monitored and evaluated from the root causes to likely outcome. Third, the model suggests ten indicators of state collapse in ethnically divided societies that can be used for early warning. Although they are not meant to be a complete or definitive list, they represent leading variables that have appeared frequently in the past and are present in many current crises. Further testing and modification of these indicators would be the next step in the elaboration of this model.

Fourth, the model provides an overview of the potential role of the international community at different points in a conflict, highlighting the importance of preventive action before a crisis reaches catastrophic proportions. As a state-centered approach to ethnic conflict, it provides a roadmap that may be used by different actors and interagency representatives to better coordinate their activities. Implicit in the model, for example, is an "exit strategy" for external actors if military intervention is called for. It is based

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not on an arbitrary date for withdrawal (usually determined by an assessment of how long it will take to complete specific military tasks), but rather on accomplishing a broader, but still limited, mission: the establishment of the “immutable core” of a functioning state.⁸ We maintain that the autonomy of four key state institutions (the military, the police, the civil service, and the judicial system) is a precondition for sustainable security, that is, for a collapsed state to have the internal capacity to solve its own problems peacefully without a foreign administrative or military presence. By autonomy, we mean that state institutions cannot be controlled by, or be seen to be operating in the interest of, competing parties or factions.

State-building is at the heart of peace-building in collapsed states. This is not the same thing, however, as nation-building, a more expansive goal which involves rehabilitating an economy and reestablishing a civil society. These goals should be the primary responsibility of the reconstituted state, not of foreign intermediaries, who may, however, provide aid and assistance.

Nor is the state-centered approach to be confused with a statist approach, which views conflict in terms of hierarchical power struggles. To the contrary, this model emphasizes the relationship between the state and society. As a state fails—that is, as it loses control, legitimacy, and cohesion—society becomes factionalized. People cling to familiar or historic identities that are left intact or that are consciously revived. It is through such bonds—based on ethnicity, religion, origin, language, class, clan, or caste—that people seek security and attempt to advance their interests as the center dissolves. Ample opportunities are created in this kind of environment for ethnopoliticians to play on group fears and loyalties, using nationalism as a means of pursuing power. To break such a cycle, the institutional basis of the state must be reconstituted.

Clarifying Concepts

Definitional disorder and conceptual ambiguity typify the study of ethnic conflict and state collapse. Some precise definitions are therefore in order at the outset of this discussion.

First, we conceive of ethnic conflict broadly as disputes based on group identity, whether defined by language, race, religion, ethnic origin, caste, class, clan, or some combination of these. Second, we do not believe that ethnic conflict is inevitable in plural societies; people do not fight simply because they carry certain labels. Those labels carry meanings or connotations that vary in different settings and at different times, depending upon the context. For example, a person in Bosnia might have identified himself or herself in 1990 as a Bosnian, Muslim (Croat or Serb), Slav, or Yugoslav. That identity, however, may change with time and place and, in conflict situations, may even slip beyond a person's own control. Facing Croat or Serb militiamen in 1996, for example, a person formerly identified as a Bosnian may be designated as a Muslim by opposing forces. Like it or not, that person must deal with the reality of that designation.

Third, we take no fixed position in the scholarly debate on whether ethnic conflict is "primordial" or "instrumental," that is, whether it is endemic to a society or people, or a product of elite manipulation. Each case must be evaluated on its own merits. There might be "ancient tribal loyalties," to use an old cliché, that are rooted, say, in imperial or colonial histories that predispose a society toward conflict. And there might be more recent or "controllable" factors, such as demographic pressures, unequal resource allocations, discriminatory government policies, and irresponsible political elites who "play the ethnic card." What is important for this discussion is to underscore the fluidity and diversity of ethnic conflict, a feature that makes prediction all the more difficult.

Finally, our notion of a state requires some clarification. We define a state as a political entity that has legal jurisdiction and physical control over a defined territory, the authority to make collective decisions for a permanent population, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and a government that interacts or has the capacity to interact in formal relations with other such entities.⁹ Institutionally, the core of a modern state consists of the armed forces, a domestic police force, a civil service or professional bureaucracy, and a system of law and justice. A state must also have a moral basis or legitimacy, a key factor in generating public loyalty and support. A modern state is not necessarily a democracy, but it must perform minimum functions for the public (providing for domestic tranquility, establishing and enforcing laws, protecting citizens, offering services such as education) and it must maintain social cohesion. Hence, from this perspective, a collapsing state is one that is losing legitimacy, maintains few functioning state institutions, offers few or no public services, and is unable to contain, or deliberately inspires, social fragmentation.¹⁰ If it collapses, the state also will lose physical control over its territory, forfeit the authority to make collective decisions for the national population, no longer have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and not be able to

interact in formal relations with other states as a fully functioning member of the international community.

How does ethnic conflict strengthen or weaken a state? Contrary to the popular perception, which views ethnic conflict as a *cause* of state collapse, we agree with those who argue that the process often works the other way around: *state collapse causes ethnic conflict*.¹¹ Ethnic nationalism, in short, is a pathology of the state. The process by which this occurs, as indicated above, starts with deterioration of the center. This leads to factionalization as societal loyalties shift from the state to more traditional communities that are closer to the people and that offer psychic comfort and physical protection. Unless the process is reversed, it may result in communal violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The further a state disintegrates, the more potential there is for ethnic conflict to spread.

A predictive model should therefore be based not only on evidence of rising communal hostility, but on wider patterns of state decay and of societal trends that foment decay. This is particularly important in societies that lack the institutional infrastructure or leadership to cope with crises. Unfortunately, quantitatively based indicators of state decay are undeveloped and, in any case, would probably be unreliable in disintegrating states. Hence, one must look at the full array of social, economic, military, and political manifestations, taking into account the particular historical, cultural, and idiosyncratic factors of societies at risk. We posit ten indicators that appear frequently in collapsing states, not all of which have to be present for impending collapse. However, the more that apply, the more likely it is that the country will be at risk.

The prediction of ethnic conflict will never be as precise as, say, weather forecasting, which has the technological capability to identify hurricanes and other natural disasters with a high degree of accuracy. Nor will predictions of ethnic conflict be able to rely as much on statistical evidence as, say, economic forecasts that warn of recessions based on widely accepted leading economic indicators. Rather, the prediction of ethnic conflict may be likened to the process of medical diagnosis of diseases for which there exists no conclusive physical test.¹² In such cases, physicians make a positive diagnosis based on the appearance of clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through testing, some merely observable. In similar fashion, this model postulates a cluster of leading societal indicators of state decay.

The Conceptual Framework

A diagram of the conceptual framework that lies at the heart of this analysis is depicted in Figure 1, on the next page. It consists of five stages for tracking a conflict, with the potential role of the international community at each stage indicated at the bottom.

The process begins in Stage 1, with an analysis of the root causes of ethnic conflict, including the historical background, socio-economic compo-




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework.

sition, and environment that predispose a society toward fragmentation. Stage 2 addresses recent trends or precipitating events that lead from fragmentation to friction, such as discriminatory government policies, collapsed empires, coups d'état, or political assassinations. Preventive action would be most effective if it were taken at this stage or before.

At this critical point, a society is poised to go in one of two directions as it enters Stage 3, the transition, which can occur violently or nonviolently. Catastrophic conflict may be averted by negotiations, state reforms, and power-sharing; this nonviolent track is represented by the lower horizontal branch of the diagram. A violent track would likely lead to full-scale conflict, secession, ethnic cleansing, or state disintegration, which is represented by the upper horizontal branch. Either way, at this stage, state transformation is

underway. When the international community becomes involved militarily, this is the phase in which it typically occurs.

In Stage 4, the state is transformed: it has moved toward disorder or a new political order. If there is a violent transformation, it may result in military victory, ethnic domination, warlordism, or on-going conflict (as in Somalia). If there is a nonviolent transformation, it may result in elections, peaceful partition, conflict resolution, and new state structures (as in South Africa).

Stage 5 represents the outcome, a phase that is depicted by a continuum bounded at one end by chaos, and at the other by constitutionalism. Obviously, there are several intermediate authoritarian or democratic outcomes, such as military rule, a one-party state, or a representative federal system. But this is not the end of the process. A country could move up and down the continuum, until it reaches equilibrium. Or it could revert to an earlier stage, if the peace is too fragile and the institutional core is too weak to sustain it.

This model provides a way to monitor a conflict as it hovers between war and peace. A crisis may be "rescued" by preventive diplomacy, as Bosnia was, for example, when the Dayton agreements were concluded; the conflict moved from the violent to the nonviolent track of Stage 3. As of this writing, Bosnia must still transit peacefully through Stages 4 and 5 to achieve sustainable security. Alternatively, a country might "backslide" from a nonviolent to a violent track, as Angola did, for instance, after the 1992 UN election results were rejected by rebel forces and the war resumed. Angola moved back again to a fragile peace in 1995.

Indicators of State Collapse

Perhaps no part of a predictive model is more vulnerable to challenge than the indicators it relies upon for forecasting. Yet the attempt to define a critical mass of factors that can usefully be applied for threat assessment never ceases. There is a wide variety of approaches to this attempt, depending upon the scope and purpose of the effort.

The Department of Defense, for example, created a Master Instability Indicators List/Matrix to predict the threat of low-intensity conflict. Intended to be a single-source tool for the evaluation of low-intensity conflict for strategic, operational, and tactical military planners, it lists 547 indicators based primarily on intelligence sources. For example, the first indicator is "informants fail to pass accurate information," while the last is "families of sponsor [government] officials leave the country."¹³ Collectively, these indicators are used to create a blank matrix into which real-world data are fed to obtain a snapshot assessment of any single conflict zone. It is meant to be of particular value to the combat commander in the field, but is less useful as a predictive tool to forecast the likelihood of a future collapsed state.

Another effort was the CIA's worldwide assessment of critical humanitarian emergencies likely to occur over a 12-month period as a result of

manmade and natural events.¹⁴ This study made no attempt to define universal indicators. Instead, it conducted a region-by-region and country-by-country survey at one point in time. While both the DOD and the CIA studies marshal useful data, neither provides a generic framework applicable for a longer time frame which can be used by a broad array of policymakers, analysts, and military planners. Nor do many other frameworks focus specifically on the problem of state collapse that may compel international intervention.

As suggested earlier, a systematic attempt to explore the full range of indicators would be more extensive than that presented here. Further research is needed to differentiate long- and short-term indicators, to develop a taxonomy of failing states, and to explain in greater detail the connections between the indicators, state behavior, and intergroup relations. However, the following indicators may serve as a useful starting point of analysis:¹⁵

- demographic pressures
- massive refugee movements that create cycles of human disasters and further intensify demographic pressures
- uneven economic development along ethnic lines
- a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
- criminalization or delegitimization of the state
- sharp and severe economic distress
- massive, chronic, or sustained human flight
- progressive deterioration or elimination of public services
- suspension of the rule of law
- security apparatus operating as a “state within a state”

Demographic pressures refer not only to population density and food self-sufficiency, but to ethnic location (spatial distribution of ethnic groups and the relationship between settlement patterns and other forms of human and physical activity), territory (groups’ attachment to land), and environment (the relationship between ethnic groups and their physical settings). These factors often shape intergroup perceptions, competition, and conflict.¹⁶ In pre-civil-war Bosnia, for example, a growing number of people had identified themselves as “Bosnian” on census and survey forms in the years following World War II, associating their sense of a multicultural society with a territory that was internationally recognized after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Yet other groups who lived in Bosnia clung to boundaries that were ethnically exclusive. This caused conflict among the rival groups on what effectively constitutes a state. Other examples of ethnically-based territorial claims which grew over the years as a result of demographic factors are those of the Palestinians and the Kurds.

Massive refugee movements that create cycles of human disasters and further intensify demographic pressures may spiral into regional crises. Refugees may increase population density and cause environmental degradation, land competition, disease, food shortages, and lack of clean water, generating conflict and violence across borders. This can be seen in several

war-torn regions from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. A contemporary illustration is the Great Lakes region of Central Africa in which five countries (Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania) are affected by the two million refugees who were displaced in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Failure to resolve this crisis has contributed to fears of ethnic reprisals, renewed bloodletting, and continuing turmoil. Though the roots of conflict are deep, the immediate problem stems from armed Hutu extremists who participated in the genocidal killings and who are determined to return to power. Using the refugee camps as their bases, they have the potential not only to further destabilize Rwanda, their principal target, but, in varying degrees, the surrounding countries as well.

Uneven economic development along ethnic lines is a recurring factor contributing to ethnic nationalism. In Nigeria, for example, the advanced educational and economic status of the Ibos (which was a legacy of colonialism and of post-independence economic policies) was not commensurate with their political power; this was a root cause of communal conflict. A 1966 coup d'état led by Ibo military officers was the precipitating event that triggered pogroms against Ibo civilians living in northern towns. These killings led to the 1967-70 Biafran War of secession. The degree to which ethnic inequalities can be the basis for ethno-nationalist mobilization has not been sufficiently recognized by local elites pursuing modernization or stabilization programs or by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which play a major role in promoting economic restructuring. In divided societies, the effects of economic policies on intergroup relations need to be taken more into account.

A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia underlies many conflicts, with aggrieved groups often invoking unresolved injustices that may date back centuries. Such grievances can be carried across generations, as seen in the Serb attempt to stem the tide of Islam in Europe, a mission that goes back 600 years to the defeat of the Serbs by the Turks at Kosovo. Judge Richard Goldstone, chief prosecutor of the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague, argues that bringing alleged criminals to justice in regions where there has been a history of massive human rights abuses and atrocities is "the only way to stop the spiral of violence," because one of the tools used by leaders to spur their followers to commit atrocities is the belief that crimes perpetrated earlier had gone unavenged.¹⁷ But such grievances need not go back centuries; they can go back decades or years. Hutu-Tutsi divisions are rooted in pre-colonial history, for example, and colonial policies worsened them. But large-scale communal violence did not erupt in Rwanda until the 1960s. Continuing into the 1990s, it culminated in genocide in 1994. Hutu extremists now are determined to avenge their overthrow by the Tutsi-led government, while the government is equally determined to bring the Hutu killers to justice.

“In the five years following the end of Desert Storm, the US military conducted 27 overseas operations stemming from ethnic wars or state collapse.”

Criminalization or delegitimization of the state are indicators of growing importance, especially in regions in transition. They refer not merely to the increase in common crime or to the spate of scandals that emerge as democracy replaces authoritarian rule, but rather to massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites, who often resist popular demands for transparency, accountability, and political representation in order to reap personal gain. When the Russian people see government officials and organized crime as the principal beneficiaries of privatization, or when the Nigerian people see the military get rich from public oil revenues, they then withdraw their support from what is, in their eyes, a predatory state. The 1995 Russian elections, which favored communists and nationalists, suggest that the post-Soviet state has yet to achieve legitimacy among a large segment of the Russian population. Similarly, the call by Nigerian dissidents for international economic sanctions against military rule is confirmation of the loss of popular legitimacy.

Sharp and severe economic distress is a common indicator of political instability. The survival of weak states is often contingent on the ability of ruling elites to manage the economy and to improve the standard of living of the people. Progressive economic deterioration has undermined political stability in Mexico (with the fall of the peso), Nigeria (with the collapse of the naira), and Russia (with an unpopular austerity program). Quantitative data may be available in some cases to chart economic decline, but many failing states have parallel economies, illicit transactions, and unreported expenditures that are not documented in open sources. Hence, any serious evaluation of economic distress in collapsing societies must take into account the nature and scope of the hidden economy, including diverted public assets, drug money, and illegal capital flight from seemingly legitimate commercial transactions.

Massive, chronic, and sustained human flight refers not only to refugees, the most identifiable human index of internal conflict, but to a broader pattern of people on the move: a “brain drain;” a middle-class exodus; the flight of skilled professionals, intellectuals, artists, and technicians; and

the emigration of economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, businesspeople, artisans, and traders. The steady loss of a society's most resourceful and talented citizens is a sure sign of state decay.

Progressive deterioration or elimination of public services is a symptom not merely of poor governance, but, increasingly, of no governance. We refer here not only to encrusted or inflated bureaucracies, but to a disappearance of that part of the state apparatus that serves the people. In Zaire, for example, Crawford Young noted that the state has "all but vanished. . . . Those segments of the state realm crucial to its survival and minimal reproduction—the security agencies, the presidential staff, the central bank, the diplomatic cadre—continue to operate," but basic public services are at their lowest levels or nonexistent.¹⁸ In Young's view, the state has lost "probity, competence, and credibility."¹⁹ Zaire illustrates how a collapsed state may drift into dissolution without widespread violence. In the short term, this may get the international community off the hook since there is no immediate humanitarian crisis. Nonetheless, failure to deal with such a case could merely postpone a far more serious crisis, breeding conditions for subsequent widespread regional disruption.

Suspension of the rule of law is a standard indicator of dictatorial or authoritarian rule; it is also a leading indicator of failing states. Taken alone, the suspension of the rule of law does not presage state collapse. But it is particularly significant in societies in which there have been popular expectations of democratic change (Algeria), or in which democratic institutions have been undermined (Nigeria) or suppressed (China). Moreover, adherence to the rule of law is an important measure of the viability and durability of newly constituted states in post-conflict situations.

Security apparatus operating as a "state within a state" is an indicator that can appear in many forms: a praetorian guard can be created to protect isolated and unpopular rulers, "private" militias can be set up to distance repressive governments from culpability in killing campaigns, or officially sanctioned "hit squads" can be developed to terrorize political opponents. In military regimes, the security forces themselves often reflect the social divisions of their societies; the "state within a state" then often becomes an "army within an army" that serves the interest of the dominant military clique.

Conclusion

During the Cold War, both communism and capitalism underestimated the force of ethnicity, each sustaining its own myth about how their systems would erode ethnic bonds. Capitalism presumed that modern economic development—through education, urbanization, and the formation of a middle class—would bring people together and make them more alike. A modern person, it was thought, would naturally shed his ethnic or "tribal" identity. Marxism, by comparison, maintained that ethnicity would be replaced

by allegiance to a higher utopian ideal, a stateless society in which there would be full equality. If there were no class divisions, it was thought, there would be no need for group rivalry. Thus, a fundamental tenet of both ideologies was the assumption that economic change would lead to ethnic harmony.

We now know that things are not so simple, that ethnic conflicts are on the rise, and that economic factors can either strengthen or erode ethnic ties. We do not know precisely how or when that may occur, but we need to learn fast.

Ted Robert Gurr has estimated that in the 1980s there were 233 sizable groups in the world that "were targets of discrimination or were organized for political assertiveness or both. Most larger countries have at least one such ethnic group. . . . Taken together the groups involved more than 900 million people, or one sixth of the world's population."²⁰ In 1993, *The New York Times* listed 48 states, ranging from Bosnia to Brazil, in which ethnic conflicts are a source of political conflict.²¹ "We can't afford to careen from crisis to crisis," Secretary of State Warren Christopher has observed. "We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq and Bosnia and Somalia, rather than simply manage them."²² Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was bolder in his prognosis, asserting that "the defining mode of conflict in the era ahead is ethnic conflict. It promises to be savage. Get ready for 50 new countries in the world in the next 50 years. Most of them will be born in bloodshed."²³

This article does not purport to recommend where the United States or other external actors should intervene in this picture of worldwide turmoil. Nor does it address the question of political will, an essential requirement for an effective American foreign policy. What this analysis does offer is a conceptual framework and methodology for early warning and monitoring, and a suggested intervention strategy, should the United States decide to intervene, that focuses on the importance of preventive action and state-building. This represents an intermediate position between doing nothing and doing everything. We admittedly have a long way to go to bring order out of chaos, but we can now at least begin to bring some order to the way in which we think about that process.

NOTES

1. *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Univ., Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Leslie H. Gelb, *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (November-December 1994).

5. *SIPRI YEARBOOK 1995* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995), Highlights, Armed Conflicts and Regional Security, p. 1.

6. *Strategic Assessment 1995*, pp. 14-15. The inventory of military operations covered the period March 1991 to October 1994.

7. See "The Greening of U.S. Diplomacy: Focus on Ecology," *The New York Times*, 9 October 1995, p. A6, for a discussion of new factors that intelligence officials are being asked to look at to assess national security

threats—such as rainfall and water table levels, infant mortality rates, high population growth and density, the spread of the Sahara Desert, inflation rates and trade deficits, and ability to absorb youth into the labor markets—as predictors of government collapse, famine, or ethnic strife. For a geographical approach, see *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives*, an unclassified CIA conference report, RTT 95-10039, October 1995.

8. There is no universally accepted definition of a state. For a fuller discussion, see Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr., "The Insecure State: Reflections on 'the State' and 'Security' in a Changing World," *Daedalus*, 124 (Spring 1995). The notion of establishing an "immutable core" of a state is not meant to suggest that peace is automatic with the reconstitution of basic state institutions. Obviously, mending a failed state requires more than institution-building; among other things, there must also be some way to settle historic grievances, a process of reconciliation, justice, political legitimacy, economic recovery, and the establishment of a civic society. Our point is simply that external actors frequently take on these tasks themselves, without focusing on the more fundamental question of how to help collapsed states help themselves. Though well-intentioned, if there is no feeling of "ownership" by the local people, such efforts are likely to unravel when intervening forces withdraw.

9. For further discussion, see Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

10. See I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995) for further discussion of the concept of collapsed states.

11. The prevailing view, seen in the media and in many policy discussions, is that state collapse is a consequence of ethnic conflict. The actual sequence, we argue, is often reversed. In other words, we look at the issue as one in which the state is both a cause of ethnic conflict and the basis of a potential strategy for resolving or managing it.

12. The authors are aware of other government attempts to create a predictive model, but these are classified.

13. *LIC Instability Indicators Study*, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Va., June 1992, pp. X-1 to X-24.

14. *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995*, report released in January 1995 by the United States Mission to the United Nations, ECOSOC section of the US Mission.

15. An example of a country that illustrates this model is Nigeria. Of the ten indicators, at least nine apply. The most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is a country of approximately 100 million, consisting of roughly 250 language groups. Three large groupings predominate: the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibos, and the Yoruba, collectively constituting 60 percent of the population. The south (including the Ibos and Yorubas) is more economically advanced than the north. Group grievances exist all around: the Yorubas resent the fact that a native son reputed to have won the 1993 election has been jailed; the Ibos were the principal victims of the 1967-70 civil war, continue to lack political power, and live in the most densely populated part of the country; the Muslim Hausa-Fulani resent the economic and educational advancement of the south. However, among the most aggrieved groups are the Ogoni people, a small minority located in the oil-rich southeast who have been agitating for their rights. An increasingly repressive and rapacious military junta has lost legitimacy by stealing billions in public revenue, suspending democratic institutions, driving the economy into insolvency, executing political activists, and clamping down on political dissent. There is a steady pattern of capital and human flight, deterioration of public services, a replacement of the rule of law by military decrees, and a security apparatus around General Sani Abacha that acts as a "state within a state," or, in this case, as "an army within an army."

16. *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives*, p. 9.

17. "Atrocities Leave Thirst for Vengeance in Balkans," *The Washington Post*, 18 December 1995, p. A17. "Every meeting I have in that region begins with a history lesson," Judge Goldstone stated. "If you're lucky they go back to the Second World War, but sometimes you begin in the 14th century. I see the tribunal as a way to begin a necessary process of healing. Now, the tribunal is not some sort of panacea, but I know of no other way of doing it."

18. Crawford Young, "Zaire: the Shattered Illusion of the Integral State," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32 (June 1994), 247-63.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

20. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 5.

21. "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1993, p. 1.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

Strategic Implications of Cultures in Conflict

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More than ever, a sense of vision is required for senior leaders and policy-makers to estimate the intangible forces at work in the environment within which the United States will have to function into the 21st century. When archetypal energies such as warrior and shaman explode into reality in a chaotic world, leaders and policymakers have the responsibility to analyze and evaluate their meaning and recommend appropriate courses of action for the country to follow, thereby offsetting the onslaught of these forces. John Ruskin, 19th-century poet, provides a suitable epigram for leaders when he talks about "seeing":

Hundreds of people can talk
For One who can think
But thousands can think
For One who can see.

To see clearly
Is poetry,
Prophecy,
And Religion,
All in One.¹

This article seeks to provide insights into a complex environment for those charged with the nation's safekeeping. Sometimes called low-intensity conflict, now often grouped with less violent peace operations, activities in that environment are best approached through an appreciation of the vital roles that human culture and the concept of time play in examining, for example, the decline of the nation-state.

The Decline of the Nation-State

The question of the decline of the Western nation-state is moving to the forefront of national strategic consciousness. As the repository of social

and political values, the nation-state represents symbolically the evolution of Western political philosophy and civilization from 5th-century Greece. The idea of the decay of the nation-state as an organizing principle challenges the values around which government is formed, and within which the Department of Defense must operate. However, the categories of thought belonging to the nation-state's politics, economics, and military structures are no longer sufficient to address the myriad possibilities of conflict described as "complex" in current National Intelligence Estimates. New language is needed to give meaning to cultural factors which have been hitherto overlooked, but which contain the key to American success in the low-intensity conflict environment.

New language is already appearing in attempts to give meaning to conflict. For example, the increasing use of "warrior," which more adequately describes the "fighter" at the primal level, is pre-military and, as such, belongs to the archaic world. Warrior is therefore an appropriate description of group or clan members whose end is combat in support of their leader. Terms such as "tribal" and "primitive" also are used in an attempt to describe warfare in places like Somalia. While problematic, this language attempts to define and clarify that intangible quality of conflict embedded in the culture itself, where fluidity reigns and where there is no order of battle in the conventional Western sense.

The United States will have to function in increasingly complex emergencies into the 21st century. For example, internal conflict may combine simultaneously with drought and natural or technological disasters to produce displaced persons or refugees. Such challenges stress not only military force structure and command and control, but also the vision of American leaders. Each emergency or conflict is likely to be different, providing little opportunity for developing standard approaches to either.

The question of the decline of the nation-state, therefore, provokes a requirement for new thinking among leaders about the history of civilizations. The Western nation-state, for example, with its emphasis on logic and the rational, contrasts with Asian states where the seemingly irrational often dominates, and where standards of law and religion are different. In the West the individual dominates as master of ceremonies in affairs, but in the East the individual is more often a junior partner. Senior American leaders must use existing scholarship to peer into the nature of conflict within non-Western states.

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“Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most superficial level.”

To understand Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya, leaders and followers alike will have to appreciate the subtle presence of the major civilizations. Countries will become more meaningfully grouped according to their culture and civilization, says Samuel Huntington, and not their political or economic development. No longer is there a First, Second, or Third World presided over by elites from Oxford and the Sorbonne, but a fragmentation of states guided, in part, by their own nationalism and sense of cultural identity.² In all of this, human culture is the neglected factor.

Culture: The Neglected Factor

Firepower may achieve temporary battlefield superiority in low-intensity conflict, but it will not necessarily contribute significantly to conflict resolution. Current planning for such conflict continues to emphasize military factors, but it omits the problem of culture. Arguments over Pearl Harbor and the Smithsonian controversy over the *Enola Gay* at the time of the 50th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still color discussions in service schools. However, the problem of human culture is seldom approached from a scholarly perspective in these classrooms, and world religions are often not taught at all, except in the context of area studies.

Understanding culture may help to answer important military and civil questions such as the will of the enemy to fight, the determination of resistance groups to persevere, or the willingness of the populace to support insurgents or warlords. Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most superficial level. It appears increasingly in scholarly work, however, on problems associated with emerging nations.

One useful model for discussing human culture is philosopher Ernst Cassirer's "Circle of Humanity," as described in his *Essay on Man*.³ Cassirer's "circle" has six categories: science, language, history, religion, art, and myth. These categories are briefly analyzed below in the context of this article. Their symbolic importance—the subject for a different paper—is not discussed here.

Science

When US leaders assess the Third World, their frame of reference is frequently not the Third World itself but the United States, with its vastly superior industrial and military might. Such a view ignores the level of science available to the largest number of people in a country such as Somalia, where a broader level of simple, even primitive, technology may be used by indigenous forces in place of sophisticated weaponry. It takes little talent or training to sharpen a stick and place it in the ground as a booby-trap. When assessing the category of science in the LIC environment, the degree to which levels of development match ability should not be overlooked.

A recent advertisement by a leading US company dealing in military technology depicts a high-tech American soldier standing at the summit of a mountain, symbolically the pinnacle of scientific achievement. Below him in the spirit and style of Josef Brandt's painting *Ein Gefecht*, a medieval battle scene flourishes with knights in armor clashing with saber and lance. These contrasting images show what awaits America's best into the 21st century, where the primitive reality of low-intensity wars will be contrasted with the achievements of technology. In wars of attrition such as Vietnam, willpower and dedication may offset high science, brutally reminding the modern soldier that mythology lies at the root of scientific achievement.

Language

Most people consider language chiefly in practical terms, as the ability to communicate with one's counterpart. Other factors however, may also be present. Cultures with highly developed languages are capable of expressing themselves in the complex terms necessary for social development. In primitive societies language requires "an other," a face-to-face communication with some other human being, in order for the transmission of ideas to occur. Oral tradition binds the group to a certain level of development beyond which it cannot go without the written word.

Language is also necessary for consciousness. The more conscious a people, the more the symbols embodied in their language can be expressed and transmitted. Therefore, ideas such as God, healer, and warrior-king remain subliminal to primitive peoples, and are encased in ritual and secrecy. Their release requires the movement to consciousness which comes when the oral umbilicus is cut. Thus, when primitives reveal their secret feelings to outsiders, they sometimes do so with the fear that any demeaning of that particular feeling or symbol will result in its disappearance, and the tribe or clan will be damaged permanently.

History

Leaders and policymakers do not always realize that history is not written everywhere as it is in the West. The rational Western quest for the accurate transmission of passing events has not always been the sole motiva-

tion of historians everywhere, as will be seen later in the case of China. One must be aware of differing cultural approaches to the place of man in relation to the cosmos—and to the Emperor. Without such an appreciation, accurate intelligence evaluations of source reporting are impossible. This, in turn, may lead to faulty findings being presented to policymakers based on a skewed interpretation of events.

Rational theories of political history come from the Greeks, who pioneered logical thought and a view of history based on new insights and facts. Today, government leaders face a world where all the different ways of thinking are expressed in varied languages and customs which are culturally represented in the nation's capital itself. There is a "history without walls," just as Andre Malraux suggests there is a "museum without walls," where the art of all cultures is made available in a way never before imagined. The exposure of modern man to an overwhelming presentation of world symbols requires a discriminating study of human culture so as to understand the meaning of history.

Religion

Religion has its force in the essential mystery of the religious experience in all cultures. Islam, identified by some as being on a collision course with the West, combines government and religion, where the US secularist tradition separates church and state. US leaders, for example, may be surprised that Muslims worldwide express solidarity with Islam, even if this trend is gradual or almost imperceptible. To miss this point is to underestimate the diverse power of this faith in all its dimensions. Simply estimating the Order of Battle of Islamic militants, or understanding the modus operandi of Muslim-oriented terrorist groups, are surface factors alongside the diverse power of the religion itself.

It is no accident that the political geometry of Indian thought is rooted in the religious mandala. Heinrich Zimmer explains in his *Philosophies of India* how the principal Hindu formula of alliances and coalitions is expressed in a series of concentric circles of natural friends and enemies.⁴ When asked what the closest circle to the king represents, US military students frequently respond with "friends." To the Western mind, one surrounds oneself with friends as a line of first warning against impending danger. Not so in Zimmer's analysis. In the Hindu scheme, the first circle is always composed of enemies who are his immediate neighbors ready to pounce and assume power.

Art

"Study art, history, and philosophy," says the fictional character Jean-Luc Picard to the young ensign sweating his Star Fleet exams, "then all of this will mean something to you."⁵ In the world of intelligence collection and analysis, art as a category of culture is often dismissed, seen only in the context of the decorative arts. In the story of mankind, however, art reveals the unfolding of the symbol in graphic form, often indicating the values of a people. In creating a work of culture, the artist becomes an instrument of a transcendent power.⁶

For the policymaker studying Northern Ireland, an inquiry into the history of the murals and slogans on Belfast's walls may reveal much about the story of struggle there. In Latin America, too, are painted the feelings of the group in conflict with authorities. Here, the god figure is often portrayed as an Indian or a peasant, symbolic of the inner struggle felt by the group. Similarly, the image of the "Shining Path" (*Sendero Luminoso*) symbolizes that which shows the way. In Tiananmen Square, the Liberty figure created by students has a Western outward appearance, except to the trained art historian who is able to discern its Chinese qualities.

Myth

Myth is expressed in the age-old stories of the hero, the mother, and the wise old man. The archetypes are psychological constellations which carry great power; they contain supernatural and fanciful beings and are therefore non-theoretical, defying standard Western categories of thought. Mythical thinking is in opposition to theoretical thinking, the product of the rational and more advanced civilizations.

Myth expresses itself in sentiment, meaning that primitive peoples "feel" things rather than "think" them. Weather, magic, or the words of a tribal leader may make the individual feel the energy of those mythical great stories in his own particular tribal culture. This brings great force and direction to the individual and may account for tremendous prowess on the battlefield, even in the face of superior firepower or numerical odds. People often fight according to the strength of the myth active in them.

Summary

Paradigms such as Ernst Cassirer's "Circle of Humanity" hold insights for leaders and policymakers concerned with the low-intensity conflict environment, where classical models of Western warfare and rational parallels with the ideal of democracy may not exist. The other prerequisite for understanding low-intensity conflict is an appreciation of the problem of time in relation to human culture.

A Matter of Time⁷

Battlefield assessments include the question, "When will the enemy attack?" At a deeper level, however, lies a more profound problem of time which affects the successful operation of US foreign policy from Iran to the Philippines: the ways in which concepts of time in other cultures affect the approach to all life, including military conflict. The problem of time is nowhere more appropriate for discussion than in Asia, where the United States suffered its most traumatic decades in recent history, facing an enemy which appeared militarily inferior in almost every way. While American soldiers in Vietnam spoke of the enemy's apparent patience and willingness to sacrifice today's battle for tomorrow's victory, the factor of time was considered only

“In terms of low-intensity conflict, people from cultures permeated by cosmic time may behave differently than those from Western culture.”

superficially at the strategic level, to address the question of when the conflict could be brought to a close under conditions favorable to the United States.

In the West, time is quantitative; it is measured in units that reflect the march of progress in Western culture, providing durations within which humankind can work and develop in the outer world. F. S. C. Northrop, in *The Meeting of East and West*, sees the West as proceeding along a theoretic continuum and the East along an aesthetic continuum.⁸ For Northrop, East and West could mutually benefit each other in an exchange where West would go East to participate in the intuitive and contemplative dimension of life, and East would go West to acquire science and technology and politics, which are more theoretically grounded.

This aesthetic expresses itself as quality rather than quantity in the East, where time is not measured in hours and minutes, but has a feeling of unlimited continuity, an unraveling. In such an atmosphere birth and death, for example, are not an absolute beginning and end. This qualitative characteristic has its roots in cosmic time, where the place of the individual is different than in Western “ego-time.” In the East the individual plays junior partner in cosmic events; in the West, he assumes the role of master of ceremonies.

In this regard, consider the culture of India. In general, Indian philosophy has seen time as moving endlessly through various cycles,⁹ with each cycle being created by Brahman, the impersonal god and highest reality of the Upanishads. In his *Philosophies of India*, Heinrich Zimmer describes time as follows:

Past, present, and future belong to transitory beings. Time is a becoming and vanishing, the background and element of the transient, the very frame and content of the floating processes of the psyche and its changing perishable objects of experience.¹⁰

Time, then, is a primordial archetype and is seen as cyclical, an idea which has dominated Indian thought. In her *Time, Rhythm, and Repose*, Marie-Louise von Franz summarizes the Indian cyclic notion of time:

The primary unit of time is the yuga, or age (1,080,000 years). . . . A complete cycle, or mahayuga, consists of four such yugas. . . . One mahayuga or great year

consists of 12,000 "divine" years, each comprising 360 ordinary years. Thousands of such mahayugas constitute a kalpa ("form").¹¹

The kalpa is also known as an Aeon and is the duration of time which elapses between the origin and destruction of a world system. Again, a feeling of timelessness prevails, and reflects Northrop's aesthetic continuum. Edward Conze, in his *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development*, described an Aeon in this way:

Suppose there is a mountain, of very hard rock, much bigger than the Himalayas; and suppose that a man, with a piece of the very finest cloth of Benares, once every century should touch that mountain every so slightly—then the time it would take him to wear away the entire mountain would be about the time of an Aeon.¹²

These descriptions exemplify the archaic basis and enduring quality of Indian time, and its sharp contrast to modern Western time.

In terms of low-intensity conflict, people from cultures permeated by cosmic time may behave differently than those from Western culture. For example, the individual's readiness to sacrifice himself in action or, conversely, to go to extreme lengths not to participate in the taking of life may appear odd to the Westerner. The United States must be prepared to encounter such paradoxes in cultures where cosmic time prevails. Mission success cannot be achieved if differing concepts of time are ignored.

In China, the other great contributor to the larger culture of Asia, time is also expressed in a manner inseparable from ritual, divination, and everyday life. The Chinese have historically maintained a strong sense of continuity expressed in a close parallel between the life of the individual and the cosmos, where order and balance prevail in a constant search for harmony. Early divination developed partially as a need to maintain the proper relationship between man and nature, and the *I-Ching (Book of Changes)* extends its influence into modern times, as seen in graduation speeches by the leadership of the Whampoa military academy in 1946, where students were reminded that they should live according to the oracle.

In another example, Deng Xiaoping, reflecting China's fluid sense of time, addressed US sanctions toward China by saying: "If you want China to beg, it cannot be arranged. Even if extended 100 years the Chinese people will not beg for the lifting of sanctions."¹³ Deng's 100 years would not be a unit of time commonly used by a Western leader, where the emphasis would be on achievement in one's own lifetime. Deng reflects Chinese classical tradition as seen in, for example, Mencius, who saw China as proceeding in cycles of 500 years. Even this duration is small when compared with cosmic time.

Historical time is also treated differently in China than in the West. The Western historian seeks to record events accurately and objectively so that in posterity lessons may be derived from his efforts. In traditional China,

however, the recounting of past events may be altered without hesitation when the need arises. The Chinese also have historically regarded the writing of their predecessors as having unquestionable authority. Confucius tell us, "I do not invent, but merely transmit. . . . I believe in and love antiquity."¹⁴ The timeless quality in Chinese thought is exemplified most profoundly in Lao Tzu's, *Tao Teh Ch'ing* (6 B.C.), where the Tao ("Way") is nameless, external, immutable, and infinite, a fundamental unity present in the universe which operates outside of space and time.

India and China have in common a view of time as unraveling like a ball of twine rolled across a table top. In the Arab world a similar feeling exists, but there the table top is the desert of the Arabian Peninsula—birthplace of Islam.

T. E. Lawrence, in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, credited the desert as an insulating factor in preserving Arab morals and politics, and remarked on its influence on religion and time. The Bedouin, for example, in his collective mentality, could not conceive of anything not being God, not involved with the manna of God. "Being," said Lawrence, was simply "the egg of all activity, with nature and matter just a glass reflecting him."¹⁵ In terms of time, there is a constant "everydayness" because the Arab would not conceive of anything which was or was not God.¹⁶ God was "their eating and their fighting and their lusting, the commonest of their thoughts, their familiar resource and companion."¹⁷ In this way God was time, as nothing was outside of the notion of God. Time, as Einstein has pointed out, is not absolute, but relative to one's conceptions. For the Arab, the vast and shifting nature of the desert symbolizes oneness with God and a rhythm opposite that of the West and its conception of time.

Time in Arab music is expressed in the individuality of the performer, who demonstrates a higher originality than his Western counterpart, according to Jacques Berque in *The Arab: Their History and Future*. He describes how the Arab may:

step aside from the orchestra and improvise for an hour or even two. It was thus, they say, that the future star, Abd al-Wahhab first shone. . . . He began to improvise, to modulate in that manner which disconcerts the Western listener, but which brought the singer his force.¹⁸

To perform this way one must be, in a sense, "outside of time." This disregard for time is also seen in a lesser need to keep appointments, or to rendezvous at meetings and conferences. Raphael Patai, in *The Arab Mind*, cited an example of how an important meeting may close hours or days behind schedule, and how nothing may be accomplished in the Western sense:

[A committee] would reach a deadlock; it would refer the issue to the Foreign Ministers to decide on it; a deadlock would be reached here also; and the issue would be referred to the Prime Ministers; these, in turn, because of their inability to reach a decision, would refer the decision to the Summit Conference. By the

time the issue is finally resolved it is too late, and the conference eventually comes out with a unanimous general decision which—more often than not—would not be implemented by the member states.¹⁹

Time, then, in the Arab culture carries the vacuousness of the Indian yuga, for as the Holy Quran tells us:

He rules [all] affairs
From the heavens,
To the earth: in the end
Will [all affairs] go up
To Him, on a Day,
The space whereof will be
As a thousand years
Of your reckoning.²⁰

Time, measured on the plane of this life, does not equal time on the spiritual plane, where the “twinkling of an eye . . . will be seen as a thousand years.”²¹

One attempt to explain the operation of time in non-Western cultures is recorded in C. G. Jung’s theory of “Synchronicity,” which incorporates the phenomenon of coincidence. This is important as it relates to human action, and may account for decisions that appear as irrational to the West.

Broadly speaking, Synchronicity is a meaningful coincidence as opposed to simply a coincidence; the former suggests connections that are beyond our immediate and limited knowledge. The following example illustrates the difference between coincidence and meaningful coincidence:

1. An aircraft crashes at the same time a person blows his nose. Such would be a *coincidence of events with no meaning*.
2. A woman buys a blue dress and, by mistake, the shop delivers a black one on the day a dear relative dies. In this case, the events are *meaningfully connected*; the two events are not causally related, but they are symbolically related.

Jung developed his theory of Synchronicity while studying the Orient. He saw causal connections as only statistical truths and therefore not absolute. Synchronicity “takes the coincidence of events in space and time as meaning something more than mere chance.”²² For Jung, nothing in the archaic world is left to chance.²³ No statistic-gathering exists as in the modern world, and without the aid of statistics, the relationship between cause and effect cannot be validated. Here, spirit is outside of space and time. A special instance is the spirit of the age, which stands for the principle and motive force behind certain views, judgments, and actions of a collective nature.²⁴

Conclusion

The sense of vision called for in the introduction to this article is derivative of the Buddha’s wisdom eye (*prajñacaksus*), and the third eye of

Siva that gives the unifying vision. To see to the heart of the matter in any particular low-intensity conflict is, more than ever, required of senior leadership and policymakers charged with the responsibilities of guiding the nation with skill and care.

Unfortunately, philosophers of culture, cultural anthropologists, and others are frequently overlooked as indirect contributors to strategy and policy formulation. Their insights into the ways of being of other peoples are invaluable for the long-range forecasting and prediction required for foreign policy vision. This article does not suggest that leaders should attempt to cover the vast intellectual ground of culture and time themselves, but that such an appreciation is fundamentally relevant to the times in which we live when the survival of Western institutions in their current form may be in question. It is also fundamental to problems one can encounter in failed or failing states, where the military instrument does not necessarily prevail.

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Our Soldiers, Their Cities

RALPH PETERS

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The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken cities of our world. We will fight elsewhere, but not so often, rarely as reluctantly, and never so brutally. Our recent military history is punctuated with city names—Tuzla, Mogadishu, Los Angeles, Beirut, Panama City, Hue, Saigon, Santo Domingo—but these encounters have been but a prologue, with the real drama still to come.

We declare that only fools fight in cities and shut our eyes against the future. But in the next century, in an uncontrollably urbanizing world, we will not be able to avoid urban deployments short of war and even full-scale city combat. Cities always have been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever before. Once the gatherers of wealth, then the processors of wealth, cities and their satellite communities have become the ultimate creators of wealth. They concentrate people and power, communications and control, knowledge and capability, rendering all else peripheral. They are also the post-modern equivalent of jungles and mountains—citadels of the dispossessed and irreconcilable. A military unprepared for urban operations across a broad spectrum is unprepared for tomorrow.

The US military, otherwise magnificently capable, is an extremely inefficient tool for combat in urban environments. We are not doctrinally, organizationally, or psychologically prepared, nor are we properly trained or equipped, for a serious urban battle, and we must task organize radically even to conduct peacekeeping operations in cities. Romantic and spiritually reactionary, we long for gallant struggles in green fields, while the likeliest “battlefields” are cityscapes where human waste goes undisposed, the air is appalling, and mankind is rotting.

Poor state or rich, disintegrating society or robust culture, a global commonality is that more of the population, in absolute numbers and in percentage, lives in cities. Control of cities always has been vital to military

success, practically and symbolically, but in our post-modern environment, in which the wealth of poor regions as well as the defining capabilities of rich states are concentrated in capitals and clusters of production-center cities, the relevance of non-urban terrain is diminishing in strategic, operational, and even tactical importance—except where the countryside harbors critical natural resources. But even when warfare is about resource control, as in America's Gulf War, simply controlling the oil fields satisfies neither side.

The relevant urban centers draw armies for a stew of reasons, from providing legitimacy and infrastructural capabilities, to a magnetic attraction that is more instinctive than rational (perhaps even genetically absorbed at this point in the history of mankind), and on to the fundamental need to control indigenous populations—which cannot be done without mastering their urban centers. We may be entering a new age of siege warfare, but one in which the military techniques would be largely unrecognizable to Mehmet the Conqueror or Vauban, or even our to own greatest soldiers and conquerors of cities, Ulysses S. Grant and Winfield Scott.

Consider just a few of the potential trouble spots where US military intervention or assistance could prove necessary in the next century: Mexico, Egypt, the sub-continent with an expansionist India, the Arabian Peninsula, Brazil, or the urbanizing Pacific Rim. Even though each of these states or regions contains tremendous rural, desert, or jungle expanses, the key to each is control of an archipelago of cities. The largest of these cities have populations in excess of 20 million today—more specific figures are generally unavailable as beleaguered governments lose control of their own backyards. Confronted with an armed and hostile population in such an environment, the US Army as presently structured would find it difficult to muster the dismount strength necessary to control a single center as simultaneously dense and sprawling as Mexico City.

Step down from the level of strategic rhetoric about the future, where anyone with self-confidence can make a convincing case for his or her agenda. Survey instead the blunt, practical ways in which urban combat in today's major cities would differ from a sanitary anomaly such as Desert Storm or the never-to-be-fought Third European Civil War in the German countryside

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(where we pretended urban combat could be avoided) for which so much of the equipment presently in our inventory was designed.

At the broadest level, there is a profound spatial difference. "Conventional" warfare has been horizontal, with an increasing vertical dimension. In fully urbanized terrain, however, warfare becomes profoundly vertical, reaching up into towers of steel and cement, and downward into sewers, subway lines, road tunnels, communications tunnels, and the like. Even with the "emptying" of the modern battlefield, organizational behavior in the field strives for lateral contiguity and organizational integrity. But the broken spatial qualities of urban terrain fragments units and compartmentalizes encounters, engagements, and even battles. The leader's span of control can easily collapse, and it is very, very hard to gain and maintain an accurate picture of the multidimensional "battlefield."

Noncombatants, without the least hostile intent, can overwhelm the force, and there are multiple players beyond the purely military, from criminal gangs to the media, vigilante and paramilitary factions within militaries, and factions within those factions. The enemy knows the terrain better than the visiting army, and it can be debilitatingly difficult to tell friend from foe from the disinterested. Local combat situations can change with bewildering speed. Atrocity is close-up and commonplace, whether intentional or incidental. The stresses on the soldier are incalculable. The urban combat environment is, above all, disintegrative.

The modern and post-modern trend in Western militaries has been to increase the proportion of tasks executed by machines while reducing the number of soldiers in our establishments. We seek to build machines that enable us to win while protecting or distancing the human operator from the effects of combat. At present, however, urban combat remains extremely manpower intensive—and it is a casualty producer. Although a redirection of research and development efforts toward addressing the requirements of urban combat could eventually raise our efficiency and reduce casualties, machines probably will not dominate urban combat in our lifetimes and the soldier will remain the supreme weapon. In any case, urban warfare will not require substantial numbers of glamorous big-ticket systems but great multiples of small durables and disposables whose production would offer less fungible profit margins and whose relatively simple construction would open acquisition to genuinely competitive bidding.

Casualties can soar in urban environments. Beyond those inflicted by enemy action, urban operations result in broken bones, concussions, traumatic-impact deaths and, with the appalling sanitation in many urban environments, in a broad range of septic threats. Given the untempered immune systems of many of our soldiers, even patrol operations in sewer systems that did not encounter an enemy could produce debilitating, even fatal, illnesses. One of many potential items of soldier equipment for urban warfare might be antisept-

tic bio-sheathing that coats the soldier's body and closes over cuts and abrasions, as well as wounds. Any means of boosting the soldier's immune system could prove a critical "weapon of war."

Urban warfare differs even in how "minor" items such as medical kits and litters should be structured. Soldiers need new forms of "armor;" equipment as simple as layered-compound knee and elbow pads could dramatically reduce the sort of injuries that, while not life-threatening, can remove soldiers from combat for hours, days, weeks, or even months. Eye protection is essential, given the splintering effects of firefights in masonry and wood environments, and protective headgear should focus as much on accidental blows from falls or collapsing structures as on enemy fire, on preserving the body's structural integrity as much as on ballistic threats.

Communications requirements differ, too. Soldiers need more comms distributed to lower levels—down to the individual soldier in some cases. Further, because of loss rates in the give and take of urban combat, low-level comms gear should not be part of the encrypted command and control network. Radios or other means of communication do not need extended range, but they must deal with terrible reception anomalies. Even a "digitized" soldier, whose every movement can be monitored, will require different display structures in the observing command center. This is the classic three-dimensional chessboard at the tactical level.

On the subject of command and control, the individual soldier must be even better-trained than at present. He will face human and material distractions everywhere—it will be hard to maintain concentration on the core mission. Soldiers will die simply because they were looking the wrong way, and even disciplined and morally sound soldiers disinclined to rape can lose focus in the presence of female or other civilians whom they feel obliged to protect or who merely add to the human "noise level." The leader-to-led ratio must increase in favor of rigorously prepared low-level leaders. While higher-level command structures may flatten, tactical units must become webs of pyramidal cells capable of extended autonomous behavior in a combat environment where multiple engagements can occur simultaneously and in relative isolation in the same building. Nonsensical arguments about the Wehrmacht making do without so many NCOs and officers on the battlefield must be buried forever; not only is the German military of the last European civil war ancient history, but it lost decisively. Our challenge is to shape the US Army of the 21st century.

Personal weapons must be compact and robust, with a high rate of fire and very lightweight ammunition, but there is also a place for shotgun-like weapons at the squad level. Overall, soldier loads must be reduced dramatically at the edge of combat, since fighting in tall buildings requires agility that a soldier unbalanced by a heavy pack cannot attain; further, vertical fighting is utterly exhausting and requires specialized mobility tools. Soldiers will need

more upper body strength and will generally need to be more fit—and this includes support soldiers, as well.

Ideally, each infantry soldier would have a thermal or post-thermal imaging capability—since systems that require ambient light are not much good 30 meters below the surface of the earth. Also, an enhanced ability to detect and define sounds could benefit the soldier—although he would have to be very well-trained to be able to transcend the distracting quality of such systems. Eventually, we may have individual-soldier tactical equipment that can differentiate between male and female body heat distributions and that will even be able to register hostility and intent from smells and sweat. But such devices will not be available for the next several interventions, and we shall have to make do for a long time to come with soldiers who are smart, tough, and disciplined.

The roles of traditional arms will shift. Field artillery, so valuable elsewhere, will be of reduced utility—unless the US military were to degenerate to the level of atrocity in which the Russians indulged themselves in Grozniy. Until artillery further enhances accuracy, innovates warheads, and overcomes the laws of ballistic trajectories, it will not have a significant role in urban combat divisions. Because of attack angles and the capabilities of precision munitions, air power will prove much more valuable and will function as flying artillery. Mortars, however, may often be of great use, given their steep trajectories. More accurate and versatile next-generation mortars could be a very powerful urban warfare tool.

The bulk of tactical firepower will need to come from large-caliber, protected, direct-fire weapons. This means tanks, or future systems descended from the tank. While today's tanks are death traps in urban combat—as the Russians were recently reminded—the need for protected, pinpoint firepower is critical. Instead of concentrating entirely on obsolescent rural warfare, armor officers should be asking themselves how the tank should evolve to fight in tomorrow's premier military environment, the city. First, the "tank" will need more protection, and that protection will need to be differently distributed—perhaps evolving to tuned electronic armor that flows over the vehicle to the threatened spot. Main guns will need to be large caliber, yet, ideally, would be able to fire reduced-caliber ammunition, as well, through a "caliber-tailoring" system. Crew visibility will need to be greater. The tank will not need to sustain high speeds, but will need a sprint capability. Further, the tank will need to be better integrated into local intelligence awareness.

While the need for plentiful dismounted infantry will endure, those soldiers will intermittently need means for rapid, protected movement. But this does not necessarily mean mechanized infantry—rather, it may demand armored transport centralized at the division level on which the infantry trains, but which does not rob the infantry of manpower in peacetime or in combat.

Engineers will be absolutely critical to urban combat, but they, too, will need evolved tools and skills. The vertical dimension is only part of the

challenge. Engineers will need to develop expanded skills, from enabling movement in developed downtown areas to firefighting. Demolition skills will be essential, but will be a long way from blowing road craters. Tomorrow's combat engineers may have to drop 20-story buildings on minimal notice under fire while minimizing collateral damage.

Aviation is vital to mobility, intelligence, and the delivery of focused firepower in urban environments, but, as Mogadishu warned us, present systems and tactics leave us highly vulnerable. Rotary-wing aviation for urban combat does not need great range or speed, but demands a richer defensive suite, great agility, and increased stealthiness.

Military intelligence must be profoundly reordered to cope with the demands of urban combat. From mapping to target acquisition, from collection to analysis, and from battle damage assessment to the prediction of the enemy's future intent, intelligence requirements in urban environments are far tougher to meet than they are on traditional battlefields. The utility of the systems that paid off so richly in Desert Storm collapses in urban warfare, and the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) and regional expertise soars. From language skills to a knowledge of urban planning (or the lack thereof), many of the abilities essential to combat in cities are given low, if any, priority in today's intelligence architecture. While leaders are aware of these shortfalls, military intelligence is perhaps more a prisoner of inherited Cold War structures than is any other branch—although field artillery and armor are competitive in their unpreparedness for the future.

Military intelligence is at a crossroads today and must decide whether to continue doing the often-irrelevant things it does so well or to embrace a realistic future which will demand a better balance between systems and soldiers in a branch particularly susceptible to the lure of dazzling machines. Try templating a semi-regular enemy unit in urban combat in the center of Lagos after 24 hours of contact. This does not mean that high-tech gear and analytical methodologies are useless in urban environments. On the contrary, innovative technologies and organizational principles could make a profound difference in how military intelligence supports urban combat operations. But we would need to shift focus and explore radical departures from the systems we currently embrace.

Military police and civil affairs troops will continue to play the important roles they played in urban interventions during the 20th century, but psychological operations (PSYOPS) units, long a step-child, will surge in importance, and may ultimately merge fully with military intelligence to enhance synergy and efficiency. Especially given the potential for electronic population control systems in the next century, PSYOPS may function as a combat arm, even if not credited as such.

Even supply is different. While deliveries do not need to be made over great distances, soft vehicles are extremely vulnerable in an environment where

***“We genuinely need a National Training Center
for Urban Combat, and it cannot be
another half-measure.”***

it is hard to define a front line and where the enemy can repeatedly emerge in the rear. All soldiers will be fighters, and force and resource protection will be physically and psychologically draining. Urban environments can upset traditional balances between classes of supply. There may be less of a requirement for bulk fuel, but an intervention force may find itself required to feed an urban population, or to supply epidemic-control efforts. Artillery and ATGM expenditures might be minimal, while main gun and infantry systems ammunition consumption could be heated. Urban combat breaks individual and crew-served weapons and gear, from rifles to radios, and masonry buildings are even harder on uniforms than on human bones. Soldiers will need replacement uniforms far more often than during more traditional operations. Unfortunately, we also will need more replacement soldiers, and all combat support and combat service support troops are more apt to find themselves shooting back during an urban battle than in any other combat environment.

Where do we begin to prepare for this immediate and growing challenge? There are two powerful steps we ought to take. First, the US Army should designate two active and at least one of our National Guard divisions as urban combat divisions and should begin variable restructurings to get the right component mix. Rule one should be that the active divisions are not “experimental” in the sense of nondeployable, but remain subject to short-notice deployment to threatened urban environments. This would put an incredible stress on the unit and, especially, on the chain of command. But today’s US Army cannot afford to have any divisions “on ice,” and, further, this pressure would drive competence. Two such divisions is the irreducible initial number, since one urban combat division would be rapidly exhausted by the pace of deployments.

Most of the divisional artillery would be shifted to corps-level, while engineers at all levels would be increased and restructured—including the addition of organic sapper platoons to infantry battalions. Composite armor and mechanized elements would be added to light forces at a ratio of one battalion (brigade) to four, with a longer-term goal of developing more appropriate and readily deployable means of delivering direct firepower and protecting the forward movement of troops. Innovative protection of general transports would be another goal. Military intelligence units would have to restructure radically,

and would need to develop habitual relationships with reserve component linguists and area specialists. Aviation would work closely with other arms to develop more survivable tactics, while each division would gain an active-duty PSYOPS company. Signalers would need to experiment with low-cost, off-the-shelf tools for communicating in dense urban environments, and an overarching effort would need to be made to create interdisciplinary maps, both paper and electronic, that could better portray the complexity of urban warfare. The divisions' experience would determine future acquisition requirements.

But none of the sample measures cited above is as important as revolutionizing training for urban combat. The present approach, though worthwhile on its own terms, trains soldiers to fight in villages or small towns, not in cities. Building realistic "cities" in which to train would be prohibitively expensive. The answer is innovation. Why build that which already exists? In many of our own blighted cities, massive housing projects have become uninhabitable and industrial plants unusable. Yet they would be nearly ideal for combat-in-cities training. While we could not engage in live-fire training (even if the locals do), we could experiment and train in virtually every other regard. Development costs would be a fraction of the price of building a "city" from scratch, and city and state governments would likely compete to gain a US Army (and Marine) presence, since it would bring money, jobs, and development—as well as a measure of social discipline. A mutually beneficial relationship could help at least one of our worst-off cities, while offering the military a realistic training environment. The training center could be at least partially administered by the local National Guard to bind it to the community. We genuinely need a National Training Center for Urban Combat, and it cannot be another half-measure. Such a facility would address the most glaring and dangerous gap in our otherwise superb military training program. We need to develop it soon.

In summary, an urbanizing world means combat in cities, whether we like it or not. Any officer who states categorically that the US Army will never let itself be drawn into urban warfare is indulging in wishful thinking. Urban combat is conceptually and practically different from other modes of warfare. Although mankind has engaged in urban combat from the sack of Troy down to the siege of Sarajevo, Western militaries currently resist the practical, emotional, moral, and ethical challenges of city fighting. Additional contemporary players, such as the media, and international and nongovernmental organizations, further complicate contemporary urban combat. We do not want to touch this problem. But we have no choice. The problem is already touching us, with skeletal, infected fingers. The US military must stop preparing for its dream war and get down to the reality of the fractured and ugly world in which we live—a world that lives in cities. We must begin judicious restructuring for urban combat in order to gain both efficiency and maximum effectiveness—as well as to preserve the lives of our soldiers. We must equip, train, and fight innovatively. We must seize the future before the future seizes us. □

NATO and Germany: A Renaissance in Strategy

CHRISTIAN E. O. MILLOTAT

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For the first time in its history, Germany enjoys a strategic glacié to the east, formed by nations willing to act in a spirit of friendship. There is every indication that in the foreseeable future these countries will establish security and even military ties to NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Establishment of those ties is an important objective of the German government, one that enjoys the widespread support of the German people.

At the same time, three related processes are having profound effects on the Bundeswehr—the German Federal Armed Forces. First, the ruling of the Constitutional Court related to the commitment of forces outside of Germany and NATO territory has expanded their range of possible missions. Second, a new operational dimension has been created by the prospects for greater integration of the Bundeswehr in multinational formations and operations. Third, as policy changes follow these developments, the size and composition of the Bundeswehr are evolving to meet the associated challenges. All of these changes—within NATO and the European Union, within the range of potential missions, and within the Bundeswehr itself—have influenced German thinking on matters that were, like many other military and political initiatives, frozen by the superpower standoff that began in 1945.

NATO's revised military strategy, codified in the New Strategic Concept and in the NATO Military Committee's Document 400, reflects the same sort of review of Cold War assumptions and policies. Strategic thinking and the supporting operational concepts, reflecting new defense opportunities, are evolving free of Cold War restraints. The effect is a return to basics in Alliance operational planning.

Of the four factors considered most influential in developing strategy and derivative operational concepts—numbers of forces, time, information,

and operational space—the latter is the most important for the Alliance and for German national security. Space in which to maneuver is the key to success in crisis management outside the NATO area, in allied defense “at a distance” outside Germany, or even in the defense of Germany itself. Space allows for the strategic concentration of forces already deployed in a defensive posture to prepare for what Clausewitz called a “convergent attack” powerful enough to shatter an adversary’s main offensive effort.

This article examines the importance of operational space—room for strategic maneuver to thwart an aggressor—in contemporary German politics, in German military history, in Cold War operational planning, and in current strategic and operational planning within the German government. The article can be considered an in-progress review of the evolution of NATO’s post-Cold War strategy and of derivative operational concepts within the Bundeswehr.

Policy Initiatives

In his March 1995 speech entitled “The Unavoidable Globalization of German Foreign Policy” on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the German Society for Foreign Policy, Germany’s Federal President, Roman Herzog, stressed the role of the Federal Armed Forces as an active element of politics. “We need them,” he declared, “to be forearmed against genocide, aggression, and blackmail. In such cases, we must also be prepared to use military power once all other means have failed. But it is equally true to say that military operations are no panacea and that they must not be uppermost in our minds.”¹

President Herzog’s statement provides the context for the debate on the expanded mission spectrum of the multinationally integrated Bundeswehr. His acknowledgment of the need to formulate German interests and to implement them in the political field highlights the role of the Bundeswehr as the military arm of national power in the national strategy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Bundeswehr therefore must be deployable throughout the full spectrum of potential military actions in the operational continuum at the military-strategic level, ranging from humanitarian relief operations to national and allied defensive operations, in all their manifestations.²

The parameters governing the employment of German soldiers for crisis reaction missions, including those under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN) or the WEU, are currently being refined. In its 1994 ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court established the legal basis for these new

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***“The geostrategic and military situation . . .
has led to a renaissance of the strategic
principle of counter-concentration.”***

parameters, thereby ending political speculation as to the legality of German participation in such missions. Allied defense planning in national capitals and within NATO fora, in accordance with the tradition of consensus in the latter, will reflect these changes.

The geostrategic and military situation confronting NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany, created in the wake of Germany's unification and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, has led to a renaissance of the strategic principle of counter-concentration within the Alliance's concept of the strategic defensive. NATO's previous strategy, codified in the 1968 NATO Military Committee Document, MC 14/3, defined its concept for defending the Alliance against the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, dated 7 November 1991, establishes the continuity of the Alliance's purely defensive orientation: "None of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence."³ NATO forces will never be employed in the context of a strategic offensive, only in a strategic defensive role. The latter concept defines the overall mission structure for all NATO forces.

The principle of strategic counter-concentration of forces, as outlined in MC 400, dated 12 December 1991, essentially provides the core of NATO's new military strategy. This concept is outlined below. The cumulative effect of these policy changes has been to free commanders from the strictures of the Cold War, restoring the full range of options to the strategic defensive and associated operational planning.⁴

Historical Perspective

Clausewitz insisted that the strategic defensive was the most effective form of successful warfare. He identified its two constituent parts as waiting and action; the active part he called the "operational-tactical offensive." This aspect of Clausewitz's work can be referred to in current terms as a military-strategic counter-concentration of forces, anticipated when the military-strategic objective is established for the senior commander. He described the possibility of attaining an operational goal by launching a large-scale attack from the strategic defensive as a concentric or convergent attack—a "counterattack," to use contemporary terminology.

His monumental and still-instructive opus, *On War*, describes the essence of a convergent (counter) attack in Chapter 9, Book VIII:

A convergent attack always holds out promise of increased results, for if it succeeds the enemy is not just beaten, he is virtually cut off. The convergent [counter] attack, then, is always the more promising; but since forces are divided and the theater is enlarged, it also carries a greater risk. All depends, therefore, on whether the attacker feels strong enough to go after such a prize.⁵

Counter-concentration is the concept that will allow NATO to conduct operations with the object of delivering a surprise, decisive attack that will cause an aggressor to capitulate or reconsider his actions.

Clausewitz's suggested interpretations and conclusions related to the nature and use of military means to support political actions were the basis for the plans and operations of a number of German commanders. The 1866 war between Prussia and Austria ended militarily when Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke, within the context of a strategic offensive, concentrated the Prussian army near Königgratz (Sadowa) and launched a convergent attack, while on the move, against the Austrian forces. In the subsequent war against France he was again able to launch a brilliant counter-concentration, but that campaign could not be decided by a single battle.

In the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff were able to conduct a counter-concentration and defeat major parts of the 2d Russian Army under General Samsonov in the context of an almost successful encirclement; that battle nevertheless failed to end the war. In 1940, the "cut-of-a-sickle operation," devised by Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein, forced the Allied forces and major parts of the British Expeditionary Corps to capitulate. The Western Campaign of 1940 was won by a concentric attack, yet it was similarly insufficient to finish the war, which Hitler had started with criminal intent.

Moltke's military generalship, and the strategic and operational insights of other practitioners such as Field Marshal von Schlieffen and General Ludwig Beck, will help political and military leaders of the allied nations to appreciate the principle of the strategic counter-concentration of forces revived in 1991 by NATO's MC 400. Their writings, thoughts, and generalship will help to define the requirements for preventive security measures to meet current and future requirements. Indeed, our US partners have been guided by these principles for many years, as demonstrated by the joint and combined campaign plans that led to the envelopment conducted during the 1991 Kuwait war of liberation.⁶

History, including the war in Kuwait, should teach us that any successful strategic counter-concentration of forces will prove futile unless it leads to a subsequent convergent attack. The operational commander must be able to mass and employ decisive force after a strategic redeployment during

a campaign, regardless of the commander's original strategic objective. Both features of such a concept have to be in harmony: the strategic objective identified must be attainable with the force available to the commander. The question of what might happen should the operational commander fail to complete such an operation is of paramount importance. The consequences of such failures have not always been clearly described, which is itself another lesson of history.

The Cold War's Influence on Strategic Thinking

A persistent and almost insurmountable weakness in NATO's planned conduct of operations during the Cold War is illustrated by the operational concept of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT) in the General Defence Plan (GDP) of the 1980s. The intent of the GDP was to achieve the military-political aim of MC 14/3 for the defense of the Central Region at CINCENT's operational level of responsibility. "In the event of aggression," the document stated, "it is imperative that Central European Command Forces:

- defend NATO territory as close as possible to the Inner German and Czechoslovakian borders with the aim of preserving or restoring the integrity of this territory;
- engage the enemy in depth and exploit his weaknesses to prevent him from bringing his quantitative superiority to bear . . . ; and,
- should the use of nuclear weapons become necessary—and be authorized—they are to be employed with the aim of changing the situation to the advantage of Central European Command (CEC) within the shortest possible time. The aim of the CEC forces must be to defeat the Warsaw Pact's First Operational Echelon, and supporting air forces, by conventional operations."

The document continued, "Operations are to create the conditions necessary to defeat the Second Operational Echelon by conventional employment of Central European Command reserves, [or] if these reserves are not available, by selective employment of nuclear weapons."⁷

CINCENT's concept of operations was designed to offset NATO's numerical inferiority in conventional forces in an emergency by the early use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Central Region. The intent—to present the enemy an incalculable risk—resulted in a situation where each military operation would have been threatened by a nuclear sword of Damocles, as the following synopsis suggests.

In the initial battle, NATO corps commanders would have tried to stop the first operational echelons of the aggressor by adopting a "layer-cake" type of integrated defense across a front of 800 kilometers within the Federal Republic of Germany. CINCENT's forces, however, were not strong enough to cover the full frontage. The intention therefore was to contain any Warsaw

Pact penetration by local counterattacks with the weak reserve forces retained by each NATO corps commander to prevent the disruption of the defensive line and to regain, if possible, any lost territory. CINCENT also could have drawn on the III (US) Corps—marked by a somewhat uncertain order of battle—and, following a decision by the French President, on the forces of the 1st French Army, or perhaps only on the II (FR) Corps. The maximum strength of these French forces would have been that of a reinforced NATO corps. In addition, the French tactical air forces might have added some 400 combat aircraft to NATO's strength.

The commitment of NATO reserves in three key areas had been planned with the objective of sealing off any penetrations along the Warsaw Pact's main axes of advance. The areas were Eggebirge-Habichtswald, near Fulda; along the bend of the Main river near Würzburg; and east of Nürnberg and in the Munich area. Plans for the use of these reserve forces, inappropriately called counterattacks, included operations against the Warsaw Pact's first and second operational echelons. The plans were based on a great number of assumptions and included instructions to cover a variety of possible situations. Their execution would have considerably restricted the initiative of the responsible commanders.⁸

What the 1987 Operational Guideline of the German Army and CINCENT's 1988 Operational Principles called the "Second Battle" would have been fought by worn-out units from the first battle, reinforced over time by allied reserves unfamiliar with the theater of war and whose time of arrival and order of battle were uncertain. It was a type of planning that sought to provide specific options for action, a fact which was well known to the Warsaw Pact. The latter's attack plans had been tailored to what could easily be identified as the procedures governing the planned defense of the Central Region.⁹ Factors that remained unknown throughout the Cold War included the use of nuclear weapons, the timing of their potential employment and their yield, the time of arrival of additional reserves in Europe, and the moment when the French President would decide to commit French forces, as well as the strength of those forces.

During the Cold War the Federal Republic accepted the principle of forward defense close to its borders to assure allied defense on German territory. Reliance on nuclear deterrence as part of that defense concept was based on the frequently advocated, fortunately never-tested, view that conventional warfare on German territory would wreak the same degree of havoc as nuclear war. This proposition apparently created mental barriers against exploring how to use the scant operational space that even then was available to commanders. The associated mindset was clearly reflected in NATO's Cold War exercises. Once the Alliance's inadequate reserves had been spent, NATO's WINTEX/CIMEX and Crested Eagle procedural exercises quickly reverted to the phase of nuclear

strikes. During such exercises, plans for the "second battle" rarely went beyond the initial outline of combat operations.

The most significant changes in the foregoing array of variables affecting NATO's future strategic and operational planning are the rediscovery of operational space and the role of nuclear weapons. The former is developed in detail below. Nuclear weapons continue to make the risks of any aggression both incalculable and unacceptable: NATO's conventional forces alone are still unable to deter war. Nuclear weapons remain the unknown variable in the calculations of a potential aggressor. The change from the Cold War era, however, is that nuclear weapons now lack an operational dimension. They are NATO's "weapons of last resort," allocated by the New Strategic Concept exclusively to the strategic level.¹⁰

Regaining Freedom of Maneuver

We can now apply the lessons of history and the recent past to contemporary NATO planning. To cause an aggressor either to capitulate or to withdraw from Alliance territory NATO can, thanks to the strategic glaxis, choose to employ either an encirclement operation or a strategic counter-concentration in conjunction with a convergent counterattack. This option will be provided in the authority given to the commanders charged with conducting the operation. The authorizing directives will, of course, reflect the consensus developed among the allies within well-established NATO political-military consultative fora.

The nations and the Alliance will specify which of the various operational alternatives will be used. This also is an aspect of strategy on which Clausewitz commented: "That is why governments and commanders have always tried to find ways of avoiding a decisive battle and of reaching their goal by other means or of quietly abandoning it." Clausewitz felt that "the bloodiest solution" would be a main battle brought about by a convergent attack. He believed that the commander should consider the possibility of encircling opposing forces, thereby "killing the enemy's spirit," as an alternative to a battle of annihilation. This alternative remains valid today.¹¹

Successful implementation of the principle of strategic counter-concentration is based on the assumption that space for the maneuver of large formations will be available. In his highly topical 1987 article on the "Principles of Operational Command," Colonel (later Major General) Dieter Brand noted that operational command hinges greatly on "the issue[s] of constraints, of the use of space, and of the available forces." He went on to say that "should operational command be confronted with political-strategic constraints concerning the use of space, it will be unable to become fully effective."¹²

General Hennig von Sandrart, as Chief of Staff, German Army and later as CINCENT, revived this kind of operational thinking at the end of the 1980s. However, his ability to transform the concept into plans was limited by the major constraint in defending in the Central Region: space available within

“The most significant changes . . . affecting NATO’s future strategic and operational planning are the rediscovery of operational space and the role of nuclear weapons.”

the Federal Republic of Germany had almost disappeared from consideration by the responsible commanders and planners as an operational factor. Perhaps the (forced) early resort to nuclear weapons paralyzed the creative thinking required to develop conventional expedients. In any event, the 1987 Operational Guideline and CINCENT’s 1988 Operational Principles could not be fully implemented.

At the time of the East-West confrontation, the Warsaw Pact planned to deploy some 44 divisions within two days to forward assembly areas for operations against the Central Region. Today an adversary in the East would have to rely on fewer forces, moved by an inadequate railway and rail infrastructure system across the strategic glacis, to achieve a military buildup against the countries to our east. When combined with NATO’s new freedom of action, limitations such as these will inhibit any attempt by an aggressor to bring up additional troops to use against the West.

The challenges of adapting military strategy to post-Cold War realities lead us to Moltke’s ideas on generalship. There will be a requirement, derived from the Alliance’s military-strategic goal, for a clear definition of the operational objective and for the consistent pursuit of this objective. Operational commanders with deep professional knowledge will have to remain well ahead of the details of current operations. Their plans will have to take into account the difficult problems of multinationally integrated forces as well as the preparations necessary to permit a strategic counter-concentration of forces when the opportunity occurs. Operational planning must again be guided by one of Moltke’s main precepts:

No plan of operations could look with any assurance beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces. Only a layman will believe that the pattern of events of a campaign as perceived is a reflection of the consistent execution of a preplanned, comprehensively conceived and predetermined original idea.¹³

For all the previously stated reasons, contingency operation plans on the Cold War model cannot do justice to the opportunities for a strategic envelopment early in a future conflict. Operations based on the disposition of

forces after a successful strategic counter-concentration must be conducted more freely than was possible in the constrained space available to NATO during the Cold War. Hence, the command of troops becomes again an art, and thus a truly creative activity. Command can regain a quality that it has lacked for decades: the option to conceive of operations that will permit strategic counter-concentrations of forces on a Clausewitzian scale.

A Way Ahead

The Federal Republic of Germany has a legitimate interest in protecting its territory against crises and military conflicts, to include countering them outside its national boundaries. Should such crises and conflicts occur on German soil, damage must be limited and any conflict must be finished quickly. The organization of the Bundeswehr is such that, as its forces are integrated into multinational formations and after a successful strategic counter-concentration of allied forces, those formations will be able to launch the convergent counter-attacks described by Clausewitz. This capacity is equally appropriate for crisis management, for allied defense at a distance outside German borders, or for integrated national defense.

German forces are currently undergoing significant reorganization to optimize their ability to cope with the new spectrum of conflict. The Bundeswehr of the future is being structured to include rapidly available Reaction Forces and augmentation-dependent Main Defence Forces. Given the size of the Bundeswehr and the presence of German commanders and planners in key Alliance commands, NATO's operational planning process will increasingly be influenced by the Bundeswehr. Indeed, the Bundeswehr will play a key part in shaping these plans from concept through completion.

In February 1994, General Helge Hansen, then German Army Chief of Staff and later CINCENT, promulgated the Provisional Guideline for the Operational Command of the Army's Forces.¹⁴ This document identifies the new challenges for operational commanders of German land forces. Army Regulations of the so-called 100 "Truppenführung" series, designed to implement the Operational Guideline, are currently being revised against the background of the new tasks identified by General Hansen. While the regulations will begin appearing in 1996, the corresponding interservice document has yet to be finalized. The latter will provide German officers with practical guidance so that they can contribute Germany's political, military, and operational ideas to the activities of NATO, WEU, and the multinationally structured corps headquarters.

Several preliminary conclusions seem appropriate for this in-progress review of the evolution of NATO strategic and operational thinking.

- NATO's new military strategy has redefined the operational dimension. It has revived axioms from traditional German command philosophy

that have also been applied by our allies in a number of cases over the last few decades.

- The core of NATO's new military strategy as reflected in MC 400 is the forgotten principle of the strategic counter-concentration of forces, which has generated fresh challenges at the operational level. Operations based on a strategic counter-concentration are a creative activity that, as Moltke suggested, must adapt operational plans to developing situations for execution by forward-oriented elements.

- The ideal case provides forces capable of mounting a concentric counterattack as defined by Clausewitz. This implies a capability which enables the forces to defeat an enemy by surprise, possibly with a single crucial operational counter-strike. The form of the operational continuum in which they will be employed will be laid down in the Alliance's military-strategic directive which is developed by consensus among the allied nations. This concept excludes operational planning of the sort common to the era of the East-West confrontation, whether by NATO or by any potential aggressor. Detailed contingency operations plans, with their strongly forward-oriented elements and their numerous assumptions about the possible course of operations of an aggressor, are truly relics of the Cold War.

- Up to the time when the strategic counter-concentration of friendly forces can be completed, the operational concept consists of an identification of the opposing forces and their deployment. There will be no attempt to determine, *a priori*, the nature of operations that will follow the strategic counter-concentration of allied forces.

- For a transitional period, Germany as a sovereign state has the unique opportunity to introduce its own military-strategic ideas in the Alliance's planning process. It will be extremely important during this period to make available maneuver space as an operational factor. These challenges go well beyond the military sphere. Meeting these challenges requires the involvement of politicians who, as President Herzog said in the speech cited above, are responsible for the definition of German interests, and particularly for the development of Germany's national security strategy.

The concentration of our multinational units in the right space, with the required force levels, and within an appropriate time frame, should provide the elements of successful combined and joint operations based on close interaction of national and allied land, air, and sea forces. Success will be assured through positioning the appropriate force at the point of main effort, the use of surprise, the influence of generalship, and the expected qualitative and quantitative superiority of Alliance formations at the decisive point.

Goethe once stated: "Only those with clear notions will also be able to lead." His insight defines existing planning deficiencies and the associated opportunities to move beyond the limitations of the Cold War. It is in this context that the German President addressed our politicians on behalf of a

renaissance in strategic and operational thinking and planning by the Bundeswehr and its NATO allies.

NOTES

Editor's note: The author's description of counterattacks following a strategic concentration of forces generally transcends the intent of "counterattack" in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: GPO, 1989), p. 93. See also Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ., 1986), pp. 296-325. Finally, the word "glacis" is not in common use, yet it figures significantly in this article. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2d edition, unabridged, defines it as follows: "Fort: a bank of earth in front of the counterscarp or covered way of a fort, having an easy slope toward the field or open country" (p. 809).

1. "The Unavoidable Globalization of German Foreign Policy," the German President's speech in Bonn on the occasion of the ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the German Society for Foreign Policy, on 13 March 1995, as published by the German Government's Press and Information Agency, No. 20/p. 161, dated 15 March 1995.

2. It is US policy to allocate specific mission options for their forces to potential crisis regions around the world. At the national US level they are called "National Political Continuum," at the military strategic level, "Operational Continuum." "Operational Continuum" covers the entire spectrum of potential military missions ranging from relief operations to war.

3. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, see Press Communiqué S-1(91)85 of the NATO Press Service.

4. In the Military Committee's Directive for Military Planning of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, dated 12 December 1991, or MC 400 for short, the military-strategic principle of counter-concentration is described in two different passages as follows:

No. 34: "In view of these fundamental changes regarding the threat and force levels, NATO's armed forces must be able to counter-concentrate in order to defend as close as possible to threatened borders.

Annex B: Counter concentration is defined as "the massing of significant military force at a particular time and place with sufficient capability to counter an aggressor's force concentration." The classification of MC 400 is NATO Confidential.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, *Hinterlassenes Werk vom Kriege*, 18th edition, Book VIII, Chapter 9, p. 1012, Bonn 1972. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), Book VIII, Chapter 9, p. 619.

6. Cf. this author's article on "Clausewitz in the Gulf—The Prussian General's Writings on War and the US Strategy for the Liberation of Kuwait" (in German: "Clausewitz am Golf—Die Erkenntnisse des preussischen Generals über den Krieg und die Strategie der USA zur Befreiung Kuwaits," *Truppenpraxis*, No. 3/1991, pp. 225.

7. Extract from a draft for a CINCENT command briefing in 1983. Unpublished.

8. The buildup and planned use of NATO reserves anticipated late in the Cold War must not be confused with the revived principle of strategic counter-concentration of forces, since the buildup was to occur at the operational, rather than at the strategic, level.

9. Operational Guideline, promulgated by the German Chief of Staff, Army, in 1987. Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands, "Operational Principles for the Employment of Land and Air Forces in Defense of the Central Region, CINCENT's Operational Principles," NATO Confidential, 1988. For information on the Warsaw Pact's planned attack on West Germany, see Michael M. Boll, "By Blood, Not Ballots: German Unification, Communist Style," *Parameters*, 24 (Spring 1994), 66-77.

10. Cf., The Alliance's Strategic Concept, see above, p. 55, etc.

11. Clausewitz, p. 496 (German); (English), p. 259. The precise military-strategic directive received by General Norman Schwarzkopf for the mission of liberating Kuwait is quoted in his memoirs, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), p. 450. Contrary to what many critics of Schwarzkopf's operations maintain, the directive does not say that Baghdad should be conquered. Extract: "I... Undertake operations to seek the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in accordance with the terms of UN resolutions and sanctions. If necessary and when directed, conduct military operations to destroy Iraqi armed forces, liberate and secure Kuwait to permit the restoration of its legitimate government..." Thus General Schwarzkopf consistently translated the military-strategic directive he had received into his Operations Plan which he, indeed, pursued strictly.

12. Dieter Brand, "Principles of Operational Command" ("Grundzüge Operativer Führung"), published in the "Denkschriften" series on questions of operational command, published by the German Chief of Staff, Army, Bonn 1987.

13. Moltke's Military Essays, Article on Strategy, Tome I, p. 71 (German version), Berlin 1902.

14. German Ministry of Defence, Chief of Staff, Army, "Preliminary Guideline for the Operational Command of Army Forces;" Fu H III I, Az 31-05-12-VS-NfD (Restricted), dated 8 February 1994.

The Future of German Operations Outside NATO

KARL-HEINZ BÖRNER

No German soldier or airman fought in the 1991 Gulf War coalition. No US or allied effort to coax Germany to share the combat burdens of providing worldwide security during or after the Cold War succeeded. In fact, since World War II German units have been constitutionally forbidden from operating outside of Europe, or so most Germans believed.

The perceived restriction disappeared in 1994, clearing the way for Germany to participate in future missions around the world. Did the new challenges of the post-Cold War era awaken the German people to the need to change their constitution so that Germany could fulfill the role of a great power? Should one expect Germany to leap to the front of the queue of nations supplying military forces to UN operations? The answers to these and similar questions lie in German law and German politics. This article explains the decision that changed German policy and suggests some implications of the change.

For years a restrictive interpretation of Germany's constitution, or Basic Law, regarded as unconstitutional any international missions by German armed forces exceeding common self-defense within the geographical areas defined by NATO or the Western European Union (WEU).¹ Conversely, most constitutional lawyers supported a more extensive interpretation of the Basic Law, one that differentiated between national or collective defense and other international missions outside NATO territory.² This situation gave rise to vigorous debate whenever German forces were employed outside NATO territory to fulfill UN missions.³ Operations of the German military in Somalia, in the Adriatic, and even on NATO AWACS flights over the former Yugoslavia prompted two political parties in the German legislative assembly, the Bundestag,⁴ to ask the Federal Constitutional Court⁵ to settle the matter once and for all.

On 12 July 1994 that court issued the following ruling:

In the proceedings on the dispute over the deployment of German forces the Federal Constitutional Court (Second Panel) has ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany is at liberty to assign German armed forces in operations mounted by the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Western European Union (WEU) to implement resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). The same applies to the assignment of German contingents to peacekeeping forces of the UN.

... The Court also finds, however, after thoroughly analyzing the provisions of the Basic Law relating to the status of the armed forces in the constitutional system, that the Federal Government is required to obtain the Bundestag's explicit approval for each deployment of German armed forces. Such approval must in principle be obtained prior to their deployment. The Bundestag must decide on the deployment of armed forces with a simple majority. Once parliament has given its approval, the decision on the modalities of deployment, especially the question of the size of the force and the duration of their deployment and on necessary coordination within and with the governing bodies of international organizations, falls within the government's sphere of competence. The nature and extent of parliament's involvement is for parliament itself to decide within the scope of these constitutional constraints.

As noted in a subsequent press release by the court, the decision "legitimized the long-disputed admissibility of the deployment of German forces [outside the NATO area] under a United Nations mandate but at the same time made their deployment in each individual case subject to the approval of the German Bundestag."⁶

In light of this landmark ruling, it remains to be seen how German forces may now be employed outside of the NATO area. Not only must there be a decision to deploy and employ those forces, but criteria for determining when to commit German forces must be developed. The will of the German people to support such missions also will have to be determined.

Implications of the Ruling

General Klaus Naumann, Chief of Staff of the German armed forces, commented shortly after the ruling that:

Germany's 1949 Constitution does not prohibit participation in multilateral peacekeeping or combat operations, and ... German troops are permitted to join military missions abroad if parliament approves. With that finding, German foreign policy has regained sovereignty, freeing Germany to act fully in concert with other members of the community of nations to which it belongs and to accept the burdens that go along with such an international role.⁷

In fact, with the unification of Germany on 3 October 1990 and the termination of all World War II victors' rights, Germany had already regained full sovereignty and was hindered from participation in international military affairs only by its own internal political and legal processes.

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One could have developed an ambiguous understanding of the Constitutional Court's ruling by reading German newspapers shortly after the decision. Politicians announced that henceforth participation of German soldiers in joint operations would be legal. Such statements were misleading, because operations of that kind had in fact always been legal. Since many politicians' interpretations of the German Basic Law were flawed, policy positions articulated to the German people and to Germany's allies misled both audiences.

Now, after the ruling of the High Court, Germany faces a new political challenge. As General Naumann suggested, "Gone are the days when [German politicians] could hide behind a strict interpretation of the constitution that was held to circumscribe severely German participation in UN and NATO operations."⁸ Criteria will be developed gradually to decide when, where, and to what extent German soldiers will be part of multilateral military missions.

The remainder of this analysis is organized around responses to five questions posed by Dr. Philip Crowl, questions that "strategists must ask before they commence a war, or before they take actions which might lead to war, or before they undertake a wartime campaign, or before they end a war in which they are already engaged."⁹ The questions, similar to those suggested in the Weinberger Doctrine and General Colin Powell's list of considerations for determining when to employ armed force, will shape responses to proposed deployment of Bundeswehr forces in support of humanitarian operations or in support of NATO, UN, or European Union initiatives throughout the world.

What is it about?

Even with a relatively secure peace and a promising policy of détente between West and East in Europe, every larger state has to rely on armed forces, not only as a counter to a possible threat, but as an attribute of sovereignty and of the national independence which the force is supposed to protect.

The German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, serve as a striking example. Without Germany's military contributions to NATO or the West European community, the nation's goal to regain full sovereignty and equal rights within the international political environment would have been highly problematic. Whether the Bundeswehr will be as significant for the Federal Republic's future as it was during the 45-year Cold War largely depends on the development of the security interests and the security policy of the Western alliances and Germany's role within this process. It is clear, however, that as a member of various alliances, Germany must take up the burden of mutual security: "Every Western European member state has to make a military contribution towards a common defense and security system. The means to fulfill this obligation will be the national armed forces."¹⁰ Therefore the Bundeswehr has to be a responsive instrument of Germany's foreign and security policy, able to share future burdens equally with other allied forces.

These obligations are detailed in the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court:

According to Article 24(2) of the Basic Law, the federation may become a party to a system of collective security and in so doing consent to limitations upon its sovereign powers. The Federal Constitutional Court also sees in this power conferred by the Basic Law the constitutional foundation for an assumption of responsibilities that are typically associated with membership of such a system of collective security. Hence German servicemen may be deployed within the scope of UN peacekeeping missions even if the latter are authorized to use force. The objections submitted by the applicants [SPD and FDP] on constitutional grounds to the participation of German forces in the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, in the NATO/WEU naval operation in the Adriatic to monitor the UN embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in the AWACS monitoring of the ban on flights in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina, likewise imposed by the United Nations, are therefore rejected. German servicemen may also be integrated into NATO formations which are deployed within the framework of UN operations. This, according to the Court, is covered by parliament's approval of Germany's accession to NATO and the UN Charter.¹¹

Immediately after the ruling, in July 1994, the German government asked the Bundestag for approval of the missions of German soldiers in Southeast Europe. Following a special session of the parliament, during which the required enabling legislative decisions were made, the cabinet lifted the restrictions on the use of German forces as of 27 July. That cabinet decision meant, inter alia, that the Bundeswehr could follow NATO rules of engagement and operational orders of responsible NATO commanders without exception. Among the immediate results were the use of German AWACS crew members in the Hungarian orbit (supporting NATO forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia) and participation by German ships in "stop and search" operations in the Adriatic, including the territorial waters of Albania and Montenegro.¹² Thus the German Chief of Staff sees a clear signal from the German government to become a mature partner in shared responsibilities.

The Constitutional Court's ruling definitely answered the question posed above: the issue of deployment is about Germany's sovereignty, about the nation's international obligations, and about the new role of its armed forces.

Is military strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives?

The current international security situation makes the development of national political objectives and a national military strategy inordinately complex for any nation with international interests and obligations. The salient features of the international environment which influence national objectives and consequently national military strategy include:

- the United States' role as the only world power capable of unrestricted global action;

- economic problems and challenges of Western Europe and Japan;
- the relatively unstable political landscape in Eastern Europe and Russia;
- the controversies of the multipolar world of the 21st century, whose powerful northern hemisphere centers will be called to help the south to solve its problems; and
- Germany's role as an ally and a continental middle power with worldwide economic interests.

The mission and structure of the Bundeswehr are being tailored to match this strategic environment. In a speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, on 21 October 1994, General Naumann stated:

The primary task of the Federal Armed Forces will continue to be the protection of Germany from external threats. But in accordance with the new political requirements, the German armed forces must now [in particular after the ruling of the High Court] also be available as a flexible instrument for peacekeeping and crisis management. . . .

. . . [Consequently] the armed forces cannot be structured for only one concrete scenario, as in the past. Part of the Bundeswehr must be able to respond to a broader spectrum of options. Another part of the Bundeswehr, that is by far the largest part, must after a longer preparation time be able to secure the protection of our country through Alliance defense.¹³

Three categories of forces must be available to German leadership to fulfill the nation's responsibilities in the new security environment: the main defense forces, reaction forces, and infrastructure organizations.

- The main defense forces (MDF) comprise all the standing and augmentable forces that would be employed in defense of Germany and its allies. The augmentable elements of the main defense forces are the foundation of national defense. They are to be kept at graduated levels of readiness and must be able to reach prescribed levels of operational readiness within the time available to make military preparations for national and Alliance defense. They are composed of active duty personnel and, to an even greater extent than before, reservists of all ranks who receive basic and continuation training during their active military service and periods of reserve duty training. Selected units of standing MDF, particularly from the logistic and medical corps, will be employed in support of the reaction forces, described below.

- The reaction forces are those elements of the armed forces that can be employed for conflict prevention and crisis management within the Alliance framework and as a contribution to international peace missions. As standing defense forces, they contribute to national defense and protect the augmentation of the mobilization-dependent MDF. If necessary, they can receive spe-

cific support from augmentable elements or from forces of the basic military organization.

- Infrastructure units, called the "basic military organization" are required to exercise command and control of all forces, to support the operation of the armed forces, to carry out training and service support functions, to perform civil-military cooperation tasks, and to support Alliance forces stationed in Germany.¹⁴

The Bundeswehr is being restructured along the lines described above to make certain that its organizations and capabilities are compatible with the new military strategy.

What are the limits of military power in support of national policy?

The challenge to strategists, now as ever, is to determine in each national crisis just how the military can contribute to resolution of the crisis. When the 1994 Defense White Paper declared that "Germany's ability to act strategically is not only a political and mental challenge. It is also a question of military capabilities and options," it echoed similar assessments in comparable publications in most NATO and other European nations.¹⁵ Political and intellectual challenges as well as the military capabilities and options must be considered separately.

Part of the answer to questions about the effects of political and intellectual challenges to the use of military power appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 13 July 1994:

To be sure, the Federal Constitutional Court's decision on sending Bundeswehr troops outside the territory of NATO does not give the government, any government, a free hand in using the Bundeswehr. The decision adheres closely to the instances at hand: the Adriatic, AWACS, Somalia. But the decision also says, and this points to the future, that the collective security systems the Federal Republic has joined—the United Nations foremost, but also NATO and the Western European Union—can change in character, as we have seen since 1989.¹⁶

The *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in Munich, added the same day:

Foreign Minister Kinkel has already warned that the restraint in military matters [practiced] up to now should not be "relinquished hysterically." He has good reasons for that warning: legally there will be only a single absolute prohibition in the future—the prohibition against wars of aggression as identified under international law. With this decision from Karlsruhe, the most consequential struggle since the 1955 debate over rearmament [of the Federal Republic of Germany] comes to an end. The decision changes Germany's entire foreign and military policy.¹⁷

Germany is preparing its military to meet new and expanded responsibilities inherent in full sovereignty as well as those related to full partnership

“Germany is preparing its military to meet new and expanded responsibilities.”

with its Alliance partners. German participation in operations will not be automatic. It will always be based on national values and interests, since there is no obligatory norm within international law for support of such activities. As General Naumann commented, “Of course, Germany will continue to exercise great restraint in the use of military power, and for good reasons. I think it would send the wrong signal if Germany now prepared to acquire forward projection capabilities, which its armed forces currently do not have. In fact, our long-term planning does not include such a step.”¹⁸

From that understanding the matter of Germany’s military capabilities and options can be addressed. Germany’s Federal Minister of Defense, Volker Rühe, said during a Conference of the Aspen Institute on 24 August 1994 in Berlin:

Today, the Bundeswehr is still best prepared for the most unlikely case—an aggression against NATO. It is least prepared for the most likely case—the new tasks associated with international crisis management. For this reason the German government has initiated a fundamental reform of the German armed forces that will give them the necessary shape to master the challenges of today and tomorrow. . . . The main emphasis of the reform will be the build-up of highly professional reaction forces with a high degree of readiness and availability, and able to cover the entire spectrum of crisis management tasks.¹⁹

Fundamental changes in Germany’s relations with its Alliance partners require a new approach to armed forces equipment planning. At the moment the Bundeswehr is adequately equipped for national defense at home, since the main defense forces have predominantly modern equipment at their disposal. For the near future, however, the high value attached to the crisis reaction capability will determine the principal materiel procurement requirements for the Bundeswehr. Priority is being given to equipping designated reaction forces for international crisis management operations. Enlarged reconnaissance capabilities are needed as well as internationally interoperable communications, command, control, and information systems for disseminating information quickly through several echelons of command. Steps must be taken to provide logistic and medical support for units engaged in crisis management operations, international peace missions, and humanitarian aid activities.²⁰ Germany has neither the intention nor the resources to engage in

unilateral military operations of any kind, and thus needs its major allies to share common burdens and responsibilities as it prepares to assume its role as a full partner in international affairs.

What are the alternatives?

Decisions with regard to national security are made in conjunction with national objectives and national military strategy, i.e. the protection of Germany from external threats and participation in peacekeeping and crisis management operations within the framework of the United Nations. The only means to carry out such decisions are military forces.

Some Germans doubtless would like NATO and the Bundeswehr to disappear entirely. Such an outcome, however, cannot be considered to be a realistic alternative to the current political position of full partnership with allied and friendly nations. Should Germany fail now to meet its international obligations, results could include loss or reduction of credibility, sovereignty, and freedom of action within the international political environment. Consequently there is no serious alternative to pursuing the stated national security interests and objectives.

Alternatives, however, should be defined and evaluated before deciding to conduct military operations in support of national policy. This is of particular importance when conducting crisis management operations. The Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict shows clearly the entire spectrum of alternatives that UN and NATO decisionmakers have to take into consideration prior to the use of military force. The alternatives range from simply demonstrating military readiness, to embargo as an economic sanction, to blockade, to containment, and finally to military intervention as the last resort.

These are the kinds of decisions that the ruling of the Constitutional Court now requires of German politicians. The alternatives, therefore, will no longer be "Are we or are we not *allowed* to participate?" but rather "Do we or do we not *want* to participate?" in military operations within the UN and NATO frameworks. This new and unaccustomed situation, as suggested in one German newspaper, "despite the clear wording of the Karlsruhe decision, will cause domestic conflicts over the new role of the Bundeswehr in international crisis management to continue."²¹ The requirement to address these questions in each instance of national policymaking leads directly to what is perhaps the most important question of all.

How strong is the home front?

Consider the historical record from the German perspective:

For the German people [the ruling of the High Court] means an enormous psychological adjustment. The Federal Republic never was a power of military intervention like the United States, England, or France. Two lost wars have taken

away the pride in military performance. It took a great deal of trouble to accept the Bundeswehr's defensive mission throughout the last four decades. Therefore it will be very hard to achieve general approval for worldwide operations with German participation.²²

All else follows from understanding this view of the German experience in the 20th century.

Not only the German people and those who have to make the decisions, but the German soldier as well will have to adjust to the new situation following the 1994 court decision. Those in the military will have to develop a new way of seeing themselves. This process will include participation of German citizens, the parliament, and individual soldiers in shaping a new perception of the role and functions of our military forces. Change of this magnitude will take time. A broad national consensus about the Bundeswehr and its new role and missions lies yet in the distant future.

Recent polls, however, indicate that there is growing support among Germans for UN peacekeeping operations and for sharing responsibilities with other nations. Public opinion regarding the ruling of the Constitutional Court was overwhelmingly supportive, with a general feeling that the court had judged wisely. Relief that there would be no further legal hairsplitting seemed to be the common conclusion. The politicians and the press pointed out that normality finally had reached Germany, which was no longer exempt from the full measure of responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. National security decisionmaking has now been shifted to the appropriate forum, and the answers to international problems are now to be provided by elected politicians, not by lawyers and judges.²³

The results of the October 1994 parliamentary elections, returning to office the Kohl government which had supported the participation of the Bundeswehr in UN operations outside the NATO area, indicate that the German voters agree with this broader international role.

Conclusion

Bonn, 31 December 1995:

NATO and with it the Bundeswehr are facing the greatest mission of their history. With the full support of the parliament and the people our soldiers will help to secure peace in former Yugoslavia. While making the preparatory decisions we received [so] much encouragement and support that we can speak of a new consensus. Germany is meeting its obligations and can be proud of its soldiers.

This excerpt of Minister of Defense Rühe's address to Germany's Federal Armed Forces, as well as the overwhelming majority in favor of the 6 December 1995 decision of the parliament to provide troops for the NATO mission in Bosnia,²⁴ proves that the German Constitutional Court's ruling of 12 July 1994 has thus

had a significant effect on national security decisionmaking. Despite the fact that the ruling itself was not a security decision as such, it permits Germany to move away from its privileged and special position toward normality in Europe and in its activities as a member of the UN and NATO. It emphasized the supremacy of parliament over the military and put the entire responsibility for Germany's foreign and security policy on the political leadership, which is now challenged to decide when and to what extent the Bundeswehr is going to participate in WEU, NATO, and UN operations. The formal clarification of Germany's Basic Law ended debate over whether Germany's armed forces are *allowed* to be employed outside NATO territory to share with its allies the burdens of crisis management and humanitarian relief. Without question, the ruling of the high court can be considered a historic decision, although politicians could have made it superfluous by achieving consensus on the interpretation of the Basic Law years ago.

German participation in operations outside its borders is not automatic, however. Each mission must be decided on individually, based on national values and interests at the time the decision is made. The Chief of Staff of the German armed forces has posed his own set of questions for any such operation:

- Is it in our interest?
- Are the objectives of a given operation achievable?
- Can the operation be delimited before it is begun?
- Are the costs—and not only in financial terms—calculable and acceptable?²⁵

It is noteworthy that America's Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration, Caspar Weinberger, posed similar questions. Their restraining rather than enabling character clearly emphasizes the intention to use military force only as a last resort.

General Naumann's list does not explicitly include what is perhaps the most important question in determining future German participation in multinational operations: "How strong is the home front?" But the German political and military leadership is clearly aware that it can act only with the approval and support of the German people.

NOTES

The author extends his thanks to Colonel Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., USAF, of the Air War College, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. Germany is a member state of the Western European Union (WEU), which is projected to be an integral part of the European Union, becoming its defense component. The aim of the WEU is "to afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and resisting any policy of aggression." The parties to the treaty express their will to promote the unity and encourage the integration of Europe. The core of the WEU Treaty is the article under which the allies pledge to render mutual assistance if one of them should be the object of an armed attack in Europe. The WEU allows the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their security and to be capable of taking action in contingencies where NATO does not commit itself.

2. German Ministry of Defense (MOD), Navy Staff, III 2 (Bonn: October 1994).

3. The restrictive interpretation of the Basic Law did not prohibit the use of military forces for humanitarian purposes. German soldiers have been providing humanitarian support for more than 30 years, comprising over 120 missions in 53 countries all over the world. As a member state of the UN, Germany has participated on six operations since 1990:

- Minesweeping operations in the Gulf.
- UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission in Iraq) inspection and weapon destruction program.
- UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority, Cambodia), providing medical support and operate a general hospital in Phnom Penh.
- UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force in Ex-Yugoslavia) including airlift to Sarajevo, control of the embargo in the Mediterranean, and AWACS missions to control the "no-fly-zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia) airlift operations for the immediate delivery of food for the people of Somalia and logistic support for a brigade.
- UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) military observers and medical support.

4. The German Bundestag is the parliamentary assembly representing the people of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is elected by the people every four years. It may be dissolved prematurely only under exceptional circumstances, the final decision lying with the Federal President. The Bundestag's main functions are to pass laws, to elect the Federal chancellor, and to keep track of the government. The two parties that brought the issue to the Constitutional Court are the SPD and FDP. The SPD is the Social Democratic Party of Germany, a recreation of the former mainly labor-oriented party of the same name. It is currently in opposition. The FDP is the Free Democratic Party, which has adopted programs in the tradition of German liberalism. It is currently in coalition with the ruling parties, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, CDU, and the Christian Social Union, CSU.

5. The main task of the Constitutional Court is to decide questions of constitutional law and to settle disputes in constitutional matters. Its function is to enforce the basic principles laid down in the constitution and to safeguard the constitution against possible violations by state institutions. Unlike the Supreme Court in the United States, which can avoid adjudicating the constitutionality of certain political matters, according to the "political question doctrine" the German Constitutional Court is bound to uphold the constitution even if this may undermine the authority of the parliament.

6. Press release issued by the Federal Constitutional Court, No. 29/94 (Karlsruhe, Germany).

7. General Klaus Naumann, Chief of Staff, German armed forces, address at a round table at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in Washington, 15 July 1994.

8. Ibid.

9. Philip A. Crowl, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers," The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 20 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: US Air Force Academy, 1978), p. 4. Dr. Crowl's first five questions in this source form the outline on which the present analysis is organized. His sixth question is "What Have I Overlooked?"

10. Lothar Rühl, in "Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers," Band II (Bonn: 1990), p. 410.

11. Press release issued by the Federal Constitutional Court, No. 29/94, para 2 (Karlsruhe, Germany).

12. German MOD, Navy Staff, III 2 (Bonn: October 1994). As of 18 October a total of 27 search missions by German ships were reported, which clearly indicates the beginning of a new era of German cooperation in international security affairs.

13. German MOD, White Paper 1994 (Bonn: 5 April 1994), p. 89.

14. Ibid.

15. Volker Rühle, German Federal Minister of Defense, luncheon address at the Conference of the Aspen Institute on 24 August 1994 in Berlin.

16. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 17 July 1994.

17. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 13 July 1994.

18. Naumann address, 15 July 1994.

19. Rühle address, 24 August 1994.

20. German MOD, White Paper 1994 (Bonn: 5 April 1994), p. 99.

21. *Dresdener Neueste Nachrichten* (German newspaper), 13 July 1994.

22. Karl Feldmeyer, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 17 July 1994.

23. German MOD, Navy Staff, III 2 (Bonn: October 1994).

24. Germany provides 4000 soldiers to NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. They add to IFOR's 20,000 US, 14,000 British, and 10,000 French troops. Non-NATO nations provide an additional 10,000 soldiers, 1500 of whom are Russian.

25. Naumann address, 15 July 1994.

Germany and Peace Support Operations: Policy After the Karlsruhe Decision

ROBERT H. DORFF

The end of the Cold War fundamentally transformed the political environment in the Federal Republic of Germany. At a time when some countries were fragmenting or dissolving altogether, Germany grew larger with unification. The end of the occupation of Germany by the World War II victors restored full sovereignty to the rehabilitated German state. Together with the sweeping changes in Central and Eastern Europe, this restored sovereignty quickly thrust the Federal Republic of Germany into the limelight of international foreign and security affairs. Its geopolitical position, as well as its obvious economic strength, guaranteed a central role for Germany in the unfolding events. The only questions concerned the precise form and nature of that emerging role.

The reemergence of a fully sovereign Germany also coincided with the explosion of peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations, and attention quickly focused on the role Germany would play in such operations. This article addresses the emergence of Germany as a "normal" international actor from the perspective of its evolving policies regarding peace support operations.¹

The focus on peace support operations is important because it affects issues related to US and allied military operations. Military leaders from these countries need to know more about what to expect from Germany in future contingencies. It is also important to the strategic community because it is at the heart of a perplexing set of issues currently on the international agenda, namely the kinds of conflicts generating a need for such operations and the appropriate responses and requisite capabilities to address them.

In the context of a general examination of German peace support operations, this article argues that it is a mistake to draw sweeping conclusions

from the June 1995 Bundestag decision to contribute to the UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and subsequently to the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). What is occurring in Germany today is a serious and profoundly difficult debate about its new identity and what the world expects from it. External forces and events are pushing Germany at a time when its leaders and people would prefer to go much more slowly. The real world will not allow them that luxury, and hence we see a policy process that is filled with tensions and even contradictions. Those outside Germany must understand something of the mix of external and internal forces at work in order to understand what to expect from Germany today and in the near future.

Background

As post-Cold War conflicts began to appear, Germany initially had an easy answer to the questions about the role it would play. Its constitution (Grundgesetz or "Basic Law") prohibited it from actively participating in military operations outside of Germany and NATO. So while it might contribute a substantial sum of money in support of the coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein,² it would not have to debate whether it should send troops. Yet even then, most observers felt that the constitutional issue would be rather quickly resolved, at which time the debate about the new German role in international security affairs would begin in earnest. And indeed, on 12 July 1994, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe handed down its ruling that would, in future, allow for the use of the Bundeswehr in "out-of-area" operations. And, rather than putting an end to the debate, the Court's ruling was actually the starting point; now the issues would have to be discussed, debated, and decided in the domestic political arena without the protection of a constitutional prohibition. The issue had been fully joined. What views would the German government articulate on the use of military force in international affairs generally and in support of peace operations specifically?³

The events in Yugoslavia played a significant role in the debate. Feeling the economic, social, and political effects of the transformations in Eastern Europe perhaps more acutely than any other West European country, Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl had moved quickly to express its views about the necessity of expanding Western institutions, such as the European Union (EU), eastward. Eager to support liberal international principles such as self-determination, and perhaps somewhat frustrated by the slowness of its European allies to respond to the very real threat of massive

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refugee movements, Germany was the first to grant formal recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991.

A wave of criticism and analysis followed. Was this the sign of the new, independent Germany? Would it press its foreign policy desires unilaterally? While in retrospect much of this debate appears exaggerated and a bit alarmist, the repercussions for Germany have been apparent. As the crisis in the former Yugoslavia worsened, and the calls for Western intervention intensified, Germany found it increasingly difficult to hide behind its constitutional prohibition. If the new Germany was going to take foreign policy initiatives on its own (so went the logic at the time), then it would have to become a full partner in all international affairs, including paying the full costs (not just financial) of political-military follow-ons to those initiatives. Whether the Germans wanted to or not, the shroud of the constitutional prohibition would have to be lifted. It was not simply a matter of domestic politics; the issue had been fully internationalized.

Official Policy Statements

Although written prior to the Federal Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994, the *White Paper 1994* contains the most current and comprehensive official statement of German policy concerning peace support operations.⁴ Yet, there is no section devoted solely to that topic. In fact, there is no chapter or sub-chapter heading referring to such operations or even to crisis management. Rather, one finds references to such operations interwoven throughout the discussions of the contemporary international situation, the concept of German security and defense policy, and the role of Germany as a country firmly committed to, and embedded in, a set of multilateral security institutions. The search for official German policy on peace support operations begins with this document.

In forewords to the *White Paper*, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Federal Minister of Defense Volker Rühe both acknowledge the importance of peace support operations to German security policy by pointing to the contributions already made by German forces.⁵ Both make overt references to the manner in which those contributions have been received by the international community. Notably absent is any clear reference to German security interests served by these operations. Further evidence of the extent to which the issue of German involvement in such operations had been internationalized appears throughout the *White Paper*, most obviously in the frequency with which it acknowledges the new and broader role that Germany must play in international security affairs.⁶ The language is clear if not direct: Germany is "called upon" and "expected to" contribute to and share in the responsibility.

Yet the regional analyses, as well as important qualifying language throughout the document, make it clear that German interests are primarily, if not exclusively, located in Europe.⁷ Although responding to external pressures

to assume greater international responsibility, German security policy seems to be laying the groundwork for limiting that responsibility to Europe and circumscribing the possible range and scope of operations into which the Bundeswehr might be drawn. It is as though Germany is defining a role for itself as a willing, but not too able, partner.

This broader tension is evident throughout the document. On the one hand, rhetoric abounds about the need for more effective and comprehensive international conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms, including the possible use of military force.⁸ On the other hand, qualifications about the German role in such international mechanisms appear with equal regularity. At times they appear to contradict the argument that Germany will now play the role it is "called upon" or "expected" to play, either by limiting that role geographically or in kind.⁹

Finally, there is an inherent tension in the approach toward crisis and conflict management and prevention as advocated and the procedures Germany would employ in arriving at a decision to participate in peace support operations. The *White Paper* implies that Germany would use essentially the same criteria for deciding as are required for similar Western European Union (WEU) decisions. This includes provisions that a WEU resolution be unanimous, and that each member state remain "free to decide on the basis of its constitution whether or not to participate."¹⁰ It is hard to imagine how such procedures can be used in support of a crisis management system; timely, decisive action is the hallmark of successful crisis management, a commodity rendered virtually unattainable in such a system of individual political decisionmaking. Each member will review any proposed action on a case-by-case basis, and that review will include a full domestic debate and decision. For Germany, already seeking to set limits on its contributions, the process almost guarantees that the Bundeswehr will not be "ordered into action under WEU command" any time soon.¹¹ By implication, German participation in peace support operations will occur only after intense public deliberation.

In sum, the *White Paper*, as a formal statement of German policy in regard to peace support operations, contains unresolved tensions and perhaps contradictions. There is ample acknowledgment of the changing nature of international conflict in the post-Cold War world. The proliferation of ethnic and religious conflict, and its emergence in the form of civil wars and the collapse of governability, represent increasing threats to international security and the security of Europe and Germany. Similarly, the discussions frequently address the need for more effective systems of conflict and crisis management to deal with such threats, including the willingness and capability to use force if necessary. And finally, there is substantial awareness of the growing expectation that Germany must play a greater role in, and share the responsibility for, the operations that support such systems. However, the caution in circumscribing just what that role might be for the Federal Republic of Germany in

general, and the Bundeswehr specifically, seems at times to run counter to the acknowledgment that Germany must assume its full share of the responsibilities. Because this document was written prior to the Federal Constitutional Court decision, it is necessary to examine what has happened since that decision was announced to see if some of the potential tensions have been resolved or clarified.

The Tornado Controversy

For supporters of an expanded German role in international security affairs, the Constitutional Court decision represented a completion of the transition to full sovereignty which was begun with the unification process and the Two-plus-Four agreement. To others more critical of such a role, the decision opened the way to a "remilitarization" of German foreign policy.¹² Two subsequent developments deserve attention, the first a general development in the debate about German military involvement "out-of-area" and the second a specific policy issue that arose late in 1994.

The general development was already in evidence prior to the Court's decision, but became more apparent in the months thereafter. This was the increased use of the "history" argument against German involvement "out-of-area," especially in the former Yugoslavia. The argument, expressed simply, is that the reappearance of the German military would be counterproductive and potentially disastrous for peace efforts in parts of Europe occupied by the Wehrmacht during World War II. Initially referring specifically to the Serbs in the Bosnian crisis,¹³ this argument grew and expanded over time. By June 1995, there was a recognition that this had become for many the substitute for the constitutional prohibition argument. As one member of the Bundestag put it, in words used nearly verbatim by a retired senior army officer and former member of the Defense Ministry staff one day later, such an argument would mean that "there would be virtually no place in all of Europe that the Bundeswehr could be deployed."¹⁴ Although this argument subsequently lost some of its resonance, SPD Party Leader Rudolf Scharping observed during the 30 June 1995 parliamentary debate on allowing German combat planes to be sent to Bosnia that ECR-Tornados with the Iron Cross would only heat up the conflict rather than diffuse it.¹⁵ The reference to the "history" argument was clear.

The specific policy issue resulted from a request made by the SACEUR, General George Joulwan, for Luftwaffe Tornados.¹⁶ On 30 November 1994 General Joulwan approached the German government about providing six ECR-Tornados to be used by NATO. The Serbs had a growing surface-to-air missile capability around Bihac, and the Tornados offered a favorable counter-threat capability. But Bonn was not yet prepared to deal with such a request. Following the Karlsruhe decision, there was no attempt to initiate a broad-ranging discussion of the appropriate roles and missions for the Bundeswehr in peace support operations. In fact, political leaders generally wanted to avoid such a discussion.

The political climate at the time made some of that reluctance understandable; national elections coming up in October cast long shadows, making members of all the major parties unwilling to risk an emotional and divisive debate. And for a country new to such debates, the example of the US anguish over the Haiti decision could not have offered much encouragement. Why launch such a debate if no concrete situation made it necessary?

What ensued was a very interesting, even entertaining, exercise in creative diplomacy. In effect, the German government chose not to respond to General Joulwan's request. Classifying Joulwan's action as an "informal inquiry" rather than a formal request from NATO, Bonn simply gave no answer. This removed any immediate necessity to initiate a debate, either within the government or in parliament. And to bolster the non-decision further, members of parliament and the government pointed out that NATO was unlikely to order any military mission involving the German Tornados; therefore, as the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary group leader Wolfgang Schaeuble stated, a "decision in reserve" was unnecessary.¹⁷

What is clear from these developments is that the question of German participation in peace support operations had become fully politicized. Under the oft-cited constraints of the constitutional question, Germany could avoid the perplexing debates about whether to participate in such operations and, if so, under what conditions. Once the legal issues were clarified, it was only natural that political considerations would take over. The question then is whether the political debate will be a full and open one or more like what followed General Joulwan's request in November 1994. In that debate a host of political considerations led to some amazing antics on the part of the German government to avoid giving any clear answer at all. The "history" argument was simply one of many justifications offered up as a logical, nonpolitical explanation for what is and always will be a very political (and difficult) decision for any country.

Current Policy Perspectives

This section examines the perspectives of several key players in the German policymaking process, including the military, the political parties, the government, and public opinion. The purpose is to provide a brief sketch of the views that obtain within each grouping; this is not an attempt to present a thorough delineation of all views, nor to decide which view currently prevails.¹⁸ This section begins with the defense planning community, turns next to an overview of public opinion, and finally examines the contemporary political landscape.

The Ministry of Defense. It is not surprising that some of the clearest statements and policies on German peace support operations are found among the military and the civilian planners within the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

The German defense planning system requires thinking on such issues to develop without a highly publicized political debate. Of course, once those policies are outlined and presented to the cabinet, before a recommendation goes to the full parliament, they become the object of intense public scrutiny, and political leaders are identified as being responsible for them. But prior to that point policy discussions often occur in relative quiet. This helps explain why some of the clearest statements about emerging security policy, including potential problems, exist within the MoD.¹⁹

One document in particular provides an interesting overview of current MoD thinking on German peace support operations. Written in July 1994 and circulated publicly, it is entitled *Conceptual Guideline for the Further Development of the Bundeswehr*.²⁰ The *Guideline* attempts to build a bridge between the wide-ranging analysis of the 1994 *White Paper* and actual force planning. It distinguishes between two missions for the Bundeswehr: traditional territorial defense and crisis reaction. The document points out that while the traditional defense mission remains an important focus of German defense planning and force structure, it is ironically the greatest threat but the least likely contingency in the post-Cold War security environment to which the Bundeswehr might have to respond. On the other hand, crisis reaction is the most likely operation, but the one for which the Bundeswehr is the least well prepared.²¹ It then discusses the kinds of changes anticipated in reconfiguring the Bundeswehr to meet the requirements of a fundamentally changed strategic situation. Particularly significant is the assessment that the current strategic environment allows for a noticeable reduction in the forces-in-being devoted to territorial defense, and hence their reallocation to the crisis reaction mission.²² Although not released until after the Karlsruhe Court ruling, the thinking behind this document obviously was underway well before the constitutional issue was clarified.

The most recent MoD thinking was evident in interviews and discussions in June 1995, and undoubtedly appeared in some form in the Bosnian policy recommendation and subsequent debate later that same month.²³ Referencing "interests and objectives of German foreign and security policy," as well as German "responsibilities as an Alliance partner," several individuals referred to what can be stated as basic principles underlying emerging German policy. First, everyone interviewed made clear references to a case-by-case decision process, always involving public debate and parliamentary approval. Obviously, domestic political processes will dominate; there will be no automatic formula for German participation. Second, some of the views are carryovers from previously articulated guidelines, such as the general limitation of German support to conflict management in the European region, and the requirement for multinational participation and international mandates in support of such operations. Third, there must be a clear, credible political strategy that leads or contributes to the resolution of the conflict, and the military operation must have a definable end state and exit strategy. Fourth, there must be compelling reasons

for the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the threat to German security, European stability, or international peace must be evident. Finally, there is a strong rejection of the "history" argument against German participation, at least as a *sui generis* limitation. On the surface at least, current MoD thinking appears to reflect significant progress in the development of Germany as a normal international actor, reacting to important changes in the international security environment and attempting to define some criteria to be used in reaching decisions about where, when, and how to participate.

However, some caution is in order about this interpretation, and it relates directly to the role and influence of the MoD in the overall political processes. In short, it is difficult to say in advance how much of the MoD staff view will prevail in the end. As Catherine Kelleher observed more than ten years ago, the German defense organization is quite idiosyncratic and most often dominated by the personality and style of the Defense Minister.²⁴ Certainly Rühle has demonstrated a willingness to go outside the established bureaucratic procedures when he deems it necessary or desirable, which means that he may or may not accept his own ministry's positions and arguments. Moreover, he must ultimately convince the Federal Security Council of the Cabinet and the parliamentary Defense Committee, which may require substantial modification of the original MoD views.²⁵ And historically, the MoD (as distinct from the Defense Minister) has not been especially powerful or influential in determining overall policy.²⁶ So despite the generally high quality of the work being done there, one should be cautious in assessing the significance of MoD thinking for the future of Germany as a normal international actor. The key will be how much influence such thinking has on Rühle and the government.

Public Opinion. Analyses and commentaries frequently point to the reticence of the German public to accept any departure from the traditional "culture of restraint" in post-World War II West German foreign and security policy. This has generally included maintaining a low profile for Germany in the power politics of international affairs, particularly in crisis management, and especially in the use of force. One of the central issues in the question concerning Germany's evolution into a normal international actor, then, is whether public opinion will allow or accept such a change. For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to examine public opinion briefly as it pertains to the role of Germany in international peace support operations.

The skepticism of the German public about an activist international role for their country is well documented, as is a pervasive aversion for power politics. In the recent debate concerning German participation in the RRF, numerous references were made to what the public would or would not support, with members of the coalition and the opposition frequently citing the limits of public support as justification for their positions.²⁷ While the public remains generally skeptical of such operations, recent evidence suggests that subtle but important shifts in public attitudes and opinions are under way.

Support for continued German ties to NATO is very strong; a recent Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach survey found that 69 percent considered NATO membership important compared to 70 percent at the beginning of the 1980s (arguably at the height of the Cold War).²⁸ In fact, the escalating instability and crisis situations in the former Soviet Union have increased public desires for NATO to remain both intact and strong, going from 57 percent in 1991 to 71 percent today. And Franz-Josef Meiers notes that 74 percent of the public support "NATO involvement in new crises on Europe's periphery."²⁹ However, 55 percent of those same respondents "agreed that the Bundeswehr's role should remain limited to territorial defence and that Germany's allies must assume responsibility for such missions [crisis management] themselves."³⁰

The same Demoskopie survey found that the participation of German soldiers as international peacekeeping troops of the United Nations was supported by a majority only in the former West Germany; in the former East Germany only 29 percent favor such participation whereas 52 percent are opposed.³¹ Meiers also cites the results of a poll conducted by Infratest Burke Berlin after the 1994 national elections in which as many as 75 percent of the German public supported the use of military force for humanitarian purposes and traditional peacekeeping missions. However, he observes that this support declines "when specific scenarios including combat missions were put to Germans."³² In principle the German public supports peace support operations, including the use of military force if necessary; in practice, however, they seem less inclined to support specific operations and especially Bundeswehr involvement in them.³³

Yet it appears that German public opinion has begun to acknowledge, at least in part because of all the media coverage of crises, civil wars, and human tragedy around the globe, that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact do not mean that the world is necessarily a safer place. This shows up most clearly in the reversal of public attitudes about military service. A majority of the German public had by 1993 concluded that obligatory public service was more important to society than military conscription. By 1995 this view had shrunk to 32 percent in the former West Germany (from 50 percent) and to 33 percent in the former East Germany (from 60 percent).³⁴ The trend is toward a view of the world and German society that on the surface seem compatible with a more activist international role for Germany, including, if necessary, the use of military force. However, there is still a prevailing view that such military action can be left largely to Germany's allies, especially the United States.

Nonetheless, current opinions suggest there are increasing opportunities for German leadership to convince the public that "out-of-area" peace operations are necessary and that they support German and European interests. But the necessity for Bundeswehr participation in such operations, whether to protect those interests or to respond to external calls for greater German

responsibility and burden-sharing, seems to have registered only weakly in the minds of the public. This represents the challenge for German political leadership: to convince the public, which is increasingly inclined to see the dangers and threats of post-Cold War conflicts (especially those close to home), that Germany is "called upon" and "expected" to include Bundeswehr participation in operations to meet those threats and counter those dangers. Is German political leadership up to that challenge?

The Political Landscape. One word summarizes the overall political landscape in Germany today in the realm of peace support operations: divided. As one senior retired Bundeswehr officer put it, the "main problem is that there is no unified German position" on what policy should be. These divisions exist not only between the coalition and the opposition, but within the coalition itself, within the government and the ministries, and even within the individual parties. Given the historical emphasis on consensus decisions, and the special requirement for overwhelming consensus when it comes to issues involving the possible use of military force, it is hardly surprising that Germany has found it so difficult to devise a policy with clear guidelines.

The Government. The Kohl-led government has taken the lead in forging some consensus on peace support operations generally and the Bosnian policy specifically.³⁵ The road to this consensus, however, was anything but smooth. Rifts have appeared within the coalition and even within the Chancellor's own party. Policy has appeared to vacillate and change dramatically almost overnight. Kohl has been variously characterized as, on the one hand, craftily leading Germany down a path toward militarizing German foreign policy and, on the other, as allowing German policy to drift aimlessly as he plays games with the allies, desperately seeking ways in which to avoid making any commitments or giving any clear answers. Neither statement is accurate, for the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Simply put, Kohl's political margin for error is so narrow following the 1994 parliamentary elections that he cannot afford a major policy disaster. Particularly in an area fraught with so many emotional time bombs as this, being caught too far out front or too far behind elite and mass opinion could seal the coalition's, as well as Kohl's own political fate. At the same time, external pressures from allies, bound together with questions about the future of NATO and the EU, also place stresses and strains on the government. Extreme caution is the guiding principle behind the Kohl approach.³⁶

Perhaps the most significant political problem within the coalition concerns the present and future of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). It is not only divided on the issue of peace support operations, it is badly split over a variety of key issues. In fact, the FDP is in the throes of a struggle for its political survival. Having watched its support in the national elections dwindle dangerously close to the minimum threshold of five percent for remaining in parliament, it has recently faced a series of embarrassing losses in state elections. Its

performance in elections in North-Rhine Westphalia and in Bremen were so poor that they prompted Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to resign as party leader. Kinkel continues to serve as Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor, but at a time when he will need to be a forceful spokesperson for any future deployment of the Bundeswehr in peace support operations, the precarious situation of the FDP works strongly against him and his ability to provide that much-needed support.³⁷ Critical elections in several German states early in 1996 may provide a clearer view of the FDP's future.

Within the cabinet differing views on peace support operations have also emerged, especially between Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defense Minister R  he. Kinkel has been openly supportive of a broader role for the Bundeswehr in peace support operations, whereas R  he has been much more cautious and circumspect.³⁸ The differences were still evident in the carefully coordinated statements made by both Kinkel and R  he before the German parliament as they sought support for the government's recommendation to contribute forces to the RRF. Kinkel stressed the need for Germany to show solidarity with the UN Security Council, NATO, and the EU; the German interests that are involved; the need to expand the concept of security in German thinking; and the expectation that Germany would "actively share in protecting the international order."³⁹ R  he emphasized the limiting features of the policy: the mission was to help people and nothing more; the collapse of the UN mission must be prevented; the ECR-Tornados would be used only in the event of an attack against the Blue Helmets, and then only to protect the aircraft of other countries.⁴⁰ While Kinkel continued to suggest much broader reasons for German participation in such operations, R  he seemed to be concerned with delineating the limitations on this mission so that no broader implications could be drawn. This is a fundamental difference of views that is unlikely to disappear soon, not only between these two cabinet ministers but within Germany generally.⁴¹

Social Democratic Party (SPD). In early 1995 the SPD enjoyed much stronger electoral prospects than the FDP, and it appeared to be gaining ground on the CDU/CSU. But it was also a badly divided party, a fact that became more evident as the year unfolded and the debate on German participation in peace support operations grew more specific. A bitter public challenge to SPD party leader Rudolf Scharping was being waged by Gerhard Schr  der, and the battle intensified as the party suffered some electoral setbacks in the first half of the year. Public support for the SPD fell steadily from the 36 percent level it received in the 1994 parliamentary elections to around 30 percent by mid-1995. SPD party members grew increasingly disenchanted with Scharping, and by the end of June 1995 only 38 percent preferred him as party leader to 36 percent for Schr  der.⁴² And as the time drew near for the parliamentary vote on the government's recommendation to contribute Bundeswehr forces, including Tornados, to the RRF, a significant minority of the SPD parliamentary delegation was already voting with the government and against its own party position.⁴³

The official SPD position on Bundeswehr participation in peace support operations was that each potential deployment should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but that in general all missions should be strictly limited to non-combat support roles. Scharping continued to argue the party view that in the case of Bosnia in particular, the "history" argument was especially relevant. Germany should contribute only medical and logistical support for the RRF, a view that was not sustained in the vote on 30 June 1995. And by the fall it was evident that the SPD had lost on the broader issue of German participation as the decision was made to contribute 4000 Bundeswehr troops to the NATO-led IFOR. In November, Scharping was defeated in his bid to remain as party leader.⁴⁴ As of early 1996, it appears that the SPD leadership, parliamentary delegation, and rank-and-file membership remain sharply divided on the issue of peace support operations.

The Alliance 90/Greens. Although there is general opposition among the Alliance 90/Greens group to the use of the Bundeswehr for anything other than strictly humanitarian operations, the situation in Bosnia has proven difficult for them, too. The reason is that the ongoing war and associated atrocities have become a human rights issue for many of their members. And the picture of the West, including Germany, standing on the sidelines and not using force to stop the aggression against innocent civilians runs counter to even a pacifistic sense of what is right.⁴⁵ In the run-up to the Bundestag debate, the group decided to reject the deployment of combat units and instead to call for "massive German support" by nongovernmental organizations for humanitarian aid shipments.⁴⁶ The leader of the Alliance 90/Greens group, Joschka Fischer, was apparently relieved that this decision avoided a major dispute by satisfying those who wanted to support humanitarian aid by the Bundeswehr. But three members of the group voted against this "common policy" position, and in the final Bundestag vote three members openly acknowledged that they voted with the government.⁴⁷

The growing tension and division finally surfaced officially in early August 1995 when Fischer circulated a policy paper in which he called "for a redefinition of the Greens' foreign policy principles." He spoke "openly in favor of an expansion of UN involvement in Bosnia," including "surface and aerial protection for the remaining UN safe zones."⁴⁸ He personally believes that it is time for the party to move away from rigid opposition to the use of force. At a minimum the Fischer paper will ensure a bruising debate within the party on this fundamental question, and the divisions are likely to grow before they begin to disappear. At the same time, it is clear that the party's desire to be a genuine force at the national level, including as a possible coalition partner for the SPD, requires a more generally applicable and acceptable approach to foreign policy than a simple renunciation-of-force policy will allow.⁴⁹

Assessment of the Political Landscape. All of the major parties are therefore split to varying degrees on issues pertaining to peace support opera-

tions generally and Bundeswehr participation in Bosnia specifically. Further, the entire electoral environment is highly uncertain for all of the parties. When combined with the at best skeptical attitude of the German public and the still-prevailing "culture of restraint," this electoral uncertainty creates a situation in which any bold, new policy initiative related to peace support operations is highly risky with unclear benefits. The result is that all of the parties and their major personalities will probably continue to be extremely cautious in developing policy, choosing general statements and case-by-case delimiters over broad, clear policy directives or guidelines. Careful coalition building will prevail. Building consensus and compromise reduces the opportunities for opponents to exploit any public perception of a policy that is out of step with German opinion. In that environment, it seems highly unlikely that the leadership required to forge a broad public consensus on peace support operations will be forthcoming any time soon. It suggests that German policy will develop slowly and incrementally, and the case-by-case approach will be preferred by almost all of the political players.

Conclusions

This overview of German policies for peace support operations indicates that external influences have moved Germany subtly but noticeably toward a clearer and more forthright recognition of the need for military power in the post-Cold War international system generally, and for a German contribution to that capability. Among those external influences, the ongoing tragedy in the former Yugoslavia is certainly paramount. The German public and political elites have seen constant images of the atrocities, and they have witnessed the recurrent and complete failure of all attempts to control the violence through non-military means. These failures in Europe's own backyard have helped push the debate in the direction of recognizing the need for an effective international military capability. Among the military and political professionals, one hears frequent and blunt references to the failures of the UN, and especially the "dual key" approach of NATO military power serving UN operations. Such criticism was virtually unheard of as recently as two years ago.

The external pressure from allies and international opinion has also continued. The frequent references to what Germany is "expected" and "called upon" to contribute provide ample evidence. The US decision to remain significantly on the sidelines in the Bosnian crisis, at least until the NATO air strikes began in earnest in late August 1995, certainly contributed to the pressures on Europe generally and on Germany specifically. It is painfully evident to many Germans today that the days of American military action making German action unnecessary are gone, unless there is a happy coincidence of interests.⁵⁰ As frustrations with the lack of effective action to counter the violence in Bosnia have grown, they join with the humanitarian argument for the justifiable use of military force. This in turn is reinforced by German desires not to be isolated

from its allies and to demonstrate solidarity with them. Moreover, the perhaps idealistic view that the UN can be an effective guarantor of international security, thereby continuing the trend toward de-nationalizing security policy, gives Germany few alternatives but to try to strengthen the flagging image of that organization. There seems little doubt that all of these factors were at work in the decision by the Bundestag on 30 June 1995 approving Bundeswehr participation in the RRF.

Does all of this mean that Germany is now a "normal" international actor, or at least well on its way toward becoming one? This conclusion remains at best premature. The decision to participate in the RRF, although significant, still includes many conditions and qualifications that are hardly normal. Only time and specific events will reveal the extent to which Germany is both willing and able to make a genuine and significant contribution to peace support operations in the post-Cold War world.⁵¹

Yet it would also be unfair and inaccurate not to acknowledge the movement of Germany in the direction of "normalcy." Germany is attempting to develop policies and procedures for participating in multinational peace operations at a time when the world's only superpower, the United States, appears to be disengaging itself from such operations. It hardly seems appropriate to judge Germany as not having done enough when the United States is itself paralyzed by domestic politics and a lack of consensus on foreign and security policy. Moreover, there has been a detectable shift in the substance and the rhetoric of the debate in Germany. Although the Kohl government has been careful to continue the consensus-building, coalition approach to policy making that has long characterized German foreign and security policy, one hears more references to "German interests" and the concepts of power politics than at any time in the recent past.⁵² And even the Greens have apparently launched an internal debate about the possible irrelevance of their party's rigid principle of non-violence for post-Cold War international affairs, certainly another indicator of movement toward "normalcy."

But German policy regarding peace support operations will continue to be characterized by considerable tension and even contradiction. How it evolves will be determined to a large extent by the perceived success or failure of German participation in the RRF and IFOR specifically and Western policy toward Bosnia generally.⁵³ Others in the West must not expect too much, too soon, from a country whose domestic inclinations and political forces make it very difficult to break with strongly held convictions about its role in international affairs. Yet it would be at least equally misguided to expect too little. The domestic situation in Germany is such that external expectations and pressures are absolutely essential to the further evolution of that country as a normal international actor. The process Germany intends to use for deciding on participation will make it very difficult for it to respond in a timely and decisive manner, and its allies need to recognize this fact and work to influence

the process. But as one member of the SPD confidently put it, Germany will eventually assume a full role in support of international peace operations. "It will go slower than many, especially the US, want to see. But German policy will and already is moving in that direction."⁵⁴

In the end, however, the events reviewed here suggest that the German decisions on Bosnia are not a general indicator of evolving German policy on peace support operations. The sequence of events and decisions composing the "Bosnia policy" of Germany is remarkable and unique. German decisions on Bosnia have been heavily driven by external factors and pressures, made all the more possible by a sense both outside and inside the country that the German decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was at least partly responsible for the Bosnian crisis.⁵⁵ And as current attempts to lay out some guidelines for that policy indicate, German participation in peace support operations will be decided on a case-by-case basis and with the full participation of the parliament. Those features alone should make us skeptical of any attempt to discern a general German policy, and especially to predict just what kinds of actions Germany will take in the future. For some time to come, Germany will continue to be caught, as Clemens observed in an earlier period, "between its commitment . . . to demilitarization and its growing recognition that military strength can contribute to a more stable, humane post-Cold War order."⁵⁶

Finally, this analysis makes it apparent that an understanding of current and future German policy in peace support operations requires an understanding of external and internal factors and processes. No systemic-level explanation focusing on German national interests and structural characteristics of the international system will provide even a reasonably accurate, let alone full understanding of German actions. Much the same can be said of the general research question about the emergence of Germany as a normal international actor. The external events and forces acting on Germany are indeed significant, but so, too, are the domestic forces. For those who wish to understand the future role of the Federal Republic of Germany in international peace support operations and its development as a normal actor, the answers lie in that nexus between international events and domestic political exigencies.

NOTES

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1. Gordon describes the "normalization" of German foreign policy as "the gradual attenuation of the particular restrictions that have influenced and constrained Germany's international actions since, and because of, World War II." See Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, 38 (Spring 1994), 225.

2. For a wide-ranging and thorough analysis of the different dimensions of the German contributions to the Gulf War alliance, see Michael J. Inacker, *Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit: Die Deutschen in der*

Golfallianz (Bonn, Berlin: Bouvier Verlag, 1991). Inacker places the total German contribution at 17 billion Marks (p. 106).

3. The potential limiting effects of this prohibition on German support of its allies had long been recognized and debated conceptually in the context of NATO and "out-of-area" operations. However, until the end of the Cold War simultaneously reinstated full German sovereignty and refocused international attention on conflicts requiring peace support operations, this debate was largely academic. The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 first raised the issue in the context of a full and fair share of international military responsibility for a Germany now seen by many as a major power.

4. *White Paper 1994: On the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994).

5. Chancellor Kohl observes: "In international peace missions, the exemplary conduct, personal dedication and skill of our soldiers, sailors and airmen have enhanced Germany's standing in the world." (p. vii) Rühe notes that the Bundeswehr "is participating with great success in international peace missions" and "has greatly enhanced its reputation by its activities in Cambodia, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia." (p. ix)

6. For example, "Germany must assume new international responsibility. By virtue of its political and economic strength, it has a key role to play in the development of European structures and is called upon to make a contribution to the resolution of future problems throughout the world." (p. 24)

7. So the statement on p. 40: "Today, Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as security in and for Europe is concerned."

8. Consider the following statements:

"Conflict prevention and crisis management in a widened geographical setting, with a mandate legitimizing such activities under international law, must be at the forefront of preventive security measures." (p. 37)

"In a political framework that aims at solving crises and conflicts by tackling their roots and causes, it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, confine, or terminate violence or war." (p. 37)

"Even after the end of the East-West conflict, lasting peace cannot be guaranteed without the possibility of employing armed forces if necessary." (p. 43)

For a country that has consistently denied or played down the role of force in international relations, these references are no small matter. See, for example, the discussion in Clay Clemens, "A Special Kind of Superpower? Germany and the Demilitarization of Post-Cold War International Security," pp. 199-240 in Gary L. Geipel, ed., *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1993). See also the arguments by Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," *Survival*, 37 (Autumn 1995), 82-103.

9. Geographically: "Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as security in Europe is concerned." (p. 40) In kind: "Even after the question of conformity with the constitution has been settled, Germany's contribution towards the preservation of peace will continue to be primarily of a political and economic character, and not of a military one." (p. 65)

10. See the discussion of the WEU on p. 58 of the *White Paper*. Further stipulations require harmonization with provisions in the UN Charter and with the military obligations of the Atlantic Alliance.

11. It is interesting, and perhaps telling, in this light to examine this statement on p. 59: "The Federal Government is committed to the idea that the WEU be just as capable of managing crises as NATO." Given the opinion held by some policy makers and analysts about the inadequacy or incapacity of NATO in this area, particularly as it related to the Bosnian crisis prior to December 1995, this statement may ring true but in a very ironic way!

12. This was the criticism most frequently cited by members of the opposition, especially in late 1994 and early 1995, and was pointed out to the author in several interviews in June 1995. Evidence that the criticism had some impact is found in one of German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's earliest public statements about German foreign policy after the Karlsruhe decision. Arguing that defense of the international order sometimes requires the use of force, Kinkel quickly added: "This does not, however, mean a militarization of German foreign policy; the culture of restraint will be maintained." See Klaus Kinkel, "Peacekeeping missions: Germany can now play its part," *NATO Review*, 42 (October 1994), p. 4.

13. In fact, Foreign Minister Kinkel expressed this view in the aftermath of General Joulwan's request for German Tornados (see the following discussion), and it was subsequently referred to as the "Kohl Doctrine." See *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), 5 December 1995, "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet."

14. From an interview with the author on 19 June 1995.

15. See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 3 July 1995, p. 26.

16. See the discussion of the Joulwan request in Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," especially pp. 85-87.

17. Schaeuble is quoted in Meiers, p. 86, n. 16, citing Udo Bergdoll, "Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), 8 December 1994, and "Bonner Versteckspiel im Tornado-Dilemma," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 9 December 1994.

18. Much of this section is based on interviews conducted by the author 15-24 June 1995 in Germany.

19. It is also a reason why one must be extremely cautious in imparting too much significance to MoD views. Precisely because the policies have not yet been subjected to the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phases of debate, policies at this stage may hardly resemble what eventually emerges. As Clemens observes: "analysts who approvingly or disapprovingly cite the readiness of Bonn's military establishment to prepare Germany for the role of a 'normal' power in world affairs may underrate the political obstacles blocking such a policy in the first place." (p. 200)

20. *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Informationsstab, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 12 July 1994). This document was made public immediately after the Karlsruhe decision, a conscious effort by R  he to preempt the public debate.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

22. The text reads: "Die strategische Lage erlaubt es, die Pr  senz der Streitkr  fte f  r die Landesverteidigung deutlich zu verringern." (p. 4) It goes on to argue, of course, that this conclusion is based on the assumption that there will be adequate warning time to shift some of the crisis reaction forces back to homeland defense should the need arise.

23. Some of those interviewed at the MoD indicated that a new document was in the works with a tentative title "Guidelines for the Use of the Bundeswehr in the Framework of International Peace Missions." It was apparently not written as part of the Bosnia decision of 30 June 1995, but this document would certainly reflect the thinking and analysis going on at that time. The reader should recall that the groundwork was being laid for a cabinet recommendation to parliament (subsequently made on 26 June) that Germany contribute to the protection of the UN Blue Helmets in the former Yugoslavia, including the assignment of 14 ECR-Tornados.

24. Kelleher observed: "Until now, the German central defense organization has functioned more often as an 'unstructured structure,' dependent more on the harmonization of personalities and political styles than on formal rules for ultimate decisions." (p. 83) Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), pp. 82-107.

25. See the caution in this regard by Clemens, cited earlier in note 19.

26. This is the result of both design and the personal policies of past Defense Ministers. See Kelleher, especially pp. 91-96.

27. See for example, the interview with CDU/CSU defense policy spokesman Paul Breuer in *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), 9 July 1995, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS)-WEU-95-132, p. 7. See also the speeches to the Bundestag by Foreign Minister Kinkel, 30 June 1995, *FBIS*-WEU-95-126, pp. 13-16, and by SPD party leader Rudolf Scharping, 30 June 1995, *FBIS*-WEU-95-127, pp. 10-14.

28. The results of this recent survey are discussed in an article by Dr. Renate Koecher, "Unerwartete Wende," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 June 1995, p. 5.

29. Meiers, p. 84.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Koecher, p. 5.

32. Meiers, p. 85.

33. The same Demoskopie survey found a similar kind of agreement in principle but disagreement in specifics concerning the expansion of NATO. Thirty-three percent favor expansion generally, 25 percent are opposed, and a very high 42 percent are undecided. When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are specifically mentioned as candidates for admission, support climbs dramatically to 47 percent while opposition declines to 20 percent. However, the same survey found that the public does not make the connection between including these countries in NATO and being bound to go to their defense if they are attacked. When this point is made, support for NATO expansion drops precipitously, so much so in fact that 41 percent are now opposed and only 27 percent in favor of NATO expansion. Apparently the public is willing to support efforts to address some of the post-Cold War challenges to international security, but only so long as there are no real demands made on Germany. Koecher, p. 5.

34. *Ibid.* Similar statements about the public and parliamentary perceptions of the Bundeswehr and military missions generally can be found in Rick Atkinson, "Luftwaffe's Wings Clipped in First Action Since 1945," *The Washington Post*, 19 August 1995.

35. The current German coalition government consists of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), along with their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP). It is commonly referred to as the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.

36. This view was evident in almost all of the comments of people interviewed in the foreign and security policy community, including the CDU staff.

37. This point was made in more than one interview, including one member of the German Foreign Ministry.

38. For a more detailed treatment of these differences, as well as other aspects of the political landscape, see Robert H. Dorff, "German Policy Toward Peace Support Operations," in *Force, Statecraft and German*

Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices, ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming 1996).

39. ZDF Television Network (Mainz), reported in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, 30 June 1995, pp. 13-16.

40. This latter point has not been very widely discussed in the United States. According to the parameters established in the government recommendation and approved by the Bundestag, the Tornados can be used only in very specific circumstances. As reported in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), these conditions do not "fit with Rühe's statements about solidarity" with the allies. For example, the article notes, a British request for the Tornados to accompany transport planes carrying powdered milk to Sarajevo would be denied. So, too, would a request to provide security for a rescue mission should another US pilot be shot down. As one CSU politician put it, "Woe be unto us if an American pilot is shot down because then the mood [of the NATO allies] will turn against us." *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), "Letzter Versuch," 3 July 1995, p. 26. See also Atkinson, "Luftwaffe's Wings Clipped."

41. Of course, one should note that these differences are logically related to the two offices and the different perspectives they have. Kinkel, as Foreign Minister, is expected to articulate the broader foreign policy views and to be subjected to more of the external pressures from his foreign affairs counterparts. Rühe rightly views himself as the "protector" of his soldiers, fighting to limit the scope and range of operations they might be called upon to perform. This is probably the more fundamental source of the differences as opposed to pure personality or political philosophy.

42. *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 3 July 1995, p. 28.

43. In the final vote on 30 June 1995, 45 SPD delegates voted with the government.

44. Although Scharping's defeat represented the first time in this century that a sitting SPD party leader was ousted, it was obviously not that much of a surprise. What was more surprising, however, was the fact that Schröder was not able to gain a majority, and the position went instead to former Chancellor candidate Oskar Lafontaine. This rather surprising outcome of the leadership struggle signals the very deep fragmentation of the party.

45. This became obvious in the group discussions leading up to the parliamentary debate, as discussed below, and was mentioned by a member of the CDU foreign policy staff in an interview.

46. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), 29 June 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, 30 June 1995, p. 16.

47. See *The Week in Germany*, 7 July 1995, p. 1.

48. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), 1 August 1995, in *FBIS-WEU-95-147*, 1 August 1995, p. 13.

49. See *FBIS Media Note*, in *FBIS-WEU-95-167*, 29 August 1995, pp. 10-11.

50. One editorial bluntly stated, "The bitter lesson: The American World policeman will swing its billyclub only when its national security interests are threatened. And they are evidently not for the Americans in the Balkans." *Bild-Zeitung* (Hamburg), 19 July 1995, quoted in *Deutschland Nachrichten*, 21 July 1995, p. 3.

51. The decision by Germany to contribute 4000 troops to the NATO IFOR, while significant, does not necessarily indicate that a threshold has been surpassed. After all, once Germany was participating in the RRF, and after NATO decided to take the lead in the implementation of the Dayton Accords, a decision not to join was all but impossible. And of course, there are still substantial limitations on the nature and scope of Bundeswehr participation.

52. Kinkel's address to the Bundestag on 30 June 1995 is notable in this regard. "But what is asked in the decision we have to make today is not only solidarity, but this is also about our very own German interests and the consistency and credibility of our German policy. . . . It is we who would have to take in the major flow of refugees in the event of a withdrawal of the UN troops." ZDF Television Network (Mainz), 30 June 1995, reported in *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, 30 June 1995, p. 14. While no one, least of all this author, argues that "Realpolitik" is the driving force behind German peace support policy today, the unwritten taboo on talking about German national interests is weakening, a point made by more than one individual in interviews.

53. A reasonably successful outcome of German participation in IFOR and of Western policy generally will reinforce positive developments in Germany, whereas a clear failure or disaster could well result not only in the defeat of the policies and the government that enacted them, but in an anti-internationalist backlash that would see Germany close itself off even more from the power politics of the west. One hopes that leaders in the United States and other Western countries see such a development as profoundly not in their best interests, and definitely as something to be avoided. To date they have not demonstrated such an understanding.

54. This statement was made in an interview on 19 June 1995, well in advance of the Bundestag vote on the UN Rapid Reaction Force, and even prior to the cabinet recommendation.

55. Scharping minced no words on this issue in his speech to the Bundestag on 30 June 1995, in which he stated: "The course that was set in 1991 was wrong, and it damaged the trust in Europe and toward Germany. The policy of quick and early recognition put pressure on the states in the EU to follow the German example. That contributed to the failure of the Yugoslavia policy and the messed-up situation in Bosnia." ZDF Television Network (Mainz), 30 June 1995, reported in *FBIS-WEU-95-127*, 3 July 1995, pp. 10-11.

56. Clemens, p. 228.

Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies

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Field Marshal Helmuth Carl Bernard Graf von Moltke (1800-1891), Chief of Staff of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871, and then of the Great General Staff (GGS) from 1871 to 1888, and architect of Germany's brilliant Wars of Unification (1864-71), remains the historical figure most responsible for shaping modern German military thought.¹ He not only established enduring paradigms for Prusso-German tactical, operational, and strategic thinking during his lifetime, but also shaped many of the political attitudes within the officer corps, particularly in his later years.² Numerous attempts at imitation, combined with the spate of hagiographic biographies that followed his death, attest to the reverence that the elder Moltke enjoyed within the officer corps.³ His nephew, General Helmuth von Moltke (generally referred to as "the younger"), by way of contrast, exhibited indecisiveness and lack of resolve during the critical battle of the Marne in 1914, and consequently has suffered only ignominy in the hands of history.⁴ By the end of his long career, the elder Moltke had significantly increased the capabilities, influence, and prestige of the GGS, developing and refining the staff-ride system, demanding the highest standards of professionalism from GGS officers, gaining "direct access" (*Immediatvortrag*) to the Kaiser in 1871, and obtaining direct control over the training program at the War Academy in 1872. In fact, the Prussian army and its general staff system had become the envy of and model for other armed forces both on the continent and beyond. Moltke's military philosophy and strategic approach have survived to inspire successive generations of soldiers. This essay offers an introduction to the great Chief of Staff's significance to the German military tradition.

Born in Mecklenburg in 1800, Moltke served initially in the Danish army, less by choice than through paternal "persuasion," for his father had forced him into the Danish cadet corps. Moltke's quiet nature, gentle disposi-

tion, and broad cultural interests had rather inclined him toward becoming a professor of history. In 1822, he enrolled in the Prussian army primarily because it offered better opportunities for promotion. In 1826, Moltke received his first assignment to the General Staff—to its topographical section—where his talents for detail and thoroughness became evident. Between 1835 and 1839, he served as a military advisor in Turkey. Upon his return, he became well acquainted with the Prussian royal family, serving first as an aide to Frederick III and eventually appointed Chief of the General Staff by King, and later Emperor, William I, whom he had greatly impressed. While arguably Germany's most important soldier, Moltke spent only a few years with troops and never commanded a unit before assuming overall direction of the campaign against Austria at the age of 65.

Military Theories: Moltke and Clausewitz

Although he attended the Berlin War College (or General War School as it was then called) in 1823 while Clausewitz was serving as its director—a purely administrative position which involved no teaching—the two had little, if any, contact. Nonetheless, in an interview in 1890, Moltke reputedly listed Homer's works, the Bible, and *On War* among the five books that most influenced him.⁵ Indeed, many of Moltke's writings draw from or paraphrase the great military philosopher.⁶ Soldiers and historians of his day wrote that the renowned Chief of the GGS had simply put the master's theories into action: "The intellectual development of our Moltke came to completion under the closest connection with Clausewitz's posthumously published work, *On War*."⁷ Sigismund von Schlichting, a devoted disciple of Moltke, declared him the "best student" Clausewitz ever had.⁸ The well-known military author and biographer of Clausewitz, Rudolf von Caemmerer, described the great Chief of the GGS as the "most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," and stated that reading the master had taught Moltke how, not what, to think.⁹

Like Clausewitz, Moltke emphasized flexibility in military planning and execution. He eschewed dogmatic thinking, whether tactical or strategic, accepted chance and uncertainty as inseparable from the nature of war, and recognized the often decisive (but incalculable) role that moral factors played in victory. He originally viewed the destruction of the enemy's main fighting force as the proper aim of war, but gradually became less convinced of its genuine decisiveness after the French resorted to partisan warfare in 1870-71.¹⁰ "We want to believe," he later told the Reichstag, "that neither the Thirty

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**Field Marshal Count
Helmuth von Moltke**



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Years' nor the Seven Years' War will recur, but when millions of individuals are engaged in a bitter struggle for national existence, we cannot expect that the matter will be decided with a few victorious battles."¹¹

Although clearly influenced by *On War*, Moltke's military theories differed from Clausewitz's in one very significant way. Moltke attempted to maintain separate spheres for politics and war, and believed that policy should not influence military operations. "Policy," he wrote, "avails itself of war to attain its aims; it works decisively at the beginning and end of war, [and has] the right to increase its demands or be satisfied with a lesser success," but "in its actions [strategy] is fully independent of policy" for it needs a free hand to pursue that elusive quarry, tactical victory, the attainment of which serves policy best.¹²

Moltke's rejection of Clausewitz reflects the struggle to retain control over the wherewithal that permits decisive victory and brings about the realization of the perfect battle.¹³ The dispute between Moltke and Bismarck after the battle of Königgrätz on the third of July 1866 provides a classic example. Following the Prussian victory, Moltke wanted to advance on Vienna and complete the annihilation of the Austrian forces. Bismarck, however, wanted to avoid humiliating the Austrians, for he needed their support (or at least their neutrality) if war against France proved necessary to complete the unification of Germany. Then, a few days after the Prussian victory, the French Emperor, Napoleon III, offered to act as mediator in negotiations with Austria. Bismarck could not refuse such an offer from a European sovereign without risking a war over the issue of honor. Indeed, Prussia had to proceed cautiously, for, as

Bismarck wrote to his wife on 9 July, “we don’t live alone in Europe but with three other Powers who hate and envy us.”¹⁴ Thus, the perfect tactical victory that Moltke desired in this instance would *not* have served policy.

On another level, however, this rejection of Clausewitz amounts to more than a struggle for autonomy. It subordinates diplomacy to strategic thinking, thereby reversing Clausewitz’s famous formulation that war is a continuation of policy by other means. This perversion, which appears quite often in the military literature of Moltke’s epigones, men like Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi, owes much of its popularity to Moltke’s powerful influence at the turn of the century. Of course, such interpretations of Clausewitz do not belong solely to Moltke or to the Germans. French, British, and US military writers have cast the master in a similar light throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁵ Indeed, Clausewitz’s dictum regarding the subordination of military leadership to political authority remains the hardest for soldiers—who witness firsthand the price of military failure—to accept.

Tactical victory formed the center of Moltke’s vision of war. He saw strategy—a “free, practical, artistic activity”—as a “system of expedients” designed to establish, as far as possible, the conditions for tactical success. Strategy must remain flexible to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to react to unpredictable factors like “weather, illnesses, railway accidents, misunderstandings, and disappointments.”¹⁶ Attempting to carry a war plan beyond the opening engagement he considered the greatest of follies, for the first clash of arms brought only new opportunities and necessities to attacker and defender alike. Nonetheless, staff officers should spare no effort in planning for as many contingencies as possible. After 1871, Moltke himself never ceased planning military solutions to Germany’s constant strategic dilemma—a war on two fronts. He developed Germany’s war plans inductively, changing them according to the evolving military situation in France and Russia, focusing the main effort first on one front, then the other, and back again as necessary.¹⁷

The last half of the 19th century saw revolutions in communication, transportation, and weapon technologies that would fundamentally alter the conduct of war. Improvements in long-range, rapid-firing rifles and cannon afforded a defending enemy decisive advantages in firepower, and threatened to make the successful execution of an infantry attack, especially a frontal one, impossible.¹⁸ As Moltke wrote in 1858, the universal and fundamental improvements in infantry weapons alone necessitated “a change in the tactics of all branches. . . . The firepower of an infantry platoon [today] surpasses the range and destructive effect of the case-shot of a six-pounder cannon.”¹⁹ His response to this general “crisis” illustrates his creative genius—he advocated combining the advantages of flank attacks and the tactical defensive, enticing the enemy to attack, waiting for the right moment to smash his assault with overwhelming firepower, then finishing him off with an annihilating counter-attack.²⁰ To be sure, this solution had obvious limitations in that it required

“He advocated combining the advantages of flank attacks and the tactical defensive, enticing the enemy to attack . . . then finishing him off with an annihilating counterattack.”

either an available flank for the assaulting force, or an enemy willing to attack first. Nineteenth-century warfare lacked neither.

Political Attitudes

Moltke also set the political tone within the officer corps, particularly with his attitudes toward the liberal agenda of the mid-19th century, and toward social democracy thereafter.²¹ The famous man of literature and letters who, in the 1820s and 1830s, embraced cosmopolitan and romanticist views, had hardened into a cynical conservative after witnessing the turmoil created by the failed Revolution of 1848.²² Moltke feared that, like the French Revolution of 1789, the present one would follow the “old course, from monarchy to republic, from republic to dictatorship.”²³ By November 1848, however, even as he wrote to his brother that he saw “no choice other than reaction or anarchy,” counter-revolutionary forces had already begun to restore order across much of Europe.²⁴ Two years later, Moltke experienced the humiliating terms of the Punctation of Olmütz, in which Austria forced Prussia to abandon her early plans to unify Germany.²⁵ Moltke called the agreement a “shameful peace” and considered it further evidence of the bankruptcy of liberal values.²⁶

While serving as a member of the Conservative Party in the Prussian Parliament (*Landtag*) and later in the Reichstag, Moltke campaigned repeatedly against the Social Democrats’ efforts to abolish the military as a separate and privileged class and to reduce the standing army to a militia.²⁷ In his 1874 address to the Reichstag, he declared:

Wars conducted by militias have the characteristic of lasting much longer and for this reason costing much more in terms of lives and money than all other wars. I remind you of the recent War of Secession in America, which each side had to wage essentially with militias.²⁸

To be sure, the Chief of the GGS did not need to inspire conservative attitudes within the officer corps; its mostly aristocratic members were already predisposed to them. Rather, Moltke’s speeches and writings articulated the officers’ general apprehensions regarding Germany’s future political course, and set the agenda for the military’s campaign to preserve its hard-won status

and prestige. In the face of newly emerging pacifist and materialistic attitudes, many officers, in fact, took great delight in quoting Moltke's famous statement that "Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; . . . war is an integral part of the divine order of things . . . the fate of humankind, the inevitable activity of nations."²⁹

Legacies

Moltke left positive and negative legacies to German military theory. First, the overwhelming success of his victories against Denmark, Austria, and France encouraged the development of a self-stylized, uniquely German approach to war in the last third of the 19th century. In 1873, for example, the Prussian military periodical *Military-Weekly* published an anonymous essay entitled, "On Military Education and Science," which examined the intellectual and educational climate responsible for the "great successes of German arms."³⁰ It described the German approach to war as soundly pragmatic and free of abstract, doctrinaire thinking:

The abstract view [of war which Clausewitz] derided now stands discredited in many ways. . . . [A] single conceptual system spanning all time is impossible The overwhelming successes of the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 encourage this view—that strict discipline, good weapons, effective elementary tactics, good marching orders, railways, practical supply measures, and telegraphs decide everything in war.³¹

By the early 1880s, this free-form approach to war had further established itself as part of the German military tradition, accruing still more Moltkean ideas: simplicity is the essential ingredient of an order; war plans do not endure beyond the first engagement; friction, chance, and uncertainty are inescapable elements of war; and strategy serves policy best when it strives for the highest aim, complete tactical victory.³² The fact that military writers often accused each other of *Schematismus*—rigid, prescriptive thinking—in Germany's turn-of-the-century military debates indicates that Moltke's ideas had become paradigmatic within the officer corps. Ironically, an inherent contradiction developed in the German view of war at this time—namely, that while war possessed no absolute rules, the destruction of the enemy's forces had to remain its ultimate aim.³³

Second, Moltke's open, inductive approach to war also helped legitimize a decentralized style of warfighting called (perhaps wrongly) *Auftragstaktik*. Much confusion reigns concerning this concept and its "dubious" historical validity.³⁴ Military writers on either side of the Atlantic have somewhat abused the term *Auftragstaktik* in an effort to legitimize their own preferred style of command.³⁵ In fact, *Auftragstaktik* and the meaning behind it surfaced decisively, albeit sparingly, in the debate over tactics that raged for years between the Imperial Army's traditionalists and reformists. In its origins, the concept probably owes more to that leading figure of the Prussian Restoration, Gerhard von

Scharnhorst, than to Moltke.³⁶ But Moltke clearly advocated the decentralization of military effort. He reasoned that war, a product of opposing wills subject to a host of frictions, gives rise to rapidly changing situations that quickly render a commander's decisions obsolete. Hence, subordinates had to think and act according to the situation, even without or in defiance of orders.³⁷ While Moltke did indeed promote such a style of command, he did not condone willful disobedience. In fact, the Prussian, and later the German, army maintained strict codes of discipline.

On the negative side, Moltke's near-perfect victories at Sadowa (1866) and Sedan (1870), combined with his efforts to avoid the greater accuracy of infantry weapons, actually contributed more to the establishment of the so-called dogma of the "battle of annihilation" and the cult of the flank attack than did Schlieffen's writings. Schlieffen believed that the essence of military history lay in the flank attack, and saw no contradiction between hammering home his message in the pages of the GGS's *Quarterly* and the apparent German tradition of attempting to remain free of doctrinaire thinking.³⁸ In addition, military genius—shorn of Clausewitz's emphasis on the harmonic balance between qualities of character and intellect—became associated with the ability to execute the perfect battle; indeed, it sometimes served as an underlying, if tacit, justification for the exclusion of political influence from the conduct of war.³⁹

In sum, Moltke's 70-year military career indelibly enhanced and legitimized a long martial tradition and shaped an entire way of military thinking. He conducted near-perfect battles at a time when military technology severely challenged traditional procedures and preferred notions. He remained committed to decentralized execution, a creative approach to tactics, an inductive method of strategy, meticulous and continuous war planning, and the ideal of personal and total dedication to duty, perhaps to a fault. Finally, to modern military theory, he contributed merely a few simple principles centered on the principle of simplicity itself.

NOTES

1. Eberhard Kessel, *Moltke* (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957) remains the best biographical study. Rudolf Stadelmann, *Moltke und der Staat* (Krefeld: Scherpe Verlag, 1950) and volume two of Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland*, 4 Vols. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1954) are also important. William O'Connor Morris, *Moltke: A Biographical and Critical Study* (New York: Haskell House, 1893, rpt. 1971) though dated and less critical than its title suggests is probably the best biography in English. The following works address aspects of his military theory: Lothar Burchardt, "Helmuth von Moltke, Wilhelm I. und der Aufstieg des preußischen Generalstabes," and Wilhelm Meier-Dönberg, "Moltke und die taktisch-operative Ausbildung im preußisch-deutschen Heer," in *Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke. Bedeutung und Wirkung*, ed. Roland G. Foerster (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), pp. 19-38 and 39-48 respectively. See also: Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," and Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1986), pp. 281-95 and 296-325 respectively; and Roland G. Foerster, "The Operational Thinking of the Elder Moltke and its Consequences," in *Operational Thinking in Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Manstein* (Bonn: E. S. Mittler, 1988), pp. 21-40.

2. During Moltke's lifetime, German military theory did not formally recognize an operational level of war. Rather, it viewed the conduct of operations as a sort of applied strategy.

3. S. v. Schlichting, *Moltkes Vermächtnis* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1900); Max Jähns, *Feldmarschall Moltke*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Ernst Hoffmann & Co., 1894-1900); Wilhelm Bigge, *Feldmarschall Graf Moltke. Ein*

militärisches Lebensbild (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1901); Fritz von der Goltz, *Moltke* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1903); and Wilhelm von Blum, *Moltke* (Berlin: G. Stalling, 1907).

4. Considerable debate raged after the war concerning the younger Moltke's alleged compromise of the Schlieffen plan through his weakening of the all-important right flank. But these accusations have been laid to rest by the work of Lothar Burchardt, "Operatives Denken und Planen von Schlieffen bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges," in *Operatives Denken und Handeln in deutschen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Herford, Bonn: E. S. Mittler, 1988), pp. 45-72, and others.

5. Kessel, *Moltke*, p. 108.

6. See especially his essay "On Strategy" (1871) or "Über Strategie," in *Großer Generalstab* (ed.), *Moltkes Militärische Werke*, 14 Vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1892-1912), here Vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 287-93. Reinhard Stumpf, ed., *Kriegstheorie und Kriegsgeschichte. Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke* (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993) highlights similarities in the military theory of each soldier. Jehuda Wallach, *Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1967), emphasizes the differences; and Daniel Hughes provides a good introduction in English in *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1993).

7. See Bernard Schwertfeger, "Die Kriegsgeschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde* (Hereafter, *Vjhft*) VI, No. 3, (1909), 498. See also the comments of Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army* (London: Hogarth Press, 1939), esp. p. 127.

8. S. v. Schlichting, *Taktische und strategische Grundsätze der Gegenwart*, 3 Vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1898-9), here II, p. 96.

9. R. v. Caemmerer, *Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Wilhelm Baensch, 1904), chap. X; and *Clausewitz* (Berlin: B. Behr's Verlag, 1905), pp. 118-19.

10. Stig Förster, "Helmuth von Moltke und das Problem des industrialisierten Volkskrieg im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Bedeutung und Wirkung*, pp. 103-16; "Optionen der Kriegführung im Zeitalter des Volkskrieges—Zu Helmuth von Moltkes militärisch-politischen Überlegungen nach den Erfahrungen der Einigungskriege," in *Militärische Verantwortung in Staat und Gesellschaft*, ed. Detlev Bald (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986); and "Facing 'People's War': Moltke the Elder and Germany's Military Options after 1871," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 11 (December 1988), 209-30.

11. Kessel, *Moltke*, pp. 747-48; and *Militärische Werke*, I, 7.

12. Most of these ideas are drawn from Moltke's essay "On Strategy." Similar ideas are expressed in the essay "Krieg und Politik," *Militärische Werke*, IV, 1, pp. 13-40, a composite essay which draws from a number of Moltke's other military writings. As Daniel Hughes has recently pointed out, the essay, "On Strategy," which appears in volume IV, part 2 differs significantly but not substantially (in that the ideas expressed therein remain the same) from that which appears in Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Moltke, *Ausgewählte Werke*, 4 vols., ed. F. v. Schmerfeld (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1925). See Hughes, *Moltke*, p. 17.

13. Frhr. v. Freytag-Loringhoven, *Kriegslehren nach Clausewitz aus den Feldzügen 1813 und 1814* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1908), pp. 15-16. See also: Ritter, *Staatskunst*, Chapter 8, Part 2; Wallach, "Misperceptions of Clausewitz' *On War* by the German Military," and Müller, "Clausewitz, Ludendorff and Beck: Some Remarks on Clausewitz' Influence on German Military Thinking in the 1930s and 1940s," in Handel, ed., *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1989), pp. 213-66.

14. Cf. Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955), p. 200.

15. See: Douglas Porch, "Clausewitz and the French," in Handel, ed., *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*; Timothy Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

16. Moltke, *Militärische Werke*, Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 33-40.

17. See: Peter Rassow, *Der Plan Moltkes für den Zweifrontenkrieg 1871-1890* (Breslau: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1982); and Förster, "Facing 'People's War,'" pp. 209-30.

18. See, for example: "Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869," and "Aufsatz vom Jahre 1871 'Ueber Strategie,'" in Moltke, *Militärische Werke*, II, 2, pp. 175 and 291-93, respectively; and compare Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book III, Chapter 1, "Strategy."

19. "Bemerkungen vom 12. Juli 1858 über Veränderungen in der Taktik infolge des verbesserten Infanteriegewehrs," in *Militärische Werke*, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 7. See also his essays: "Bemerkungen vom April 1861 über den Einfluß der verbesserten Feuerwaffen auf die Taktik," and "Bemerkungen vom Jahre 1865 über den Einfluß der verbesserten Feuerwaffen auf die Taktik," in the same volume, pp. 27-41 and 47-65, respectively.

20. "Bemerkungen vom 1861," *Militärische Werke*, II, 2, pp. 29ff. Moltke uses the term "crisis" (*Krisis*) to refer specifically to the difficulty of conducting the final assault on the objective, "Verteidigung und Angriff," *Militärische Werke*, IV, 3, p. 213.

21. For a summary of Moltke's political transformation see Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), esp. 53-6.
22. Moltke's novelle, *Two Friends*, and his *Letters from Turkey* remain classics in German literature.
23. Letter to his wife Marie, dated 2 July 1848 in Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe an seine Braut und Frau* (Stuttgart & Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags-Anhalt, 1910), p. 122.
24. Letter to his brother, Adolf, dated 17 November 1848, in Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe 1825-1891*, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1959), p. 241.
25. Holborn, "Prusso-German School," p. 285. The Punctuation of Olmütz exacerbated the distrust between liberal and conservative, and liberal and soldier, causing widespread disillusionment in Prussia regarding liberal-democratic ideals. James J. Sheehan, *German History 1770-1866* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 713-17. For the impact of the settlement of Olmütz on the Prussian officer corps see Craig, *Politics*, esp. pp. 128-33.
26. Letter to Adolf, dated 25 February 1851. Moltke, *Briefe*, pp. 255-56.
27. The liberal cause lost momentum after the Indemnity Act of September 1866 gave retroactive approval to military reforms enacted without parliamentary consent. But a new enemy of the Prussian army and state had emerged in the form of the Social Democratic Worker's Party, later the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The first socialist organization in Germany was the General German Workers' Association founded in Leipzig in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle. Members from this group formed the Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1869. Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany 1840-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 288-89.
28. Address to the Reichstag on the Imperial Military Law, dated 16 February 1874. Moltke, *Leben und Werk in Selbstzeugnissen. Briefe, Schriften, Reden*, ed. Max Horst (Brisfelden bei Basel: Verlag Schibli-Doppler, n.d.), p. 412.
29. Letter to Professor Dr. Bluntschli, dated 11 December 1880. Moltke, *Leben und Werk*, p. 351. This phrase and other portions of the letter were used by military writers such as von der Goltz, Bernhardt, and Freytag-Loringhoven. See, for example, Goltz, *Volk in Waffen*, p. 430.
30. "Über Militair-Bildung und Wissenschaft," *Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, No. 1 (1873), pp. 1-37, here p. 7. (Hereafter, *Beihefte*.) The article draws from a variety of authorities (e.g. Pascal, Voltaire, Kant, J. S. Mill, and Gibbon), suggesting that officers of the Bismarck era possessed a broad educational background.
31. "Über Militair-Bildung," *Beihefte*, pp. 13 and 29.
32. See, for example, "Die Lehren der Kriegsgeschichte für die Kriegführung," *Beihefte*, No. 8 (1881), pp. 380-408.
33. "Lehren der Kriegsgeschichte," *Beihefte*, pp. 381-82.
34. See Bassford, *Clausewitz in English*, p. 233, n. 46; and Daniel Hughes, "Abuses of German Military History," *Military Review*, 66 (December 1986), 66-76.
35. The US Army's rather free and enthusiastic use of the term *Auftragstaktik* in the 1980s has become something of an embarrassment. An oft-cited source of this confusion is Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945* (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), esp. p. 116.
36. The so-called "mission tactics" embodied Scharnhorst's entire philosophy of command, and provided the foundation for the new infantry, cavalry, and artillery manuals written after Jena. Charles E. White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1989), pp. 139-40.
37. Nineteenth-century English military writers like F. N. Maude and G. F. R. Henderson argued a similar need for a decentralized approach to warfighting. F. N. Maude, *Military Letters and Essays* (Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson-Kimberly, 1895), p. 40; and G. F. R. Henderson, *The Battle of Spichern* (London: Gale and Polden, 1891), pp. 287-91. Bassford, *Clausewitz in English*, p. 240, n. 23. French authors like du Picq acknowledged that modern war required greater decentralization, but sought measures to retain unit cohesion and control. Du Picq, *Battle Studies*, esp. pp. 152-62.
38. Schlieffen once wrote to Freytag-Loringhoven that "flank attacks were the essence of all military history." Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen, *Briefe*, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), p. 312.
39. See for example: Schlieffen, "Der Feldherr," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 2 vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1913), pp. 3-10; and Freytag-Loringhoven, "Eine Zeit der Rückganges in der Kriegskunst," *Vjhft* II, No. 4 (1905): 597-608. The Second World War witnessed renewed interest in the intuitive aspects of military genius. Famous Wehrmacht officers like Generals Herman Balck and Friedrich von Mellenthin referred to this inner awareness as *Fingerspitzengefühl*, a "fingertip sense" for the terrain and the dispositions of the enemy. See William DePuy, *Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Doctrine* (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, 1980). Aspects of Clausewitz's military genius still receive emphasis in the Bundeswehr's *Heeresdienstvorschrift* (HDv) 100/100 VS-NfD *Truppenführung* (Bonn, 7 September 1987), esp. paras. 605-15 and US military manuals like *FM 22-102 Command* (1995, Draft), esp. pp. 10-12; and *FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 11, 38, 39.

Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield

HAROLD R. WINTON

The field of classical music, which requires the harmonious blending of sounds produced by a wide variety of talented artists, has provided military historians and practitioners a rich trove of analogies for the description of battles and campaigns. It can, however, likewise be used to examine the interaction of two armed services in times of peace. It is thus perhaps fitting to consider the thoughts of George Szell, renowned conductor of the Cleveland orchestra, who opined that

the characteristics commonly associated with chamber music can be achieved in symphonic orchestras far more readily than is customarily imagined. It is a matter, first, of the excellence of the players themselves, and second of the manner in which they are trained to listen to what others are doing and to make their individual part contribute to the ensemble synthesis.¹

This article will examine the extent to which Army and Air Force cooperation on air-ground issues met maestro Szell's standards in the years between the end of the war in Vietnam and the eve of Desert Shield.

The heart of the work is a critical, comparative analysis of Army and Air Force doctrine regarding air-ground operations in the period 1973-1990. For purposes of the analysis, air-ground operations are defined as attacks from the air against enemy ground targets that have either tactical or operational consequence for friendly ground formations. Such attacks are usually classified under the rubrics of close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). The purpose of the analysis is to determine the degrees of commonality and divergence that marked the two services' approaches to air-ground operations and the underlying reasons for either the compatibility or tension between the

emerging doctrinal positions. Initial factors to be examined include the services' visions of the nature of war, their doctrine development processes, and the roles of key Army and Air Force personalities in shaping doctrine.

The article is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the period from 1973 to 1979 when the Army and the Air Force began a partnership that was based primarily on the Army's realization of its need for Air Force support to execute its Active Defense doctrine. The second examines the period from 1980 to 1986, in which the partnership was strengthened as the Army transitioned from a doctrine of Active Defense to AirLand Battle and began to grapple with the concept of the operational level of war. The final section assesses the years from 1987 to 1990 in light of the Army's efforts to develop capabilities to conduct deep battle and the emergence of unofficial thought within the Air Force concerning the operational level of war.

Forming the Partnership, 1973-1979

The Vietnam experience significantly affected both the Army and the Air Force, but in noticeably different ways. The Army was virtually shattered. The proud, confident days when troops had helicoptered into the Ia Drang Valley and put to flight multiple NVA regiments were, by 1973, a faded and distant memory. Instead, at the forefront of the Army's consciousness were a series of battles that were, at best, tactical stalemates, and a deep malaise brought about by an unpopular war, an inequitable draft system, a progressive unraveling of small-unit discipline, and a severe questioning of the competence and integrity of its senior leaders. While some placed the onus for the Vietnam debacle on misguided policy and faulty military strategy directed from the E-ring of the Pentagon, others realized that if the Army was to provide effectively for the common defense, it would have to reform itself both morally and intellectually. The intellectual component of that transformation was to be centered first in doctrine.

The Air Force experience in Vietnam was not as searing as the Army's, but it did possess some doctrinal implications. First, the evidence on air interdiction was mixed. While it had not been able to alter appreciably the support to guerrilla warfare, it had demonstrated the ability to disrupt substantially the logistical flow to conventional offensive operations. Second, seven long years operating under a badly fragmented command system strongly

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reinforced the Air Force's institutional preference for a single air commander in each theater of operations, operating under the direct purview of the theater commander. The implications of the Vietnam experience for the theory of strategic attack to negate an opponent's military capability and undermine his political will were less clear. Many Air Force analysts insisted that Linebacker II demonstrated what airpower could do when the politicians took the gloves off.² More thoughtful analysts, however, pointed out that there was no specific target set that neutralized the DRVN military capability and that Nixon's political objective of disengaging America from Vietnam was purchased with the carrot of concessions as much as it was imposed with the stick of airpower.³ Vietnam provided rather uncertain grist for the Air Force doctrinal mill.

Army-Air Force communications on doctrinal matters were also influenced by the differing command echelons at which each service's most significant doctrine was developed. The Air Force doctrinal structure envisioned three levels: basic, or fundamental, doctrine, which is normally written at the Air Staff; operational doctrine, which is the responsibility of the major subordinate commands; and tactical doctrine, which is developed by a variety of schools and agencies.⁴ The structure of Army doctrine is similar, but more closely tied to its level of organization. At the top is capstone doctrine, which is the rough equivalent of Air Force basic doctrine. Subordinate doctrine addresses warfighting and support concepts appropriate to corps, division, brigades, battalions, and ultimately even minor tactical units.

The major difference between the Army and the Air Force after 1973 was that the Army formed in that year a single organization, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which was responsible for the development of virtually *all* its doctrine from the capstone manual to the lowest tactical publication. This gave the Army a powerful integrating agency that could, and did, make doctrine the engine that drove the Army. Perhaps doctrinal development in the Air Force was more diffuse because doctrine was a more tangential concern in Air Force than in Army life. This diffusion also created real problems in institutional communication. Both the Air Force and the Army recognized that the USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC), to which belonged all the continental US-based aircraft that flew CAS and interdiction missions, was the logical point of contact at which TRADOC should interact on doctrinal matters. But the TAC-TRADOC dialogue was always influenced by the fact that TAC did *not* speak for the Air Force—the Air Staff closely guarded its prerogatives in doctrinal matters.⁵ Given the distinctly divergent institutional arrangements for doctrinal formulation, it is surprising that one actually finds a significant amount of cooperation between the two services during the era between Vietnam and Desert Shield. That story begins with the development of the Army's "Active Defense" doctrine published in 1976.

The 1976 edition of *Field Manual 100-5* was driven by three dynamics: the reorientation of the American national security focus from Indochina

to Europe; the increased range, accuracy, and lethality of direct-fire weapons evident in the 1973 Middle East War; and the personal energy and determination of TRADOC's first commander, General William E. DePuy. The situation in Europe was grim. Army forces there had been bled white to support the insatiable manpower appetite of the war in Vietnam, and the continuously modernized Warsaw Pact forces appeared capable of launching a successful offensive into NATO territory. The 1973 Middle East War served as a wake-up call for the US Army. Tank and artillery losses from both sides were greater than the complete inventory of these systems in US Army, Europe.⁶ General DePuy supplied the energy to apply the lessons that he derived from the Arab-Israeli War to the fashioning of an American Army that would be tactically capable of repelling a Warsaw Pact invasion in Europe.⁷

The centerpiece of this transformation was the 1976 edition of *Field Manual 100-5*. The second paragraph of the opening chapter contained the clear imperative, "Today the US Army must, above all else, *prepare to win the first battle of the next war*" (emphasis in original).⁸ The entire second chapter was a discourse on the effects of modern weapons that graphically depicted their increased range and lethality from World War II to the 1973 Middle East War.

Of particular interest to the present study was Chapter 8, "Air-Land Battle," the second paragraph of which explicitly addressed the Army's dependence upon the Air Force:

Both the Army and the Air Force deliver firepower against the enemy. Both can kill a tank. Both can collect intelligence, conduct reconnaissance, provide air defense, move troops and supplies, and jam radios and radar. But neither the Army nor the Air Force can fulfill any one of those functions completely by itself. Thus, *the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force* [emphasis in original].⁹

This analysis paid particular attention to the suppression of Warsaw Pact air defenses, asserting, "Whenever and wherever the heavy use of airpower is needed to win the air-land battle, *the enemy air defenses must be suppressed*" (emphasis in original).¹⁰ This suppression was depicted as a joint effort that required the integration of the intelligence and strike capabilities of both services. In short, the Army's 1976 doctrinal prescription for a future war in Europe clearly recognized that cooperation with the Air Force was a tactical and institutional imperative.

Air Force basic doctrine in the period 1973-1979 does not reflect a similar sense of commonality. The 1975 edition of *Air Force Manual 1-1* was a bland document. The manual listed eight combat operational missions that included strategic attack, counter air, air interdiction, close air support, aerospace defense of the United States, aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift, and special operations.¹¹ It also provided the stock definitions of and

commentary on AI and CAS operations. The former were defined as those "conducted to destroy, neutralize or delay enemy ground or naval forces before they can be brought to bear against friendly forces." CAS operations were "intended to provide responsive, sustained and concentrated firepower of great lethality and precision . . . in close integration with the fire and maneuver of surface forces." There was, however, nothing in the 1975 edition of *AFM 1-1* to indicate that the conditions under which AI and CAS were to be executed had recently undergone radical transformation or that close cooperation with the Army, particularly in the area of the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), had become a key element in the Air Force's ability to conduct these operations without suffering unacceptable losses.

The 1979 edition of *AFM 1-1* did little, if anything, to improve this situation. Now widely derided by airpower cognoscenti, this manual has been referred to by one informed analyst as representing "the nadir of Air Force doctrine."¹² The manual appeared to meet the objective stated by its original drafters three years earlier to "provide a document that is interesting, relevant, and useful at all Air Force organizational levels."¹³ However, in attempting to be all things to all people, the manual also appeared to lose its focus.

Despite the fuzziness of Air Force basic doctrine, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the Air Force was closely scrutinizing the realities of a possible war in Europe and was actively cooperating with the Army to reach mutually acceptable solutions to those problems. The former was manifested in the decision to develop a single-mission CAS aircraft and in a series of studies that examined the details of a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The latter was demonstrated in numerous joint ventures between TAC and TRADOC.

The development of the A-10 ground attack aircraft was the most tangible and, in many ways, the most significant indicator of the Air Force's commitment to air-ground operations between Vietnam and Desert Shield. The key problem was how to kill tanks with air-delivered munitions. The answer that emerged was an aircraft designed around a Gatling gun that fired 3000 to 4000 rounds of armor-piercing ammunition per minute.¹⁴ From the Army's point of view, production and fielding of the A-10 not only vouchsafed the Air Force's commitment to the CAS mission, it also created a corpus of pilots whose whole professional being was centered around providing that support.

The Air Force's analytical focus began to shift toward the problems of a European war in the mid-1970s. In late 1975, RAND completed a study for the Air Force that examined the relative merits of additional manned aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and stand-off munitions for improving air-ground capability in NATO.¹⁵ In May 1976, the Air Force sponsored a two-day conference at RAND to explore in some detail exactly how the Warsaw Pact ground forces might attack NATO.¹⁶ Among the issues addressed were how the war might start, principal attack axes, the primacy of the

offensive in Soviet doctrine, Soviet concepts and tactics, logistical support, air defenses, and chemical warfare capabilities. Other RAND studies requested by the Air Force included a 1978 analysis of the effects of weather on battlefield air support in NATO and a 1979 assessment of the potential vulnerabilities of Warsaw Pact forces to attacks against their tactical rear areas.¹⁷ The main conclusion one draws from these analyses is that in the early post-Vietnam years, the Air Force took its mission to support the Army in a European war very seriously indeed and engaged in a comprehensive effort to determine how best to accomplish this mission.

The most obvious institutional arrangement that reflected Army-Air Force cooperation was the connection between TRADOC and TAC. Initial meetings between the commands were held in October 1973; on 1 July 1975, they established a joint office known as the Directorate of Air-Land Forces Application, or ALFA.¹⁸ ALFA's location at Langley AFB, Virginia, TAC's headquarters and a mere 15-minute drive from TRADOC's headquarters at Fort Monroe, facilitated communication.

During the period 1975-1979, ALFA successfully resolved many of the tactical and procedural issues regarding air-ground interface on a highly lethal battlefield. Airspace management was addressed in a document issued by TRADOC, TAC, and FORSCOM (US Army Forces Command) that was successfully tested in the 1976 Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise.¹⁹ The agency also produced a comprehensive volume on the Soviet air defense threat and a study of this system's vulnerabilities.²⁰ In September 1977, tests under ALFA's aegis were conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, to evaluate techniques for the combined use of attack helicopters and A-10 aircraft against enemy ground formations.

At higher levels, however, ALFA was not able to bridge the gap between Army and Air Force views on air-ground cooperation. The genesis of the problem was General Creighton Abrams's 1973 decision to eliminate the field army as an echelon of army organization.²¹ The demobilization of the Army and the elimination of the peacetime draft at the end of the Vietnam War led to a precipitous reduction in Army manpower. In order to satisfy Congress with an acceptable "tooth-to-tail" ratio and stabilize the Army's force structure, Abrams struck an agreement with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to retain 16 divisions on active duty in return for a guaranteed force of roughly 785,000. To hold up his end of the bargain, Abrams had to do two things: first, put a major portion of the support structure into the reserves; and second, cut manpower at command levels above the division. Thus, the field army as an organizational echelon disappeared.

The field army headquarters, however, had been the nexus of air-ground cooperation in both World War II and Korea. The fundamental precept that emerged from this relationship was that each field army would be supported by a collocated Tactical Air Command that worked for the theater air

commander but whose *raison d'être* was assisting the supported ground commander in the accomplishment of his mission. A series of proposals involving the exchange of liaison elements between the two services culminated in a test of the concept late in 1977. In January 1978 TRADOC published its analysis of exercise Blue Flag, which concluded that there was adequate Air Force representation at the corps level and that the Army had adequate representation to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).²² There was, however, an anomaly in this report. It envisioned individual corps commanders communicating directly with the air component commander regarding the redistribution of sorties among the corps, which was clearly not a position the Air Force relished.²³ The demise of the field army would continue to bedevil Army and Air Force planners in the years ahead.

In summary, the early post-Vietnam years were marked by a deliberate effort on the part of the Army and the Air Force to prepare themselves to defend Western Europe. The Army's effort was driven by the creation of TRADOC and the conscious use of doctrine as the device to refashion itself in the wake of the Vietnam trauma. In contrast, Air Force basic doctrine appeared to lack a unifying vision. Nevertheless, the Air Force developed an aircraft tailor-made for killing enemy tanks in Europe and it carefully assayed both the Warsaw Pact ground forces and the physical environment in which it would have to operate to help the Army defeat them. Finally, a promising start at forging cooperation between the two services was embodied in the TAC-TRADOC partnership. There remained, however, the troubling issue of restoring the higher-level ground-air interface in the wake of the Army's decision to eliminate the field army as an organizational echelon.

Strengthening the Partnership, 1980-1986

Over the next six years, the Army significantly revised its capstone doctrine from Active Defense to AirLand Battle. The latter term generated a great deal of misunderstanding, particularly during the Gulf War. It is important to remember that AirLand Battle was *Army* doctrine; it was *not* Air Force doctrine, and it was *not* joint doctrine. Air Force basic doctrine was rearticulated in 1984, providing a somewhat more coherent view of the theory and application of airpower than had its predecessors. Air Force cooperation was absolutely essential to the execution of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. That cooperation was evident in the development of the "31 Initiatives," which focused mainly on programmatic activities between the Army and Air Staffs, and ALFA's publication of several practical biservice manuals. However, the tension between Army and Air Force perspectives regarding air-ground integration at the operational level again surfaced, this time in the extent to which NATO doctrinal prescriptions for the control of air interdiction would be incorporated into American Air Force practice.

General DePuy had clearly intended for the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5* to be widely read. It was. It was also widely debated. As the debate matured, criticism of the Active Defense became focused on several key issues. First, it was too weapon-system oriented; soldiers were portrayed as mere operators, not warriors. Second, the defensive method of moving from blocking position to blocking position seemed to cede the initiative to the adversary. Third, the emphasis placed on winning the *first* battle left open the more important question of winning the *last* battle. Additionally, the doctrine's focus at division level and below omitted the important contribution to be made by the corps, particularly in disrupting Soviet second-echelon forces. Although this debate was in part prompted and abetted by outside analysts, it was largely an internal affair.²⁴ Army officers read DePuy's manual closely; and the more they read it, the less they liked it.²⁵

This dissatisfaction in the ranks corresponded with two developments at the top. On 1 July 1977, General Donn A. Starry replaced General DePuy as TRADOC commander; and in June 1979 the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Chief of Staff-designate, Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, suggested to Starry that it was time to begin work on a new *FM 100-5*.²⁶ Starry was already inclined in this direction.²⁷ Although as commander of the Armor Center, and a DePuy protégé, he had been one of the key participants in developing the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5*, his perspective began to change when he took command of the V Corps in Europe.²⁸ Here he realized the vital importance of not simply blunting the initial attack, but of engaging Soviet second-echelon forces as well.²⁹ After a period of casting around for a term that would adequately convey the sense of the doctrinal shift he envisioned, Starry announced his decision to refer to the Army's approach to warfare as "AirLand Battle."³⁰ There are two things noteworthy about this decision. First, although the doctrine espoused in the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5* came to be known as "Active Defense," that was a derived name, not a given one. In contrast, Starry deliberately hung a label on his emerging doctrine. Second, the "Air" part of AirLand Battle was clearly intended to signal the Air Force that the Army envisioned a strong partnership between the two services on any future battlefield.³¹

The 1982 edition of *FM 100-5* reflected both Starry's guidance and the input of a number of mid-grade officers who had found the previous edition badly wanting.³² The new manual addressed virtually all of the concerns raised by the latter. Gone was the single focus on the first battle. Instead, the manual introduced the concept of an operational level of war that involved the planning and conduct of campaigns, defined as "sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with *simultaneous and sequential battles*" (emphasis added).³³ The new doctrine espoused four "basic tenets" of *initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization* (emphasis in original).³⁴ The

tenet of depth led to the concept of "deep battle," which was particularly significant for air-ground operations, for it articulated the Army's realization of the need to delay or disrupt—to interdict—Soviet second-echelon formations before they made contact with friendly troops.

In 1986 the Army published a new edition of *FM 100-5*, which updated and expanded the concept of AirLand Battle.³⁵ This edition contained much more explicit attention to the conduct of campaigns and major operations. Of particular note for the conduct of air-ground operations was this statement:

Operational level commanders try to set favorable terms for battle by synchronized ground, air, and sea maneuver and by striking the enemy throughout the theater of operations. Large scale ground maneuver will always require protection from enemy air forces and sometimes from naval forces. Commanders will therefore conduct reconnaissance, interdiction, air defense, and special operations almost continuously. Air interdiction, air and ground reconnaissance . . . must all be synchronized to support the overall campaign and its supporting operations on the ground, especially at critical junctures.³⁶

This passage reflected a growing maturity on the part of Army doctrine writers, for it specifically referred to ground operations *supporting* an overall campaign plan. While it established the need for ground forces to receive air protection and for the synchronization of interdiction with them, especially at critical junctures, this doctrinal statement implicitly accepted the proposition that the critical decisions on how the synchronization would take place would be made in the context of *campaign* objectives, not merely the tactical dictates of individual *battles*. This realization brought it much more closely into tune with the Air Force perspective on the employment of airpower.

That perspective was formally updated in the 1984 edition of *AFM 1-1*, now titled *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*.³⁷ It was divided into four chapters, dealing with the military instrument of power; the employment of aerospace forces; missions and specialized tasks; and issues of organization, training, equipment, and sustainment. The discussion of the coordination of interdiction activities with surface forces was particularly apt:

The effect of these attacks is profound when the enemy is engaged in a highly mobile maneuver scheme of operation dependent on urgent resupply of combat reserves and consumables. Air and surface commanders should take actions to force the enemy into this intense form of combat with a systematic and persistent plan of attack. The purpose is . . . to generate situations where friendly surface forces can then take advantage of forecast enemy reactions.³⁸

In sum, the Air Force's 1984 statement of its basic doctrine represented a more coherent explication of airpower principles than its predecessor and recognized some of the potential for the cooperation of air and ground forces

at the operational level, but stopped short of a fully developed typology of how this synergism could best be achieved.

The partnership between Tactical Air Command and TRADOC was strengthened by a formal understanding at the departmental level "for enhancement of joint employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine."³⁹ This April 1983 document, signed by the service Chiefs of Staff, committed the services to use the 1982 edition of *FM 100-5* as the basis for seeking increased integration of Army and Air Force tactical forces, enhancing interservice planning and programming, continuing the dialogue on doctrinal matters, working together on deep-attack systems, coordinating airlift requirements, and resolving issues concerning the integration of AirLand Battle into theater operations. It was followed in November 1983 by an understanding signed by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Charles A. Gabriel, and the new Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham. This paper emphasized the planning and programmatic aspects of the previous memo and pledged the services to "initiate herewith a joint process to develop in a deliberate manner the most combat effective, affordable joint forces necessary for airland combat operations."⁴⁰ This agreement committed the services to exploring 31 specific initiatives regarding air-ground operations that dealt with issues of air defense, rear area operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, special operations forces, munitions development, combat techniques and procedures, and the fusion of combat information.⁴¹

The "31 Initiatives" achieved mixed success. Within 15 months, action on 18 of them had been completed, including the Air Force's decision to cancel the development of a "mobile weapons system" (an ersatz tank) for airbase defense and a ground-based radar jamming system; concomitant cancellation of an Army program for an airborne radar jammer; joint development of a tactical missile system (J-TACMS) and a surveillance target and attack radar system (J-STARS); and agreement between TAC and TRADOC regarding procedures for CAS in the rear areas.⁴² The services continued to find it difficult, however, to settle the issue of air-ground interface at the operational level of war.

The focal point for this obstacle was the divergence of perspectives over Initiative #21, battlefield air interdiction (BAI). BAI had a long and checkered past that arose from three issues: first, the divergence between the Army and the Air Force concerning the relative authority of various command echelons in directing aircraft to provide ground support; second, the elimination of the field army as a ground echelon of command; and third, the influence of NATO tactical air doctrine on US Air Force doctrine. The Air Force command philosophy, expressed most recently in the 1984 edition of *AFM 1-1* was one of "centralize control-decentralize execution."⁴³ Although the doctrine did not spell out the *level* of centralization, the Air Force preference was for control at the theater of operations. This meant, from the Air Force perspective, that the theater air commander would retain responsibility for control and direction of

the air interdiction effort, while ground commanders supported by various air formations would have a voice only in the sub-allocation of CAS sorties to their subordinate units. As we have seen, however, the structure of the air-ground interface process was now in a state of disarray brought about by the disappearance of the field army.

The problem was further complicated by the military command structure in Allied Command Europe's Central Region, AFCENT, and divergences between British and American philosophies of air-ground operations. AFCENT was organized with a theater headquarters, a supporting air headquarters known as Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), which contained the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces (2ATAF and 4ATAF), and two subordinate land headquarters, Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). Although 2ATAF and 4ATAF were subordinate to AAFCE, they were also responsible for providing air support to NORTHAG and CENTAG respectively. And, although both ATAFs and both Army Groups were truly allied formations, 2ATAF and NORTHAG were dominated by the British, while 4ATAF and CENTAG were dominated by the Americans. Furthermore, the British and Americans had distinctly different perspectives on air-ground operations.⁴⁴ Based on philosophy, economics, and aircraft capabilities, the Royal Air Force preferred to generate a large number of sorties in small, two-plane formations with relatively little centralized control. It also preferred relatively shallow interdiction to deep interdiction. The USAF, on the other hand, preferred a slightly more "above the fray" approach that emphasized a fewer number of larger formations under relatively tight centralized control. And, based on its possession of platforms that could conduct deep interdiction and its concern for the high density of air defense weapons arrayed at and immediately behind the front lines of Soviet forces, it preferred deep to shallow interdiction.

A compromise was worked out in NATO tactical air doctrine that provided for both relatively deep air interdiction (AI) and relatively shallow battlefield air interdiction (BAI).⁴⁵ More significantly, this doctrine also provided that BAI and CAS would be joined together in a category known as offensive air support (OAS).⁴⁶ And, reflecting the British preference for the nexus of air-ground operations to be at the Army-Group/ATAF level rather than at the AFCENT/AAFCE level, OAS sorties were allocated to the ATAF commanders. Furthermore, because the ATAF had responsibility for supporting an Army Group, the Army Group commander had significant influence in determining how the OAS sorties were sub-allocated among the corps under his command. On the whole, the US Army was quite satisfied with this arrangement. The OAS = BAI + CAS formulation gave the CENTAG commander (an American) sufficient influence over air operations to conduct major land operations under the theater campaign plan. Furthermore, this arrangement provided subordinate corps commanders access to an Army commander in the person of the commander, CENTAG, to whom they could

make their case for priority of *both* BAI and CAS sorties.⁴⁷ The USAF, however, was much more ambivalent about BAI. While senior American airmen had been obliged by the constraints of allied diplomacy to accept it as NATO doctrine, they were reluctant to incorporate into US doctrine any provisions for ground commanders to influence air interdiction.

A long period of negotiation at the TAC-TRADOC and departmental levels culminated in a position paper on OAS in May 1981.⁴⁸ In essence, this document constituted formal biservice cognizance of the NATO doctrine. It also codified the previously agreed arrangement for an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) to be assigned to each corps and it explicitly recognized that, "generally, only at corps level will sufficient information be available to determine whether it is possible to engage and counter a threat with conventional organic firepower or whether it is necessary to have this organic firepower supplemented by OAS."⁴⁹ In other words, the Army not only persuaded the Air Force to subscribe to the NATO doctrine on BAI, it also extracted acceptance of the reality that the ATAF commander's critical decision on the allocation of his OAS sorties between BAI and CAS would be dependent upon intelligence developed at the corps level and passed through the Army Group to the ATAF. There were, however, two problems. First, the position paper was just that—a statement of position; it was *not* doctrine. Second, the signature of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations did not remove underlying Air Force reservations about giving the Army influence over any form of interdiction.⁵⁰

In sum, between 1980 and 1986, the Army and the Air Force institutionalized the partnership that had been formed from 1973 to 1979. This regularization was centered around the Army's development and refinement of its AirLand Battle doctrine and was manifested in the series of J-manuals produced by the TAC/TRADOC relationship and in the "31 Initiatives" at the department level. The Air Force also developed a more coherent statement of its basic doctrine. And, although this doctrine did not take explicit cognizance of the operational level of war articulated in the 1982 and 1988 editions of *FM 100-5*, it at least demonstrated a preliminary vision for how air and ground forces might cooperate at this level. There remained, however, divergences of perspective about the air-ground interface that were apparently resolved by the interdepartmental position paper on Offensive Air Support, but which continued to boil beneath the surface.

Cross Currents, 1987-1990

As the Army-Air Force partnership continued to mature (1987-1990), two developments—one in each service—influenced the partnership in ways that were not immediately apparent. The first was the Army's development of a detailed doctrine for the corps' conduct of deep battle; the second was the

publication of a National Defense University thesis entitled *The Air Campaign*, written by a then relatively obscure Air Force Colonel named John Warden.

The strength of the Army-Air Force partnership was evident in the continuation of a number of biservice projects. By December 1987, TRADOC and TAC, operating under the aegis of the 31 Initiatives, developed a draft summary of requirements for a follow-on to the A-10 as a CAS aircraft.⁵¹ By 1988 the services had reached agreement on concepts for joint attack of Soviet helicopters, the alignment of air liaison officers and forward air controllers with Army maneuver units, and a follow-on to the J-SEAD manual of 1982. Further indication of the institutional solidarity was evident in an article by General Robert D. Russ, who was General Wilbur L. Creech's successor at TAC, entitled "The Air Force, the Army, and the Battlefield of the 1990s." Here Russ stated categorically, "Everything that tactical air does directly supports Army operations."⁵²

In 1987, the Army took another step forward in the maturity of its deep battle concept with the publication of a handbook describing the capabilities of existing and developmental deep battle systems. The handbook outlined an integrated group of Army and Air Force systems to sense enemy targets, process information about these targets, communicate the information to appropriate agencies, and control the Army and Air Force weapons that would be used to strike them. The Air Force's Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) and Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Reporting System (JSTARS) and the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) were particularly important components of this system.⁵³ The *pièce de résistance* of deep battle publications was the 1990 handbook "Corps Deep Operations (ATACMS, Aviation and Intelligence Support): Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures." This work was exactly what its title implied, a handy how-to book for use by corps commanders and their principal planners in sorting out the difficult coordination issues that would be involved in attacking second-echelon divisions of a Soviet-style combined arms army. It was the product of six years of hard thinking that conceptually represented the practical link between the technology developed to fight the deep battle and the overarching doctrine of AirLand Battle.

However, by developing extended-range systems that allowed the corps commander to fight the deep battle, the Army had raised the question of how the effects of these systems would be coordinated with air operations. The immediate focus of this issue was the placement of and procedures surrounding the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The FSCL, originally known as the "no-bomb line," was developed during World War II as a coordination measure to reduce, if not eliminate, the chance that aircraft might drop ordnance on friendly troops. It was defined as a line *short of which* the release of air weapons required the prior clearance of a ground commander, and it applied primarily to aircrews returning from interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions with unexpended ordnance who wanted to be able to take advantage

of targets of opportunity without endangering friendly ground forces. The FSCL was normally placed at the range limit of friendly artillery. As long as this range was in the neighborhood of 10-15 kilometers beyond the friendly front lines, this placement did not present much of a problem, because air strikes within that range would, perforce, be coordinated with ground forces. However, with the advent of the multiple-launch rocket system and later ATACMS, the Army had weapons that could reach out to roughly 30 and 100 kilometers respectively. Additionally, the corps deep attack manual envisioned Apache helicopter attacks to a depth of 70-100 kilometers beyond the front lines. These newly developed capabilities placed the Army and the Air Force at loggerheads. If, on the one hand, the FSCL was pushed out to the depths of new Army weapons, it would significantly interfere with Air Force interdiction efforts and could potentially allow enemy forces to escape attack by friendly air formations. If, on the other hand, the FSCL was kept relatively close to the friendly front lines, the corps commander would lose freedom of action in the employment of his fire support assets if he was required to coordinate fires beyond the FSCL with the Air Force prior to execution. This conundrum defied mutually satisfactory resolution.⁵⁴

Another indicator of the potential fraying of the Army-Air Force partnership was the 1988 publication of John Warden's *The Air Campaign*.⁵⁵ This book could be interpreted on two levels. At its most obvious, the book was an intelligent and imaginative tract that took the basic logic of operational art—the linkage of strategic objectives and tactical goals—and applied it to air warfare. As such, it addressed classic military questions such as the relationship between offense and defense, the trade-offs between concentration and economy of force, the employment of operational reserves, and the use of deception in war—all from an air perspective. In this sense, there was little revolutionary about it. In another sense, however, it was an airpower manifesto in the tradition of Douhet, Mitchell, and de Seversky. Although carefully qualified, there was a theme of airpower dominance that ran through the book like a brightly colored thread. Chapter subheads such as "Single Arms Can Prevail," "War Can be Won from the Air," and "Command Is True Center of Gravity" suggested an airpower-centered approach to warfare that had perhaps not fully matured at the time of publication.

That soon changed. The pivotal question that *The Air Campaign* had not addressed was, "If airpower can be a war-winning instrument, *how* does it become one?" In the summer of 1988, Warden conceived of an answer to that question.⁵⁶ Picturing an enemy society as a system, he reasoned that its ability to generate power depended on five sub-systems which, in decreasing order of significance, were leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces.⁵⁷ Warden represented these sub-systems as five concentric rings with leadership in the center and fielded forces on the circumference. This formulation directly confronted a central concern of almost all airpower

thinkers: what to target. To Warden the answer was clear: start at the inside and work out. Had it not been for the pivotal role that Warden played in the early planning for air operations in the Gulf War, *The Air Campaign* and Warden's subsequent musings on targeting philosophies would not have been of much more than academic interest.⁵⁸ Even at the time, however, it did represent a view in the Air Force that the application of airpower could, and perhaps even should, be thought of as being independent of ground operations. To this extent, it constituted another cross-current in the story of the Army-Air Force partnership

Conclusions

This article has examined two issues: the areas of convergence and divergence between Army and Air Force perspectives on air-ground operations between the end of the Vietnam War and the eve of Desert Shield and the underlying causes for them. It is clear that there was a great deal about which the services agreed. They agreed on the importance of CAS, that it was an Air Force mission, and that there should be a dedicated CAS platform and, therewith, a dedicated group of pilots whose sole training focus would be their ability to execute the CAS mission. They agreed on the importance of suppressing enemy air defenses, the fact that it was a shared responsibility, and the detailed procedures required to carry it out. They agreed on the importance of attacking enemy second-echelon forces, that Army helicopters and Air Force platforms could work in close cooperation to accomplish this mission, and the detailed tactical procedures such cooperation required. They disagreed over two issues: the amount of influence that senior ground commanders should have over Air Force interdiction operations, and the mechanisms for coordinating the effects of fixed-wing air and extended-range Army systems. At the risk of being somewhat simplistic, one can conclude that while at the tactical level there was very significant agreement, at the operational level there was noticeable divergence.

The dynamics behind these similarities and differences of perspective were the product of the centripetal forces that tended to pull the Army and the Air Force together and the centrifugal forces that tended to pull them apart.

The relative cohesion and strength of the Army-Air Force partnership from 1973 to 1990 can be attributed in rough priority to:

- the unifying effect of the NATO defense mission;
- the close cooperation of personalities at or near the top of each service;
- a leadership shift in the Air Force that put fighter rather than bomber pilots in the majority of influential positions; and
- the clarity of the Army's vision of how it intended to fight a future war that tended to pull the Air Force in its wake.

The NATO defense mission gave each service a clear and *unifying* mission. The ability to defeat a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe below the nuclear threshold was, for the period under analysis, the single most significant criterion of operational effectiveness for both services. When the Army and the Air Force looked at this challenge, each realized it needed the other. While it was true that the Army dependence on the Air Force was greater than vice versa, it could not be denied that to suppress hostile air defenses, the Air Force needed Army help. Furthermore, in order to make manifest its contribution to the national defense, the Air Force had to demonstrate its ability to destroy Soviet tanks as well as Soviet MiGs.

The close personal relations established between senior Army and Air Force leaders were vital to the strength of the partnership, helping to forge a bond in peace that one hoped would withstand the rigors of war.⁵⁹ These relationships were abetted by a gradual but distinct change in Air Force leadership. In 1960, bomber pilots held 77 percent of the top Air Force leadership positions, fighter pilots, 11 percent; by 1990 these percentages had become 18 and 53 percent respectively.⁶⁰ This shift seems to have been driven at least in part by the more prominent role of fighter pilots in the Vietnam War and the declining numbers of bombers in the inventory. While there are complications in the analysis, the trend is clear; and it is legitimate to suspect that the Air Force fighter community was slightly more favorably disposed to welcome the Army's doctrinal advances than was the bomber community.

The final factor pulling the Army and the Air Force together was the Army's clear vision of how it wanted to fight a future war and its distinct realization that Air Force support was absolutely essential for victory. Air Force centrality to the Army's view of tactics was integral to both the Active Defense and the AirLand Battle doctrines; the Army's articulation of the operational level of war in the latter also contained an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of coordinated air support. In something of a doctrinal muddle for several years after Vietnam, the Air Force appeared to follow the Army's lead.

There was, however, also a set of forces that tended to pull the services in opposite directions. These included:

- the operational differences between the media in which they fight;
- the cultural implications these differences engender;
- varying institutional structures for doctrinal formulation; and
- the capabilities of emerging technology.

Air and land forces fight in two distinctly dissimilar environments. The former enjoy the flexibility to focus their effects at different loci depending on the strategic, operational, and tactical dictates of the moment, but their presence is relatively transitory. The latter offer the offsetting advantage of much more permanent effects, but their flexibility is limited by gravity. These

diverging operating characteristics produce cultural approaches to war that maximize the inherent strengths of each force, i.e., flexibility and permanence.

Beyond these endemic difficulties of developing common doctrine, the Army's 1973 decision to create a major subordinate command dedicated to the formulation and promulgation of doctrine and the Air Force's choice *not* to create such a command made it difficult for the two services to develop common doctrinal framework. Finally, the technological evolution that extended the ranges of land-based indirect fire systems and armed helicopters blurred the line between what had been the relatively exclusive operational domains of the two services, thus creating new doctrinal challenges that defied easy solution.

Interestingly, the partnership between the two services appeared to be independent of two factors that frequently play a role in interservice relationships: the size of the defense budget and external pressure for cooperation. The partnership began in the mid-1970s when the defense budget was falling steadily in the aftermath of Vietnam, and it continued to prosper throughout the 1980s when the defense budget was robust. It is also clear that the partnership was not foisted on the services by outside pressure for greater joint cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was passed well after the TAC-TRADOC dialogue had matured into a full partnership and after the 31 Initiatives had been officially formulated. Furthermore the key joint publication, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, which flowed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act's specific recognition of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the promulgator of joint doctrine, was still in draft form in 1990.⁶¹ The drive for "jointness" therefore had virtually no effect on the cooperation that was established between the two services during the period of this study. While it could be argued that an earlier start on joint doctrine might have settled the unresolved issues between the Army and the Air Force prior to 1990, the extent to which joint doctrine can compensate for a lack of internally generated interservice cooperation remains to be demonstrated.

From 1973 to 1990, the Army and the Air Force formed a solid partnership centered around the Army's ability to execute its AirLand Battle doctrine with Air Force support. The strength of this partnership was evident in extensive biservice training, doctrinal publications, and programmatic cooperation. There was, however, an underlying tension that can be primarily attributed to diverging perspectives between the two services about the modalities of air-ground cooperation at the operational level of war. Had war broken out in Western Europe, it is arguable that the strengths of the partnership would have been much more apparent than its weaknesses. The tension in the partnership nevertheless became rather more apparent in the weeks and months after Saddam Hussein's tanks rolled into Kuwait, triggering the American-led coalition's responses of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In this theater, the Army-Air Force partnership was severely strained; and the per-

formance resembled neither a delicately balanced chamber session nor a finely tuned symphony, but a concerto in which each performer believed he was playing the featured instrument. Here, the mutual listening skills were exiguous, and the interaction between the two services at times resembled a dialogue of the deaf.⁶² But that is another story.

NOTES

This is an abbreviated version of a study that will appear in a forthcoming anthology of airpower analyses prepared by the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University. The author wishes to thank Andrew Bacevich, Dennis Drew, Douglas Johnson, Thomas Keaney, Phillip Meilinger, David Mets, and John Romjue for their substantive and useful comments on an early draft of the effort. All matters of fact and interpretation herein remain, however, the author's responsibility. They do not reflect the position of either the Air University or the Department of the Air Force.

1. Robert C. Marsh, "The Cleveland Orchestra: One Hundred Men and a Perfectionist," *High Fidelity*, 11 (February 1961), 38.

2. General William Momyer, who commanded the 7th Air Force in Vietnam, is explicit here. "It was apparent that airpower was the decisive factor leading to the peace agreement of 15 January 1973." William M. Momyer, *Airpower in Three Wars (WW II, Korea, Vietnam)* (Washington: Air Force History Office, 1978), p. 243.

3. Mark Clodfelter, "Nixon and the Air Weapon," in Dennis E. Showalter and John G. Albert, eds., *An American Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964-1973* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), pp. 182-83.

4. *Air Force Manual 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1984), pp. v-vi.

5. The TAC problem was exacerbated by the fact that it did not even speak for the entire tactical air community in the Air Force. United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), like TAC, were four-star commands with their own perspectives on air-ground operations issues.

6. Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), pp. 30, 33.

7. Additional details on DePuy's personal and TRADOC's institutional role in driving the lessons of the 1973 Middle East War into the Army's psyche are found in the TRADOC Report of Major Activities, FY 1974, 1 August 1975, pp. 14-19; TRADOC Report of Major Activities, FY 1975, 20 September 1976, pp. 1-10; and William E. DePuy, "Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine, and Systems," in Richard M. Swain, comp., *Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 75-111.

8. *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1976), p. 1-1.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 8-1.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 8-4.

11. Remainder of paragraph based on *Air Force Manual 1-1: United States Air Force Basic Doctrine* (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1975), p. 3-2.

12. Dennis M. Drew, "Two Decades in the Air Power Wilderness: Do We Know Where We Are?" *Air University Review*, 37 (September-October 1986), 12.

13. AF/XO Directorate of Concepts History, 1 July - 31 December 1976, p. 62. USAFHRA File No. K143.01.

14. Details on the A-10's design from William L. Smallwood, *Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War* (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 11-17.

15. Donald E. Lewis, et al., "An Analysis of Alternatives for Improving U.S. Air-to-Ground Capability in NATO (1980): Final Report (U)," (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1975). (S) Information taken from this document is unclassified.

16. J. H. Hayes, H. A. Einstein, and M. Weiner, "How the Soviet Ground Forces Would Fight a European War: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at the RAND Corporation, 19-20 May 1976 (U)" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977). (S) Information taken from this document is unclassified.

17. See R. E. Huschke, "Effect of Weather on Near-Term Battlefield Air Support in NATO: Weather and Warplanes VII (U)" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1978) (C) and D. E. Lewis, et al., "Potential Vulnerabilities of the Warsaw Pact Tactical Rear: Analysis and Results (U)" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1979). (S) Information taken from these documents is unclassified.

18. TRADOC Annual Historical Review (AHR), FY 1976/7T, 22 September 1977, p. 55. TRADOC History Office (THO). ALFA was subsequently redesignated the Air-Land Forces Application Agency.

19. TRADOC AHR, FY 1976/77, p. 56, THO.
20. TRADOC AHR, 1 October 1976 to 30 September 1977 (U), 29 August 1978, p. 34, THO.
21. What follows is based on Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 322-25.
22. TRADOC AHR, 1 October 1977 to 30 September 1978, 1 November 1979, p. 177, THO.
23. Ibid.
24. One of the earliest external critiques was William S. Lind, "FM 100-5, Operations: Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army," *Military Review*, 57 (March 1977), 54-65.
25. For a hard-hitting critique of the Active Defense, see Gregory Fontenot and Matthew D. Roberts, "Plugging Holes and Mending Fences," *Infantry*, 68 (May-June 1978), 32-36. Robert S. Doughty and L. D. Holder, "Images of the Future Battlefield," *Military Review*, 58 (January 1978), 56-69, contains a more scholarly and muted criticism that saw the "new tactics" as an intermediate step in a longer process. See also John M. Oseth, "FM 100-5 (Operations) Revisited: A Need for Better Foundation Concepts?" *Military Review*, 60 (March 1980), 13-19. For additional details, see John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, Va.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), pp. 13-21. The criticism of the Active Defense doctrine is also perceptively assessed in Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," a paper presented at the Kingston RMC Military History Symposium, 23-24 March 1995, pp. 15-22.
26. Romjue, *Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, p. 30.
27. In an address to the Tactics/InterUniversity Seminar Symposium at Fort Leavenworth on 30 March 1978, Starry defended the rationale behind the Active Defense, but admitted that improvements could be made in the doctrine and that the emerging dialogue on the subject was useful. Donn A. Starry, "A Tactical Evolution—FM 100-5," *Military Review*, 58 (August 1978), 2-11.
28. The subtleties of the DePuy-Starry relationship during development of the Active Defense doctrine are explored in Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done*, pp. 81-83.
29. Starry's subsequent recollection of this experience: "The fact that we needed to fight the deep battle, not just with firepower, but by going deep with maneuver forces as well, starting with attack helicopters, followed by ground maneuver forces, much on the order that the Israelis did on the Golan Heights in October 1973, highlighted the deep surveillance-deep fires and command and control needs." John L. Romjue interview with Starry, 19 March 1993, THO. One of the interesting aspects of this revelation is how Starry's perception of the lessons of the Middle East War differed from DePuy's. To Starry it demonstrated the need to maneuver deep; to DePuy it indicated the need to blunt the breakthrough attack.
30. TRADOC Commander message, 29 January 1981, Subject: The Air Land Battle, THO.
31. Starry confirmed that the term AirLand Battle had its roots in the extensive discussions that had taken place between TAC and TRADOC since 1973. Author's interview with General Donn A. Starry (USA, Ret.), 13 May 1995. Starry also told his doctrine writers that getting the Air Force on board was absolutely necessary to make the doctrine work. Author's interview with Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege (USA, Ret.), 16 February 1995.
32. One of the interpretive issues here is the extent to which AirLand Battle represented a logical extension of Active Defense and the extent to which it represented an overthrow thereof. Starry's position is the former, i.e. AirLand Battle = Active Defense + Deep Battle. Starry interview, 13 May 1995. One of the two principal authors of the 1982 edition of *FM 100-5* saw AirLand Battle and Active Defense doctrines as being almost antithetical. Wass de Czege interview, 16 February 1995.
33. *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1982), p. 2-3.
34. Ibid., Appendix B and p. 2-1.
35. *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), p. I. Wass de Czege, who also worked the second draft of this edition, maintained that the first several years of teaching in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, for which he served as the first Director, were essential to expanding the treatment of the operational level of war. Wass de Czege interview, 16 February 1995.
36. *Field Manual 100-5*, 1986, p. 28.
37. *Air Force Manual 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1984).
38. Ibid., p. 2-14.
39. Army/Air Force "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON JOINT USA/USAF EFFORTS FOR ENHANCEMENT OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE," 21 April 1983, reprinted in Richard G. Davis, *The 31 Initiatives* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 91-92.
40. Army/Air Force "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON INITIATION OF A JOINT US ARMY - US AIR FORCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS," 2 November 1983, reprinted in Davis, p. 93.
41. These categories of initiatives were established by Davis for purposes of historical analysis; the MOA merely listed the initiatives themselves. See Davis, pp. 47-64.

42. Ibid., pp. 71-79.
43. *AFM 1-1*, 1984, p. 2-20.
44. What follows is based on Steven L. Canby, "Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare: The Divergence within NATO," *Air University Review*, 30 (May-June 1979), 2-20.
45. This doctrine was codified in the NATO *Allied Tactical Publication 27 (B)*, *Offensive Air Support*.
46. Stephen T. Rippe, "An Army and Air Force Issue: Principles and Procedures for AirLand Warfare," *Air University Review*, 37 (May-June 1986), 63.
47. The lack of such influence over shallow interdiction was a major point of contention for the US VII Corps in the Gulf War.
48. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations Memorandum, Subject: USA and USAF Agreement on Apportionment and Allocation of Offensive Air Support (OAS)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, 23 May 1981, THO.
49. USA AND USAF POSITION ON APPORTIONMENT/ALLOCATION OF OAS, attachment 2 to *ibid.*, par. 6d.
50. These reservations were reflected in the AF/XO history of the period: "Following the Field Review, AF/XOXID forwarded much of the background data on the OAS Agreement to TAC and USAFE [United States Air Forces, Europe] in an effort to defend the issue. However, it is obvious that opinions continue to differ and that discussions on this subject will continue in the coming months." AF/XO Director of Plans History, 1 July - 31 December 1981, p. 90. USAFHRA File No. K143.01.
51. TRADOC AHR, 1 January to 31 December 1987, August 1988, p. 93, THO.
52. Robert T. Russ, "The Air Force, the Army, and the Battlefield of the 1990s," *Defense* 88, August 1988, p. 13. Russ's statement was quite controversial within some circles of the Air Staff because it seemed to preclude the use of tactical air assets for strategic attack.
53. "Deep Operations Capabilities Handbook: Present and Future (U)" (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1987), pp. iii, 1-21, CAC historical files. Handbook is classified Secret; portions cited are unclassified.
54. The 1988 TRADOC annual history mentions an agreement signed that year by the service chiefs that established notification and coordination procedures for Army fires beyond the FSCL. TRADOC AHR, 1 January to 31 December 1988, June 1989, p. 35, THO. However, as in the case of the BAI agreement signed by the service OPSDEPS, the provisions of this agreement were not incorporated into doctrine.
55. John A. Warden, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988).
56. The summer of 1988 time-frame is from the author's interview with Colonel John Warden, USAF, 6 June 1995. In this interview, Warden explicitly stated that his purpose was to create a new vision of airpower that would supplant the Creech/Russ view that airpower's primary function was to support the Army.
57. The fully developed concept can be found in John A. Warden, "The Enemy as a System," *Airpower Journal*, 9 (Spring 1995), 40-55.
58. The role that Warden's ideas played in shaping the American military response to Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait is beyond the scope of this study. One version of that story is dramatically outlined in Richard T. Reynolds, *Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1995).
59. Starry was emphatic on this point. He stated categorically, "We would not have had AirLand Battle had it not been for him [Bill Creech]. I could not have carried it off by myself." Author's interview with Starry, 13 May 1995.
60. These figures and those that follow are taken from a thesis by James M. Ford, "Air Force Culture and Conventional Strategic Airpower" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1992), p. 60.
61. The JCS issued Joint Publication 3-0 as a test publication on 10 January 1990. TRADOC AHR 1 January to 31 December 1990, June 1991, p. 55, THO. The manual was not published in final form until 1994.
62. The literature of the Gulf War is replete with instances of ineffective communication between the Army and the Air Force. See, inter alia, Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 151-52, 218-23, 338-40; Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 174-81, 315-16; Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm" (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), pp. 181-90; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 203-04, 324-48, 447-54, 494; and Barry D. Watts's perceptive review essay of Gordon and Trainor's work, "Friction in the Gulf War," *Naval War College Review*, 48 (Autumn 1995), 105. A dissenting view is that of Edward Mann, who contends that "the air campaign plan would eventually meld perfectly with schemes of surface maneuver to be developed later." Edward C. Mann, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1995), p. 175.

Commentary & Reply

AFTER RALPH'S "REVOLUTION"

To the Editor:

In the Summer 1995 issue of *Parameters*, Ralph Peters delivered a brilliant, thought-provoking piece, "After the Revolution." In typical Ralph Peters style, he challenged, cajoled, and provoked—and encouraged military professionals to articulate our ultimate purpose. Yet, in one fundamental way, he faltered. He lost sight of what unites us as a group of free individuals: our Constitution and the rule of law.

Without a vision and "parameters" to guide us toward our vision, we easily can become lost. Major Peters' search for meaning ended hopelessly as he saw today's military caught somewhere between the drug war and maneuvering to avoid the "non-military" roles into which it is continually being thrust. His hopes were not raised when he peered into the future—all Ralph saw was more "filthy missions" rather than Gettysburgs and Shilohs. How could someone who has trained as hard, read as much, and thought so deeply about his profession lose faith in where we're heading? It happens when one loses sight of the objective and tries to operate without a gameplan.

What disturbed me most about "After the Revolution," was Ralph's assertion that "A military's reason for being is to do the nation's dirty work." Quite the contrary—in the United States and all truly liberal democratic states, a military's reason for being is to do the nation's sublime work. Our reason for being is "to deter war"—not make war. If deterrence fails, our job is to win wars—but consistent with the principles on which liberal democratic nations stand. At no time can we as military professionals take our eyes off our Constitution, or operate outside the bounds of legitimacy that it embodies. Our unity—that which ties us to the people we serve—is the rule of law. When contact with the Constitution is broken, people feel insecure, people lose their sense of purpose, and yes, the future can appear very uncertain.

Major Peters was on point when he expressed frustrations with restrictions and gray areas in US efforts to fight drugs. He was penetratingly accurate when he stated that in recent deployments, "there has not been one weapon system, no matter how expensive and technologically mature, that has been as valuable as a single culturally competent Foreign Area Officer." Later, he was brilliant with, "At the present, we are preparing for the war we want to fight someday, not for the conflicts we cannot avoid."

Yet, his impassioned remark, "You cannot, cannot, cannot play by textbook rules when your opponent either hasn't read the book or has thrown it away" starts down the path towards the "dirty work" mentality that sounds good, and sadly enough to many people, feels good. But, it is wrong, plain and simple.

Richard Simpkin concluded his masterpiece on warfare in the 21st-century (*Race to the Swift*, 1985) with the assertion that the answer to winning wars in the future will be through finding a "politico-legal device." Today's "operations other than war" (OOTW) and Ralph's "conflicts we cannot avoid" are echoes of Simp-

kin's "Irregular operations of every kind constitute the most likely form of future armed conflict; they should be understood and acknowledged for what they are—a way of war!" Simpkin both foresaw the days of OOTW and prescribed a way for militaries to engage, all the while maintaining their legitimacy. The answer is not in working outside the law, but in changing law to conform to current realities. In this way, the law becomes a force multiplier, not an inhibitor.

Simpkin offered an example of a politico-legal device that could serve as a model for today: the device of outlawry.

It worked remarkably well and was rightly much feared. . . . Individual outlaws and known members of outlawed organisations would have the same legal status as hostile combatants at war. . . . The state would then be entitled to employ against them both the gamut of revolutionary warfare techniques and, if appropriate, unrestrained action by organised forces.

That is the proper way to engage today. If, like Ralph, we as military professionals feel frustrated, operating with our hands tied behind our backs, it's time to think through the problem and be prepared to offer a better solution. Even freedom has its restraints—unrestricted freedom is anarchy. Our guidebook is the Constitution, and our bounds are the rule of law.

Lieutenant Colonel Mac Warner
Fort McPherson, Georgia

To the Editor:

I found Ralph Peters' article "After the Revolution" to be refreshing reading. His outspoken commentary certainly provided alternative perspectives on several issues. However, the work is op-ed like in its discussion; if his intent was to produce an analytical effort, he fell short.

Peters errs in his premise, central to the article, concerning the rise of the "criminal and warlord parastates" and the simultaneous decline of the nation-state. Peters' evidence for the decline of the nation-state is unconvincing. One wonders, for instance, how he classifies Sarajevo as a city state. It is simply a strategic piece of terrain being fought over by warring parties, and will belong to the nation-state of the victor. His other examples are also suspect. Russian anarcho-capitalism is simply a nasty-sounding description of the growing pains of an emerging democracy saddled with the baggage of a communist past. Economic migration is indeed a problem faced by nation-states, but cannot be characterized as an "emerging system."

No doubt terrorists, drug traffickers, "criminal governments" and the shopping list of transnational actors are serious threats to an assortment of nation-states; however, threats to individual states (Peters builds a good case for this) and threats to the nation-state system are different issues. For parasitic transnational actors, the nation-state system is the beast that must exist for them to survive. Gratuitous statements and liberal reference to a nation transitioning to democracy (Russia) and a weak nation-state (Colombia) hardly offer compelling evidence that the nation-state system is in decline. Peters also has not adequately identified what system will replace the nation-state system. Criminal international organizations? With no nation-states, they cannot be international—they cease to exist. They cannot profitably oper-

ate, at least on a large scale, in anarchical situations. Warlord states? Again, these states (and I assume Somalia is his example), are hardly threats to nation-states; indeed, they are prey for nation-states. Does Major Peters believe that Somalia will continue to be dominated by warlords in the long term? Check back in five years.

The nation-state system is alive, and yes, it is well. As long as motivations of nationalism, ethnicity, and religion exist, the nation-state will survive. There is currently no viable, long-term alternative.

Major Paul A. McCarthy, USA Ret.
Woodbridge, Virginia

To the Editor:

As a recent graduate of the Command and General Staff College, I had the unique opportunity to spend the last two weeks of the CGSC experience participating in the Prairie Warrior '95 Exercise. Over the course of this ten-day, high-tech simulation, the computers went down for a variety of reasons. During one of the many lulls, I wandered over to the library to find something to read. Discovering the Summer edition of *Parameters*, I read with bitter joy Major Ralph Peters' essay "After the Revolution."

This essay ought to be required reading for every officer, especially those of higher rank. The Prairie Warrior exercise, and indeed, the entire CGSC course, merits Major Peters' epithet, "At present, we are preparing for the war we want to fight someday, not for the conflicts we cannot avoid." Whether the enemy was the "Nebraskis" or "Krasnovians" encountered during the regular CGSC tactics block of instruction, or the North Koreans during the Prairie Warrior exercise, most of our training has been directed against conventional, World War II-style enemies.

As the exercise was drawing to a close, and the hundreds of computers and associated supplies and equipment were being collected, it seemed to me that the new acronym CEA (criminal enterprise armies) coined by Major Peters might also be used to describe the dangerous collusion between high-level defense officials, politicians, and representatives from the defense industries. These capitalist enterprise armies have a vested interest in ensuring that Uncle Sam continues to spend billions of dollars on questionable defense products. Though far different in externals, these two types of armies share some distinct similarities: both look at armaments as a means of making money, and both place the welfare of their constituency above that of the nation. Heaven help the individual American soldier should these armies decide to collaborate.

Major Ray C. Finch III
Lawrence, Kansas

The Author Replies:

Writing on these themes, I have two aims: to help destroy the enemies of my country, and to conserve the lives of my fellow soldiers in doing so. I am willing to slaughter any sacred cows blocking the road to military effectiveness. There is no such thing as "defeat in good conscience."

Major Ralph Peters

ON "MORAL OBLIGATION"

To the Editor:

The article by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Christopher ("Unjust War and Moral Obligation: What Should Officers Do?") in the Autumn 1995 issue of *Parameters* is one of the most thought-provoking articles I've read in a long time. I think he raises an issue both for officers on active duty and for those of us who are "part-time" citizen-soldiers, and who may have a different view of the profession of arms. Before reading the article, my position would have been, "Of course, if an officer has a total moral opposition to the policies of his or her government, he or she has the duty to resign." Now I'm not so sure.

But I have a question for Lieutenant Colonel Christopher. How does he judge the World War II German generals, based on his standards? Many readers and historians have criticized Hitler's senior officers for their failure to do anything other than acquiesce to Hitler's ambitions. Some, such as Ludwig Beck, resigned. Some others, such as Franz Halder, served despite misgivings, and ultimately Halder (along with Beck) participated in the 20 July plot. And the great majority "soldiered on," with greater or lesser knowledge of the evil they were serving. After all, Hitler was a legally elected head of state. I think that Lieutenant Colonel Christopher should apply his contemporary standard back to history, as the study of history is one of the few ways we have to gain "experience" without having to live through such an incredibly painful choice.

Major David Emery, USAR
Vancouver, BC, Canada

To the Editor:

I find myself troubled by Paul Christopher's "Unjust War and Moral Obligation." I write with some hesitation because I do not claim to be well read on the literature bearing on the issue and I am not a philosopher, but I have over the years reflected on the issue: What would I have done had I found myself confronted with the problem, the moral dilemma posed? Christopher contends that "A military officer's resignation when called to arms, especially that of a senior officer, would constitute a public statement about . . . the political objectives." By long tradition officers abstain from a public stance on political issues. He goes on to assert "Just as officers ought not to fight when the President decides against the use of force, they ought not to refuse to fight when the President orders them to."

While we clearly cannot have each and every individual in the armed forces free to decide on whim whether to fight or not, Christopher seems to allow no room for opposition to unjust action. He admits it is difficult "to know . . . with any degree of certainty which side in a war is just," but that still leaves us in doubt as to the course a moral officer should take. Didn't we execute Axis officers in the post-World War II war crimes trials for failing to make private judgments against unjust war?

It appears to me that Lieutenant Colonel Christopher is too emphatic, too absolute. What if some future US political authority orders a clearly unjust war? Are we to abide by his standard and emulate those Nazi officers who carried out Hitler's orders? Might there not be at least some middle ground? An officer asked

to lead in an unjust action might ask to be relieved of his command rather than resigning from the service. This may be a less than ideal solution, but it does attempt to address the vital issue of private conscience in the military context.

Professor I. B. Holley, Jr. (MG, USAFR, Ret.)
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

The Author Replies:

Professor Holley and Major Emery are right to pose their questions concerning my arguments about a professional officer's obligation to fight in unjust wars in the context of Nazi Germany. This is the toughest case, and it raises a number of important arguments to which I must either respond persuasively or soften my position.

Nazi Germany presents a difficult case because we tend to condemn this evil regime not only for its aggression but also for the heinous crimes committed against its own citizens, and it is difficult to separate these two distinct policies. I believe that Germany's policy of genocide against certain of its own citizens negated any claim the Third Reich may have had to legitimacy, and military officers who knew of such government-sanctioned practices had, as a bare minimum, a moral obligation to resign.

But few military officers knew of Hitler's policy of genocide (although some knew of the internments), and their culpability for the crime of aggression is less clear. Nations embarking on acts of aggression are always careful to cloak their deeds in moral terms. For example: (a) ancient claims to territory, resources, and authority; (b) the need to protect (or tax) national and religious populations that spill over territorial boundaries; and (c) claims of military necessity and the need for national security—all have been used to disguise naked aggression in just robes. As long as there is some plausibility to such claims, however, how is one to ascertain with any certainty the intentions of policymakers? The issue of whether wars are objectively just or not is uncannily elusive. Indeed, even today debate continues concerning the justice of past US uses of military force. Consider the US Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Marine occupation of Lebanon that led to the Beirut bombing in 1983, US "humanitarian" actions in Somalia, Operation Just Cause in Panama; the US invasions of the Dominican Republic and Grenada, and the Bay of Pigs, to mention just a few examples. There are intelligent, informed people arguing both sides of the justice issue in each case.

Moreover, intelligent persons disagree over criteria for determining when force should be used. One widely accepted view held by political leaders and scholars is that self-interest, not justice, is the only relevant consideration for deciding when to use force. They claim that decisions concerning the use of force are best understood as a kind of national cost-benefit analysis. Even though I believe this position is badly misinformed, I include it because it is so pervasive among political scientists. Upon reflection it is obvious that when developing algorithms for a cost-benefit analysis, one will have to consider the same components that those who advocate justice consider—e.g., costs in terms of human suffering, loss of lives, financial hardships; and benefits in terms of law enforcement, international stability, and national prestige. Cost-benefit analysis is simply a moral argument couched in consequentialist terms. Obviously, the components of what counts as appropriate costs and benefits are subject to widespread disagreement, not to mention the difficulty of predicting with any significant accuracy the future outcomes (costs and benefits) of political undertakings.

My point is that in many cases we simply won't know or may very likely be mistaken about the justice of a particular use of force. Recognizing this fact in advance, we agree *ahead of time* to fight in wars that are formally just. This is why the just war tradition absolves soldiers from culpability concerning the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) and holds them responsible only for the actual conduct of war (*jus in bello*).

While each of us may nurture his or her own subjective sense of ideal justice (we often call this our conscience), joining the military profession constitutes an agreement to fight on behalf of the "ideal" concept of justice embodied in our nation's Constitution. It is crucial that our precommissioning programs emphasize this fact.

Notice that although Professor Holley concedes that "we clearly cannot have each and every individual in the armed forces decide on whim whether to fight or not," the position he defends would permit just that, as the recent example of a US soldier who refused to serve under a UN command points out.

Suppose this soldier were to claim that the US/UN intervention is unjust because there are no clearly stated political objectives and there is little chance of success? I presume that Professor Holley would respond that the US Constitution clearly states that treaty agreements are "the supreme Law of the Land" (Art. VI), and that because a lawful authority has lawfully agreed to send US forces in accordance with a US/UN agreement, and because this soldier took an oath carry out the legal orders of his superiors, he has a legal and moral obligation to do so. This was, after all, one of the central conditions of his enlistment. Professor Holley's desire to salvage "private conscience in the military context," though understandable, is simply not defensible because formal justice in such situations takes us as close to ideal justice as we can get.

This does not mean officers must always fight when ordered. In addition to actions that might call into question the legitimacy of the government—such as *policies* directed toward the suppression of religious freedoms or genocide—which would mandate resignation, there are cases where the formal justice of a war might be questioned.

Consider the actions of the US political establishment leading up to the Gulf War, for example. (I discuss this case in *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Moral and Legal Issues* [Princeton, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994], pp. 93-95.) The US Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to declare war, but President Bush had already begun ordering US forces into the region when Congress began its debate on US involvement, and he made it clear that he would continue to deploy forces with or without congressional approval. On 12 January 1991, the Senate avoided a confrontation by voting 52 to 47 in favor of the use of force. The Senate announced that it was merely a vote of confidence, but suppose that the vote had gone the other way; suppose the Senate had voted 50 to 49 against supporting President Bush's plans. The War Powers Resolution gives the President the authority to commit forces without congressional approval for up to 60 days, but this period is only meant to give the President the flexibility to respond to crisis on short notice while Congress debates the issue. Cases where the President were to order troops to combat in the face of congressional disapproval would call into question the formal justice of the war, and in such cases military officers should refuse to obey.

A recent example of informal justice occurred when then-President Marcos of the Philippines was not reelected to office and attempted to call out the army in order to stay in power. Secretary of Defense Henrique passed the order along, but the Secretary of the Army, General Ramos (a graduate of West Point and now President of the

Philippines) refused to obey. Instead, he ordered his military units to remain in their barracks, thereby averting the collapse of the constitutional government.

In sum, officers have a legal and moral obligation to fight in wars mandated by their government unless one of these two conditions is met:

- The government has, by actions directed against its own population, rendered itself illegitimate.
- The war violates constitutional requirements of formal justice.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Christopher

GENERALS AT LEAVENWORTH

To the Editor:

Douglas Johnson's interesting review of Jonathan Shay's *Achilles in Vietnam* in the Autumn 1995 issue requires one emendation. In describing a symposium on officer responsibility conducted at the Command and General Staff College, Dr. Johnson attributes the initiative for the session to General Creighton Abrams, the Army's Chief of Staff at the time. In fact it was Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, then Commandant at Fort Leavenworth, who was responsible for the design and conduct of the symposium. General Abrams did get involved, however, after a number of general officers who had been invited to the event came away very unhappy with the rough treatment they had received at the hands of student officers who were extremely critical of the ethical standards of senior officers as they perceived them. Some of the disgruntled generals suggested that there might be a problem at Leavenworth, that maybe Cushman was getting out of hand.

Word of this unhappiness eventually got to Abrams, who went out to Leavenworth to have a look for himself. He gave a talk, then met with groups of students for some candid give and take, including discussion of the recent symposium. One student asked him what he thought about that event; "You want to do your very best not to force people to lie," Abrams told him.

When the visit was over and Cushman was seeing Abrams off, the Chief of Staff turned to him and said: "I don't have any problem with these students. They're all right." That was the final word on the symposium on officer responsibility.

Lewis Sorley
Potomac, Maryland

The Reviewer Replies:

Dr. Sorley is doubtless correct on attributing the initiative to General Cushman. Jack Cushman was doing his dead-level best to innovate and make the course relevant. I do distinctly recall the rumors of reports to the Chief, although we students had little direct knowledge of the particulars. As students we were quite certain the Army was not likely to repeat the event, as the discomfort of the visiting general officers was plainly evident. Nevertheless, we felt we had done our best for posterity and were not at all worried that General Abrams would be upset with us. Evidently he wasn't. Dr. Sorley's comments are a welcome addition.

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson

Review Essays

Looking Back at the Bomb

JAMES E. AUER and RICHARD HALLORAN

The great debate over the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that swept across America last summer was partly emotional and even trivial but mainly genuine and profound. The 50th anniversary of the bombings generated at least nine books, a packet of magazine articles, radio commentaries, television shows, reminiscences by Americans who attacked and Japanese who were victims. If it had not been for the O. J. Simpson trial, the atomic issue might have dominated national attention.

The deliberations have subsided, but that does not mean the issues have gone away or a consensus has been reached. The fundamental question remains: Was the United States justified in dropping two bombs that immediately killed 200,000 people, the vast majority of them civilians? More simply, was President Truman right or wrong?

After studying much of the literature, we have concluded that the United States was justified and President Truman was right. We also believe that, like most human endeavors, it could have been handled better; the atomic bombing of Nagasaki so soon after Hiroshima is rightly open to question. Lastly, we recognize that, again as with most human endeavor, reasonable men and women will differ.

Sifting through this mass of material, it seems evident that Japan had been defeated by late July 1945, and that some Japanese leaders realized this. But defeat and surrender are not the same, and the issue was how to get Japan, notably the militarists who ruled the nation, to quit. In this, President Truman appeared to have six options:

- Invade Japan in two stages, prolonging the war for a year and taking large numbers of American and Allied casualties.
- Continue the aerial bombing and naval blockade until the Japanese lost the will to resist and surrendered.
- Get the Russians into the war in the hope they would crack Japanese resolve and make them sue for peace.
- Accept Japan's proposals to negotiate by modifying the demand for an unconditional surrender to permit Japan to retain the Emperor, a vital point to the Japanese, and agreeing to a minimal occupation of Japan.
- Warn that atomic bombs would be used unless Japan surrendered, and possibly detonate one as a demonstration.
- Drop the atomic bombs to shock the Japanese into quitting before more devastation was loosed on their nation.

Each option was considered, some more thoroughly than others, between 12 April when Mr. Truman became President and 24 July when he approved an order to drop the bombs after 3 August 1945. It was not a methodical process—government then was no more neat and orderly than it is today—but the decision was taken after three and a half years of a brutal, draining, desperate war.

US forces planned to invade Kyushu, Japan's southwestern island, on 1 November 1945; a second assault was planned for 1 March 1946, against Tokyo. As for expected casualties, planners knew the ratio had risen as American forces got closer to Japan and the Japanese became ever more ferocious in defending their homeland. Estimates were all over the lot, from a minimum of 40,000 on up.

Continuing to bomb and blockade aroused fears that Japan would wait out the United States in hopes of a better deal. Americans were weary and impatient to end the war. Keeping an invasion force poised for months would be hard. Allied prisoners all over Asia might be killed.

The Russians promised to enter the war in August, but there is little evidence that Japan would have quit even if the Russians had reached the southern tip of Korea. The high command in Tokyo was not relying on forces on the Asian mainland to defend Japan proper.

Negotiating on Japanese terms was seen as breaking faith with Allies and a political land mine within the United States, where the public backed unconditional surrender. The Allies relented on retaining the Emperor; a shift in the Potsdam Declaration called for the unconditional surrender of Japan's armed forces rather than Japan as a nation, a nuance that Japanese diplomats caught but militarists ignored.

Much thought was given to warning the Japanese about the atomic bomb beyond the Potsdam Declaration's promise that Japan faced "prompt and utter destruction," but some doubted the Japanese high command would believe it. A proposed demonstration was dismissed because the Japanese might shoot down the airplane carrying the bomb, because the bomb had been tested but once and might not work again, and because the Japanese might think the United States had only one.

That left dropping the bomb. On 24 July in Potsdam, Mr. Truman approved its use. The next night, he wrote in his diary: "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. . . . It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made useful."

Critics of Mr. Truman contend he dropped the bomb to stave off the Russians, or to justify the \$2 billion expense of developing the bomb, or because he was a racist. The overwhelming evidence in several of the new books, plus that from historian David McCullough in his superb biography, *Truman*, shows that the President was driven foremost by a determination to end the war on American terms and with the least loss of life. "We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war," Mr. Truman said just after the bomb had been dropped.

With the benefit of hindsight, some of the criticism might have been forestalled if the Potsdam Declaration had included an explicit pledge that the imperial throne would be retained plus an explicit warning about the atomic bomb. No one knows, however, whether that would have been enough to make Japan surrender. No Japanese has come forward to say: "If only . . ."

Each student of this decision may draw his or her own insights from the history of this episode. Among them might be to reinforce the conviction that moral issues do not go away, as much as a soldier might be tempted to brush them aside to get on with the mission. Another might be an understanding that the only fair way to judge a momentous decision would be in the context of the times. As Senator Howard Baker said during the Watergate hearings: "What did the President know and when did he know it?"

Still another: Personalities count, whether they be elected or appointed political leaders or serving military officers. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson comes off as thoughtful and perceptive, while Secretary of State James Byrnes seems to have been unable to see past the next political maneuver. Even so, in this decision, civilian supremacy over the military services served the nation well. Students of this question might find enlightening a comparison between the dominating political role of the Japanese high command and the subordinate military role of the American Joint Chiefs in World War II.

Lastly, we come away from these books again discouraged by the corrosive effect of interservice rivalry. Some was natural and even constructive: Each service thought it had the better way to force Japan to surrender—the Army Air Force by bombing, the Navy by blockade, the Army by invasion. From that came consideration of all possibilities. But sometimes a reader might wonder whether General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz were more concerned with fighting each other than the Japanese.

A leader of the so-called revisionists who condemn President Truman's decision is Gar Alperovitz, a historian and political economist at the University of Maryland. His new book, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb*, is an updated version of his 1965 *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*. Armed with scores of declassified records, including Mr. Truman's notes on Potsdam that were discovered in 1979, Alperovitz has written a long and thoroughly documented work.

He contends that Japan knew it was defeated by May 1945. In his view, if the United States had indicated more clearly that Japan could retain Emperor Hirohito, Japan would have surrendered without an American invasion or the atomic bombings. Any hesitation by Japan would have been overcome by Russia's attack, but the United States delayed the Potsdam Conference so that the Alamogordo atomic test results would be known. Then, Secretary of State Byrnes persuaded President Truman to discourage Soviet entry into the war. Alperovitz further contends that most US officials, military and civilian, other than Byrnes, who won over a wavering President Truman, and the Manhattan Project chief, Lieutenant General Leslie Groves, wanted the Potsdam Declaration to assure the Japanese that they could retain the Emperor. Despite his almost endless documentation, Alperovitz admits that critical decisions at Potsdam were not documented, including the decision on 24 July to allow the Army Air Force to use atomic bombs on cities as soon as made ready. Alperovitz says Byrnes wanted to use the bombs not to induce Japan's surrender but to make the Soviets behave. Thus, two bombs were needlessly dropped on two cities that weren't military targets.

Then Alperovitz contends that Truman and Byrnes proceeded to cover up the deed. While Alperovitz anoints Byrnes as his major villain, he's back and forth on Secretary of War Stimson. He alternately paints him as the "good" advocate of offering assurances on the Emperor, the "bad" Cabinet secretary responsible for building the bomb, the "good" savior of the ancient capital in Kyoto, and the "bad" postwar apologist for the bomb. Most poignantly, Alperovitz uses Stimson as the "good" voice of reason arguing unsuccessfully that "where wisdom lay" was in seeing "satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb." Alperovitz is hard on Truman for not listening to his Chief of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, who warned that atomic bombs would be in the same category as poison gas, a violation of "all of

the known acts of war.” The author condemns the President for having acted illegally, self-servingly overestimating the number of American lives saved, and misrepresenting Hiroshima and Nagasaki as military targets.

Race is the focus of historian and multiculturalist Ronald Takaki, a Japanese American at the University of California, Berkeley, in his mercifully briefer *Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb*. Mr. Truman’s racial bias, his lack of international experience, and his inferiority complex dominate Takaki’s account. Takaki also takes umbrage over Truman’s estimate of half-a-million lives saved by the bombs and emphasizes the lesser casualty estimates of some military leaders.

Takaki makes sure his readers know Mr. Truman used the “n-word” frequently, including in letters to his wife, Bess. In one, Mr. Truman writes, his Uncle Will “says the Lord made a white man of dust, a nigger from mud, then threw up what was left and it came down a Chinaman. He does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I.” Takaki tells us there was lots of racism then in the United States, in case we didn’t know, and Harry Truman, despite some actions to the contrary, such as in integrating the military services after the war, was an example of that racism.

Robert Jay Lifton, a professor of psychology at John Jay College and the City University of New York, and Greg Mitchell, a former editor of *Nuclear Times* magazine, consider the term “revisionist” to be pejorative. Even so, they are far more vituperative than Alperovitz and Takaki in condemning Mr. Truman and his associates in their *Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial*. They allege not only a cover-up by Truman, but a “confabulation,” which they define as “an untrue belief or reconstruction that can unconsciously alter events in favor of one’s own moral claim.” The authors assert: “It can change what one actually did into something one’s conscience can accept—and this confabulation had the specific psychological function of placing blame for the bombings entirely on the Japanese.”

In the final quarter of this volume, the authors describe the “largely unexamined dimension of Hiroshima: the lasting psychological, ethical, and political impact on those who used the first nuclear weapons.” They say “the bomb’s contamination not only of Japanese victims and survivors, but of the American mind as well” has produced “aberrations in American life.”

Among these aberrations, they list nuclear weapons “as the dominant technology of a permanent, self-propelling American megamachine that seems almost independent of human control.” The nuclear dynamic “inevitably extends to non-nuclear devices” being seen as “humane,” which “undoubtedly influenced the widespread use of highly advanced and lethal napalm in Vietnam and carpet bombing in Iraq.” The atomic bomb’s “desecration and transgression is further illuminated by the Frankenstein myth” as the monster and his creator are “antithetical halves of a single being.”

Lifton and Mitchell assert that America’s “bomb entrapment required us to violate existing ethical practices in actions aimed at harming our people and consistently lying to them about that harm.” It was a “self-betrayal” of “our own history, our national entity, and ourselves.” Hiroshima is the “mother of all cover-ups, creating tonalities, distortions, manipulative procedures, and patterns of concealment that have been applied to all of American life that followed” in Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran-Contra.

They assert the decision to bomb Hiroshima ultimately caused the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda. There is more, but you get the drift.

The analyses by Alperovitz, Takaki, and, most of all, Lifton and Mitchell, confuse power and morality. War, as Clausewitz reminds us, is a continuation of politics by other means, and those means can get very nasty. Alperovitz, Takaki, Lifton, and Mitchell say little about the strategic concerns of American leaders during and after World War II. Alperovitz mentions but provides little analysis of Roosevelt's decision to defer the serious problem of dealing with the Soviet Union. Truman had to confront that problem immediately and saw the potential of the bomb to end the war plus deal with Soviet aggressiveness. Alperovitz and the others blame Truman and Byrnes for causing the Cold War; Lifton and Mitchell blame them for a myriad of additional ills. But none of these authors offers convincing evidence to suggest that their alternative strategies would have produced a better world.

More important, Alperovitz, Takaki, and Lifton and Mitchell fail to note that the atomic decision was made cleanly and properly by the civilian Commander in Chief of the armed forces in accordance with the Constitution. No Dr. Strangelove appeared. Alperovitz suggests that the inexperienced or naive Truman might have been duped by Byrnes but does not assert that the President denied his responsibility for the decision even when the suffering from the blasts and radiation became obvious. In short, the authors ignored the process of civilian control that worked.

All three books also make much of reservations by military and civilian leaders before the bombs were dropped. None of the authors, however, notes that no one even threatened to resign, much less did so to indicate moral outrage. If military officers are bound to disobey illegal or immoral orders, then George Marshall, William Leahy, Ernest King, and Douglas MacArthur, to name only some of those alleged to have opposed dropping the bomb, did not do their duty. Another conclusion is that their views have been taken out of context.

Nor do the revisionists suggest that any other country possessing the bomb would not have used it. They might expect the United States to hold itself to a higher standard, but by 1945 the rigors of war weighed heavily on all combatants. And in a democracy the highest imperative, after victory itself, was to stop the killing of American men (and foreign men, women, and children, too). Woodrow Wilson ended American neutrality and entered World War I, even though he had promised not to during his election campaign, because of his outrage at Germany's use of unrestricted submarine warfare. Following Pearl Harbor, the United States used nearly unrestricted submarine warfare as an effective means of defeating Japan. The fire-bombing of Tokyo provided further evidence of American willingness to use horrific means to force Japan to surrender. Had the atomic bomb not been used, there would have been political bloodshed when the American public found out about it, especially because it "*wasn't used to save American lives.*" Minoru Genda, the Japanese naval officer who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor, was asked during a visit to Annapolis, Maryland, in the 1970s whether Japan would have used the A-bomb. Despite his position as a member of the Diet, Japan's national legislature, he answered candidly that he thought so—and set off a political uproar in Japan. Revisionists do not permit themselves to see that the American decision reflected the bomb's capability to make a difference in a long and ugly war, not America's immorality.

At the other end of the spectrum, Robert James Maddox, a historian at Penn State University, wastes no time in disclosing where he stands. On page 2 of *Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later*, he laces into Gar Alperovitz

by name, rank, and serial number. Referring to Alperovitz's earlier book, *Atomic Diplomacy*, Maddox asserts: "Despite the appearance of meticulous documentation, it was based on pervasive misrepresentations of the historical record." He accuses the revisionists of "writing history backward" in using casualty projections for an invasion of Japan. He says they are either "incompetent to write about" the figures or they employ them "to promote their own agendas."

Maddox has written a lean, well-focused, and tightly argued volume seen largely from the standpoint of American leaders who influenced the President's decision. The book is carefully documented and has a useful bibliography. A thoughtful chapter examines the legacy of unconditional surrender and how it complicated getting a defeated Japan to quit. President Truman, Maddox says, inherited from President Roosevelt "a mixed bag of advisers, whose competing claims inhibited development of consistent, well-thought out policies."

A chapter on "Advice and Dissent" gives a good account of a crucial meeting on 18 June 1945, when the President met with Cabinet officers and the Joint Chiefs. Until then, each service had fought for its own mission. The Chiefs, led by General George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff, agreed that an invasion, at least of Kyushu, Japan's southwestern island, was essential. The President wanted to know what casualties could be expected. The Chiefs gave varying estimates, which apparently began the controversy that runs to this day. The fact of the matter, as General Marshall pointed out, was that no one could say with any accuracy. He concluded only: "It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war."

Later, at Potsdam, the Chiefs discussed the atomic bomb. Here, Maddox contradicts the revisionists: "Pending the discovery of new material, there is no reliable evidence that *any* [emphasis in original] high-ranking officer expressed moral objections about the bomb to Truman." Maddox has a less-than-kind word for unnamed military officers: "Later claims by various generals and admirals about what they thought are immaterial and in many cases obviously self-serving or motivated by devotion to their particular branch of service."

Maddox's clinching argument:

Truman was commander in chief of American armed forces and had a duty to the men under his command not shared by those who were to propose alternatives while bearing no responsibility for the consequences. Or by those passing moral judgment years later. One can only imagine what would have happened had tens of thousands of young Americans been killed or wounded on Japanese soil, and then it became known that the president had chosen not to employ weapons that might have ended the war months earlier.

Another lean book is Alan J. Levine's *The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies*. Rather than put the revisionists in the cross-hairs, Levine goes after a wider range of writers. He contends that Ronald Spector's *Eagle Against the Sun* is flawed by its lack of interest in Japan's side of things. He asserts that John Toland's *The Rising Sun* "perhaps exemplifies the tendency to whitewash the Japanese." On the other hand, David Bergamini's *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* mistakenly "portrays all of modern Japanese history as a sinister conspiracy orchestrated by the throne."

Levine, a historian specializing in Russian history, is no apologist for the United States or President Truman or American military commanders. He argues that Japan could have been forced to surrender with air and sea power: "The Americans

would only have had to wait to starve and burn Japan into submission." Thus, he writes: "The belief in the need to invade Japan was an error pregnant with consequences." Again: "The foolishness of American strategic thinking is shown by the fact that many leaders of the Japanese Army *wanted* [emphasis in original] an invasion." As other writers report, the Japanese meant to exact such heavy losses on the invading armada and on the beach that the Americans would negotiate a peace less onerous to Japan.

Levine views the Hiroshima atomic bomb in the context of bombing Japan into surrender and therefore supports Truman's decision: "The morality of the decision to use the bomb cannot be sensibly considered in isolation, although this has often been tried. The United States made the decision to accept massive losses of civilian life when it began the fire attacks on Japanese cities, not when President Truman decided to use the atomic bomb."

Had the A-bomb never existed, Levine argues, Japan would still have quit before the planned invasion. But conventional bombing and blockade would probably have killed more Japanese than those lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "It is thus reasonably certain," Levine concludes, "that the use of the bomb saved Japanese as well as American lives." He also argues: "In hindsight, the dropping of the second bomb, so soon after the first, must be considered a horrible mistake. Nagasaki's destruction seems to have contributed nothing to the decision to surrender." Other writers would point to continued Japanese resistance up to and beyond the Emperor's proclamation on 15 August that Japan must make peace by "enduring the unendurable and suffering the insufferable."

Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar wait until the end of *Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* to go after unnamed revisionists: "Anyone who closely and dispassionately examines the last weeks of the war would have to conclude that Truman was looking for ways to end the conflict honorably and at the lowest possible cost in American *and Japanese* [emphasis in original] lives."

Allen, who has written about the Civil War, and Polmar, a writer on military affairs and consultant to the Pentagon, bring up a point not found elsewhere in the debate over casualty projections. The Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot "ordered more than 370,000 Purple Hearts for award to the wounded and the families of those killed in the final battles for Japan." Thus, they contend, "Kyushu would have been the bloodiest invasion in history."

This is an uneven book with, nonetheless, some keen insights. The opening chapter says officers at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., had begun working on plans for a campaign against Japan in 1897. The first American thought that this might require an invasion came in 1900. Another chapter dissects Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and how he confronted it in Trumanesque the-buck-stops-here fashion. Allen and Polmar give a good account of the meeting on 18 June 1945, when the President, his top advisers, and the Joint Chiefs discussed the options for forcing Japan to surrender. The authors give another good account of discussions at Potsdam, where Stimson and Byrnes disagreed, as they had in Washington, over unconditional surrender.

The book, however, is marred by an evident lack of familiarity with Japan. The Kuriles stretch toward Japan from the Kamchatka Peninsula, not from Siberia. The Japanese word "haragei" does not mean "the Japanese art of saying one thing while meaning another"; rather it means "gut feeling" and refers to unspoken, intuitive communication. The term "ketsu-go," said to mean "decisive battle,"

apparently comes from reports by General Douglas MacArthur's staff but is not found in Japanese records or a dictionary today. The proper term was "hondo kessen," announced by the Imperial General Staff in June 1945.

Stanley Weintraub's massive volume entitled *The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945* is disappointing. It seeks to weave together so many strands, from Japanese soldiers retreating through the jungles of Burma to American sailors abandoned after the cruiser *Indianapolis* is torpedoed, that all but the most dogged reader gets lost.

Once Weintraub, who teaches arts and humanities at Penn State, brings his narrative to Potsdam, he slips into a day-by-day account that, despite its meandering, provides certain insights. For one thing, arguments over the fate of Poland and war reparations from Germany, which had quit in May, seemed to have taken more time than discussions over how to make Japan surrender. For another, he clears up a small mystery, which is why President Truman ordered the atomic bomb not to be used until 3 August. Apparently Truman wanted to be out of Potsdam and away from Marshal Josef Stalin when it was dropped.

This book, too, is marred by factual errors. The author mistakes the Kuriles for the Ryukyu chain of islands; Hiroshima is not "close to the southern tip of Honshu" but 100 miles away; Thailand was not occupied by Japan but was an ally. The author's distaste for the military service comes through in repeated references to the "brass" and in technical mistakes: He writes of "loading" a bomb after takeoff, when he meant "arming," and the command "bombs away" to order bomb bay doors opened rather than a bombardier's signal that bombs have been dropped.

Bruce Lee's *Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II* is the result of a journalist going through what he says were 14,000 pages of "Magic" summaries, the product of American intelligence breaking Japanese diplomatic codes. The book provides only skimpy context and is thus useful primarily to those who bring to it a strong grasp of World War II history.

Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is aptly described in its title. The large-sized book traces the atomic bomb from research and development through deployment to the B-29 base on Tinian to the drops over the two Japanese cities and the consequences of those detonations.

While not among the recent books, students of this issue might find keen insights in Chapter One of Forrest C. Pogue's book *George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959*. He quotes General Marshall as saying, "I think it was quite necessary to drop the bomb to shorten the war."

Curiously, none of these books reports much about the engineering and logistics feat that enabled B-29s to bomb Japan with conventional and atomic weapons. The scruffy island of Tinian was captured on 10 August 1944. Less than four months later, an airfield was ready for the first B-29 strike on 24 November. By August 1945, a year after construction started, that airbase was the largest in the world at the time and accommodated nearly 1000 B-29s. A visitor to the nearly abandoned island 30 years later found the airfields, with a touch of maintenance, could be usable again.¹

Among the magazine articles, a standout is Donald Kagan's "Why America Dropped the Bomb" in the September 1995 issue of *Commentary*. Kagan, a historian at Yale, is masterful in refuting the "new revisionist consensus" that the bomb was neither necessary nor a morally acceptable means to end the war, and that Americans have

refused to admit this. Kagan contends, "If a moral complaint is to be fairly lodged, it must be lodged against any and all warfare that attacked innocents." He asserts: "It is right to do all we can to reduce the horrors of war. But to prevent them entirely, it will be necessary to prevent war." He concludes that Americans need not shrink from basic questions arising from Hiroshima: "An honest examination of the evidence reveals that their leaders, in the tragic predicament common to all who have engaged in wars that reach the point where every choice is repugnant, chose the least bad course. Americans may look back on that decision with sadness, but without shame."

An article in the Spring 1995 issue of the *Wilson Quarterly* is pertinent even if not directly a part of the A-bomb debate. Mitchel Reiss, a White House aide in 1988-89, reviews the 50 years since Hiroshima in "The Future That Never Came" and says "never before in military history have countries exercised such restraint with the destructive power at their disposal." Lest anyone become complacent, he cautions: "The danger is that as the echoes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki grow more distant with the passing of time, the devastation and unspeakable horror of those events may fade from our collective memories. We forget at our peril."

NOTE

1. The Tinian airbase was built by the Sixth Brigade of Naval Construction Battalions commanded by Commodore Paul James Halloran, Civil Engineer Corps, USN, who was Richard Halloran's father. Readers, please excuse this nod to filial piety.

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Review Essay

The Middle East: Contradictory and Less Predictable

NORVELL B. DEATKINE

Each summer for the past few years I have been able to spend several weeks in the Middle East, in 11 countries including Algeria, Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and this year in Oman. When I return and begin preparing for my next class and catching up on my reading, as well as attending various gatherings of the Middle East scholarly illuminati, I have a problem in relating what I hear and read to what I have seen. The problem is that of transforming the increasing mass of information into readable analyses of what it all means, to identify what Arnold Toynbee has called "the slower, impalpable, imponderable movements that work below the surface and penetrate to the depths."

Midst the recent avalanche of books, symposium papers, and articles on Middle Eastern subjects, a truly analytical vision of recent and current events in the Middle East is rare, particularly one that can describe current events from a historical perspective. There are few Hodgsons, Hittis, Houranis, Brockelmanns, Coons, Von Grunebaums, Kedouris, Alfred Guillaumes, H. A. R. Gibbs, and others of similar stature writing today. Those who attempt it, such as Bernard Lewis, an Orientalist of the old school, are systematically deconstructed in print by the current crop of predominantly chronocentric and egocentric academicians. Toynbee predicted in 1948 that "Pan-Islamism is dormant—yet we have to reckon with the possibility that the sleeper may awake if ever the cosmopolitan proletariat of a Westernized world revolts against Western domination and cries out for anti-Western leadership." There is today a particularly urgent need for this type of historical perspective when analyzing Islamism and its consequences.

This need is made more pressing by the many contradictions in trends that this reviewer has observed in the past six years. Begin with the opposing trends of modernity and atavism. On one hand the radical Islamists are projecting an image of an Islamic state operating within the strictures of a 7th-century Islamic culture and theology, while on the other hand the same radicals, who are frequently highly educated young men, pursue state-of-the-art technological advances in all areas of human endeavor. This is one of the points made by Daniel Pipes in an illuminating article on radical Islam in the December issue of *First Things*. Radical Islam is not some quaint Eastern religion suitable for new-age dabblers. Second, despite increasing calls for a united Islamic world, the reality seems to be a continuing fragmentation of the Arab and Islamic world. Third, while there seems to be some stirring of political freedom in parts of the Middle East, generally there is less social freedom than 25 years ago: consider the more traditional roles and dress that women have adopted, willingly or otherwise, during that period. Fourth, satellite dishes have sprouted like mushrooms all over the Middle East, even in Iran, where they are banned (recently a satellite dish factory in Iran was raided

to stop production). Yet, Western mythmakers notwithstanding, the "global village" effect has *not* occurred in the region; if anything, the trend seems to be away from the Western world and its political culture, as well as its social mores. As a political-military operator in the field or a planner at national level, how does one make sense of these apparent contradictions?

One can begin to look for answers by analyzing a similar era—the Tanzimat, the Ottoman Empire's experiment with Westernization. That attempt to modernize the Ottoman Empire while retaining its traditional society and political culture provides an early example of the impossibility of changing one component of a culture, whether economics, politics, or technology, without altering the culture itself. Yet this is precisely what the neo-Islamists want to do. As a Muslim colleague put it, "We want your TV sets but not your programs, we want your technology but not your culture." Essentially they want modernity but not modernism. Does this disdainful rejection of Western culture presage a return to the "self-sufficiency" of the middle ages, in which an Islamic world slumbered in the belief that the Western world was inferior and did not constitute a threat to their comfortable existence? Or is this a harbinger of an aggressive, new ideology masquerading as a religion, with the predictable result of collectivist totalitarianism similar to fascism or communism? Or is it the legitimate, predictable, and inevitable response to generations of Western domination, cultural penetration, and perceived Western superiority in almost every aspect of human advances? Or is this simply the perception created by overheated academic discourse? Is there an "Islamic threat"?

The academic contest concerning the Islamic "threat" is a relatively new game, but it is being fought with the same teams on the field: those sympathetic to the Arab or Palestinian cause on one side and those sympathetic to the Zionist idea on the other. There are, however, some notable exceptions on this question among Arab secularists.

The academic battle lines were drawn in sharp relief by Bernard Lewis in a 1990 article, "Muslim Rage," in which he explained that the palpable anti-Western emotions of the governments and populace were not simply a consequence of Western support (meaning American) of Israel, as so many writers on the Middle East would have us believe, but something much deeper—a clash of civilizations. This theme was enlarged upon by Samuel Huntington in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" in the Summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Most Middle East scholars have attacked or distanced themselves from that perspective; even those with reservations about aspects of radical Islamism are loathe to say so unless they transform the evidence into conflicts based on gender, race, or class. For example, the most recent *Middle East Journal* had an entire edition on feminist issues in the Middle East, complete with passages such as this one: "These masculine-centric discursive axioms constituted European nationalism from its inception. Both Benedict Anderson and George Mosse argue that nationalism favors a distinctly homosocial form of male bonding." I wonder what Freya Stark, Elizabeth Monroe, and Gertrude Bell would have thought of the preceding lines? Talcott Seelye, a long-serving US Foreign Service Officer in the Middle East, was once quoted as saying he never read any of the newer works on the Middle East. One can readily understand why.

Some coherent and useful literature is still being published, however. An example is *A Sense Of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West*, which presents

a balanced analysis and is written in understandable English. Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser have produced an excellent review and assessment of the current literature on the subject of Islamism and the interaction of the Western and Islamic worlds. The authors are careful, however, to disassociate themselves from the "Islam versus the West" paradigm, declaring their "deep commitment to the concept of reconciliation and cooperation between civilizations." One hopes this idealism did not skew their analysis. Moreover their affinity for splitting the difference ("no one side is more right than the other") in placing blame for civilizational conflict is not necessarily the right approach in a "let the chips fall where they may" examination of the issues. These reservations aside, this is a succinct and highly readable work for political-military planners and operators. The authors recognize that there is little we can do to prevent Islamic takeovers of states that are failing in their obligations to the populace; nevertheless, they believe that US dialogue with "moderate" Islamic groups is "worth pursuing." The September 1995 *Middle East Quarterly* features two interviews of note. One is with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, who provides a reasonable rationale for a dialogue with Islamic fundamentalists. The other is with an Iranian dissident, Mohammad Mohaddessin, who opines that "there is no such thing as a moderate fundamentalist. It's like talking about a moderate Nazi."

In an academic field where personal attacks and charges of racism abound, producing an objective book on the subject of Islam and the West is akin to walking across a minefield. The current literature on the subject produces more heat than light—more visceral emotion than dispassionate analysis. One writer sees the Huntington article as being the root of the "racist" attitudes of Western leaders—as if Islam constitutes a race. The writer, Haifaa A. Jawad, in the periodical *Defence and International Security* decries the policy of some Western states to solicit friendly Muslim nations to contain Muslim fundamentalism. This writer has it backwards: the leaders of several Muslim nations are concerned about what they see as a too-benevolent view of Islamism among those Western nations. The double standard is also at work here. While the author condemns the denial of Western citizenship to Muslim immigrants, she fails to mention hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, into their third generation, living in Arab countries that adamantly refuse to grant them the most basic of human rights. ("They will forget their homeland." "It will legitimize Israeli occupation." etc.) Then there is her complaint that Muslims living in the West are not treated with respect. There is no mention of the thinly veiled intolerance to non-Muslim communities in the Middle East which is emptying these states of their Christian and other minority populations.

Tolerance and respect cannot be a unilateral exercise. This idea is illustrated by the proceedings of various Christian-Muslim dialogue groups, one of which was recently reported in the periodical *First Things*. The Westerners, generally clergymen of "progressive" mainline churches, denounced the Crusades, the reconquest of Spain, Western imperialism, the establishment of artificial borders, the wars in the Russian Muslim states, and Bosnia, the latter two ostensibly the latest version of the Crusades. The Muslims reiterated these denunciations, adding the state of Israel as an example of a new Crusader state, "a foreign body lodged in the heart of the Arab world." Never will one hear any reference to how the Muslims came to occupy Spain, or the Balkans, or North Africa, or indeed most of the land they occupy today. Author C. M. Naim, a professor of Urdu at the University of Chicago, made this memorable observation: "Interfaith dialogue soon turns into an incoherent comparison of Islam, a faith without

history, and Christianity, a history without faith." Certain American Middle East gurus tend to convulse at the mere mention of the home-grown "religious right" while maintaining a curious accommodation to Islamic fundamentalism. As Naim wrote, "One only heard that secularism is good for America but not for Pakistan or Egypt, because . . . Muslims are required by their religion to establish an Islamic state."

This imbalance in dialogue allows for views that are otherwise not tolerated in our secular society. For instance, a book written for American Muslim high school students, *The Messenger of Allah*, was available at a book fair sponsored by the Middle East Studies Association. In describing the situation at the time of the Prophet Mohammed's wars against non-Muslim tribes in the Arabian peninsula, the book describes Jews as hypocrites, back-stabbers, usurers, deceitful. Christians come off somewhat better, being alluded to merely as cowards. Among the apologists for Islam it is this condescending license granted to Islamic excesses but denied others which renders their indulgent assessments suspect. The lack of rigor in studies of the effects of Islam on society and everyday life by some Western scholars results in a myopic view that could prove dangerously wrong.

Politically driven assessments in the other direction are also plentiful. A PBS *Frontline* program, "Jihad in America," was mostly an exercise in fear-mongering; the overblown rhetoric of the featured speakers spewing hate and vengeance was not evaluated in the context of their culture or compared to other domestic movements spouting similar appeals to visceral emotions. For instance, the tone of the Muslim rabble-rousers in the film was approximately the same as some of the speakers at the recent "Million Man March" in Washington, D.C. Nor in retrospect is the radical Muslim rhetoric more dangerous than was that of the New Left on college campuses in the 1960s and 1970s. One advocated class warfare, one promotes religious confrontation, and one racial strife. The result is the same. In a truly classic book, *The Arab Mind*, Raphael Patai captures the Middle Eastern propensity for exaggeration, and for context over content. Too bad the Arab elite hate the book. They could learn much from it. Patai would have made an interesting defense witness at the World Trade Center bombing conspiracy trial, in which the verbal bombast of the ten defendants proved to be a crucial element in the convictions.

Turning to the more topical issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, *The UN Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for On-Site Verification*, by Kathleen Bailey, has some interesting conclusions pertaining to the planning and conduct of arms control verification inspections. The author introduces her book by stating,

The successes of the UN activities in Iraq have encouraged arms control planners to press for more intrusive inspections in several areas—from new inspection measures for the global 1972 Biological and Toxin Convention to regional agreements such as the African Nuclear Weapons-free Zone.

A close study of the book—a very readable and interesting experience despite its daunting title—leaves one doubtful that measures to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction are effective. In the chapter on chemical weapons, the author believes the Iraqis may have removed and hidden an entire Sarin chemical production plant. In the next chapter, Dr. Bailey concludes that biological agents are easily hidden and that only effective human intelligence will uncover them. She notes also that the lack of

Western human intelligence sources was a primary weakness in the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

In her final chapter, on nuclear weapons, the author substantiates what UNSCOM inspectors have indicated, that the Iraqis had the indigenous capability to produce weapons well beyond that envisaged by Western intelligence services, reflecting a persistent incredulity in the West that underdeveloped nations have the ability to produce sophisticated weapons without our help. David Kay, the former chief inspector of the nuclear inspection team to Iraq, makes this point crystal clear in a Winter 1995 article in the *Washington Quarterly*. In the space of one decade, Iraq went from total dependence on the outside world to near total indigenous capability. Dr. Bailey, in turn, avers that without human intelligence, the detection of home-grown nuclear production is near impossible, noting that even after ten ballistic missile inspections, the Iraqis are considered to have 200 to 300 Scud-type missiles hidden. She summarizes by concluding that export controls inhibited but did not prevent continuing Iraqi acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

It is within the above context that two articles in the Autumn 1995 issue of the *Washington Quarterly* are of interest. One by Aaron Karp is relentlessly Pollyannish, but the other, by Ahmed Hashim, is more clear-eyed and guarded in outlook. Both agree that conventional arms acquisition and force structures of Middle Eastern nations have peaked and are now actually declining. Both agree that the Arab quest for conventional arms parity with the Israelis has abated; Karp, however, sees little interest on the part of the Arabs to create a strategic deterrence based on weapons of mass destruction, while Hashim posits that is exactly what is happening. Karp has evidence that:

Egypt long ago lost interest in acquiring a nuclear option. Syria never assembled the technical resources. Others like Saudi Arabia toyed with the possibility but were never seriously interested. The few that remained interested, like Iran and Libya, have had little luck, although foreign technical assistance or illegally acquired fissionable materials could change that.

In light of the sobering lessons contained in the Bailey book, assessments such as these are not only condescending but downright dangerous. Not only does Ahmed Hashim make a good case for the view that Middle Eastern leaders will opt for weapons of mass destruction as a solution to their security problems, but he also goes against the grain of conventional wisdom in viewing it as a possible positive development. He questions the stereotypical view of Middle Eastern leaders as "insensitive to human casualties and destruction." Whether or not the Middle East would be stable with weapons of mass destruction requires "research without hoary clichés about irrationality and callousness of leaders and of people in the Middle East."

In his book *Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the North*, Anthony Cordesman presents a less-benevolent view of the Arab and Persian leadership. He writes that in addition to strengthening the friendly Gulf forces and improving our force projection capabilities, we must tighten arms controls and limit technology transfers to Iran and Iraq. Cordesman goes on to state that these restrictions should not be meant to isolate Iran and Iraq politically, culturally, or economically. How we can accomplish both objectives simultaneously is not clearly explained. Cordesman is also very cautious in his assessment of the Iranian nuclear effort; while he concludes that Iran will

probably need eight to ten years to have a nuclear capability, he notes that Iran continues to "allocate significant resources to its nuclear weapons effort." Marvin Miller, in a chapter on weapons of mass destruction in the newly released book *Powder Keg in the Middle East*, quotes others to arrive at the conclusion that while Iran has malevolent intentions it lacks the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. As I read these somewhat dismissive assessments, I recalled the group of Iranian students I met in Aleppo, Syria, in 1994: fluent in English, reserved, but polite and friendly. None were majoring in recreation, social work, or criminology: they were all engineers.

On the subject of Iran, Ahmed Hashim, in the Adelphi Paper *The Crisis of The Iranian State*, sees an Iranian state with its economy in free-fall, growing popular alienation, and a political system facing a crisis of legitimacy; the author is not certain it will survive the crisis. At best he sees an Iran "lurching from crisis to crisis, hoping to find ad hoc solutions to its political and socio-economic problems." On the other hand, Shahram Chubin, in another chapter in *Powder Keg in the Middle East*, believes that "Iran has no urgent, overwhelming, or concrete security problem."

The other pariah state, Iraq, was the subject of a presentation by an American University graduate student, Ms. Laura Drake, at a recent seminar. Her analysis, based not only on research but in-country observation, led her to conclude that the "dual containment" policy has the earmarks of failure and will be counterproductive to US interests. It leaves Israel as the unchallenged hegemon in the area (which is seen as the major objective of our policy), Syria less likely to come to terms with Israel, and Iraq in "progressive state breakdown." Iraq has become the "black hole" of the Middle East and is likely to draw surrounding states into a conflagration no one wants. As Drake succinctly put it, the regime of Saddam Hussein is stronger than the state, and we cannot kill the regime without killing the nation—an event that would destabilize the entire Middle East. Moreover, we are increasingly isolating ourselves from the Europeans, and as Iran undergoes revolutionary ossification, our Middle Eastern policies could revitalize a movement that is dying of its own inherent disease.

A common thread through all these readings is the need for not only strategic intelligence but, much more important, the knowledge that explains the underlying trends. The mass of information available to the political-military analyst can be overwhelming unless he or she has intimate knowledge of and an intuitive feel for the differences between the significant and the trivial in this field of study. That sort of knowledge is achievable only after years of on-the-ground work with the indigenous people. Unfortunately the terrorist menace has affected the design of our newer embassies in the Middle East, making it increasingly difficult to come by that level of knowledge. These embassies have become fortresses, with layers of security and coded-access elevators and doors. Communications by e-mail and overly air-conditioned offices seem more appropriate to corporate vice-presidents than to the occupants of the slightly disheveled, somewhat decrepit, and highly personalized working spaces of our embassies in the 1950s and 1960s. Increasingly our embassies have become little Americas. All too often we know only what host-nation officials or the Westernized elite who hang around embassies want us to know. In turn, much of what the local people know about us is formed by the vacuous Hollywood depiction of America combined with CNN's daily recitation of disaster and mayhem, interspersed with "infotainment" of the Simpson trial variety.

One point is clear. The days of relative stability in the Middle East are coming to a close. The potentates and despots who rule the Middle East are aging, and their successors are not designated or are of doubtful mettle for the job. There are demands for more democratic and open societies, but many of the Islamist ideologues in the vanguard of these movements equate the social dissolution of Western society with its political system. Once in power they are unlikely to rule in a benevolent fashion. The historical mistrust between ruler and ruled remains pervasive. The saying attributed to the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun and quoted by Elie Kedourie perhaps best sums up the relationship: "The best life has he who has an ample house, a beautiful wife, and sufficient means, and who does not know us and whom we do not know."

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Review Essay

Strategic Reading on Northeast Asia

DONALD W. BOOSE, JR.

The year 1995—half a century after the end of World War II and half a decade after the end of the Cold War—was a turbulent one for Northeast Asia. The region was plagued with disasters. South Korea's economy continued its strong growth, but its political life was disrupted. Japan's weak ruling coalition remained in power, but the Japanese economy suffered severe shocks. Russia remained too weak, too focused on its domestic concerns, and too divided in its counsels to take a major role in regional issues, but gave clear notice of its intention to remain engaged. Midyear tension between the United States and China had subsided somewhat by the end of the year, but China's future direction and role remains a significant concern within the region. In November, the heads of state of the member nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Osaka reaffirmed their commitment to free trade throughout the region by 2020, but opted for an "Asian" model of self-paced voluntary steps coupled with regional development assistance instead of the "Western" model of strict rules and fixed target dates.

The United States tried with varying degrees of success to balance its priorities among the interests which bind it to the region. Those interests are identified in current strategy documents as security, economic prosperity, and a growing community of market democracies. In February 1995 the US government issued new versions of three of those documents: the President's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's *National Military Strategy*, and the Department of Defense's *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia and Pacific Region*. The message in each of these documents is that the Pacific is equal with Europe as a region where US interests demand engagement. The Clinton Administration intends for the United States to continue to be a Pacific power and, having ended the post-Cold War Pacific drawdown, plans to maintain the same force presence—about 100,000 troops—in each region.

The challenge is to develop policy when the three categories of US interests conflict. While elsewhere in Asia the disconnect tends to be between economic interests and the US commitment to democracy and human rights, in Northeast Asia the conflict is often between security and economic policy. On 27 June 1995 the perennial US-Japan trade friction was defused once again by an agreement on automobiles and components. Automobile imports are also a major point of contention between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), where reaction against US trade pressures in this and other sectors—particularly agriculture—prompted anti-American feelings. US security relationships with both Japan and Korea were clouded by these trade tensions and by growing grass-roots dissatisfaction with the American troop presence. This issue was aggravated in Korea by an incident in a Seoul subway and brought to a high pitch by the rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa by American servicemen, prompting calls in both Japan and Korea

for revision of the respective Status of Forces agreements. Nonetheless, during 1995 both security relationships were reaffirmed at separate ministerial-level meetings at which Japan and Korea also pledged increases in financial support for US forces.

US engagement in East Asia and the interacting interests and foreign policies of the four major powers in that region are the subjects of *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (1995) edited by Michael Mandelbaum. This slim but content-rich volume is recommended to readers looking for a regional overview and well-informed speculation on future trends. All five contributors are knowledgeable and experienced observers. Robert Levgold suggests that while Russia will have little effective influence until its own transformation is complete, Russian internal upheaval could seriously affect the region.

David M. Lampton argues that China remains fixed on the goal of continued economic growth, which requires regional stability, but brings Chinese self-confidence, greater desire for regional influence, and growing military power. That element of current US strategy which calls for the enlargement of democracy is viewed as a threat by the Chinese leadership. Thus, while Lampton argues for a continued US military presence and engagement in the regional security dialogue to provide reassurance as China tests its strength, he warns that foreign policy deftness will be essential if the United States is to deal with China while maintaining the support of the other regional powers.

Mike Mochizuki notes that the US-Japan security relationship was undermined by the end of the Cold War but the Japanese government, having no satisfactory alternative, will seek to continue the alliance. He predicts Japan's efforts will be hampered by weak political leadership and reluctance to shift away from traditional "neomercantilist" economic policies. Michael Mandelbaum concludes that the United States will remain actively engaged in East Asia for two reasons: the risk of a rise to power of a regional hegemon if the United States withdraws, and the lure of wealth as the Asia-Pacific region continues its economic boom. Richard H. Solomon offers a sobering view of the dangers lurking in the region during this time of transition, but sees the possibility of future economic and political cooperation among the four powers, with a strong US-Japan alliance at its core.

The other partner in that alliance, long viewed by American officials as the linchpin of the US position in Asia, had a troubled year in 1995. Japan's long recession, the most serious since World War II, continued into its fifth year as a series of bank failures and scandals added to the misery. On 17 January an earthquake struck the city of Kobe, killing some 5000 people and causing widespread devastation; on 20 March terrorists belonging to the *Aum Shinrikyo* religious group attacked the Tokyo subway system; and in April the yen suddenly rose dramatically against the US dollar, peaking at an 80:1 yen/dollar ratio, although the exchange rate later stabilized at about 100:1. These events shook Japanese self-confidence, while perceptions of a slow and inadequate government response deepened Japanese disillusionment with politicians and bureaucrats. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama proved to be a skilled survivor, garnering a measure of domestic and international respect, but his ability to act decisively was hobbled by the weakness of his coalition government. Murayama resigned early in 1996 and was replaced on 11 January by former trade minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.

On security issues, the government announced on 29 November a new defense policy outline which calls for a reduction in conventional forces, while increasing Self-Defense Force disaster rescue, anti-terrorism, and UN peacekeeping

operations (PKO) capabilities. Japan's peacekeeping role was highlighted in January 1996 when a Japanese detachment joined the UN observer force on the Golan Heights. This was the fourth such deployment since passage of Japan's 1992 PKO bill.

Five recent books address Japan and its relationship with the United States, three from an American and two from a Japanese perspective. *The United States, Japan, and Asia: Challenges for U.S. Policy* (1994), edited by Gerald L. Curtis, was originally prepared as background reading for a 1993 meeting of Columbia University's Assembly of America. Its contributors, most of them well-known East Asia specialists in academia, business, and government, set out to provide information that would be useful to Americans trying to assess US interests and policy in the region. While much has happened in the two years since the writing was done, these essays have held up well. They provide valuable historical data and perspectives that are still largely valid on a range of foreign policy, economic, and security issues.

Ambassador Frank McNeil, a Japanese linguist with years of service in that country as a diplomat and in other capacities and now Director of the Naval War College Strategic Studies Group, brings his long personal experience to bear in a useful introduction for American readers. His *Democracy in Japan: The Emerging Global Concern* (1994) is a readable, well-balanced, and easy-to-understand description of Japanese political and economic developments written by a man with command of the material and a sensible approach. McNeil's discussion of contemporary issues and his prologue (which consists largely of a description of life in a Japanese town written by his daughter, who teaches English in Japan) can be unhesitatingly recommended, although his long historical overview is flawed by excessive errors of the sort resulting from too much cut-and-paste and too little editing. McNeil's insights and perspective on the US-Japan relationship are so valuable that it would be nice to see a subsequent edition of this book with a reworked historical section.

Thomas M. Huber also has solid credentials as a Japanese linguist and institutional historian. In *Strategic Economy in Japan* (1994), Huber suggests that while much of the Japanese economy is purely private and commercial, a substantial part—particularly the techno-industrial and financial sectors—is managed in much the same way that the United States and other Western countries manage their foreign and defense policy and for the same reason: to achieve domestic and international policy goals. He does not suggest that this is sinister. He points out that Japanese economic policy is developed by bureaucrats and then subjected to the same kind of public scrutiny and legislative oversight and approval as US foreign and defense policy. Indeed, in the absence of a military force capable of power projection, economic policy seems a plausible alternative. His comparison of a Japanese export drive to a military campaign is well done, although some operational art mavens may take issue with his conflation of the terms "center of gravity," "decisive point," and "objective." Whether or not one accepts Huber's arguments, his book provides a well-written, systematic, and coherent introduction to the Japanese economy.

In spite of its provocative title, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces* (1995) is a generally straightforward account of the development of the Japan Self-Defense Forces since their inception (at the direction of General MacArthur) as the National Police Reserve in 1950. The author, Tetsuo Maeda, is a Japanese journalist who has written on defense issues for years. He tends to view any increase in Japan's military capability with suspicion and is critical of Japan's tendency to follow

the US lead in foreign and defense policy, but in tracing the 45-year history of Japan's postwar military, he provides insights that Americans will find valuable. Maeda properly deals in detail with the conundrum of Article Nine of Japan's constitution, which appears to prohibit categorically any type of armed force, but which has been variously interpreted over the years. It is clear that when Japanese officials declare some particular activity "unconstitutional," they really mean that it is more than current public opinion will accept. Some Americans with experience in Japan may believe that the true meaning is simply, "We don't want to do that right now."

Daikichi Irokawa's *The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan* (1995) provides a thoughtful social history of the Showa Era (1926-1989). Irokawa lived through those years as a young adult on the home front in World War II, a sailor in the Imperial Navy in the last year of the war, and a historian of modern Japan known for his research on the popular roots of Japanese democracy. His book—as the title indicates—is focused on the life of Hirohito, the Showa Emperor, and the role of the emperor in modern Japan. Some aspects of this issue may be of little interest to non-Japanese readers, but Irokawa's discussion of the extent of Hirohito's active involvement in wartime decisionmaking (based on documents just now coming to light) and his very personal description of Japan's postwar transformation, including its "lifestyle revolution," make for compelling reading.

Across the Korea Strait, the nuclear framework agreement between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continued to hold as we entered 1996. The agreement was reinforced after an episode of North Korean truculence by two subsequent agreements signed on 13 June in Kuala Lumpur and on 15 December in New York. North Korea has in effect accepted that South Korea will manufacture and install the light water reactors that will replace the North's uncompleted graphite modulated reactors that produce weapons-grade plutonium. At the same time, the North continued its efforts to increase direct dialogue with the United States, attempting to close down the Korean Armistice mechanism and replace it with a US-DPRK arrangement. Although North Korea rebuffed efforts to restart the South-North dialogue in 1995, its representatives met periodically with those of the South in Beijing. The North also accepted shipments of South Korean emergency aid rice, inter-Korean trade grew steadily, and the DPRK signed an unprecedented joint venture agreement with the South Korean Daewoo Corporation. At year's end, the reclusive life of North Korea's presumptive leader, Kim Jong Il, and his failure to assume the titles of President of the DPRK and General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, fueled unprovable speculation about internal political machinations. A request for emergency food shipments—and the willingness to accept, grudgingly, South Korean rice—indicated growing North Korean economic weakness. Nonetheless, the North Korean military remained formidable.

South Koreans could take pride in their country's economic and political progress, but events in 1995 raised questions about the costs, nature, and extent of that progress. The booming economy suffered serious trade and current account deficits and was plagued by a high bankruptcy rate among small- and medium-sized firms. Trials, allegations of payoffs, and attempts at regulation were manifestations of the troubled relationship between the ROK government and the giant South Korean conglomerate firms, the *chaebol* (reminiscent of and written using the same Chinese characters as the infamous *zaibatsu* of prewar Japan). Critics accused President Kim Young Sam of administrative ineptitude and of using his otherwise welcome reform campaign to punish

political rivals. Midsummer elections demonstrated Korea's transition to a functioning democracy, but also revealed the persistence of historic regional factionalism. Throughout the year protesters called for the arrest and punishment of those responsible for the bloody 1980 military suppression of an uprising in the southwestern city of Kwangju. These trends came to a head when government investigators unearthed an immense ruling party political slush fund, financed by the *chaebol*. The year ended with two former presidents in prison awaiting trial, widespread demonstrations, and observers asking if the Republic of Korea will emerge from this experience with a stronger democracy and healthier government-business relationship, or revert to the old patterns.

The background to these events is capably described by Mark Clifford, long-time Korea correspondent and now business editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. His *Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea* (1994) traces the 35-year-old Korean economic miracle initiated by Park Chung Hee, an austere, autocratic soldier with a vision of Korea's future and the will to pursue that vision ruthlessly. Calling on his experiences as an officer in the Japanese army observing state-dominated economic development in Manchuria, Park crafted a strategy that took advantage of Korea's protected position within the circle of US allies, the motivating factor of a very real threat from the North, and Korea's most valuable resource: a well-educated Korean workforce willing to endure sacrifice to improve the nation. Park's "harsh politics and heavy industry" approach, coupled with tight government-controlled allocation of credit to selected industries, worked the economic miracle, but established an insidious pattern of state-industry interdependence. Further, while Park himself was generally immune to the lure of personal enrichment, his successors proved unable to resist, and so the stage was set for more recent events.

Aside from the problems of corruption and political disruption resulting from the uneasy business-government relationship, Clifford sees reliance on the 30-year-old economic model as dysfunctional in the modern global economy. Just as Japan's economy has now stalled, he predicts the same for Korea if its leadership is unable to break free of the old patterns. Readers of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* will see the ethos of that magazine reflected in Clifford's book and will not be surprised at his prescription for dealing with Korea's current problems: deregulation, economic liberalization, and the opening of Korea to foreign capital flows, business, and direct investment.

Additional insights and different perspectives are available in *U.S.-Korean Relations* (1995), the latest in a useful series produced by Claremont College's Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies under the direction of Chae-Jin Lee. Eight of these excellent and inexpensive little books have been published to date, four of them dealing with Korea. In this one, Donald N. Clark examines the cultural stereotypes that have plagued the relationship and comes to the optimistic conclusion that, while our views of each other will always be defined by "images," knowledge on both sides is improving and the images are becoming better focused. Wayne Patterson looks at one aspect of the 90-year US-Korean relationship: Koreans who have immigrated to the United States. Lawrence B. Krause, whose views on Korean economic reform seem congruent with those of Mark Clifford, makes a case for industrial alliances between US and Korean firms. Eun Mee Kim provides a wealth of hard data on foreign direct investment between the United States and Korea, noting that the Korean *chaebol* are now beginning to invest heavily abroad and are on the verge of becoming true multinational corporations. Patrick Morgan argues for a

“liberalist” approach, in which cooperative actions and interdependence play a role as large as or greater than security in the US-ROK relationship. Even military professionals firmly in the “realist” camp should find his arguments worth considering. This is a diverse slate of articles, but it epitomizes the value of the Keck Center publications: the reader is guaranteed exposure to interesting and thought-provoking ideas presented by knowledgeable scholars, packaged in a reader-friendly format.

The prognosis for Northeast Asia is for more turbulence ahead. Whatever the outcome, the interests of the United States will be affected. Every one of these books has something to offer that will help the reader understand the dynamics of the important Northeast Asian region.

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Review Essay

Trends in National Security Issues

RUSS GROVES

Readers generally familiar with the stream of recent literature related to US national security policy and its underpinnings know that thoughtful and scholarly works are increasingly available on almost any related topic. As the end of the Cold War may have opened the gates for nation-states and political movements globally to stake new claims in pursuit of sovereignty and nationalism, so also have writers begun

a competition of sorts to address subjects that were often embedded within and overshadowed by larger issues of the Cold War era. The works in this essay generally fit that description. Without exception, they are scholarly, thoughtful, and have merit. Specialists and non-specialists alike who seek to remain generally abreast of the mainstream can profit from any of these books.

For those concerned with the diversity of views regarding active and reserve component force mix and future configurations, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier Force*, by Jeffrey Jacobs, is must reading. The author does a superb job of framing the contemporary debate, with mention of its historical roots dating to the origins of the militia. Of particular value are the descriptions of the National Guard and Army Reserve, their command structures, a section about adjutants general and their functions, the intended and actual working relations between active and reserve components, and recommendations for the future. The author advocates much broader and more direct control of training and mission readiness assessment by the active components, as part of force integration in an environment of declining defense budgets, than is presently the case.

Although guaranteed to be provocative, this work will serve as one of the more useful primers on the history, context, and references bearing upon the larger issues related to the reserve components. A recent initiative by the active Army to reduce the National Guard force structure by approximately 60,000 and to reduce in number or eliminate divisions as an organizational level altogether, and the spirited opposition by the National Guard, have re-energized that debate.

The line between advocacy and objectivity in the book is not always clear. The author at times displays a missionary zeal, focusing on "flaws" in the present system, which detracts from otherwise compelling arguments for radical change, including restructuring of the Guard. A modest scrub of his sometimes pejorative biases would have left more than sufficient material for serious and searching debate. While the author offers few final answers to the issues discussed, he presents well a sense of the processes through which each generation has tried to deal with them.

The authors of *The American Military in the 21st Century* seek a return to "first principles" in a constructively hypothetical effort to create the armed forces of the United States anew. Based on the Key West Agreement of 1948, which resulted in an assignment of functions to the branches of the military that, along with embedded rivalries, has endured until today, the book makes the case for a long overdue look at roles and missions, organization, efficiency, and means as the bases for change in the US military establishment.

Using the Key West agreement as a point of departure, Steven Wolfe is followed by six contributors who provide well-researched opinions on extraordinarily detailed measures for a wide-ranging reorientation and reorganization. Berry M. Blechman, positing a future world moving more toward unification than not, sees economic interdependence, technology diffusion, and an expanded global audience for all forms of information due to enhanced communications. To those conditions he adds emerging shared values, namely through a growth of democracy and disdain for war and its legitimacy. He recommends a flexible military, essentially US-based, capable of power projection under a variety of circumstances, using the present structure of the Department of Defense, without eliminating branches of the service as did the Canadians some years ago. He concludes that a US military should be just that, a military force. He argues

that a lack of national support for a capable and responsive military will only tempt those whose intent is mischief on a regional if not international scale.

William J. Durch and Pamela L. Reed review a collection of interests that will affect the structure of the US armed forces. Included are public opinion, congressional action, affordability, service interests, and the interests of other defense-oriented domestic constituencies. They observe, "Somewhere between doing only those jobs that a silver bullet can finish and wading deep into the limitless swamp of ethnic conflict, may be a rationale for the use of force that will meet the needs of global leadership while skirting the worst of the swamp."

In a separate article, Durch examines issues related to defense of the US homeland. He reviews the history of nuclear defensive forces and their past and present capabilities, including strategic, tactical, and cruise missiles. Although he sees nuclear weapons development as virtually ended, he concludes that a progressive reduction of nuclear missiles should be the goal while maintaining the ability for assured nuclear retaliation to deter direct nuclear attack on the United States.

John H. Crenshaw notes that only some peace operations "will resemble the kinds of missions to which the US military is accustomed and for which it has traditionally been trained." In his scheme, soldiers would be specially trained and equipped for peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. These could be forces that "do not necessarily shoot to kill, that receive more training in police techniques and riot control, and, perhaps, that are trained to exercise greater patience." Crenshaw urges creation of a new specified peacekeeping command in the US military, and he recommends maintaining a strong humanitarian assistance program as an element of military foreign assistance programs to reduce long-term threats to international stability and US interests.

While *The American Military in the 21st Century* as a whole does not introduce a brave new world, informed readers will find themselves attempting to balance the thematic advocacy of the book with political reality to reach a workable solution. The book deserves a serious but at-arm's-length reading.

In *World Politics and the Evolution of War*, author John J. Weltman reminds readers that over the past five centuries war has been present three times more often than not. His analysis begins with the French Revolution, in which governments saw the potentially unpredictable character of war while the military saw a new age of the decisive battle, in which warfare had changed from its former status as a formal, stylized activity to an enterprise that offered the prospect of achieving clear-cut and dramatic results. This latter view was legitimized through the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz.

Weltman describes the development of nuclear strategy as an attempt at a Jominian solution to a problem that was essentially Clausewitzian in nature. Rules and calculations surrounding the use of nuclear weapons abounded, but the real operative factors were attitudes, expectations, perceptions, and behavior of the antagonists. Nuclear deterrence is ultimately a speculation about psychology and human behavior in situations without historical precedent. Arguably, nuclear deterrence produced a return to conventional war where nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, were not factors, as in Korea and Vietnam (and between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988). Desert Storm is seen to represent the archetypal form of war that Americans have historically thought proper.

Weltman asks whether democracies are indeed more peaceful than other forms of governance. Regardless of the identity of adversaries, he suggests the United States

is in an era of limited, controllable, and localized warfare in which decisive results and catastrophic reversals are unlikely. If true, the United States should therefore adopt a military force posture based on the ability to inflict punishment cheaply and at a distance, without conquering territory or destroying opposing armed forces. The goal would be to achieve limited objectives by punishment, rather than military victory.

Although Weltman's scope is narrow by comparison and perhaps less intense in its advocacy than *War and Anti-War* and *The Real World Order*, he nonetheless poses a question for the age: Has large-scale war been tested by modern civilization and found to be unsatisfactory as a means for solving differences? His work is balanced, credible, elegant, and deserves attention, whether or not one agrees with his conclusion.

Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge, edited by Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos, emerges as an unintended companion work to Weltman's book, although it was published a year earlier. The editors cite *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu to establish the context of their study: "In all history there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close." Various authors then examine the causes and outcomes of more than a score of wars since the 1960s.

Their purpose in the book is to develop understanding of the prolongation of wars, which they propose is as important to national security as attempts to understand the causes of war: "Understanding the prolongation phenomenon allows introduction of strategies for reducing the gravity of such wars by limiting their damage and by enhancing their prospects for an early peaceful resolution." This proposition is tested through analyses by various scholars of recent conflicts: Iran-Iraq, the Lebanese Civil War, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland.

The essay on Vietnam, by Earl Tilford, Jr., has particular relevance. Tilford reminds readers that while the Vietnam conflict is often seen by Americans as having begun in 1959, it actually spanned the years 1945 to 1975. His assessment reveals at least nine reasons for prolonged involvement by the United States. They are worth repeating here:

- A Cold War US mindset against international communism.
- John Kennedy's foreign policy of "pay any price" to defend liberty.
- Covert and incremental introduction of US forces into combat.
- Internal disarray in Vietnam's military and its civilian government.
- Competing domestic US considerations leading to an ambiguous and indecisive US policy.
- The ill-conceived Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.
- An Army and Marine Corps ground war attrition strategy, which the United States could not win (General Vo Nguyen Giap predicted it would lead to US withdrawal when US dead reached approximately 50,000).
- Success in war measured in logistical terms, absent enemy cities to be captured or borders to be crossed.
- The prolonged agony of US extraction following the battles of 1968 and Tet in particular.

Tilford adds that lack of coordination between political goals and military strategy caused the United States to lose; the two came together only in support of withdrawal. From 1959 until the war's conclusion, Hanoi was committed to total war. The United States was committed to something less. It is no surprise that the twin concepts of "endstate" and "exit strategy" have become ground rules in the post-Cold War US political-military discussion.

Tilford and his colleagues have provided the foundation for those who would convert the lessons of Vietnam and elsewhere into strategic policy. The conversion, according to summarizing remarks by the authors, requires an understanding of societal factors that can make war appear beneficial to some groups; international and regional factors such as Cold War confrontations that placed surrogates of the United States and Soviet Union at odds; and strategic incompatibility between adversaries that can lead to prolongation. Thus counter-prolongation dynamics were perhaps at work in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Although not on a scale comparable to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the same may have been true of US involvement in Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia, while Haiti and Bosnia are headed in the same counter-prolongation direction. Is "prolonged war" an oxymoron in any foreseeable US political climate short of total war? Might there be a future conflict based on a scenario such as environmental or natural resource availability in which the United States would go to war for an indeterminate period, intended or unintended?

In the introduction to *Gray Area Phenomena*, by Max G. Manwaring et al., Ambassador Edwin G. Corr borrows Peter Lupsha's definition of the phenomenon: "threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations." This book examines transnational lawlessness in the form of the drug trade, revolutionary criminal groups, and rogue states, along with neo-Luddites including eco-terrorists (who oppose the "evils" of technology), the xenophobes (who prefer racial or national unity), and fundamentalists (who are the only "true believers"). Strong emphasis is placed on international narcotics control, especially cocaine revenues, a large part of which is used to corrupt legitimate government in a variety of ways.

The authors rate the decline of governability in third-world countries as a major contributor to the existence of the phenomenon. Loss of governmental legitimacy is attributed in part to efforts by those governments over time to distribute rather than create wealth. As a result, losses in societal creativity and free market activity follow, as well as a general inability to deal with corruption, poverty, economic opportunities for all citizens, and the conduct of the state's business, not the least of which is free elections.

In terms of external support to governments under stress, "nation-building," despite its attributes, is not seen as a turn-key operation. True nation-building is the development of people who can and will fight corruption and inefficiency; who can and will build roads, schools, and health care facilities; who can and will strengthen their own national, regional, and local institutions; and who can and will create and maintain the necessary linkages between and among institutions within a given society. Also found in this vexing equation are large urban centers that are impenetrable, uncontrollable, and form dangerous zones of rebellion. Examples cited are Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Cairo, and Bombay, in which the urban mass is such that the cities are, by most measures, out of control.

On a global scale, the international rule of law and close regulation of monetary procedures, especially to prevent money-laundering, are seen as essential antidotes to *Gray Area Phenomena*. An international unity of effort is necessary, with priority on intelligence rather than combat operations. In conjunction with a political willingness, police efforts must displace military efforts to restore order and legitimacy.

In this context, the United States must define its own vital-interests test that will lead to involvement and abstinence on the scale of gray area activity. In summary, Ambassador Corr argues for application of the six criteria of the Manwaring paradigm, which is based on examination of 69 low-intensity conflicts and forms the basis for coping successfully with insurgencies, terrorism, and narcotics control. The criteria (to deal mainly with international narcotics problems) are: maintenance of host government legitimacy; organization for unity; type and consistency of support to the besieged government; reduction of outside aid to the traffickers; and discipline and capabilities of the supported government's police and armed forces.

Gray Area Phenomena is a serious and worthy look at criminal and outlaw forces working globally to undermine governments and market economies. The book proposes many prescriptions for the challenges listed, but possibly the most instructive comes from the chapter entitled "Achieving the Elusive Unity of Effort," by John T. Fishel. Four case studies from US involvement in Bolivia, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru provide specifics on the application of policy with constructive criticism, mainly in the areas of unity of effort and undefined endstates. It is here that a student of national strategic and military policy will find the details that will lend reality to the suggestions found elsewhere in the book.

This book expands the existing view of operations short of war and offers increased appreciation for the complexities surrounding emerging US foreign policy. It is quite possible that gray area challenges will dominate future efforts by the United States to protect domestic and international market economies from threats. Armed interventions may come overwhelmingly to mean operations against gray area adversaries, rather than more conventional enemies. Whether or not that comes to pass, *Gray Area Phenomena* is an important assessment of real and sinister challenges to US values. Along with the other works reviewed here, it should be included in readings intended to lead to a well-rounded comprehension of life in the national security fast lane.

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The Reviewer: Brigadier General Russ Groves is the adjutant general for Kentucky. He holds a Ph.D., is a member of the Kentucky Bar Association, and is a licensed architect. He has held five commands in the Kentucky Army National Guard and is a graduate of the US Army War College.

Book Reviews

The Old Man's Trail. By Tom Campbell. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Reviewed by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC Ret., Director of National Security Programs, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and coauthor of *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Gulf War*.

The differences between the American way of war in Vietnam and that of their enemy are legion. Legion also are the books that have described the war through the lens of the American fighting man. To date only one novel has appeared in English that tells the story from the other side of the hill. *The Sorrow of War*, written by Bao Ninh, is an account of a young North Vietnamese soldier who survived the killing fields of South Vietnam. It is a bitter lyrical tale of torment, trial, and disappointment.

Now comes *The Old Man's Trail*, another book chronicling the North Vietnamese experience. Only this one is written by an American. It is a tribute to the bravery and dedication of a platoon of young Vietnamese caught up in what appears to be an endless war. It ends on an optimistic note of eventual victory over the Americans.

Lest the theme turn off American veterans of the war, be assured this is no Jane Fonda polemic. It is written by a retired career Marine who served two and a half years as an infantry officer in Vietnam. Like most of us who served in that war, the author, Tom Campbell, gained a begrudging respect for his adversary. *The Old Man's Trail*, Campbell's first novel, is not about fire-fights in the rice paddies. Rather, it tells the story of a platoon of 15-year-old North Vietnamese porters whose job it was to deliver the weapons and ammunition to the Vietnamese engaged in those fire-fights.

Considered expendable by their leaders in Hanoi, they were but a tiny cog of 40,000 equally expendable cogs that maintained or traveled the jungle supply route over the 650 miles from depots in North Vietnam to the battlefields of the south. Called the Ho Chi Minh Trail by Americans, it was known to the Vietnamese as "the old man's trail." Named after an anonymous elderly South Vietnamese who plotted the course, which dated back to French colonial days, it was the vital supply line for the war against Saigon. Bombed unmercifully and cut repeatedly, it was never destroyed.

Campbell's story is a simple one, told in direct and simple prose. Well researched from American and South Vietnamese sources and prisoner reports, it is as accurate a picture of life along the trail as we are likely to get until Hanoi provides greater detail. That life was hard and dangerous is an understatement. Nature and American bombs conspired to make it so. The death of a young soldier when he slipped off a narrow part of the trail on the first day of the journey is but the harbinger of many deaths to come. Bombers suddenly raining death on their convoy was a horror, aggravated by the venality and incompetence of bureaucrats who controlled the pace of movement south. But the story is not one of unmitigated suffering. Rather, it is one of perseverance in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles.

The nominal protagonists who tell the tale make up a platoon of 60 young porters whose only purpose in life and death is to deliver 2500 pounds of mortars and

ammunition down the trail. Those who survived would then be integrated into the combat units in the south with little hope of ever returning home.

The odyssey is told through reflections of Duan, their 30-year-old resourceful NCO, already a veteran of the trail; Ba, the platoon's political officer, a propaganda-spouting communist dilettante who grows in stature under hardship; and Ky, a boy porter, one of the survivors of the trek, who endures and never loses his youthful optimism and trust in his leaders.

The perils of the journey south provide the backdrop for what is essentially a morality tale, replete with examples of tenderness, cruelty, and the vices and virtues between the two. For a first novel, *The Old Man's Trail* is successful at maintaining its focus. From the outset, when the platoon first shoulders its burden, to the end when the surviving half sets it down at its destination, Campbell bores in on the strengths and weaknesses of soldiers under stress. If there is one criticism of this otherwise fine story, it is the author's failure to balance the character development of his three principals. We come to know Duan intimately, but Ba and Ky remain somewhat elusive.

That Campbell admires the men behind the faces he fought is obvious. As a Marine he knows what makes the mettle of a real warrior, even if that warrior's only job was to carry the burden of supplies down an old man's trail.

In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. By Robert S. McNamara. New York: Times Books, 1995. 414 pages. \$27.50.
Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, author of *Eisenhower as Strategist*.

As Robert McNamara's autobiography shows, initial impressions (and titles) can be misleading. Strictly as an account of US policymaking during the Vietnam conflict, *In Retrospect* offers little that is not already known. The author's conclusions—that US policymakers did not understand the conflict, failed to explain it to Congress and the American public, and inadequately organized for it—are accurate, but can be found elsewhere. If written by a less lofty author, *In Retrospect* would garner little attention. Ultimately it is less important *what* the book says than *who* said it.

For those who participated in the war, or relatives of casualties, McNamara's acceptance of much personal responsibility for the failure of Vietnam policy provokes reactions ranging from anger and a sense of betrayal to relief. *In Retrospect* thus has value as catalyst for emotional catharsis. It contributes to the process of psychic healing that has shaped American life for the past 20 years. But the book's ultimate value lies deeper. If read carefully, it offers enduring lessons that transcend Southeast Asia and affect all dimensions of American national security. Yet because McNamara set out to write a book on Vietnam rather than strategic leadership, readers looking for this must work harder than those simply seeking to expunge the mental ghosts of Vietnam. In the end, it is worth the effort.

Strategic leadership requires diverse skills. A strategic leader must reconcile competing demands for power resources; balance costs, risks, and benefits; understand the paradoxical logic of strategy across cultures; communicate complex concepts while mobilizing support; and develop an acute sense of timing. These are fairly obvious to students of human conflict, but there are other more complex skills necessary for strategic leadership which are seen only by astute observers. Foremost among these is a

rare form of courage. This is where the true value of McNamara's book resides: it is an invaluable study of the dilemmas of courage among strategic leaders.

For strategic leaders, courage does not entail physical danger or discomfort, but emotional and psychological risk. Reputation, honor, career prospects, and sense of self-worth can hinge on key decisions. The psychic risks faced by strategic leaders can be more frightening than combat—when under fire, adrenaline at least numbs the fear; there are few anesthetics for psychic pain. McNamara must be assessed in this context. In some ways, he was courageous. He certainly never shirked responsibility for his actions or decisions. As a manager, he bravely bucked conventional wisdom and had the strength of character to implement radical change in the organizations he led. This was evident both during his tenure at Ford Motor Company and during his reform of the Pentagon's strategic planning and budgeting processes. But in the final reckoning of McNamara's career, these are sideshows. The use of military power rather than its development takes center stage. Here McNamara's courage faltered. By his own admission, he did not adequately oppose the strategy of Johnson Administration hawks (both military and civilian) even after he developed serious reservations about the feasibility of military victory in Vietnam. Instead, he was "inclined to recommend" the escalatory steps proposed by those he considered more knowledgeable about Southeast Asia, such as Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow. The boldness and willingness to accept risk that led McNamara to great power thus failed its ultimate test.

In McNamara's defense, he filled one of the most complex and difficult positions in the US government. A successful Secretary of Defense must simultaneously be a manager, politician, and strategist. On the first, McNamara was a master. On the second, he was at least adequate, but this was not a fatal flaw since during most of his tenure he worked for the most skilled politician in American history. As a strategist, though, McNamara fell woefully short and, unfortunately, no one in the Johnson Administration, from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisors McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow on down, was any better. Like a figure in a Greek tragedy who is essentially good but is overcome by one fatal character flaw, McNamara's inability to understand the uses and, more important, the limits of force in American statecraft proved his downfall.

McNamara's admission of shortcomings distinguishes him from the other failed strategists of the Johnson Administration. Some insist to this day that their approach to Vietnam was right. Although others like Rostow are more reflective, none have expressed such deep remorse as McNamara. But what really matters is not that failed strategic leaders confess, but that they use their shortcomings as guideposts for those who come after them. Robert McNamara has done this, thus providing a great service to his country and its future leaders. He writes:

Looking back, I clearly erred by not forcing a knock down, drag-out fight over the loose assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our military strategy in Vietnam. I had spent twenty years as a manager identifying problems and forcing organizations—often against their will—to think deeply and realistically about alternative courses of action and their consequences. I doubt I will ever fully understand why I did not do so here.

Such understanding is the key: by illuminating the *failure* of courage among strategic leaders, *In Retrospect* could help develop it.

As a study of the fragile, sometimes tortuous, balance between obedience to superiors and dissent from flawed policies that strategic leaders must maintain, *In Retrospect* has enduring value. "Subordinates ought to find ways to compensate for idiosyncrasies in their leader's style. . . . Had we done so, we might have changed the policy," McNamara wrote. This is the credo. Those who approach *In Retrospect* less as a scholarly analysis than a portrait of tragedy, ripe with implications for the conundrums of courage, will leave it more thoughtful than when they first picked it up.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power. By Colin S. Gray. University Park, Pa.: Penn State Univ. Press, 1994. 204 pages. \$32.50 (\$14.95 paper). **Reviewed by James J. Wirtz**, Naval Postgraduate School.

During the 1980s, the US Navy advanced an extraordinarily successful Maritime Strategy that directly linked seapower to the defeat of a continental power, the USSR. This was no small accomplishment. Demonstrating how attack submarines would break the camel's back by shifting the strategic nuclear balance in the event of a stalemated battle along the Central Front was a clever argument. Although some claimed that the Navy's scenario was simply far-fetched, it was politically effective. The Maritime Strategy linked disparate communities—submariners, aviators, Marines—into a coherent strategy that fit each community's aspirations. Thus, all the naval services could read off the same script, presenting a common front in interservice debates. The Maritime Strategy also allowed the Navy to capitalize on the Reagan defense buildup by explaining how naval forces could contain, deter, and ultimately defeat the primary (Soviet) threat facing the United States.

The Maritime Strategy, along with the Soviet Union, has now been consigned to the ash heap of history. What Colin Gray provides in this fine volume, however, is a scholarly assessment of the merits of seapower as an instrument of national strategy and a balanced assessment of the relationship between land, air, and seapower in war. In other words, *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World* is a calm treatment of the intellectual tradition behind the Maritime Strategy, without the hyperbole and marketing directed at bureaucratic and domestic political audiences.

The focus of Gray's Mahanian analysis is the historical relationship and fortunes of maritime and continental rivals. He notes that in modern times, maritime powers have enjoyed an advantage in these rivalries. Unlike continental states, a lack of propinquity makes seapowers a logical ally for land powers facing a would-be hegemon. Seapower also allows a state to exert a global influence and to harness resources from around the world. In a particularly insightful metaphor, Gray suggests that seapower is how states exploit the global access created by nuclear umbrellas, command of the air, or domination of outer space.

Gray's analysis probably would not offend Army or Air Force officers. To his credit, he acknowledges the limitations of sea and air power. As the American experience in Vietnam demonstrates, mastery of the sky and sea is no guarantee of victory. Seapower, which now entails mastery of the air, is viewed as an enabler, allowing a state to strike at the weaknesses of a continental adversary. In other words, Gray is no single-service advocate. True great powers must exhibit real competence

in both sea and land war; great-power militaries are ultimately produced by joint military capability. Gray also would suggest that the relatively new realms of electromagnetic warfare (often referred to as information war) and space have yet to be integrated into joint warfare. In the next century, great power war will fully occupy all five of these dimensions. For strategists, the emerging challenge is how to best integrate air, land, sea, information, and space power to achieve national objectives.

What is disappointing about Gray's work is that it has more to say about the Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States—a classic great-power standoff between a land power and a sea power—than it does about the current strategic environment. Clearly, the United States conducted the Cold War as a maritime power, with a dominant Navy and a relatively small, albeit outstanding, Army that was supplemented by an extraordinarily capable Air Force. But now that the United States is left without a Great Power rival, what is it to do with its dominant Navy? Gray is strangely quiet on this score; he simply notes that now is the time to prepare for the next great-power competition and that the British experience in the first half of the 19th century appears similar to our current predicament.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World advances a theme common to great navalists throughout history. For the most part, these strategists have advanced arguments about how seapower can help achieve victory on some Eurasian battlefield. In response, Army officers, preoccupied with the exigencies of land battle, have found this position counterintuitive if not dangerously diversionary. By contrast, the far simpler task of explaining what to do with seapower in the absence of a continental rival or a serious naval competitor has received little attention. Gray has said more than most about our situation: think of the Navy as the enabling force, plan for joint warfare, and prepare for the coming Great Power rival. Still, now that a period of virtually uncontested American dominance of the world's oceans has arrived, it is ironic that Mahanians have relatively little to say about the Golden Age. Like a peaceful end to the Cold War, overwhelming naval dominance was a utopia sometimes envisioned by strategists. No one has yet clearly articulated how the US Navy should respond to this opportunity.

Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire. By Geoffrey Regan. New York: Avon Books, 1995. 258 pages. \$12.50. **Reviewed by Colonel Kenneth Steinweg**, author of "Dealing Realistically with Fratricide," *Parameters*, Spring 1995.

In taking up this book, *Blue on Blue* by Geoffrey Regan, the reader is led to believe that it is a book about fratricide. It really is not. Fratricide is defined by TRADOC as "employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment . . . which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel." Charles Schrader's book *Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War* is a classic work on the topic and is frequently quoted in this book. Therefore, Mr. Regan has a keen appreciation of the definition, or at least an obligation to approximate the definition in his exploration of this topic. It is not that he should adopt an American definition, but some sort of definition is required if he does not choose to use standard ones. Actually, the cover

of the paperback version has it right. This is "a devastating assortment of miscalculations, malfunctions, and military mishaps—from ancient Greece to the Persian Gulf." Assortment is a key word there. You will find discussions on fragging, accidents on the parade field, submarines that sink due to technical incompetence, ships colliding at sea, and intentional allied fights. Including these incidents with the serious issue of fratricide is a major disservice, and it will confuse a reader not familiar with the issue. There is no common ground here except dead soldiers.

The author is British and much of the discussion is focused on European units and history. There is extensive documentation of World War I incidents not well covered in the American literature, as well as 40 pages of mostly European incidents from ancient times up to World War I. To the American reader, some of the information will add to the background on fratricide.

The introduction to the book seriously detracts from the efforts made to develop the topic in subsequent chapters. Pages are devoted to an alleged cover-up of British casualties from allied (American) pilots attacking British APCs during Desert Storm. This is followed by a digression into unsubstantiated, unsourced claims of World War II European criticism of American military unprofessionalism. Assertions of American "gung ho" attitudes, and "shoot first and identify later" philosophy are brought up only to be left unsupported and undeveloped in subsequent chapters. The author then plunges into problems of ancient warfare.

An introduction is supposed to set the stage for what comes next, but here it instead wraps the rest of the book in contradictions and controversy. Mr. Regan claims that the leaders of the allied effort in Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf and Sir Peter de la Billiere, "were satisfied that friendly casualties could be minimized if not entirely eradicated." Schwarzkopf in his book, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, does not make this claim and, indeed, acknowledges the presence of fratricide on every battlefield. Mr. Regan, just two pages later, states, "Most military commanders [understand] . . . that [fratricide] is an unpleasant but unavoidable fact of military life." So just what is the author's position?

There is no concluding chapter to pull this all together, only a last chapter, titled "Discipline and Friendly Fire," an odd collection of stories on desertions, officers and NCOs beating and shooting soldiers, and execution of soldiers. Is this fratricide, or does it even deserve to be called "blue on blue"? Not by any standard definition. The Afterword, only one and a half pages, concludes: "When men are afraid, they will always shoot first rather than identify a target, or drop bombs too early rather than risk the flak. Mistakes will be reduced when men have less fear. But then that would not be war, and they would not be men." This was the original criticism of American soldiers, and nothing has been learned in a travel through this book.

Mr. Regan obviously has extensive knowledge of military history. The thousands of examples cited reflect a lifetime of study and work in the area of human conflict. However, it has not been focused in this book in a way that provides benefit to the reader. This book would be better labeled, "1001 Ways Soldiers Have Died During War (and Peace)." This may be a harsh judgment, but the seriousness of the issue and the honest attempt to protect soldiers from this horrible fate deserve focused attention. The uninformed who are attracted to this book by the title will remain uninformed, and perhaps be more confused. Readers knowledgeable on the subject

will gain no insight. We have so much to learn to correct the problem of fratricide, and Mr. Regan's book does not move us forward.

Arch of Fire: A Child in Nazi Germany. By Siegfried Streufert. Harrisburg, Pa.: Aina Kai Books, 1995. 212 pages. \$19.98.

Dachau: The Harrowing of Hell. By Marcus J. Smith. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1995. 291 pages. \$16.95.

Reviewed by Colonel Henry G. Gole, USA, Ret.

The reader scanning these pages may pose the question your reviewer asked as he dutifully eyed two unopened books sent to him by his favorite editor: Do we need yet another book—or two—to sift through the overworked ashes of Nazi Germany one more time? The short answer for the titles above is yes. Both authors tell their stories in the first person without pretense, without excursions, indeed, without analysis. None is necessary; these books ring true as reports of evil. Specialists in Germany and modern Europe will appreciate both accounts and cite them for the young who are ignorant of the past or subjected to revisionist versions of the past that would excise evil from the Nazi story. The general reader will find them easy to read and troubling to contemplate.

Siegfried Streufert, a well-published author of science articles and a professor at Pennsylvania State University's College of Medicine in Hershey, Pa., was born in Berlin in 1934 and grew up in a community just outside of Kiel in wartime Germany. He describes the drama of everyday life on the home front through the eyes of a boy who recalls events in the literal way children see things: frequent bombing that reduces his suburban neighborhood to a few houses that become crammed with survivors; propaganda in the classroom and how his decent parents counter it in conversations at home; house searches by Nazi thugs suspicious of his father's loyalty to Hitler; and BBC reports on the war from "the other side" that reveal the lies fed to the German people. His father, a public official and political enemy of the Nazis before their 1933 victory and an enemy during the war, is taken to a concentration camp in the course of the war, never to be seen again.

Streufert successfully blends the life and death issues of war and resistance with important little-boy events like kite-flying, tree-climbing, adventures in the ruins, affection for animals, friendships, and family life. This reader walked in the shoes of a small German boy from 1939 to 1945 and shared the joy of life with him as our author finds his way to normal life as a citizen of the United States of America. But he did not forget. Nor should we.

At the end of April 1945, 26-year-old Lieutenant Marcus Smith, a newly minted medical doctor, entered Dachau concentration camp on the day after its liberation as the sole medical officer of Displaced Persons (DP) Team 115. The team of ten US infantrymen was hastily trained to feed, clothe, treat, and repatriate some of the millions of DPs in Germany at the close of World War II. The condition of the more than 32,000 starved and seriously ill prisoners of Dachau shocked the team, shocked its medical officer, and would soon shock the world. No one knew in advance the magnitude of the deplorable conditions to be encountered by Team 115, but by

improvisation and hard work the Americans did their best for the cadaverous wretches of Dachau. Marcus Smith tells us that for 25 years he was unable to think about the experience. Then, in a letter written in 1972, he explained: "I have written the book for the post-World War II generation; it is dedicated to my children with the hope that they will remember the events that have shown how thin the veneer of civilization really is." He wondered if the malignancy of Nazi Germany was growing in America!

Dr. Smith, who died in 1986, has written a lucid book. He was mostly successful in his attempt to write a detached, clinical, professional account of his six weeks in hell, but he was shattered by the evidence of genocide that surrounded him. When "success" is measured in reducing the number of deaths per day in Dachau to fewer than 100, it is a tribute to his compassion that shock and anger penetrate his professional posture.

Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II. By Jeffrey W. Legro. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995. 255 pages. \$35.00. Reviewed by Dr. Samuel J. Newland (LTC, ARNG, Ret.), Department of Corresponding Studies, US Army War College.

The 50-year anniversary of World War II has been accompanied by the publication of a virtual deluge of books, threatening to bury the student of military history who attempts to maintain currency in the field. Some have been nostalgic reminiscences by veterans of the war, while others have been a rehash of familiar battles or biographies of notable wartime leaders. There have been some original contributions to the historiography of the period, but all too many of the publications have replowed familiar ground, digging up only a limited number of new insights. Thus, it is a pleasure for a reader to find a few books like *Cooperation Under Fire*, in which an author seeks to present an analysis of a largely ignored aspect of the war, the mutual restraint shown by Great Britain and Germany in employing certain weapon systems.

The book is not a history of this phenomenon, but a political scientist's approach to understanding why two nations, in the process of attempting to destroy each other, found it advantageous to exercise mutual restraint in the employment of certain weapons or strategies. The author's musings about why poison gas had not been employed during World War II ultimately expanded to this study. The author looks at three strategies or weapon systems that were initially employed during World War I—poison gas, submarine warfare against merchant ships, and strategic bombing affecting civilian populations—and asks why restraint was exercised in each during World War II.

With a substantial amount of research, and drawing on his background as a political scientist, the author determines that cooperation and noncooperation can best be understood by examining the effects of organizational culture—the beliefs and customs of national (including military) bureaucracies. These organizations had developed preferences regarding the employment of selected "unthinkable weapons" during the interwar period and so determined their nation's preferences regarding the use of poison gas during World War II. The author elects to add to his analysis

proposed restraints on the bombing of civilian targets and the sinking of merchant vessels. Both of these issues emerged from the Great War and were strategies that the major powers attempted to limit, much as they did chemical warfare. The question to be answered is why was restraint so evident regarding the use of poison gas and rejected for the other two?

A survey of military thought during the interwar years shows that strategic bombing and submarine warfare were considered bona fide techniques to be employed by the military in the event of another war. In fact, as the author acknowledges, "All nations believed that the submarine had a valid military role." With such widespread acceptance of the submarine, attempts to restrict its use failed early in the war.

Attempts to restrict the use of airpower were similarly futile. In the interwar years proponents of airpower from many nations had promoted the primacy of strategic bombing for waging and winning the next war. The literature of the period suggests that attempts to restrict airpower would be short-lived—and they were. Strategic bombing became a valued weapon of war.

What is absent from Legro's analysis is the realization that poison gas was a weapon of mass destruction whose employment brought few advantages and many liabilities to the army that employed it. One finds no meaningful discussion of the opinions of political and military leaders that the overall threat of retaliation and the likely contamination of the battlefield made poison gas a weapon to be feared as much by the employer as by the intended target. There was as much to be lost by its use as there was to be gained.

This is not to say that Legro's book is without value to the military reader. It does include a substantial amount of information on the early attempts of the major powers to limit the bombing of cities and to restrict submarine attacks against merchant ships, and, of course, on whether to employ poison gas. Its biggest shortfall is the author's attempt to explain the complex political and military decisions relating to the three strategies with a standard off-the-shelf theory. The issues discussed in the book are far too complex and dynamic for that approach.

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