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"AID-TO-CIVIL": INDIAN ARMY AND PARAMILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC PEACEKEEPING

*A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement
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Library of Congress*

July 1984

Author: Douglas C. Makeig


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PREFACE

This study analyzes the changing nature of civil-military relations in India, particularly as it relates to the use of federal forces in domestic peacekeeping operations. After discussing the nature of violence in India and the legal norms which govern "aid-to-civil" deployments, the paper analyzes the foundation stones of India's peacekeeping establishment: the police, paramilitary forces, and the Army. Lastly, the study focuses on three case studies of aid-to-civil deployments which illustrate the assumptions laid down in the foregoing chapters.

Information for the study was derived from open source materials, primarily from India.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SUMMARY -----	vii
GLOSSARY -----	ix
1. INTRODUCTION -----	1
2. THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE IN INDIA -----	2
3. LAW-AND-ORDER IN THE INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM -----	7
4. STATE AND LOCAL POLICE: A WEAKENED FOUNDATION -----	13
5. PARAMILITARY FORCES: STRONG ARM OF THE CENTER -----	17
6. THE INDIAN ARMY: RELUCTANT ARBITERS OF THE DOMESTIC PEACE -----	27
7. RELIABILITY OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES -----	40
8. CASE STUDIES OF ARMY INVOLVEMENT -----	43
a. Moradabad and the Upsurge of Communalism -----	43
b. The Punjab Morass -----	45
c. Assam and the Smoldering Insurgencies in the Northeast -----	55
9. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS -----	59
NOTES -----	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	65

APPENDIXES

A. Profiles of Indian Paramilitary Forces -----	73
Notes -----	87
B. Excerpts from a Televised Speech by General A. S. Vaidya, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, on 1 July 1984 -----	89
C. "Keep the Army Out," (editorial) -----	91

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Map - Map of India -----	xi
2. Chart - Responsibilities for Controlling Domestic Breaches of the Peace -----	9
3. Chart - National Defense Responsibilities in Wartime -----	9
4. Chart - Levels of Response to Domestic Disturbances -----	12
5. Chart - State Police Organization -----	14

TABLES

1. Availability of Manpower for Internal Security Duties -----	18
2. Paramilitary Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, April 1982-April 1983 -----	20
3. Changes in CRPF/BSF Force Deployments, by State, between January 1973 and January 1974 -----	23
4. Army Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, June 1979-December 1980 -----	32
5. Indian Army Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, 1973-84 -----	33
6. Indian Air Force Flights in Aid-to-Civil, 1980-82 -----	35
7. Home Guards Personnel Strength, by State (1982) -----	36
8. Incidents of Unrest Within Peacekeeping Forces, 1978-84 -----	41
9. Measures of Force Reliability -----	42

SUMMARY

"Aid-to-civil" refers to the process by which local Indian authorities request the central government in New Delhi to lend police assistance during emergencies. Deployment of these forces has steadily increased over time, as the climate of violence has worsened. Although the Indian Constitution reserves law-and-order responsibilities for the states, the center has become increasingly involved in local disputes. Moreover, New Delhi has acquired a formidable arsenal of special powers which are employed in times of local crisis.

State and local police forces are the weakest links in India's internal security apparatus. India's paramilitary establishment, numbering about 382,000 personnel in nine different forces, performs three missions: border defense, "watch-and-ward," and aid-to-civil. The Army--India's force of last resort in domestic peacekeeping--performs three domestic missions: providing disaster relief, running essential industries during strikes, and quelling civil disturbances. While there is little danger of a military coup in India, the Army could acquire increased police and administrative responsibilities by default. Mounting unrest within police and paramilitary ranks serves to increase Army responsibilities in aid-to-civil.

Three case studies of aid-to-civil deployments (Moradabad, Assam, and Punjab) show the ways these forces are used in the domestic peacekeeping environment. Raising new forces and enlarging existing ones, as suggested by the Gandhi government, offer no guarantee that the Army will be relieved of domestic peacekeeping responsibilities. An appendix to the study profiles India's nine paramilitary forces.

GLOSSARY

<u>ahimsa</u>	"non-violence"
aid-to-civil	formally "aid-to-the-civil power," an Indo-British legal concept whereby authorities can request federal police or army assistance during civil disorders
AR	Assam Rifles
<u>bandh</u>	general strike
BSF	Border Security Force
cantonment	geographical area under army jurisdiction which houses troops
center	central government in New Delhi
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
CPC	Criminal Procedure Code
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
<u>dacoit</u>	Indian bandits
<u>dharna</u>	civil disobedience tactic whereby protestors refuse to clear an area when ordered to do so by police
DIG	deputy inspector general
DM	district magistrate
DSC	Defense Security Corps
<u>gherao</u>	protest tactic whereby an official is physically encircled, sometimes for long periods of time
<u>hartal</u>	a work stoppage staged as a political protest
HG	Home Guards
HQ	headquarters
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IPS	Indian Police Service
ITBP	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
<u>jail boro</u>	protest tactic designed to fill the jails and inundate the court system
<u>jawan</u>	common soldier
JCO	Junior Commissioned Officer
<u>lathi</u>	bamboo stave used by Indian police to control crowds
LS	Ladakh Scouts
LSD	<u>Lok Sabha Debates</u>
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MNF	Mizo National Front
Naxalites	ultraleftist revolutionaries
NCO	noncommissioned officer

PLA	People's Liberation Army (Manipur)
PPF	Punjab Police Force
PREPAK	People's Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak (Manipur)
<u>rail rokho</u>	protest tactic designed to block railway traffic
<u>raj</u>	term used to describe British imperial rule in India
<u>rasta rokho</u>	protest tactic designed to block road traffic
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RPF	Railway Protection Force
RPG	shoulder-fired antitank grenade launcher
SAP	state armed police
Section 144	provision of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure allowing local authorities to ban the gathering of five or more persons
SFF	Special Frontier Force
UPPAC	Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary




Figure 1. Map of India.

"AID-TO-CIVIL": INDIAN ARMY AND PARAMILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC PEACEKEEPING

1. INTRODUCTION

The term "aid-to-civil" (or, in its full form "aid-to-the-civil power") is a British imperial usage referring to the process by which local authorities can request the central government to lend police assistance in times of emergency. In the Indian setting, appeals for federal intervention are characteristically made when the local constabulary is confronted with a demonstrable threat to public order which cannot be contained without resorting to higher levels of police firepower and manpower at the disposal of central authorities in New Delhi. Once the aid-to-civil request is made, New Delhi authorizes the deployment of any one or a mixture of forces that are deemed appropriate to the prevailing level of threat. Such forces include specialized police units, commando squadrons, and paramilitary personnel trained in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and riot control. The Army is India's force of last resort in domestic peacekeeping situations and is only called out when all other means of stemming the incidence of violence have failed.

Under British rule, the procedures governing aid-to-civil deployments were codified into a coherent body of civil-military law which, in most respects, has been adopted intact by independent India. This longstanding tradition of civil-military relations places strict limits on the center's discretionary use of force in the domestic context by establishing procedures for officers and civil servants to abide by when conducting aid-to-civil operations. Implicit in this tradition is the acknowledgment that the police powers of government can become an instrument of tyranny if authorities at all levels are not subject to legal constraints in the use of force. Since the Indian constitution also acknowledges that authorities must act quickly and, if need be, resolutely to preserve the integrity of the state against domestic threats, India's system of civil-military relations attempts to balance the imperative of maintaining law-and-order with the imperative of ensuring that the state's obligation to use force under certain circumstances is not abused. This is a delicate balancing act to perform, but one in which India has achieved considerable success, at least in comparison with the long list of newly independent states that have fallen victim to military coups, organized police repression, and other systematic abuses of authority.

Events of the past decade suggest, however, that the fabric of civil-military relations in India is showing signs of wear as Army and paramilitary personnel are being deployed in the aid-to-civil role in greater numbers, for longer periods of time, and with increasing frequency. Furthermore, the scope of violence in India has reached unprecedented levels, as has the level of force which Army and paramilitary personnel have employed in restoring order. Since 1980 alone, the massive use of federal force in Assam, the Punjab, and a number of north Indian cities convulsed with communal rioting is testimony to the fact that mass violence is becoming more widespread in India. At the same time, the ability of local police forces to contain violence has diminished perceptibly, thereby prompting state and local authorities to rely more than ever on New Delhi for peacekeeping assistance.

2. THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE IN INDIA

To many observers, the subject of violence in Indian society conjures up two contradictory images. At one extreme, India is portrayed as a timeless civilization whose national identity is rooted in moral precepts such as ahimsa [non-violence]. The underpinning for this Gandhian article of faith is the belief that Indian society is essentially well ordered, stable, and cohesive. The persistence of mass violence is acknowledged, although the phenomenon is attributed to factors such as the debilitating legacy of colonial rule, the pernicious influences of Westernization, and the erosion of Indian social mores. At the other extreme, more jaundiced observers of the Indian scene view the massive social convulsions that have visited the Indian Subcontinent through the millenia as the defining characteristic of a society that is inherently violent and ungovernable.

These conflicting images are gross generalizations that speak more to myth than to reality. Like any society in the throes of rapid modernization, India is going through a period in which violence has become the social biproduct of larger economic and political transformations.¹ Indeed, a convincing argument can be made that India is particularly vulnerable to violent disorders precisely because it maintains a pluralistic, federal system of government that encourages competition for political power and influence among highly mobilized social groups. The competition of the political marketplace provides Indian democracy with an extraordinary vitality that is noticeably lacking in most Third World nations. Competition, however, is also an invitation for struggle which can spawn violent challenges to constituted authority and intense frictions between adversarial groups. Indian administrators and elected officials are sensitive to the need for accommodating (or, at a minimum, tolerating) pressure groups that operate within the bounds of legitimate dissent. The increased level of violence in India does not necessarily symbolize a failure on the part of the political system or of Indian officials; rather, it points to the inherent difficulties encountered in any political system which tolerates public protest and encourages political mass participation. Moreover, the sheer complexity of Indian society virtually ensures that the political system will be hardpressed to keep pace with the demands of an increasingly articulate and well-organized citizenry.

Commenting on the worsening climate of violence in India, the 1979 Police Commission Report observed:

The increasing number of riots, whether in the universities, in industries, or between religious groups or more recently between caste groups in the rural areas, are indicative of the growing sense of impatience on the part of the people and the increased and deeper involvement of the police in containing the situation.²

The Commission's candid assessment is borne out by press reports, analyses by independent observers, and statistics compiled by the Indian Government.

Indian authorities regard communal violence as the most serious threat to domestic order. Between 1958 and 1960, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) recorded 50 incidents of communal rioting; after a slight decline in communal

violence in the early 1970s, the number of incidents rose to 1,050 between 1979 and 1981; and, in 1983 alone, 500 communal incidents resulting in over 1,100 fatalities were recorded nationwide.³ Statistics of this kind are impossible to verify and are ordinarily subject to underreporting by the government. Despite these drawbacks, the figures do highlight the fact that communal violence is intensifying. Moreover, it is assumed that many more acts of communal violence occur which are not recorded in official statistics or newspaper reports. As one scholar of the subject wrote: "What does not meet the eye, for every instance of actual violence there were numerous situations poised unsteadily on the knife-edge of disorder."⁴

Seemingly innocuous acts such as the playing of music in front of a mosque or the inadvertent killing of a cow in a Hindu neighborhood can provide the spark for a communal riot. The violence that engulfed the industrial suburbs of Bombay in spring 1984 was triggered when a Hindu zealot publicly insulted Islam, prompting Muslim leaders to respond in kind. Similarly, the 1980 Moradabad riots were touched off when Muslims were angered by rumors that the police had allowed a pig to enter a mosque. Once the communal spark is lit, however, the principal actors in the ensuing carnage are usually unemployed youths, common criminals, and other dispossessed elements. This pattern of communal tensions mushrooming into a mob frenzy with a momentum of its own is difficult for authorities to contain; anticipating it is almost impossible.

During the first 3 decades of independence, communal incidents pitting Muslims against Hindus were confined largely to core riot areas in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. The areas hardest hit by communal violence have been industrial towns in these states where Hindus and Muslims coexist uneasily in roughly equal numbers. Intercommunal competition for scarce economic resources such as jobs and government services is often the underlying source of tension. The bloodlettings in Moradabad, Meerut, and Aligarh since 1981 show that urban communal riots in this region have intensified and increased in frequency. As the Police Commission noted, however, the incidence of communal violence has spread beyond the historically volatile states of the Indian heartland. Since 1980, ferocious communal violence has erupted in Gujarat, Assam, Maharashtra, and, most noticeably, the Punjab.



Newspaper cartoon lampoons government efforts to combat communalism.

[Source: Indian Express (Bombay), 15 April 1984.]

Not only have communal incidents begun to infect states not usually associated with the phenomenon, but the range of communities embroiled in the violence has expanded, the duration of the disturbances has been more prolonged, and the level of bloodshed has been more pronounced. The Punjab, once a model of communal harmony and efficient police administration, has been the battleground for Hindu and Sikh extremists for over 2 years; tensions between Hindus and Muslims, tribesmen and settlers, and residents and aliens have exploded into mass violence in several states of the northeast; and economic rivalries between caste groups have ignited violent flareups in Gujarat, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Although most of these incidents are centered in urban areas, press reports indicate that serious acts of caste and communal violence are starting to occur in rural areas.

The practice of taking to the streets in protest has been elevated to the level of a high art form in India. "So common have protests become in Indian life," writes an academic observer, "that they have become partly routinized. Protests and the deliberate use of the threat of violence have become institutionalized."⁵ The recourse to protests and demonstrations is an inheritance of India's nationalist movement which gained in popularity long after the achievement of independence. Moreover, the phenomenon is symptomatic of the decline of India's political party system. In the absence of effective party leadership at the state and local levels, sections of the Indian public have bypassed the established political and judicial processes for redressing grievances and have chosen to employ more direct methods of advancing a cause. Protest tactics include:

- bandhs (general strikes)
- hartals (work stoppages)
- rasta rokho (blocking vehicular traffic on the roadways)
- rail rokho (blocking the railways)
- gherao (the physical encirclement of an official, sometimes for long periods of time)
- dharnas (refusal to clear an area when ordered to do so)
- fasting, often performed round-the-clock by teams of protestors, though rarely to the point of exhaustion or death
- jail boro (deliberately courting arrest in order to inundate the jails and tie up the court system).



*Policemen mount a lathi charge against youthful protestors
in front of the Presidential residence in New Delhi.
[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 6 April 1984.]*

Seen from the standpoint of public security, the rash of protests poses several problems for local authorities. First, the deployment of police and paramilitary personnel to monitor the protests monopolizes a considerable portion of security manpower to the neglect of routine, investigative functions. Second, the courts are severely strained by the burdens of civil protest. Third, there is always a danger that today's peaceful protest will become tomorrow's riot.

Strikes and militant job actions are another source of organized protest that often breed violence. Most of the 25,000 unions in India are dominated by established political parties which are as interested in mobilizing the unions for purely political reasons as they are in promoting the workers' demands. Labor unrest is particularly severe in the textile and public sector transportation industries. Strikes called by railways workers in 1974, Assamese oil workers in 1980, and dockworkers in 1984 immediately prompted federal intervention in the interest of maintaining essential services. In all these cases, it was the Army that was called out in aid-to-civil to replace striking workers.

The tribal insurgencies that have festered for decades in the Indian northeast are another source of chronic violence. Parts of Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura have been administered by federal security forces as "disturbed areas" for years. Although the level of violence in these states is ordinarily limited to hit-and-run attacks on security personnel and isolated incidents of sabotage, several of the states have experienced massive disorders. The February 1983 massacre of over 3,000 Muslim immigrants in Assam and the 1980 bloodletting in Tripura which killed as many as 2,000 Bengalis are grim portents for the region's future. There is little prospect that the Army and paramilitary forces will be able to prevent such violence in the near future.

The specter of international terrorism is a comparatively recent phenomenon in India. The activities of groups such as the Naxalites, the Kashmir Liberation Movement, and extremist Sikh factions have forced New Delhi to assign a top priority to stamping out terrorist violence. This challenge is particularly dangerous since most of the organizations receive support in one form or another from Indian expatriate networks or from unfriendly neighbors such as Pakistan. The Gandhi government has repeatedly linked all manner of domestic unrest with a ubiquitous "foreign hand" that is variously guided by the United States or Pakistan. Despite the government's rhetorical excesses, the fact remains that terrorism is a growing threat to public order and stability in India.

Despite the disturbing increase in all forms of organized violence, it must be emphasized that the Indian political system has a tremendous capacity for absorbing violence. Any one of the massive disruptions that have racked parts of India in recent years would paralyze and probably topple most other governments. India's ability to persevere in domestic crises can be attributed largely to the fact that violent disturbances have been confined to a single region of the country at a time. Even though the regional nature of the violence gives a composite picture of a nationwide trend toward unprecedented levels of violence, authorities in New Delhi have had the advantage of dealing with each emergency situation on a case-by-case basis. In this way, New Delhi can exert enormous pressure on a given region through the massive deployment of security personnel, including the Army. The center will always have the upper hand in these regional bloodlettings as long as multiple outbreaks of violence do not occur simultaneously and regionally-based upheavals do not acquire a national character.



A critical view of government's response to an escalating cycle of violence.
[Source: Times of India (Bombay), 22 May 1984.]

India has disproved the theories of social scientists who have been regularly predicting the country's imminent collapse since 1947. It is an open question, however, whether India can continue to contain the violent social forces within its borders without fundamentally altering the liberal, democratic traditions on which the country was founded. Responding to an escalating cycle of domestic violence by authorizing the use of higher levels of federal force and draconian security laws carries long-term consequences which the Indian political system may not be equipped to absorb.

3. LAW-AND-ORDER IN THE INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM

Under provisions of the Indian Constitution, individual states have the primary responsibility for maintaining law-and-order and the center has sole responsibility for ensuring the nation's defenses against external threats. In between this constitutional division of power, there exists a gray area in which the center and the states routinely interact in the aid-to-civil role. The center retains residual powers to assist in local peacekeeping efforts under three sets of circumstances.

First, New Delhi is primarily responsible for administering eight federally controlled enclaves collectively known as Union Territories.⁶ The number of Union Territories has declined in the past 2 decades as all of the constituent parts of the former Northeast Frontier Agency (excepting Mizoram) have been granted statehood. The decision to deploy federal troops in Union Territories is left to the discretion of federally appointed administrators who act under New Delhi's advice. Three of these jurisdictions (Delhi, Mizoram, and Chandigarh) have experienced recurrent law-and-order breakdowns that have necessitated the introduction of paramilitary and Army peacekeeping forces.

Second, New Delhi has the power under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution to place all state and federal security forces, as well as civilian transport companies, under the command of the Armed Forces during declared national emergencies. During the 1962 conflict with China, the 1971 war with Pakistan, and the 22-month Emergency period of 1975-77, this provision was invoked by the President in his role as commander in chief and later assented to by the Indian Parliament. Enabling legislation that activates the national mobilization of forces includes the Defense of India Rules and the Army Act of 1950.

Third, state and local authorities can request police assistance from the center on an emergency, as-needed basis to put down a strike, contain a riot, or perform a variety of security chores that fall under the general heading of "aid-to-the-civil power." Ordinarily, the center deploys a level of force in aid-to-civil that is commensurate with the level of threat that the local police encounter or expect to encounter. If the violence escalates or spreads, more troops can then be dispatched to back up those already on the scene. Federal authorities invariably react to an escalation of violence by sending in more troops and authorizing the use of increasingly more severe security powers. This process of gradually tightening security in a given locale continues either until the violence subsides or until the Army is called out. Once the drastic step of Army intervention is employed, local command and control arrangements ordinarily revert to Army commanders in the field. There have been only two recorded instances (Kerala in 1968 and West Bengal in 1969) when paramilitary forces were deployed over the objections of an elected state ministry. In both cases, the states were opposition ministries controlled by the Communist Party of India-Marxist.

Figure 2 illustrates how domestic peacekeeping responsibilities are allotted to local, state, and federal security forces as a threat to public order escalates. In contrast, Figure 3 illustrates the levels of responsibility these same forces exercise during wartime. As a rule of thumb, those paramilitary peacekeeping forces which are closely integrated into the Army chain of command during peacetime (Indo-Tibetan Border Police [ITBP], Assam Rifles [AR], Ladakh Scouts [LS], Special Frontier Force [SFF], and Border Security Force [BSF]) carry the heaviest burden of wartime responsibility. Other paramilitary organizations (such as the Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF]) operate under armed forces supervision during wartime, but usually provide support services in rear areas. In keeping with the Indo-British tradition of civil-military relations, the Army has the least responsibility in domestic peacekeeping and the local police have the least responsibility in wartime operations.




Figure 2. Responsibilities for Controlling Domestic Breaches of the Peace.




Figure 3. National Defense Responsibilities in Wartime.

Constitutional provisions reserving domestic police functions for the states have eroded perceptibly. The Gandhi government's Emergency declaration of 1975 shifted the balance of center-state relations in favor of New Delhi and set a precedent for expanding federal involvement in local police affairs. Although the Janata government (1977-79) attempted to restore the balance, the return of Mrs. Gandhi to power in 1980 and the upsurge in organized violence that ensued set the process of increased federal intervention in motion again. As a direct consequence of the mounting number of aid-to-civil requests levied on India's peacekeeping establishment, New Delhi has acquired a formidable arsenal of special security legislation which can be activated in times of local crisis. Moreover, New Delhi has resorted to the use of these extraordinary powers with increasing frequency.

Under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, the central government is empowered to take over the administration of a state when the voters fail to return a majority government to power, when New Delhi expresses no-confidence in a state ministry, or when state authorities are unable to maintain the peace. Article 360 stipulates that a state ministry can also be dissolved when a financial crisis arises. In all of these cases, there is broad latitude for the central government to dissolve a ministry through the mechanism of President's Rule. Under this device, authority reverts to the state governor who is appointed by the center and ordinarily serves in an honorary capacity. The resort to President's Rule has become commonplace, even in states that are not experiencing a breakdown in law-and-order. Between 1951 and 1977, 50 states came under President's Rule; since Gandhi returned to power, more than 10 declarations of President's Rule have been issued; and during a total of almost 16 years at the helm of the Indian Government, Gandhi has resorted to the mechanism over 40 times. In states such as Punjab and Assam, President's Rule was extended an additional 6 months after the initial decree expired. The imposition of President's Rule allows federal security forces to intervene in a state at the direction of the appointed governor who is responsible only to New Delhi.⁷

Aside from grave emergencies which require national mobilization, New Delhi also has at its disposal an expanding body of special powers that can be tailored to the peacekeeping requirements of federal troops acting in the aid-to-civil role. In most cases, these legislative devices are issued as ordinances promulgated under the President's emergency powers. These ordinances include:

- o The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956, subsequently amended), whereby the union government declares a state or district a "disturbed area." In areas where the declaration comes into force, Army and paramilitary commanders are given broad authority to arrest suspects, conduct searches, and use lethal force without resort to the authority of the District Magistrate who ordinarily supervises aid-to-civil operations.⁸
- o The National Security Act (1980), which authorizes security forces to arrest and detain suspects for up to 6 months without a warrant. Although there are provisions in the act that provide for judicial reviews in order to minimize the chances for abuse, the intent of the legislation is to give the Armed Forces a relatively free hand in dealing with agitators, rioters, and terrorists. Many provisions of the act are identical to provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act which served as the legal basis for the Emergency of 1975.
- o The Essential Services Maintenance Act (enacted on an as-needed basis), is employed when federal troops replace striking workers in industries such as oil production and rail transport that are deemed vital to the nation's economic well-being. The targeted industry is effectively taken over by the Army pending a settlement of the labor dispute. Strikers are often subjected to arrest under provisions of the National Security Act.

- ° The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967), which allows the center to ban subversive organizations. This ban currently applies to rebellious Sikh organizations in the Punjab and several insurgent groups in the northeast.
- ° The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984), which was implemented to assist the Army in rooting out Sikh terrorists in the Punjab. Under the legislation, security personnel were given unprecedented powers of arrest and detention. The law also provides for secret tribunals to try terrorists.
- ° A welter of subsidiary legislation which enables New Delhi to impose censorship, regulate travel, and enforce curfews in areas that are experiencing violent disturbances.

As in the extreme case of the Punjab where the Gandhi Government employed virtually every piece of extraordinary legislation on the books to curb Sikh terrorism, New Delhi has the legal means to impose what amounts to a state of martial law without formally declaring a national emergency. Civil libertarians complain that the promulgation of Presidential ordinances undermines the role of the courts and parliament in acting as watchdogs over the center's coercive powers. Opposition parties regularly denounce Gandhi's frequent resort to draconian security measures as an attempt to restore the Emergency "through the back door." Gandhi adamantly denies this charge, claiming that the opposition is more concerned with scoring political debating points than with ensuring the nation's domestic security. Gandhi has repeatedly stated that declaring another Emergency would be counterproductive. This course of action would solidify the opposition against her government by confirming the widely held suspicion that Gandhi harbors authoritarian instincts.

Figure 4 shows how authority for containing a violent disturbance shifts from local to state to federal authorities as the threat to public order escalates. In all but the most extreme crises, local police assets are the first forces to respond when a breach of the peace occurs. If the situation requires a more massive show of force than is locally available, then local authorities request the state government to deploy state armed police (SAP) personnel. Unlike the constables who patrol the streets only with lathis (wooden staves), SAP personnel are armed. At this juncture, command and control authority is vested in the District Magistrate (DM), who in coordination with the District Superintendent of Police, is responsible for maintaining the peace in the district. The most frequently used legal mechanism for preventing violence, or stamping it out after it occurs, is Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). Under this basic provision of Indo-British law, "any magistrate or officer in charge of a police station may command any unlawful assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, to disperse."⁹ If a mob fails to disperse, then the police ordinarily jail violators of Section 144 in an attempt to isolate the ring-leaders and defuse the tension. If overused, however, the recourse to Section 144 loses its deterrent effect. Protestors often will court arrest under this provision and encourage their followers to do likewise in a conscious show of defiance of local authority.

Incident	Command and Control Authority	Appeals for Assistance Made to	Legal Mechanism	Forces Deployed
Local breaches of the peace	District Magistrate; District Superintendent of Police	--	Section 144 CPC	Local police
Serious local breaches of the peace	District Magistrate; Deputy Inspector General Police	Inspector General Police*	States' Schedule of the Indian Constitution	State armed police
Widespread violence	Chief Minister; Minister of Home Affairs; District Magistrate	Chief Secretary; Secretary of Ministry of Home Affairs	Article 356	Paramilitary forces, as needed
Escalating, widespread violence	Prime Minister; Minister of Defense	Cabinet Secretariat; President of India	President's Rule; proclamation of "Disturbed Areas"; National Security Act; other legislation	Army, as needed
Insurrection, national emergency, wartime	President; Minister of Defense	--	Article 356; Army Act 1950	Total national mobilization of forces

*There are provisions in the Indian Criminal Procedure Code which allow the District Magistrate to appeal for assistance directly to local Army and/or paramilitary force commanders. Such appeals are issued only during the gravest emergencies where it is determined that an immediate and massive deployment of security personnel is required.

Figure 4. Levels of Response to Domestic Disturbances

If, after invoking Section 144 and deploying SAP units, the situation continues to deteriorate, the DM signs a requisition order for the deployment of federal paramilitary forces. The request is sent through the Home Department at the state capital which then petitions the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi. The DM still retains operational control over the federal forces that arrive in aid-to-civil, but his decisions are carefully coordinated with state officials and paramilitary commanders who mount the peacekeeping operations. The size and makeup of the paramilitary forces that are dispatched in aid-to-civil are decisions that are made in New Delhi. Once the peace has been restored, the decision to withdraw these forces rests with the DM, though again in consultation with his superiors in New Delhi.

Even though the DM is the pivotal figure in the local command structure during aid-to-civil deployments, it is worth noting that he is an officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). Consequently, he is responsible to both the state ministry under which he serves and to New Delhi. A failure on his part to contain a volatile situation in the district can result in his transfer to a quieter district or even his removal from office. At the very least, a miscalculation of the law-and-order situation could impede his career advancement in the highly competitive IAS. This explains in large measure why DMs tend to request outside police assistance at the least provocation since state and federal authorities must then share the blame should the violence escalate. Federal authorities play a significant command role in paramilitary operations when more than one district or state are embroiled in violence, when a disturbance becomes particularly ugly and attracts national media coverage, or when several paramilitary forces are deployed simultaneously.

When violence escalates to the point that the Army is called on in aid-to-civil, the national command authority in New Delhi is involved in crisis management on a daily basis. The ultimate power to send in the Army rests with the President who acts on the recommendation of the elected Prime Minister. Planning and implementing aid-to-civil operations involves the relevant cabinet ministers who oversee paramilitary forces, civilian authorities in the Ministry of Defense, Army commanders whose troops are deployed, and national intelligence officials. In the case of the Punjab crisis, decisionmaking powers were focused on the state Governor and coordinated in New Delhi by an ad hoc group of officials charged with advising the Prime Minister on a daily or even hourly basis; in other crisis situations, coordination is handled by the Cabinet Secretariat which routinely advises the Prime Minister on a wide range of sensitive national security issues.

4. STATE AND LOCAL POLICE: A WEAKENED FOUNDATION

State and local police forces are the weakest links in India's domestic security apparatus. The problem of police inefficiency is widely recognized in India. Authorities also recognize, however, that curing a problem of such magnitude is a long-term proposition. Until state police assets are better equipped and trained to tackle the rising tide of domestic violence--a distant prospect--the resort to federal peacekeeping forces is a trend that will likely continue.

The Indian police system is remarkably impervious to change. Organized by the British in 1864, the Indian system is essentially a colonial hierarchy grafted on to the Mughal administrative structure which the British inherited. Like their colonial predecessors, Indian authorities readily concede that direct central control over the local police is unworkable in a vast and complex country such as India; at the same time, authorities are sensitive to the need for federal supervision of state-controlled police departments on a routine basis.

Figure 5 illustrates a simplified police hierarchy in a typical Indian state. Overall responsibility for maintaining the peace rests with elected officials who oversee the state's police assets. Daily decisionmaking is

carried out by central government officials who are loaned to the states but are ultimately responsible to the MHA in New Delhi. The all-India organizations which provide the states with police and civil administrators are the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), respectively. Both organizations are administered by the union MHA.




Figure 5. State Police Organization.

The Chief Minister (CM) is the highest elected official in a state administration. Directly below the CM are two IAS appointees, the Home Minister and the Home Secretary, who oversee the daily workings of police administration in the state. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) is the chief executive officer of the state police and the highest career post in the IPS system. The posting of IPS and IAS officers to state ministries provides a measure of continuity in police administration. This so-called "steel frame" of federal administration that reaches down to every district in India cushions the political shocks which often occur in states such as Kerala which have a long history of revolving-door ministries. The all-India administrative cadres also enable New Delhi to maintain a direct line of communication with state and local police forces during times of local crisis.

The Gandhi government is considering a proposal which would give the center the power to transfer IAS and IPS officers from one state to another at the discretion of the center. This policy change is intended to promote national integration by encouraging federal administrators to transfer to regions other than their own. More importantly, the regulation would give New Delhi the power to weed out those administrators who are not sufficiently responsive to central directives. Under existing regulations, all-India service officers can only be transferred if the affected states consent to the transfer or if an officer is first assigned to the central government on deputation. If the proposed change goes into effect, New Delhi's influence over state administrations will be considerably enhanced. The proposal could have an adverse effect on service morale.¹⁰

The lynchpin of the Indian administrative system is the District Magistrate (DM) who is responsible for maintaining law-and-order, collecting revenues, and dispensing justice. The post is usually an early career assignment for IAS officers and carries with it tremendous local responsibilities and prestige. In all matters pertaining to law-and-order, the DM acts under the advice of the superintendent of police who heads the district's police machinery. Underneath the district superintendent are other IPS officers who head smaller administrative subdivisions of the district. The district superintendent provides the DM with daily police reports that are based on intelligence from the field. If field officers report that a potentially violent situation is brewing, the DM can cross-check the report by communicating through the revenue administration hierarchy of the district. This parallel administration is also headed by the DM and extends to the village revenue officer, the potwari.

At the lowest level of police administration are constables and their "nongazetted" superior officers who form the backbone of the police system. Unlike IPS personnel, state police officers are not directly responsible to the IPS hierarchy that connects the states with New Delhi. Police administration in the four Presidency cities of Bombay, Madras, Delhi, and Calcutta is organized along different lines than other Indian jurisdictions.

State police are divided functionally between armed and unarmed branches. Indian states support an estimated 400,000 armed police personnel. These state armed police (SAP) battalions go by a variety of unit designations such as Manipur Rifles, Bihar Military Police, Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, and

Malabar Special Armed Police. SAP personnel are housed in military barracks and trained to respond in force when local authorities request state assistance in quelling a violent disorder. Although the professionalism of SAP units varies between states and between individual battalions within a state, informed observers maintain that "the efficiency of these forces has gone down in direct proportion to the rise in their strength."¹¹ SAP performance is hampered by poor working conditions, inadequate training, and manipulation by corrupt politicians. It is estimated that SAP manpower increased 40 percent between 1970 and 1980--a trend which has probably accelerated since then.¹²



Maharashtra State Armed Police cadets marching in passing-out ceremonies.

[Source: Times of India (Bombay), 29 April 1984.]

Local Indian constables (the equivalent of the British bobby) are the object of public hostility because of their unsavory reputation for brutality, corruption, and communal bias. An IPS officer with years of experience wrote of the manifold problems he confronted when he was appointed IGP in a state: "Political patronage had permeated all ranks, corruption and servility were everywhere, and abuse of power abounded."¹³ These allegations have a basis in fact, particularly in backward states such as Bihar where criminal elements have infiltrated the ranks of the police and local administration. While IPS officers are for the most part well-educated, professional administrators who retain a degree of public confidence, state policemen are generally held in low regard throughout India.

The MHA encourages states to improve the public image of the police by recruiting more minorities into the ranks, improving salaries and promotion prospects, and dismissing corrupt elements. There are indications that a career in police work, traditionally regarded as a low-status occupation, is starting to attract better educated, urban applicants.¹⁴ Critics point out, however, that the police modernization schemes advocated by New Delhi offer no guarantee of increased efficiency. "A better trained and equipped police might turn out to be a more ruthless instrument of exploitation," warned one analyst.¹⁵

The MHA facilitates federal, state, and local police coordination by sponsoring conferences attended by IGPs, paramilitary commanders, and Ministry of Defense officials. These coordinating sessions are intended to put command arrangements in place before an aid-to-civil request is made.¹⁶ There are also indications that SAP units are running short of small arms because domestic production cannot meet the demands of the states. The MHA has requested that the Ministry of Defense loan arms to the states on an emergency basis and begin importing foreign-made small arms. Authorities maintain that critical weapons shortages exist in Punjab and Bihar.¹⁷

5. PARAMILITARY FORCES: STRONG ARM OF THE CENTER

India supports a federally-controlled paramilitary establishment of approximately 381,000 personnel. Taken in conjunction with an Army of about 1 million, state armed police battalions numbering 400,000, and Army auxiliary units numbering upwards of another 500,000, India maintains a formidable complement of forces for use in wartime and in aid-to-civil operations. Table 1 shows the breakdown of these forces.

The raising of paramilitary forces to perform duties deemed inappropriate or unsuited to the missions of the regular armed forces dates back to the earliest days of the colonial period. The paramount concern of British imperial strategists was the protection of the Indian Empire from external threat and internal upheaval. The original purpose of locally recruited paramilitary forces was to bring the frontier areas of the empire under the nominal control of the British raj. Bearing designations such as Irregulars, Levies, and Scouts, these colorful units that patrolled the borders are a fond legacy of the Indian military establishment to this day. Administrative frustrations in taming the unruly tribes of the frontiers--another British legacy--demonstrated that the deployment of highly mobile paramilitary forces was more cost-efficient and better suited to the political-military conditions of the frontier than the permanent stationing of regular army troops. The aid-to-civil mission of these early paramilitary forces was a secondary consideration for the British. The Army, particularly those units with European personnel, was regarded as the most reliable first line of defense against internal unrest and subversion. Moreover, policing and administering the farflung areas of the frontier were the sole responsibilities of the central government since local authority was unreliable, weak, or non-existent.

Table 1

Availability of Manpower for Internal Security Duties

Force	Personnel Strength (estimated)	Operational Control (peacetime only)
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)	92,000	Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
Border Security Force (BSF)	92,000	MHA/Army
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)	31,000	MHA
Assam Rifles (AR)	36,000	Army (though technically MHA)
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)	17,000	Army (though technically MHA)
Railway Protection Force (RPF)	70,000	Ministry of Railways/MHA
Special Frontier Force (SFF)	8,000*	Cabinet Secretariat
Ladakh Scouts (LS)	5,000*	Army (?)
Defense Security Corps (DSC)	<u>30,000</u>	Ministry of Defense
Total Paramilitary Personnel under Central Government Control	381,000	
State Armed Police (SAP)	400,000	State governments
Army	1,000,000+	Ministry of Defense
Home Guards (HG)	<u>500,000</u>	Ministry of Defense
Total Personnel	2,281,000	

*These are rough estimates since the Indian Government does not publicize personnel strength. Both forces are believed to be relatively small units composed of elite commandos with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations.

After India achieved independence in 1947, the role of paramilitary forces in national defense expanded gradually along with paramilitary force levels and budgetary allocations. Until the mid-1960s, paramilitary forces were used sparingly. State police forces were often able to contain violent disturbances within their jurisdictions without the assistance of federal troops. With the exception of the massive dislocations that occurred when the Subcontinent was partitioned in 1947, the relatively stable security environment which India enjoyed during its first 15 years of existence allowed the Army time to nurture the apolitical military traditions bequeathed by the British. The age-old problem of border security was shared equally by the center and the states.

Border clashes with the Chinese in 1962 and the 1965 war with Pakistan marked the beginning of a period in which New Delhi expanded the size and scope of activities of the various paramilitary organizations. New forces were raised and a number of SAP cadres were taken over by the center. Although operational control over paramilitary forces gradually shifted to the center at the expense of the states, successive Indian governments have been careful to disperse authority over these forces in order to prevent any single ministry from acquiring a monopoly over the domestic use of federal force. As the paramilitary command structure is presently constituted, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is statutorily responsible for exercising operational control over five of India's nine paramilitary organizations, including the Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which are ordinarily the first two bodies to respond to aid-to-civil requests from the states. The Indian Police Service (IPS) and the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI--India's domestic intelligence apparatus) are also MHA assets which work closely with paramilitary forces.

MHA control over these forces is circumscribed, however, by formal and informal arrangements which allow the Army and the Ministry of Defense to oversee many of the border security functions of paramilitary forces. The seconding of officers to paramilitary units, the recruitment of ex-servicemen into paramilitary ranks, and close coordination between Army and paramilitary units in counterinsurgency operations ensure that the Army retains considerable influence in paramilitary affairs. Moreover, the Assam Rifles (AR), selected units of the BSF, and several commando forces are all fully integrated with the regular Army on a permanent basis. In times of war or national emergency, all of India's paramilitary forces revert to the operational control of the Ministry of Defense.

Army control over paramilitary activities during peacetime is circumscribed by the overriding authority of the Cabinet Secretariat which also controls some paramilitary assets. The Cabinet Secretariat reports directly to the Prime Minister through the Director General of Intelligence. While this complex command and control structure can create serious problems of force integration during wartime, most Indian administrators and military officers agree on the need to disperse authority during peacetime so that the power to apply paramilitary force is not abused.

Even though forces such as the BSF are assigned multiple missions which defy simple categorization, Indian paramilitary forces can be loosely classed according to the primary security mission which they perform. These missions include border defense, "watch-and-ward," and aid-to-civil.

India's first line of defense against overland incursions which fall short of fullscale invasions rests with the BSF, AR, and three relatively small commando forces: Special Frontier Force (SFF), Ladakh Scouts (LS), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). BSF units are responsible for maintaining security along the borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and portions of the Chinese and Burmese frontiers; the AR generally confines its activities to the distant reaches of the Indian northeast; and the three commando forces operate with the Army along the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier stretching

from Kashmir to Nepal. Routine border duties include: the assertion of national sovereignty along ill-defined boundaries; the interdiction of smugglers, infiltrators, and illegal immigrants; and the provision of law-and-order in remote regions which have never been effectively brought under the control of central authority, whether British or Indian. All of these border defense forces are capable of mounting tactical operations in conjunction with regular Army units.

The British term "watch-and-ward" refers to security responsibilities involved in guarding sensitive defense-related installations. This is the primary duty of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Railway Protection Force (RPF), and Defense Security Corps (DSC). In peacetime, direction of these forces is shared by MHA, the Ministry of Railways, and the Army, respectively. The protection of public sector enterprises such as defense production plants, ordnance factories, railways, and power facilities is a vital element of defense mobilization in wartime. In peacetime, these forces provide a measure of protection against acts of sabotage by striking employees and agitators.

The frequent deployment of Indian paramilitary forces in aid-to-civil has expanded the domestic peacekeeping role of the central government far beyond the limited border defense responsibilities for which these forces were originally raised. Critics also charge that the expanded aid-to-civil role of paramilitary forces exceeds the limits which the framers of the Indian Constitution placed on the center's internal police powers. Fragmentary data supplied by MHA to a parliamentary committee (table 2) confirm that paramilitary forces were extremely active in the aid-to-civil role during a 12-month period from April 1982 to April 1983. The committee complained that almost all CRPF personnel were deployed on a continual basis in aid-to-civil and that peacekeeping chores were detracting from the border defense responsibilities of the BSF.

Table 2

Paramilitary Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, April 1982-April 1983

<u>Paramilitary Force</u>	<u>No. of Deployments</u>
Central Reserve Police Force	119
Border Security Force	108
Indo-Tibetan Border Police	7
Assam Rifles	4
Total	238

[Source: India (Republic of). Lok Sabha, Forty-ninth Report of the Estimates Committee: Police, April, 1983. Information pertains exclusively to four paramilitary forces that operate under the control of the MHA.]

Unless an incident of local violence is so serious that the deployment of regular Army units is required, the CRPF is usually the first paramilitary force dispatched to the site of a disruption. If CRPF firepower is inadequate or if the violence spreads, the BSF is usually the next force to be deployed in aid-to-civil. In situations requiring counterterrorist expertise, specialized units of the ITBP or SFF are also introduced. Requests for federal police assistance from states patrolled by AR, LS, or ITBP units are probably handled by locally available units in conjunction with the CRPF. Only after a combination of these forces fails to contain a violent disturbance is the Army called on in aid-to-civil. The decision to deploy regular Army units is almost never taken until all other means of defusing a situation through mediation or force have been exhausted.



CRPF personnel in riot gear manning a picket line in Amritsar.
[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 7 April 1984.]

The force levels and budgetary allocations for the central government's paramilitary arm have undergone dramatic expansion since the mid-1960s. A 1974 inquiry into paramilitary affairs that was conducted by the Public Accounts Committee of the Indian Parliament noted "an alarming increase" in

the budgets of these forces at the expense of economic development programs. Between 1947 and 1971, the CRPF budget tripled and the BSF budget doubled. Total expenditures on paramilitary forces increased over 500 percent during this same period and doubled between 1969 and 1971. The committee questioned whether increased expenditures for paramilitary forces had shown a return on the investment in terms of enhanced security since every statistical index used to measure the incidence of riots, strikes, and protests showed that the climate of violence in India was getting progressively worse. The central government responded that individual states were ill-prepared to meet mounting challenges to public order with their own police assets. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the center to augment the firepower and personnel strength of the paramilitary forces that were tasked to assist the states in emergencies.¹⁸ It is interesting to note that another parliamentary committee investigating paramilitary affairs in 1983 voiced many of the same concerns regarding the overuse of paramilitary forces in aid-to-civil and the unrelenting growth of these forces.¹⁹

It is estimated that since Gandhi's return to power in 1980, the budgets of the five paramilitary forces under the control of MHA have increased 60 percent. Although stepped-up vigilance on the borders accounts for some of the increase in paramilitary budgets, the mounting number of aid-to-civil deployments is probably the major factor that accounts for the burgeoning growth of these forces. Table 3 illustrates how New Delhi makes best use of its paramilitary manpower by shifting these personnel from state to state as the situation requires. Force mobility, which has improved still more since these figures were released in 1974, is an important calculation for security planners in New Delhi who must balance off aid-to-civil demands on paramilitary forces with Army and paramilitary manpower resources available for border defense duties.

Three reasons can be cited to account for the increasing aid-to-civil burden that paramilitary forces have had to bear in recent years. First, as government spokesmen invariably point out, the level of violence in India shows no sign of abating. As long as the states are unable or, in extreme cases, unwilling to contain the forces of mass violence, the center must perform its constitutional mandate to provide for the nation's defense. The speed with which a communal riot can spread beyond district and state boundaries bolsters the argument that the center must move quickly and firmly to contain local clashes that can have regional, national, or even international repercussions. The string of Hindu-Muslim riots in Moradabad in 1980 convinced authorities in New Delhi that an effective paramilitary response to such incidents is required if Army intervention is to be avoided.

Second, state police forces have consistently proved inadequate in handling the rising level of violence and public protest. As the 1979 National Police Commission reported, Indian police personnel are underpaid, understaffed, poorly trained, and constantly maligned by the public. It declared:

Functioning under the constraints and handicaps of an outmoded system, police performance has undoubtedly fallen short of public expectation.²⁰

Table 3

Changes in CRPF/BSF Force Deployments, by State,
between January 1973 and January 1974
 (by number of companies)

State/Union Territory	CRPF		BSF*		Number of Companies Transferred
	Jan 73	Jan 74	Jan 73	Jan 74	
Andhra Pradesh	54	27	4	--	31
Assam	27	18	10	--	19
Andaman & Nicobar Is.	2	2	--	--	0
Bihar	8	6	5	2	5
Lakshadweep	1	1	--	--	0
Delhi	12	26	11	1	24
Jammu & Kashmir	31	25	27	15	18
Kerala	11	13	--	--	2
Manipur	30	33	--	--	3
Mizoram	24	24	--	--	0
Meghalaya	2	3	--	--	1
Madhya Pradesh	14	--	--	--	0
Nagaland	30	35	--	--	5
Arunachal Pradesh	24	29	--	--	5
Tamil Nadu	11	2	--	--	9
Tripura	18	18	1	1	0
Uttar Pradesh	11	38	--	--	27
West Bengal	49	42	--	--	7
Pondicherry	1	2	--	--	1
Karnataka	--	3	--	--	3
Maharashtra	--	5	--	--	5
Rajasthan	--	2	--	--	2
					<u>2</u>
					Total 167

*The number of BSF companies dispatched to sensitive border states was intentionally omitted from government statistics for security reasons. Thus, states that had no BSF deployments cannot be differentiated from those states omitted from the data altogether.

[Source: Statement by F. H. Mohsin, Deputy Minister of State for Home Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha, 21 February 1974. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 87, no. 3, cols. 78-79.]

Not surprisingly, police morale has plummeted, despite the attempts of state and central authorities to correct some of the deficiencies. Lacking efficient cadres of police personnel at the local level, state governments have by necessity looked to the central government to provide emergency police assistance.

Third, the tendency on the part of the center to respond quickly to aid-to-civil requests is matched by the eagerness of the states to petition New Delhi for such assistance at the first sign of trouble or for reasons that are unrelated to local security. Dispatching whole companies of armed police personnel to monitor protest movements which can last months or even years is a costly proposition which most states would prefer to have New Delhi underwrite. Moreover, state and local authorities are hesitant to use force against agitations that enjoy widespread local support for fear of inciting the voters' wrath at election time. As in the case of the farmers' agitation for higher prices which swept across parts of northern India in 1981 and 1982, elected officials welcomed the arrival of federal paramilitary forces sent in to perform the politically distasteful task of policing a popular local cause. In cases where communal frictions are on the verge of erupting into violence, local authorities often request a paramilitary presence in order to avoid being targeted for political attack by one or more of the communities that are party to the dispute. This pattern of states deferring police responsibilities to the center applies to states where opposition parties are in power as well as to states ruled by the same party that is in power in New Delhi. A 1983 newspaper investigation into the activities of two CRPF battalions requested by the Telugu Desam state ministry of Andhra Pradesh revealed that paramilitary forces were deployed at the request of politicians who were reluctant to side overtly with landlords in a local dispute with low-caste tenants.²¹

Center-state frictions have become extremely sharp in the past decade as the party of independence, the Indian Congress, has fragmented and lost the support of many of the peripheral states. Although the Congress-I is still the only national political organization capable of mobilizing a measure of support across state, communal, and caste lines, the emergence of regionally based alternatives to Congress domination has undercut Gandhi's ability to impose political uniformity on the states. In the sensitive area of domestic security, the federal government's expanding role in aid-to-civil has opened up the possibility of a non-Congress state ministry resisting pressures from the center to introduce paramilitary forces to curb political protests. The statewide bandhs [general strikes] called by the Marxist-led coalition government of West Bengal sorely tempted Gandhi to take over administration of the state by invoking President's Rule. In July 1984, Mrs. Gandhi imposed President's Rule on Jammu and Kashmir after her party operatives induced National Conference legislators to cross the aisle and call for the ouster of Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah. This controversial tactic was followed several weeks later by toppling the opposition ministry of N. T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh. Both of the engineered crises triggered street violence which had to be monitored by paramilitary forces.

The increasingly frequent recourse to President's Rule by Janata and Congress-I governments has, by itself, added to the peacekeeping burdens of paramilitary forces since the mechanism allows New Delhi to bypass the state ministries altogether when responding to domestic threats. In cases where New Delhi has allowed the law-and-order situation in a state to get out of hand in order to provide a pretext for President's Rule, it is usually federal paramilitary forces that are subsequently called out to put down the engineered crisis. In the case of the July 1984 ouster of the state ministry in Kashmir, the federally appointed Governor of the state quietly called in BSF troops in advance of the ministry's downfall. New Delhi obligingly transported these personnel to Srinagar on specially chartered Indian Airlines flights.

There is broad agreement among Indian military commanders and their civilian superiors that the Army must not be routinely called on to suppress domestic disturbances except when paramilitary forces lose control of a situation. An expanded aid-to-civil role for the Army would:

- reduce the deterrent effectiveness of the Army's presence when it does respond in aid-to-civil emergencies;
- divert military manpower to essentially nonmilitary tasks;
- undermine Army morale; and
- erode the tradition of segregating the military from the civilian-controlled political process.

For these reasons, paramilitary forces are intended to insulate the regular armed services from the temptation or even the appearance of interfering in political affairs. Given the choice, Indian civilian authorities would sooner live with the consequences of overusing paramilitary forces in aid-to-civil than running the risk of compromising the apolitical instincts of the military establishment.

Paramilitary personnel have a delicate mission to perform, considering that they are almost always outsiders rushed to the scene of a local disturbance. While a detached outsider has a certain advantage in being regarded by the local population as an impartial arbiter, the role also has its drawbacks. The fact that state and local authorities have petitioned the center to provide police assistance is an admission that the local police have failed in their responsibility of maintaining the peace. This tacit admission of failure characteristically breeds resentment among local policemen. Once set in motion, the process of police demoralization complicates efforts to restore the peace. Police officials often withhold cooperation from paramilitary officers who, in turn, reciprocate by showing disdain for the professional capabilities of their police counterparts. Lacking intelligence-gathering networks, sympathetic contacts with the population, the goodwill of the police, and often, a knowledge of the local language, paramilitary forces

must carry out their peacekeeping mission with little local backup. In situations where federal forces are called out to suppress a popular agitation, paramilitary performance can also be hindered by public outcries over New Delhi's deployment of an "occupation army."

Simmering interforce rivalries become particularly acute when a contributing factor in deploying paramilitary forces is the breakdown of local confidence in the police. As in the case of the 1980 Moradabad riots, paramilitary forces often arrive at the scene of a communal incident when the minority community (in this case Muslims) accuse the police of communal bias. The dispatch of paramilitary personnel to protect the minority community from the fury of the mob then triggers charges by the majority community (Hindus) that New Delhi has intervened against their interests. Invariably, it is the minority community in any communally charged disturbance that complains of police bias and lobbies for federal protection, regardless of whether the minority is Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh. For example, in the Punjab where Sikhs comprise a slim majority and are heavily represented in the state police, the massive deployment of paramilitary forces since 1982 was generally well received by the minority Hindu community which looks to New Delhi for communal protection. In neighboring Haryana where Hindus are in the majority, it was the Sikhs who welcomed paramilitary protection from the Hindu-dominated state police force. Conveying the message that the center is prepared to make liberal use of federal forces to protect minorities is an important element of Gandhi's electoral strategy of wooing the minority vote for the upcoming national elections. If overused, however, the tactic can incite a communal backlash on the part of the majority community against central government interference in local affairs. Either way, paramilitary forces are caught in the middle of a local communal maelstrom.

Deploying an appropriate level of forces to a violent disturbance is difficult for authorities to gauge. A premature show of force can have the effect of triggering a violent public reaction instead of defusing tensions. On the other hand, a hesitation on the part of authorities to deploy a sufficient level of force runs the risk of allowing a locally tense situation to escalate rapidly into a major conflagration. The pattern of deployments in recent years has been to induct paramilitary forces rapidly and in great numbers as soon as a potentially serious disturbance erupts. Furthermore, once deployed in aid-to-civil, a skeleton paramilitary force is often kept in place long after the immediate crisis has passed, in order to guard against further outbreaks of violence.

Local command and control arrangements over aid-to-civil operations are a source of frustration for paramilitary officers who are responsible to several chains of command. Tactical decisions to move in force into an area, to set up checkpoints, to arrest suspects, and to fire on a crowd are all made by the district magistrate. As is often the case, however, the district magistrate cannot be physically present to issue orders when a whole section of a city or district is in flames. Clearing every order through the command center at district headquarters is a cumbersome process which deprives paramilitary commanders of the tactical initiative in dealing with lawless elements. Tactical coordination between police and paramilitary forces also poses challenges, particularly when police discipline or morale has collapsed in the

face of a crisis. In extreme cases such as the Punjab where the constabulary was thoroughly demoralized, paramilitary forces must take over routine police functions in addition to their primary responsibility for mounting counter-terrorist operations. When President's Rule was imposed on the state in October 1983, local police were assigned village patrol duties far removed from the urban areas of Sikh unrest.

Joint paramilitary operations in aid-to-civil are often hampered by:

- the overlapping efforts of paramilitary intelligence wings;
- the lack of compatible communications equipment between units; and
- the absence of tactical coordination between officers in the field, civil authorities at the state and local level, and the various paramilitary command elements in New Delhi.


The MHA and the Army regularly sponsor meetings between civil, military, and paramilitary officials so that operational strategies are in place before aid-to-civil requests are issued. (For a discussion of individual paramilitary forces, see Appendix A.)

6. THE INDIAN ARMY: RELUCTANT ARBITERS OF THE DOMESTIC PEACE

In December 1983, Indian Defense Minister Ramaswamy Venkataraman conducted a tour of remote Army outposts in the Indian northeast. Speaking before a gathering of officers and jawans, Venkataraman conceded that Army aid-to-civil operations were onerous tasks which nevertheless had to be assigned to the Army in the interest of national security. In an effort to bolster troop morale, he told the gathering:

The Army, in its fine tradition, has continued to render assistance to other agencies of Government for maintaining law-and-order, essential services, and in relief work during natural calamities or accidents. Though such occasions might act as disruptions to the normal training routine, they are necessary duties that have to be performed. I would like to emphasize here that our troops have a very important role to play, particularly in states where anti-insurgency operations have to be undertaken. Close coordination with the civil authorities and other sister organizations are necessary. I am happy to say, in performing these duties the Army has won admiration from all.²²

As the Defense Minister noted, the Indian Armed Forces are employed in three circumstances to carry out domestic support missions. These aid-to-civil roles--in many ways similar to the functions of the US National Guard--include relief operations, the maintenance of essential services, and law-and-order missions.



Defense Minister Venkataraman (at left, in tribal costume) conferring with Army commanders during a tour of the Indian northeast.


[Source: Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), 29 January 1984.]

Disaster relief is the only domestic duty which the Armed Forces perform with any degree of enthusiasm. Unlike their other domestic roles, the military welcomes the opportunity to assist local authorities in alleviating hardships caused by floods, cyclones, droughts, and a wide range of natural and manmade catastrophes. The three service branches of the Indian military are the only organizations with the expertise and logistical support at their disposal for carrying out large-scale relief operations. Moreover, this aid-to-civil role provides the military with a positive public image of "serving the people." Military officers and civilian officials both regard a positive military image as an essential ingredient of national defense planning. A selective list of relief missions performed by military personnel in 1982 includes:

- recovering the bodies of passengers killed in a train wreck;
- salvaging a bus that fell into a river;
- clearing the debris of a collapsed building; and
- airdropping relief supplies to victims of avalanches and floods.²³

Relying on the military to keep essential industries operating during a strike has become a routine response for federal authorities. Unions in nationalized undertakings have displayed a new militancy in pressing their demands on the government, and political agitators have on several occasions resorted to general strikes to protest central government policies. As a result, the Army has been deployed on numerous occasions to prevent an industrial shutdown from paralyzing the economy or causing undue local hardships. A sample of routine Army interventions in industrial disputes includes the following:

- July 1979--restored water supply to Delhi;
- July 1980--operated the Badrapur powerplant in Delhi;
- August 1980--replaced striking workers of the Bihar state electricity board;
- September-October 1980--took control of electrical, water, and medical services in Himachal Pradesh during a public employees' strike; and
- March 1982--maintained water supplies in Rajasthan when state water employees struck.²⁴



Indian Army engineers taking over operation of the Barauni oil refinery in Assam.
[Source: Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), 8 February 1981.]

The most sensational Army interventions in industrial disputes occurred during the 1974 national rail strike, the 1981 shutdown of the Assam oil-fields, and the national dock strikes of 1975 and 1984. In the first case, Army personnel and Army auxiliary units were deployed in 101 cities and rail junctions along India's nine major rail lines. Besides operating the locomotives, troops were responsible for maintaining telecommunications, electrical services, and railyard security. The swift deployment of troops kept the trains running and the strike was stopped in a matter of weeks.²⁵ In Assam, students and civil servants called a general strike in November 1981 for the expressed purpose of shutting down the oil pipeline which supplies India with 30 percent of its oil. The tactic was designed to wring political concessions from New Delhi on the thorny issue of illegal immigration into the state. The Gandhi government responded by invoking the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and declaring 1 kilometer on either side of the entire length of the pipeline a "disturbed area." Under this provision, the Army patrolled the pipeline and operated the refineries and pumping stations. Oil supplies were resumed within a month after the Army takeover. Army engineers are posted in key positions in the industry to this day. In the case of the dock strikes, Army, Navy, and paramilitary personnel were called on to keep the ports open.

In each of these instances, the military performed its mission well. It is common knowledge, however, that the military does not like to perform these chores because they are regarded by the public as strikebreakers. Since paramilitary forces do not maintain trained personnel in adequate numbers to perform diverse tasks such as running a train, berthing a vessel, or operating a refinery, New Delhi has no other option but to rely on the armed services when public service employees in critical industries walk off the job.

The deployment of Army troops in domestic peacekeeping situations is a sensitive subject which civilian and military authorities prefer not to publicize. Nevertheless, it is apparent that over the course of the last 10 years the domestic use of the Army has expanded far beyond the historical, localized aid-to-civil role of an earlier era. Not only are Army troops called out more frequently, but they are also resorting to higher levels of force to contain domestic violence, as was clearly demonstrated in the Army crackdown on the Punjab in June 1984. Furthermore, once deployed in a peacekeeping role, Army troops often remain at the site of a disturbance for long periods. In extreme cases such as in the states of Nagaland and Assam, the Army presence is pervasive and, for all practical purposes, permanent.

Quantifying Army deployments in aid-to-civil is a difficult task. Different government ministries use different categories of analysis to compile deployment data and rarely release any information that sheds light on deployment patterns, tactics, and force composition. Consequently, data on the subject must be gleaned from parliamentary sources, ministry reports, independent analyses, and media coverage.

According to Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha, Army troops were called out in aid-to-civil 476 times between 1951 and 1970, or on an average of about 24 times per year.²⁶ The only succeeding period for which data of this kind are available is 1980 and 1981--a particularly active period for the Army because of the communal riots in north India and the deteriorating law-and-order

situation in the northeast. According to Ministry of Defense statistics, the Army was called out 46 times in 1980 and 3 times in the first 6 months of 1981.²⁷ A more detailed description of Army deployments appeared in the Indian military journal Sainik Samachar.²⁸ According to Lieutenant Colonel M. M. L. Ahuja, the number of aid-to-civil deployments for the 16-month period between June 1979 and December 1980 totaled 276, or almost half as many deployments that Sinha noted for the 20-year period between 1951 and 1970. A further breakdown of the Ahuja data (table 4) reveals that the use of the Army in the domestic context focused on law-and-order situations as opposed to essential services maintenance and disaster relief. The nebulous "other" category in Ahuja's data was left to the readers' imagination, no doubt because authorities in New Delhi were reluctant to divulge sensitive information which could adversely affect military morale or invite political criticism. These piecemeal statistics provide ample indications that the Army's involvement in domestic peacekeeping is substantial. A Ministry of Defense spokesman revealed in 1981 that the states requisitioned the Army to contain a wide range of violent incidents such as communal riots, student agitations, tribal clashes, and labor unrest.²⁹

Those Army deployments which took place from 1973 to 1984 are listed in table 5. Even though the data in the preceding table suggest that the Army is called out in aid-to-civil on numerous other occasions that are not recorded in newspaper headlines and official statistics, table 5 is a useful list of the most significant Army deployments in which force was used to maintain the peace. Two trends can be distinguished. First, the Army has been most active in the communally tense states of north India (Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh) and in the insurgency-ridden states of the northeast. The most violence-prone state in recent years is probably Gujarat. South Indian states have requested Army assistance only four times, and even then for brief periods. Second, Army deployments in the years 1973-75 lasted a month or less. In all of these documented cases, the violence which prompted Army intervention was either stamped out or else contained to the point that peacekeeping duties were resumed by paramilitary forces. In sharp contrast, incidents of violence since 1980 have required the stationing of Army troops for considerably longer periods.

Although the Army is the military service that carries the heaviest burden in domestic peacekeeping operations, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF) also provide aid-to-civil assistance as the need arises. The Navy regularly provides civil authorities with divers for use in salvage operations and coastal floods. Divers were dispatched to the Golden Temple in June 1984 to recover weapons that the terrorists had submerged in a temple tank. The IAF routinely airlifts emergency supplies to inaccessible regions of the country in the aftermath of natural catastrophes. In addition, the IAF plays a significant support role in transporting Army and paramilitary troops to the scene of violent disturbances. When the Army was deployed in the Punjab, the IAF transported Army units from as far away as Tripura to participate in the operation. Similarly, at the height of the 1980 communal riots centered in Moradabad, the IAF rushed in Army units from the northeast. Table 6 provides fragmentary data on IAF support missions in aid-to-civil. Here again, the period of heaviest military involvement occurred in 1980. India's national air carriers, Indian Airlines and Air India, can also be pressed into service to transport troops to the scene of a disturbance.

Table 4

Army Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, June 1979-December 1980

State	Reason for Deployment			
	Law & Order	Essential Services	Disasters	"Other"*
Bihar	6	1	1	4
Gujarat	4	--	4	1
Punjab	2	2	--	5
Karnataka	--	--	3	1
Delhi	2	2	--	5
Haryana	--	--	2	1
Kerala	3	--	--	--
Orissa	3	--	1	--
Madhya Pradesh	3	--	2	3
Tamil Nadu	2	--	1	--
Andamans & Nicobar Is.	2	--	--	--
Meghalaya	4	1	1	1
Assam	2	--	5	--
West Bengal	--	--	1	12
Manipur	2	--	1	--
Nagaland	2	--	--	11
Tripura	1	--	--	--
Uttar Pradesh	17	--	2	27
Jammu & Kashmir	7	--	--	40
Arunachal Pradesh	1	--	--	1
Mizoram	1	--	2	25
Himachal Pradesh	--	1	1	14
Maharashtra	--	--	14	2
Andhra Pradesh	--	--	2	1
Rajasthan	--	--	3	3
Sikkim	--	--	--	3
Totals	64	7	46	159

*This category is undefined in the data.

[Source: Lieutenant Colonel M. M. L. Ahuja. "In Service of the People." Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), January 1981, pp. 46-48.]

Table 5

Indian Army Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, 1973-84

Year	Where Deployed	Reason	Dates	Approximate Duration
1973	Assam Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Imphal, Manipur Nasik, Maharashtra	language riots police unrest tribal violence riots election violence	13 Apr-17 May 21 May-13 Jun 13-18 Jun 13-21 Sep 23-24 Apr	1 month 3 weeks 1 week 1 week 2 days
1974	Baroda, Gujarat Ahmedabad, Gujarat Dhanbad & Ranchi, Bihar Palampur, Himachal Pradesh Patna, Bihar all India West Bengal (4 districts)	communal unrest food riots communal violence ? student riots national rail strike riots	10-14 Jan; 25-26 Feb 28 Jan-16 Feb 20 Mar-2 Apr 25-26 Apr 18-26 Mar 7-20 May 27 Aug-5 Sep	1 week 3 weeks 2 weeks 2 days 1 week 3 weeks 2 weeks
1975	all Indian port cities Delhi Cooch Behar, West Bengal	docker's strike communal riots rural unrest	? Jan ? Feb 9-17 Feb	1 week? 1 week? 1 week
1976	Prime Minister Gandhi declares a state of national emergency. The Army is not called out in aid-to-civil.			
1977-79	No reliable information available.*			
1980	Assam Tripura** Meghalaya** Manipur** Nagaland** Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh , Gujarat , Delhi Jammu & Kashmir Tamil Nadu Bihar Himachal Pradesh	"antiforeigner" stir; election violence tribal violence tribal insurgency student/tribal unrest tribal violence communal violence (Moradabad) ? ? CISF strike ?	Feb 7 Jun-14 Nov "frequently" 17 Apr-17 May 23-30 Jul & 15 Nov Aug-Sep ? ? ? Oct ?	continuous 6 months continuous 1 month continuous 2 months ? ? 1 week ? ?
1981	Assam Gujarat	"antiforeigner" stir antireservation stir	continuous 1 Feb-2 May	1 year 3 months

Table 5 (Continued)

Year	Where Deployed	Reason	Dates	Approximate Duration
1982	Assam Arunachal Pradesh Goa Baroda, Gujarat Kerala Maharashtra Mizoram** Nagaland**	"antiforeigner" stir student/tribal unrest communal disturbances communal disturbances communal disturbances Bombay police strike election violence election violence	continuous 17 Jul-21 Aug 2-7 Nov 28 Oct-5 Nov 30 Dec-12 Jan 83 8 Aug-9 Sep May & Dec ? Oct	1 year 4 weeks 5 days 2 weeks 4 days 1 month 4 days? 2 days?
1983	No known Army deployments other than counterinsurgency operations in the north-eastern states and continuous peacekeeping duties in Assam. Army put on alert in Punjab, Chandigarh, and Haryana.			
1984	Maharashtra (Bombay, Bhiwandi, Thane, and adjoining suburbs)	communal riots	May-June	4 weeks
	Punjab, Chandigarh (limited deployments in adjoining areas of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Delhi, and Kashmir)	Sikh terrorist campaign centered in Amritsar; Army mutinies	5 Jun-present	ongoing
	Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	Hindu-Muslim riots; political demonstrations	9 Sep-present	ongoing

*Ministry of Defence Annual Reports do not mention any Army involvement with domestic peacekeeping chores during the Janata years in power. The Reports only highlight Army aid-to-civil in cases of natural disasters.

**Regular Army troops are stationed and on alert in Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura on a continuous basis. The Reports ordinarily refer to Army operations in these states under a separate heading dealing with "counterinsurgency operations."

Table 6

Indian Air Force Flights in Aid-to-Civil, 1980-82*

Year	Flying Hours	Load	Number of Passengers
1982	382	119,127 kgs.	6,715
1981	619	183,188 kgs.	5,795
1980	1,108	436,689 kgs.	8,894

*Figures for years prior to 1980 are not available.

[Source: Government of India, Ministry of Defense. Annual Report, 1980-81 through 1982-83.]

The Home Guards (HG) is a lightly armed auxiliary force which also supports Army peacekeepers during aid-to-civil operations. The HG was founded in 1962 and is jointly operated by the union Ministry of Home Affairs and the states. HG personnel strength stands at about 500,000, although the force is authorized to raise up to 1 million men during wartime emergencies. HG personnel are volunteers who are pressed into service in their own village or district when a local emergency arises. Volunteers do not receive salaries but are authorized a nominal 8 rupees (less than \$2) per day, payable only when personnel are called up for training or duty. The permanent staff of the HG is attached to individual states. The center and the states are jointly responsible for meeting HG budget requirements. Border states arm approximately 30 percent of their HG personnel, whereas only 20 percent of HG personnel are armed in other states. Table 7 shows the breakdown of HG personnel strength by state. Those states which support the largest HG forces--Bihar, Gujarat, and Maharashtra--are arguably the states that most frequently resort to aid-to-civil requests; inexplicably, the relatively tranquil state of Karnataka supports the single largest HG force, and the most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, supports a relatively miniscule HG force. When called into service, HG personnel perform routine security duties such as perimeter patrolling in support of Army and paramilitary units. Some states also employ HG personnel in civic action projects such as road construction, well digging, and flood control.

Table 7

Home Guards Personnel Strength, by State (1982)

<u>State/Territory</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>
Andamans and Nicobars	535
Andhra Pradesh	8,023
Arunachal Pradesh	--
Assam	17,097
Bihar	59,720
Chandigarh	1,029
Delhi	9,258
Goa, Daman, & Diu	364
Gujarat	51,346
Haryana	11,913
Himachal Pradesh	7,868
Jammu & Kashmir	1,614
Karnataka	147,599
Kerala	--
Madhya Pradesh	16,347
Maharashtra	23,929
Manipur	3,086
Meghalaya	2,531
Mizoram	617
Nagaland	--
Orissa	14,571
Pondicherry	412
Punjab	3,093
Rajasthan	1,852
Tamil Nadu	955
Tripura	232
Uttar Pradesh	9,907
West Bengal	3,693

[Source: Republic of India. Lok Sabha Debates, 27 April 1983, cols. 168-169.]

For civilian officials who are confronted with violent challenges to their authority, the Army is the force of last resort. But because troops are so effective in restoring order, there is always the temptation to revert to the Army before exhausting other force alternatives such as the CRPF, the BSF, and SAP battalions. Army personnel are widely respected for their toughness and impartiality--attributes which paramilitary forces do not share. In many instances, the arrival of Army troops or even rumors of an impending Army deployment are enough to quell a domestic disturbance. Once the drastic decision to deploy the Army is made, New Delhi provides Army commanders with sweeping legal powers and sufficient levels of troops to bring the disturbance to a speedy resolution. S. K. Sinha notes that Army troops called out in aid-to-civil "cannot afford to fail in their mission, because if they do, the door is flung open to anarchy."³⁰

Army training manuals cite four principles to guide officers during aid-to-civil operations. First, troops are required to use minimum force. This principle is the opposite of wartime doctrine which specifies the use of maximum force to repulse an enemy. In order to gauge the level of force that is required in a given situation, commanding officers are taught to use means that are proportional to the threat that was encountered. Thus, the use of artillery is inappropriate when troops assist local police in containing communal rioters armed with Molotov cocktails, but was justified in the case of the Golden Temple siege when Sikh terrorists countered the Army with sub-machineguns and antitank rockets. The minimum force requirement is intended to restrain the Army from employing a level of firepower that would result in unnecessary civilian casualties. The use of excessive force in aid-to-civil could incite a violent public reaction and tarnish the reputation of the Army. Indian officers recognize that there are occasions when minimum force requirements put their troops in jeopardy. Lightly armed patrols are vulnerable to ambush by heavily armed combatants.

Second, troops are guided by the doctrine of necessity which requires Army personnel to perform only those tasks which are vital to the success of the operation. Inflicting reprisals, the use of torture, and imposing severe hardships on the local population are strongly discouraged. Even though Army indoctrination stresses that aid-to-civil operations must be carried out within the carefully defined limits of the law, Army commanders in practice have broad powers to bring lawless elements to heel.

Third, Army personnel must demonstrate impartiality when enforcing the law. While the Army invariably satisfied this requirement in the past, the mutiny of over 1,500 soldiers in the wake of the storming of the Golden Temple raised concerns that the Army's tradition of impartiality had been put to the test once too often. Ordering troops to fire on their co-religionists or ethnic kinsmen poses a stiff challenge to Army discipline. For this reason, the military has always had reservations over performing domestic security chores for fear of creating divisions within the ranks. As one Army officer told a newsman on returning to his cantonment from riot duty, military men do not equate aid-to-civil duties with "proper soldiering."³¹

Fourth, Army personnel must act in good faith when enforcing civil law. The Indian Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that all security personnel performing aid-to-civil duties are immune from criminal prosecution, provided they act in good faith.³² Army personnel are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for exceeding their authority. Instead, offending personnel are handled discreetly within the system of military justice.

When troops are introduced into a local disturbance, the police and paramilitary forces that are already on the scene do not automatically come under the operational control of the Army unless the President invokes emergency powers which authorize a de facto or de jure military takeover of civilian administration. In situations where the Army acts jointly with other command authorities, the police retain powers of search and arrest. Army personnel can only exercise these powers when accompanied by the police. Even when extraordinary powers such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act are invoked, all persons arrested must be turned over to the nearest police station as soon

as possible. Permission to fire other than in self-defense differs between the Army and the police. The police open fire on the command of the District Magistrate, whereas Army troops respond only to the command of their officers. Army experience in dealing with communal riots demonstrates that flag marches through a riot-torn area often provide sufficient deterrence to defuse the violence. In many situations, the Army intentionally avoids any confrontation with rioters and performs routine patrolling duties on the perimeter of the rioting. This tactic allows paramilitary forces to relinquish this responsibility and to concentrate their efforts on the worst-hit areas of the disturbance. In this way, Army troops are often relieved of the burden of firing on their countrymen even after they have been deployed in aid-to-civil.

The Army usually takes the lead role in counterinsurgency operations in the northeast and, since June 1984, in the Punjab. An Indian journalist has provided a rare look at a typical cordon-and-search operation which, in this case, was carried out in a tribal hamlet in a "disturbed area" of Manipur in 1981. According to the account, Army personnel surrounded a village suspected of harboring insurgents. The operation commenced at midnight. After posting a jawan reportedly every 200 yards in order to ensure that no villagers slipped through the security cordon, officers with loudspeakers ordered all males to assemble for identification checks in the pre-dawn hours. Troops then moved into the village to interrogate suspects. Arrests were made by two local constables who accompanied the troops and acted under the authority of the District Magistrate. Suspects were transferred to the Army's base camp at Leimakhong for further questioning and then handed over to civil authorities for holding and trial. The village was put under a 24-hour curfew that was enforced by policemen sent in after the Army's departure.³³

The Army's deepening involvement in domestic peacekeeping has brought the military into close contact with elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. This contact is in itself a recent phenomenon which serves to expand the military's historically limited role in carrying out domestic security functions normally reserved for the civilian sector. There are indications that the military has been tasked to coordinate aid-to-civil operations on a routine and continuing basis. In one of the many commanders' conferences intended to coordinate the agencies of government during aid-to-civil emergencies, security officials of several states met at the Army's Central Command Headquarters in Lucknow in October 1983 to draw up contingency plans. In attendance were: the chief secretaries and top police officials of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa; the regional commanders of several paramilitary forces; and senior Army and IAF officers.³⁴ This formalized coordination session is an exercise that has been duplicated in other regions where states anticipate violent disorders which could require Army intervention.³⁵

Although enhanced coordination between the military, the police, and civilian administrators is intended to promote efficiency, granting the military routine access to administrative and political decisionmaking channels sets a dangerous precedent. Once the Army becomes proficient in restoring and administering the peace, there is always the risk that the military will resent being tasked to intervene on behalf of civilian officials who prove incapable of maintaining domestic order. Calling in the Army to perform

police functions could lead the officer corps and sympathetic politicians to conclude that the military is best equipped to impose order on an increasingly violent society. Requesting the Army to replace civilian administrators (as was done in the Punjab on a supposedly interim basis) is a logical extension of requesting the Army to replace the police.

There is mounting evidence that the Army has already developed the bureaucratic capacities needed to carry out internal administrative functions in peacetime as well as during wartime. The Army's familiarity with civil administration duties is a byproduct of the aid-to-civil experience gained during deployments in districts, states, and sensitive border regions where local administration has been handed over to the military. Throughout the turbulent northeast, the Army for years has provided the only effective administration, particularly in the insurgency-ridden districts of Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura; since 1981, the Army has filled the administrative vacuum in Assam; and since June 1984, the Army has been solely responsible for ordering security in the troubled state of Punjab. Moreover, military personnel have the technical expertise to manage whole industries because of their long experience in maintaining essential services during labor disputes. Army officers do not like taking on added responsibilities associated with civil administration, and invariably resent even the suggestion that they harbor political ambitions. The Army is nevertheless in a position to perform domestic administrative chores on a long-term basis if called on to do so.

The Army's jurisdiction over cantonments could serve as a model for further extending the military's role in civil administration. India's 62 cantonments are strategically located on the outskirts of major population centers so that troops can render timely assistance to local authorities during emergencies. The cantonments are in most cases cities within a city that are administered under legal provisions set forth by the British in the 1920s. Everything from recreation to taxation and criminal justice are administered by an independent cantonment board headed by the Army officer in charge. Army responsibilities in administering cantonment life are substantial. Almost half of India's cantonments have a population in excess of 10,000 and each cantonment typically supports three to four times as many civilians as military personnel.³⁶

In the Indian context, there is little danger that a disgruntled clique of military commanders will stage a coup on the plea of rescuing the nation from civil disorders. The strong tradition of civilian supremacy over the military, the immense difficulties in coordinating a military takeover involving four regional commands and three service branches, and the poor examples set by military governments in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh all act as powerful disincentives for potential coup plotters in India. There is a danger, however, that civilian administrators will be forced by events to rely more heavily on the military peacekeepers. A weak or indecisive central government would almost certainly usher in more pronounced military involvement in domestic affairs. Under these circumstances, the Army could acquire increased police and administrative responsibilities by default, not by design.

7. RELIABILITY OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Since the early 1970s, the level of unrest within India's police and paramilitary forces has increased dramatically. Periodic breakdowns in force discipline have raised concerns in New Delhi that these forces cannot be counted on to fulfill their internal security missions. In addition, labor unrest and police revolts are in themselves sources of serious violence. In each case where troops have broken ranks, New Delhi has had to call on unaffected paramilitary units and even Army units to restore order.

Prior to the early 1970s, incidents of rebellion by the Indian Armed Forces were rare.

- In the 1930s, a police revolt against British rule was suppressed in southern India;
- During World War II, units of the British Indian Army rallied to the cause of the renegade Indian National Army which fought with the Japanese against Allied forces in Burma and Malaya;
- An abortive mutiny by Indian sailors was quickly suppressed on the eve of independence in 1946; and
- Hindu and Muslim troops of the Punjab Boundary Force broke ranks during the Partition of the subcontinent.

The relative calm that prevailed among Indian security forces in the first 25 years of independence was shattered in 1973 when units of the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary (UPPAC) took up arms against the government during a labor dispute. After declaring President's Rule in the state and sending in the Army to put down the revolt, the Gandhi government acquiesced to the demand that police be allowed to form their own unions. Following this decision, police strikes broke out in Tamil Nadu, Bihar, West Bengal, and Delhi in the 1970s. There are currently 54 "welfare associations"--a euphemism for police unions--in India. These unions display a high degree of militancy in their dealings with state ministries and often compete with each other for members and political favors.

The most serious police strike to date occurred in Bombay in August 1982. After walking off the job in order to draw attention to their demands for higher pay and better working conditions, police malcontents went on a rampage in the heart of the city. After the strikers erected barricades in the streets, attacked government properties, and clashed with nonstriking personnel, the Gandhi government dispatched the Army to restore order and prevent the strike from spreading to the other 100,000 police union members in Maharashtra. At the height of the week-long disturbance, striking millworkers and criminal elements from Bombay's thriving underworld joined the fray alongside police.³⁷

Table 8

Incidents of Unrest Within Peacekeeping Forces, 1978-84

Date	Location	Immediate Cause of Unrest	Resolution
Oct 78	Tamil Nadu	CRPF strike; state police unwilling to move against strikers	2 battalions of BSF sent in to crush the strike
May 79	Gujarat	police strike	Army called in to restore order; strikers fired on; 5,000 arrested
Jun-Oct 79	Bhubaneswar, Puri, Trivandrum, Cuttack, Neemuch, Thumba, Cochin, Madras, Port Blair, Delhi, Bokaro	wildcat strikes by CRPF, CISF, and RPF units	Army and BSF dispatched to disarm strikers; 24 CISF strikers and 3 Army jawans killed at Bokaro; 3 CRPF mutineers killed in Delhi
Oct 79	Tamil Nadu	police strike	BSF and CRPF units dispatched; 3,000 policemen detained
Nov 79	Bombay (Maharashtra)	abortive police strike	BSF and CRPF personnel quell the Congress-supported strike
Oct 80	industrial locations in Bihar and West Bengal	CISF strike leads to clashes with police	Army dispatched to disarm CISF mutineers
Jan-Feb 81	Gujarat	police discredited during caste reservation protests	Army sent in to fill police vacuum and restore order
Aug 82	Bombay (Maharashtra)	police strike	Army sent in to restore the peace
Jun 84	Army barracks in Bihar, Maharashtra, Tripura, and Rajasthan	uncoordinated mutiny by over 1,500 Sikh conscripts in the aftermath of Army actions at the Golden Temple of Amritsar	loyal Army units capture the mutineers; Army discipline restored.

As illustrated in table 8, the Army has been deployed on five occasions since 1978 to put down strikes by police and paramilitary units. On at least three other occasions, Army intervention was avoided when BSF and CRPF units managed to contain violent strikes called by other paramilitary forces. Ironically, CRPF personnel have found themselves on both ends of the lathi since they have moved against police strikers and have been suppressed themselves for staging strikes. Force discipline is most suspect in the case of CRPF, RPF, and particularly CISF. States with armed police battalions that have performed poorly in the past 10 years include Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. With the sole exception of the Sikh mutinies that took place in June 1984, the Army has not experienced an internal crisis of discipline on the order of these police and paramilitary strikes.

Table 9 is a subjective summary of those factors which contribute to the overall performance of police, paramilitary, and Army units during aid-to-civil deployments.

Table 9

Measures of Force Reliability

	Involvement in Domestic Peacekeeping Duties	Trained in Wartime Duties	Trained in Riot Control	Authorized to Use Lethal Force	Overall Efficiency in Controlling Disturbances
State and Local Police	daily	no	armed branch only	yes, when authorized by District Magistrate	poor
BSF/CRPF	as requested by states	yes	yes	yes, when authorized by District Magistrate	mixed
Other Centrally- Controlled Para- military Forces	minimal involvement, though increasing	yes	no	yes, when authorized by District Magistrate	--
Armed Forces	in extreme emergencies only	yes	no	yes, when authorized by commanding officers	excellent

8. CASE STUDIES OF ARMY INVOLVEMENT

a. Moradabad and the Upsurge of Communalism

Moradabad is an industrialized district seat in north central Uttar Pradesh, an area of India where Muslim artisans, laborers, and traders comprise a large segment of the urban population. For generations, Hindus and Muslims of the Indian heartland have coexisted uneasily and a number of townships have been racked periodically by localized communal violence. In 1980, communal passions exploded in Moradabad over a relatively minor issue. The initial violence was quickly transformed into pitched battles between Muslims and the police that soon spread to adjoining districts. Once set in motion, the turmoil took on the characteristics of a Hindu-Muslim confrontation that invited comparisons with the darkest days of Partition in 1947.

The incident that triggered the violence occurred on 13 August 1980 at a mosque where 5,000 worshippers had assembled to offer Id prayers. The appearance of a pig on the mosque premises enraged the worshippers who blamed the local police for allowing the sacrilege to take place. Muslim mobs began attacking the police, who were outnumbered and totally unprepared for the violence that followed. Much of the city was in flames by nightfall. State authorities responded by invoking Section 144 and dispatching 37 companies of Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary (UPPAC). The arrival of state armed police further angered the mob which regarded the force as biased against Muslims. The deployment of 10 BSF companies and an unknown number of CRPF companies also failed to bring the riots under control. On 15 August, Army units from nearby Meerut were dispatched to Moradabad in aid-to-civil and all district magistrates in Uttar Pradesh were notified to take precautions against communal unrest. During the first days of the violence, a UPPAC commander, a sub-inspector of police, a head constable, and scores of policemen were injured or killed. By the time the Army arrived, civilian officials reported that 130 riot-related deaths already had occurred.

Events in and around Moradabad provide textbook examples of the ways in which the Army responds to riot situations. On entering the embattled city, Army troops replaced discredited UPPAC personnel whose presence was resented by the Muslim community. To further assuage Muslim public opinion, state authorities removed the District Magistrate from office and transferred several police officials. While Army and BSF units cordoned off sections of the city where riots were in progress, CRPF personnel moved into the worst-hit areas to conduct house-to-house searches and make arrests. A 24-hour curfew was clamped on the city, hundreds of "anti-social" elements were jailed under the National Security Act, and several universities were closed. These severe measures ended the worst violence in the city within 2 days.

Security authorities feared that the carnage in Moradabad would quickly spread to adjoining districts. To head off this possibility, Army units were deployed in nearby Rampur, Aligarh, Meerut, Bareilly, and Dhampur, and as far away as Agra, Lucknow, Varanasi, and Kanpur. Additional Army units staged flag marches in Ahmedabad (Gujarat) and Mahow (Madhya Pradesh) as a preventive measure. All of these cities have a large Muslim population and are regarded as ripe for communal outbreaks. In each city and district where federal forces were posted, the Army worked in close cooperation with BSF, CRPF, UPPAC, and HG units. Although violent incidents did occur in several

locations after security forces arrived on the scene, observers maintain that the massive Army deployment prevented what could have escalated into a communal holocaust. The Army earned the respect of the public for enforcing order efficiently and impartially. Muslim leaders blamed the UPPAC for causing the riots and bitterly criticized state and federal authorities for not resorting to the Army sooner. All told, the riots lasted several weeks and claimed over 200 lives, most of whom were Muslims. Over 700 persons were arrested across northern India.

The summer riots of 1980 were the opening chapter in a succession of communal disturbances that erupted over the next 4 years and were put down by federal peacekeeping forces. Paramilitary forces were stationed in Meerut for 3 months in 1982; CRPF and BSF units were rushed to Hyderabad to quell communal riots that occurred over a 5-month period in 1982 and over several weeks in 1984; paramilitary forces put down similar incidents in Baroda in January 1983; and other disturbances that required paramilitary assistance occurred in Biharshariff, Trivandrum, and Goa.

When Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in the industrial suburbs of Bombay in May 1984, security authorities took the drastic step of bypassing paramilitary forces and resorting directly to Army intervention. Officials recognized that if police and paramilitary personnel failed to contain the riots, all of Bombay could go up in flames. Authorities immediately dispatched six Sikh Army battalions to put down the violence in the industrial suburbs of Bhiwandi and Thane. Army columns staged preventive flag marches throughout metropolitan Bombay. Leaving nothing to chance, the Army took the precaution of reinforcing security at Bombay's port facilities and replaced CISF sentries at the nearby nuclear power complex at Trombay. This spasm of communal violence resulted in approximately 300 deaths and 2,300 arrests, and left thousands homeless.



Maharashtran state policeman takes aim against rioters in the industrial suburbs of Bombay.

[Source: Indian Express (Bombay), 22 March 1984.]



Troops from the Sikh Regiment deployed in aid-to-civil during the Bombay riots.

[Source: Indian Express (Bombay), 21 May 1984.]

There is no evidence to support the allegation that this string of communal disturbances was the handiwork of a "foreign hand." What is clear is that the tendency on the part of federal authorities to suppress communal disturbances with large numbers of federal security personnel has not halted the nationwide spiral of violence. Increased competition between communal groups, the availability of illegal weapons, and the breakdown of local authority have combined to make communal violence the most pressing domestic concern of the Gandhi government.

b. The Punjab Morass

Events of the last 2 years in the Punjab clearly demonstrate how a localized agitation by a dissident minority can, if a political solution is not reached, become an escalating spiral of violence which ultimately requires Army intervention. Throughout the Punjab crisis, the Gandhi government attempted to match the increasing violence of Sikh terrorists by gradually employing more draconian security powers and greater numbers of security personnel. Gandhi's reactive strategy failed to quell terrorist violence. Unlike previous aid-to-civil deployments, the level of force which New Delhi deployed in the Punjab was unprecedented. Moreover, the storming of the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984 did not conclude with an orderly transfer of power from the Army to civilian authorities. Because the state lacks reliable cadres of bureaucrats, administrators, and security personnel, the

Army has become deeply involved in civil administration duties as well as counterterrorist operations. An early Army withdrawal from the Punjab appears unlikely.



Newspaper cartoon takes a supportive view of the Army rescue operation in the Punjab.

[Source: Times of India (Bombay), 5 June 1984.]

The ferment in the Punjab has its origins in the economic, political, and religious grievances of the Sikhs who comprise a slim majority of the state's population but only 2 percent of India's total population. Starting in 1981, Sikh militants began agitating for greater autonomy, Vatican-style status for the holy city of Amritsar, the merger of Chandigarh with Punjab, a larger share for Punjab of interstate rivers, and a constitutional amendment to classify Sikhism as an independent religion. The Gandhi government made minor concessions to Sikh religious sensibilities but refused to accede to Sikh political demands for fear of setting a precedent for other restive minorities to follow in their dealings with New Delhi. As a consequence of the political stalemate between Sikh dissidents and the federal government, Sikh moderates gradually lost control over their political constituency and leadership over the mass protests shifted to a militant assortment of revivalists, separatists, and terrorists. Even though a vast majority of Indian Sikhs favored a political solution to redress community grievances, the focus of the agitation centered on a splinter movement of religious zealots, many of whom advocated the creation of an independent Sikh state of "Khalistan."


A number of factors complicated the Gandhi government's search for a political compromise. First, the main political party of the Sikhs, the Akali Dal, was deeply divided and bitter over its inability to win power from Gandhi's Hindu-dominated Congress-I state ministry. As sympathies for the Sikh agitation spread to all levels of the bureaucracy and police department, the state government's ability to enforce order eroded quickly. The breakdown of local authority compelled New Delhi to assume increasing responsibilities for administering the state, thereby inflaming Sikh public opinion even further. Second, the proximity of the Punjab to the Pakistan border convinced New Delhi that the political turmoil in the state could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. The Punjab is the Army's communication lifeline in the event of another war with Pakistan. Security planners feared that Pakistan would take advantage of the turmoil by supporting Sikh dissidents or even launching another invasion of Indian-held Kashmir. Third, Sikh militants had the advantage of operating from the Golden Temple sanctuary which was declared off-limits to security personnel. Over the course of the agitation, the terrorists were able to build up formidable defenses within the temple which served as the nerve center of the statewide terrorist campaign. Fourth, the Punjab is the breadbasket of the nation, providing over half of India's grain supply. Any disruption in the movement of agricultural produce out of the state would have disastrous consequences which no Indian Government could tolerate. The Sikh threat to halt grain shipments in June 1984 was the final act of defiance which persuaded Gandhi to call out the Army in the Punjab.

Paramilitary forces were introduced into the Punjab in December 1982. Those forces active in the first year of the counterterrorist campaign included 20 CRPF battalions and 11 BSF battalions. By fall 1983, it was apparent that state authorities were unable to contain the terrorist attacks and mass demonstrations that were taking place almost daily. Paramilitary forces reported that the Punjab Police Force (PPF) was reluctant to move against their co-religionists for fear of provoking terrorist reprisals. Some sections of the PPF and the state bureaucracy actively sided with Sikh agitators and obstructed aid-to-civil operations. On 6 October 1983, President Zail Singh dissolved the Congress-I state ministry and imposed President's Rule in the Punjab. The following day the President declared the state a "disturbed area." This ordinance conferred sweeping powers of search, seizure, and arrest on police officials down to the level of sub-inspectors. The police were also given shoot-to-kill orders when confronting lawbreakers. The following week, these same powers were extended to all paramilitary forces acting in aid-to-civil in the state. Thus, by the middle of October, security in the Punjab was effectively under central government control. Home Minister P. C. Sethi vowed in Parliament, however, "to use the powers with extreme caution. . . . Minimum force has to be used."³⁸



*Punjab Police Force personnel patrolling a lane
prior to the Army crackdown.*

[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 11 April 1984.]



*Sikh extremists observing paramilitary positions
from inside the Golden Temple.*

[Source: Telegraph (Calcutta), 15 July 1984.]

By February 1984, the law-and-order situation in the Punjab showed no signs of improvement. Sikh terrorists were directing an assassination campaign from their Golden Temple sanctuary, Hindus were arming themselves in anticipation of a communal war, and economic activity in the state ground to a halt. It was at this point that Gandhi took personal charge over the crisis. According to reliable press reports, Gandhi created a crisis management team composed of the Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary of the Prime Minister, the security adviser to the cabinet, the Home Secretary, and the heads of intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces. Chief of Army Staff General A. S. Vaidya was also brought in to crisis planning sessions and instructed to ready his forces for possible action in the Punjab. A special adviser to the Governor of the Punjab was appointed to facilitate coordination between New Delhi and security forces in the field.³⁹

As of March 1984, 50,000 paramilitary personnel were firmly entrenched in every district of the state.⁴⁰ Units from the BSF, CRPF, RPF, ITBP, and SFF were active in tracking down terrorists, securing vital industries and lines of communication, ensuring the security of the border with Pakistan, and providing the state's fearful population with the basic elements of police protection. In districts such as Amritsar where terrorist violence was

endemic, security authorities divided the jurisdiction into three zones of operation in which individual forces were given primary responsibility for enforcing the law. Under this strategy, the CRPF was charged with patrolling the outlying areas of towns and cities; the BSF had responsibility for maintaining security in border areas and around temple sanctuaries; and the discredited PPF was banished to the villages where the level of violence was minimal. In April, over 500 RPF personnel were rushed to the Punjab from across India when Sikh terrorists mounted coordinated attacks on railway facilities.

In order to free up paramilitary personnel for aid-to-civil duties, Army units from India's three other commands took up BSF positions along the Pakistani border. To allay Pakistani fears of an Army buildup on the border, New Delhi informed Islamabad that the deployment of additional Army units was not intended to threaten Pakistan. These replacement units were tasked with sealing the border against the infiltration of men and arms from Pakistan.

In April, Gandhi tightened security in the Punjab another notch. The National Security Act was strengthened to allow security forces to detain suspects for up to 6 months without a warrant. Those arrested could be held up to 2 years without a trial. At the same time, the federally appointed Governor of the Punjab was authorized to call in the Army at his discretion. In order to prevent the terrorists from carrying out their threat to extend the campaign of violence to other parts of India, security arrangements in adjoining states were upgraded and paramilitary personnel fanned out along access routes to and from the state. Over 500 paramilitary personnel, probably from the ITBP or SFF, were assigned VIP protection duties when Sikh terrorists published an assassination "hit list" that included senior Indian Government officials. Additional paramilitary commandos were attached to states bordering on the Punjab in order to coordinate a regionwide counter-terrorist campaign.⁴¹ In May, security authorities created 23 commando task forces "for the purpose of containing terrorist activity and improving the efficiency of other security forces in the state."⁴² These task forces drew on personnel from several paramilitary forces and were deployed in eight sensitive districts. On 3 May, BSF units laid siege to a Sikh temple in Moga that was being used as a terrorist sanctuary. This action turned out to be a dress rehearsal for the massive Army assault on the Golden Temple a month later.

Indian public opinion--a crucial factor in a national election year--was divided over Gandhi's vacillations in the Punjab. Ordering the Army to mount a frontal assault on the holiest of Sikh shrines ran the risk of inflaming Sikh passions across India and undermining Army discipline; alternatively, a bold stroke designed to crush Sikh terrorist networks would be welcomed by many sections of Indian public opinion, particularly Hindus. In May, an alliance of opposition party leaders issued a joint appeal for Army intervention in the Punjab. Although the influential Times of India viewed this option as a "dangerous shortcut,"⁴³ editorials such as the one that appeared in the leftist tabloid Blitz supported the view that "the Army with its morale, training, and freedom from local prejudices would be able to deal with the situation far better than the state police."⁴⁴ Two weeks before the Army swung into action in the Punjab, India Today concluded that "Mrs. Gandhi

must act fast. Leaders who allow themselves to become helpless lose the right to govern. In Punjab, time is not on Mrs. Gandhi's side."⁴⁵

Gandhi made the decision to deploy the Army on a massive scale in mid-May 1984. The assault on the Golden Temple, codenamed Operation Bluestar, had been planned for months, although Gandhi reassured Sikh leaders that such an assault was out of the question. Army commandos had been rehearsing the operation on a mock temple complex erected at Chakrata Air Base. Immediately after Gandhi told a national radio and television audience on 2 June that all hope for a negotiated settlement had evaporated because of mounting terrorist violence, Governor B. D. Pandey made the formal request for Army intervention. Lieutenant General R. S. Dyal, the Sikh Chief of Staff of the Army's Western Command, took over as security adviser to the Governor and all security forces in the Punjab and Chandigarh were placed under his command. A plan to flush out the terrorists from the Golden Temple by cutting off food and water was vetoed by the Army. Commanders reasoned that a long siege would rally public opinion behind the Temple defenders, incite civil disturbances in other parts of the state, and commit Army troops to perform static duties for a long period. Therefore, Army troops were ordered to mount what was intended to be a quick, surgical strike against Sikh terrorists. All communications to the state were severed, a dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed, and media coverage from the state was banned. For all practical purposes, the Punjab was put under martial law.



LTG R. S. Dyal, the Sikh commander who was put in charge of aid-to-civil operations in the Punjab.


[Source: Times of India (Bombay), 8 June 1984.]

On 30 May, units of the 9th Infantry Division based in Meerut were moved into Amritsar to take up positions manned by BSF and CRPF personnel. The following day, troops from a predominantly Hindu regiment in Assam were airlifted into the state to participate in the operation along with Army elements drawn from a variety of regiments such as the Garwhalis, Brigade of Guards, 10th Guards, Madrasis, Dogras, Punjabis, and Gurkhas. Some of the Army units transferred from the northeast were replaced by Sikh regiments from the Punjab and adjoining states which had seen action only weeks before during the communal riots in Bombay. By 3 June, 70,000 paramilitary and Army personnel were in place. After terrorists inside the Golden Temple answered Army demands to surrender with volleys of gunfire, an elite squadron of Army commandos under the command of Major General R. S. Brar was given the order to storm the temple by force. Backed by the full weight of India's military and paramilitary establishment, SFF commandos and troops from the 12th Battalion of the Bihar Regiment shot their way into the Golden Temple under cover of darkness on 5 June.

The ensuing 60-hour siege of the temple complex revealed that Indian intelligence had underestimated the military capabilities and weapon stocks of the terrorists. Under the expert command of a former Army major general, the defenders inflicted heavy casualties on Army personnel with machineguns and antitank rockets. Determined to minimize damages to the temple, Army commandos hesitated to employ artillery until it became apparent that troops armed with light weapons could not dislodge the heavily armed defenders. In exasperation, Army units opened up with 3.87-mm assault guns and mountain guns. IAF helicopters hovered above the temple to pinpoint terrorist positions while tanks and armored personnel carriers preceded infantrymen into the temple. These drastic measures enabled the Army to take control of the temple after 24 hours of close combat. According to Indian Government accounts, Army casualties were 83 killed and 249 injured; terrorist casualties in the vicinity of the Golden Temple numbered 493 killed and 86 injured; and over 4,700 were arrested in connection with the Army crackdown.⁴⁶ Most Indian observers agree that civilian casualties were far higher than the Government reported. Those killed in the battle probably exceeded 1,000.

The Army's siege of the Golden Temple inflicted political scars which will not heal easily. While the Army accomplished its primary objective of eliminating hardcore terrorist elements under the command of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his fanatic followers, most Indian Sikhs were appalled by what they viewed as the Army's unwarranted desecration of Sikhism's holiest shrine. During an inspection tour of the temple shortly after terrorist guns were silenced, Indian President Zail Singh expressed shock at the level of destruction wrought by the Army. Although the Haramandir Sahib in the center of the temple tank was virtually unscathed, the Akhal Takht, which serves as the seat of Sikh temporal power, was badly damaged.

Sikh support for Khalistan increased noticeably after the Army action and security forces had to be called out across northern India to put down angry Sikh mobs. Many Sikhs now regard Bhindranwale as a martyr who laid down his life in defense of Sikhism. New Delhi's clumsy efforts to portray the temple's defenders as narcotics traffickers and tools of Pakistan and the CIA carry little credence in the Sikh community. Worst of all from the Army perspective, moderate Sikh leaders are either languishing in jail or so embittered that they refuse to bargain with the Gandhi government. Without any viable leadership to represent Sikh interests at the bargaining table, the Army has had to provide basic elements of police and civil administration in the state. Each of the 12 districts in the Punjab is now overseen by a major general and a small Army staff which is responsible for administration. Two Army divisions are responsible for civil administration. Overall authority for administering the state is vested in an Army general who occupies a floor of offices in the state capitol building.



Prime Minister Gandhi touring the heavily damaged temple complex on 23 June.
 [Source: India News (Washington, D.C.), 2 July 1984.]

Indian military experts applauded the Army for carrying out the siege in a highly professional manner.⁴⁷ Indeed, Army personnel suffered a high level of casualties because commanders adhered to the standing order that minimum force must be used in aid-to-civil operations. Had the Army resorted to the heavy firepower at their disposal, the temple would have been razed in short order. In sharp contrast to the Army's performance, paramilitary forces have been severely criticized for their failure to interdict the massive amounts of illegal arms and ammunition which the terrorists stockpiled inside the temple. Government investigators revealed that BSF and police intelligence personnel colluded with the terrorists in the smuggling operation. New Delhi has vowed to purge the BSF of traitorous elements and the Punjab police department is undergoing a complete overhaul.⁴⁸ Gandhi has also hinted that the Indian intelligence system may be reorganized and new paramilitary forces may be formed. Within weeks after the assault, the Punjab Governor, the Superintendent of Police, and the Minister of Home Affairs were replaced because of their failure to control events in the Punjab.

Another aftershock of the siege was the mutiny of over 1,500 Sikh Army personnel. Sikhs account for 10 to 15 percent of total Army strength and are highly regarded for their military prowess. Even though Army commanders anticipated some unrest within the ranks, troops in at least five cantonments broke ranks as news of the siege traveled by word of mouth. Shortlived mutinies broke out among Sikh regiments at Pune (Maharashtra), Agartala (Tripura), Alwar (Rajasthan), and Ganganagar (Rajasthan). Most of the mutineers were young recruits who had not completed basic training and indoctrination. Loyal Army units arrested most of the mutineers within a matter of days after Army and paramilitary patrols set up roadblocks leading out of the cantonments. The most serious disruption occurred at the Sikh Regimental Center at Ramgarh (Bihar). Veteran soldiers reacted to the killing of

Bhindranwale by murdering their Hindu commander and making a desperate bid to reach Amritsar to join in the battle. During a speech to Army troops, Chief of Army Staff General A. S. Vaidya pledged:

Those who acted in a mutinous manner will be dealt with severely under the laws as enacted for the Army so that those who remain with us in the Army and have the honor of bearing arms for the country would be a proud and disciplined body of soldiers.⁴⁹



Army troops searching for Sikh deserters in a bus on the Delhi-Uttar Pradesh border.

[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 8 June 1984.]

Indian commentators point out the danger of allowing Army officers to exercise political power. Once the Army develops a taste for power, civilian superiors could find themselves powerless to order the troops back to the barracks. There is a growing apprehension among the officer corps that Sikh anger against the Gandhi government could be redirected against the Army. If this were to occur, unrest within the Army would intensify since officers and troops would be reluctant to carry out a mission that enjoys little popular support. The mutiny of Sikh soldiers may also prompt the Army to abolish the institution of ethnic-based regiments in favor of integrated units.

c. Assam and the Smoldering Insurgencies in the Northeast

As the Gandhi government contemplates the long-term implications of deploying large numbers of federal security forces in the Punjab, there is a conscious realization in Indian defense circles that the drawnout counter-insurgency campaign that the Army has been waging in the northeast must not be repeated in the Punjab. Decades of experience in combating tribal insurgents and providing basic elements of law-and-order in this isolated corner of the country have taught defense planners that aid-to-civil requests can tie down security forces indefinitely if a lasting political solution to the problem of national integration is not found. Indian authorities have referred to the northeast as a "no-win situation," a "running sore," or a "quagmire"--phrases that have been applied to localized brush wars the world over. Although the problems of the northeast do not currently show any signs of threatening the political integrity of India as a whole, the region's intractable problems of organized violence provide a sobering example of how a preponderance of military force is not by itself a prescription for political stability.

Indian security forces perform several vital missions in the ethnic mosaic that makes up the states of the northeast. First and most important is the maintenance of Indian defenses against China. During the 1962 border war, Chinese forces advanced virtually at will into remote sectors of the former Northeast Frontier Agency. Indian strategists admitted at the time that the Chinese could have overrun the entire region if they had the political will to do so. The frontier with China--the so-called MacMahon Line--remains disputed and New Delhi has vowed never again to leave the region's defense to Chinese pledges of good neighborliness. Northeastern defenses against China are substantial and the region supports an even larger concentration of Indian military forces than the western border with Pakistan.

Second in importance is the mission of maintaining border security along the ill-defined frontiers with Bangladesh and Burma. This task falls mainly to the Assam Rifles and the Border Security Force which are charged with interdicting smugglers, curbing illegal immigration, and asserting Indian sovereignty. The inaccessibility of these frontiers and the presence of tribal groups that inhabit both sides of the international boundary make this mission difficult, if not impossible, to carry out effectively. The trans-national character of the violence that plagues the states of the northeast provides an international dimension to the problems of internal security.

Third, federal security forces have been heavily involved in suppressing a wide range of violent incidents that have flared up in the region. Integrating the area into the mainstream of Indian political life has been a high priority for Indian authorities since the earliest years of independence. Despite the implementation of policies designed to accord the region's indigenous population a stake in the nation's economic development, tribal resistance to national integration policies has spawned an array of insurgent movements. Moreover, economic progress has brought with it new social dislocations which have sharpened anti-immigrant tensions, intertribal feuds, and intercommunal competition based on linguistic and religious affiliations. With the exception of the relatively more developed state of Assam, local administrations in the region are notoriously ineffective in countering

insurgents, many of whom are heavily armed and highly motivated. In the case of Assam, large sections of the police and bureaucracy have openly sided with local dissidents in their campaign to expel non-Assamese immigrants from the state. In the absence of strong local administration, the balance of center-state relations throughout the Indian northeast has been heavily weighted in New Delhi's favor.

A brief survey of the extremist movements which have sprouted in the region reveals that Indian forces have a formidable internal security mission to perform.

- ° Nagaland is host to the longest running insurgency in India. Starting with the refusal of Naga tribal leaders to recognize Indian sovereignty in the region after the British withdrew in 1947, Naga extremists have waged a low-level guerrilla war against the Indian Army since the early 1950s.
- ° In Manipur, extremists fighting under the banners of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) have mounted hit-and-run attacks on security forces for over 10 years. The stated goal of these competing organizations is to unite Meitei tribesmen in Burma, Manipur, and adjoining Indian states into an independent confederation.
- ° In Mizoram, the Mizo National Front (MNF) and its military arm, the Mizo National Army, have been fighting a desultory campaign against Indian security forces since the 1960s. Elements of the MNF and the PLA received weapons and training from the Chinese in the 1970s, although Beijing has in recent years severed its connections with tribal dissidents in the region.
- ° Tribal guerrillas also have been active in the Bengali-majority state of Tripura under the leadership of the Tripura National Volunteers.
- ° In the least developed states of Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh, organized tribal resistance has been slow in forming, although there, too, anti-immigrant tensions and simmering resentments over New Delhi's neglect of the region lie clearly under the surface.⁵⁰

The "anti-foreigner" stir in Assam presents the most nettlesome security threat to the region. Since 1980, militant student groups have waged a Gandhian-styled civil disobedience campaign to pressure New Delhi to expel Bangladeshi peasants who enter the state illegally. Since most of the immigrants are Bengali-speaking Muslims, the agitation has acquired a communal character pitting, on one hand, Hindus against Muslims, and, on the other hand, Bengali speakers against speakers of Assamese and several tribal languages. In the absence of any headway at the negotiating table, extremist factions of the main student groups have resorted to sabotage and murder. New Delhi has responded to the escalating violence by declaring and later extending President's Rule in the state on three occasions and making liberal use of extraordinary legislation such as the Essential Services Maintenance Act and

the National Security Act. Although Assam (as well as other states of the northeast, excepting Tripura) has an elected Congress-I state ministry, the political allegiance of the state to Gandhi's rule is shallow. A succession of Assamese policymakers, all of whom were handpicked by Mrs. Gandhi, have failed to enlist the support of the public.

In February 1983, Assam witnessed the bloodiest communal violence since Partition. As voters went to the polls to elect a state ministry, tribal resentments over the Congress-I tactic of packing the voting rolls with Bangladeshi Muslim supporters resulted in a massacre. In the environs of the immigrant hamlet of Nellie in central Assam, tribesmen armed with spears and machetes systematically butchered over 3,000 immigrants in a week of violence. Even though Indian intelligence had ample warning of election-related violence, security forces were slow to react. BSF and CRPF units proved inadequate in quelling the violence and the Army was deployed in aid-to-civil. By March, 7 of Assam's 10 districts were put under Army rule. At the height of the violence, as many as 160,000 paramilitary personnel and 200,000 Army troops were on duty in the state. As expected, Congress-I won the election handily. The low voter turnout caused by a boycott and the associated violence handed the Congress-I a hollow victory, however.




Prime Minister Gandhi (right) sits at the bargaining table with student leaders of the Assam "anti-foreigner" agitation. Negotiations, conducted intermittently since 1980, remain deadlocked over the issue of immigrant repatriation.

[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 14 August 1984.]

In dealing with the violence that has overtaken much of the northeast, New Delhi has followed a classic two-track strategy. Negotiations with insurgents and agitators have been conducted in each of the states, although the cease-fires and truces concluded at the talks have given way to renewed fighting. The other side of the strategy--the threat and use of military force--has been vigorously applied as a prelude to negotiations and as a response to stepped-up guerrilla activity.

Critics of New Delhi's policies point out that "the continuous stationing of Indian troops in the northeast for a long period to control the law-and-order situation may affect the morale and fighting efficiency of the Indian armed forces."⁵¹ Recommendations have been put forward to strengthen police and paramilitary forces so that the Army can recede to the background in the region. This would be accomplished by creating centrally located paramilitary commando units equipped with transport helicopters. Paramilitary forces would have primary responsibility over counterinsurgency operations, and revitalized state armed police units would be responsible for routine law-and-order duties.⁵² Another aspect of police work in the northeast that has been criticized is the lack of reliable intelligence. Police paramilitary and Army intelligence data must be processed through several administrative channels before reaching decisionmakers. Although critics would prefer to buttress local control over law-and-order, most of the schemes that have been proposed for the northeast would maintain, if not enlarge, New Delhi's already substantial role in the region. Most paramilitary units currently operate under the operational control of the Army and proposals to streamline intelligence gathering would invariably serve to centralize further New Delhi's coordination over counterinsurgency operations. In addition, there is a strong possibility that statewide or even regionwide spasms of violence will continue to overwhelm police and paramilitary forces, thereby requiring timely intervention by the Army on a recurring basis.

Currently, Manipur and the Union Territory of Mizoram are classified "disturbed areas" where federal security forces have a generally free hand in pursuing insurgent groups; paramilitary forces are active on a daily basis in Tripura; and, for all intents and purposes, the Army is performing peace-keeping duties in Nagaland and Assam on a permanent basis. Given the persistence of the various insurgent groups that operate in the region, there is little likelihood that the massive presence of Indian security forces will be scaled back in the near future. Insurgents have the advantages of widespread local support, intimate knowledge of the forbidding terrain, and sanctuary in neighboring Bangladesh and Burma. Factors which work to the advantage of New Delhi include the overwhelming numbers of security personnel which can be brought to bear on the region, the lack of international support for the guerrillas, and the absence of unity among local insurgent groups. Under these conditions, security forces can probably prevail against isolated pockets of insurgents. Lasting political solutions to the region's complex economic, communal, and demographic problems lie far in the future, however.



[Source: Times of India (Bombay), 3 June 1984.]

9. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

In an effort to sum up the present day role of Army and paramilitary forces in aid-to-civil, several trends have been identified in this study.

First, state and local police forces are ill-equipped to handle the increased levels of violence that are being played out across India. Terrorism and communal rioting in particular will continue to require the intervention of federal security forces in the coming years. This trend toward resolving local breaches of the peace at the national level is bound to frustrate state authorities who are pressing the campaign for greater leverage in their dealings with New Delhi.

Second, paramilitary forces, although better armed and trained than state units, are also being overwhelmed by the increased burden of aid-to-civil deployments. Consequently, border security has suffered and the ability of these forces to act jointly with the Army during wartime is open to question.

Third, resorting to the Army in aid-to-civil is no longer the rare exception to the rule in domestic peacekeeping. Army deployments in the past 10 years have been more frequent, have (on the average) lasted longer, and have necessitated the use of higher levels of firepower. As Lieutenant General (and future Army Chief of Staff) Bewoor stated in 1972, an over-reliance on the aid-to-civil role of the Army runs the risk of gradually injecting the military into the civilian decisionmaking process--a domain that has been traditionally off-limits to military personnel. According to Bewoor's analysis, the 1971 defeat of Pakistan was directly attributable to the Pakistan Army's preoccupation with civilian administration at the expense of defense preparedness.⁵³ The dangerous implications of increased Army involvement in civilian affairs are clearly perceived by Indian authorities, both in the military and civilian establishments. Devising ways to minimize this involvement while at the same time ensuring domestic security lends itself to no easy solution, however.

In the aftermath of the Army's controversial actions in the Punjab in June 1984, the Gandhi government put forward a proposal to raise a new paramilitary force whose mission will be to deal with terrorism and communal violence when requested by the states. New Delhi's objective is apparently to redefine the missions of existing security forces so that paramilitary forces can be kept on the borders, the police can be kept on the nation's streets, and the Army can be kept in the barracks. Tentatively named the National Security Guard (NSG), the force will initially include 25 battalions (approximately 20,000 personnel) drawn from existing police and paramilitary formations. Press reports speculate that the force could ultimately be expanded to 40 battalions, or about half the size of the BSF or CRPF. The NSG will be headed by R. T. Nagrani, formerly a senior IPS officer now serving as an additional director in India's external intelligence apparatus, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Nagrani's duties with the RAW reportedly include command of the secretive SFF, India's premier counterterrorist strike force. Nagrani's appointment suggests that the SFF might form the nucleus of the NSG, at least in regard to its purported role in counterterrorist operations. Additional manpower could be drawn from a 150-man BSF commando unit and a 170-man ITBP

counterterrorist unit. The operational integration of the NSG with RAW underscores New Delhi's concern that international terrorism has become a major threat to India's security. Nagrani will be assisted by K. Dadabhoy, Inspector General of operations in the CRPF. Whether the depletion of paramilitary manpower for reassignment to the NSG will be compensated by expanding recruitment to existing forces has not been addressed publicly.⁵⁴

Members of the NSG will receive "specialized commando training," presumably in a counterterrorist/counterinsurgency capacity. Published reports allege the force will be armed with lightweight weapons such as Armalite 5.56-mm automatic rifles, Carl Gustav guns, and other sophisticated weaponry imported from abroad. Although billed as a counterterrorist force modeled along the lines of the British Special Air Service (SAS), the unwieldy projected size of the force suggests that the NSG will be structured primarily to assume riot control duties currently being performed by the BSF, CRPF, and the Army. Federal authorities have given assurances that the NSG will be sufficiently immune to the evils of communalism and corruption which permeate other security forces. Editorial reactions to the formation of the NSG have been uniformly skeptical over this claim.⁵⁵ One officer quoted in the Indian press warned: "If you raise 40 battalions you will end up creating yet another BSF or CRPF, though perhaps with smarter uniforms and better weapons."⁵⁶

Past experience shows that raising new paramilitary forces and enlarging existing ones are no guarantee that internal security will improve to the point that the Army can be relieved of aid-to-civil burdens. Indeed, the burgeoning growth of India's paramilitary forces since the mid-1960s suggests that problems of command and control, force reliability, and public confidence in paramilitary personnel actually multiply as these forces expand. There is no reason to suspect that the formation of a "super-paramilitary force" with better weapons, better training, and more responsibilities will provide the solution to the problem of escalating violence in India.

Lastly, the trend toward unbridled expansion of paramilitary forces in the hopes of insulating the Army from involvement in domestic peacekeeping carries with it the danger that paramilitary forces themselves can become instruments of political abuse. The creation of a huge paramilitary bureaucracy that does not necessarily share the Army's aversion to political meddling could, under certain circumstances, undermine the checks and balances of the Indian federal system that are designed to curb the police powers of the central government. During the Emergency years (1975-77), paramilitary forces did perform political functions such as arresting opposition leaders and intimidating Gandhi's detractors. If called on to perform this function again, India's paramilitary establishment could act in the role of New Delhi's private army. If threatened again by nationwide protests or a series of violent assaults on the Indian body politic, a desperate national leadership in New Delhi could call on paramilitary forces to ensure the viability of the regime. Under this worst-case scenario, paramilitary forces would be used explicitly to bypass the Army, whose willingness to come to the rescue of a beleaguered civilian administration cannot be taken for granted.

NOTES

¹For an analysis of the social and economic forces which contribute to the upsurge of communal violence in India, see Imtiaz Ahmed, "Political Economy of Communalism in Contemporary India," Economic and Political Weekly (New Delhi) vol. 19 (2 June 1984), pp. 903-7.

²Ministry of Home Affairs, First Report of the National Police Commission (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1979), p. 10.

³Mary Ann Weaver, "Behind the Hindu-Muslim Riots in India's Beleaguered Bombay," Christian Science Monitor, 25 May 1984, p. 7.

⁴David H. Bayley, The Police and Political Development in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 249.

⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁶Union Territories include: Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Delhi; Goa, Daman, and Diu; Lakshadweep; Pondicherry; and Mizoram.

⁷For a full discussion of the use and abuse of President's Rule, see J. R. Siwach, Politics of President's Rule in India (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1979).

⁸In the case of the ongoing crisis in the Punjab, this ordinance was amended to allow for even more severe police powers to take effect in jurisdictions declared "most disturbed areas."

⁹B. R. Beotra, ed., Law of Defence Services (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1970), p. 10.

¹⁰"IAS, IPS Purge Coming," Indian Express (Bombay), 17 June 1984, p. 7.

¹¹"Joe" (pseudonym), "Paramilitary Forces--At What Cost?" USI Journal (New Delhi), December 1981, p. 360.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Eric Stracey, Odd Man In: My Years in the Indian Police (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 286.

¹⁴Kushwant Singh, "India's Police Riot," New York Times, 11 July 1979, p. A24.

¹⁵Sunanda Datta-Ray, "Protector or Violater? Restoring Dignity to the Police," The Statesman (Calcutta), 2 April 1984, p. 7.

¹⁶See statement by Minister of State for Home Affairs B. V. Desai, in Lok Sabha Debates (hereafter cited as LSD), vol. 18, no. 8, 26 August 1981 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), cols. 206-7.

¹⁷G. S. Chawla, "States Clamour for Small Arms," Indian Express (Bombay), 27 April 1984, p. 5.

¹⁸Bernard Weintraub, "Soaring Cost of Police is Indian Issue," New York Times, 24 October 1974, p. A8.

¹⁹Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report on Ministry of Home Affairs--Police (hereafter cited as Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report) (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1983).

²⁰First Report of the National Police Commission, p. 7.

²¹K. G. Konnabiran, "Who Are the Real Extremists?" Express Magazine (Bombay), 11 December 1983, p. 7.

²²Ramaswamy Venkataraman, "To Brave Soldiers in Northeast," Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), 29 January 1984, p. 25.

²³"Army's Help Sought on Several Occasions," The Statesman (Calcutta), 21 May 1983, p. 7.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵See statement by Deputy Minister of Railways M. S. Qureshi, LSD, vol. 43, no. 21, 20 August 1974, cols. 70-71.

²⁶Lieutenant Colonel (ret'd) S. K. Sinha, Of Matters Military (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980), p. 151.

²⁷Statement by Minister of State in the Ministry of Defense S. V. Patil, LSD, vol. 18, no. 8, 26 August 1981, cols. 252-53.

²⁸Lieutenant Colonel M. M. L. Ahuja, "In Service of the People," Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), February 1981, p. 46.

²⁹LSD, vol. 18, no. 8, 26 August 1981, cols. 252-53.

³⁰Sinha, Of Matters Military, p. 151.

³¹"What the Army Should Not Have to Do," The Statesman (Calcutta), 19 November 1980, p. 7.

³²Beotra, Law of Defence Services, p. 668.

³³"How Insurgents are Flushed Out," Hindu (Madras), 24 November 1981, p. 5.

³⁴"Civil-Military Liaison Conference at Lucknow," Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), 18 December 1983, p. 20.

³⁵See, for instance, "Civil-Military Liaison Conference at Simla," Sainik Samachar (New Delhi), 15 May 1984, p. 16.

³⁶Government of India, Defence Annual (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1982), pp. 19-20.

³⁷See Coomi Kapoor and Sunil Sethi, "Bombay on the Brink," India Today (New Delhi), 15 November 1983, pp. 54-62; and, New York Times, 19 August 1982, p. A-11.

³⁸LSD, vol. 62, no. 3, 17 November 1983, cols. 1403-5.

³⁹G. K. Reddy, "Mrs. Gandhi Takes Personal Charge," Hindu (Madras), 24 February 1984, p. 1.

⁴⁰Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, 3 March 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: South Asia (hereafter FBIS/South Asia), 5 March 1984, pp. E3-4.

⁴¹Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, 18 April 1984, in FBIS/South Asia, 18 April 1984, p. E2.

⁴²"Commando Task Force in Punjab," Times of India (Bombay), 18 May 1984, p. 8.

⁴³"Keep the Army Out," Times of India (Bombay), 18 May 1984, p. 8. See appendix C for full text of the editorial.

⁴⁴Anand K. Sahay, "Delhi Gets Tough," Blitz (Bombay), 28 April 1984, p. 10.

⁴⁵"Punjab Crisis: Is There a Way Out?" India Today (New Delhi), 15 May 1984, p. 60.

⁴⁶India (Republic), White Paper on the Punjab Agitation (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1984), p. 169.

⁴⁷Military analysts also recognized that the Sikh terrorists in the temple complex mounted an extremely effective defense.

⁴⁸Cecil Victor, "BSF: First Line of Penetration," Patriot (New Delhi), 29 June 1984, p. 4.

⁴⁹Delhi Diplomatic Service Information Service (in English), 2 July 1984, in FBIS/South Asia, 2 July 1984, pp. E2-3. Excerpts from the nationally televised speech are reprinted in appendix B.

⁵⁰For a more detailed analysis of the law-and-order situation in these states, see Douglas C. Makeig and Russell R. Ross, Insurgencies and Separatist Movements in South Asia. Unpublished study prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1 July 1982.

⁵¹K. S. Sidhu and T. B. Chakraborti, "Insurgency in Northeastern Region and India's Security," Vikrant (New Delhi), October 1983, p. 27.

⁵²Shekar Gupta, "Guarding the Northeast: Time to Disengage," Indian Express (Bombay), 14-15 December 1982, p. 7.

⁵³Times of India (Bombay), 10 September 1972, p. 1.

⁵⁴For the most thorough discussion of the NSG to appear to date, see Shekhar Gupta, "Paramilitary: New Force," India Today (New Delhi), 15 July 1984, p. 21.

⁵⁵See for example, "A Para-military State?" The Statesman (Calcutta), 20 August 1984, p. 6; and "Admission of Failure," Times of India (Bombay), 11 August 1984, p. 8.

⁵⁶India Today, 15 July 1984, p. 21.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Profiles of Indian Paramilitary Forces

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)

The mission of the CRPF is to respond to state requests for federal assistance in containing domestic breaches of the peace. Raised by the British in the 1930s to curb banditry in the Sind, the force was originally known as the Crown Representative Police and was structured to provide local authorities with federal assistance when conventional police tactics proved inadequate to meet a regional threat to public order. Since independence, the personnel and firepower of the CRPF have increased dramatically. The number and increased duration of CRPF deployments have significantly expanded the aid-to-civil role of the central government. Between 1947 and 1965, the CRPF consisted of State Armed Police battalions which were deputed to the center. When India upgraded paramilitary capabilities after the 1965 war with Pakistan, these police battalions were fully taken over by the central government and put under the operational control of the MHA.

The steady growth of the CRPF reflects not only the rising level of mass violence in India, but also the states' increasing reliance on the center to maintain law-and-order. Starting from a mere two battalions of SAP in 1947, the CRPF expanded to 14 battalions by 1964.¹ The recruitment of additional CRPF personnel continued through the mid-1970s as the CRPF became heavily involved in stamping out Naxalite insurgents and dacoit gangs. The election of the Janata government in the aftermath of the Emergency (1977-79) brought about a fundamental rethinking of the use of paramilitary forces in aid-to-civil. The Janata perception was that the Emergency had tipped the delicate balance of center-state relations in favor of an overbearing central establishment, particularly in the sensitive field of internal security. Accordingly, the Desai government froze the level of CRPF personnel as a visible signal to the states that the center should not routinely be called on to assist local authorities in the suppression of violence. In 1978, CRPF strength was reduced by two battalions. The overall force level did not decline significantly, however, since the cuts were carried out through normal force attrition caused by retirements and resignations. Plans were made to reduce the CRPF by one battalion for each of the next 3 years, ostensibly on the grounds of economy.

When Prime Minister Gandhi returned to office in 1980, the Janata paramilitary plans were shelved and the CRPF (as well as other paramilitary forces) began an extraordinary period of growth. As part of the Congress-I election manifesto that pledged federal protection for minorities and the lower castes, Gandhi came to office determined to use the police powers of the center to reverse what she characterized as the worsening state of communal relations under the Janata regime. Immediately after Gandhi assumed office, the MHA raised eight CRPF battalions and announced plans to raise three to six more battalions in the near future. Three of the new CRPF battalions were established for the specific purpose of responding to incidents of caste or communal violence. Two of these battalions completed training in 1980 and saw

action during the Meerut riots and the communal frenzy in Assam. The third unit, the 6th Battalion based in Ranchi, became operational in June 1984.² In addition, efforts were made to recruit more CRPF personnel from minority communities (particularly Muslims) and a special cell was created within MHA to monitor communal trends on a nationwide basis. The CRPF now supports a force of approximately 92,000 personnel, almost a 20 percent increase in personnel since Gandhi returned to office.



CRPF personnel providing VIP security at a Congress-I political meeting while larger-than-life figures of Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi look on.

[Source: India Today (New Delhi), 31 January 1984.]

The CRPF is organized along military lines. Enlisted personnel hold military ranks, are housed in barracks, and are subject to disciplinary codes similar to those of the Army. During wartime or declarations of national emergency, the CRPF is subordinate to the Army. At those times, the CRPF is usually assigned rearguard duties such as maintaining domestic security, patrolling sensitive communication lines, and guarding POWs. The authorized strength of a CRPF battalion is 974 personnel. An additional 244 personnel per battalion support firefighting, medical, and administrative units. The CRPF maintains 16 battalion headquarters, or "Group Centers," headed by Deputy Inspectors General. Battalion headquarters are located at:

- Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh)
- Nagpur (Maharashtra)
- Avadi (Tamil Nadu)
- Pallipuram (Kerala)
- Bhubaneswar (Orissa)
- Gauhati (Assam)
- Neemuch (Madhya Pradesh)
- Rampur (Uttar Pradesh)
- Mokamehghat (Bihar)
- Durgapur (West Bengal)
- Bontalab (?)
- New Delhi
- Ghandinagar (Gujarat)
- Ajmer I (Rajasthan)
- Ajmer II (Rajasthan)
- Imphal (Manipur)³

These headquarters are strategically located near transportation lines and areas prone to recurrent breakdowns of civil authority. The main CRPF training establishments include:

- Internal Security Academy, Mt. Abu (Rajasthan)
- Central Training College I, Neemuch (Madhya Pradesh)
- Central Training College II, Avadi (Tamil Nadu)
- Recruits Training Center, Barwaha (Madhya Pradesh)

CRPF officers are recruited through the IPS system. The enlisted ranks are filled through competitive examinations held by MHA. CRPF payscales approximate the low standards for police, and prospects for promotion within the force are generally poor. Not surprisingly, force morale has suffered in recent years as thousands of new recruits have been inducted and the demand for CRPF intervention has mounted.

Although it bears many of the trappings of a military organization and is given military duties during wartime, the CRPF is ordinarily the first paramilitary force that New Delhi calls on to respond to local pleas for federal police assistance. In explosive situations such as communal riots in the Hindi-speaking heartland of India, CRPF companies are usually sent in with BSF detachments which have considerably more firepower and logistical support at their disposal. In less dramatic instances when the CRPF is deployed in aid-to-civil, the presence of CRPF forces does not ordinarily attract public controversy since their deployment has become a routine feature of police work in both urban and rural areas.

A 1983 parliamentary committee reported that "the demand for the CRPF from the states has been so large as to virtually necessitate the deployment of the entire forces."⁴ The committee urged the center to exercise more prudence in deploying the CRPF and recommended that a minimum 10 percent of the force should be kept in reserve at all times. This overuse of the CRPF detracts from the deterrent effect that a show of federal force is supposed to provide and serves to demoralize local peacekeeping forces. Moreover, almost constant deployment of the force has stretched CRPF assets to the limit, thereby forcing Indian authorities to induct Army and other paramilitary units into local breaches of the peace with increasing frequency. In remote border regions of the Indian northeast, CRPF personnel routinely function alongside the generally unreliable state police units and leave counterinsurgency operations to the BSF, the AR, and the Army.



CRPF jawan monitoring a crowd of protesters.
[Source: Indian Express (Bombay), 16 March 1984.]

Indian constitutional scholars have argued that the center's penchant for keeping CRPF units in a locale for long periods and shifting units from state to state with virtually no pretense of acting at the request of local authorities amounts to an unconstitutional abridgement of states' rights. Parliamentary legislation specifies that besides assisting local authorities in aid-to-civil, New Delhi has the right to deploy the CRPF "for any other purpose as directed by the Central Government."⁵ While the argument in favor of states' rights may be compelling on legal grounds, the fact that the states demand CRPF assistance and the center readily accedes to their demands erodes the position of critics seeking to curb excessive federal intervention in local peacekeeping situations. CRPF deployments in aid-to-civil have steadily increased since 1974--a trend that is likely to continue.

The CRPF has not been immune to the same charges of inefficiency and communal bias which are often leveled at state police personnel. An example of this occurred in the Punjab in April 1984 when Sikh moderates and radicals alike demanded the withdrawal of the CRPF on the grounds that the force was predominantly Hindu and therefore prone to siding with the Hindu minority. Although the charge is difficult to substantiate due to the lack of data on the ethnic composition of paramilitary forces, the public perception was that the CRPF was a "Hindu force" sent in to replace the discredited Punjab Armed

Police which, in fact, does include a high percentage of Sikh officers and enlisted men. Fearing that the high visibility of the CRPF could harm the communal atmosphere in the state, New Delhi agreed to replace some of the CRPF units with BSF units which did not bear the stigma of communal bias. Although New Delhi publicized the move as a concession to Sikh public opinion, the units involved in the rearrangement of forces were few in number and restricted to the most sensitive areas patrolled by paramilitary personnel, such as around the Golden Temple in Amritsar.



BSF personnel taking over security duties from the CRPF near the Golden Temple.
[Source: Patriot (New Delhi), 14 April 1984.]

Border Security Force (BSF)

The 92,000-strong Border Security Force is the largest and best equipped of India's major paramilitary forces. Moreover, the diverse security roles which have been assigned to the BSF make it an integral component in New Delhi's capability in responding to external threats and internal upheavals. Virtually no border skirmish or civil disorder which requires central government intervention takes place without the BSF playing a role.

The BSF was formed by a 1965 act of Parliament which converted 25 existing state armed police (SAP) battalions under the jurisdiction of the border states into a centrally-controlled paramilitary force under the Ministry of Home Affairs. India's military defeat by China in 1962 and the 1965 conflict

with Pakistan convinced defense planners that routine border patrolling could not be left to a patchwork of state security forces. Not only did border states have to bear a disproportionate share of the cost and responsibility of policing the nation's frontiers in relation to other states, but the previous arrangement also prevented the rapid integration of existing border forces into the Army chain of command during wartime. An unintended consequence of the absorption of the SAP battalions into a federal structure was a dramatic degradation of the affected states' ability to maintain law-and-order within their jurisdictions. A 1983 parliamentary investigation revealed that states located along the frontiers with Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh have still not recovered from the loss of armed police cadres, despite increases in central government funding to cover the costs of recruiting and training replacement battalions.⁶ States such as Uttar Pradesh and Punjab which confront formidable difficulties in maintaining the peace have therefore come to rely more heavily on federal peacekeeping forces such as BSF and CRPF in times of local crisis.

Under its charter, the mission of the BSF is to "ensure the borders of India."⁷ Considering that the entire frontier with Pakistan and China is regarded as hostile and the porous borders with Bangladesh and Burma are riddled with insurgents, smugglers, and illegal immigrants, the BSF has an extraordinarily difficult mission to perform. Routine border defense duties include: surveillance from watchtowers; foot patrols; mounted patrols in desert and mountainous terrain; riverine patrols in small boats; the interdiction of illegal cross-border traffic; combing operations in insurgent belts, often in conjunction with Army units; and the protection of local populations in frontier areas. The territorial responsibilities of the BSF include the 7,300-kilometer frontier with Pakistan, some sections of the disputed border with China, and all 1,500 kilometers of the Indo-Bangladeshi border. If necessary, BSF units can be rushed in to assist other paramilitary units such as the Assam Rifles and Ladakh Scouts in maintaining security along the borders with China, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal.

In the event of a minor border skirmish--a common occurrence in all border sectors--the BSF serves as India's first line of defense. After alerting the local Army commander and the Ministry of Defense as to the nature of a given incident, BSF commanders are often directed to resolve the dispute with their own assets. Under this arrangement, the Army does not become directly involved in every minor border fracas over cattle rustling, errant firings by opposing paramilitary forces, and the like. In this way, the Army preserves its deterrent capability by responding only to incidents which are beyond the control of paramilitary forces or involve regular army units of opposing forces. Real and potential aggressors know that a failure to resolve a border incident at the local level runs the risk of drawing the Indian Army into the dispute--a prospect which none of India's neighbors takes lightly. Incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and along the border with Bangladesh are routinely resolved by the BSF commander in the field who meets with his Bangladeshi or Pakistani counterpart to discuss any localized dispute at a neutral location.



BSF troops stationed along the Indo-Bangladeshi border.

[Source: The Statesman (Calcutta), 24 April 1984.]

An example of this occurred in April-May 1984 when Indian and Bangladeshi paramilitary forces engaged in sporadic cross-border firings which resulted in the death of a Bangladeshi jawan. The incident occurred when India began construction of a barbed wire fence along the Bangladeshi border as part of a campaign to curb illegal immigration into Assam. In coordination with the Ministries of Defense, Home, and External Affairs, New Delhi dispatched the BSF Inspector General to discuss the situation with the head of the Bangladesh Rifles. Although the BSF's negotiating brief did not go beyond reiterating India's intention to go ahead with the border fencing in the face of Dhaka's protests, the flag meeting allowed the two sides to defuse the tension that had been building without resorting to the use of regular armed forces.⁸ The two sides agreed to withdraw some of their forces from the border area and submit the question of the legality of building the fence to a joint committee.

By all accounts, the BSF is overwhelmed by the increased incidence of smuggling and illegal immigration. India and its neighbors have tightly controlled economies which place a premium on import controls. This has led to the creation of a flourishing black market in smuggled consumer goods and agricultural produce which no amount of border patrolling can effectively

check. An even more serious concern is the rise in small arms and narcotics trafficking across India's boundaries. In all probability, these activities support the operations of tribal insurgents and other lawless elements which operate with impunity in unsecured border areas. Although the BSF is hard pressed to stem this illegal cross-border traffic, New Delhi hesitates to involve the Army in these kinds of interdiction missions. Assigning more police functions to the Army would take personnel away from the primary task of maintaining defense preparedness and inevitably would expose the Army to the bribery and corruption which facilitate smuggling operations.

In the critical area of illegal immigration--particularly into the troubled state of Assam--the BSF mission is specifically designed to protect the Army from having to act in the politically sensitive role of ferreting out those migrants who recently arrived from those who are Indian citizens. BSF spokesmen report that 2,000 illegal immigrants were turned away at the border during the first quarter of 1984.⁹ This probably represents only a small fraction of the human tide that spills over the border with Bangladesh.

In the event that a minor border skirmish escalates into widescale hostilities or an actual invasion, the BSF can be integrated into the Army's command and control structure. BSF personnel are fully trained in wartime operations and are armed on a par with regular infantry units. A clause in the BSF charter specifically states that "every member of the force shall be liable to serve in any part of India as well as outside India."¹⁰ The offensive role of the BSF was fully tested during the Bangladesh campaign of 1971. Prior to the commencement of fullscale hostilities, BSF advisers trained Bangladeshi guerrillas on Indian territory as well as in liberated zones within enemy territory. BSF units fought side-by-side with advancing Army units when war was declared and some BSF personnel took part in the siege of Dhaka that ended in Pakistan's surrender. BSF forces fought well in the campaign and earned some of India's highest commendations for gallantry. In any future land war involving India's neighbors, the BSF can be expected to play a vital role in mounting joint operations with the Army and maintaining security in rear areas.

In addition to border security and assisting the Army in wartime, the BSF has been heavily tasked with assisting state authorities in the maintenance of law-and-order--the classic aid-to-civil role. BSF personnel have become a regular feature of domestic peacekeeping operations whenever state and local authorities prove unequal to the task. Units are often deployed to trouble spots in central and southern India where the BSF has no border defense responsibilities. In order to respond to state requests for timely federal assistance, BSF units are permanently garrisoned in or near cities which Indian intelligence agencies have identified as ripe for renewed communal clashes. To improve the BSF's response time to aid-to-civil requests, the Gandhi government has upgraded the ground and air transport wings of the BSF. This affords New Delhi great flexibility in rushing BSF personnel to any corner of India as the need arises.



BSF troops stage a flag march in Delhi during a civil disturbance.
 [Source: Express Magazine (Bombay), 18 March 1984.]

The BSF charter does not explicitly authorize the central government to deploy BSF personnel in aid-to-civil; nor does the charter or any subsidiary legislation prevent New Delhi from expanding the scope of BSF activities. In the absence of clear-cut legal guidance on the subject, successive Indian governments have significantly expanded the aid-to-civil role of the BSF to the point that BSF personnel are routinely deployed along with CRPF personnel to quell a wide range of violent incidents, seemingly without regard to the seriousness of a given episode. Thus, BSF peacekeepers are deployed to assist local authorities in everything from village land disputes between caste groups to major communal conflagrations involving whole districts. In all likelihood, BSF involvement in local police duties is greatest in the outlying districts of the northeastern states where civil administration is weakest and where BSF personnel are permanently concentrated in great numbers. The center's lack of restraint in acceding to states' requests for BSF assistance explains in part why personnel strength and budgetary allocations for the BSF have undergone such dramatic increases.

Critics of the BSF point out that assigning border defense and policing roles to the same paramilitary force leads to an ineffective and potentially dangerous use of security manpower. According to this line of reasoning, the BSF has become both a "second class army" and a "first class police force."¹¹ While the militarization of the BSF is consistent with its role during wartime and in counterinsurgency operations, the deployment of a heavily armed,

federal police force with a decided military orientation is often seen as an inappropriate response to local problems of law-and-order. Like the Army, BSF personnel are trained in the lethal application of force, and like the police, they are trained in law enforcement procedures such as crowd control. But unlike the Army and the police, BSF personnel must constantly alter their tactics to suit the peacekeeping environment in which they are deployed. Critics argue that the overuse of the BSF in aid-to-civil invites abuses on the part of civilian political authorities or, conceivably, by independent-minded BSF commanders. As one Indian observer noted, India has "two ground forces--the Army and the BSF--each competing with one another, each responsible to a different chain of command [in peacetime], each getting in the other's way, and most unfortunately, with one force under political control."¹²

The BSF is headquartered in New Delhi and commanded by a Director General within the MHA. The force is divided into four regional commands headed by an Inspector General (equivalent to an Army major general). Command headquarters are located in Ahmedabad, Jullundur, Srinagar, and Shillong. The BSF officer corps, numbering over 1,500, is recruited through the IPS system of competitive examinations. Many BSF officers are either retired Army personnel or active-duty personnel seconded to the BSF from their Army units for 2 or 3 years. This system of mixed recruitment provides the BSF with officers experienced in wartime operations and in civilian policing duties. BSF recruitment is open to all Indian citizens. As in the case of the regular armed services, the BSF takes pride in the fact that recruitment generally reflects the ethnic composition of the country at large.

BSF payscales approximate those of police personnel, or about 20 percent below Army salaries. The BSF operates its own training institutions. Courses of instruction are offered at:

- o BSF Academy, Tekanpur;
- o Training Center and School, Hazaribagh;
- o Central School of Weapons and Tactics, Indore;
- o Signal School, New Delhi; and
- o the NCO School, Jullundur.¹³

Press reports indicate that the BSF is in the process of raising two new battalions for West Bengal and one battalion for Tripura in response to the increasingly unsettled conditions in the northeast.¹⁴ Because the Army generally retains operational control of counterinsurgency campaigns in states such as Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, an unknown number of BSF units probably operate directly under the Army on a full-time basis. One such unit, the ex-Underground Battalion (No. 111 stationed at Satakha), is composed of former members of the Naga underground who now support the government.¹⁵

BSF equipment has improved quantitatively and qualitatively over the years. BSF inventories include standard Army-issue small arms, mortars, and trucks. Units stationed along the Indo-Bangladeshi border are being equipped with night vision monoculars and fiberglass speedboats to apprehend illegal immigrants.¹⁶ In contrast to allegations of partisanship that often arise when CRPF personnel are dispatched to explosive scenes of communal or caste

violence, BSF personnel are usually regarded as reliable guardians of the peace who can be trusted to enforce the law impartially. As with the Army, minorities tend to view the BSF as their federal protectors against the depredations of local police forces which are usually dominated by the majority community.

Assam Rifles

The AR is the oldest, most tradition-bound paramilitary force in India. The organization was formed by the British in the 1830s to maintain order among the unruly tribes of the Lushai Hills in the northeastern periphery of the British Indian Empire. The force has had several designations including the Cachar Levy, the Assam Frontier Police, and the East Bengal and Assam Military Police. Its present designation was acquired in 1917. Up to 1965, the AR was administered by the Ministry of External Affairs. After 1972, when most of the constituent parts of the sprawling Northeast Frontier Agency had been granted statehood within the Indian Union, control over the AR was transferred to MHA. AR officers are drawn exclusively from regular Army units and 19 of the 21 AR battalions are under the operational control of the Army. This operational integration with the Army has earned the AR the reputation as a reliable paramilitary force that is capable of carrying out support activities in the areas of counterinsurgency, border defense, and joint operations with the Army during wartime. Total AR personnel strength is approximately 36,000.



General A. S. Vaidya, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army (with swagger stick), meets with AR commanders in Shillong.
[Source: Sainik Samacher (New Delhi), 18 December 1983.]

The AR probably does not operate outside its area of responsibility along the remote borders with China, Burma, and Bangladesh. The unsettled conditions within these nascent Indian states suggest, however, that the AR is routinely called on to provide aid-to-civil assistance in outlying states and districts where civil authority is weak or nonexistent. As in the case of all paramilitary forces raised by the British, the AR serves an important administrative role in New Delhi's attempt to integrate the relatively backward northeast into the Indian mainstream. Although AR personnel can only be deployed in domestic situations at the request of local authorities, the wide array of national security legislation which New Delhi has always brought to bear on the northeast has given the AR--and, by extension, the Army--broad authority to strike at insurgents, maintain law-and-order, and administer the peace. Although performed in the name of local government authorities, Army and paramilitary forces that routinely operate in aid-to-civil in the northeast fill an administrative vacuum which persists in these states. AR personnel, easily identifiable by their Australian-style bush hats, have been a permanent feature of civil administration in the region for 150 years. As long as local authorities are incapable or unwilling to suppress tribal unrest, anti-immigrant flareups, and cross-border insurgencies, the AR will continue to provide a modicum of central government control over the region.

Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)

The ITBP was formed in 1954 to provide protection for remote checkposts along the Chinese border with Uttar Pradesh and to police the border traffic between the two countries. After the 1962 war with China, the ITBP mission was expanded to include guerrilla warfare operations behind enemy lines. With a strength of about 17,000, the ITBP is headed by an Inspector General within the MHA. Although the ITBP is listed as an MHA asset for accounting purposes, operational control is exercised by the Army through the Ministry of Defense. As in the case with other Indian paramilitary forces deployed along the Chinese frontier, ITBP recruits local tribesmen who possess an intimate knowledge of the local terrain, peoples, and languages. Officers are drawn from the regular Army. The ITBP works closely with the Uttar Pradesh Special Police Force, a state-sponsored border patrol which is also directed by the Army and funded by New Delhi. Little is known about either of these forces since they operate in sensitive border regions which the Indian Government carefully conceals from the outside world. The ITBP operates a High Altitude Defense and Survival Academy at Mussorie, a Winter Craft Wing at Alui, and a Basic Training Center at Kulu.¹⁷

Although the ITBP mission primarily is to ensure border security and operate alongside the Army during wartime, recent reporting suggests that the organization has also acquired an aid-to-civil role. A parliamentary report showed that ITBP personnel were called out seven times in aid-to-civil between April 1982 and April 1983. The circumstances and duration of these deployments were not made public, however.¹⁸ In December 1982, ITBP personnel were dispatched to New Delhi during the IX Asian Games to guard against terrorist attacks by Sikh extremists.¹⁹ The ITBP presence at the Asian Games suggests that the force may have a specialized counterterrorist role. Newspaper reports maintain that an unknown number of ITBP personnel were on aid-to-civil

duty in the Punjab in advance of the statewide Army crackdown of June 1984. Because the ITBP rank-and-file is composed largely of hill tribesmen who have no ethnic identification with the contending parties in the Punjab agitation, New Delhi may have inducted the ITBP in an effort to bolster local confidence in federal peacekeeping forces who were accused of taking sides in the communal dispute.

Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)

The mission of the 31,000-man CISF, one of India's three "watch-and-ward" paramilitary organizations, is to provide security for 112 public sector undertakings that are spread across the country. The force was formed by an act of Parliament in 1969 after the Marxist-led United Front government of West Bengal refused to move against striking workers at nationalized industrial establishments in the state. In response to the increased pace of nationalization and the growing militancy of the unions in these industries, CISF personnel strength increased 30 percent over the next decade. Routine CISF duties include providing protection against sabotage, destruction of property by striking workers, and pilferage by employees. Besides patrolling industrial enterprises such as steel plants, the CISF is also charged with protecting sensitive installations such as nuclear power facilities and all of India's port facilities, with the exception of Bombay. Since the sites that are patrolled by CISF are wholly owned and administered by the central government, individual Indian states have no authority over security arrangements within these facilities.

The CISF is headed by an Inspector General within MHA, and the entire country is divided into three operational zones under Deputy Inspectors General. In wartime, operational control over the CISF is exercised by the Ministry of Defense. Approximately one-third of CISF personnel are armed with light weapons. CISF officers are assigned from the IPS cadre for a period of 2 to 4 years. The CISF operates its own intelligence branch and runs a Training College at Hyderabad and a Training Center at Bhilai. Recruitment is by open examinations administered by MHA.

Past performances by the CISF during the 1975 and 1984 dockworkers' strikes and during the May 1984 communal riots that broke out in the vicinity of the Trombay nuclear facility suggest that the CISF is a dispirited force which the Army is hesitant to rely on in times of crisis. CISF personnel have on several occasions staged their own work stoppages which have necessitated the intervention of Army and other paramilitary forces.

Railway Protection Force (RPF)

India possesses one of the world's most extensive railway networks. The rails serve as India's communication lifeline in times of national emergency as well as the backbone of the peacetime economy. As a nationalized enterprise, the vital mission of railway security is the primary responsibility of the 70,000-strong RPF. Formed originally in 1882, the RPF became subordinate to the Ministry of Railways in 1957, although MHA provides training facilities, administrative support, and officers for the force through the IPS. RPF personnel are lightly armed and carry out investigative functions in

conjunction with parallel forces raised by the states to patrol railway facilities within their jurisdictions. About 2,000 RPF personnel are detailed to state-run railway forces on a permanent basis. During wartime, the RPF functions under the Ministry of Defense in order to facilitate the movement of troops and materiel to the war front.²⁰

During the 1974 national rail strike, the RPF provided valuable security assistance to the Army when troops were called in to keep the trains running. When Sikh extremists mounted coordinated attacks on rail facilities in the Punjab in April 1984, RPF personnel from across the country were rushed into the state to back up state armed police personnel and railway authorities. On short notice, the RPF was able to place eight guards on every passenger train operating in the Punjab. In the particularly hard-hit district of Sangrur, RPF, police, and paramilitary personnel were posted every 2 kilometers along the vital rail link.

A major concern for security authorities is the disruptive potential of militant unionism which has taken hold of some sections of the RPF. There have been scattered instances in the past decade when RPF personnel failed to carry out their assigned security duties.²¹

Defense Security Corps (DSC)

Even though it is a support element of the Indian Army, the DSC can be categorized as a paramilitary organization because it functions exclusively in the "watch-and-ward" role. Founded shortly after independence in 1947, the 30,000-strong DSC is charged with providing perimeter and internal security for military installations, defense production facilities, and ordnance factories. The organization is headed by an Army major general and commanded by regular Army personnel. The DSC is statutorily required to recruit all other personnel from the burgeoning ranks of ex-servicemen. An average of 35,000 armed forces personnel retire annually.²² Under this unique DSC recruitment system, the Army is able to ease the transition to civilian life for a small percentage of these ex-servicemen by offering them secure employment as a reward for services rendered. The system has the added advantage of providing the Army with a large pool of trained security personnel who can adapt easily to military regimentation.

Integrating ex-servicemen into the civilian economy has become a source of mounting anxiety in Indian defense circles in the wake of revelations that retired Army personnel have become involved in training and leading subversive causes such as the Khalistan agitation and Tamil terrorism. In the event of war, the DSC would continue to provide protection against the destruction of defense infrastructure throughout India.

Special Frontier Force (SFF)

Although it is a highly secretive organization whose existence is not openly acknowledged by the Indian Government, fragmentary evidence suggests that the SFF is an elite Army commando unit. SFF personnel, probably numbering between 5,000 and 10,000, are deployed along sensitive sections of the

disputed Sino-Indian frontier in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. In the event of another border war with China, the SFF would operate in small units behind enemy lines in Tibet (Xizang). Conjecturally, their mission would be to slow the enemy's advance by harassing enemy troop movements, sabotaging communications infrastructure, coordinating the guerrilla warfare activities of Tibetan fifth-columnists, and collecting intelligence. In recent years, the SFF has allegedly taken on a domestic security role, particularly in situations requiring counterterrorist expertise. SFF commandos, for example, led the assault on the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984.

The SFF is nominally under the control of the Army, though authority to deploy the commandos almost certainly rests with the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretariat which is responsible for overseeing India's most sensitive security and intelligence operations. Critics maintain that Gandhi relied on the SFF to implement some of the more repressive policies of the Emergency years (1975-77) so as not to compromise the Army's apolitical traditions. Considering that terrorist incidents are occurring regularly in India, the SFF will probably be used more in the future in a domestic security role.

The SFF was founded in the aftermath of India's military humiliation by China in 1962. Headquarters are located at Chakarta military base (codenamed Establishment 22) not far from Dehra Dun. Some SFF personnel are recruited from the local hill tribes of the border area and from among Tibetan refugees who still nourish the dream of liberating their homeland from Chinese control. SFF officers are drawn from the ranks of the regular Army. All personnel are airborne-trained at Sarsawa Air Base and acclimatized to the rigors of high altitude warfare. Little else is known about the force.²³

Ladakh Scouts (LS)

The LS is another irregular military force whose mission is to provide advance warning of Chinese attack, slow down the enemy advance, and wage guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The force is deployed along the sensitive Ladakh sector of the Sino-Indian frontier. With a force complement of approximately 5,000 personnel recruited from the local hill tribes, the LS is probably under the operational control of the Army. Little else is known about the LS. The force is probably not used to quell domestic violence outside of the sparsely populated hill country of Ladakh.

NOTES FOR APPENDIX A

¹David H. Bayley, "Public Protest and the Political Process in India," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, B.C.), vol. 42 (Spring 1969), p. 52.

²Times of India (Bombay), 29 June 1984, p. 2.

³Statement by Minister of State for Home Affairs H. A. Y. Makwana in Lok Sabha Debates (hereafter cited as LSD), vol. 14, no. 23, 18 March 1981, cols. 231-32.

⁴Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report on Ministry of Home Affairs--Police (hereafter cited as Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report), p. 10.

⁵A. G. Noorani, "Central Reserve Police and the Constitution," Indian Express (Bombay), 20 May 1970, p. 6.

⁶Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report, p. 10.

⁷B. R. Boetra, ed., Law of Defence Services (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1970), p. 564.

⁸G. K. Reddy, "Fence No Military Installation," Hindu (Madras), 9 May 1984, p. 1.

⁹Ashim Mukhopadhyay, "Can Border Fencing Check Infiltration?" Indian Express (Bombay), 19 April 1984, p. 7.

¹⁰Beotra, Law of Defence Services, p. 564.

¹¹Ranjit Gupta, "The Problems of the Frontier," Hindu (Madras), 9 April 1981, p. 3.

¹²Ravi Rikhye, "Toward a Border Range Command: New Orientation for the B. S. F." Vikrant (New Delhi), March 1984, p. 34.

¹³Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report, p. 32.

¹⁴Mukhopadhyay, "Can Border Fencing Check Infiltration?" p. 7.

¹⁵Shekar Gupta, "Guarding the Northeast: Time to Disengage," Indian Express (Bombay), 14-15 December 1982, p. 7.

¹⁶"Monoculars for B. S. F." The Statesman (Calcutta), 10 April 1984, p. 1.

¹⁷Estimates Committee, Forty-ninth Report, p. 32.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹"How Commandos Kept Vigil at Asiad," Indian Express (Bombay), 9 December 1982, p. 9.

²⁰G. S. Khosla, "Policing the Railways: The Bane of Divided Responsibility," The Statesman (Calcutta), 30 April 1983, p. 3.

²¹"Curfew in Faridkot: CRP, BSF Redeployed in 4 Punjab Towns," The Statesman (Calcutta), 17 April 1984, p. 1.

²²LSD, statement by Minister of State in the Ministry of Defense K. P. Singh Deo, vol. 26, no. 29, 8 April 1983, cols. 154-6.

²³Dilip Bobb, "Blunting the Edge," India Today (New Delhi), 15 December 1980, p. 85.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

Excerpts from a Televised Speech by General A. S. Vaidya,
Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, on 1 July 1984
(FBIS/South Asia, 2 July 1984, pp. E2-3.)

"My gallant officers, JCO's, and men, you have with your recent actions drawn admiration of the nation. The nation is proud of us in the Army because of your valiant and also disciplined and restrained actions in the face of grave provocation and danger in clearing terrorists and criminals from an area of the Suvarna Mandir [Golden Temple] and restoring to it its legitimate use as a place for worship.

I address you today not in triumph, not as the head of a victorious Army, but certainly with pride and with humility. With pride because of deeds of valour you have performed, because of restraint you have shown in not firing at the holy shrine in spite of fire of terrorists emanating from its precincts. With humility because one must be humble though courageous in the face of death and sufferings and you my soldiers, you did sacrifice your lives and you did suffer. I convey to you my personal admiration for your valour, forbearance, and restraint.

Though we have flushed out terrorists and criminals from the area of Suvarna and restored the hallowed sanctity of the shrine, our work in Punjab is not yet over. We have been charged by government to help the civil administration in restoring law and public order and to bring normalcy to life in Punjab. This will mean flushing out and apprehending terrorists from villages and also bringing out hidden firearms, ammunition, and explosives so that law abiding and peaceful people are not tyrannized nor country held to ransom by a few unprincipled, unpatriotic, and disloyal terrorists.

Utmost tact, discipline, and understanding will be needed from you who have to carry out this task. It will have to be done without arousing hostility and resentment of law abiding citizenry. You must remember that we are operating amongst our own people. I expect from you the same high standard of discipline, forbearance, and moral fibre as you have displayed so far. I have full (?faith) in you and I am confident that you will uphold traditions and honour of Army and country. . . . Though a small portion of our Army was affected, it was still a matter of shame and concern that some of you forgot the oath of allegiance you took to this country of ours and chose to get instigated by enemies of this land both internal and external and collectively did an act of disloyalty. Not only that but some of you chose to resist by resorting to force of arms even against your own comrades. To those who remained steadfast I would like to give an assurance that those who acted in a mutinous manner will be dealt with severely under the laws as enacted for the Army so that those who remain with us in the Army and have the honour of bearing arms for country would be a proud and disciplined body of soldiers. . . .

I am sure you will rise above difficulties and carry out tasks allotted to you doing your best at whatever level you may be with steadfastness, discipline, and loyalty which has and Inshallah--God willing--will always remain a hallmark of our Army."

APPENDIX C

Appendix C

"Keep the Army Out," (editorial)
(Times of India (Bombay), 18 May 1984, p. 8)

The law and order situation in Punjab remains bad, indeed, alarming. While the extremists continue to kill, burn and loot at will, the police are unable to gather the necessary intelligence, follow their movements, anticipate their criminal activities and apprehend them. All this must cause grave concern to all patriotic Indians and generate pressure on the government that it live up to its minimum obligation of protecting the lives and properties of law-abiding citizens. But it does not follow either that those in opposition recommend a course of action that is likely to prove disastrous, or that the government panic and adopt such a course. Yet the first has already taken place; leaders of the National Democratic Alliance [NDA] comprising the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Lok Dal have demanded that the Army be inducted into Punjab. Fortunately the second is not likely to follow. Mrs. Gandhi is not the kind of leader who either panics in the face of heavy odds, or who can miss the possible consequences of the proposal or who is likely to look for a dangerous short-cut in Punjab. Even so the state governor's reported meeting with General Dayal is bound to provoke the speculation that the government too might be thinking in those terms. It is necessary to put an end to this kind of speculation. The earlier the better.

It is difficult to believe that the NDA leaders have thought through the implications of their proposal. The main problem in Punjab, as everyone knows, is the inadequacy or failure of intelligence. This is the function of the police. They have fallen on their job and they alone can handle it, if anyone can. Even if it is considered legitimate to question their capacity or willingness to do so, it is more than obvious that the army cannot fill this vital gap in Punjab's internal security arrangements. The police, of course, need to be supported. The demands on them have grown and will continue to grow, and they are too thinly spread to be able to cope effectively with sudden outbursts of mob violence as in Jalandhar, Chandigarh, Amritsar and other towns in recent weeks. The central reserve police force is intended precisely to meet such a contingency. So a number of CRPF units have been assigned to the State. Since these are not considered adequate, the authorities have withdrawn the BSF units from their normal border duties and assigned them to Punjab. There is nothing the Army can do in the state which the CRPF and the BSF cannot do equally well, indeed better. For these paramilitary forces are trained to operate in relatively smaller units than the army and that is what internal security duties call for. The Army is a weapon of last resort; the government must never use it as if it was nothing more than a better equipped police force. In the case of Punjab, it is not even a weapon of last resort; it must not be used at all.