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EVOLVING SERVICE ROLES IN PRESENCE MISSIONS

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
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PREFACE

This paper reports the results of an inquiry into the evolving nature of U.S. military presence activities, from the end of the Cold War to the present day and beyond. The inquiry was conducted under a task from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) and funded by the U.S. Air Force (Studies and Analysis).

IDA examined, for the period since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military activities that generally fall under the broad concept of presence. Several key questions were addressed: What is an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and analyzing presence? What sorts of changes, if any, have occurred recently in U.S. presence activities? What are the perspectives of the Services and other DoD organizations toward presence activities in the new security environment? Are there any new approaches to conducting or assessing presence that deserve serious consideration by the DoD?

This study compiles and analyzes the first all-Service chronology of discrete presence incidents for the period from the beginning of the end of the Cold War (1983) through late 1994. Six detailed case studies of presence operations were conducted. Senior Service officials were interviewed and a variety of source materials from the Services and the Unified Commands were reviewed in order to understand emerging U.S. military perspectives on presence in the post-Cold War era. A methodology for comparing the effectiveness of alternative U.S. presence postures in providing initial crisis responsiveness is proposed and illustrated. And a set of costing principles that can be used to evaluate alternative presence postures is defined and applied to an illustrative set of presence posture alternatives.

The analyses conducted in this task were based exclusively on open source materials. Several IDA project members have participated concurrently in analyses of the presence issue for the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM). By mutual agreement between the sponsors (OSD (PA&E) and the CORM), the results of both study efforts have been made available to each sponsor as the analyses have progressed.

This study has benefited from the advice and assistance of a number of individuals. Thanks to Bruce Anderson, Bob Atwell, Linton Brooks, Adm. Philip Dur, Tom Gibson, Jeff Grotte, Adm. Bob Hilton, Wade Hinkle, Chris Jehn, James Lacy, Karl Lowe, William Morgan, Arnold Moore, Dave Perin, George Quester, John Tillson, Victor Utgoff, and Col. Jack Wood.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last half century the National Security Strategy of the United States has relied heavily upon various combinations of power projection capability and overseas military presence.[1] Presence is considered a core military concept by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2] In its 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR), the Department of Defense (DoD) reiterated the importance it attaches to the overseas military presence activities of all the Services and the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands. It also announced plans to assign to one of the Services—the U.S. Navy—significant extra force structure in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) solely for the purpose of presence.[3]

Given the importance of presence in the national security strategy and the massive changes in the security environment over the last decade, are there any new approaches to presence that warrant serious consideration by the DoD sooner rather than later?

The purpose of this paper is to report the results of an inquiry into the evolving nature of U.S. military presence activities, from the end of the Cold War to the present day and beyond. The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II first describes the principal ways in which the concept of presence is defined within the U.S. national security community and then develops a framework for considering presence. Chapter III depicts U.S. military presence activities and trends since the end of the Cold War and offers several potential explanations for observed changes. Chapter IV briefly outlines the current process within the DoD for addressing presence and then characterizes the perspectives of major DoD components with respect to presence. Chapter V summarizes a set of potential alternatives for the provision of U.S. military presence in the years ahead, while

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1 The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994.

2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Military Net Assessment, 1991* and (later years).

3 See DoD, *The Bottom Up Review, 1993*; see also the Secretary of Defense, *1994 Report to Congress*, p. 22: "Sizing U.S. naval forces for two nearly simultaneous MRCs provides a fairly large and robust force structure that can easily support other, smaller regional operations. However, U.S. overseas presence needs can impose requirements for naval forces, especially aircraft carriers, that exceed those needed to win two MRCs. . . . the naval force of aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and other naval combatants is sized to reflect the exigencies of overseas presence, as well as the warfighting requirements of MRCs."

Chapter VI outlines a methodology that could be used to assess the resource implications of these alternatives. Chapter VII concludes the paper with a set of recommendations for the DoD as it seeks to analyze and program resources for U.S. military presence. Several appendices provide supporting material.

II. WHAT IS U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Many definitions of U.S. military presence are circulating within the U.S. national security community today. This chapter describes them. It then proposes a framework for thinking about presence as one among a number of instruments available for achieving the *objectives* of presence. As will be described, the four principal objectives of presence are taken to be the following: influencing international events in ways favorable to the national interest, reassuring friends and allies, deterring aggression, and enabling initial crisis response.

A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE CONCEPTS

A number of government documents were reviewed and interviews conducted in order to determine current usage. The bibliography cites the key documents. Notable among them were: *The National Security Strategy of the United States, The Secretary of Defense's 1994 Report to Congress, The Bottom Up Review, The National Military Strategy of the United States(Draft),The DoD Report to Congress on Forward Naval Presence, The Joint Military Net Assessment,* and selected Service and CINC publications and briefings.

The concept of military presence has both a locational sense and an action or mission sense.[1] U.S. military forces located in a specified foreign area are virtually unanimously thought to *be present* there. Not surprisingly, forces not in that area are considered not present there. These are locational aspects of the concept. On the other hand, virtually everyone agrees that if military forces are engaged in combat they are in combat and not *doing presence.*

Debates about the concept usually start over just which military forces that are not engaged in combat are actually doing (or providing) presence. One school of thought has asserted that only military units that are in foreign areas and engaged in routine non-combat

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1 Dismukes suggests that presence refers to both a posture (location) and a mission (action). See Bradford Dismukes, *National Security Strategy and Forward Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces,* CRM 93-192, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994.

activities [not engaged in National Command Authority (NCA)-ordered combat or non-combat activities] are doing presence.[2] A second school asserts that all military units in foreign areas that are not engaged in combat are doing some form of presence. [3] A third asserts that military units not engaged in combat may be doing presence even if they are located in the United States—so long as they are ready on very short notice to move to a foreign area somewhere around the globe and engage in local presence activities. A fourth group insists that military units located in foreign areas and not engaged in combat are not doing presence unless they are tangibly promoting one or more of the objectives of presence.[4] Several groups assert that there are important distinctions to be drawn among one or more of the following presence terms: presence, military presence, overseas presence, forward presence, and global presence.[5]

For purposes of this study military presence is defined relatively inclusively. It is taken to mean the *overseas* assets and activities of military units not engaged in combat. This definition is consistent with that provided in the draft National Military Strategy of the United States.[6] This formulation does not by any means deny the value to the United States of U.S.-based military capabilities in promoting the *objectives* of presence. To the contrary, the framework spelled out in the next section implies that the U.S. has a wide

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2 *The Bottom Up Review*, the Secretary of Defense *Report to Congress, 1994*, and the *National Security Strategy of the United States* all at least imply that NCA-ordered operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations, are distinct from overseas presence activities. The Commission on Roles and Missions working group Issue paper on presence (November 2, 1994) follows this general approach.

3 Joint Staff formulation as presented in discussions of the expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in briefings to the Commission on Roles and Missions, and in the draft National Military Strategy of the United States, September 1994.

4 This is the thrust of the arguments made by Adm. P. Dur in "Forward, Ready, Engaged," *Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1994*. He argues that having military assets located forward is not enough: the forces must be manifestly capable of inflicting credible combat damage in order to be providing real presence.

5 Some observers argue that military presence is a subset of presence, where the broader construct includes both other governmental forms (political, diplomatic and economic) as well as U.S. economic, scientific and cultural activities in foreign areas. Some observers distinguish between overseas military presence (all forces stationed or deployed overseas in a non-combat mode) and call forward (naval) presence a subset of overseas presence. The 1991 Air Force paper "Global Reach, Global Power" articulated the concept that U.S.-based forces could project credible power very rapidly to virtually any area of the globe; this has given rise to the idea that these forces, while not necessarily continuously present in a foreign area, can be there so rapidly that they exert a presence or have a presence value in the area nevertheless.


6 *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Draft, September 1994.

range of foreign policy instruments to achieve the objectives of presence, including U.S.-based power projection assets. It is our conviction, based upon this analysis, that this collection of foreign policy instruments is likely to work best when it is used in concert, rather than in disjointed fashion.

B. A FRAMEWORK

There are differing views in the media, on Capitol Hill, and among the American public as to how much the United States should spend to "do" presence. This debate has in turn generated questions about the relative efficacy and cost-effectiveness of alternative means of achieving the objectives of presence.

This section presents a conceptual framework for presence activities. In this framework, all military assets and activities—whether located overseas or not, whether engaged in NCA-ordered operations or not, whether belonging to one Service or another—are resources available to the United States to safeguard and promote the principal objectives of presence and, thereby, the national interest (Figure II-1).



Fgure II-1. Presence as a Tool to Advance U.S. National Interests

The principal objectives of presence are taken here to be those of reassuring friends and allies, influencing international events in ways favorable to U.S. interests, deterring aggression, and providing appropriate initial crisis response capabilities overseas. This statement of the principal objectives is consistent with that employed by the Joint Staff in its Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) analyses. While not identical in wording to the objectives of presence specified in the National Security Strategy, it does not differ substantively. Economic, diplomatic, and military resources all play important roles in the strategy of the United States in furthering important national values and interests. Presence assets and activities provide one very important set of tools for promoting these values and interests. The principal objectives of military presence may thus be advanced with a variety of military and other, non-military tools, including activities and assets that are not themselves traditionally considered part of presence per se. For example, in a recent assessment the Joint Staff asserted that deterrence has been and is today promoted by a combination of forward presence assets and other, e.g., power projection, capabilities.[7]

Identifying the most effective or cost-effective mix of alternative military assets to promote any one of these important national objectives presents a very difficult analytic challenge. We know from the historical record that there have been occasions when the U.S. had significant combat capability in or very near a potential aggressor and that presence did not deter the aggression.[8] There have also been other occasions where aggression against friends and allies has not occurred even though the U.S. did not have sufficient conventional combat power in place to stop the aggression.[9]

Just what combinations of military instruments, and just what military instruments in conjunction with other instruments of foreign policy, have worked well and will work well in the future to promote the objectives of presence may be impossible to sort out conclusively. Nevertheless, they may be analyzed constructively. While it seems clear that U.S. military visits or small-scale military-to-military exchange programs can be of great value in improving understanding between nations, it also seems extremely unlikely that such activities could substitute for well-trained, carefully tailored military forces in

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7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Miltary Net Assessment*, 1991.

8 Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 despite a significant naval presence in the area; N. Vietnam attacked U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 despite the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. ships.

9 See Hank Gaffney, "Some Random Reflections on Naval Forward Presence," a briefing, Center for Naval Analyses, October 1994.

providing an initial crisis response capability to conduct a Non-combatant Evacuation Order (NEO), to monitor a no-fly zone over Southern Iraq, or to establish a significant air strike capability in Southwest Asia for the opening days of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC).

To help advance DoD's understanding about presence activities, and to assist in structuring some additional analytical tools to address presence issues in the post Cold-War era, our approach in this scoping study is as follows. We first clarify some of the recent changes in U.S. overseas presence activities. Then we describe the current process for providing resources to conduct these kinds of activities and identify the perspectives of the major DoD organizations concerning presence. Following this, we lay out several alternative approaches that we believe warrant closer consideration by DoD. We illustrate a simple yet potentially quite useful method for displaying and comparing potential contributions of a variety of plausible military assets to achieve objectives of presence. This method permits a structured analysis of the comparative benefits and limitations of each kind of asset for a range of possible task(s). A costing methodology that could help the DoD maintain a more systematic handle on the selection of alternative means to achieve the objectives of presence is also outlined. The final chapter provides a set of conclusions and recommendations.

III. THE HISTORICAL RECORD

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter describes major changes in U.S. military presence activities over the last decade, and then offers some explanation for them. The first section presents an overview of major trends in levels of U.S. forces overseas and in other relatively routine forms of presence activities. The second section presents the results of an effort to build and analyze the first all-Service chronology of discrete presence incidents covering the last decade. The third section describes the highlights of six detailed case studies of specific presence activities that the United States has engaged in over the same period. The final section offers a set of observations concerning these changes.

B. THE MACRO RECORD

Since 1985, the United States has dramatically reduced force levels both at home and abroad. Figure III-1 and Table III-1 present the story.[1] The overwhelming majority of reductions has occurred since 1989. A glance at the first three columns of Figure III-1 will reveal this for overall worldwide U.S. active duty force levels. Note that virtually all the change occurs in the last column of the group. In particular, as the final two columns of the first row of Table III-1 also show, while U.S. active duty force levels worldwide declined by 21 percent between 1985 and 1993, 20 of that 21 percent occurred since the Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989.

U.S. force levels in areas outside the United States have also declined significantly since 1985, but again, virtually all of the 40 percent reduction occurred since the Wall fell. (The second set of three columns in Figure III-1 show this, and the numbers are provided in the second row of Table III-1).

Most of the draw-down overseas has occurred in Germany, which has experienced all of its 58 percent drop during 1985-93 since 1989. (See the third group of columns in Figure III-1 and row three of the table.)

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1 Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress*, January 1994, pp. C1-C2.

Forward-located U.S. force levels in areas other than Germany have declined since 1985, again with nearly all reduction taking place since 1989. But note that, compared with Germany, the reductions in other areas have been far less steep (23 percent since 1989), roughly comparable to reductions in overall active duty force levels (20 percent).





Figure III-1. Trends in U.S. Active Duty Force Posture (1985-93)

Table III-1. U.S. Active Duty Force Levels and Locations, 1985-93 (force levels in thousands of personnel)

U.S. Active Duty Force Levels	1985	1989	1993	Overall Percent Decline '85-'93	Percent decline '89-'93
Total	2151	2130	1705	21	20
Total in foreign areas	515	510	308	40	40
Total in Germany	247	249	105	58	58
Total in other foreign areas	268	261	203	24	23
Total in foreign areas as a percent of Total Active	24	24	18	25	25

Since 1989, overall U.S. troop levels overseas have declined appreciably, except for the Desert Shield/Storm operation. Although by no means as marked a reduction, some U.S. naval forms of presence overseas may also have dropped slightly since 1989. Some evidence for this may be found in Figure III-2, developed from Navy data provided to the GAO. The figure suggests a slight overall reduction since 1989 in carrier deployments to the three principal theaters for U.S. maritime presence.



Source: Navy data from GAO Report GAO/NSIAD 93-74, February 1993.

Figure III-2. Numbers of U.S. Naval Carriers Deployed Full Time to Selected Forward Areas, 1985-93

While helpful in depicting very broad patterns, these macro pictures are still too coarse to illuminate potentially important changes in U.S. presence activities and in Service involvement in them. Accordingly, the study team analyzed two additional types of information. First, a chronology of nearly a hundred discrete presence incidents has been developed, drawing on open-source Service data and citations from standard newspapers and other sources. Second, six case studies have been conducted of U.S. participation in events involving Libya in 1986 (Operation El Dorado Canyon), Iraq in 1991 (Operations Provide Comfort, Poised Hammer and Southern Watch), Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy), Bosnia in 1992 (Operations Sharp Guard, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight), and Macedonia in 1993 (Operation Able Sentry).

C. DISCRETE INCIDENTS

Drawing on a range of open source data about U.S. involvement in discrete presence incidents, this study presents the first all-Service chronology of such activities over the last decade and provides an analysis of key trends.[2] Appendix A offers a full description of the incidents and methods employed. This section provides a brief overview of major findings.

1. Introduction

The chronology spans 12 years, from January 1983 to September 1994. Three sub-periods were then compared, roughly covering the last years of the Cold War (1983–86), a transition phase (1987–90), and the post-Cold War (1991–94). These three periods each include one of the "benchmark" years (1985, 1989, and 1993) that we highlighted in the previous "Macro" section. The benchmark years were selected as likely to be representative of each of these periods examined in this section. This set of discrete presence incidents (hereinafter either presence or "political-military" incidents)[3] was analyzed in several ways. The first assessment tallied the number of incidents, their duration, and the force levels involved; the second analysis compared the locations and types of incidents. The third cut at the data addressed the participation of the Services, both jointly and independently.

2. Political-Military Incidents, Duration, and Size: 1983–1994

Table III-2 provides findings concerning numbers of political-military incidents, their duration, and their size.

---

2 Key sources are provided in the bibliography for Appendix A.

3 Discrete incidents of the sort examined here were defined as "political-military incidents" by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, *Force Without War*, The Brookings Institution, 1978. Political-military incidents involve the deliberate use of military force in foreign areas in a non-combat mode to achieve national goals by influencing foreign perceptions. They thus fall under the rubric of presence activities as we have defined presence here. This definition refers to U.S. response. Events which the U.S. did not respond to with military forces were not considered.

Table III-2. Discrete Incidents: Numbers, Duration, and Force Size

Period	Incidents	Yearly Average	Incidents >90 Days	Yearly Average	Major Force Commitment
1983-1986	40	10	8	2	0
1987-1990	26	6.5	9	2.25	3
1991-1994	34	8.5	15	3.75	6
Grand Total	100	-	32	-	9

The average numbers of new incidents in the three periods indicate no clear trend upward or downward. However, a look at the lengthier incidents, presumably the more substantive events in terms of cost, manpower committed, etc., reveals that the frequency of events longer than 90 days has grown in absolute terms. Furthermore, as Appendix A documents, the average level of military force employed in these incidents has also risen significantly over the course of the past dozen years. The two principal findings in this section are that the numbers of lengthy incidents and major force commitments in these incidents have risen markedly over the course of 1983–94.

3. Political-Military Incident Location and Type: 1983–94

The second set of findings concerns the location and type of these incidents. Figure III-3 indicates the geographic trends.




Figure III-3. New Incidents per Period by Region

The most obvious trend is that the Middle East (including North Africa) is no longer the primary focus of U.S. political-military activity. If current trends continue, it is no more likely to be the locale for new incidents than either Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa, both of which are receiving substantially more American attention in terms of these incidents. The Western Hemisphere continues to be the site of many new incidents. East and South Asia, on the other hand, receive scant U.S. attention in these terms. (The study group also examined the geographic distribution of incidents lasting at least 90 days, but in this case found no significant differences from the distribution in the overall incident set.)

Among incident types, two kinds dominate. Of seven categories of incidents,[4] those defined as threat situations and humanitarian operations comprised the vast majority over the 12-year period. However, humanitarian operations, once a small fraction of new incidents, now occur about as often as threat situations. As U.S. attention has shifted from one geographic region to another, the nature of political-military missions that U.S. forces are engaging in also is shifting—from threat situations to humanitarian operations.

4. Service Roles in Political-Military Incidents: 1983–94

The third set of findings concerns Service participation. The study revealed that, with the exception of the Department of the Navy,[5] the Services are increasingly participating in political-military incidents.[6] Complementing this trend, the number of joint operations has steadily increased, from 12 to 14 to 24 incidents in the three respective periods. The number of incidents lasting longer than 90 days has grown relative to the number of active duty personnel, thus increasing the per person burden placed on the U.S. military. Finally, and disregarding the jointness of each incident, i.e., the relative extent of an individual Service's involvement in, any given operation, Figure III-4 reveals overall

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4 The seven are: Counterdrug operations, Freedom of Navigation Acts, Humanitarian Relief, Support Operations, Threat situations, Visits, and Exercises. For details, see Appendix A.

5 Department of Navy forces include the U.S. Marine Corps.

6 In absolute terms, U.S. Army involvement has increased from 8 to 11 to 20 incidents per period; U.S. Air Force involvement has shifted from 15 to 11 to 24 incidents per period; DoN involvement has dropped from 31 to 25 to 269 incidents per period. See Appendix A, Section IV, for details.




Figure III-4. Service Participation in New Incidents/Period

trends in Service participation in new political-military incidents. Clearly each Service plays a significant role—with the Air Force and Army units becoming more frequent participants. In the latest period, for example, the Air Force participated in more than two-thirds of the incidents while the Army participated in roughly half of them. Whereas the Navy and Marine Corps had been by far the most frequent participants in the earlier periods, this appears to be declining.

D. CASE STUDIES

1. Background

Six case studies, shown in Table III-3, were undertaken as part of the study effort.

Table III-3. Case Studies

Case	Country Involved	Time Frame	Study in Appendix
El Dorado Canyon	Libya	1986	B
Provide Comfort	Iraq	1991-ongoing	C
Uphold Democracy	Haiti	1994-ongoing	D
Sharp Guard, Provide Promise, Deny Flight	Bosnia	1992-ongoing	E
Poised Hammer, Southern Watch	Iraq	1991-ongoing	F
Able Sentry	Macedonia	1993-ongoing	G

These studies are heuristic, their purpose being exploratory and illustrative. Specifically, a key objective was to examine to what extent military assets are being used to support political and foreign policy goals. A secondary objective was to take a closer look

at the specific assets brought to bear in several cases. The forces available to the National Command Authority (NCA) for resolving a crisis are without equal in the post-Cold War period compared to those of other nations, and the NCA consequently has an extensive menu of force options upon which it can draw.

2. Observations

U.S. military forces are being used to support a broad array of U.S. political and foreign policy goals.

In almost every major UN peacekeeping operation of the past 5 years, U.S. military forces have been heavily involved—in Bosnia, Iraq, and Macedonia. They have also been used for the unorthodox purpose of humanitarian aid, as the case of PROVIDE COMFORT illustrates (and the UN intervention in Somalia as well). Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the recent U.S. intervention in Haiti, exemplifies the continuing use of the U.S. military in the Western Hemisphere, even after the Cold War. Finally, the U.S. strike on Libya in 1986 calls attention to the role of the U.S. military in combating terrorism, a threat that continues to plague nations on a global scale. (A more recent replay of EL DORADO CANYON was the Tomahawk strike on Iraq in connection with the assassination attempt on former President Bush.)

U.S. military actions now typically include more than one service.

In all cases examined, more than one Service was involved. The Navy-Marines and Air Force teamed to carry out the attack on Libya, and in PROVIDE COMFORT both the Navy and Air Force were involved in the early stage of the humanitarian effort and were later joined by ground forces when the decision was made that such forces were required. In the Macedonia case, the Army had the lead role, supported by Air Force transport aircraft.

The chances for a successful military operation may be greater with more than one Service, or even sometimes two. The Air Force transport aircraft involved in ABLE SENTRY and PROVIDE COMFORT, for example, were important elements in the success of those two missions, and, again in PROVIDE COMFORT, ground troops were found to be ultimately necessary. And in the case of Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the carrier-based aircraft and the Air Force F-111s in the United Kingdom were both considered necessary for a successful strike.

Alternative forces are often available to execute specific missions, and consideration is not always given to the full menu of options available.

The process for determining the weapons and forces to be employed in a particular crisis has not always focused on cost-effectiveness considerations. Tradition, for example, can play a strong role in determining what kind of forces are chosen. In some cases, force selection is a function of what assets are closest to the area of concern, particularly when a quick response is required. Often, the basis of the decision is not entirely clear. The case of EL DORADO CANYON, for example, leaves unresolved the question of why the F-111s were made part of the strike force. Was it for political reasons (to involve the United Kingdom) or because of the technical limitations of the carrier-based aircraft? Why, in the case of the Haiti intervention, were CONUS-based aircraft introduced into the crisis so late? Those aircraft and the troops deployed on them were, along with the diplomatic initiatives, apparently decisive elements in resolving the crisis, but how much thought was given to them until late in the crisis.

E. OBSERVATIONS

1. Overall Findings

Fewer forces are stationed forward today. There has been significant continuity over the last decade in maritime routine forward presence patterns. There is increased participation by Army and Air Force in discrete presence activities. Increased jointness of operations is also evident in discrete presence activities, and these activities are lasting longer on average. The relative frequency of humanitarian and peace operations has increased, and there is a significantly smaller active force to draw on in order to conduct them.

From the case studies, several observations are worth highlighting (see the appendices for details). First, there is considerable joint involvement evident in these often complex operations. Second, force and Service mixes for a given operation are rarely dictated conclusively by the nature of the presence operation. There appears to be some latitude available to decision-makers in the selection of forces for a given operation. Chapter V will propose some techniques to assist in selecting force packages when the U.S. has some latitude in this regard.

2. Explaining Changes

A number of major factors appear to account for the changes that we have observed in presence patterns over the last decade. Among them are the following:

- The end of the Cold War has reduced many traditional forward presence requirements, e.g., in Europe, and has opened opportunities to participate more vigorously in peace/humanitarian operations.
- Promoting the transition to democracy with U.S. military forces in a non-combat role is a higher administration priority now than during much the Cold War.
- The longer duration of presence activities may be due to the higher fraction of peace/humanitarian operations combined with the possibility that those types of operations are more extended by their nature, on a average, than others.
- The Joint Staff is placing greater emphasis on joint operations.

IV. THE CURRENT PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS AND DOD PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE

A. CURRENT REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

Forces for overseas presence fall into three general categories: forward-stationed forces—mainly Army and Air Force in Europe, Japan and Korea—and overseas prepositioned equipment for forces that will deploy from the United States; forces that regularly deploy for periods of up to 6 months, mainly Navy and Marine forces (CVBG and ARG/MEU(SOC)); and various programs of foreign military interaction.

Forward-stationed forces count as presence forces but their requirements are determined largely for warfighting and initial response in contingencies. Requirements for forward-stationed forces are developed in National Security and Military Strategy reviews and in the strategy, planning and force structure documents found in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

Forward presence forces that deploy on a regular basis for periods of up to 6 months consist mainly of Navy and Marine Corps units, but Army and Air Force units occasionally rotate overseas in a similar fashion. CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM have stated requirements for 100 percent CVBG/ARG coverage in their areas of responsibility (AOR). The Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) Message provides guidance for allocating CV/CVN and ARG/MEU(SOC) assets to cover shortfalls from this 100 percent coverage within the current CVBG force levels and deployment policies. The shortfalls are met with, for example, a USAF Composite Air Wing or US Army field deployments. The Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP) Concept is another process that is being developed and tested to provide forces to CINCs for routine and crisis deployments of forces "to substitute alternative joint packages for the standard naval force configuration used to provide response to crises and overseas military presence." The U.S. Atlantic Command, USACOM, is the Joint Force Integrator with this responsibility. As the AJFP Concept now stands, the CINC states a capability requirement that is validated by the CJCS/Joint Staff. ACOM, in coordination with the supported CINC, then develops a tailored AJFP to meet the required capability.

And, finally, many overseas units and individuals perform tasks that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance stability. In the past, individual CINCs have had their own processes for establishing these requirements. Two examples are CINCPAC's Cooperative Engagement Matrix Process and EUCOM's Theater Security Planning System. More recently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has established the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Process to provide a methodology for overseeing and comparing presence programs in the CINC AORs. These programs include security assistance; combined planning and exercises; military liaison teams; Regional Study Centers; Special Operations Force; defense attachés; Army Foreign Area Officer programs; Personnel Exchange Program; port calls, visits, deployments, and demonstrations; Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; NATO Partnership for Peace; humanitarian mining clearing operations; and counterdrug programs.

In his 1994 annual report to Congress the Secretary of Defense articulated an approach to presence which may be broadly characterized as having three key features:

- Maintain a significant maritime presence in three major areas—notably the Western Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. Continue to station significant U.S. land-based forces in two areas—North East Asia and Europe. Provide relevant prepositioned assets as needed and feasible for all major areas, and otherwise address all areas on a case-by-case basis.
- Rely, in achieving these presence-level objectives, upon forces from the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps that are justified programmatically for war fighting. Rely upon naval forces that are programmed for warfighting as well but, in addition, permit the Navy to maintain at least one extra carrier battle group—above and beyond that in the program force for warfighting—to round out the force the Navy says is needed to provide SecDef-approved levels of naval presence to each of the three major theaters of Areas of Responsibility (AORs).[1]
- Encourage cautious experimentation with several alternative possible means of maintaining presence capabilities to supplement presence forces in key AORs for such times when a naval carrier battle group is not in the Mediterranean, or, alternatively, when it is not in the Indian Ocean.

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1 See SecDef *Report to Congress*, January 1994, p. 22.

B. PERSPECTIVES OF DOD COMPONENTS—THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has indicated the importance it attaches to presence through the *Bottom Up Review* and the Secretary's *Annual Report to Congress*, both of which were quoted from earlier. The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, as the OSD sponsor of this study, has clearly indicated its interest in improved understanding of presence and possible presence approaches.

C. PERSPECTIVES OF DOD COMPONENTS—THE JOINT STAFF

There are several indications that at least some parts of the Joint Staff would like to strengthen and integrate DoD processes to meet the objectives of presence. The expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) effort to improve presence planning is one example. Intimations of the desirability of improving the existing process surfaced in the Preface to DoD's 1994 *Report to Congress on Naval Forward Presence*.[2] Discussions with several Joint Staff representatives to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) suggested strongly that the current process is not sufficiently integrated. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Owens, has issued several calls for a more integrated, joint approach to presence.[3] Finally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, recently suggested publicly that there may be a more joint, integrated means of doing presence:

> When you project power and you would like to keep an aircraft carrier forward deployed to be ready for the unexpected, is it really necessary to do that all the time? Or is it possible, in some theaters, during the time that you don't have the carrier, to forward deploy certain ground-based air together with some Marines or Ranger type units? You might wish to supplement with some bombers on alert or forward-deployed. So you can create the effect on the ground, if need be, that is identical to the one the carrier would project. And so all of a sudden you say to yourself, 'Maybe I don't need to deploy the same capability all the time. Maybe I can build my forward presence around an Aegis cruiser and the air piece I forward deploy and put on the ground.[4]

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2 DoD, *Report to Congress on Naval Forward Presence*, 1994, Secret.

3 Remarks by Adm. W. Owens to the Military Operations Research Society on the JROC, October 18, 1994, Arlington, VA.

4 Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Readiness: It's a Balancing Act," Air Force Times, January 2, 1995.

D. PERSPECTIVES OF DOD COMPONENTS—THE SERVICES

Through this study effort and a related analysis for the Commission on Roles and Missions, a significant amount of material concerning Services' perspectives on presence activities was identified and collected. Appendix H provides a compilation. Appendix I provides a similar set of CINC position papers. The following two sections offer representative statements from the Services and CINCs.

1. U.S. Air Force

Interview with Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Former USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak was interviewed on October 12, 1994. His summary position concerning presence may be paraphrased as follows:

> Presence is not a mission. It is especially not a mission that is the monopoly of any one Service. Presence is a characteristic of armed forces, like speed or mass or maneuverability. All armed forces, wherever they are located, possess the characteristic of "presence" to a greater or lesser degree. . . . We usually think of presence as a function of location, or geography. This is accurate as far as it goes, but we should also think of presence as a function of time. . . . Thus, the 82nd Airborne, stationed at Ft. Bragg, is 'present' quickly, anywhere. Others know this and take this form of presence into account. CONUS-based long-range air forces exercise particularly effective 'presence' because they can be overhead any spot on the Globe in less than 24 hours from a standing start.

General Fogleman assumed the position of USAF Chief of Staff late in 1994. While the study team has not had the opportunity to interview General Fogleman for this study, The Commission on Roles and Missions has received several statements from him suggesting significant continuity on the issue of presence, with additional interest in promoting collaborative efforts with all the Services in conducting presence activities.

CORM Submission by the U.S. Air Force

The CORM received from the Department of the Air Force a document entitled "Assessment of Air Force Contributions to Overseas Presence," dated 15 December 1994. This document is provided at Appendix H. It describes the USAF position that the Service contributes forces relevant to overseas presence in four major categories, as follows:

> The USAF contributes to Overseas Presence with unique forces which are *globally deployed, globally capable, ready to deploy, or deployed in region.*

> These air and space forces incorporate numerous technological advances to provide a uniquely flexible and lethal contribution to America's presence strategy. USAF forces allow the U.S. to project power across the spectrum of conflict with reduced vulnerability, cost, and risk.[5]

2. U.S. Army

Interview with the Chief of Staff of the Army

The study team interviewed Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Gordon Sullivan concerning overseas presence on December 20, 1994. Notes from the interview are provided at Appendix H. In essence, General Sullivan said that the demand for Army resources in presence and other types of political-military missions has increased significantly in the past few years. He estimated that such uses of Army resources had grown 300 percent since the end of the Cold War. In fact, he noted, in August the Army had a force of at least 5 soldiers in 105 different nations. He suggested that 'presence' might be equated with 'present for duty in the minds of the target.'

CORM Submission by the Department of the Army

The CORM received a position paper from the U.S. Army on 22 December 1994 entitled "The Army: The Central Element of America's Overseas Presence." The document is provided in Appendix H. The central thrust of the Army's position is captured by the following:

> The Army, as the Nation's strategic force for prompt and sustained land combat, remains the cornerstone of effective overseas presence. Overseas presence is multidimensional and executed by multiple, complementary means including not only forward stationed forces and prepositioned equipment, but also military-to-military contact, security and humanitarian assistance, combined exercises, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement and intervention operations. . . . The Army, as the primary land element of U.S. military power in support of all aspects of overseas presence, plays a central role in our national capability for shaping the international security environment. The foundation of our Nation's overseas presence remains a trained soldier on the ground, promoting stability and thwarting aggression wherever deployed.[6]

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5 Department of the U.S. Air Force, "Assessment of Air Force Contributions to Overseas Presence," December 15, 1994.

6 Department of the U.S. Army, "The Army: The Central Element of America's Overseas Presence," December 22, 1994.

3. U.S. Marine Corps

Interview with the Commandant of the Marine Corps

As have many of the Service Chiefs, Commandant Gen. Carl Mundy has articulated his positions concerning overseas presence in a number of contexts over the years. A key point he made in a recent interview concerning presence was:

> Preparation for war must not result in a diminution of our abilities to do crisis response and war avoidance operations like those that took place in Rwanda, off Haiti, or Cuba this year; or in Bangladesh, Liberia, Somalia, Kuwait, the Philippines and Haiti in years past. As an example, in 1991, Marines were involved in the evacuation of nearly 20,000 citizens and diplomats, assisted 2 million refugees, and deployed 90,000 Marines to combat.[7]

CORM submission by the Marine Corps

The U.S. Marine Corps provided a position paper to the CORM concerning its role in presence activities that is contained in Appendix H.

4. U.S. Navy

Interview with the Chief of Naval Operations

A member of the study team interviewed Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jeremy Boorda concerning overseas presence on October 17, 1994. The record of his interview is provided at Appendix H. His fundamental position on this issue may be seen in the following: The maintenance of a continuous presence in a region has important benefits for political military operations. Not only does it familiarize the Service with the region, but it gives it a leg up in deploying forces when the contingency occurs. . . . Admiral Boorda noted that the key point in political/military operations is to convince the target that the U.S. has the will to carry out its threats or promises. This often, he said, requires a demonstration of the willingness to actually use firepower.

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7 Gen. C. E. Mundy, Jr., USMC Commandant, "Strategy for a New Era," The Retired Officer Magazine, November 1994, p. 54.

CORM submission by the Department of the Navy

The Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton, provided a recommendation to the CORM on September 1, 1994, concerning several topics including presence.[8] He urged the CORM to:

> Assess our requirement for sea-based forces overseas for Presence and Crisis Response, and assign the Navy and Marine Corps primary functions in providing combat ready forces forward for deterrence of conflict, promotion of interoperability, crisis control and to enable the deployment of heavier CONUS-based forces.

His supporting rationale for this recommendation included the following:

> While our vital interests are still largely across the ocean, the indisputable trend is to base more of our power projection potential in CONUS. The importance of combat ready, credible sea-based power (ground forces and air power) has increased proportionally as both a significant deterrent and as a capability to preempt crises and prepare the battlefield. The Bottom Up Review recognized this change in adding presence as a force sizing criterion in addition to the requirement for two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs).

Other Navy Inputs

The Navy has developed a methodology for estimating the U.S. naval force structure that, under Navy assumptions and policies, would suffice to meet various levels of theater by theater forward presence requests of the geographic CINCs. This methodology was briefed to the study team by Adm. Philip Dur in October 1994.[9]

One of the Navy representatives to the CORM, Adm. Thomas Lynch, also had the following to say about the U.S. presence activities:

> Some of the issues that are most near and dear to us (involve) presence—overseas presence. For instance, we've had those from other Services and others who have said that bombers from Barksdale AFB (in Louisiana) or having a GI on the ground or a missionary in country—that's presence. That's true. But when we're talking about presence in a military sense, we're talking about credible combat power in the region, knowing

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8 The following two quotes are taken from a letter to Dr. John White, Chairman of the CORM, from the Secretary of the Navy, September 1, 1994.

9 The methodology is contained in the secret DoD *Report to Congress on Naval Forward Presence* cited above. See also Adm. P. Dur, "Forward, Ready, Engaged," Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1994.

the environment, knowing the people, interoperability with our allies and being there very timely, very responsive. That's presence. And that's what the Navy and Marine Corps have been doing. That's what we're all about since the days of the Barbary pirates. So that's very important to us—to make sure it is articulated properly.[10]

5. The U.S. Coast Guard

The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Adm. Robert E. Kramek, provided submissions to the CORM on August 12, 1994, and on November 22, 1994, concerning forward presence that are contained in Appendix H.[11] The central position of the Coast Guard appears to be as follows:

> As a maritime operating agency with regulatory and enforcement responsibilities, the Coast Guard is closely identified with in size, mission, and capability by most of the navies throughout the world. As such, we are a unique non-threatening, humanitarian, yet military instrument for achieving national security objectives. Through security and technical assistance, and joint/combined exercises, the Coast Guard is frequently used by the CINCs as the force of choice in achieving forward presence, good will, and the advancement of national influence. These Coast Guard capabilities should continue to be an available resource to the CINCs and I am committed to that end.

E. PERSPECTIVES OF DOD COMPONENTS—SELECTED CINCS

1. U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM)

CORM Submission

USACOM Deputy Commander in Chief, Vice Adm. H.W. Gehman, Jr., submitted a document to the CORM on 1 December 1994 containing the following CINC perspective concerning future overseas presence:

> There is little doubt as to the overall utility and purpose of presence—assurance, influence, deterrence and crisis response. These purposes are as valid today as they have been for 200 years. However, it is the depth of our resources and the nature of the threat that should tailor our response. The type or method of presence, whether permanently forward based or rotational, requires constant and comprehensive review to ensure that it is proportional to the threat....The Unified Command Plan, signed by

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10 "If We Want to Have Air Force Subsumed We Could Probably Make That Happen," an interview with Adm. Thomas Lynch, the Navy's liaison to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces reproduced in The Virginian-Pilot, Norfolk, Virginia, November 26, 1994, p.6.

11 A letter to Dr. John White, Chairman of the CORM, from The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Adm. Robert E. Kramek, August 12, 1994.

> President Clinton on September 24, 1993, directed USACOM to execute geographic CINC responsibilities, train and integrate joint forces, and provide these forces to war fighting CINCs. For USACOM, this evolutionary change translates into both a permanent AOR responsibility and an expanding role in both providing and tailoring global and theater level presence.

The general statement above was then followed by this perspective on the need for innovation, integration, and more jointness:

> Since the end of World War II, a pattern of overseas presence has evolved to support our strategic goals. As an example, the United States has maintained naval and ground forces in Europe and the Far East on a continual and rotational basis since 1945. The support requirement has now changed; logic would dictate that old paradigms for presence should do likewise. It is time to reconsider what is really required and what has simply become automatic. Deployment should occur because there is a requirement, not simply to fill a schedule. Residual Cold War deployment patterns can and should be modified in relation to existing threat patterns. Much of our current investment in overseas presence can be supplemented or offset by making flexible use of combined and joint force capabilities.... JTF 95 is an important first link in the process to use the full spectrum of capabilities resident in our nation's armed forces for future presence and response requirements.

2. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

CORM Submission

Former CINCCENT, General J. P. Hoar (USMC), provided the following perspective to the CORM while he was still CINCENT:

> Recommend that the commission define forward presence and crisis response as the primary roles for the naval Services and assign them the primary function of conducting littoral warfare, encompassing sea-based power projection from surface, subsurface, and naval aviation platforms, amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces, and their influence well inland beyond the traditional boundary of the high water mark.[12]

CENTCOM has not provided, as of this date, a submission to the CORM comparable to that sent by the other geographic CINCs.

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12 A letter to Dr. John White, Chairman of the CORM, from CINCENT, Gen. J. P. Hoar, August 3, 1994.

General Hoar was interviewed, after his retirement, concerning presence issues. The interview, conducted by a representative of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) for the CORM presence effort, suggests among other things that a mid-size amphibious carrier looks to most of the world like very credible combat power.

3. U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

Gen. George A. Joulwan, CINCEUCOM, forwarded a document to the CORM on December 15, 1994, concerning his perspectives on presence. This document, reproduced in Appendix I, included the following highlights:

> Europe is where we have the majority of our forward stationed forces and where our presence matters most. . . . Presence not only creates the environment in which our influence is welcome, it adds credibility to our leadership. Because our words are connected to resources—resources and capabilities actually present in the region, as opposed to merely promised—they have a special weight. . . . I encounter daily the effectiveness of all forms of our forward presence in furthering U.S. interests. . . . I have no doubt about the importance of our forward presence but I know it is a "hard sell" in Washington. Deterrence is measured in the undetectable units of what didn't happen. The ways of influence are difficult to trace and having a lot of it doesn't always mean that you get exactly what you want.

4. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)

Admiral Macke, CINCPAC, responded on December 2 to a request from the Chairman of the CORM concerning CINCPAC's perspectives on presence. The response is in Appendix I. Noteworthy points include:

> Forward presence is essential to our concept of operations. It ties together U.S. interests and objectives and takes on many shapes. These can include high level visits, defense attaché activities, military sales, military to military contact programs, exchange and training programs (including IMET and training assistance), multilateral seminars and conferences, exercises, small unit exchanges, humanitarian and civic assistance, port calls, band visits, and staff talks. . . . The U.S. Pacific Command has developed a universal process for unified commands to manage forward presence activities, planning processes, and allocation of scarce resources. We call it the Cooperative Engagement Matrix. The Matrix provides the staff with a data base to formulate recommendations, prioritize forward presence activities, and conduct comparative analyses for commanders.

5. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

Adm. J. B. Perkins III, Deputy CINCSOUTH, responded on November 21, 1994, to the CORM's request for the CINC's perspective on overseas presence. Admiral Perkins

indicates that SOUTHCOM has had many decades of experience in operations other than war, or overseas presence activities from their perspective. SOUTHCOM's briefing, contained in Appendix I, provides CINCSOUTH's assessments of the types of presence activities most helpful in addressing three of the CINC's major challenges: Counterdrug efforts; Military to Military Contact Programs; and Nation Assistance.

6. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

A SOCOM representative responded on November 10, 1994, to the CORM request for SOCOM perspectives on their contributions to overseas presence. The document is contained in Appendix I. SOCOM's overview is provided here:

> Special Operations Forces (SOF) make unique contributions to the geographic CINCs' overseas presence efforts. These joint, tailored, rapidly deployable, and uniquely trained forces give CINCs influence, reassurance, deterrence and crisis response capabilities. These units have vast operational experience (139 countries in FY94), are regionally oriented, language trained, and culturally attuned. Specifically trained to interact with host country personnel, these experienced, mature, low profile professionals provide one of a kind support to overseas presence.

F. DISCUSSION

Considerable attention is paid today to overseas presence assets and activities by various DoD components. All the Services and CINCs believe they make important contributions to overseas presence, and there exists spirited discussion as to which Service is the most fundamental and the most cost-effective in providing presence and in promoting the objectives of presence.

The Secretary of Defense's office has indicated an interest in examining the implications of some innovative ways to promote the objectives of presence. Several of the CINCs have been developing innovative approaches along these lines, such as the USACOM effort to think through more joint approaches using the Joint Adaptive Force Package construct, and PACOM's Cooperative Engagement Matrix. (See Appendix I for descriptions). Both initiatives appear to advance the general concepts of, first, exploiting the rich menu of building blocks for promoting the objectives of presence that the United States has at its disposal today, and, second, looking hard at ways to promote these objectives as cost-effectively as feasible.

The next two chapters pursue several of these issues by examining several alternative presence postures for the U.S. to promote the objectives of presence in the years ahead. A set of criteria for assessing these operational concepts is proposed and briefly illustrated. The final chapter then offers several suggestions for exploring and assessing these kinds of alternatives on an ongoing basis within the DoD.

V. SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes several ideas that are generally in line with the Secretary's suggestion alluded to at the beginning of Chapter IV. The concept of building a more joint and integrated approach to meeting all the objectives of presence has great intuitive and practical appeal. The leading CINC proponent of such an approach is USACOM. This chapter argues that a more systematic method of determining the crisis responsiveness of various military assets, both individually and acting as a team, can be constructed for considering presence alternatives and made available to OSD, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs. We describe this approach in general terms in the first part of the chapter and then illustrate it briefly with several specific but still very broad-gauge alternatives.

Today's U.S. presence posture (which we refer to hereinafter as the Baseline and Presence Posture Alternative I) is normally described by DoD in terms of presence "input-type" measures such as days per year in given theaters of a particular type of asset, usually a Carrier Battle Group or an Amphibious Ready Group. While this input description may have its uses, the proposal here is to try to move to more "output"-oriented measures and assess the relative responsiveness of U.S. military assets in moving into position to accomplish various initial crisis tasks under various presence postures. This is not to deny, by any means, the importance of other presence objectives such as influence, reassurance, and deterrence. We will return to them later in this chapter. Here, however, the specific proposal is to develop a useful means to compare potential alternative presence postures in terms of their respective abilities to provide initial responses to each of several representative crises—under various logistical conditions. Such logistical conditions might include, for example, foreign base/access denial in the area, the infeasibility of conducting the particular mission from CONUS with land-based assets, the inability of one or another type of maritime asset to perform the given mission, or extremely malpositioned maritime assets. Table V-I depicts a simple construct of this kind.

Table V-I. Crisis Responsiveness of a Presence Posture

Presence Posture	Logistical Condition	Days to Put Capability in Range					
		T1: MT1*	T1: MT2	T1: MT3	T2: MT1	T2: MT2	T2: MT3
1. Put Effective Capability in Range	worst case** average*** best case****						
2. Put Effective Maritime Assets in Range	worst case average best case						
3. Put Effective Land-Based Assets in Range (access given)	worst case average best case						
4. Put Effective Land-Based Assets in Range (access denied)	worst case average best case						

* (T1)Theater 1, Crisis Response Military Task (or function) 1 (MT1)

** lesser of row 2 (worst) and either row 4 (worst) or worst case plausible access situation.

*** lesser of row 2 (avg.) and either row 3 (avg.) or average with most likely access situation.

****lesser of rows 2 and 3.

For each given type of crisis in a given theater, maritime assets and land-based assets (U.S.-based and/or forward based) may be capable of doing the job. If, in a truly extreme case, land-based assets could not be used for a given initial crisis response task—due for example to total denial of access in the theater and an inability to use U.S. land-based assets for the particular task—then maritime assets would be needed. (Similarly, there have been and will be cases where maritime assets are unable to accomplish the task, e.g., inland operations that are out of maritime range.)

This table would provide in row 2, for example, the expected timelines for maritime assets to move into range for the particular crisis task for the given maritime portion of the presence posture alternative. Where land-based assets could be used for the task, this table would depict the response times under circumstances of in-theater base access availability (row 3) and base access denial (row 4). The top row (1) could then portray, for the joint posture, the expected time required to begin the task with whichever asset could get there first under stipulated conditions, e.g., for the worst case—conditions of worst plausible in-theater access denial and maritime assets as far out of position as they might be in the presence posture. The top row could similarly depict average and best case possibilities of the sort described in the table and accompanying notes.

Fully articulated, this scheme would permit the analyst and decision maker to see the likely responsiveness of different presence postures and assets for different types of crises, to make judgments about whether a posture is sufficiently responsive, and then potentially to assess the costs on the margin of efforts to increase responsiveness. An assessment scheme of this sort would clearly have to rely upon expert military judgment in a number of "squishy" areas, such as the definition of the crisis tasks, assessments of military assets capable of performing each task, and assessments of the probability of being granted access.

B. ILLUSTRATING THE APPROACH

1. Today's Baseline Posture (Alternative Posture I)

Table V-2 depicts a set of illustrative timelines for land-based and maritime assets to move within range of each of several representative crises in each of several theaters today (for descriptions of the crises or military functions, see Appendix K). These estimates portray worst case, average, and best case timelines for land-based and sea-based assets of several kinds in each of several theaters.

Table V-2 depicts the approach to assessing the crisis responsiveness of a given presence posture or alternative (here, today's baseline, Posture/Alternative I), considering the total force package that would be available to the CINCs. The table shows, for each theater, the response time to begin to perform a set of military tasks or functions that the CINCs might require in a crisis, assuming the use of:

- Maritime forces only (row 2 estimates);
- Land-based forces based either in CONUS or in theater only—assuming base access is granted—(row 3 estimates);.
- Land-based forces based in CONUS only--assuming in-theater base access is totally denied—(row 4 estimates);
- The best combination of all forces (row 1).

A black dot (•) in the table indicates that under the given circumstance the force may not be able to perform the function in question.

For each function, for each type of forces, this particular table shows best case response times, worst case times, and average or most likely times. A dash (-) indicates that an average is not meaningful because the force cannot perform the function under some circumstances or that the function requirement does not exist (there is no MRC in the Mediterranean). For the combination (row 1c), the best case is the lowest of either the best

case for maritime forces (from row 2.c) or the best case for land-based forces assuming base access is granted (from row 3.c); the average for row 1b is the lowest of either the average of maritime forces (from row 2.b) or the average of land-based forces assuming base access is granted (from row 3.b); and the worst case is the lowest of either the worst case for maritime forces (from row 2.a) or the worst case for land-based forces assuming base access is denied (row 4.a). The basic premise in this version of the table is that while it is possible that access to all bases in a theater will be denied, it is likeliest that access to at least some base will be granted.[1]

Table V-2 shows that if land-based forces can perform a function, their response times will be faster than maritime forces' times for the typical case—one in which the United States has access to a base in theater from which land-based forces can operate. Land-based forces are faster in all cases in which they can perform the function from CONUS, except when maritime forces happen to be located closer than two days steaming time from the scene of the crisis. It is only in extreme cases—in which the United States does not have access to a base in theater, and the function cannot be performed from CONUS, and no other assistance is available—that U.S. maritime forces are likely to be the most responsive asset for the crisis.

One could use tables like V-2 for the Baseline (Posture I) example in order to clarify the crisis responsiveness of any potential U.S. presence posture. By showing which forces dictate the response time, for any set of circumstances, the table enables decision makers to see the real difference in total force responsiveness associated with any change in overseas deployments or force structure.

1 That premise is supported by our investigation of 100 crises over the past 10 years which showed that in almost every crisis the United States had access to some base in theater from which land-based forces could respond. See Appendix A.

Table V-2. Posture 1—Illustrative Timeline of Baseline Crisis Response with Land-Based and Maritime Assets for a Representative Set of Tasks

(Days)

Available Assets and Condition	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. Total Force																					
a. worst case	-	17	2	12	12	1	1	2	15	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2. Maritime																					
a. worst case	-	17	17	12	12	4	12	9	15	15	11	11	8	11	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. weighted average	-	4	4	3	3	1	3	4	5	5	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Land-based, base access granted																					
a. worst case	-	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Land-based, base access denied																					
a. worst case	-	•*	2	•	-	1	1	2	•	2	•	-	2	2	2	•	2	•	-	2	2
b. average	-	-	1	•	-	0	0	2	-	1	•	-	1	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	1
c. best case	-	1	1	•	-	0	0	2	1	1	•	-	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	1

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

- • Function potentially infeasible
- - Function not required or average not meaningful
- * Airfield not available

2. An Initial Set of Alternative Presence Postures

Several alternative presence postures are illustrated below. Every posture includes the crisis response assets that the Army, Air Force, and Marines have today under Bottom Up Review (BUR) assumptions. The postures vary in total naval force structure, however. While many other possibilities can be conceived, these initial alternatives should help to illustrate the concept we are proposing in this paper.

A Naval Management Alternative Posture

One alternative to today's presence posture, an alternative we label Posture NMA, would involve the Navy implementing a package of management innovations. Through these changes it may well be feasible for the United States to deliver, at lower cost to the Nation and with a smaller naval force structure than stipulated in the BUR force (one or two fewer carriers), an *identical* amount of naval force as is provided to the three major naval "presence" areas—The Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific—under the Baseline (Posture I). These results could be achieved in several ways, including increasing by several knots the transit speeds of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) rotating between CONUS and the destination theaters and reducing the length of stops en route to and from the Indian Ocean.[2] Detailed results of the NMA analyses are provided in Appendix J. Note that it appears feasible for the DoD to achieve these results without violating existing PERSTEMPO guidelines.[3] Under the NMA, because the forces deployed forward would not change from today's Baseline (Posture I), the DoD could deliver *identical* amounts of influence, reassurance, deterrence and initial crisis response capability as are delivered today.

Other Alternative Presence Postures: II, III and IV

In addition to the NMA, three other military presence posture alternatives were developed. They are compared below with today's Baseline (Posture I) and the NMA:

- Alternative Posture II—meet CINC requests for full, continuous presence of *both* a CVBG and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in each of the three primary theaters, the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean (IO) and the Med.

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2 IDA has validated and built upon the seminal analyses by Dr. William Morgan at the Center for Naval Analyses. See the following papers by Morgan: *Let's Talk Deployment Arithmetic*, CAB 94-23, Center for Naval Analyses, May 1994; *The Navy's Deployment Arithmetic—Can It Add Up to a Larger Navy*? CRM 94-2, Center for Naval Analyses, August 1994.

3 Perstempo guidelines set specific limits on the amount of time that sailors may be deployed, including the length of individual deployments, which is currently 6 months.

- Alternative Posture III—provide full, continuous presence with *both* a CVBG and an ARG in the Western Pacific and *either* a CVBG or an ARG in the Med and in the IO at all times (This alternative also involves making CVBGs capable of conducting Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) and establishing a strengthened military-to-military contact program through activities such as IMET.[4])
- Alternative Posture IV—provide full, continuous presence with both a CVBG and an ARG in the Western Pacific and with both a CVBG and an ARG in a new, single Med/IO theater at all times (for naval presence purposes).

In Alternative Postures III and IV systematic efforts are made to try to ensure that land-based air/ground capabilities are available in theater or deployable from CONUS to complement naval presence assets as needed.

C. ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES

This study lacked the time and resources to assess each alternative presence posture fully. We have briefly articulated a means of addressing crisis responsiveness of alternative postures. We have also developed a set of four potential criteria to compare these alternatives. These criteria consider benefits in promoting the objectives of presence, their resource implications, and other considerations. The criteria are outlined briefly below.

To what extent does the approach—

(1) provide general capabilities to meet presence objectives?

(1a) initial crisis response

(1b) influence

(1c) reassurance

(1d) deterrence

(2) rely upon foreign access or basing permission to succeed?

(3) have force structure implications?

(4) cost more or less than the current program?

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4 International Military Education and Ttraining (IMET) is a relatively low cost and very highly regarded program among many of the CINCs. See for example, CINCEUR's discussion of his IMET program. In FY95 CINCEUR's IMET program cost approximately $27 million. Other engagagement programs, such as the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), which in EUCOM runs $16 million per year now, could also be strengthened significantly in this alternative.

Developing a fully structured set of assessments along the lines laid out here is the subject of a separate, more extensive study. However, we have conducted some preliminary assessments of each posture alternative.

1. Initial Crisis Response Analyses

There are several ways of assessing the relative crisis responsiveness of these presence posture alternatives within the context of the framework outlined above. Table V-3 depicts one of them. The table compares the total force package crisis responsiveness of all of the postures by displaying the total force package response times for each crisis response function for Presence Posture I (row 1 of the Posture I table above) and the changes in total force package response times associated with Postures II, III and IV. (Recall that the NMA Posture provides naval coverage identical to that in Posture I, so there is no need to display it in this particular table.) The table shows the differences for each military function in each theater. The table includes an additional average response time for instances in which the United States could not obtain base access in a theater. That average corresponds to the lowest of either the average for maritime forces or the average for CONUS-based land based forces, for functions that may always be performed from CONUS (Humanitarian Relief, Strikes against Point Targets, and Strikes against Area Targets).

The table shows that the differences in crisis responsiveness of the four presence posture alternatives is small. In the event the United States can obtain base access in theater, the postures do not differ at all. That is because typically land-based assets can deploy to the scene of a crisis as fast as or faster than maritime assets. In the event the United States cannot obtain base access in theater, Postures III and IV differ from Posture I only by one or two additional days in average response time, for those functions that CONUS-based forces might not be able to perform. Under the same circumstances, Posture II differs from Posture I by one or two fewer days in average response time and by 8 to 11 fewer days in worst case response times.

Table V-3. Presence Alternative Crisis Response Assessment

(Days)

Posture	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. I (baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	17	2	12	12	1	1	2	15	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average without base access	-	4	1	3	3	0	0	2	5	1	4	4	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1
c. average with base access	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. II (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	-11	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-3	0	-3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	-2	0	-2	-2	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. III (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	-2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. IV (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater
Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

\- Function not required or average not meaningful

When evaluating the difference between the postures one should keep in mind, however, that historically the United States has been able to obtain base access in almost all of the crises in which it has been involved in the past 10 years and, furthermore, that even if it could not obtain base access, the worst case for maritime forces is likely to occur only under a very limited set of circumstances. Therefore one can think of Postures III and IV as being slightly more risky than Posture I on average and Posture II as being slightly less risky on average and, depending on the nature of a given crisis, significantly less risky in the absolute worst case. Because the costs of the various postures differ, the decision to adopt one or the other on the basis of crisis responsiveness is fundamentally one of how much risk reduction one wishes to buy.

2. Influence, Reassurance and Deterrence Assessments

Several analyses of the relative efficacy of alternative military instruments in promoting the influence, reassurance, and deterrence objectives of presence have also been conducted during the course of this and the complementary CORM study. A set of interviews with senior government officials has been conducted. Defense attaches from a dozen foreign embassies have been interviewed. CINC staffs have been polled. And a set of case studies has been undertaken which may help shed some light on this issue. Summary observations from these various inputs are offered in this section.

1) A military presence in overseas regions carries substantially more weight in the eyes of foreign decision makers—and therefore goes much further toward achieving U.S. presence objectives—than do forces based exclusively in the United States.

2) A widespread conviction was identified among interviewees and in the literature that "what deters" is a demonstrated ability and willingness to use substantial combat capability, and a willingness to accept casualties. There was no coherent evidence, however, that a particular level of combat-capable forces had to be continuously present in order to deter.

3) A mix of land-based and sea-based forces and foreign military interaction (FMI) programs seems best, rather than exclusive reliance upon one or the other as a U.S. strategy for meeting the objectives of presence.

4) The effectiveness of presence does not dramatically rise or fall with the use of one Service or another.

5) Military-to-military contacts and combined operations of various kinds--from planning meetings to small exercises--are often dismissed as unimportant, as poor substitutes for U.S. combat force deployments. Yet the evidence points to these types of continuous engagement as an integral part of establishing a bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and foreign nations, contributing to closer political relations, enhancing interoperability and, in former totalitarian states, reinforcing democratic notions of the role of the military in civil societies. (See the concluding chapter of this paper for an argument that DoD undertake a scientific assessment of the impacts of such activities).

6) The maintenance of regular, though not necessarily continuous, U.S. military presence involving combat capable forces and on-the-ground, military-to-military contact programs in the post-Cold War era may yield economic benefits.

Based upon the findings described above—the evidence for which is documented in several CORM working papers[5]—the Posture alternatives sketched here (I, NMA, II, III, IV) are unlikely to differ appreciably in the extent to which they promote the objectives of influence, reassurance, or deterrence.

3. Force Structure Implications

The Presence Posture alternatives do differ significantly in their naval force structure implications, but not significantly as to the force structures of the other Services. The next chapter describes the force structure implications of each posture in greater detail, but the NMA posture would reduce the navy force structure by one or two CVBGs compared to the BUR, Posture II would increase the number of CVBGs by from 1 to 4 CVBGs, and Postures III and IV would each reduce the number of CVBGs by one or two.[6]

4. Cost Implications

The cost implications of these Postures will be described in Chapter VI.

D. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has outlined a methodology for assessing alternative U.S. presence postures, focusing most heavily upon a scheme for comparing such postures in terms of

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5 See CORM Presence Working Papers B1, B2, and B5.

6 See CORM Presence Working Paper C3. The range of CVBGs results from several considerations, including how many CVBGs are considered to be "on the margin" for presence, and whether management efficiencies are included in the posture. Also See Chapter VI.

their relative advantages for initial crisis responsiveness, one of the core objectives of presence. Only a small set of alternative presence postures has been illustrated here. There are many other possibilities that seem worthy of consideration.

The methodology presented here attempts to provide a unified conceptual framework for considering the initial crisis response assets of all the Services. The metric proposed (days to move sufficient assets into range) is closer to a presence "output" measure than the current DoD metric, e.g., number of days or percentage of the year that a military asset (a CVBG or an ARG) spends in theater.

Chapter VI now presents a method for assessing the resource implications of each of the posture alternatives.

VI. ASSESSING RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter proposes a methodology for determining the costs of alternative methods of providing overseas presence. To summarize the issue briefly, in the post-Cold War world naval or other forces sized for war fighting may not be deemed sufficient to perform traditional forward presence activities in the same way we did during the Cold War. Additional forces for presence have been justified in the recent past on a case-by-case basis. Understanding the true cost implications of such decisions is important, and hinges upon developing a valid set of cost principles.

B. DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED

This section discusses several illustrative presence options that could be considered within the context of the cost analysis. For each option, force structure and operating policies are discussed. Some of the options have sub-options that vary some of the determinants of cost. Costs are examined using three time horizons: 10 years and 18 years, as well as the 6-year FYDP period.

Alternative I, the baseline, is the status quo. Naval forces exceed those required for two MRCs, but the Regional CINCs' stated requirements for presence are not fully met. The force structure for this alternative is the one discussed in the Bottom-Up Review. The Navy has 11 carrier battle groups and 1 training carrier. One or two of these carrier battle groups are needed, not for two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs), but for presence.[1] This was assessed to be a moderate-risk force. For this baseline case, we assume that, over a 20-year period, four carriers will be procured, CVN-76 (which has been contracted for), CVN-77, CVN-78, and CVN-79. We consider the cost of the baseline force structure operating as currently planned. One excursion from Alternative I (an excursion labeled NMA in Chapter V), could consider the cost of buying more presence

1 This assumes that the training carrier would be deployed in the two-MRC case, but would not provide presence in peacetime. Modifying these assumptions could change the number of carriers attributable to the presence mission.

from the existing force structure by changing some Navy operating policies. Another excursion might push procurement of at least two of the planned carriers beyond the 20-year time horizon by extending the Service life of carriers currently in the fleet.

Alternative II would satisfy CINC requests for naval presence by expanding the Navy. The force structure postulated for this alternative is 13 carriers (12 battle groups and 1 training carrier with NMA efficiencies) and 16 carriers (15/1) without them.[2] Army and Air Force force structure would remain unchanged. This alternative would involve both delaying the retirement of existing carriers and procuring additional carriers. It is possible that this alternative will strain existing carrier production facilities. Facilities would have to be expanded, so that the cost of that expansion must be included. Operating costs for the additional carrier battle groups would also be included.

Alternative III would limit the Navy's force structure to that required by the two-MRC case, 9 carrier battle groups and 1 training carrier. CVN-76 would be procured, but procurement of CVN-77 would be delayed until 2008, and conventional carriers would be retired to get down to the required force structure. This alternative involves lower operating costs than the baseline.

Alternative IV is a modification of Alternative III in which some land-based forces are forward deployed all or part of the time in order to bolster presence. Variations in operating costs, deployment costs, prepositioning costs and costs associated with overseas basing should be considered.

C. COSTING PRINCIPLES

1. Costs Included in the Analysis

The first costing principle that must be established is which costs will be considered. To provide the most useful information for decision making, the costs we will consider here are the *future* costs *borne specifically to perform the presence mission.*

Costs already incurred are sunk and are thus not included. They do not enter into any future decisions about how to provide presence.

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2 The number of CVBGs needed for this option depends on the operating policies postulated for the Navy. The high end assumes a continuation of current operating policies. A carrier force of 13/1 could meet the requirement without violating Navy policy concerning personnel tempo. A force of 12/1 could only meet the requirement by violating personnel tempo policy.

For forces justified on the basis of presence, we propose including both their procurement and Operating and Support (O&S) costs. For forces justified on the basis of missions other than presence, we propose excluding their procurement costs even though these forces provide presence—they would exist regardless of decisions made about presence. For forces justified on the basis of nonpresence missions, only additional O&S costs above what they would have been without the presence mission, will be considered.

The costs of alternatives should be estimated relative to the baseline of the currently planned force structure according to the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) operating in the currently planned way. For the Navy, that involves a force of 11 active carriers and 1 training carrier with about 3 carriers deployed at any time.

2. Categorization of Costs

Analysis of the costs of alternative ways of providing overseas presence should use the following categorization:

Hardware costs

- Development
- Procurement
- Service-life extension programs

Operating and support (O&S) costs

- Personnel
- Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

Indirect Costs

Deployment preparation costs

- Prepositioning
- Lift (Sea & Air)

3. Data Sources

Procurement costs come from the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). For O&S and deployment preparation costs, we use Service input and make use of several models including IDA's Force Acquisition Cost System (FACS) and the Air Force's SABLE model. To estimate the costs of some of the excursions, we draw on the results of analytical studies from organizations such as the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and

analytical studies from organizations such as the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and IDA. In addition, other specialized data will be needed from the military Services and OSD.

D. METHODOLOGY BY TYPE OF COST

1. Hardware Costs

No new systems are being designed to perform the presence mission, so development costs are not included in our analysis.

Procurement costs do enter into the analysis. In the BUR, only 10 carriers (9 active and 1 for training) are justified for the two-MRC case. The eleventh and twelfth carriers are justified on the basis of presence. Therefore, in the baseline, the difference in procurement costs required to maintain a 12-carrier force instead of an 10-carrier force should be considered. While the 10 carriers needed for the two-MRC case also provide presence, their existence is justified on the basis of war fighting. Therefore, there are no marginal (extra) hardware costs associated with them for presence.

Procurement costs should be incorporated into the analysis on a cash-flow basis. If, for example, an alternative allows us to maintain a carrier force of 12 (11 of which are needed for the two-MRC case) without any procurement during the defined time horizon, no procurement costs are included in the analysis. On the other hand, an alternative that requires a replacement carrier in 2005 to maintain a force size of 12 will include the full procurement cost of that carrier. The procurement cost of the carrier now planned for that time period is $4.6 billion in FY 1995 dollars.[3]

If a 12-carrier force is maintained without additional procurement, by extending the life of a carrier with a Service life extension program (SLEP), the cost of the SLEP should be attributed to the presence option. Alternative II, for example, includes a force of 14 carriers. The costs of procuring the additional carriers should be added in that option.

2. Operating and Support Costs

For elements of the force structure that are justified on the basis of the presence mission (e.g., the twelfth carrier in the above example) all operating and support (O&S)

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3 The source of this estimate is a Selected Acquisition Report (as of December 1993).

costs will be attributed to presence. According to the FACS, the annual cost of operating a conventional carrier is $244 million ($184 million for a nuclear carrier) and the annual cost of operating a carrier airwing is $140 million.

For elements of the force structure justified on other grounds (the two-MRC case, for example) only additions in O&S costs above what they would have been without the presence mission will be considered.

Deployed carriers have higher operating tempo than nondeployed carriers, and hence higher operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. Alternatives that reduce the number of carriers deployed will have lower carrier O&M costs, even if carrier force levels do not change. Some alternatives may modify some operating policies (e.g., maintenance intervals). These alternatives should include the changes in O&S costs.

Some alternatives may involve additional deployment of Air Force, Army, or Marine Corps forces to provide influence, reassurance, and deterrence. We expect that these alternatives will not involve force structure changes, but that they will entail additional deployment costs. An alternative involving permanent stationing of an Air Force wing in Southwest Asia, for example, may involve the construction of some facilities. It also may involve more frequent or more expensive permanent change of station moves. These factors should be considered in the costing analysis.

An element of force structure typically has an authorized number of personnel associated with it and an easily calculated level of personnel costs. Some alternatives that postulate modified operating policies may involve higher personnel costs. Extra personnel costs in these latter options should be estimated and included in the cost of the option.

3. Indirect Costs

Historically, only about half of the Defense Department budget is spent on the procurement, operation, and direct support of combat forces. A substantial portion of the remainder (about a third of the total) is devoted to various kinds of defense infrastructure, including installation support, central logistics, administration, medical care, personnel management, central communications, and training. While elements of infrastructure vary with force structure, the precise nature of the relationship is very uncertain. We estimate the indirect costs using the Force Acquisition Cost System (FACS). It allocates all indirect costs to forces and treats half of them as fixed. This approach is consistent with research

performed for OSD's Total Force Policy Study.[4] The indirect costs consist of personnel and operating costs for logistics, medical, training, and other support functions. Investment costs are not included. They are allocated among elements of force structure according to a scheme that depends on the personnel and operating costs of the forces.

4. Deployment Preparation Costs

Some of the alternatives are likely to involve the use of CONUS-based forces to meet the crisis-response requirements of presence. They may require the prepositioning of additional materiel in theater. They also might require the procurement and operation of additional lift assets to provide the needed responsiveness. For each alternative, attention should be paid to the need for additional prepositioning and lift. If they are needed, the extra costs will be included in the analysis. Service assistance will often be needed to estimate these costs.

E. FORMAT FOR RESULTS

We propose presenting costs as changes from the baseline, in billions of FY 1995 dollars for each of several planning (time) horizons. Information on both total (undiscounted) costs and the net present value of costs should be shown. Discounting transforms costs incurred in different time periods to a common unit of measurement. The net present value of costs is computed by applying a discount rate to future costs. In its parallel work, the CORM has decided on a short-term time horizon of 10 years and a long-term time horizon of 18 years, in adddition to the FYDP period. These seem reasonable. Following OMB guidelines, we propose using discount rates of 2.75 percent.

F. INITIAL COST ESTIMATES FOR THE STUDY ALTERNATIVES

Table VI-1 provides some initial estimates of the costs of the alternatives.[5]

The table indicates the following:

- If Navy operating policies can be modified to keep carriers on station a larger fraction of the time, savings of $900 million a year can be achieved without reducing naval presence.

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4 James L. Wilson, W. C. Devers, T. P. Frazier, M. S. Goldberg, S. A. Horowitz, and J. J. Kane, *Considerations in a Comprehensive Total Force Cost Estimate*, IDA Paper P-2613, November 1992.

5 For a more elaborate discussion of these costs, see Stanley Horowitz and Karen Tyson, CORM Presence Working Paper D-1, January 1995.

- Reducing naval presence by removing two carriers from the structure would save about $1.9 billion per year.
- Changing the relative prominence of the Services in providing presence could save roughly $1.7 billion a year (not counting the costs associated with additional Air Force deployments).

Table VI-1. 18-Year Costs of Alternative Presence Postures (Relative to the Baseline)

Alternative Presence Posture	No. of Naval Carriers in Force Structure	Total Cost FY1996-2013($B95)	Net Present Value FY96-2013:($B95)	Comments
Baseline (I)	12	—	—	Procures 3 carriers
NMA (Ia)	11	-17.0	-13.9	Eliminates 1 carrier and airwing
More Naval Presence (II)	13	+16.5	+14.0	Buys 1 more carrier, operates additional carrier and airwing
Smaller Naval Presence (III)	10	-34.4	-27.4	Buys and operates 2 fewer carriers and operates 2 fewer airwings
Smaller Naval Presence, more exercises, forward land-based deployment (IV)	10	-31.1	-25.2	Cost of Air Force deployments not yet included

It is important to remember that our results are driven by some critical assumptions:

- We use the BUR to define our Baseline and recognize that the fluid world situation could increase or decrease the number of carriers and carrier airwings needed for warfighting. This would affect the cost of using naval forces for presence.
- The two-MRC scenario does not require 12 carriers in the force structure. The BUR and the analysis performed for it largely support this assumption, but some material in the BUR is consistent with the notion that 12 is at the top end of the range of carriers that could be needed for the two MRCs. Accepting this requirement would considerably reduce the savings associated with many of the alternatives relative to the Baseline.

- The procurement of surface combatants or aircraft does not vary across the alternatives. It is our understanding that by 2013 the Navy's planned recapitalization program will not yet have procured enough new equipment to modernize the portion of the inventory needed for the two-MRC scenario. Thus, increases or decreases in the amount of procurement attributable to presence would fall outside the planning period used in this analysis.

G. DISCUSSION

The cost elements that we propose for analysis of the presence alternatives are conceptually fairly simple. This chapter has outlined them and provided several preliminary illustrations. Looking to the future, developing credible cost estimates for each specific alternative at a budget level of detail will require very careful attention to at least two matters:

- specifying the alternatives in enough detail to support the costing. The resources associated with each alternative will have to be identified. This includes understanding the procurement implication of alternatives with respect to surface combatants and aircraft. It also includes quantifying, for example, additional lift requirements associated with greater reliance on crisis response from CONUS.
- information on cost elements not available from standard sources such as overseas basing costs. Participation by the Services will be required in some cases.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this paper we have attempted to clarify what military presence is, to describe changes and areas of continuity in U.S. military presence activities over the last decade, to identify the perspectives of major DOD components concerning how such activities should be treated in the future, to discuss some innovative possibilities for thinking about presence, and to begin to sketch—albeit briefly—some methodological tools that could be of use to DOD components in the future in planning and programming assets for presence.

A. OBSERVATIONS

Several observations and conclusions seem important, even based on this initial scoping study.

- U.S. national security strategy depends heavily upon an effective combination of power projection capabilities and forward presence capabilities and activities. This will be the case for many years to come.
- U.S. military presence capabilities and activities serve several purposes, including influence, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response.
- A rich menu of military activities and force units is available to U.S. decision makers to promote these objectives, including activities and force units provided by all of the Services today. The interviews and position papers provided in Appendices H and I attest amply to this, as do both the chronology of discrete U.S. presence incidents we developed (Appendix A) and the six case studies conducted for this research effort (Appendices B through G).
- Several innovative efforts are under way to draw on the strengths of all the DOD components in promoting the objectives of presence. Notable among these are the USACOM effort to develop the Joint Adaptive Force Package concept and the PACOM Cooperative Engagement Matrix, described by each CINC, respectively, in Appendix I. While each approach has limitations, both have considerable promise.
- Presence tends to be measured more in "input" terms today (e.g., days on station in a region) than in "output" terms (extent of influence achieved, adverse activities deterred, or responsiveness of U.S. military assets to potential crises of one sort or another). Based on our experience, we believe more output-oriented measures can be developed. We have proposed in

Chapter V a scheme that covers one of the major stated objectives of presence—initial crisis responsiveness. The construct is an admittedly preliminary effort, but it could enable structured, systematic analysis of the relative responsiveness of various military assets that may be used by the U.S. to promote this important objective of presence.

- While they are more subjective, the presence objectives of influence, reassurance, and deterrence are certainly important. They would seem to be best promoted by U.S. efforts to demonstrate engagement and commitment. Part of such demonstration efforts would reasonably include clear evidence of U.S. ability and willingness to use combat force to protect and advance U.S. interests, friends and allies. But on-the-ground engagement with military-to-military contact programs, as well as combined, joint exercises, can be especially important too.

- Because the presence postures and activities that the United States engages in now and is planning for the future have resource implications, we have identified several costing principles for addressing presence activities. We have described them in Chapter VI and provided some first-order illustrations of how they may be applied to several alternative presence postures.

  Here, we propose considering the future costs borne specifically to perform the presence mission. Costs already incurred are not included, because they are sunk. They do not enter into any future decisions about how to provide presence. For forces justified on the basis of presence, we propose including both their procurement and O&S costs. For forces justified on the basis of missions other than presence, we propose excluding their procurement costs even though these forces provide presence. This is because these forces would exist regardless of decisions made about presence. For forces justified on the basis of non-presence missions, only additions in O&S costs above what they would have been without the presence mission will be considered.

These principles may be somewhat controversial. They may require additional application and refinement before they are well accepted.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Three principal recommendations are in order.

OSD should conduct a regular, systematic, in-depth review of the programs and capabilities available to the Department to promote the objectives of presence. Some opportunities may be available to capitalize on management efficiencies in delivery of

forward presence, e.g., taking seriously the types of management policy alternatives described briefly in Chapter V, in Appendix J, and in the path breaking work conducted by Dr. William Morgan of the Center for Naval Analyses[1] along these lines.

As a part of this first recommendation, DoD should also consider conducting rigorous assessments of the payoffs of those presence activities that it now labels Foreign Military Interactions (FMI), e.g., military-to-military contact programs, exercises. For it is one thing to assert the value of such activities or collate perceptions as to their value, and quite another to develop a strong body of evidence along these lines. Analyzing the actual efficacy of such activities in promoting tangible results favorable to U.S. foreign policy or presence objectives would be worthwhile for several reasons. Most important, it could help DoD get the most for its presence dollar.

OSD should adopt a method of considering and comparing simultaneously the contributions of various military assets in providing initial responsiveness for a variety of representative crises. One such construct has been outlined here briefly. Others may be available as well. But this study has identified at least one simple technique that DoD can use to move beyond pure "input" type measures of physical presence to more clearly meaningful "output" type measures, such as timeliness of crisis response of various presence postures.

DoD should adopt a set of costing principles for presence activities and conduct periodic assessments of the costs and benefits of various presence posture alternatives. A variety of innovative approaches to achieving the objectives of presence have been identified in this study. The recommended costing principles and periodic assessments would enable DoD to structure a systematic, joint program to promote the objectives of presence as is being advanced by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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1 William F. Morgan, *Let's Talk Deployment Arithmetic*, CAB 94-23, Center for Naval Analyses, May 1994. See also Dr. Morgan's *The Navy's Deployment Arithmetic—Can It Add Up to a Larger Navy?* CRM 94-2, Center for Naval Analyses, August 1994.

Appendix A

CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL-MILITARY INCIDENTS 1983-1994

Appendix A
CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL-MILITARY INCIDENTS 1983–1994

I want also to thank the men and women of the United States armed forces. It was their *presence* . . . that played a pivotal part in this agreement.

—President Bill Clinton
The Crisis in Haiti
September 18, 1994

STUDY OVERVIEW

Military forces have been employed for operations other than war virtually since their inception. From staging parades to awe the populace to maneuvering forces near a troublesome border in a time of diplomatic crisis, military forces have often participated in overtly political actions. The U.S. military has a long history of such actions and we are particularly interested here in those over the last decade. This study has attempted to chronicle the more notable among such actions from January 1983 to September 1994 in an effort to detect the emergence of new trends and modes of thinking in the development of political-military incidents.

As tasked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, IDA was to "describe the major uses of U.S. armed forces in political-military missions during the post-Cold War period, and in the transitional period when the Cold War was ending." In addition, IDA was to attempt to "identify and establish major trends in the United States use of the armed forces in political-military missions." Pursuant to these tasks IDA developed a chronology of political-military incidents with a base year of 1983.

SOURCES

IDA began this effort by surveying the existing literature on political-military incidents. Much of the literature prior to the mid-1970s has explored, to varying degrees, the use of force in political-military incidents or related functions. Unfortunately, much of this work is piecemeal or tangential to the purpose of this paper.

The seminal work in the field of political-military incidents is *Force Without War* by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan. Published in 1978, *Force Without War* has served as the definitive guide on which many subsequent studies have been modeled. In 1985 Philip D.

Zelikow published *The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Study*, which updates Blechman's research. Around that time, with the ending of the Cold War and the evident expansion of previously subordinate military roles, many researchers published analyses or chronicles of political-military incidents. Among these is Adam B. Siegel, a researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses, whose works have considered the use of Navy Department forces.

In addition to these methodological guides, a number of other sources provide a lengthy roster of incidents. The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force has compiled a rather thorough catalog of Air Force involvement in political-military incidents from 1946–1992. Similarly, a significant number of works from the Center for Naval Analyses chronicle U.S. naval activities in the post-World War II era. The author was unable to locate any composition of similar scope and breadth on behalf of the United States Army. Beyond these writings, the *American Defense Annual*, the *Current News/Early Bird*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* were found to be of significant value. Further references and complete citations are contained in the Selected Bibliography at the end of this appendix.

The future of political-military incidents will undoubtedly be one of continuing study. As the services grapple with the roles and missions debate and other contentious issues, the requirements for academic research into the area will remain unsated.

METHODOLOGY

IDA created an initially broad data base of potential events by searching through a wide variety of sources, of which those of significance are listed in the Selected Bibliography. We paid particular attention to the forces involved and the motivation behind the use of those forces. Having generated a rough list, we then developed a series of filters to purge events that failed to meet one or more of a number of criteria. Like previous authors on the subject, however, we found that event selection remains somewhat of an art. For the purposes of this study, we eliminated the occurrences in Table A-1 from consideration.

Table A-1. Event Discrimination

1.	Routine deployments, exercises, and rotations	6.	Transfers of financial or military resources
2.	Weapons of mass destruction	7.	Space-borne assets
3.	Events resulting in violence*	8.	Diplomatic activities and personnel
4.	U.S. paramilitary operations	9.	Changes in force posture
5.	Actions taken in the United States or Puerto Rico	10.	Classified activities

* Striking omissions are produced by this filter. For example, Operation DESERT SHIELD is included, Operation DESERT STORM is excluded. It might be reiterated, however, that this paper is focused on military operations other than war.

In addition to this negative filter, we applied two additional positive filters. The first, unit composition/size, was intended to remove events considered to be too insignificant in size to merit consideration. The smaller the scale of the events to be included, the more inaccurate the data base becomes given the difficulty in collecting records of such actions. The composition/size filter was configured as indicated in Table A-2.

Table A-2. Composition/Size Filter

U.S. Air Force:	AWACS (1 aircraft +) Combat Aircraft (1 aircraft +) Lift assets (squadron +) Support Assets (varying sizes)
U.S. Army:	Combat Aircraft (1 aircraft +) Combat Arms-Artillery (battery +) Combat Arms-Infantry (company +) Combat Arms-Tank (platoon +) Support Assets (varying sizes)
U.S. Marine Corps:	Amphibious Ships (1 ship +) Combat Aircraft (1 aircraft +) Combat Arms-Artillery (battery +) Combat Arms-Infantry (company +) Combat Arms-Tank (platoon +) Support Assets (varying sizes)
U.S. Navy:	Aircraft Carriers (1 ship +) Amphibious Ships (1 ship +) Combat Aircraft (1 aircraft +) Major Surface Combatants (1 frigate +)* Support Assets (varying sizes)

* Submarines were excluded given the paucity of unclassified records.

Consistent with the model established by Blechman and Kaplan, we subcategorized those events that met the composition/size criterion as major, moderate, and minor force commitments. Table A-3 shows the resultant criteria as a rough ranking of military effort based on past experiences. This classification does not attempt to relate such factors as cost or manpower involved.[1]

Table A-3. Level of Force Classification

	Type of Force		
Level of Force	Naval	Ground	Land-Based Air
Major	Two or more aircraft carrier task groups	More than one battalion	One or more combat wings
Moderate	One aircraft carrier task group	No more than one battalion, but larger than one company	One or more combat squadrons but less than one wing
Minor	No aircraft carriers included	No more than one company	Less than one combat squadron

We then applied a second (temporal) filter to those events that failed to meet the composition/size criterion. Our question, should the deployment of a company of soldiers for one day merit inclusion while a deployment of 100 soldiers for 100 days does not, does not easily lend itself to quantification, particularly in a quick analysis. Given unlimited resources, perhaps a man-hour per incident measure would serve as a guide to incorporating the temporal factor. However, given the limited resources of this study we subjectively decided which events merited inclusion—of which there were very few—and jettisoned the rest. Figure A-1 depicts the filtration process.

Throughout these filters, one may correctly note a bias toward combat units at the expense of non-combat units. This is because combat units typically exert the greatest degree of presence, or at least give the appearance of doing so. Additionally, transport assets routinely deploy and are much more difficult to track. The political-military value of non-combat units should not, however, be underestimated.

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1 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978: p. 49.




Figure A-1. Filter Schematic

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Using the data base established, IDA attempted to best illustrate the data through a series of figures and tables employing limited quantitative analysis. The purpose of this was twofold: (1) to track emerging trends in political-military incidents in the post-Cold War era. (2) to capture the data compiled in a visually stimulating manner.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

As with all studies, the context and points of potential error need to be mentioned. IDA undertook the chronology compilation and analysis as a subtask of a larger 4-month study conducted at the behest of the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the summer/fall of 1994. Given the limitation of resources, the study should be viewed in this context.

Points of potential error and limitation exist in this study and all others. (1) The data, while collected from a series of sources, reflects the biases evident in these sources. Efforts to limit such biases have, naturally, been extensive. (2) The types of filters utilized are neither necessarily self-evident nor beyond reproach. Although strict objectivity is clearly preferable, analysis is by definition an art and thus is captive to the limitations of subjectivity. (3) This list is illustrative and

not exhaustive. It does not purport to contain all such events or to be the definitive guide to the study of political-military incidents. The purpose of the study is to track broad trends and not the specific details of any one occurrence or event. (4) Given the scarcity of resources, we have been unable to conduct research in the field or to spend any amount of time searching service archives. A more extensive effort would commonly entail such work.

With these considerations in mind, the results may be properly examined.

CHRONOLOGY

No.	Date	Location	Description
1	83 2	Egypt	USAF E-3A AWACS aircraft, supported by tankers, deployed to Egypt at the request of President Mubarak in response to a perceived Libyan threat. In addition, the *Nimitz* CVBG deployed to the area of Libya.
2	83 2	Honduras	Operation BIG PINE. 7,000 U.S. troops and Honduran forces began six-days of exercises on the coast, seven miles from the Nicaraguan border.
3	83 4	Thailand	The U.S. made an emergency shipment of military equipment to Thailand following an incursion of Burmese regulars.
4	83 6	Honduras, Nicaragua	The carrier *Ranger* led a battle group that conducted a two-week demonstration off the west coast of Central America where the U.S. was attempting to check the spread of Communism. Later in the summer another carrier group headed by the *Coral Sea* exercised of the east coast and the battleship *New Jersey* off the west.
5	83 7	South China Sea	USN ships rescued 262 Vietnamese refugees and directed merchant ships to 80 more.
6	83 8	Chad, Sudan	Two E-3As and 8 F-15s were deployed to Sudan in response to the unsettled political situation in that region. Aircraft from the USS *Eisenhower* operated in the Gulf also.
7	83 8	Honduras	Operation BIG PINE II began. It was the largest military exercise ever held in Central America to that date, and involved substantial joint forces.
8	83 8	Lebanon	USS *Eisenhower* brought in close to Beirut in response to continued attacks on U.S. peacekeepers. Additional ships deployed to respond to the crisis.
9	83 9	Korea	Responding to the downing of KAL 007, the U.S. naval and air elements engaged in and support search and rescue operations.
10	83 10	Grenada	USS *Independence* CVBG and MARG I-84 approached Grenada as a "signal" to the government there. A day after arrival, Operation URGENT FURY began.
11	83 10	Iran	The 31st MAU moved near the Persian Gulf as Iran threatened to blockade the strait. The *Ranger* CVBG arrived to support U.S. forces in the region.
12	83 10	Korea	The *Carl Vinson* CVBG extended operations near Korea following a North Korean terrorist act in Burma.
13	84 2	Hormuz Strait	The U.S. sent a naval task force through the Strait in an assertion of the right of passage after Iran threatened to prevent such action.

14	84 3	El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua	SecDef authorized an increased navy presence off the coast of Central America to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region and to deter Nicaraguan aggression. The *America* began operations shortly thereafter and joint exercises were continually conducted throughout the year.
15	84 3	Egypt	AWACS aircraft were deployed to Egypt because of Egyptian fears of a Libyan attack on the Sudan. The U.S. later airlifted Egyptian personnel and equipment to Sudan in response to a Libyan air raid against Sudan.
16	84 4	Iran	Following hostile Iranian actions, the U.S. maintained a continuous carrier presence in the region and began escorting American flagged merchant ships in May.
17	84 6	Saudi Arabia	Following Iraqi initiation of a major anti-shipping campaign, AWACS aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia.
18	84 6	Gulf of Sidra	F-14 Tomcats from the *Saratoga* flew over the Gulf of Sidra in demonstration of the US' rejection of Libya's claim to sovereignty over the 30,000-square-mile body of water.
19	84 8	Sudan	USAF deployed E-3A aircraft to monitor fighting in Chad.
20	84 8	Arabian Sea, Gulf of Suez	USN joined a multinational effort to locate mines in the Gulf of Suez. The USS *Harkness* began Operation INTENSE LOOK on August 4. Meanwhile, the *LaSalle* began operations off Saudi Arabia August 15. USAF tankers and airlifters also participate.
21	84 9	Lebanon	Following terrorist threats, three USN warships appeared off the coast of Lebanon.
22	84 11	Cuba	An E-3A AWACS and two fighters provided air patrols over a disabled U.S. merchant ship that had drifted into Cuban waters. The USS *Nimitz* also provided support for the rescuing USCG vessel.
23	85 3	Lebanon	U.S. embassy evacuated while the USS *Eisenhower* steamed toward Lebanon following terrorist threats against American personnel.
24	85 4	Japan	3 U.S. F-16s touched down at the joint U.S.-Japan Misawa Air Base in northern Japan. The aircraft presaged the deployment of two squadrons by 1987. These are the first U.S. combat jets stationed in northern Japan since 1972.
25	85 6	Lebanon	The *Nimitz* battle group and the 24th MAU arrived off Beirut August 17 in response to the hijacking of TWA flight 847.
26	85 9	Mexico	Massive earthquakes wrought havoc on Mexico City, destroying 2,500 buildings and killing 4,000 people. Airlifters transported 375 tons of cargo to aid rescuers and to assist the populace.
27	85 9	Iran	The USN escorts a MSC ship and increased surveillance activity in the Persian Gulf following Iranian actions.
28	85 10	Mediterranean	In response to the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, the U.S. rushed a SEAL team and Delta Force commando units to the Mediterranean as U.S. and Italian warships shadowed the cruise ship. Three days later USN F-14 Tomcat fighters from the *Saratoga* plus support aircraft force an EgyptAir 737 ferrying the hijackers to land at Sigonella AB in Italy.
29	85 11	Malta	The USS *Coral Sea* and other units responded to the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner.
30	86 1	Yemen	U.S. naval forces moved to Yemen to await an order to extract American citizens from a bloody civil war. Royal Navy ships and others instead conducted the operation.

31	86 1	Gulf of Sidra	The *Coral Sea* and *Saratoga* carrier battle groups conducted freedom of navigation exercises in and near the Gulf of Sidra, dubbed Operation ATTAIN DOCUMENT I. Similar exercises occurred in February and March, eventually culminating in violence before a triumphant U.S. withdrawal.
32	86 1	Iran	The Pentagon ordered two U.S. warships to an area just outside the Persian Gulf after the Iranian Navy briefly stopped and boarded the U.S. merchant ship *President Taylor.*
33	86 3	Honduras	4 U.S. Chinook and 10 UH-1 Hueys, manned by U.S. soldiers, transported a battalion of Honduran troops close to the Nicaraguan border, where Sandinista forces were fighting Contra rebels.
34	86 4	Mediterranean	The USN reassembled the USS *America* and the USS *Coral Sea* carrier battle groups as a warning to Libya.
35	86 5	Gulf of Oman	The presence of the U.S. destroyer *David R. Ray* averted an Iranian boarding of the commercial vessel *President McKinley*, which Iran desired to search for contraband. Iran had previously searched the *President Taylor* in January.
36	86 7	Bolivia	U.S. troops were sent to Bolivia in Operation BLAST FURNACE to aid the Bolivian military in a series of raids on drug traffickers. U.S. forces are comprised of 6 Black Hawk helicopters and a company of associated personnel.
37	86 9	Cyprus, Lebanon	Following the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner, the USS *Forrestal* moved to the Eastern Mediterranean to counter the aircraft from fleeing to Cyprus or Beirut.
38	86 9	Korea	USAF flew E-3 sorties and F-16s sat alert during the Asian Games in South Korea to deter North Korea from attacking.
39	86 11	China	The USS *Reeves* , *Rentz* , and *Oldendorf* arrived in Qingdao to make the first port visit to China since 1949.
40	86 12	Honduras	In response to a Nicaraguan attack on Contra bases in Honduras, 6 U.S. Chinook helicopters were used to ferry Honduran troops to the border areas.
41	87 1	Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf	The USS *Kitty Hawk* and escorts were ordered to the northern Arabian Sea to warn Iran not to carry its present offensive too far while a U.S. Middle Eastern Task Force was moved further north in the Persian gulf. Additional deployments followed.
42	87 2	Lebanon	A U.S. naval assault force led by the USS *Inchon* was ordered to the waters off Lebanon. Other ships already there were redeployed in an effort to alleviate tension after a wave of kidnappings.
43	87 3	Honduras	A combined exercise involving U.S. personnel and Honduran forces began. Operation SOLID SHIELD was the largest U.S. exercise ever in Central America.
44	87 7	Persian Gulf	Operation EARNEST WILL began as the USN conducted the first naval convoy of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. E-3A AWACS aircraft, tankers, and cargo aircraft are also utilized. The operation was terminated December, 1989 after 136 convoys containing 270 merchant ships had been safely escorted.
45	88 1	Haiti	Marine units moved close to the coast of Haiti in response to unrest sparked by a change in government.
46	88 2	Black Sea	The guided-missile cruiser *Yorktown* and the destroyer *Caron* were bumped by a Soviet frigate and destroyer, respectively, in international waters near Sebastopol, where they were asserting the right of passage.

47	88 3	Honduras	2 battalions of the 82d airborne and 2 battalions of the 7th Infantry Division deployed to Honduras in response to a Nicaraguan offensive. USAF tankers were utilized in Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT.
48	88 4	Panama	Eight C-5s and 22 C-141s airlifted 1300 security specialists from the U.S. to Panama, where political instability threatened the safety of the several thousand Americans residing in that nation. Also, U.S. troops engaged in an exercise simulating the takeover of the Panama Canal to demonstrate American resolve to ensure the security of the Canal. U.S. forces included 9 UH-60 Black Hawks, AH-1 Cobra gunships, and 89 soldiers from the 193d Light Infantry Brigade. In June an additional 250 security personnel were sent to Panama.
49	88 9	Korea	USAF E-3As and fighters flew high visibility sorties to deter any North Korean aggression during the Olympic Games in South Korea. In addition, two CVBGs operated in the Sea of Japan at this time.
50	88 9	Burma	Preparations were made to evacuate non-combatants from Burma because of increasing civil strife. An evacuation was not deemed necessary in the final analysis.
51	88 9	Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico	The 1989 Defense Authorization Act resulted in the use of USN assets to fight the War on Drugs, primarily in a "detection and monitoring role."
52	88 11	Maldives	*Nimitz* CVBG moved toward the Maldives in response to an attempted coup.
53	89 2	Lebanon	A MARG and the *Theodore Roosevelt* moved toward Lebanon as fighting intensified in the civil war.
54	89 5	Panama	Operation NIMROD DANCER deployed 1,881 U.S. personnel from Marine units, the 7th Light Infantry Division, and the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division to Panama to bolster the U.S. presence. USAF airlift was utilized. Meanwhile, USSOUTHCOM increased the number of exercises significantly.
55	89 5	South China Sea	A series of rescues by USN ships of Vietnamese refugees began. These events occurred regularly throughout the summer of 1989.
56	89 6	China	During civil unrest in China, a CVBG steamed in the South China Sea.
57	89 8	Soviet Union	The guided-missile cruiser *Thomas S. Gates* and the guided-missile frigate *Kauffman* visited the Soviet Black Sea Fleet base of Sevastopol.
58	89 8	Iran, Lebanon	In the wake of the killing of a U.S. hostage and an inability to make progress on the release of other hostages, the White House ordered the USS *America* to the coast of Iran and the USS *Coral Sea* and the battleship *Iowa* to Lebanon.
59	89 9	Virgin Islands	President Bush ordered 2 battalions of military police and 2 guided-missile frigates to the Virgin Islands to help quell riots that broke out in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. Operation HAWKEYE is the first use of Army troops to quell a civil disturbance since the 1968 riots in America's cities. USAF provided airlift which brought in troops and humanitarian aid.

60	89 9	Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the Caribbean	President Bush announced the Andean Initiative to authorize the deployment of U.S. personnel, among other actions, to South American states to combat drug trafficking. Six months later, DoD announced a $2-bn military anti-drug effort in the Caribbean, ordering additional ships and aircraft to the Caribbean, including AWACS, E-2s, P-3s, aerostats, and support elements.
61	89 12	Philippines	Two F-4 Phantom IIs made "persuasion" flights over rebel positions during an unsuccessful coup attempt against President Aquino. In addition, USN units moved into Subic Bay.
62	90 5	South China Sea	A series of rescues of Vietnamese refugees by the U.S. Navy commenced. They continued into July.
63	90 6	Liberia	U.S. forces arrived off the coast of Liberia following civil unrest. U.S. forces evacuated U.S. citizens and dependents from Liberia in a two-week operation in August. Over 850 people were evacuated. Operation SHARP EDGE is extended until January, 1991. A combined total of 2,400 people are evacuated. U.S. forces were composed of the USS *Saipan* , *Patterson* , *Ponce* , *Sumter* , and 2,300 Marines from the 22d MEU.
64	90 7	Persian Gulf	6 U.S. warships, 2 KC-135s, a C-141 and warships of the United Arab Emirates held short-notice exercises to signal Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to avoid starting a conflict with Kuwait.
65	90 7	Philippines	U.S. military personnel from PACAF and the 7th Fleet joined a rescue effort for victims of a major earthquake that killed over 200 people.
66	90 8	Southwest Asia	Following Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, President Bush ordered the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, a massive deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and other Middle East locations. Within hours of the deployment order, two fighter squadrons of fully-armed F-15s are launched from Langley AFB. Furthermore, the USS *Independence* immediately headed for the Persian Gulf. By January, 1991, the following U.S. forces were in theater: 6 carrier battle groups, 9 Army divisions, 2 USMC divisions, and 10 tactical fighter wing equivalents. In addition, other assets were utilized i.e. long-range bombers, satellites, etc.
67	91 1	Somalia	Operation EASTERN EXIT evacuated 260 individuals from Somalia, utilizing rotary aircraft from the USS *Guam* and the USS *Trenton* .
68	91 3	Iraq	The U.S. deployed elements from the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiments in an attempt to intimidate Iraqi government units that were conducting operations against rebel forces.
69	91 4	Iraq, Turkey	Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began as the U.S. sought to protect Kurdish refugees. Similarly, in April U.S. Army personnel and the 24th MEU established Kurdish refugee camps in Operation LAND COMFORT.
70	91 4	Bolivia	The U.S. deployed nearly 600 personnel to Bolivia to help fight drug trafficking. These troops included trainers, officers, engineers, and medical personnel.
71	91 5	Cuba	USAF deployed forces and equipment to Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay, Cuba Naval Station in support of OPERATION GTMO, providing humanitarian relief to Haitian migrants. Eventually an airlift of refugees was necessary.

72	91 5	Bangladesh	Operation SEA ANGEL commenced as an amphibious group led by the USS *Tarawa* began providing aid to Bangladeshis. Army Black Hawk helicopters also assisted the operation. USAF established a strategic airlift to deliver 738 passengers and 832 tons of food to alleviate suffering caused by Cyclone Marion. Additionally, an intratheater airlift delivered food from depots established in-country.
73	91 6	Turkey	Operation Provide Comfort II began to aid/protect the Kurds.
74	91 6	Philippines	Operation FIERY VIGIL occurred as the USN and the USAF evacuated U.S. dependents from the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. A carrier battle group led by the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and other ships and USAF aircraft led the evacuation. Tens of thousands of U.S. dependents were evacuated.
75	91 9	Saudi Arabia	Aircraft from USAF delivered Patriot missiles and two Patriot battalions.
76	91 9	Zaire	As fighting broke out between government and rebel groups, the U.S. evacuated over 700 Americans and other nationals in Operation QUICK LIFT and supported the deployment of French and Belgian forces needed to protect other foreign nationals.
77	92 2	Common-wealth of Independent States	USAF aircraft began delivering food and medical supplies to states of the former Soviet Union in Operation PROVIDE HOPE.
78	92 3	United Kingdom	6 USAF B-52s arrived at RAF Fairford after the UN Security Council warned of "severe consequences" if Iraq refused to destroy its nuclear, chemical, and missile arsenals.
79	92 4	Bosnia-Herzegovina	USAF aircraft made the first delivery of food, blankets, and medical supplies to Sarajevo as war between Bosnian and Serbian forces continued. Two months later, USAF C-130s began relief flights from Germany to Sarajevo in Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. Depending upon the situation, these flights were suspended intermittently. In February, 1993, this operation is expanded to include the remainder of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
80	92 4	Italy	Operation HOT ROCK. U.S. Navy Sea Stallion helicopters and personnel assisted Italian government officials in an effort to halt lava flows from Mount Etna that threatened populated areas.
81	92 7	Colombia	USN P-3s and 4 USAF C-130s joined the Colombian AF in the search for drug lord Pablo Escobar.
82	92 7	Adriatic Sea	The USN guided-missile frigate *Jack Williams* and other units began patrolling the Yugoslav coast in observance of a UN embargo.
83	92 8	Angola	In support of Operation PROVIDE TRANSITION, AMC aircrews and airplanes transported combatants from rival factions to their home provinces to strengthen a truce and the transition to a democratic government.
84	92 8	Iraq	Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began as the U.S. ordered the Iraqi military to stop flying planes and helicopters below the 32d Parallel. The USS *Independence* carrier battle group was repositioned to enforce this ban. Likewise, USAF elements enforced this ban.
85	92 8	Kenya, Somalia	The U.S. began a massive airlift of food to Somalia, utilizing USAF C-130s and C-141 aircraft, as part of a global effort to ease mass starvation. 70 U.S. Army Green Berets were also included for security. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF was suspended in late September due to bad weather, gun battles, and looting.

86	92 12	Iraq	The USS *Kitty Hawk* carrier battle group was deployed to the region of Iraq during heightened tensions as Iraqi aircraft continued to penetrate prohibited air zones, among other provocations.
87	92 12	Somalia	President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia as part of Operation RESTORE HOPE. U.S. troop levels fluctuated according to the situation on the ground over the course of the next 16 months but included at various times a carrier battle group, 28,000 troops, and an amphibious assault force. All services participate in substantial numbers. The UN began UNOSOM II May 4, 1993 as the U.S. relinquished control. The last U.S. troops left Somalia March 25, 1994 as Operation RESTORE HOPE terminated. U.S. forces remained "on-call" offshore.
88	93 1	Kuwait	President Bush ordered a battalion of soldiers from Ft. Hood, Texas to deploy earlier than had been scheduled to exercise with the Kuwaiti military in light of continued Iraqi hostility.
89	93 1	Haiti	In Operation ABLE MANNER, U.S. Coast Guard ships and 3 USN ships sailed towards Haiti to prevent a refugee exodus.
90	93 4	Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO began enforcing the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia through Operation DENY FLIGHT. The initial U.S. contribution consisted of 12 F-15s and 12 F/A-18s. This is the first deployment of NATO to a combat zone since the founding of the Western Alliance in 1949.
91	93 6	Macedonia	The U.S. sent troops for UNPROFOR's border observer incident in Macedonia where they patrolled Macedonia's border with Yugoslavia. These units eventually comprised two infantry companies from the 3rd Infantry Division and 3 Black Hawk helicopters. A total of nearly 600 personnel were involved. This is the 1st time U.S. combat units were deployed under the UN blue hat of peace keeping operations.
92	93 10	Somalia	Following the combat deaths of U.S. army personnel, significant numbers of additional U.S. personnel were deployed to the theater.
93	93 10	Haiti	26 American soldiers arrived in Haiti as the vanguard of a larger UN peacekeeping force to follow. Days later, the U.S. recalled the USS *Harlan County*, which was to have ferried U.S. engineers on a UN mission to Port-au-Prince, in the face of armed Haitian demonstrators. The resultant Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY began as the USS *Gettysburg*, *Sterett*, *Vicksburg*, *Jack Williams*, *Klakring*, and *Caron* imposed a UN embargo on Haiti after the failure of the Governor's Island Agreement.
94	93 12	Colombia	160 engineers from the 46th Engineer Battalion arrived in Colombia to construct a school, clinic, and roads. Additional Navy personnel constructed river bases and radar facilities for use by Colombian forces in combating drug traffickers and insurgent forces.
95	94 3	South Korea	President Clinton ordered a battalion of Patriot missiles to South Korea as tensions with North Korea rose. Traveling via train and surface vessel, they arrived in mid-April. In May, the USS *Independence* CVBG was required to remain within one weeks sailing time of the Korean Peninsula in preparation for any potential crisis. This status was revoked several months later.
96	94 4	Burundi	American forces assisted French and Italian troops in the evacuation of American citizens from civil strife in Rwanda.

97	94 5	Caribbean	The USS *Wasp* amphibious assault ship began eight weeks of training near Haiti, where it is later joined by an amphibious ready group. Following the exercise the *Wasp* was rotated out of the area. The exercises were designed to pressure the government of Haiti.
98	94 7	Zaire	U.S. Army and Air Force personnel began Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Goma, Zaire in an effort to alleviate the suffering of Rwandan refugees. Approximately 2,000 ground troops were involved as are military cargo aircraft.
99	94 8	Cuba	The USN moved naval assets toward Cuba in an effort to staunch the flow of Cuban refugees.
100	94 9	Haiti	Elements of the 82d Airborne were recalled en route as the military government of Haitian General Cedras agreed to implement the Governor's Island Agreement.

DATA BASE

Notes

No.: Event number

Date: 1983 (January) to 1994 (September)

Force: Major

Size Moderate

Minor

Note: For a more detailed description, see Methodology

Location: The states and/or bodies of water that served as the foci of U.S. activities

Region: EAS (East Asia)

EUR (Europe)

MID (Middle East and North Africa)

SAS (South Asia)

SUB (Sub-Saharan Africa)

WES (Western Hemisphere)

Note: For a more detailed description, see the annex to this appendix

Type: C = Counterdrug Operations: Self-Explanatory

F = Freedom of Navigation: Self-Explanatory

H = Humanitarian Relief: Includes disaster relief, refugee assistance, and rescues

S = Support Operations: Nonviolent support of 3rd party operations

T = Threat Situation: Situations in which the potential for hostilities is high

V = Visit: Self-Explanatory

X = Exercise: Self-Explanatory

Military Service: USAF (Air Force), USA (Army), USN/MC (Navy + Marine Corps)

Duration:

<30 = 30 days or less

<90 = 90 days or less

<180 = 180 days or less

>180 = 180 days or more

Data List

		Force				Military Service			
No.	Date	Size	Location	Region	Type	USAF	USA	USN/MC	Duration
1	83-2	Mod	Egypt	MID	T	1		3	<30
2	83-2	Maj	Honduras	WES	X		2	3	<30
3	83-4	Min	Thailand	SAS	S	1			<30
4	83-6	Mod	Honduras, et al.	WES	X	1	2	3	<180
5	83-7	Min	South China Sea	SAS	H			3	<30
6	83-8	Mod	Chad, Sudan	MID	T	1		3	<30
7	83-8	Maj	Honduras	WES	X		2	3	<30
8	83-8	Mod	Lebanon	MID	T			3	<180
9	83-9	Mod	Korea	EAS	S	1		3	<30
10	83-10	Mod	Grenada	WES	T			3	<30
11	83-10	Mod	Iran	MID	T			3	<180
12	83-10	Mod	Korea	EAS	T	1		3	<30
13	84-2	?	Hormuz Straight	MID	F			3	<30
14	84-3	Mod	El Salvador, et al.	WES	X	1	2	3	>180
15	84-3	?	Egypt	MID	T	1		3	<30
16	84-4	Mod	Iran	MID	T			3	>180
17	84-6	?	Saudi Arabia	MID	T	1			?
18	84-6	Min	Gulf of Sidra	MID	F			3	<30
19	84-8	?	Sudan	MID	T	1			<30
20	84-8	Min	Arabian Sea, et al.	MID	T	1		3	<90
21	84-9	Min	Lebanon	MID	T			3	<90
22	84-11	Min	Cuba	WES	H	1		3	<30
23	85-3	Mod	Lebanon	MID	T			3	<90
24	85-4	Mod	Japan	EAS	T	1			>180
25	85-6	Mod	Lebanon	MID	T			3	<30
26	85-9	Min	Mexico	WES	H	1			<30
27	85-9	Min	Iran	MID	T			3	<30
28	85-10	Mod	Mediterranean	EUR	T		2	3	<30
29	85-11	Mod	Malta	EUR	T			3	<30
30	86-1	?	Yemen	MID	H			3	<30
31	86-1	Maj	Gulf of Sidra	MID	F			3	<90
32	86-1	Min	Iran	MID	T			3	<180
33	86-3	Min	Honduras	WES	S		2		<30
34	86-4	Maj	Mediterranean	MID	T			3	<30
35	86-5	Min	Gulf of Oman	MID	T			3	<30
36	86-7	Min	Bolivia	WES	C		2		<180
37	86-9	Mod	Cyprus, Lebanon	MID	T			3	<30
38	86-9	Min	Korea	EAS	T	1			<30
39	86-11	Min	China	EAS	V			3	<30
40	86-12	Min	Honduras	WES	S		2		<30
41	87-1	Mod	Arabian Sea, et al.	MID	T		2	3	>180
42	87-2	Min	Lebanon	MID	T			3	<30
43	87-3	Maj	Honduras	WES	X		2	3	<30
44	87-7	Min	Persian Gulf	MID	T	1	2	3	>180
45	88-1	Min	Haiti	WES	T			3	<30
46	88-2	Min	Black Sea	EUR	F			3	<30
47	88-3	Maj	Honduras	WES	T	1	2		<90

(Cont'd)

(Cont'd)

		Force				Military Service			
No.	Date	Size	Location	Region	Type	USAF	USA	USN/MC	Duration
48	88-4	Maj	Panama	WES	T	1	2	3	>180
49	88-9	Maj	Korea	EAS	T	1	2	3	<30
50	88-9	Min	Burma	SAS	H			3	<30
51	88-9	Min	Caribbean, et al.	WES	C			3	>180
52	88-11	Mod	Maldives	SAS	T			3	<30
53	89-2	Mod	Lebanon	MID	T		2	3	<90
54	89-5	Maj	Panama	WES	T	1	2	3	>180
55	89-5	Min	South China Sea	SAS	H			3	<180
56	89-6	Mod	China	EAS	T			3	<30
57	89-8	Min	USSR	EUR	V			3	<30
58	89-8	Maj	Iran, et al.	MID	T			3	<90
59	89-9	Maj	Virgin Islands	WES	H	1	2	3	<90 ?
60	89-9	Mod	Bolivia, et al.	WES	C	1	2	3	>180
61	89-12	Min	Philippines	SAS	T	1		3	<30
62	90-5	Min	South China Sea	SAS	H			3	<90
63	90-6	Min	Liberia	SUB	H			3	>180
64	90-7	Min	Persian Gulf	MID	X	1		3	<30
65	90-7	Min	Philippines	SAS	H	1		3	<30
66	90-8	Maj	Southwest Asia	MID	T	1	2	3	>180
67	91-1	Min	Somalia	SUB	H	1		3	<30
68	91-3	Maj	Iraq	MID	T		2		<180 ?
69	91-4	Maj	Iraq, Turkey	MID	H	1	2	3	<90
70	91-4	Mod	Bolivia	WES	C		2		<180 ?
71	91-5	Min	Cuba	WES	H	1	2	3	>180
72	91-5	Mod	Bangladesh	SAS	H	1	2	3	<30
73	91-6	Maj ?	Turkey	MID	T	1	2	3	>180
74	91-6	Mod	Philippines	SAS	H	1		3	<30
75	91-9	?	Saudi Arabia	MID	T	1	2		?
76	91-9	Min	Zaire	SUB	H	1	2		<30
77	92-2	Min	Russia, et al.	EUR	H	1			<30
78	92-3	Min	United Kingdom	EUR	T	1			<30 ?
79	92-4	Min	Bosnia	EUR	H	1		3	>180
80	92-4	Min	Italy	EUR	H			3	<30
81	92-7	Min	Colombia	WES	S	1		3	<30
82	92-7	Min	Adriatic Sea	EUR	T	1		3	>180
83	92-8	Min	Angola	SUB	S	1		3	<30
84	92-8	Mod	Iraq	MID	T	1		3	>180
85	92-8	Mod	Kenya, Somalia	SUB	H	1	2	3	<90
86	92-12	Mod	Iraq	MID	T			3	<30
87	92-12	Maj	Somalia	SUB	T	1	2	3	>180
88	93-1	Mod	Kuwait	MID	X	1	2		<90 ?
89	93-1	Min	Haiti	WES	H			3	>180
90	93-4	Maj	Bosnia	EUR	T	1	2	3	>180
91	93-6	Mod	Macedonia	EUR	T		2		>180
92	93-10	Maj	Somalia	SUB	T	1	2	3	<180
93	93-10	Min	Haiti	WES	T	1	2	3	>180
94	93-12	Min	Colombia	WES	S		2	3	<90

(Cont'd)

		Force				Military Service			
No.	Date	Size	Location	Region	Type	USAF	USA	USN/MC	Duration
95	94-3	Mod	South Korea	EAS	T		2	3	<90
96	94-4	Min	Burundi	SUB	H			3	<30
97	94-5	Min	Caribbean	WES	X			3	<90
98	94-7	Maj	Zaire	SUB	H	1	2	3	<90
99	94-8	Min	Cuba	WES	H	1	2	3	>180
100	94-9	Maj	Haiti	WES	T	1	2	3	>180

STUDY RESULTS

The study results concentrate on three major areas in an attempt to elucidate future trends in the use of military forces in political-military incidents. For the period 1983–1994, we look at the number, duration, and size of incidents, the location and type of incidents, and the role of the services in the incidents.

Number, Duration, and Size of Incidents

This section examines the number of political-military incidents that occurred 1983–1994 and adjusts for the duration and size of those incidents.

New U.S. Political-Military Incidents by Period

Of the 100 events chronicled (Table A-4), 40 occurred in the 1983–1986 time frame, 26 during 1987–1990, and 34 additional incidents in the 1991–1994 period. An average of 10, 6.5, and 8.5 events took place in the three respective time segments. These statistics reflect an active period of U.S. military involvement in the mid–1980s, a sharp decline in the late 1980s, and a moderate increase in the early 1990s. This raw measure does not, however, account for incident cost, duration, size, or other crucial factors.

Table A-4. New Incidents/Period

Period	Total	Average (Yearly)
1983–1986	40	10
1987–1990	26	6.5
1991–1994	34	8.5
Total	100	

New U.S. Political-Military Incidents Lasting Over 90 Days by Period

In an attempt to compensate for the admittedly imperfect measure of New Incidents/Period, we introduced a second calculation, related to incident duration. This second calculation eliminates those incidents that are generally minor and/or brief in nature while emphasizing incidents that lasted longer than 90 days. Presumably, lengthier incidents are more expansive in terms of cost and force size than shorter incidents.

The results reveal a distinct pattern not evident in the coarser New Incidents/Period measurement. Specifically, for each successive period the average number of new incidents per period lasting over 90 days increased despite fluctuations in the average number of new incidents per period. This trend is clearly visible in Table A-5, with each successive period, as the average number of new incidents lasting over 90 days climbs from 2 to 2.25 to 3.75.[2]

Table A-5. New Incidents > 90 Days/Period

Period	Total	Average (Yearly)
1983-1986	8	2
1987-1990	9	2.25
1991-1994	15	3.75
Total	32	

The measure New Incidents >90 Days/Period is a marked improvement over New Incidents/Period in tracking the burden of political-military incidents on the United States. An additional calculation, however, is necessary to further refine the results.

New U.S. Political-Military Incidents Lasting Over 90 Days by Period and Force Size

The added factor is that of force size. As illustrated by Table A-6, the number of major force commitments, as defined in the Methodology, has jumped from 0 to 3 to 6 in the respective 1983–1986, 1987–1990, and 1991–1994 time periods. Moderate force displays, primarily lone carrier battle groups (CVBGs), have actually decreased from a high point of 6 in 1983–1986 to a mere 2 incidents in the 1987–1990 period and with 3 more incidents in the 1991–1994 framework. Minor force commitments, similar to major force commitments, continue to rise. From 1983 to 1994 there were 9 major, 11 moderate, and 12 minor force commitments.

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[2] The 1991–94 period average (3.75) is significantly different from that for 1983–86 (2). With a T-test value of 2.9, the difference between the two means is significant beyond the .005 level.

Table A-6. New Incidents/>90 Days/Period/Force Size

Year	Number of Incidents by Force Size			
	Major	Moderate	Minor	Total
1983-1986	0	6	2	8
1987-1990	3	2	4	9
1991-1994	6	3	6	15
Total	9	11	12	32

Although various costing measures are beyond the scope of this trend analysis, the elements of incident duration and force size may compensate sufficiently for this gap. Using these two elements, it is clear that not only is the number of lengthy political-military incidents increasing, but the number of lengthy and major force commitments has risen markedly over the course of 1983–1994.

Political-Military Incident Location and Type

This section discusses the location and types of political-military incidents encountered by U.S. forces. Additionally, the analysis is refined to reflect incident duration.

New Incidents per Period by Region

Of the 100 discrete incidents recorded from 1983 to 1994, 35 (35 percent) occurred in the Middle East and North Africa, 27 (27 percent) in the Western Hemisphere, 11 (11 percent) in Europe, 10 (10 percent) in South Asia, 8 (8 percent) in East Asia, and 9 (9 percent) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure A-2 shows these incidents broken out by period.




Figure A-2. New Incidents/Period/Region

The 1983–1986 period is characterized by a high degree of U.S. activity in the Middle East (52 percent), moderate U.S. activity in the Western Hemisphere, and relatively little activity in the remaining regions, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which received no U.S. attention at all. This period is distinguished by U.S. actions in Lebanon, Libya, the Persian Gulf, and Central America.

The 1987–1990 period reflects a shift in U.S. commitments. The Western Hemisphere and South Asia saw proportionately increased U.S. activity, accounting for 31 percent and 23 percent respectively. The Middle East and North Africa saw drastically reduced U.S. activity, dropping to 27 percent. East Asia, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa continued to receive scant attention. This period is highlighted by U.S. actions in Panama, counterdrug operations, and continued strife in Central America and the Persian Gulf.

The third period, 1991–1994, displays a continuing shift in U.S. commitments. Activities in the Western Hemisphere dominate U.S. actions (27 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa has become the second-ranking region, in terms of political-military incidents, at 24 percent versus the 21 percent of the Middle East and North Africa and Europe, despite the Gulf War. Incidents in both East and South Asia remain at very low levels. This period is marked by U.S. exertion in Haiti, Iraq, and the former communist states of Europe, and by humanitarian operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Although we cautioned above that the gross number of new incidents is not a measure of U.S. cost, force commitment, incident duration, and other factors, certain patterns are evident when this data is broken out by region: (1) U.S. political-military incidents in the Middle East and North Africa have declined, and continue to do so, despite the increased U.S. presence in the region following the Gulf War. (2) The Western Hemisphere continues to see a constant and relatively high number of political-military incidents. (3) Both Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa have received sharply increased U.S. attention over the past 4 years.

New Incidents Lasting Over 90 Days by Period and Region

A measure of discrimination in the form of incident duration reveals similar trends. Of the new incidents that lasted over 90 days during the period 1983–1986, 50 percent occurred in the Middle East and North Africa and 38 percent in the Western Hemisphere. This is the same pattern displayed in Figure A-2, above, as is the declining prominence of the Middle East and North Africa vis-à-vis the Western Hemisphere during the period 1987–1990. This trend continued with the further decline of the Middle East and North Africa (to 20 percent) versus the Western Hemisphere and Europe (40 percent and 27 percent, respectively). Figure A-3 depicts these trends.




Figure A-3. New Incidents/>90 Days/Period/Region

New U.S. Political-Military Incidents per Period by Type

In addition to quantifying the level of U.S. activity by location, it is useful to examine the nature of the incidents to identify future trends. As discussed above in the section on data base notes, we developed seven incident classifications for the purpose of this study. They are: counterdrug operations (C), freedom of navigation acts (F), humanitarian relief (H), support operations (S), threat situations (T), visits (V), and exercises (X). Figure A-4 shows, for the periods of interest, what percentage of U.S. activity was devoted to each incident classification.




Figure A-4. Type of Incident/Period

The 1983–1986 period is overwhelmingly dominated by threat situations (23 of 40 incidents). This of course reflects U.S. actions in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically Lebanon, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. No other incident type played a comparable role.

The number of threat situations declined from 58 percent to 54 percent from the first to the second time period as the number of humanitarian operations increased from 10 percent in 1983–1986 to 23 percent in 1987–1990. Other incident types continued to play a lesser role. Finally, the 1991–1994 period reinforced this shift in incident type as threat situations constituted 41 percent of all new incidents versus the 41 percent allotted to humanitarian incidents.

The following trends emerged from this data. (1) Threat situations are no longer necessarily the primary driver behind U.S. political-military incidents. (2) Humanitarian

operations are becoming increasingly prominent with time. (3) No other incident types play a particularly high profile role in U.S. political-military incident activities.

SERVICE ROLES IN POLITICAL-MILITARY INCIDENTS

Having established numerous trends in political-military incident duration, location, size, and type, we now examine the role of the individual services in political-military incidents.

Joint/Service Involvement per Period by Incident

The number of joint[3] incidents increased from 12 (30 percent) in 1983–1986 to 14 (54 percent) in 1987–1990 and 24 (71 percent) in the years 1991–1994. In addition, the individual services acted alone in some incidents during the periods of interest. The U.S. Air Force acted alone in 6 incidents in the 1983–1986 period and in 2 incidents in the 1991–1994 period. The Air Force did not act alone in any incidents in the 1987–1990 period. The Army acted alone in only 3 incidents in the 1983–1986 period, in no such incidents in the 1987–1990 time frame, and again in 3 incidents in the 1991–1994 period. The United States Navy/Marine Corps acted alone in 19 incidents between 1983 and 1986, 12 incidents between 1987 and 1990, and only 5 incidents between 1991 and 1994. These results are shown in Figure A-5.




Figure A-5. Joint/Service Involvement/Incident/Period

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[3] *Joint* refers solely to the participation of more than one service in a given incident and not to command structures or similar force characteristics.

The results reveal several discernible patterns. (1) All services are involved in political-military incidents via joint fora. (2) The number of incidents reflecting jointness has increased sharply 1983–1994. (3) The U.S. Navy/Marine Corps has acted alone most frequently.

Service Participation by Period

Excluding the joint label allows service involvement to be further refined. The United States Air Force continued to make gains in participation in new incidents, although proportionately smaller than the Army. Nonetheless, USAF participation increased from 38 percent to 42 percent to 71 percent in the three respective time periods. As shown in Figure A-6., Army participation in new incidents increased from 20 percent in 1983–1986 to 42 percent in 1987–1990, and eventually 59 percent in 1991–1994. Navy/Marine Corps participation in new incidents climbed from an already high figure of 78 percent to an astonishing 96 percent in the 1987–1990 period before declining to 77 percent in the 1991–1994 period. Combining the three periods together reveals aggregate participation rates of 50 percent for the Air Force, 39 percent for the Army, and 82 percent for the Navy/Marine Corps.




Figure A-6. Service Participation/Period

The following conclusions are drawn from Figure A-6. (1) The role of the U.S. Air Force has increased to the point that most new incidents now involve USAF assets. (2) The U.S. Army is also increasingly involved in political-military incidents. (3) The Navy/Marine Corps has been the service most often involved in new political-military incidents.

Manpower per Incident

Yet another method of evaluating the role of the services in political-military incidents is to characterize the manpower available to react to those incidents. As shown below, the erosion of the military manpower pool, coupled with a rising number of lengthy political-military incidents, increased the relative burden upon the U.S. military.

As reflected in Table A-7 the average number of political-military incidents per 100,000 active-duty military personnel has fluctuated in a manner which demonstrates no distinguishable pattern.

Table A-7 Average Incidents/100,000 Active Military Personnel

Period	Incidents	Military Personnel	Average
1983-86	40	21	1.90476
1987-90	26	21	1.23810
1991-94	34	18	1.88889
Total	100		

Adjusting these political-military incidents to include only those exceeding 90 days in duration clearly reveals a sharp increase in the average number of incidents greater than 90 days per 100,000 active duty personnel.

Table A-8 Average Incidents >90 Days/100,000 Active Military Personnel

Period	Incidents >90 Days	Average
1983-86	8	0.38095
1987-90	9	0.42857
1991-94	15	0.83333
Total	32	

Table A-8 displays an increase in the average from 0.38095 in 1983-1986 to 0.83333 in 1991-1994. This may be attributed to both an absolute increase in the number of incidents and an absolute decline in the number of military personnel available to service those incidents.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the data presented in Section IV, we have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) In the period 1991–1994 the United States was not involved in more political-military incidents than in previous periods.

(2) The number of political-military incidents lasting over 90 days has grown in absolute terms despite fluctuations in the actual number of political-military incidents.

(3) The number of political-military incidents lasting over 90 days and representing a major force commitment has increased absolutely.

(4) U.S. political-military incidents have declined sharply in the Middle East and North Africa since the mid-1980s. In contrast, political-military incidents in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa have increased sharply since the 1980s.

(5) The number of political-military incidents in the Western Hemisphere remained relatively high and constant in the 1983–1994 period.

(6) The number of political-military incidents lasting over 90 days in duration declined in the Middle East and North Africa and increased substantially in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa.

(7) The number of political-military incidents lasting over 90 days in the Western Hemisphere increased over the 1983–1994 period.

(8) The number of political-military incidents involving threat situations declined since the mid-1980s to less than half of all such incidents. Comparatively, the number of humanitarian incidents nearly quadrupled to more than two-fifths of all political-military incidents over the course of the last 12 years.

(9) The Navy/Marine Corps tendency to act alone in political-military incidents has decreased dramatically since 1983. Conversely, the number of joint operations increased markedly.

(10) Air Force and Army participation in political-military incidents increased sharply, albeit in the form of joint operations.

(11) The relative manpower burden placed upon the Services by political-military incidents exceeding 90 days in duration increased as the number of such incidents grew and the available manpower to address these incidents declined.

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Annex A-1

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN

EAST ASIA
China
Japan
Mongolia
North Korea
South Korea
Taiwan

EUROPE
Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Holland
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia (Former)


MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Afghanistan
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Cyprus
Egypt
Georgia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Tunis
Turkey
Turkmenistan
UAE
Uzbekistan
Western Sahara
Yemen

SOUTH ASIA
Australia
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Cambodia
India
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Maldives
Myanmar
Nepal
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
C.A.R.
Cameroon
Chad
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bassau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Reunion
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Tanzania
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Equador
French Guiana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Virgin Islands

Regional Breakdown



Appendix B

CASE STUDY:
OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON
(LIBYA)

Appendix B
OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON

OVERVIEW

The 1980s was a period in U.S. history when international terrorism was of great concern. In early 1981 the new Reagan administration adopted a tough line on terrorists, adopting a policy of "swift and effective retaliation." The U.S. intelligence community and the State Department identified a number of countries as being sponsors of international terrorism—Iran, Syria and Libya being particularly active—but through the early part of the decade there was no clear–cut case of a "smoking gun" that provided sufficient evidence that linked a terrorist act directly to a specific state.

Then, in the spring of 1986 a disco was bombed in West Berlin and two people were killed and more than 150 wounded, including 50 to 60 Americans. National Security Agency intercepts and other intelligence information tied the bombing of the disco directly to the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, and 9 days later U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft conducted a retaliatory strike code-named EL DORADO CANYON against five targets in Libya. The targeting objectives of the raid established by the military planners were not met—specifically bomb damage objectives and low collateral damage—and an Air Force F-111 and its crew were lost, but the Reagan administration declared the strike to be a success and more recent assessments have concluded that it was in fact a success story in the annals of coercive diplomacy.

DECLARED U.S. INTEREST

The policy of "swift and effective retribution" was formulated to deter state-sponsored terrorism. By the mid-1980s terrorism was being carried out on a global scale and there was increasing concern in the United States that the acts of violence were not random events but rather the plots and stratagems of global networks of paramilitary organizations being directed and funded by governments antagonistic to the United States and the West.

In the U.S. government at the time there was a policy consensus that terrorists deserved harsh punishment. The problem, however, was that terrorist acts—typically covert, planned in great secrecy, and executed as hit-and-run operations—generally leave no hard consequently hard evidence to establish the identity of those responsible for the violence. This problem led to a split within the Reagan administration over the question of the actual utility and role of military force in countering terrorism. The Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, led the school of thought that argued that diplomatic methods should have priority, that a military response risked attacking the wrong group of suspects and could lead to an escalation of the conflict, and that even good intelligence information was usually inconclusive. The Secretary of State, George Shultz, led the other school that argued that the evidence of complicity did not have to be 100 percent foolproof, that whatever risks there were could be managed, and that a passive policy would likely lead to even more terrorism and would undermine U.S. interests abroad. Defense Department reservations about the role and effectiveness of military intervention in countering terrorism were overcome in the case of EL DORADO CANYON, due perhaps primarily to the determination of President Reagan to act and to the apparently conclusive nature of the intelligence information available to the decisionmakers (even though that information was never made available to the public).

The immediate context within which EL DORADO CANYON was planned and implemented was international terrorism, but there was a larger context which is also relevant to understanding the decision to attack Qaddafi's Libya. Shortly after Qaddafi came to power in a military coup in 1969, he expelled U.S. military bases from his country and began to assume the role of Nasser's heir in the Middle East, acting as the guardian of Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism. Qaddafi began making aggressive noises about becoming the regional hegemony and threatened his neighbors, particularly the Sudanese, and began to develop a military relationship with the Soviet Union. Without meaningful military capabilities within Libya itself, Qaddafi turned to the financial support and backing of Palestinian terrorist organizations and became their accomplice.

Four years into his regime Qaddafi declared the Gulf of Sidra, a 300-mile body of water lying between Tripoli and Benghazi, to be part of Libya. The United States and other governments rejected this claim on grounds that it violated the international legal limit of 12 miles, and in 1973 and again in 1980 U.S. reconnaissance aircraft of the Sixth Fleet were harassed by Libyan fighter interceptors in the Gulf. In this period, the rules of

engagement in effect required U.S. Navy pilots to seek permission from the task force commander before returning any fire and to hold fire when the enemy was returning to base or disengaging. The Reagan administration changed these rules to allow the Navy pilots to intercept aircraft and to escort them away from areas where the Sixth Fleet might be exercising and to engage in "hot pursuit" should the U.S. aircraft be attacked. Under the new rules of engagement, in August 1981 two U.S. Navy F-14s in the Gulf were approached by two Libyan Soviet-built SU-22 attack aircraft and fired upon. The Navy plane returned fire by firing SIDEWINDER missiles and which shot down the Libyan jets down.

Another incident occurred in March 1984 when a Libyan TU-22 bomber attacked U.S CIA facilities in the Sudan, and over the next few months Libyan naval vessels began scattering mines near the Suez Canal. In that same year, the Soviets were reported to be using Tobruk for a naval repair facility and Jufra as an airfield. This activity led President Reagan to sign National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 on April 3, 1984. Some parts of the still-classified directive have become public, including the following: "No nation can condone terrorism . . . States that use or support terrorism cannot be allowed to do so without consequences . . . The United States will use all available channels to dissuade states from supporting terrorism . . . When these efforts fail, the United States has a right to defend itself."[1]

Plans for dealing specifically with Qaddafi proceeded apace in 1985. Early in that year the NSC staff outlined two approaches: a "broad" one and a "bold" one. The broad approach considered the possibility of supporting Egypt in an armed conflict with Libya and coupling further freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra with additional kinds of ship movements. The bold approach was a combination of covert and overt actions, including a proposal to encourage Egypt and Algeria to find a pretext for declaring war on Libya and to assist those two countries with U.S. help once the war began. A specific plan that was developed in some detail called for a joint U.S.-Egyptian attack on Libya, with the United States providing logistical support. This plan, code-named "Flower/Rose," was advocated by RADM John Poindexter, the President's deputy

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1 As quoted in Gregory L. Trebon, *Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism—What Did Operation El Dorado Canyon Accomplish?*, Report No. 88-2600, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 1988.

national security adviser at the time, but it gained no support, the JCS arguing that six U.S. divisions would be required if the attack got bogged down.[2]

Then in early 1986 Qaddafi declared that the invisible line at the top of the Gulf of Sidra at 32 degrees 30 minutes north latitude would henceforth be a "line of death" for those attempting to cross it. At the time, the Sixth Fleet was engaged in an operation code-named ATTAIN DOCUMENT, the purpose of which was to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation but also likely intended to provoke Qaddafi into some kind of military action. As part of this operation, the U.S. Navy attacked the Libyan SA-5 site at Sirte and destroyed some Libyan patrol boats in the Gulf. In March 1986 Qaddafi declared a "state of war" to exist with the United States and threatened that all U.S. installations in NATO countries were potential targets of Libyan actions.

DESCRIPTION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSETS INVOLVED

The specific operational planning for EL DORADO CANYON took place within the context of a formal military planning effort that had actually begun as early as late 1985, when the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), directed that a series of strike plans against Libya be developed under the supervision of the Commander of the Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT) and the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE). USCINCEUR had been designated as supported CINC by the JCS. COMSIXTHFLT was designated the Officer in Tactical Command (USCOMEDOPS) on January 17, 1986. This command arrangement was in effect for the ATTAIN DOCUMENT exercise in early 1986 and for EL DORADO CANYON. Crisis action teams were fully operational at USEUCOM, USAFE, and USNAVEUR during ATTAIN DOCUMENT and were recalled for EL DORADO CANYON. The basic missions, rules of engagement, force constitution, and command relationships concerning Operation EL DORADO CANYON had their origins in the planning activity associated with ATTAIN DOCUMENT.

The five targets selected for the attack were:

1. The Azziziyah barracks in Western Libya which served as Qaddafi's command center and residence

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[2] For details see David Martin and John Walcott, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism*, New York, Harper and Row, 1988.

2. The military side of the Tripoli International Airport where Libya's fleet of nine IL-76s was based
3. The naval barracks at Sidi Balal, a command training facility near Tripoli
4. The Jamahariyah Barracks in East Libya which Qaddafi used as an alternate command post
5. The Benin airfield where Libyan MiG-23s were based

The targets were distributed among the elements of the Air Force and the Navy, the Air Force being responsible for the three targets in the west (1, 2, and 3) and the Navy for the two targets in the east (4 and 5).

In the selection of these targets there was apparently no specific official or unofficial policy directive to target Qaddafi himself—assassination of foreign leaders was against U.S. law. However, the fact that Qaddafi's command center and residence at the Azziziyah Barracks and the alternative command post at the Jamahariyah Barracks were on the target list suggests that interest clearly existed in getting rid of the Libyan leader. Should Qaddafi be eliminated in the attack, it could be interpreted as an unintended by-product of the retaliatory strike.

Early in the planning stages of Operation EL DORADO CANYON a dispute developed between the NSC staff and the JCS over the question of appropriate targets and delivery systems. The NSC staff suggested the idea of destroying essentially economic/industrial targets while the JCS favored an approach that linked the targets to Libya's terrorist activities. The NSC staff also argued the case for using the most advanced weapons systems like cruise missiles and stealth fighters; the JCS believed that the F-111s and Navy fighters aboard the carriers were up to the job.

The five targets were recommended by the Deputy Commander in Chief, Europe (DEPUSCINCEUR), in Stuttgart. USCINCEUR proposed the list to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, according to one account, on the basis of the following criteria:

1. Targets must be clearly related to terrorism and demonstrable as such. This would show we were only responding in kind and demonstrate our recognition of the distinction between terrorists and the Libyan military.
2. Targets must be valuable and well within our capability to strike effectively. This would enable a high probability of success, minimize the likelihood of American losses, and help our goal of demonstrating a capable U.S. military.
3. Targets must be capable of attack with a low probability of collateral damage or casualties. Heavy civilian casualties would portray an image of an

indiscriminate U.S. military no better than the terrorists we were trying to deter.

4. Successful attack must be possible with a force size proportional to target value. This would limit the size of the strike force and preclude the image of heavy handedness by the Americans.[3]

The basis for using both Air Force and Navy aircraft has not been as clearly established as the basis for target selection. In a recently published study, various explanations were given:

- Given that a night strike was needed to minimize aircraft losses, the Navy had insufficient night-capable strike aircraft (A-6Es) to cover all five targets with an adequate damage expectancy.
- The Navy could have covered all targets, but the Air Force was brought in to provide a level of insurance.
- Although the Navy had night-capable aircraft, the A-6 would not have fared well against the formidable anti-air defenses of the Tripoli target set.
- The Reagan Administration wanted British political support for the strike operation, support embodied in the Thatcher government's anticipated decision to authorize the use of bases in the United Kingdom.[4]

An additional explanation was given by the *Wall Street Journal* at the time: inter-service rivalry and the felt need to participate.[5]

The attack on the Libyan targets was made with forces of the U.S. Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps. Twenty-four Air Force F-111s, 5 EF-111s, 19 KC-10s, and 10 KC-135s departed their bases at Lakenheath, Mildenhall, and Upper Heyford in the United Kingdom at approximately the same time as the USS *Coral Sea* left its position north of Sicily and the USS *America* headed down Sicily's west coast. Seventy aircraft aboard the *Coral Sea* and *America* were involved in the strike: F-14s, F/A-18s, A-6s, E-2Cs, and EA-6Bs.

The Air Force planners at Lakenheath launched 24 F-111s even though the strike plan called for only 18 aircraft to actually complete the mission. This was to ensure that 18 aircraft would actually be over their targets in Libya. En route six of the aircraft

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3 Gregory L. Trebon, op. cit., pp. 12–14.

4 James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991*, Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1993. pp. 83–84.

5 As quoted in Gregory L. Trebon, op. cit., p. 90.

returned to base. The EF-111 electronic warfare planes were assigned the role of jamming the Libyan radar and the KC-10 and KC-135 tankers carried the 7 million pounds of fuel required for the round trip mission.

The strike plan for the Navy was to use A-6s aboard the USS *Coral Sea* to attack Benin airfield outside Benghazi and the aircraft aboard the USS *America* to hit the army barracks. The *Coral Sea* was to attack the Libyan air defenses on the Benghazi side of the Gulf and the *America's* aircraft were to fly air defense suppression for the Air Force on the Tripoli side. The A-6 Intruders and A-7 Corvairs were to deliver SHRIKE anti-radar missiles and the F/A 18 Hornets were to fire HARM anti-radiation missiles against the Libyan radar. The E-2Cs were to scan the horizon for hostile aircraft and EA-6B Prowlers were to jam Libyan communications and radar. Some F-14s were assigned the role of accompanying the Hornets in case of need for firing air-to-air missiles.

OUTCOME/ASSESSMENT

After the attack on Libya the official Pentagon announcement was that it was an unqualified military success—a "flawless professional performance." However, the Air Force and Navy planners took a more sober position on the extent to which military objectives had actually been met.

The bomb damage assessment after the strike showed that no direct hits were achieved at Azziziyah and at Sidi Bilal smoke obscured the target and many bombs were ineffective. The Libyan fleet of 13 IL-76s, which was the main target set at the Tripoli airfield, sustained only three to five hits and the seven A-6 aircraft targeted against the Benin airfield managed to destroy only two of the six hangers. The Navy planes from the USS *America* managed to get only 10 percent of their weapons on target.

There was also considerable collateral damage. In one neighborhood four 2,000-pound bombs fell on residential areas and killed innocent bystanders. This was the neighborhood in which the French Embassy was located and the French government later sent the U.S. government a stern complaint.

Finally, the military objective of carrying out the attack without loss of U.S. military personnel was not realized in that two Air Force officers flying one of the F-111s against Azziziyah lost their lives and aircraft in the operation. The cause of the loss has never been officially established and explanations have ranged from pilot error to the effectiveness of Libyan antiaircraft missiles.

As to whether the political objectives of the raid were met, President Reagan and George Shultz have argued in their memoirs that the attack silenced Qaddafi; in the words of Shultz it put Qaddafi "back in his box." However, the President was prepared to acknowledge that the effect was temporary rather than permanent, for within 2 years after the event Qaddafi remained a problem: "Although our air attack on Libya had silenced some of the state-sponsored terrorism directed from Tripoli, the forces of radical Islamic fundamentalism were on the march there and elsewhere in the Middle East; Colonel Qaddafi had begun a crash program to develop chemical weapons to advance his revolution, with all that meant to a world that had good reason to worry about the next move by this unpredictable clown."[6] In 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland and Libyan intelligence agents were indicted in U.S. courts. Whether this post-raid activity of Libyan agents was in retaliation for the U.S. raid cannot be determined. It is the case that the number of international terrorist incidents has generally declined over the past 8 years but how much of this can be attributed specifically to the raid on Libya cannot be determined.

Operation EL DORADO CANYON might be viewed as a limited success for coercive diplomacy in that it apparently had, at least for a while, a moderating effect on Qaddafi's behavior. The strike also communicated the message to other state-sponsors of terrorism that the United States was prepared to act militantly against the sponsors of terrorism—that terrorism had a price in terms of physical damage. Those states considering future acts of violence comparable to the bombing of the disco in West Berlin now had to think twice about their plans.

At the same time, however, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of carrying out such operations as EL DORADO CANYON. As already noted, the effects may be only temporary. The strike was not conclusive in its results but rather can be seen as only one episode in a series of events which have not yet played themselves out. (Qaddafi remains the leader of the Libyan regime and a potential threat to U.S. security. It may be that he has shifted his focus away from terrorism and toward the development of weapons of mass destruction.)

EL DORADO CANYON also showed that operational risks cannot be easily discounted. Great effort was made in the planning of the operation to avoid extensive collateral damage and, while different views will likely always exist as to what collateral

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6 Ronald Reagan, *An American Life*, New York, Simon and Schuster, p. 407.

damage is acceptable to planners, in the case of EL DORADO CANYON the damage was much greater than the military expected. In addition, two Air Force officers were killed in the raid.

A further consideration is that EL DORADO CANYON was a relatively major military operation—scores of aircraft and complex command and control arrangements. To mount an attack of this scale and complexity raises questions about the cost-effectiveness of this kind of military operation. Viewed exclusively as a reprisal or retaliatory attack in response to setting off of a bomb in a foreign country, this kind of operation may not be a feasible option for the United States every time a similar event occurs in the future.

On cost-effectiveness grounds, it is appropriate to consider the following:

- Could the same basic mission have been accomplished by attacking a more limited number of targets? If the major message to be communicated to Qaddafi was more political than military, perhaps two or three target sets would have been adequate.
- The problem of "overflight" was an important consideration in the operation. U.S. diplomatic efforts to get the permission of the French government to allow the F-111s to overfly France proved impossible and the U.S. aircraft consequently had to fly hundreds of extra miles in the execution of their mission. Use of CONUS-based aircraft could have eased the problem of overflight.
- Gaining the consent of the Thatcher government to launch the F-111s from the UK required the expenditure of U.S. diplomatic capital. U.S. allies have traditionally been sensitive to supporting U.S. military operations where their direct security interests are seen not to be involved. Circumstances can be foreseen where the United States may in the future have to take responsive actions in a timely manner in cases where working out the "coalition politics" involved could jeopardize the success of a mission such as EL DORADO CANYON. This is a further argument for examining alternative basing options such as CONUS-based aircraft.

In this connection it is also worthwhile to consider the alternative explanations (reviewed earlier) as to why the Air Force F-111s were made part of the attacking force. The first explanation was that the Navy had insufficient night-capable strike aircraft to cover the five targets with adequate damage expectancy. The F-111s were therefore seen as a *necessary* complement to the Navy aircraft involved in the attack. In order to achieve the specific objectives of the mission, the Air Force planes were required. Future

contingencies can be envisaged where limitations of naval aircraft could force a decision to employ Air Force planes.

The second explanation for Air Force participation was that it provided a degree of "insurance," presumably against unforeseen circumstances or unexpected developments. There is always the risk in military operations of failing to adequately assess the threat and some degree of "overkill" provides protection against faulty threat assessments. Obtaining good intelligence information can be difficult in cases where U.S. access is limited, such as in Libya, Iran and North Korea, and therefore a "comfort level" can be built into a U.S. military operation by beefing up the attacking forces to a point where the confidence of the planners in the operation is not brought into question. Scenarios involving Iran and North Korea would necessitate considerable insurance above and beyond that provided to deal with Qaddafi's Libya.

The third explanation, that the A-6s would not have fared well against the Tripoli anti-air defenses, again suggests that technical limitations of naval aircraft may argue the need for Air Force planes. In increasingly complex attack environments where the aircraft of one service may not be able to perform all the tasks required for successful completion of the mission, it may be necessary to draw on the capabilities of all the services.

Finally, the fourth explanation was that the Reagan administration viewed the use of British bases as tangible evidence of the Thatcher government's political support. In the future, the United States might find itself in a similar situation where the support of a particular friend or ally is considered essential to meeting a U.S. political objective. U.S. aircraft launched from bases in Japan, for example, could send an important "signal" to North Korea or China that the U.S. was undertaking military action with the political backing of the Japanese government.

Appendix C

CASE STUDY:
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
(NORTHERN IRAQ)

Appendix C
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

BACKGROUND

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT took place in the immediate aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, the international coalition effort to liberate Kuwait in early 1991.[1] After the U.S. and its allies defeated the Iraqi military in February 1991, Iraqi Shi'as and Kurds rebelled against the Iraqi government. The rebels expected support from the U.S. and other coalition members who had called for the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. When aid did not come and the rebellions failed, a huge refugee crisis emerged.

Although the U.S. and its coalition partners still had hundreds of thousands of troops in the region to deal with any Iraqi threat, the vast majority of troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait along Iraq's southern border. However, the worst refugee problem emerged in Turkey, along Iraq's northern border. Since Turkey was a NATO member, its refugee crisis was the responsibility of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), rather than U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which controlled most of the forces in the area. EUCOM was ill-prepared for a relief effort having detailed a significant portion of its forces to CENTCOM to fight the Iraqis.

Politically, the U.S. was preoccupied with negotiating an end to the war with Iraq and establishing a new post-war order in the Middle East. When the rebellions in Iraq erupted, the U.S. and its regional allies saw the possibility of independent Kurdish and Shi'a states in Iraq as a threat to the post-war peace. Preoccupation with these political questions distracted U.S. policymakers from the emerging refugee crisis and left them in a poor position to act quickly.

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[1] Most of the material in this case study is excerpted from a larger IDA study on political-military connectivity being prepared for OSD(SO/LIC). The material has been formatted according to the outline used in all of the six studies on presence. Specific bibliographical references can be found in the larger case study for those interested in details of documentation, or can be obtained from the case writer.

The critical event that led to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was the outbreak of sectarian rebellions in Iraq after the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait. On March 2, 1991, the first anti-government riots by Shi'as began in the city of Nasiriyeh, south of Baghdad. Within a week, the uprising spread to the major Shi'a cities throughout southern Iraq.

In the north, the Kurdish rebellion began on March 7, 1991, with the liberation of the more remote towns and cities. On March 14, the Kurdish uprising gained momentum when over 100,000 Kurdish auxiliaries of the Iraqi army joined the rebels. By March 21, the Kurds had liberated three northern Iraqi provinces and had seized the city of Kirkuk. Both groups of insurgents expected help from the United States.

On March 9, the Iraqi government launched its counterattack against the Shi'as, using reorganized elements of the elite Republican Guards divisions. In the face of these well-trained and well-armed forces, the Shi'a revolt collapsed quickly. The government was ruthless in its effort to reassert control, ending the uprisings in all of the major Shi'a cities by March 18. The Shi'as were subdued and the government turned its attention to the Kurds.

The campaign against the Kurds began on March 28, 1991. As with the Shi'as, the lightly-armed Kurds were no match for Iraqi helicopters, armor and artillery. The city of Kirkuk fell on the first day, while the provincial capitals of Irbil, Suleimaniyeh, and Dohuk fell to government forces by March 30. By April 3, the Kurdish uprising had collapsed. The Iraqi army's use of helicopters was crucial to their success, since it allowed them to quickly spot and strike rebel forces with impunity. The fact that U.S. negotiators had permitted the Iraqis to fly their helicopters (ostensibly as transport for senior officials as they surveyed the damage to the country) as part of the cease-fire agreement created a tremendous controversy in the U.S. about the administration's handling of the end of the war.

In Iraq, the sudden reversal of fortune led to a massive exodus of Iraqi Kurds. In 1988, the Iraqi government used chemical weapons to kill thousands of Kurds, in a campaign to crush a serious uprising in the north. Many Kurds expected that government retaliation for the much larger and more widespread 1991 rebellion would be proportionately worse. Expecting a pogrom, nearly a million Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran by April 5, 1991. The U.S. military estimated that there were over 450,000 Kurdish refugees in 43 locations along the Iraq-Turkey border.

The high concentration of refugees in a mountainous area, with no food, shelter, or sanitation rapidly led to a disaster. Deaths among the refugees from starvation, malnutrition, exposure and disease quickly climbed to over 1,000 a day. Efforts by the Turkish government to get aid to the refugees were hampered by a lack of funds and poor roads. As the refugee population climbed, the problems only got worse.

Meanwhile in Europe and the United States, numerous commentators in the press criticized the allied leaders, particularly President Bush, for failing to aid the rebels in Iraq. That the U.S. had permitted Iraq to fly its helicopters, facilitating the suppression of the rebellions, only made matters worse. As the press began to cover the refugee crisis, public pressure to help the refugees mounted rapidly. The European allies were particularly concerned about the developing refugee crisis. On April 2, Turkey appealed to the Security Council for help in dealing with Iraq and the refugee crisis. On the same day, France and Britain began to pressure the U.S. to participate On April 5, 1991, President Bush announced that in two days' time, the U.S. would begin to air drop supplies to refugees in northern Iraq. The President also pledged an additional $10 million in refugee assistance to help deal with the crisis and left the door open to increase U.S. assistance. As the President made his announcement, U.S. forces with the European Command (EUCOM) were placed on alert to carry out the mission.

DECLARED U.S. OBJECTIVES (POLITICAL AND MILITARY)

The Bush administration's decision to initiate Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was driven in large part by the need to preserve the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and the need to support U.S. allies. While President Bush, in announcing the first air drops, declared that "the human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq demands immediate action on a massive scale," the underlying national security interest dictated that the U.S. not be seen as willing to ignore a serious humanitarian disaster nor willing to turn a deaf ear to the pleas of the NATO allies for action.

The primary political goal of the operation was to preserve the credibility of U.S. international leadership. Since, in the eyes of the public and some allies, the administration's refusal to aid the Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions had led to the refugee crisis, there was a sense that the U.S. was obligated to pick up the pieces. The U.S. had been so successful in organizing and maintaining the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War, that the international community expected more from the U.S. To walk away from

such a huge humanitarian crisis would cast doubt on U.S. leadership and undermine the U.S. victory over Iraq.

Towards a similar end, the Bush administration sought to support its allies, alleviating the pressure on the Turkish government. Turkey lacked the resources (both financial and material) to deal with the refugee crisis on their own and they faced serious unrest among their own Kurdish population if they could not bring the situation under control. The U.S. assistance in dealing with the refugees could help to stabilize the situation for the Turkish government and it would demonstrate that the U.S. would come to the aid of its allies. Providing aid to the Kurdish refugees and ending the crisis offered the best means to these ends.

Like every other administration since the Vietnam War, the Bush administration was concerned about being drawn into an open-ended commitment. Intervening to provide relief to refugees did not lend itself well to a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces. There are indications that from the beginning, the Bush administration wanted to guarantee that it would not get caught indefinitely caring for the refugees. On April 12, 1991, President Bush agreed to an allied plan of action that included turning the relief efforts over to civilian agencies as an explicit objective. The efforts by the military to rely on local sources of aid and transport and the White House's constant efforts to turn relief operations over to the U.N. are two examples of how this constraint exhibited itself during the operation.

The decision process initiating the operation lay mainly with the senior advisers in the White House. Pressure from the public, members of Congress and the European allies, and the growing news coverage of the refugees plight demanded some type of action from the United States. Faced with this pressure, the President and his advisors had to decide quickly on a strategy to deal with the immediate crisis. The White House decided that the U.S. must undertake a relief effort and ordered the Department of Defense to develop and execute a limited operation.

As the crisis progressed, the White House reassessed the political objectives and constraints on the operation, modifying its guidance as necessary. In particular, the President expanded the scope of the operation gradually, in response to new information. He authorized the military to move beyond air drops of supplies to an increased presence on the ground. To protect U.S. forces in the area, he announced a "no fly zone" in Iraq above the 36th parallel, detailing additional U.S. planes to the area to enforce the declaration. Finally, the President agreed to a British recommendation that the allied task

force establish "safe havens" inside Iraq to entice the refugees to return to their homes. At each juncture, the gradual expansion of the mission improved the chances that the U.S. would accomplish its primary political goals.

The fundamental military objective of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was to get aid and relief to Kurdish refugees along the Turkish-Iraqi border. The administration wanted to end a humanitarian crisis and it was up to the military to do what was necessary to stabilize the situation. This objective remained constant even as the scope and direction of the operation were revised to keep up with events.

The operational objectives for Combined Task Force - PROVIDE COMFORT (CTF) evolved gradually. Initially, the CTF was only authorized to conduct air drops of relief supplies. By April 9, 1991, the CTF was permitted to put troops on the ground to guide the air drops into the camps. On April 10, with the addition of Navy Task Force 60, centered around the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71), the CTF mission grew to include a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to insure that no Iraqi aircraft flew north of the 36th parallel. CINCEUR revised its operational guidance for the CTF to develop a long-term approach that would emphasize local ground transport of supplies, more bulk food and goods, and an effective distribution system that could be handed over to the U.N.

The operational objectives changed again when the administration consented to a British idea to set up a "security zone" in northern Iraq for the refugees. The new objectives then became to clear Iraqi troops out of the area around the city of Zakhu, Iraq, and to set up a system for stabilizing and repatriating the refugees. As the allied forces moved into Iraq, the CTF discovered that they would have to expand the "security zone" to include the towns and cities where the refugees came from. While the objectives for the security zone changed according to the situation, CINCEUR and the CTF Commander remained committed to getting the troops out of Iraq as soon as the U.N. could handle the relief efforts.

The time constraints involved in the operation were a very critical issue. The high death rates in the refugee camps meant that U.S. forces had to act quickly to save lives. While the short time frame did not affect the military objectives, it did affect the planning for the mission. In order to arrest the death rate in the camps, EUCOM had to get whatever it could find into the camps as quickly as possible. There was no opportunity for advance planning, so everything had to be organized on an *ad hoc* basis. EUCOM sent whatever combat and support units it could move quickly and easily. More importantly, the lack of information about the refugees' plight meant that EUCOM could

not anticipate what units and what supplies would be needed. The overall mission demanded that they get the troops there and modify the operation as it went along.

The rules of engagement (ROE) for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT involved a very strong prejudice against the use of force. In Turkey, where Turkish units could provide basic security for the relief effort, the normal peacetime rules of engagement were adequate. However, when the CTF had to move into Iraq against an uncooperative Iraqi military, EUCOM issued new detailed ROE for the move. Essentially, the ROE authorized the use of force only in self-defense and then only as a last resort. The ROE gave explicit instructions on how to deal with any military units committing a "hostile act" or showing "hostile intent" and also covered how to deal with violent mobs and riot situations among the refugees. In the words of the commander of the U.S. 3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team, U.S. troops at all levels had to change their mind-set from one "of closing with and destroying the enemy to that of accomplishing the mission without resorting to force."

As allied units arrived to join the relief effort, the CTF had reconcile the national ROE of each unit with the U.S. ROE governing the bulk of the forces. In many cases, the ROE for allied units were even more stringent than the U.S. ROE, often restricting the deployment of troops as well as their use. Because the different ROE represented a threat to the effectiveness of the allied force in Iraq, the CTF pushed for most of the allied units to adopt the U.S. ROE. For those forces whose governments would not modify their ROE sufficiently, the CTF worked with the national commanders to establish clear rules for CTF commanders to take tactical control of allied units in the field. This helped to minimize any confusion over when and how force could be used.

The CTF's Military Coordination Center (MCC) also improved the operating environment by reducing the likelihood of a hostile confrontation with Iraqi forces. By warning the Iraqis in advance of allied movements, the MCC ensured that allied forces would not surprise any Iraqi units and spark a fight. The combination of the ROE and the MCC proved very effective in preventing conflict. Throughout the whole operation, only one firefight erupted between allied and Iraqi forces. There were no other incidents on the ground.

EVENT DESCRIPTION/U.S. MILITARY ASSETS INVOLVED

The opening phase of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began on April 7, 1991. U.S. Air Force transport planes dropped 27 tons of supplies into the Kurdish camps along

the Turkey-Iraq border. The original guidance from CINCEUR called for up to 10 days of air drops and the development of a forward support base for the operation. EUCOM deployed the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), the 39th Special Operations Wing and various other Air Force units to the region to handle the air drops, as part of Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (JTF-PC). The JTF was under the command of MGEN James Jamerson, USAF.

Shortly after their arrival in Turkey, elements of the 10th SFG and State Department disaster relief experts were sent to the refugee camps to help organize distribution and to assess the needs of the refugees. The results of the first missions were mixed. Some aid got to the Kurds, but many drops came down in adjacent valleys that were inaccessible to the refugees. Reports from the field also indicated that some of the supplies being dropped were destroyed on impact.

Based on this information, CINCEUR and the JTF commander concluded that the relief effort would have to switch its emphasis from air drops of prepackaged materials (e.g. MREs) to overland transportation of bulk goods. On April 9, CINCEUR revised its mission guidance calling for reduced reliance on air drops, tailoring of deliverables to the needs of the refugees, and civilianizing the relief effort as much as possible. In order to support this expanded effort, EUCOM ordered ground combat assets into Turkey to assist. On April 9, the 24th MEU received it orders to deploy to Turkey, arriving in port on April 13.

As an intermediate step to overland transport, the JTF first switched over to using helicopters to bring in supplies. Teams from the 10th SFG in the refugee camps began to clear landing zones (LZs). By April 15, the aviation element of the 24th MEU, HMM-264, was in place in Silopi, Turkey with its 23 helicopters and ready to assist. However, when the helicopters started arriving at the refugee camps, the starving refugees swarmed into the LZ, forcing the pilots to dump their cargo from a low hover to avoid an accident. According to one account, the helicopters faced an added danger from allied aircraft continuing to air drop supplies over the refugee camps and the helicopter LZs.

On April 10, the JTF acquired a naval forces (NAVFOR) component composed of Navy Task Force 60, a carrier battle group built around the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71). Task Force 60 was to provide fighter cover over northern Iraq to ensure that no Iraqi aircraft violated the "no fly zone" above the 36th parallel. President Bush had announced the "no fly zone" the day before, authorizing CINCEUR to expand the mission for PROVIDE COMFORT accordingly.

On April 12, the U.S. and its allies agreed upon a plan to resolve the refugee crisis by setting up "safe havens" inside Iraq to entice the refugees to return to their homes. On April 16, EUCOM established the Combined Task Force (CTF) to execute the allied plan with a large multinational force. EUCOM expanded the military mission to include a ground based presence in Iraq and a new effort to return the refugees to Iraq. The CTF was to set up a series of temporary camps in Turkey and Iraq to act as way stations for the Kurds returning to their homes in the new allied safe zone. Turkey agreed on April 16 to permit the U.S. to establish temporary refugee camps on its side of the border. To help establish the camps EUCOM ordered the rest of the 24th MEU ashore to help the prepare the sites.

EUCOM developed a four-phase plan for U.S. forces to provide relief in conjunction with allied military forces and the numerous international relief organizations (IROs). In phase one, EUCOM would rely on air drops until they could acquire local transport to move bulk goods overland by truck. In phase two, the U.S. and allied forces of the Combined Task Force (CTF) would set up supply bases and temporary camps (mainly in Turkey) for the refugees. Phase three involved the longer term goal of returning the refugees to their homes in a Iraq, via way stations along the route. In order to encourage the refugees to return to Iraq, the CTF would move its forces into northern Iraq to establish a secure environment. In the final stage, the CTF would turn over the relief and security operations over to the U.N. and associated international relief organizations.

At the same time, CINCEUR assigned LTG John M. Shalikashvili, USA, to command the CTF. With the new commander came new operational guidance that the CTF was to prepare receive British, French and Dutch units and prepare to move into Iraq to set up temporary refugee camps. LTG Shalikashvili, in order to carry out that assignment, created Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) composed of the 24th MEU and a battalion each of British and Dutch Marines. The same day, MGEN Jay M. Garner, USA, deputy commanding general of V Corps, was assigned as the Commander, Joint Task Force Bravo (CJTFB).

On April 19, LTG Shalikashvili met with an Iraqi army delegation at the Turkish-Iraqi border, to inform them that coalition forces intended to enter Iraq on April 20 on a humanitarian mission. On April 20, with U.S. Air Force A-10 and F-16 attack jets flying overhead, Joint Task Force Bravo moved across the border and into the Iraqi city of

Zakhu. Before nightfall, the Marines of the 24th MEU had already begun setting up tents for the first refugee camp.

The basic allied strategy was to get the Kurds out of the mountains and return them to their homes through a series of way stations in Turkey and Iraq. The refugees would past east through Silopi and the main forward support base. Then they would turn south and follow the road down to Zakhu, where they could stay until they felt safe enough to return to their homes.

Setting up the refugee camps and keeping them supplied required a huge effort by the allied support troops. Medical units were busy in Turkey treating the refugees for malnutrition, dysentery, and typhoid. The engineering units from the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands worked to clear mines from the roads to Zakhu. They also worked to repair the bridges and airfields in the area that had been damaged during the war. Once the infrastructure was repaired, supplies could be brought in more quickly and in greater quantities. Logistics units worked to set up the necessary supply depots to support the relief effort.

Despite all of this effort by the support troops, setting up and supplying the refugee camps remained difficult. The first truck deliveries of bulk supplies did not occur until April 24, two weeks after the decision to reduce reliance on air transports. Even setting up the first camps in Iraq took over a week, with the first camp in Zakhu opening on April 27. As difficult as it was to set up the camps in Iraq, enticing the Kurds to move into them proved just as difficult. The Kurds had fled Iraq out of fear of widespread government reprisals for the rebellion. Until the Kurds could be assured that they would not be subject to retribution or further repression, they refused to leave the mountains.

The security issue had been the driving force behind the allied decision to send troops into northern Iraq. Thus, once the allies had set up and secured the camps near Zakhu, they brought leaders of the various Kurdish clans into Iraq to see the camps, hoping they would convince their clans to follow. In practice, the effort to woo the Kurdish leaders fell far short. Some refugees did move out of the mountains and into the camps near Zakhu, mostly those whose homes were nearby. However, since most of the refugees came from the city of Dohuk and other areas outside the allied security zone, they had no desire to go to camps near Zakhu. The refugees wanted to go home and until they could safely return their homes, they would stay in the mountains.

As a result, on May 2, 1991, the allied forces began to expand the security zone in northern Iraq. By the beginning of May, the JTFB had been reinforced with the 3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team, the French 8th Airborne regiment, the British 3d Commando brigade, and airborne battalions from Spain and Italy. With the exception of the 3/325th Airborne, these units formed the core of the five composite brigades in JTFB. These forces allowed the JTFB to expand its perimeter to the east of Zakhu towards the towns of Al Amadiyeh and Suri.

Expanding the security zone was not an easy process since there remained the constant potential for conflict with the Iraqis. To avoid any major incidents, the CTF set up a Military Coordination Center (MCC) with the Iraqi military on April 19. The MCC was under the command of COL Richard Naab, USA, and served as a clearinghouse for information on the movements of troops. The CTF would notify the Iraqi through the MCC where they would be moving in northern Iraq and request that Iraqi forces keep 30km from allied positions. However, the Iraqis were not always quick to evacuate their positions before allied units moved in. As a result there were numerous tense moments when individual allied commanders had to meet with their Iraqi counterparts and order them to withdraw.

By May 3, 1991, elements of JTFB had moved south to the edges of the city of Dohuk, the provincial capital. CINCEUR and the CCTF both informed the U.S. administration of their opinion that securing Dohuk was essential to getting the Kurds to return to their homes. The commanders of the British and French contingents expressed similar sentiments to their governments. However, the decision to secure Dohuk was not an easy one. Because Dohuk was a regional capital, occupying the city would have been such a egregious violation of Iraqi sovereignty that the action could jeopardize the support of the USSR and the PRC at the U.N. Thus, the political leaders had to find an alternative solution.

The political decision over the fate of Dohuk developed slowly. As allied forces from JTFB pushed closer to the edge of the city, the U.S., Britain and France began to push for a U.N. "police force" to protect the security zone in northern Iraq. When U.N. representatives suggested the plan to the Iraqis, they rejected it out of hand. The U.N. continued to press Iraq on the issue, attempting to work out a compromise. Finally, on May 18, 1991, Iraq and the U.N. came to an agreement whereby the Iraqi army would turn Dohuk over to a 500-man U.N. security force. On May 19, the first contingent of U.N. guards began patrolling the streets of Dohuk.

A political settlement between Iraq and the U.N. was critical to the goal of civilianizing the relief effort. When JTFB first went into Iraq to set up the "security zone," the international relief organizations (IROs) working in Turkey refused to help run the new sites in Iraq. Normally, the U.N. relief agencies and the IROs provide aid and assistance with the approval of the host government. Since the coalition entry into Iraq was opposed by the Iraqi gover ıment, the IROs refused to enter Iraq until either the U.N. agencies went in or Iraq consented to the operation. When the U.N. and Iraq came to an agreement on the U.N. security force for northern Iraq, it also opened the door for the IROs to assist with the relief efforts in Iraq.

During the political wrangling over Dohuk, Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) was not idle. Their overall mission was to return the refugees to their homes. To do so, JTFB had to set up new logistics bases and way stations inside Iraq. The way stations at Zakhu were ready by early May and on May 11, Joint Task Force Alpha (JTFA) began moving the first refugees into Iraq. Another critical node was the airfield at Sirsensk. The airfield, damaged during Operation DESERT STORM, was the only one within the coalition "security zone" in Iraq capable of supporting the C-130 transport planes carrying the relief supplies. Coalition engineer units were able to make the airfield operational by May 14, allowing much quicker delivery to refugee camps in Iraq.

At first, the refugees were reluctant to return to Iraq because of the security situation. During the middle of May, the flow of refugees back into Iraq began to slowly increase. However, once the U.N. had established a presence and secured Dohuk, the refugees began to return at much more rapid rate. On May 25, the flow peaked as 55,200 refugees moved into the camps at Zakhu on their way home.

With the refugees moving back into Iraq and the U.N. providing both security and relief aid, the Combined Task Force (CTF) could begin winding down its operations. On June 7, the CTF handed control and operation of all of the temporary camps in the security zone over to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As the CTF reduced its involvement in the relief operations, it could also start reducing its forces. On June 8, with all of the refugees out of the camps in Turkey, Joint Task Force Alpha was deactivated. Four days later, the CTF's Civil Affairs Command, which had helped coordinate the camps, was also deactivated.

Throughout the rest of June, the CTF continued to reduce its presence. The remaining support troops left Iraq on June 15, while the combat troops also made preparations to leave. The allied battalions of JTFB withdrew first, further shrinking the

coalition force. Finally, on July 15, Battalion Landing Team 2/8 of the 24th MEU and the 3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team were the final element of JTFB to depart Iraq. To provide continued security for the relief agencies in Iraq, the CTF activated an infantry battalion task force to act as rapid response unit. JTFB was deactivated, bringing Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to an end.

OUTCOME/ASSESSMENT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT accomplished all of the political objectives that the administration set out for it. By orchestrating a new coalition of nations in a successful effort to relieve and repatriate Kurdish refugees in Turkey, the U.S. once again demonstrated the credibility of its leadership. The U.S. also showed that it would support allies like Turkey, when confronted with a serious crisis of any kind. On a geostrategic level, the U.S. proved that it was willing and able to act as a superpower. More importantly, the U.S. accomplished these goals without getting drawn into a large open-ended military commitment to the Kurds. The coalition was able to turn over relief operations to the U.N. and other agencies, needing only to leave behind a small quick reaction force to deter the Iraqi military.

On a more mundane level, the success of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT helped to mute domestic criticism of how the Bush administration handled the Iraqi rebellions in the aftermath of the war. The U.S. gained something of a political windfall, when the Iraqi government entered negotiations with the Kurds that led to an agreement giving the Kurds much greater autonomy within Iraq. The U.S. did not simply repatriate the Kurds, they helped to improve their political lot in Iraq. The operation was a tremendous success.

The Combined Task Force succeeded in achieving all of the objectives it was assigned. The CTF was able to stabilize the refugee population, reducing the death rate and the incidence of disease and starvation. In the camps, they guaranteed a steady flow of relief supplies and organized an effective distribution system. The CTF also successfully moved into Iraq to set up a "security zone" permitting the refugees to return their homes. The success of the movement into Iraq is particularly striking, given the fact that the CTF was relying on composite multinational brigades and was attempting to coordinate the move with the Iraqi army, while using the minimum necessary force. Above all, they set up the operation so that they could turn it over to the U.N. and the relief agencies. As a result, the CTF did not get tied down in an open-ended commitment

to run the refugee camps. The coalition forces accomplished every operational goal and task set out for them. LTG Shalikashvili, the Commander of the CTF, in testimony before Congress described the success of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as beyond his "wildest dreams."

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts in modern military history. It was also the first in a growing trend of disaster relief operations carried out by the U.S. military. Since 1991, U.S. military forces have assisted in disaster relief efforts in Bangladesh (cyclone/flooding), the Philippines (volcanic eruption), Florida (hurricane), Somalia (drought/famine), and now the Mississippi River basin (flooding). As a result of these successful efforts, many people now see disaster relief as a new and growing role for the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era. PROVIDE COMFORT offers a number of lessons about whether and how U.S. military forces should be used in future relief efforts.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT provided a clear demonstration of the role that military forces can play in disaster relief. The training and preparation that allows military forces to sustain themselves in the stressful environment of combat also allows those same forces to cope with disaster situations quickly and effectively. The U.S. military is also the only organization that can move large quantities of goods very rapidly over long distances and on short notice. While private relief organizations can move and distribute relief supplies given time to prepare, the U.S. military has unmatched transportation and logistic assets that can make a huge difference in a crisis.

However, this effort revealed some cautionary lessons about using the military in disaster relief. While the military does bring valuable skills and assets to the mission, those skills are not complete. In any relief operation, the military will still need to be guided by disaster relief specialists who know the organizational and logistical pitfalls of refugee assistance. Given the military's special advantages in supply and logistics, it is best utilized for short term emergency relief rather than long term operations. U.N. agencies and international relief organizations are better skilled at performing long term aid and reconstruction.

One of the most striking aspects of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was the fact that it succeeded despite being an *ad hoc* effort. Military units from more than a dozen countries and over fifty different private relief organizations converged on the refugee camps, organizing themselves into an effective unit under the umbrella of the CTF. All of this was done without any exchange of memoranda or other written agreements to

govern the operation. Everyone involved in the relief effort simply focused on what their organization could contribute and on how best they could aid the refugees. The success of this *ad hoc* organization was particularly striking among the allied military units. The different national contingents simply built themselves around the CTF command structure and conducted the operation through informal arrangements at every level. This success among the military units can best be attributed to three key elements: professionalism, liaison and training.

First, the professionalism of the military personnel involved in the operation helped keep them all focused on the goal of aiding the refugees. This professionalism was particularly critical to the successful cooperation among the senior officers. As the senior commanders from each component and country developed their plans, any traditional national or interservice rivalries took a back seat to the central goal of saving the refugees. No commander eschewed certain tasks as being inappropriate for his unit. Rather, each commander (and each PVO representative) sought only to use his resources where they could be most effective.

Excellent liaison at every level of the command structure also helped to make the operation a success. With military units from different countries being combined into multinational brigades, it was essential that the CTF maintain effective liaison at each level to insure that its orders were properly understood and executed. The liaison between coalition partners and the CTF headquarters helped to identify and resolve differences in rules of engagement (ROE) and differences in unit capability. The liaisons within the CTF improved the exchange of information so that the unit commanders could make sound decisions, based on a more complete knowledge of the resources at their disposal. Thus, the limitations of any one unit could be identified and compensated for.

Training was the central element to the success of the coalition in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. First, the high levels of training that allied military units underwent as part of their normal routine, meant that each unit was in a high state of readiness when it deployed to Turkey and Iraq. The personnel were well-trained and well-prepared to do their jobs. The engineers repaired roads and airfields. Medical units treated the sick and helped improve sanitation. Air transport squadrons and quartermaster units delivered supplies and established support bases. Coalition fighter squadrons provided air cover and were on stand-by for close air support. Only the ground combat units had to perform in a manner that differed from their training, learning to conduct an advance against an enemy without using force. But even in this case, the

unit discipline engendered by their previous training helped them to carry out their orders within the confines of their rules of engagement. The bottom line is that the training regimens of each unit assigned to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT left their personnel well-prepared and well-suited to meet the challenges of their mission.

On an individual level, training was a critical element in the successful performance of the unit commanders. Most of the senior American officers had extensive experience with joint and combined (i.e., multinational) operations. Since virtually all of the coalition units came from NATO, nearly all of the officers had at least some experience operating in a multinational environment. Among the senior American officers, there were many that had joint service experience and were thus capable of integrating units from the different services. One example is COL Stephen Winsor, USA, of the 18th Engineer Brigade, who had no difficulty integrating Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) detachments and a Navy construction battalion into his unit. While the CTF pushed the limits of integration through its organization of joint and combined brigades, the previous NATO and joint service training of the coalition officers left them well-prepared to handle the challenge.

One other factor should be noted in relation to the success of the *ad hoc* organization of the CTF: luck. The CTF was lucky in so far as a number of potentially destabilizing factors broke their way, leaving open the possibility of success. Had the various Kurdish militias begun to fight one another launch raids against Iraqi targets from behind coalition lines (presumably incurring an Iraqi attack), or had the Iraqis challenged the entry of allied forces into northern Iraq, the entire operation would have been much more difficult to accomplish. While none of these dangers were likely to materialize (the desperate situation of the Kurds probably helped keep them unified and the shock of Iraq's military catastrophe in Kuwait only weeks earlier made an Iraqi military challenge unlikely), the fact is that the *ad hoc* organization of the CTF never had to face the test of combat. Whether the composite brigades of Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) would have performed so well against an Iraqi assault or whether conflict among the Kurds would have disrupted relief operations is open to question.

In the end one can only say that the commanders in the CTF took a calculated risk in setting up their organization, trading clearly defined structures to gain time and to improve capabilities. That calculated risk paid off. While no one would suggest that *ad hoc* organizations are the best way to ensure success, using a loose organizational structure in a military intervention can sometimes be very effective. The best lesson to

draw from this aspect of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is to remain flexible. Each branch of the U.S. armed forces has long been aware of the value of task-based organization. Army, Marine and Navy task forces have been a hallmark of U.S. military operations over the past twenty years, bringing together diverse units into a single whole that is best capable of accomplishing a mission. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, although it was often extreme in the extent of its task-based organization, provided a reaffirmation of the value of organizing a military force to suit the requirements of the mission.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT also demonstrated the ability of the military to work well with non-military organizations. The cooperation between the CTF and the various relief agencies contributed greatly to the success of the operation. The assistance of State Department disaster relief specialists was critical in this regard. This civilian-military cooperation is a critical issue for disaster relief operations, since the civilian organizations are likely to get there before the military. Guaranteeing smooth cooperation can improve the success of an operation.

ALTERNATIVE FORCES

U.S. Air Force assets were heavily involved in the early execution of PROVIDE COMFORT. Air Force transport planes were tasked to haul the massive tonnage of supplies into the distressed area. The 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), the 39th Special Operations Wing and other Air Force units were deployed to the region to handle the air drops. The lift capability of these forces was critical to the outcome of the mission. The urgency of the crisis did not allow for sealift of the supplies.

The problems of access encountered by the Air Force planes could only be overcome by the introduction of ground combat assets. Marine helicopters were introduced as an alternative to the airplanes but they were also found to have their limitations.

U.S. Air Force A-10 and F-16 aircraft were highly involved as part of the coalition forces assigned to enter Iraq. In this instance, the Air Force planes were part of the comprehensive effort to control the skies over northern Iraq. Navy Task Force 60 was assigned the job of ensuring that the "no fly zone" above the 36th parallel was violated by Iraqi aircraft. Air Force and Navy aircraft thus operated in tandem to ensure success of the operation.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrates the critical role Air Force assets can play in humanitarian operations. The massive nature of this particular operation required the lift capabilities of the Air Force supplemented by ground forces.

As this case study shows, humanitarian efforts can involve forced entry into the territory of an adversarial state and Air Force assets can be crucial in supporting the advance of the interventionist force.

CHRONOLOGY

07 Mar 91	Kurdish rebellion begins in northern Iraq.
14 Mar 91	100,000 Kurdish auxiliaries of the Iraqi Army defect to the rebels. Kurdish rebellion gains momentum across three provinces.
21 Mar 91	Kurdish rebels hold three northern Iraqi provinces (Dohuk, Irbil and As-Suleimaniyeh) and parts of two others (Kirkuk and Ninawa).
28 Mar 91	Iraqi Army begins its campaign against the Kurdish rebels, retaking the city of Kirkuk.
29 Mar 91	Kurdish refugees begin to move towards the borders with Turkey and Iran. Iraqi Army makes steady progress.
30 Mar 91	Iraqi Army retakes provincial capitals of Dohuk, Irbil, and As-Suleimaniyeh. Refugees flee in greater numbers.
31 Mar 91	U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated nearly 500,000 refugees along the Turkish Iraqi border.
02 Apr 91	Turkey appeals to the U.N. Security Council for assistance in dealing with the refugees. France pushes for strong U.N. action.
03 Apr 91	Kurdish rebellion in Iraq collapses. Iraqi Army reasserts control over area.
04 Apr 91	U.K. calls for a massive international effort to aid the refugees.
05 Apr 91	President Bush announces U.S./allied effort to deliver aid to refugees via air drops. Alert order given to EUCOM to organize operation. EUCOM activates Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (JTF-PC).
06 Apr 91	U.S. forces begin to deploy to Turkey.
07 Apr 91	First U.S. air drops begin over refugee camps. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, proposes U.N. buffer zones in Iraq for refugees.
08 Apr 91	U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, visits Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey. U.K. proposes a U.N.-supervised Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq and receives backing of European Community.
09 Apr 91	Mission expanded to sustain refugee population for 30+ days and provide temporary camps. EUCOM orders additional assets to area. The Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (24th MEU and Phibron-8) is ordered to proceed to Turkey. U.S. decides "safe zones" in Iraq for Kurdish refugees are unworkable.

10 Apr 91	President Bush declares a "no fly zone" in Iraq north of the 36th parallel. U.S. Navy Task Force 60 (TF 60), comprised of the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71) and escorts, join JTF-PC as the naval component.
11 Apr 91	U.S. Navy fighters from TF 60 begin enforcing "no fly zone" over Iraq. U.S. begins to work with allies on "safe zone" plan for refugees.
12 Apr 91	U.S. announces that it will double the size of its forces in Turkey. U.S. also comes to agreement with European allies on plan for "safe zones."
13 Apr 91	24th MEU arrives in port in Turkey.
15 Apr 91	24th MEU begins operating a service support base(SSB) at Silopi, Turkey.
16 Apr 91	Combined Task Force - PROVIDE COMFORT (CTF) established. Mission expanded to include the establishment of temporary camps and movement into northern Iraq to repatriate the refugees.
17 Apr 91	LTG John Shalikashvili takes command of CTF. Allied forces begin to arrive in Turkey to join CTF. Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) formed to enter northern Iraq and set up "safe zone."
19 Apr 91	JTFB moves towards Zakhu, Iraq. CTF commander meets with Iraqi military to ensure no Iraqi opposition to CTF moves. Military Coordination Center (MCC) established in Zakhu, Iraq to ensure deconfliction between Iraqi and allied units.
20 Apr 91	JTFB takes control of Zakhu. Construction begins on transit camp near Zakhu.
22 Apr 91	Civil Affairs Command (CAC) established at CTF headquarters.
23 Apr 91	Largest single day delivery of relief supplies - 969 tons; CTF suffers first casualty as a result of a land mine.
24 Apr 91	First truck delivery of supplies to refugee camps.
27 Apr 91	First transit camp opened at Zakhu.
28 Apr 91	Air drops from fixed-wing aircraft significantly reduced. Medical Command established at CTF HQ.
29 Apr 91	New SSB opened at Yuksekova, Turkey.
01 May 91	Combined Support Command (CSC) established at Silopi, Turkey.
02 May 91	JTFB begins to expand the security zone in northern Iraq.

05 May 91	JTFB security zone now includes towns of Suri and Al-Amadiyeh. JTFB on outskirts of provincial capital of Dohuk.
11 May 91	JTF Alpha begins moving refugees out of Turkey and into transit camps at Zakhu. Second transit camp opened at Zakhu.
13 May 91	First transit camp turned over to U.N. control.
15 May 91	Engineers complete repairs to runway at Sirsensk Airfield, Iraq. First fixed-wing flight of relief supplies lands at Sirsensk.
18 May 91	Iraq consents to turn over Dohuk to a 500-man U.N. police force.
19 May 91	First U.N. police enter Dohuk to patrol. Refugees begin moving back into Iraq at a quicker pace.
21 May 91	CTF reaches peak strength of 21,701 troops.
25 May 91	81 allied support troops enter Dohuk to provide aid. Transit camp population at Zakhu peaks at 55,200.
29 May 91	Deployment of all coalition forces complete.
06 Jun 91	Last border camp in Turkey closed.
07 Jun 91	Operation of transit camps and all other relief efforts turner over to U.N.
08 Jun 91	JTF Alpha deactivated. CTF begins phased redeployment.
12 Jun 91	Civil Affairs Command deactivated.
15 Jun 91	Remaining support troops withdraw from Iraq. Combat troops withdraw in stages with allied battalions leaving first.
15 Jul 91	U.S. 24th MEU and 3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team depart Iraq. JTFB deactivated. Infantry battalion task force activated.
17 Jul 91	Combined Support Command deactivated.

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Appendix D

CASE STUDY:
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
(HAITI)

Appendix D
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

BACKGROUND TO CRISIS

The U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Haiti in 1994 was yet another episode in a long history of severely troubled U.S.-Haiti relations going back to the early part of the nineteenth century. After 12 years of rebellion against the French colonists, the descendants of slaves of African descent overthrew the colonial government and established in 1804 the first independent Black republic. The U.S. government failed to develop any strong ties to Haiti, however, and took 60 years to officially recognize the Haitian government as legitimate (1864). [1]

In 1915 the United States invaded and occupied Haiti in what began as an attempt to reverse a military coup but ended up as a 19-year stay in the country. The main objective of this U.S. effort was to create a stable democracy (and perhaps—as some have argued—to keep the Germans from establishing a foothold in the Caribbean and South America), but the U.S. occupation had no decisive impact on Haitian politics and political development.

In 1957 Dr. Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier, a Black nationalist intellectual, was elected president of Haiti and during his time in office (he died in 1971) the violence of politics in that country reached a new high. Tens of thousands of Haitians were killed or compelled to flee abroad to escape the repression of the Duvalier regime, carried out systematically by the Black militia created by Duvalier, the Tontons Macoutes. President Kennedy suspended aid to Haiti in 1963.

Duvalier had declared himself "President for life" in 1964 and when he died, the label was passed on to his son, Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc"). During the time in office of the younger Duvalier, the United States developed a somewhat warmer attitude toward

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1 The historical information in this section draws on material found *in South America Central America and the Caribbean* (London: Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 360–361.

Haiti, but the repression continued and thousands of "boat people" fled the repression, poverty, and famine. Finally, in 1986, the United States arranged for "Baby Doc" to go into exile in France.

After a series of coups, the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest, was overwhelmingly elected President in Haiti's first free and peaceful election in December 1990. One of his first declared objectives was reorganization of the Haitian Army, and within 2 years of his election (September 30, 1991) Aristide was overthrown by the Army, led by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras. This coup d'état and the repressive policies of the Cédras regime were the events that triggered the Haiti crisis and the U.S. decision to intervene with military force.

At the eleventh hour, the invasion was cancelled when General Cédras was reported to have learned that C-141 and C-130 transport aircraft at Pope AFB carrying the 82nd Airborne Division had been ordered by President Bill Clinton to head for Haiti. At the time, a delegation headed by former president Jimmy Carter was in Port-au-Prince negotiating with the Cédras regime to willingly give up its power.

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The Clinton administration made clear that U.S. policies concerning developments in Haiti were based essentially on national rather than strategic or security interests. The basic national interests of the United States revolved around the following set of considerations:

1) *Democracy vs. Military Dictatorship.* The election of Aristide was the first time in Haitian history when the leadership of that country assumed power as a result of a free election. The overthrow of Aristide by the group of military affairs led by Cédras was seen in Washington as a throwback to the right-wing regimes dominating Haiti's political history and a threat to U.S. interest in promoting the democratic process throughout the Caribbean and South America. While Aristide's political orientation and ideology were suspect in some parts of the Clinton administration, the general feeling was that he deserved support inasmuch as he had come into office through the ballot box.

2) *Coercive Policies of the Cédras Regime.* The Cédras regime was seen in Washington to be not only illegitimate in that it ruled without the support of the people, but also violent and repressive in the way it governed. President Clinton himself characterized the regime as one that relied on violence and coercion against the Haitian people to stay in power. Cédras and the military officers around him were not seen to be

soldiers at all but a bunch of thugs and bullies whose coercive tactics could not be tolerated by the United States. In his address to the nation on September 15 on the situation in Haiti President Clinton said, "Haitian dreams of democracy [have become] a nightmare of bloodshed . . . The dictators launched a horrible intimidation campaign of rape, torture, and mutilation . . . People starved, children died, thousands of Haitians fled their country . . . Cédras and his armed thugs have conducted a reign of terror, executing children, raping women, killing priests . . . As the dictators have grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown more brutal."[2]

3) *Haitian Refugees*. Hundreds of Haitians began to flee the Cédras regime, the overwhelming majority of them taking to the high seas with the United States as their destination. President Clinton during the campaign in 1992 had taken a sympathetic view of their plight, perhaps inadvertently encouraging them to leave, but it soon became clear that the problem was not the exodus of a few hundred refugees but rather the possibility of a massive wave of refugees arriving in Florida and expecting to come under the care of the U.S. government. President Clinton's Special Adviser on Haiti clearly exaggerated but nevertheless said at one point that 5.5 million of the 5.8 million Haitian people could end up in the United States if actions were not taken to stop the flow of refugees.

Various efforts were made, prior to the decision to invade, to get rid of Cédras and his regime. The first was to impose an embargo against Haiti, but the embargo seemed to hurt the Haitian people more than it did the Cédras regime. The embargo had the unintended effect of exacerbating the refugee problem—the increasing economic hardships on the Haitian people led them to believe that only escape to America could alleviate their situation. The effectiveness of the embargo was also limited by the illicit flow of goods across the border with the Dominican Republic. Gasoline shipments were said to be smuggled across the border with relative ease and frequency. Efforts to seal the border were not effective. In addition, the Clinton administration authorized certain covert intelligence operations against Cédras, but these actions also apparently had no effect on the regime.

There was of course no complete national consensus on the imperative to invade Haiti. Public opinion polls and newspaper editorials across the country reflected strong opposition to invasion.[3] The arguments against invasion were numerous, but the primary

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2 *Reuters Transcript Report*, September 15, 1994.

3 Representative samples of public opinion are: Peter Grier, "Invading Other Nations Looks Easier and Easier Until the Costs Come In," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 20, 1994, p. 7; Trudy Rubin, "Why

one was that while the United States would have little trouble with the invasion itself it would not be able to extricate itself easily once in occupation of the country. In this connection, the experience of the U.S. expeditionary force sent to Haiti in 1915 was invoked—the U.S. Marines remained until 1934. The more recent U.S. experience in Somalia was a further analogy brought into the debate by the opposition. Here the question was whether the Clinton administration had prepared for the possibility that the invasion force would become embroiled in a civil war involving urban guerrilla warfare, for which it was unprepared. The administration argued that "nation-building" in Haiti was not part of the U.S. military objective and that U.S. forces would be out of Haiti in a matter of months rather than years. The administration argued that, unlike in the case of Somalia, there was a clear "exit strategy."

INVASION PLANS AND FORCES

The most massive deployment of U.S. military force since Desert Storm was assembled for the invasion of Haiti. The forces were organized as Task Force 120, and the force involved about 20,000 U.S. military personnel.

The invasion scenario was expected to unfold along the following lines:

- Before the invasion, President Clinton will issue an ultimatum to Haiti's military rulers to step down or face being ousted. At the same time, Americans in Haiti will be urged to leave the country for their own safety, possibly on charter planes provided by the U.S. government.
- Militarily, Special Forces liaison teams will be dispatched to foreign military command headquarters to set up communications with those nations that will take part in what military planners expect to be a multinational operation.
- Early in the operation, Special Forces commandos will arrive in Port-au-Prince under cover of darkness to conduct specialized pre-invasion missions, such as providing tactical intelligence, seizing control of or sabotaging key targets, and assessing the on-scene situation for commanders.
- Dropped from Air Force C-141s, parachuting Rangers will then move against the military and civilian airports to take control so that air transports can use the facilities for bringing in troops.
- Troops also will move quickly at the beginning of the operation to protect the American Embassy in downtown Port-au-Prince.

Should the U.S. Even Consider Invading a Country Like Haiti?," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 15, 1994, p. 23; and Peter A. Jay, "Head-First Into the Haitian Quagmire," *The Baltimore Sun*, p. 17.

- Air Force jets will be used to knock out key military communications sites and telephone service around Haiti as part of the effort to prevent Haitian military leaders from issuing orders.
- Special Forces commandos will attack radio and television stations to prevent them from being used by the Haitian military, and will take over at least one radio and TV station and begin broadcasting propaganda urging Haitian forces to give up and the militia to lay down its arms.
- Switching stations used by the Haitian military's land-line communications will be key targets for air strikes.
- Airborne paratroopers will seize the area south of Port-au-Prince known as Petionville, where most of Haiti's military and police leaders live in fortified mansions.
- Other key military targets that will be attacked during the first part of the invasion include the Justice Ministry, military headquarters, and police headquarters, all of which are near the presidential palace.
- Once the airports and port facilities are controlled, U.S. military forces will begin streaming into Port-au-Prince. Marine units will conduct an amphibious landing with helicopters and landing craft, and Army airborne and Ranger forces will arrive on transports or by parachute. The landing will involve delivering armored personnel carriers as protection for occupying American troops.
- Another assault force will attack the port of Cap Haitien, on the northern coast, where additional troops and equipment will be brought in rapidly to take charge of neutralizing opposition in the northern part of the country.[4]

In mid-September nine U.S. Navy warships and an 1,800-member Marine amphibious task force stood off Haiti. The Navy assembled 12 large cargo vessels to take in heavy military equipment after the initial assault. The aircraft carrier *Dwight D. Eisenhower* had been sent to Norfolk to pick up combat elements of the Army's 10th Munitions Division; the carrier would serve as a giant helicopter pad to transport the division to the mainland for the assault. The USS *Mount Whitney* was designated the

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4 Bill Gertz, "Force Would Target Nation's 'Brain Cells'," *The Washington Post*, August 31, 1994, p. 1. The details in this newspaper report clearly suggest that the basic elements of the invasion plan were briefed to the media.

command ship. Air Force C-130 and C-141 cargo plans were outfitted at Pope Air Force Base to transport cargo and troops. The invasion plan also called for the use of AC-130 gunships, A-10 attack planes and fighters. The invasion forces are depicted in Figure D-1.[5]

Preparations for the invasion were to a large degree purposefully transparent and the Clinton administration acknowledged that the massive show of force was intended to intimidate Cédras and his regime, to demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. intentions to get rid of them.

The force planning concept behind Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the brainchild of Admiral Paul Miller, CINCUSACOM at the time of the Haiti crisis, who in his earlier role of CINC of the Atlantic Fleet had sought new ways of packaging naval forces by placing Marine and ground elements on carriers for forward deployment. As unified commander of the Atlantic Command he developed simliar task organizations using forces of the Army and Air Force. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY the concept, called "Adaptive Joint Force Packages," was put to work and plans were developed for an air/land/sea and all-Service operation. The concept calls for mixing and matching forces and, in the Haiti case, for example, Army helicopters and troops were developed on two aircraft carriers. Joint Task Force 120 reported to the unified CINC directly rather than through separate chains of command.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY has been called "a prototype of the U.S. military's new operational style." Its key features have been identified as follows:

- All-service teamwork under competent joint command
- Imaginative use of all capabilities
- Precision
- Swift assembly and simultaneous application of forces
- Dominating maneuver
- Overwhelming force at the right places and times.[6]

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5 Figure D-1 is taken from the *The Washington Post.*

6 Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), "Haiti Becomes a Turning Point," *Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute*, October 1994, pp. 73–74.




Figure 1. Invasion Forces

OBSERVATIONS

1. The armada-like Task Force 120 assembled to invade Haiti did not provide sufficient "presence" for meeting U.S. objectives in Haiti. The deployment of the formidable naval task force off the coast of Haiti failed to convince the Cédras regime that discretion is the better part of valor. The Clinton administration went out of its way to publicize such actions as the steaming to within a mile of the Port-au-Prince waterfront of a U.S. destroyer and two other warships in mid-September, but the Cédras regime showed no sign of being affected by such actions.

2. There is a credibility issue associated with the massive forces deployed to deal with the Haitian crisis. Excessive overkill runs the risk of being perceived as an incredible threat. The punishment is seen to be so out of proportion to the crime that it cannot be taken seriously. (This was the fallacy of the "massive retaliation doctrine" of John Foster Dulles.)

3. A massive display of force also runs the risk of emboldening the intended target instead of causing him to back down. History shows the extent to which some leaders with tendencies toward megalomania thrive on encounters with more powerful nations and use those encounters to up the ante in a crisis. The cost of resolving the crisis thus becomes more expensive.

4. When such overwhelming force is employed to resolve a relatively minor crisis, the question becomes whether a similar magnitude of force will be required every time a band of thugs or some rag-tag army chooses to defy the United States. Is there a kind of law of forced repetition at work here? Next time, perhaps in some other area of operations, a quantity of firepower brought to bear in a particular crisis might be seen as less than a full demonstration of U.S. resolve if it is less than the quantity of forces involved in the case of Haiti. Maintaining credibility has a price.

5. When Saddam Hussein moved his troops toward Kuwait in October 1994, President Clinton indicated that the Iraqi leader might be trying to take advantage of U.S. force commitments in Haiti—the United States being too preoccupied and involved there to deal effectively with a new crisis in the Gulf. The magnitude of the deployments for Haiti were such that Saddam Hussein could very well have concluded that the United States could not act in time to prevent the takeover of Kuwait. More modest deployments targeted at Haiti or more involvement of Air Force elements in the operation might have convinced Saddam Hussein—had he been thinking along those lines—that the U.S. Army

and Navy were not spread too thinly or too tied up to respond to his attack on Kuwait. The kind of thinking that President Clinton attributed to Saddam Hussein might have also applied at the time to certain circles in Pyongyang.

6. There was a great deal of fanfare associated with the deployment of forces assembled for an invasion of Haiti. The movement of troops and ships was openly announced in the media. Apparently, however, there was no thought given to the use of land-based bombers as part of a demonstration-of-force mission. The naval forces arrayed to intimidate Cédras were not effective in this role, and while there was clearly no guarantee that bombers flown from the United States would have any more success than the airpower threat represented on the aircraft carriers, there was at least an outside chance that Cédras would read the introduction of, say, B-52s, flying over various military installations or facilities as a serious racheting up of U.S. determination and resolve. The introduction of a strategic weapon system into the dynamics of the crisis might have had a positive effect.

7. The Clinton administration made clear that the U.S. objective in Haiti was to get rid of Cédras and his regime and to restore Aristide to power, but Cédras and his regime were threatened only indirectly, not directly. That is, the regime was put under the threat of being forced out as the result of an invasion. The decision was made to use military force, but options other than invasion were apparently given little if any attention—for example, the option of discriminate use of airpower. U.S. airpower might have been used to destroy a selected list of targets in Haiti—targets specifically associated with Cédras' instruments for running his police state, such as the barracks and facilities of the paramilitary police force. The lack of any air defenses in Haiti would have made this option of interest in terms of risk of loss of U.S. life, and the precision-guided, smart weapons of the kind employed in the Gulf War would help ensure the destruction of the targets with minimal unwanted collateral damage.

8. General Cédras apparently decided to agree to the demands of the negotiating team led by President Carter only when he became aware that troop planes were on their way from the United States. This fact would appear to be a powerful argument for ensuring that CONUS-based aircraft are part of the overall force elements involved in resolving a particular crisis. But perhaps more important in this connection is the particularly unique feature of aircraft that was demonstrated once again in the Haitian crisis—the ability to be recalled once launched. This feature allowed the United States to

give a clear signal regarding its intentions without actually being forced to follow through on the threat.

9. The Adaptive Joint Force Packages approach to military planning has been likened to the manipulation of the Rubik Cube. The process is one of mixing and matching until the separate elements become aligned in the appropriate combination. But the general utility of this approach to planning can be questioned. What set of criteria actually drives the mixing and matching? What are the decision rules? To what extent does this approach sacrifice the benefits of operating in standard modes? Would the approach work effectively in environments where time is critical or the threat is greater than that represented in the Haiti crisis? The new concept of force planning may be innovative and useful in future crises, but the planning steps involved need to be clarified with a view toward determing just what kinds of efficiencies and effectiveness can be achieved under scenarios different from the limited case of Haiti.

CHRONOLOGY

1986	Feb 7	President Jean-Claude Duvalier flees after being forced out by uprising, ending 29-year family dictatorship. The army chief, Lieut. Gen. Henri Namphy, is named to oversee 2-year transition to democracy.
1990	Dec 16	After a series of coups, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide is overwhelmingly elected President in Haiti's first free and peaceful vote.
1991	Feb 7	Aristide is sworn in as president and immediately announces reorganization of the Army.
	Sep 30	Aristide is overthrown by the military in a violent coup led by Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cédras.
	Oct 8	The military installs a Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Nerette, as provisional president.
1993	Jun 17	The United Nations Security Council imposes an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.
	Jul 3	Aristide and Cédras, on Governor's Island in New York, sign an agreement brokered by the United Nations calling for Cédras to resign and Aristide to return by Oct. 30.
	Oct 11	About 200 United States troops arrive as part of United Nations plan to restore democracy. Their ship, the Harlan County, turns around and leaves after pro-military gunmen demonstrate.
	Oct 13	The United Nations Security Council reimposes sanctions in response to two-day rampage by gunmen who prevented landing of ship.
	Oct 14	Assassin kills Justice Minister Guy Malary, an Aristide supporter.
	Oct 16	Concerned by violence, members of a United Nations commission on human rights begin to leave Haiti.
	Oct 30	Deadline for Aristide's return passes as he remains in exile in the United States.
1994	May 6	The Security Council approves tighter trade sanctions banning travel by military leaders, their families, and their supporters and embargoing all commerce to and from Haiti except food, medicine, cooking oil, and journalistic supplies.

May 8	President Clinton announces that the United States will stop returning boat people without hearing their claims for refugee status. Fleeing Haitians will be allowed to make their claims aboard United States ships in the Caribbean or in other countries.
May 8	Clinton names William H. Gray 3d, former Congressman from Pennsylvania, as special envoy to Haiti, replacing Lawrence A. Pezzullo.
May 11	The Haitian military and its supporters in Parliament install a Supreme Court Justice, Émile Jonassaint, 81, as provisional president.
May 21	Tightened United Nations embargo goes into effect.
Jun 10	Clinton announces more sanctions against Haitian Government, cutting off commercial air traffic from the United States and banning financial transactions between the countries.
Jun 29	Faced with a growing number of refugees, the United States reopens processing center at Guantánamo Bay naval base in Cuba.
Jul 5	Washington changes policy to bar Haitian refugees from United States. They are to be returned to Haiti or taken to "safe havens."
Jul 7	Washington sends 2,000 marines to waters off Haiti and says United States forces have been practicing for invasion.
Jul 31	The United Nations Security Council votes 12–0, with two abstentions, to authorize the use of force against Haiti, clearing the way for an American invasion.
Aug 29	Father Jean-Marie Vincent, a prominent Catholic priest loyal to Aristide, is gunned down in Port-au-Prince.
Sep 15	In a nationally televised address, Clinton says the United States is ready to use force to oust the military leaders.
Sep 17	Clinton sends former president Jimmy Carter, Gen. Colin L. Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to Haiti to negotiate with Cédras.
Sep 18	Clinton announces that Carter has reached an accord under which the military leaders will step down when the Parliament passes an amnesty law or on Oct. 15, whichever comes first.
Sep 19	U.S. forces start landing and will eventually number more than 20,000.
Oct 10	Cédras resigns.
Oct 15	Aristide returns.

Appendix E

CASE STUDY:
OPERATIONS SHARP GUARD, PROVIDE PROMISE, AND DENY FLIGHT
(BOSNIA)

Appendix E
OPERATIONS SHARP GUARD, PROVIDE PROMISE, AND DENY FLIGHT

This case study presents an overview of the way military assets were used in support of political and foreign policy objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intent is not to present an exhaustive summary of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main focus is on the relationship between military force and political goals in light of the increasing demand that U.S. forces be used effectively and with the greatest degree of utility in "presence" and other political-military missions.

BACKGROUND

The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contained six republics (Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). (See Figure E-1.) In each republic there was one majority ethnic group. In Bosnia, however, the mix was 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 18 percent Croat. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. Fighting broke out between the Croatian government and Croatian Serbs who wanted to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Efforts by the European Community to resolve the crisis and stop the fighting within the framework of a Conference on Yugoslavia failed.

The United Nations (UN) became actively involved in the former Yugoslavia on September 25, 1991, when the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 713, which called upon all member states to implement "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia."



Figure E-1. Map of the Former Yugoslavia

After seven months of fighting, a cease fire was signed, and in February 1992 the UN Security Council established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to oversee the cease-fire.[1] (The UN Security Council mandated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to lead relief efforts in the former Yugoslavia.) After two months, the newly created UN Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC), with 7,500 troops, was deployed in the former Yugoslavia. In March 1992, Bosnians voted for independence, and fighting broke out between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs.

UNPROFOR is headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia. Four military officers have served as UNPROFOR commander:

1. Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar (India), March 1992–March 1993;
2. Lt. Gen. Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Sweden), March 1993–June 1993;
3. Lt. Gen. Jean Cot (France), June 1993–March 1994; and
4. Gen. Bertrand de Sauville de La Presle (France), Mid-March 1994–Present.

Following the adoption of Security Council 871 (1993), the military structure of UNPROFOR was reorganized under three subordinate commands: UNPROFOR Croatia, under Maj. Gen. A. Tayyeb (Jordan), headquarted in Zagreb; UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, under Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose (UK), headquartered in Kiseljak; and UNPROFOR Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, under Brig. Gen. Tryggve Tellefsen (Norway), headquartered in Skopje.

In June 1992, Canadian and French UN troops deployed from Croatia after UNPROFOR's mandate was extended to Bosnia to keep Sarajevo airport open. By August, a three-battalion force of French, Egyptian, and Ukrainian troops was established in Sarajevo. The group reported to UN headquarters in Zagreb. On August 13, the Security Council adopted resolution 770, which called on states to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the fall of 1992, the war involved the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) backed by regular federal Yugoslav army troops against the government of Bosnia–Herzegovina (also known as the army of Bosnia–Herzegovina, or BiH) and the Croatian defense council (HVO). In early 1993, the BiH-HVO alliance in central and southeastern Bosnia

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[1] Security Council Resolution 721 of February 21, 1992 authorized the Bosnian operation.

collapsed, turning the war into a three-way fight. BSA forces achieved major successes against Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, which led to UNPROFOR being tasked with securing the UN's safe areas.

The mission to protect UN safe areas posed considerable challenges to the UNPROFOR, which was initially deployed to protect aid convoys in areas controlled by only one combatant. The outbreak of fighting in central Bosnia turned the main aid route from the Croatian port of Split into a battle zone, and aid to eastern Bosnia has only been made possible by demilitarization agreements negotiated by UNPROFOR and the provision of troops to secure Muslim-held Srebinica and Zepa. In August 1993, French UNPROFOR troops also became a buffer force on Mount Igman, near Sarajevo, following disengagement of Serb and BiH forces after NATO's threat to launch air strikes. Events in Sarajevo in February 1994 repeated the pattern set in Srebinica and on Mount Igman, but with greater initial success.[2]

According to international press reports, in the history of United Nations peacekeeping missions, UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia occupies a unique position.

> Traditionally, UN military forces have served to separate belligerents willing to accept them as interlocutors and to help with the distribution of humanitarian aid; both roles that were reflected in UNPROFOR's original mandate in February 1992. UN troops, monitoring the cease-fire along the Croat-Serb front-line, were in Sarajevo when the first shots of the war were fired there in April 1992. However, the fast-changing situation forced the UN troops to withdraw from their headquarters in the city when, under heavy fire, it was threatened with being overrun. Since then, UNPROFOR's tasks have been greatly extended and now include all aspects of crisis management. To this end, it has had to establish close links with the NATO and European Union (EU) efforts to contain the continuing conflict in the Balkans.[3]

As the geographic scope of the war spread among all of Bosnia's main ethnic groups, UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded to protect Bosnians in six designated safe areas (see Figure E-2):

- Gorazde
- Zepa
- Srebrenica

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2 Tim Ripley, "Bosnia mission forces UN to grow with the times," *International Defense Review*, 5/1994, p. 64.

3 "Bosnia mission forces UN to grow with the times," p. 63.




Figure E-2. Enclave Map
Source: *The Washington Post*

- Sarajevo
- Tuzla
- Bihac

As of December 1994, efforts to end the war had had little effect. (See the Chronology presented at the end of this appendix.)

MILITARY ASSETS INVOLVED

Ground Troops

On June 14, 1993, the Security Council received from the Secretary-General a report on the requirements needed to implement resolution 836. The Secretary-General indicated that it would be necessary to deploy additional troops on the ground and to provide air support. In contrast to the UNPROFOR commander's estimate of a 34,000 troop requirement, the Secretary-General stated it was possible to implement the resolution under a "light option" with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. That option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives.

On June 18, the Security Council adopted resolution 844, which authorized an additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR by 7,600 troops. On August 18, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that following the necessary training exercises in coordination with NATO, the UN had the operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR.

Of the 25,000 UN troops in Bosnia, 9,000 were combat-ready up front, 16,000 combat support "tail." (See Figure E-3.)

As of December 1994, there were no American troops on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though planning was made for such a deployment. Gen. George A. Joulwan, CINC EuCom, told the House Appropriations Committee in March 1994:

> If there is a negotiated settlement [U.S. ground troops] would come from Europe, from my theater. Principally Army. From the two divisions that we are talking about that are forward deployed. . . . The second rotation of troops, if it were required, would have to come from CONUS. Depending on how long we kept the force there.
>
> The assessment I have made is that when you are dealing with the UN, which has the responsibility for land operations right now, the UN is involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. That is Mission A.

But if we are going to put our troops in there, I think we need to organize them, equip them, and size the force for an eventuality that it may go to Mission B or peace enforcement. So I think it is important that we put them in the right configuration to do that.





Figure E-3. U.N. Peacekeeping Troops in Bosnia
Source: *The Washington Post*

In Operation "Provide Promise," the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital deployed to Zagreb, Croatia, to provide medical support to UN forces. There are 221 U.S. military personnel assigned to the MASH adjacent to Zagreb's airport. It supplied medical care for injured troops of the 29,000 strong UN mission throughout the Balkans as well as some Bosnian civilians.

Though the United States has not provided ground troops, some U.S. equipment has been made available to other UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In March 1994, for example, the United States sent Q-36 and Q-37 *Firefinder* radars to Bosnia to be operated by 60 members of the Jordanian military.

AIR ASSETS

Approximately 40 American warplanes, F-16s, FA-18s, F-15Es, and A-10s, are based at Aviano, Italy, along with five EC-130 airborne command posts and three Awacs (Figure E-4). They are part of a much larger force which could be used against the Bosnian Serbs. The larger force includes Dutch, French, British, and Turkish warplanes at other Italian bases and American, French, and British planes aboard aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. The United States also has deployed an extra AC-130 gunships to Brindisi, in southern Italy.



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READY TO STRIKE

NATO forces available for action in Bosnia

United States

- In Aviano, Italy — Twelve U.S. Air Force F-16C fighters, eight F-15E aircraft, 12 A-10 attack planes; eight Marine F/A-18 fighter-bombers; five Air Force EC-130 airborne command and control aircraft
- On the USS Saratoga in the Adriatic — Twelve U.S. Navy F-14 fighters, six F/A-18C fighter-bombers or A-6A bombers
- In Pisa, Italy, and Istres, France — Ten Air Force KC-135 airborne refueling planes
- In Brindisi, Italy — Two Air Force AC-130 gunships

France

- In Cervia, Italy — Sixteen Mirage 2000-D fighters
- In Istrana, Italy — Five Mirage F-1 reconnaissance planes, eight Jaguar attack jets
- On aircraft carrier Foch — Six Super Etendard bombers
- In Trapani, Sicily — One E-3F early warning aircraft
- In Istres, France — One C-135 airborne refueling plane

Britain

- In Gioia del Colle, Italy — Eight F-3 Tornado fighters, 12 Jaguar attack planes
- On the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal — Six Sea Harrier fighter-bombers
- Near Milan, Italy — Two K-1 Tristar airborne refueling planes

The Netherlands

- In Villafranca, Italy — Fourteen F-16A fighters, four F-16A reconnaissance planes

NATO

- In Trapani, Italy — Eight E-3A, one E-3D early warning aircraft
- In Aviano, Italy — One E-3D early warning aircraft

Figure E-4. Description of Military Assets

As of February 1994, the following air assets were in the Bosnian theater.

- In Aviano, Italy: 12 USAF F-16C fighters, 8 F-15E aircraft, 12 A-10 attack planes, 8 Marine F/A-18 fighter-bombers, 5 USAF EC-130 airborne command and control aircraft.
- On USS *Saratoga* in the Adriatic: 12 USN F-14 fighters, 6 F/A-18C fighter-bombers or A-6A bombers.
- In Pisa, Italy, and Istres, France: 10 USAF KC-135 airborne refueling planes.
- In Brindisi, Italy: 2 AF AC-130 gunships.

Some of the air assets were based on carriers. For example, the USS *Saratoga* was part of a NATO/Western European task force which included the *Ark Royal*, the French carrier *Foch*, and about 15 multinational destroyers and cruisers that formed a defensive perimeter the east and south of the carriers. The *Saratoga*'s F/A-18C *Hornets* and A-6E *Intruders* are NATO's key night close air support strike aircraft for UN protection. The carrier's ES-3A electronic intelligence and F-14 photo reconnaissance capability are primary elements of the NATO intelligence gathering activity. The *Saratoga*'s two F-18 squadrons, VFA-81 and VFA-83, flew a total of 30 to 35 sorties per day.

In the Adriatic, two U.S. surface ships and a submarine enforce UN economic sanctions with 18 other Allied ships from ten countries. As of January 1994 the Allied ships had challenged a total of 24,773 ships, and stopped or boarded 1, 893 of them.

The United States also supports Operation "Provide Promise," the international humanitarian airlift and air-drop effort, with its national combat search-and-rescue forces in case aircraft are lost to accidents or hostile action. For example, when an Italian G.222 transport aircraft was shot down in September 1992, U.S. Marine Corps helicopters launched from the USS *Iwo Jima* to search for the aircraft. Liaison personnel from the U.S. special forces coordinate these activities.

OBJECTIVES OF U.S./UN/NATO MILITARY ACTIVITY

U.S. Interests

In public statements following the 1994 NATO summit, President Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, originally made in February 1993, to contribute U.S.

ground forces to help implement an enforceable peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina should one be reached by all parties.

Secretary of Defense William Perry said in February 1994 before the House Appropriations Committee that the "primary thrust" of U.S. policy in Bosnia was diplomatic, not military. Military force would be used only if it would "enhance our diplomatic initiative." Any military threat or use of military force must be "enforced—and I emphasize the word enforced" by a combination of NATO air power and UNPROFOR ground forces. Thus, any direct NATO involvement would be through air power, and "I am assuming there will be no use of the NATO ground forces sent in."

Following Perry's statement, the President made certain commitments to deploy U.S. troops if a peace settlement were reached.[4] In a speech to the nation from the Oval Office on February 19, 1994, President Clinton stressed that America could not afford to ignore conflicts in Europe. "In this crisis our nation has distinct interests," he said, citing two.

- We have an interest in helping to prevent this from becoming a broader European conflict, especially one that could threaten our NATO allies or undermine the transition of former communist states to peaceful democracies.
- We have an interest in showing that NATO—the world's greatest military alliance—remains a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era. We have an interest in helping to stem the destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating throughout all of Europe. And we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping to stop the strangulation of Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.

In spite of American interests, Clinton emphasized that "Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving this problem, and indeed it has. . ." President Clinton pledged not to send American ground units into Bosnia and that American ground forces would not be used to "impose a settlement that the parties to the conflict do not accept." The President concluded with three points: "I want to be clear about the risks we face

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[4] John J. Hamre, comptroller and chief financial officer, DoD, testified before the House Appropriations Committee in August 1994, "We estimate that a deployment of 20,000 Army soldiers to Bosnia would cost about $1.1 billion annually. This includes the cost to transport the troops and their equipment to Bosnia. Several major underlying assumptions of this estimate are that: Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) would be at the peacekeeping rate; the deployment and sustainment of the force would be accomplished 50 percent by air and 50 percent by sea; and that 80 percent of the force would come from Europe and 20 percent from CONUS. Excluded from this estimate are any costs associated with off-shore Navy and Air Force personnel that may be needed to support the in-country ground force.

and the objectives we seek if force is needed. American planes will likely account for about half the NATO air strikes. . . . Our military goal will be straight forward: to exact a heavy price on those who refuse to comply with the ultimatum. . . . I have also ordered American negotiators to intensify their efforts to help the parties reach a fair and enforceable settlement."

UNPROFOR Objectives

American, UN, and NATO forces have carried out separate military activities as a part of the mission in the former Yugoslavia. By February 1994, approximately 12,000 combat troops and 11,000 support troops were deployed in Bosnia as part of the BHC. The mission had five parts:

- Escort duties guarding UNHCR aid convoys, UN/EU envoys and local political leaders traveling to peace talks. UN military engineers also maintain roads used as convoy routes.
- Secure the six UN safe areas through the threat of NATO air strikes, negotiated cease-fires and confidence-building measures.
- Monitor the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia from the ground and liaise with NATO air forces enforcing the no-fly zone.
- Assist the International Committee of the Red Cross with prisoner-of-war and refugee exchanges and medical evacuations.
- Support EU/UN cease-fire monitoring efforts.[5]

NATO Role

The exact nature of NATO's role in Bosnia has always been both unclear and a source of endless debates within UNPROFOR. The basic UN mandate and UN Security Council Resolutions under which UNPROFOR operates are clear enough. A major source of friction, however, derives in part from the fact that the NATO forces were assembled under a separate mandate from the North Atlantic Council. NATO's Chief Liaison Officer to the UN, Air Commander John Houghton, RAF, said, "The UNSC and NAC mandates were not drafted together and don't match word for word. There are

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5 "Bosnia mission forces UN to grow with the times," p. 63.

different interpretations, which lead to discussions on different ways of approaching the job and getting the best effect for UNPROFOR and NATO."[6]

NATO forces are involved primarily in enforcing the no-fly zone and monitoring and enforcing the arms embargo. The NATO roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the following:

- Combat air patrols.
- Enforce no-fly zone.
- Close air support to protect UN ground troops.
- Operation "Sharp Guard," which enforces UN economic sanctions.
- Offensive air support to enforce the no-artillery zone around Sarajevo.

Houghton added, "Cooperation between the UN Air Operations Coordination Centre in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and NATO's Combined Air Operation Center in Vincenza, Italy, is a minute-to-minute working relationship." In contrast, the coordination between NATO and the UN for authority to strike Bosnian Serb targets with NATO aircraft requires hours if not days.

Operation "Sharp Guard"

As noted, the United Nations (UN) became actively involved in the former Yugoslavia on September 25, 1991, when the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 713, which called upon all member states to implement "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia." In May 1992, economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia and Montenegro.

Operation "Provide Promise"

On September 14, 1992, the UN Security Council authorized UNPROFOR and the UNHCR to extend aid relief efforts over all of Bosnia. The goal was to deliver, in addition to land convoys, by air 5,000 tons of relief supplies each week.

Operation "Deny Flight"

The Security Council, on October 9, 1992, adopted resolution 781, which banned all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for those of

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6 Tim Ripley, "Keeping the peace," *Flight International*, November 8, 1994.

UNPROFOR and other flights in support of UN operations. NATO agreed to use surveillance aircraft to monitor the UN ban on military flights over Bosnia, but there was no plan to enforce the no-fly zone with combat aircraft.

By November 1992 there had been 465 violations of the no-fly zone. On March 16, 1993, the Secretary-General reported that three aircraft dropped bombs on two villages east of Srebrenica on March 13, before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It was the first time since the Security Council instituted the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia-Herzegovina that aircraft were used in combat activity in that country. UNPROFOR was unable to determine the nationality of the aircraft.

On March 31, 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 816, which extended the ban on military flights to include flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 9, the Secretary-General submitted a letter to the Security Council from the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Manfred Wörner, which stated that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the "necessary measures" to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on April 12, 1993.

Air Strikes on Ground Targets

In June 1993, NATO authorized the use of alliance aircraft for close air support missions for UN troops in Bosnia. Two months later, NATO authorized air support to defend UNPROFOR troops if called by the UN. NATO agreed to provide 1) close air support to defend UN troops at any location in Bosnia, and 2) air strikes consistent with UN mandates in Bosnia.

IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

UN Economic Sanctions

Historically, economic sanctions have not been an effective means with which to influence the conduct of an adversary. "Although it is not true that sanctions 'never work,' they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on

compelling the target country to take actions it stoutly resists."[7] Economic sanctions tend to have the greatest impact on the weakest and most vulnerable segments of society—children and the elderly. In American history, economic sanctions have been perceived as measures short of warfare that are morally superior to combat. The case for economic sanctions rests on the belief that leaders will be responsive to the suffering of the people. Economic sanctions are least effective on nations whose leaders are prepared to ignore their consequences or are relatively immune from resulting hardships.

The impact of economic sanctions on the conduct of the Bosnian Serbs has been marginal, at best. The sanctions, which may have affected the pace of the fighting, have not stopped the flow of weapons. The longer the sanctions were in place, the clearer became the differences between the interests of the nations enforcing the sanctions. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the sanctions was perceptual. Unless sanctions were 'given a chance to work,' if the Western powers, particularly the United States, used force there would be a significant protest that measures short of war were not adequately explored. Thus economic sanctions should be seen in the light of domestic politics rather than as an effective tool of coercive diplomacy.

One sees the consequences of a lack of consensus among the Western powers in Operation "Sharp Guard" as well. Europeans tend to favor the idea that Serbia should be freed incrementally from UN sanctions which were imposed to punish Serbia for fueling the war in Bosnia. This would be an incentive for Serbia to cut off assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. The United States has consistently rejected the lifting of sanctions. The U.S. position has been that the Sarajevo government is both legitimate and a victim of Serbian aggression (tantamount to genocide); thus the Serbs must be punished. The U.S. position on lifting sanctions eroded and finally collapsed in late November 1994 in response to the continued reluctance of other NATO members to use air strikes to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. U.S. opposition to renegotiating the Bosnian peace plan based on a division of territory also began to slide toward the European position that the Bosnian Serbs should be told in advance that they should expect to win some sort of link with Serbia in any ensuing peace treaty.

Thus instead of pressure—economic or military—being applied on the Serbs by NATO or the United States, a so-called "contact group" of mediators from the United

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[7] Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Revisited: History and Current Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 92.

States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, has been negotiating with the Serbs. Within the "contact group," however, there is no consensus on the purpose or the goal of the negotiations. Russia has pushed not only for eased sanctions and more openness toward the Serbs, but also for an explicit promise that the Bosnian Serbs will be permitted to break off from Bosnia, in effect creating their own nation within a nation. Symptomatic of the disaccord within the "contact group" was the U.S. objection to the word "confederation" in the CSCE final communiqé which was replaced by a pledge of equal treatment for the Serbs. Russia and France treat the two as meaning the same thing nonetheless. Likewise, Russia blocked any reference to the Bosnian conflict in the final CSCE statement in early December.

Humanitarian Assistance

On August 13, 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 770, which called on states to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On September 14, 1992, the UN Security Council authorized UNPROFOR and the UNHCR to extend aid relief efforts over all of Bosnia. The goal was to deliver, in addition to land convoys, by air 5,000 tons of relief supplies each week.

Operation "Provide Promise" was a U.S.-led effort to provide food and medical supplies to isolated enclaves. The operation provided for daylight airlift missions to Sarajevo and nighttime airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between July 3, 1992, and January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organized by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicine, and other relief goods. As of March 1994, U.S. aircraft (mainly C-130) had flown 2,893 sorties into Sarajevo (36 percent of the 7,929 total sorties). Six other nations—Great Britain, Canada, France, Sweden, Norway, and Germany—participated in airlift missions. Three countries—the United States, Germany, and France—participated in air drop missions which stopped in early summer 1994.

Though only a small percentage of total assistance to Bosnia, the Operation "Provide Promise" airdrops accounted for 87 percent of all aid reaching two isolated enclaves in central Bosnia. Overall, more than 2,600 flights dropped approximately 17,000 metric tons of aid to the enclaves. As of March 1994, 33,496 metric tons of supplies had been delivered by airlift and 15,136 by air drop.

As of March 1994, the airlift had lasted for 20 months, one-half year longer than the Berlin airlift. Nearly 11,000 flights hauled more than 100,000 tons of supplies. Army soldiers supported Bosnian relief flights and airdrops.

Without the humanitarian assistance provided under the UN umbrella, the suffering in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been many times worse than it has been. Over two million people have received food and medical supplies from the UN or one of the national commands involved in the convoys and air drops. The relief effort was not an unqualified success, however, because the relief mission was perceived as a hostile military action by the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR was created to be a noncombat unit, but relief missions became part of a combat strategy. "The main UN mission [in Bosnia] was humanitarian delivery of food and medicine to besieged communities, but this amounted to breaking the sieges—a military and political effect. It is hardly surprising that the Serbs interfered when they could get away with it."[8]

No-Fly Zone

Operation "Deny Flight," NATO's designation of the mission to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, began on April 12, 1993. Of the approximately 100 aircraft provided by NATO members used to enforce the no-fly zone, 34 were provided by the United States. NATO air force commanded by a U.S. general based in Naples, while day-by-day operational control was directed by an Italian general located at Vincenza. As of January 28, 1994, U.S. aircraft had flown 23,146 sorties over Bosnia–Herzegovina.

Between April 1993 and March 1, 1994, there were over 1,400 violations of the no-fly zone. Most involved helicopters flying short medical or supply missions and were not deemed to be "militarily significant."

On February 28, 1994, U.S. F-16s under NATO command shot down four of six Serbian warplanes returning from a bombing raid on a Bosnian munitions plant. Six fixed-wing aircraft violated the no-fly zone which has been in effect since April 1993. This was the first fixed-wing violation in that no-fly zone. The aircraft came in rather low in cloudy weather and were picked up by AWACS which notified U.S. fighters. While U.S. aircraft awaited authorization, the two Serbian and four Bosnian aircraft began to drop munitions. The four Bosnian aircraft were shot down by Sidewinder

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[8] Betts, p. 25.

missiles. The request to fire traveled no higher than to a three-star AF General, James E. Chambers, who commands NATO's Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy.

Operation Deny Flight has been a successful military operation, but it is less clear that the military and foreign policy operations of either the Bosnian Serbs or their Serbian counterparts have been influenced significantly. The Serbs have been able to realize their territorial ambitions through the use of ground forces. Since the no-fly zone was separate from the threat of strikes against ground targets, there may be no link at all between the actions of Serbian gunners and NATO surveillance and combat aircraft enforcing Deny Flight. The ability to constrain the Serb air force has not been shown to have an influence on Serb political and military conduct.

Air Strikes on Ground Targets

The air strikes have had a marginal impact on the conduct of the Bosnian Serbs for two reasons. First, the air strikes have been sparse, of marginal military significance, and announced in advance. Second, the Bosnian Serbs have viewed the air strikes as a cost of doing business rather than a threat to their operations. The value of air strikes was undermined from the very beginning by a lack of consensus among NATO members as to the utility of bombing Bosnian Serb targets.

On January 10, 1994, the Heads of State and Government participating at the NATO summit held in Brussels on January 10-11, issued a declaration which stated they were determined to "eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate" and reaffirmed their readiness under the authority of the Security Council "to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Two days later, NATO members voted unanimously but with varying degrees of conviction for a broader but still highly conditional plan for the use of air strikes in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Clinton acknowledged that NATO had vowed in August 1993 to use air power to prevent "the strangulation" of Sarajevo, yet had done nothing as the noose was tightened around the Bosnian capital. Clinton added, "What happens depends on the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs."

NATO aircraft support UNPROFOR with the air power to strike at Bosnian Serb guns, tanks, and other weapons which are found in the heavy weapon exclusion zones around Sarajevo (20 kilometer radius) and around Tuzla (20 kilometer radius). (See Figure E-5.)

On February 4, a mortar round fired into one of the suburbs of Sarajevo killed ten civilians and wounded 18 others. On February 5, a single mortar round fired into a Sarajevo marketplace killed 68 people and wounded 142 others. U.S. and European allies threaten air strikes in retaliation.




Figure E-5. Heavy Weapon Exclusion Zone
Source: *The New York Times*

On February 6, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had requested the Secretary-General of NATO to obtain "a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city." Three days later, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement calling for "the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within 10 days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in the area within 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) of the center of Sarajevo and excluding the area within 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) of the center of Pale." The deadline was set for 10 days from 2400 GMT, February 10, 1994.

On February 20, NATO set a deadline of 1 a.m. Monday, February 21, by which Serb forces had either to remove or surrender their heavy weapons or to face the possibility of air strikes. The weapons must be moved 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away from the heart of Sarajevo or placed under UN control. The Serbs complied.

One month later, however, on March 30, a Bosnian Serb ground offensive began. The start of the offensive coincided with a visit by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright and Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the JCS, who were in Sarajevo to show support for the mostly Muslim Bosnian government. In less than a week, however, on April 3, Secretary of Defense William Perry said on national television that the United States would not act if Gorazde were overrun. "We will not enter the war to stop that from happening."

Less than one week following Perry's remarks, on April 8, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, "Let me be clear: neither the President nor any of his senior advisers rules out the use of NATO air power to help stop attacks such as those against Gorazde. . . . We stand by that commitment." Two days later, on April 10, two USAF F-16s struck Bosnian Serb targets (an obsolete tank and a group of tents) near the Muslim enclave of Gorazde. This raid was NATO's first attack against ground troops since the alliance was formed in 1949. The aircraft launched from Aviano Air Base in northern Italy. The next day, U.S. jets carried out highly limited bombing raids against Serbian forces around Gorazde. The raid was carried out by two Marine FA-18s under NATO command.

The bombing raid, which consisted of three iron bombs dropped, did not influence the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs to any great extent. The targets of the attacks simply modified their behavior long enough to regroup and launch another attack. Three days later (April 15), Bosnian Serb forces resumed shelling the Muslim safe haven Gorazde.

On April 22, NATO planned to carry out punishing air strikes if the Serbs failed to stop their attacks on Gorazde to demonstrate that the alliance is capable of making them pay a heavy price, according to Pentagon officials. The objective of the raids would not be to send a political signal. The point would be to hit the Serb forces surrounding the town hard enough to deter them from continuing their attacks. Once more the Serbs held their assault long enough to force NATO to call off the strike. No more NATO air strikes occurred for the next four months. On August 5, NATO planes hit Serbian heavy weapons violating the exclusion zone around Sarajevo. On September 22, NATO planes hit a Serbian tank near Sarajevo after Bosnian Serbs attacked peacekeepers.

In November, the UN Security Council granted NATO new powers to hit targets in Croatia used by Serb nationalists for attacks on Bosnia. On November 21, NATO warplanes bombed a Serbian-controlled air base in Croatia. "By military standards," according to the *New York Times*, "the NATO attack carried out today against a Serbian

controlled air base in Croatia was the equivalent of a nasty note." In that strike, NATO warplanes bombed a Serbian-controlled air base in Croatia, destroying its runway and its antiaircraft defenses. The NATO bombing was the largest air raid in Europe since the end of World War II and the biggest mounted by NATO since it was founded in 1949. With the raid came a warning to the Serbs that the UN and NATO were prepared to use force again if provoked. Serbian aircraft were not hit at the insistence of the commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, Lt. Gen. Bertrand de Lepresle of France. "This was a limited strike," Admiral Smith told the *New York Times*. "We clearly could have taken those aircraft had we chosen to, but we have a dual UN-NATO key."

This strike took the Western alliance's political involvement in the Bosnian war to a new level. Adm. Leighton W. Smith, the American who commands NATO forces in southern Europe, said 39 aircraft from the United States, France, Britain and the Netherlands took part in the attack against the Udbina airfield in Croatia. The base had been used three times in the past two weeks by nationalist Serbs to send aircraft—some carrying napalm and cluster bombs—against the Muslim-held Bihac area of Bosnia, 22 miles (35.2 kilometers) away.

This, according to another *Times* report, is how allied military operations are conducted in the Balkans, where every air strike must be approved by NATO and by UN commanders who are fearful that strong military action might provoke Serbian retaliation against UN peacekeepers. If this had been the Persian Gulf war, the allies would have pounded the airfield and everything on it. If this had been the 1986 air raid on Libya, the Americans would have destroyed fighters, transport planes, and helicopters. The film of aircraft exploding on the tarmac would have been shown on the evening news. NATO commanders took great pains to point out that the raid on Croatia took place under restraints imposed by the UN.

"We are dealing with the UN," a NATO official said. "If we had our druthers, we would have taken out the Serb planes." But while Washington wanted to punish the Serbs, it also wanted to avoid signaling Croatia or the Muslim-led Bosnian government that NATO was joining the war on their side, a point that Pentagon officials said had been made to officials in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

The lack of consensus among the allies derives, in part, from the diverging interests of the participants. There is also the fact that a single strategy cannot be applied successfully to a wide variety of unrelated objectives. The lack of a consensus among the

United States, the UN, NATO, and the CSCE on the utility of bombing ground targets illustrates both points.

The extent of UN control over operations where large contingents from Security Council members are involved is in disarray. The experience of Somalia and Bosnia demonstrates the contradiction and incompatibility between UN and national commands. The willingness to turn over command to the UN appears to be inversely proportional to the national command's assessment of the level of risk involved. National commands in Bosnia have been particularly concerned with UN control of issues concerning immediate troop safety, air strikes, and the use of certain types of weapons.

U.S. officials have differed from their European counterparts over the utility of bombing. The basis for this disagreement derives from an assessment of the political impact of air strikes. There is agreement within NATO that a peace proposal should be based on a plan that divides Bosnia between the Serbs and a federation of the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo and the Bosnian Croats. (The Serbs have consistently rejected this type of deal.) Britain and France have stuck to the position that in order to get a peace agreement, any plan must be approved by President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, who British and French officials believe is not sincerely interested, but rather is motivated by more self-serving reasons, in ending the war he helped to start. Consequently, Britain and France (and other European states) have counted on Milosevic to stop the flow of supplies to the Bosnian Serbs, which would presumably present the Bosnian Serbs with no option but to accept a peace plan which divides Bosnia. Europeans are concerned, therefore, that NATO bombing raids to cut supplies into Bosnia will scare off Milosevic—or cause him to be overthrown—making the prospect for peace even more remote.

POLICY AND STRATEGY ASSESSMENT

General

As of December 1994, the use of military assets in support of U.S. foreign policy and political objectives has not been effective. The Bosnian Serb strategy to destroy Muslim forces, massacre civilians, and occupy Muslim-held territory has been delayed but not stopped by Western military forces. In sum, Western military assets did not contribute to the central objective, which was to protect the Bosnian state from the

onslaught of Bosnian Serbs. In nearly all respects, the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia must be regarded as an operational failure.

U.S. officials have argued that the tragedy in Bosnia might have been averted if a structure similar to the Partnership for Peace had been in place in Bosnia 3 years ago. The Bosnian Serbs, according to this argument, might have participated and put ties with NATO ahead of their ambitions to create a Greater Serbia even at the expense of Bosnia. During the December 1994 meetings of NATO (in Brussels) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, in Budapest), the prevailing view was that the continuation of the war in Bosnia is a consequence of shortcomings in existing structures in both organizations rather than a lack of will or disagreement on fundamental issues. Despite statements such as this one by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "The crisis in Bosnia is about Bosnia, not NATO," many view NATO's inaction in Bosnia to derive from disagreements within the alliance on how to bring the war to an end rather than from flaws or inadequacies in existing security structures.

The sources of failure are varied. The most important failure, however, was on the level of grand strategy. Nearly all of the operational problems and shortcomings flow from the lack of cohesion and commitment among the Western powers.

The UN operation in Bosnia failed, in part, because UN forces were not in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the consent of the combatants. This undermined the UN operation: "First, tried-and-tested principles of UN peacekeeping were being changed and, perhaps, fatally weakened without a full discussion of all the implications. Second, many individuals and states (mainly small and/or developing) feared a new interventionist peacekeeping."[9] The lack of consent meant that UN forces were *de facto* taking sides in the conflict and had no claim to impartiality.

There was no way to use tactics to compensate for a lack of a coherent grand strategy. One important lesson of the UN's efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that there must be a consensus among the principal participants on the objectives of the mission and there must be a leader within the group of countries providing forces.

Collective security is predicated on a harmony of interests between the most powerful nation and the rest of the nations in the coalition. Such harmony of interests did not exist among the UN, the European members of NATO, and the United States. The

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9 "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 100.

lack of such harmony of interests has been at the root of the failure of various attempts at collective security since the League of Nations.[10]

Policy Failure

Observers such as Richard Betts conclude that much of the blame for the failure of the Bosnian effort may be attributed to a policy failure. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Betts pointed out that the terms of diplomatic settlements often reflect results on the battlefield which is one reason why belligerents continue to fight until the last moment. In contrast to this reality, Betts continued,

> Others sometimes proceed from muddled assumptions about what force should be expected to accomplish. In a bizarre sequence of statements last spring, for instance, President Clinton threatened air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, then said, 'The United States is not, and should not, become involved as a partisan in a war.' Next he declared that the United States should lead other Western nations in ending ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, only to say a moment later, 'That does not mean that the United States or the United Nations can enter a war, in effect, to redraw the lines. . .within what was Yugoslavia.'

This, according to Betts, was an example of a "profoundly confused policy," since it is impossible to use military force against one side without implicitly taking sides with the opponent. Military power, if it is to be used with any legitimacy or purpose, must serve the goal of ending the war, "which means leaving someone in power at the end of the day."

> How is this done without taking someone's side? And how can the outside powers pretend to stop ethnic cleansing without allocating territory—that is, drawing lines? Yet Clinton and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did not make threats to protect recognized or viable borders, but to enforce naturally unstable truce lines that made no sense as a permanent territorial arrangement. Such confusion made intervention an accessory to stalemate, punishing either side for advancing too far but not settling the issue that fuels the war.[11]

The source of the policy failure, therefore, may be attributed to the unwillingness or inability of the west in general and the United States in particular to take sides in the Bosnian civil war. The "delusion of impartial intervention," as Betts describes U.S.

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[10] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1946), pps. 41-63.

[11] Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, No. 6, November/December 1994, p. 22.

policy, derived at best from a miscalculation of the importance of force in the outcome of the Bosnian crisis and at worst from an underlying indifference to the outcome of the civil war. The policies of European nations, which are both in closer proximity to Bosnia and more directly affected by the fighting there, have been equally flawed for reasons deriving more from indifference than over commitment.

In the view of David Gompert, Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the Bush administration's National Security Council, "it is worth asking how U.S. policy over the past four years could have been such a dismal failure."[12] In Gompert's view, the problem was not one of leadership. To the contrary, the Bush administration was particularly qualified to take the lead in Bosnia. After assessing the situation, however, the Bush team concluded that the down sides of U.S. leadership in Bosnia were too great to justify an American commitment. In order to stop Serbian aggression, the United States would have had to make a massive military deployment to Bosnia rather than simply try to stuff "some smart bomb down the right Serbian chimney." The United States had no vital interest which would have justified wrenching the lead position away from the eager Europeans. Thus, in Gompert's view, "at the root of the American failure was West European failure. . . . Although many British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and other European men and women have served courageously in the Yugoslav conflict, Europe itself has been a flop." Put another way, the United States was not prepared to do the right thing, which was to strike Serbian targets with massive force, over the objections of the Europeans.

Strategy Failure

Strategy is the way force is actually used in support of political objectives. In assessing the success of a particular strategy, it is very important to draw a distinction between the *utility* and the wisdom of carrying out these type of operations.[13] Regardless of what one thinks about the wisdom of using Western military power against Bosnian Serb forces, there is no question that the strategy applied by UN/NATO forces in Bosnia failed, unless one adopts the narrow view that America's strategy has been to keep the United States out of the Bosnian conflict to the greatest possible extent. At best, the Western strategy raised the cost of Serbian military operations and slowed the rate of

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12 "How to Defeat Serbia," p. 41.

13 *Force Without War*, p. 19.

advance. The Bosnian Serbs were neither deterred from further military operations nor forced to relinquish any significant gains.

"American reliance on its European partners to take the lead in Yugoslavia proved to be a grave mistake that compounded the West's failure," according to a senior NSC official in the Bush administration.[14] The Europeans favored EC leadership as well, particularly in light of the view that this was an ideal opportunity for German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterand to show how coherent and bold the new Europe was prepared to be. America deferred to the European wish to focus on EC-American rather than NATO channels of communication and coordination.

In November 1994, NATO's Chief Liaison Officer to the UN, Air Commander John Houghton, RAF, said the challenge was to start negotiating with the Croat government for the partial expansion of close air support to areas of Croat airspace near Bihac in northern Bosnia. In August 1994, "impartiality compounded the absurdity when the UN military commander also threatened the Bosnian government with attack if it violated the weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. UN strategy thus bounced between unwillingness to undertake any combat at all and a commitment to fight on two fronts against both belligerents. Such lofty evenhandedness may make sense for a judge in a court that can enforce its writ, but hardly for a general wielding a small stick in a bitter war."[15]

Rules of Engagement

The readiness of the UN to use force is "directly linked to the issue of consent. In the past, UN forces have been empowered to use force when directly threatened or when their central activities were being openly opposed, but they had seldom resorted to major uses of force."[16] (See Appendix 6.)

Illustrative of the UN's muddled approach to the Bosnia crisis are the UNPROFOR Rules of Engagement (ROE), which were issued first by UN Commander Gen. Jean Cot and repeated by his successor Gen. Michael Rose. The ROE, which were drafted to conform to the intent of Security Council Resolution 721, which authorized the Bosnian operation. "The ROE for UN forces in Bosnia are much more detailed and

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14 David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, p. 35.

15 Betts, p. 25.

16 Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Autumn 1994, p. 101.

complex than the rules of engagement a U.S. military commander would likely use."[17] The complex and unclear nature of the UN ROE, which remind American analysts of the most intrusive political interference in military operations during the Vietnam War, is attributed to the inability within the UN to determine which nation should lead the multinational force in Bosnia. Since the ROE is a political document, the local military commanders have no authority to overrule it.

Under the UN ROE, UN forces cannot carry out offensive operations without specific approval, must use minimum force, can only use weapons as a measure of last resort, cannot retaliate, and must cease fire when an opponent stops shooting. This leaves the UN forces in a vulnerable position which cedes all initiative to the potential attacker and establishes a publicized threshold for violence under which the Bosnian Serbs may act with impunity. "The underlying problem is that the ROE, which might work in a true peacekeeping operation, are being used in a situation in which there is no peace."[18]

In addition, Security Council 836 states that the use of air power to support UNPROFOR in the safe areas was "subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR." Thus, the "long and complex discussions over the authority to use force in Bosnia, a matter in which national governments, NATO collectively, the UN Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the commanders of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia all felt entitled to a key role or even a veto."[19] The United States was exasperated over this micromanagement while nations whose troops were on the ground—primarily Britain and France—were somewhat relieved to be able to defer to the Secretary-General's insistence on at least a degree of UN control.

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Command, control, and coordination procedures between NATO and UNPROFOR were worked out in NATO Council decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993. Nonetheless, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) has been a serious problem for the Bosnia–Herzegovina Command (BHC). From its first days, and through 1993, the BHC's successive commanders, Lieutenant Generals Philippe Morillon and Francis Briquemont, operated from a small forward headquarters in Sarajevo, 24

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17 Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia," *Orbis*, Fall 1994, p. 635.

18 "Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia," p. 636.

19 "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 103.

kilometers from the main headquarters in Kiseljak. This was to allow political consultations with local leaders and to be close to the conflict's center of gravity. As a result, much of the day-to-day operational control rested with the chief of staff (CoS), British Brigadier Roderick Cordy-Simpson, at Keseljak. During the siege of Srebinica, when Morillon was largely isolated from the BHC, the CoS was in effective command until Morillon went to Srebinica to take command there.

The BHC had operational command of armored infantry battalion groups at Vitez, Vosoko, Bihac, and Mostar. The three Sarajevo sector battalions remain on duty in the city. Transport, engineer, and supply elements were based around its Area of Responsibility (AOR) and two small helicopter units were based at Split. English is the working language for the BHC and this creates problems for the non-NATO participating forces, such as the Egyptians and Ukrainians.

The wide geographic spread around Bosnia and the country's mountainous terrain made communications the greatest single difficulty, according to Cordy-Simpson. "Quite simply, our headquarters's one satellite and HF radio system is just not good enough." The INMAR-SAT telephone link to Zagreb and battalion bases is good, but VHF communications collapse with operations in the interior of Bosnia (except with cumbersome rebroadcast stations). HF radios have to be used, though these have problems operating at night. Communications links are less problematic for convoys through relatively peaceful areas, but the situation becomes dire once more military-style operations are required.

As BHC is not conducting a combat operation, it is not officially sanctioned by the UN to gather intelligence, the euphemism military information (Milinfo) was therefore coined to cover this activity. Standard intelligence staff procedures are used to collect and disseminate Milinfor, but some of it comes from unusual sources. For example, participants in the conflict provide information on their enemies, which is not unusual in war.

NATO air forces have conducted regular aerial photographic reconnaissance of Bosnia since early 1993 but real-time data links, such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), have not been made available to UNPROFOR in Zagreb or the BHC. NATO sources said they were concerned about the security of such information within the UN chain of command.

In addition to the BHC's command relationship with UNPROFOR in Zagreb, it also coordinates activities with NATO and national forces operating in the Balkans. U.S. European Command personnel are also attached to the main BHC headquarters to coordinate USAF humanitarian airdrops and disseminate intelligence collected by the United States. Reports from France also suggest French special forces were poised to rescue General Morillon from Srebinica if BSA forces had directly threatened his life. NATO liaison officers are also based at Keseljak (and subsequently at Sarajevo) to coordinate enforcement of the no-fly zone.[20]

Chain of Command

The chain of command upwards to UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York (Figure E-6) has been a major problem. While UN civil affairs advisors are assigned to the BHC, they are UN civil servants only and are not authorized to conclude negotiations with local leaders or made decisions on behalf of the secretary general. This greatly slowed down UNPROFOR's decision-making process and was a hindrance as operations became more military in nature, particularly when questions of close-air support were involved. The appointment of Yasukshi Akashi as UN special representative to the former Yugoslavia in early 1994, and devolution of authority to him, including responsibility for the launching of close-air support, was very helpful in streamlining the BHC's chain of command.[21]

NATO could not, according to Boorda, carry out the threat to strike heavy weapon positions in BH without UN authorization. Adm. Jeremy Boorda, commander of NATO's southern command in Naples, said in February 1994,

> The UN would either have to request me to do that or I would have to request permission of the UN to go in.

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20 "Bosnia mission forces UN to grow with the times," p. 64-5.

21 Ibid., p. 65.




Figure E-6. Organization of International Efforts in Bosnia
Source: GAO NSIAD 94-156BR

ALTERNATIVE FORCES

Given the incoherence of NATO, US, and European policies toward the war in Bosnia and the profound disagreement over the utility of military force as a means to influence Serbian conduct, alternative force packages would not have made any difference in light of the reluctance and eventual abandonment of the use of force.

There has never been a strike by American forces launched from an aircraft carrier against ground targets in Europe. Since the demand for "presence" and peacekeeping operations in Europe shows a greater growth rate than for any other region after Africa, the question of the utility of carrier-based aircraft for these missions is particularly acute. The duration of the requirement for air operations over Bosnia raises serious doubts, for example, that there is an alternative to land-based aircraft especially for strikes on ground targets.

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

Note: Between September 25, 1991, and November, 1994, the UN Security Council adopted over 60 resolutions and issued more than 50 statements by the president relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Not all of these resolutions and statements are cited in this chronology.

1991

June	Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Fighting broke out between Croatian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslav National Army, and the Croatian government.
July-September	As former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made efforts to negotiate a cease-fire, Bosnian Serbs continue to apply their policy of "ethnic cleansing."
September 25	Security Council adopted resolution 713, which called on all states to implement "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia."
October 8	UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed Cyrus Vance as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia.
November	Secretary General of the UN designated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the lead agency to provide relief in the former Yugoslavia.
November 27	UN Security Council adopted resolution 721, which approved the efforts of the Secretary–General and his Personal Envoy, and endorsed the statement made by the Personal Envoy to the parties that the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia could not be envisaged without full compliance by all parties with the Geneva agreement.
December 15	UN Security Council adopted resolution 724, which contained a plan for a possible peacekeeping operation.
December	There were approximately 500,000 refugees of all types from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

1992

January-February	Croatia and Serbia agreed to an unconditional cease-fire.
February 15	Notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the UN plan, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
February 21	The Security Council adopted resolution 743, which approved the establishment of UNPROFOR for a period of 12 months.
March	Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted for independence. Bosnian Serbs did not and fighting broke out.
April 7	The Security Council adopted resolution 749, which authorized the full deployment of UNPROFOR.
May	UN imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in retaliation for its aid to the Serbian nationalists military campaign in Bosnia.
May 22	By adopting resolutions 46/236, 46/237, and 46/238, the UN General Assembly decided to admit the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia, to membership in the United Nations.
June	UN recognized Bosnia and Croatia as independent states. UNPROFOR's mandate was extended to Bosnia to secure the Sarajevo airport.
June 30	The Security Council adopted resolution 762, which authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in "pink zones"—certain areas of Croatia controlled by the Yugoslav People's Army.
July	NATO agreed to use naval force in Adriatic to assess compliance with UN sanctions on Yugoslavia. In 1993, the naval force was given powers to enforce the sanctions.
July 13	The Security Council adopted resolution 764, which condemned the practice of "ethnic cleansing."
July 24	The Security Council invited the European Community in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the UN to examine the possibility of broadening and intensifying the EC's Conference on Yugoslavia.

August 13	The Security Council adopted resolution 770, which called on states to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Security Council also adopted resolution 771, which reaffirmed that all parties to the conflict were bound to comply with the obligations of international law and strongly condemned violations, including "ethnic cleansing."
August 25	The UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/242, which condemned the massive violations of human rights and international law in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
August-October	The European Community and UN cosponsored an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Security Council authorized UNPROFOR and member states to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia.
September 19	The Security Council adopted resolution 777, which stated the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was asked to apply for membership and on September 22, by adopting resolution 47/1; the General Assembly agreed with resolution 777.
October 6	The Security Council adopted resolution 780, which expressed grave alarm at the continuing reports of widespread human rights violations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
October 9	The Security Council, on October 9, 1992, adopted resolution 781, which banned all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of UN operations. NATO agreed to use surveillance aircraft to monitor a UN ban on military flights over Bosnia. By March 1, 1994 there had been over 1,400 violations of the no-fly zone.
October 22	The Security Council adopted resolution 779, which authorized UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik.
November 10	The Security Council adopted resolution 787, which, among other things, recommended that UN observers be deployed on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

December 18	The General Assembly adopted two more resolutions—47/121, which dealt with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 47/147, which addressed the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
December 18	In response to reports of massive, organized, and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, the Security Council adopted resolution 789, which strongly condemned these acts of unspeakable brutality.
1993	
January	EC/UN negotiators proposed peace plans for multiethnic Bosnia.
January 26	The Security Council adopted resolution 802, which demanded an immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the safe havens.
February 22	The Security Council adopted resolution 808, which decided that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Resolution 877 (October 21, 1993) named Ramón Escovar-Salom, Attorney-General of Venezuela, as Prosecutor.
March 31	The Security Council adopted resolution 816, which extended the ban on military flights to include flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
April 7	By adopting resolution 817, the Security Council recommended that the General Assembly admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a member.
April 8	The General Assembly decided to admit as a member in the UN the "State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as 'the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State."
April 9	The Secretary-General submitted a letter to the Security Council from the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Manfred Wörner, which stated that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the "necessary measures" to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on April 12, 1993.
April 12	Operation Deny Flight began.
April 16	The Security Council adopted resolution 819, which demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surrounds as a "safe area" which should be free from any armed attack or other hostile act.

April 17	The Security Council adopted resolution 820, which commended the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Council expressed grave concern at the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the provisional provincial map. The Council decided to strengthen the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless the Bosnian Serbs signed the peace plan and stopped its military attacks.
May 6	The Security Council adopted resolution 824, which declared that in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and other threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all the parties.
May 7	The Security Council affirmed its position that the Vance-Owen peace plan remained the basis for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and asked the Bosnian Serbs to return to it.
May 21	The Bosnian Muslims began to consolidate their own republic, "Herceg-Bosnia." Consequently, fighting increased between Muslim-led Bosnian government forces and the forces of the Bosnian Croats.
April-June	Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the UN peace plan. Negotiators proposed a new plan to partition Bosnia into Muslim, Croat, and Serb areas, which was basically a revival of the March 1992 plan. Violence continued and UN declared six safe areas in Bosnia.
June 4	The Security Council adopted resolution 836, which expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas, including to deter attacks against them, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government, and to occupy some key points on the ground.
June 10	The Security Council adopted resolution 838, which requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on further options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina with priority given to its borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
June 11	British troops with the UN killed two Bosnian Croat militiamen near the village of Nova Bila after Croats attacked and looted a private unarmed aid convoy, killing some of the drivers, according to UN sources.
June 18	The Security Council adopted resolution 844, which authorized an additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR by 7,600 troops.

June 26	European foreign ministers sought to reassure seven members of Bosnia and Herzegovina's collective leadership that the international community would make sure that the Bosnians were left with a viable state of their own if they agreed to negotiate an end to the civil war based on an ethnic partition of the country.
June	NATO authorized close air support for UN troops in Bosnia.
July 8	The Secretary-General appointed Cyrus Vance to carry out his good offices in the difference between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece.
August	NATO authorized air support to defend UNPROFOR troops if called by the UN. NATO agreed to provide 1) close air support to defend UN troops at any location in Bosnia, and 2) air strikes consistent with UN mandates in Bosnia.
August 18	The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that following the necessary training exercises in coordination with NATO, the UN had the operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR
August 20	International mediators presented a draft peace accord to Bosnian Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian leaders and gave them 10 days to accept or reject it.
August 24	Bosnian Croat leaders again refused to allow a United Nations convoy to deliver food to an estimated 50,000 Muslims who were reportedly near starvation in the eastern half of the city of Mostar.
August 25	United Nations trucks piled high with food and medicine entered Mostar, passing enraged Croatian women trying to keep the badly needed aid from reaching Muslims.
August 28	Almost a year and a half ago, the United States opposed a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina that had been agreed to by leaders of the republics Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The idea was to stave off civil war. Now the United States urged the leaders of the three Bosnian factions to accept a partition agreement similar to the one Washington opposed in 1992.
August 29	As Bosnian Serb, Croat, and Muslim negotiators prepared to resume peace talks in Geneva, the leaders of Bosnia's Parliament called on the United States and NATO to enforce any peace agreement that might come from the negotiations.

August 30	The Clinton administration assured the UN that it would provide most of the 30,000 or so new troops to enforce any Bosnian peace agreement. But the prospects appeared increasingly poor for the current peace proposal, which had been drawn up by Thorvald Stoltenberg for the United Nations and Lord Owen for the European Community.
September	President Clinton said the United States would commit troops only if a NATO commander was in charge of the operation, if there were a clear timetable for withdrawing the force, and if the financial burden on the United States was acceptable and there was clear support from Congress.
September 2	The Clinton administration strongly urged Croatia and Serbia to make fresh territorial concessions to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to help revive peace negotiations in Geneva. President Clinton said, "If while the talks are in abeyance, there is abuse by those who would seek to interfere with the humanitarian aid, attack the protected areas and resume the sustained shelling of Sarajevo, for example, then first I would remind you that the NATO military option is very much alive." Clinton added that he was in favor of lifting the arms embargo in order to permit the outgunned Bosnian Muslims to rearm, but could not convince the allies.
September 13	In an implicit rebuke to Yugoslavia, the World Court demanded "immediate and effective implementation" of its past orders that the Belgrade Government refrain from committing or sponsoring acts of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
September 16	Bosnian government forces advanced in heavy fighting against Croatian units along a new front about 20 miles northwest of the battered city of Mostar today.
October 4	After intensive consultations and two interim extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate, for a 24-hour period on September 30 and for another four days on October 1, the Security Council, but its resolution 871, extended the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through March 31, 1994.
December 21	In a new assessment, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that the economic embargo imposed on Serbia 18 months ago would most likely deteriorate and that the West would probably have to accept the ethnic partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
December 22	The CIA said its paper, *National Intelligence Council—Symposium Notes, 3 December 1993*, was a draft.

1994

January 10	The Heads of State and Government participating at the NATO summit held in Brussels on January 10-11, issued a declaration which stated they were determined to "eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate" and reaffirmed their readiness under the authority of the Security Council "to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
January 12	The Secretary-General instructed his new Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, to undertake an urgent preparatory study of the NATO proposal.
January	UN Special Representative was delegated authority to call for NATO close air support anywhere in Bosnia. He was also delegated authority to call for air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo, but required further authorization for other air strikes.
January	Four Canadian soldiers were kidnapped by Croatian army troops.
January 4	Lt. Gen. Francis Briquemont of Belgium, head of UN peacekeeping forces, asked to be relieved of his post one week after accusing the UN of passing too many resolutions on Bosnia and sending too few troops. The Security Council has authorized the use of force if necessary to protect the delivery of food and other essentials, but UN troops have never fought a battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that have repeatedly delayed convoys.
January 7	Three days before the NATO summit meeting, the United States and France agreed to paper over their differences over the Western military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a last-ditch effort to avoid an embarrassing rift at the meeting in Brussels.
January 10	NATO communiqué from the summit in Washington reiterated the 5-month-old threat to begin air strikes against Serbia "to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
January 12	NATO members voted unanimously but with varying degrees of conviction for a broader but still highly conditional plan for the use of air strikes in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Clinton acknowledged that NATO had vowed in August 1993 to use air power to prevent "the strangulation" of Sarajevo, yet had done nothing as the noose was tightened around the Bosnian capital. Clinton added, "What happens depends on the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs."

January 13	Pope John Paul II urged "all forms of action aimed at disarming the aggressor" in Bosnia, but stopped short of specifically condoning air strikes.
January 18	The three parties negotiating an end to the Bosnian war formally approved a plan under which the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, would be demilitarized and administered by the United Nations for two years.
January 18	The French Defense Ministry said today it would recall Gen. Jean Cot, the commander of UN peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia, at the request of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Cot had previously criticized his civilian superiors in an interview with Le Monde and said he should be able to call for NATO air strikes without prior approval. The Secretary General has said that he alone has the authority to call for air strikes. UN diplomats said Mr. Boutros-Ghali had sent a strongly worded cable to Cot criticizing him for "inappropriate" behavior.
February 3	The president of the Security Council issued a statement which strongly condemned Croatia for deploying elements of its army and heavy military equipment in the central and southern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded that they be withdrawn.
February 4	A mortar round fired into one of the suburbs of Sarajevo killed ten civilians and wounded 18 others.
February 5	A mortar round fired into Sarajevo killed 68 people and wounded 142 others. U.S. and European allies threatened air strikes in retaliation.
February 6	The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had requested the Secretary-General of NATO to obtain "a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city."
February 9	The North Atlantic Council issued a statement calling for "the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within 10 days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in the area within 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) of the center of Sarajevo and excluding the area within 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) of the center of Pale." The deadline was set for ten days from 2400 GMT, February 10, 1994.

February 10	The Russian delegation to the UN raised concerns over what was perceived to be a "one-sided ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, who were being threatened with air strikes."
February 12	The Geneva peace talks collapsed.
February 19	President Clinton addressed the nation from the Oval Office about U.S. policy in Bosnia.
February 20	NATO sets deadline of 1 a.m. Monday, February 21 by which Serb forces would have to either remove or surrender their heavy weapons or to face the possibility of air strikes. The weapons would have to be moved 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away from the heart of Sarajevo or placed under UN control. (The Serbs complied.)
February 20	About 400 Russian soldiers arrived in the city of Pale, Bosnia Herzegovina, under a UN flag.
February 23	Nunn said the administration would have to prove it had an exit strategy before deploying troops to Bosnia.
	Military representatives of the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat sides signed a cease-fire agreement. Cease-fire date set for noon on February 25.
February 28	U.S. F-16s under NATO command shot down four Serbian warplanes returning from a bombing raid on a Bosnian munitions plant.
February	U.S. government invited to Washington the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats as well as the Foreign Minister of Croatia.
March	Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats agreed to a U.S. proposal for a federation to be joined in confederation with Croatia.
March 1	Between April 1993 and March 1, 1994, there had been over 1,400 violations of the no-fly zone.
March 4	The Security Council adopted resolution 900 which called on all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the consolidation of the cease-fire around Sarajevo.
March 11	The Secretary-General reported that in order to implement resolution 900, UNPROFOR's troop strength would have to be increased by 8,250 additional troops.
March 27	U.S. special envoy Charles Redman arrived in Sarajevo to begin an attempt to talk Bosnian Serb nationalists into giving up nearly one fourth of the territory they hold.
March 30	Bosnian Serb ground offensive began.

March 30	U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright and Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the JCS, came to Sarajevo today to show support for the mostly Muslim Bosnian government, pledging financial aid and possibly U.S. ground troops to enforce a peace settlement.
March 31	Tasushi Akashi, UN Secretary General's special representative to Bosnia, said that U.S. troops were needed immediately—before the "window of opportunity closes" for peace in the Balkans.
April 3	Secretary of Defense William Perry said on national television that the United States would not act if Gorazde were overrun. "We will not enter the war to stop that from happening."
April 8	National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, "Let me be clear: neither the President nor any of his senior advisers rules out the use of NATO air power to help stop attacks such as those against Gorazde. . . . We stand by that commitment."
April 10	Two USAF F-16s struck Bosnian Serb targets near the Muslim enclave of Gorazde in NATO's first attack against ground troops since the alliance was formed in 1949. The aircraft launched from Aviano Air Base in northern Italy.
April 11	For the second straight day, U.S. jets carried out highly limited bombing raids against Serbian forces around Gorazde. The raid was carried out by two Marine FA-18s under NATO command.
April 15	Bosnian Serb forces resumed shelling the Muslim safe haven Gorazde.
April 22	NATO planned to carry out punishing air strikes if the Serbs failed to stop their attacks on Gorazde to demonstrate that the alliance is capable of making them pay a heavy price, according to Pentagon officials. The objective of the raids would not be to send a political signal. The point would be to hit the Serb forces surrounding the town hard enough to deter them from continuing their attacks.
April 24	Three kilometer security zone established around Gorazde.
June 9	The House of Representatives voted to order President Clinton to end U.S. participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia. The House, by a vote of 244–178, approved a proposed congressional order for Clinton to lift the UN ban.
August 5	NATO planes hit Serbian heavy weapons violating the exclusion zone around Sarajevo.
September 22	NATO planes hit a Serbian tank near Sarajevo after Bosnian Serbs attacked peacekeepers.

November	UN Security Council granted NATO new powers to hit targets in Croatia used by Serb nationalists for attacks on Bosnia.
November 21	NATO warplanes bombed a Serbian-controlled air base in Croatia and destroyed its runway and its antiaircraft defenses. "By military standards," according to the *New York Times*, "the NATO attack carried out today against a Serbian controlled air base in Croatia was the equivalent of a nasty note."
December 7	France announced that it had asked the UN and NATO to make detailed plans to withdraw the 23,000 international peacekeeping troops from Bosnia because the "situation there is becoming unbearable and mediation efforts have proved fruitless."

Appendix F

CASE STUDY:
OPERATIONS POISED HAMMER AND SOUTHERN WATCH
(IRAQ)

Appendix F
OPERATIONS POISED HAMMER AND SOUTHERN WATCH

The purpose of this case study is to explore the relationship between military assets and political and foreign policy objectives. The intent is not to present an exhaustive inventory of events in Iraq. The goal is to move toward a better understanding of how to improve the effectiveness and utility of U.S. forces used in "presence" and other political-military missions.

BACKGROUND

After the Gulf War ended in February 1991, the Iraqi regime appeared to be vulnerable to a domestic uprising. Thus, protection was extended to Iraqi Kurds through the declaration of safe havens in the north. This security zone was established by allied forces shortly after an abortive rebellion by Kurds following the end of the Gulf War. The establishment of "Kurd-inhabited 'safe havens' in northern Iraq in April 1991 was achieved not by any formal UN peacekeeping force, but by U.S., British, and French forces. These forces were subsequently replaced by a small group of UN guards, who were distinct from peacekeeping forces."[1] (See the Chronology presented at the end of this appendix.)


Second, two no-fly zones (also referred to as air exclusion zones and no-flight zones), one northern one southern, were established. (See Figure F-1.)

Two operations involving air assets, Operation Provide Comfort, a humanitarian aid mission, and Poised Hammer, a no-fly zone, were imposed on Iraq north of the 36th parallel.

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1 Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Fall 1994, p. 99.

MAPS OF KURDISTAN



Maps of the Kurdish Region and Kurdistan
(Sources: *New York Times*, *Washington Post*)

MAPS OF NO-FLY ZONES




Figure F-1. Maps of Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones
(Source: *New York Times*)

In March 1991, the victorious Allies imposed a ban on all fixed-wing aircraft flights over all of Iraq. Initially the flight ban did not apply to helicopters; thus it was not a great surprise when Iraqi forces subsequently used helicopters to attack Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq. In response, in the summer of 1992 the United States came to the aid of Iraq's Shiite population. In what amounted to a reversal of policy, the United States was instrumental in creating safe havens for the Shiites. The key was to protect them from air attacks. On August 11, 1992, a report submitted to the UN detailed Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds. This report prompted a wider discussion of the plight of the Kurds and Shiites which led to the creation of safe areas in southern Iraq (below the 32nd parallel) which basically extended to the Shiites the same protection given to Kurds above the 36th. The no-fly zone in the south was dubbed Operation Southern Watch.

The overall objective of Operations Poised Hammer, Provide Comfort, and Southern Watch was to protect the Kurdish enclaves and Shiite population in Iraq.

The Clinton administration expressed support for the Bush administration's policy and pledged continuity. On January 8, 1993, the Bush administration stated, "The criteria is [sic] clear: That they have to move the missiles and stop violating the no-fly zone." On January 13, 1993, after U.S. forces struck targets in Iraq, President-elect Clinton said, "I support the action that the United States took today. . . . I think a couple of times over the last year and a half we have sent mixed signals." U.S. officials linked the success of the military operations in Iraq to the degree to which the terms of UN resolutions were met. January 20, 1993, White House communications director George Stephanopoulos said, "We need to see Iraq change its behavior. We need full compliance with the UN resolutions." Without going into detail, Stephanopoulos may have been referring to resolution 687, which pertains to the dismantling of Iraq's ability to construct weapons of mass destruction.

MILITARY ASSETS INVOLVED

Decisions concerning the type of forces that would enforce the no-fly zones (carrier vs. land-based aircraft) were worked out within the Pentagon. Within the Pentagon, draft plans were drawn up by CINC and subsequently modified by the Chairman and ultimately by OSD, though there was a lot of behind-the-scenes coordination between the CINC staff and the Joint Staff before plans were submitted to the CINC or the secretary. Key players at the Joint Staff were the chairman, his deputy and their assistants, but definitely not J-5 or the service staffs.

North of 35th Parallel: Poised Hammer

Today approximately 70 USAF aircraft are located in the region to enforce the northern no-fly zone. These aircraft are supported by British RAF aircraft.

South of 32nd Parallel: Southern Watch

In September 1991, the United States deployed Patriot missiles and two Patriot battalions to Saudi Arabia. In December 1992, the USS *Kitty Hawk* carrier battle group deployed to the region near Iraq in response to Iraqi penetrations of no-fly zones USAF squadrons including F-15C air superiority and F-15E precision-bombing night attack aircraft were deployed in the Arabian peninsula in late August 1992. F-15C interceptors would engage in combat air patrol and air-to-air combat. Before the additional deployments, USAF had 14 F-15Cs and 12-F-15Es stationed in the region.

Britain committed six Tornadoes after British Prime Minister (PM) John Major accused the Iraqi government of systematic genocide against the Shiites. He had announced his support for an "exclusion zone" in August 1992. France sent 10 Mirage fighters. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas agreed that Western allies should forbid Iraqi military flights over Shiite territory, since a similar ban in the north has been one of the most effective measures taken on behalf of the Kurds.

By the time of the August 1992 incident there were 200 aircraft at Gulf air bases, including F-16 *Falcon* fighters, F-117A stealth fighters, F-15 strike *Eagles*, A-10 *Warthog* tank killers, E-3 AWACS airborne warning planes, and reconnaissance. In all, an estimated 5,000 U.S. personnel were deployed at those bases. The RAF also sent six *Tornado* reconnaissance aircraft.

The Air Force had reduced the number of planes has stationed in the Gulf Region to enforce the flight ban. It then had about 60 warplanes there, according to military officials. The precise number of aircraft has usually been classified.[2]

The U.S. Navy had about 70 combat aircraft aboard the USS *Independence* in the Gulf south of Iraq—F/A-18 Hornet attack planes, F-14 Tomcat fighters, EA-6B Prowler

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2 Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Shoots Down An Iraqi Warplane In No-Flight Zone," *New York Times*, December 28, 1992.

electronic jammers and A-6E Intruder attack planes. The Navy had nearly 15,000 sailors aboard some 25 ships in the waters surrounding Saudi Arabia. The *Independence* was accompanied by a battle group that includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. The cruisers carried Tomahawk cruise missiles.

In January 1993, a battalion from Fort Hood deployed ahead of schedule to exercise with Kuwaiti military. Navy and Marine Corps operations in the Persian Gulf supported the continuing UN embargo against Iraq and provided protection for the Iraqi minority Kurdish and Shiite Muslim population centers. Naval aircraft support joint no-fly operations over northern Iraq.

OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

Northern Zone

As noted, the northern security zone was established by allied forces following an abortive Kurdish rebellion shortly after the Gulf War. The security zone, which runs along entire 36th parallel (280 miles) is patrolled by coalition aircraft. The purpose of the no-fly zone was to protect the independent Kurdish enclave where four million Kurds live. The zone was also created to convince 1.5 million Kurdish refugees in Iran and Turkey it was safe to return to Iraq. Coalition forces had no mandate to intervene south of the 36th parallel, even though the Kurdish region extended below the 36th parallel.

The zone was patrolled by coalition forces based in Turkey. Turkish PM Suleyman Demirel summoned U.S., British, and French ambassadors on January 18, 1993, to discuss uneasiness caused by permitting coalition aircraft to strike Iraqi targets.

Southern Zone

The southern zone, code named Operation "Southern Watch," was established in August 1992 when President Bush announced that Iraqi aircraft and helicopters would be prohibited from flying below the 32nd parallel. The "rules of the game" were communicated to the Iraqis directly through military channels. The USS *Independence* and USAF assets are deployed to enforce the no-fly zone. The purpose of the southern no-fly zone was to protect the Shiite population.

Part of the American interest was to enforce the no-fly zone without creating unacceptable political problems for host nations. Due to regional sensitivity, the United States would not confirm that U.S. warplanes were based in specific Gulf countries. U.S.

officials on background said U.S. jets were based in Dhahran, refueling planes stationed at Hafr al Baten, and Stealth fighters were deployed at Khamis Mushait, near Red Sea. In addition, British and French planes are also said to be at Dhahran.

IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

General

The Iraqi government considers both no-fly zones to be an unacceptable infringement on its sovereignty. Iraq rejected the no-fly zones, in part, because they allegedly were not a part of a UN effort. The zones were imposed by three Western powers (United States, Britain, France). Thus Iraq is committed to the declared policy of confronting and removing the no-fly zones at a time and with the means chosen by Iraq.

Saddam Hussein has shown every intention of rebuilding the Iraqi military and establishing Iraq's position as a major power in the Gulf region. Military challenges to the integrity of both no-fly zones are likely to be a permanent feature of Iraqi policy as long as Saddam is in power. The only solution, in the view of one analyst, is for the United States to adopt a policy which would "actively seek the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime while aiming to contain Iraq by three principal means: maintaining sanctions, retaining a forward military presence in the region, and preserving the Gulf War coalition."[3]

Provide Comfort

Since Combined Task Force Provide Comfort's contributions to the relief effort began in April 1991, 5,665 truckloads of relief supplies were delivered as of January 1994. Coalition fighters flew 22,697 sorties in support of Provide Comfort since October 1991.

Northern No-Fly Zone

Iraq's approach in the north is to focus on how to harm the Kurds rather than directly confront the coalition's air power, though this occurs from time to time as well. The Iraqi government did not consent to the initial incursion of coalition forces in northern Iraq. At one point UN forces in northern Iraq forced an Iraqi military unit to

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3 Michael Eisenstadt, "Saddam's Military Options," in *Like a Phoenix From The Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, Policy Paper Number 36, 1993), p. 79.

withdraw from the exclusion zone. Under subsequent UN-Iraq agreements UN forces were permitted into northern Iraq. "Baghdad's later consent was clearly in some measure the outcome of the earlier forcible incursion."[4]

The success of the northern no-fly zone has had positive effects on other operations. "The action in northern Iraq, because it both saved large numbers of lives and showed some ability to act against the wishes of a sovereign state, strongly influenced subsequent UN responses to other crises."[5]

Many analysts agree that the northern no-fly zone is the more salient of the two primarily because one of Saddam's chief policy objectives is to regain control of the Kurdish north.[6] Saddam has apparently adopted a long-term strategy intended to isolate the Kurds, gradually weaken them through an embargo, and only move militarily once the coalition forces have appeared to have lost interest in protecting them. Thus the no-fly zone has been successful in at least postponing if not completely thwarting Saddam's plans to crush the Kurds. (See Figure F-2.)




Figure F-2. Map of January 19, 1993 Strike
(Source: *The New York Times*)

4 "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 99.

5 "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 99.

6 "Saddam's Military Options," p. 79.

The military objective to deny flight operations in northern Iraq has been achieved. Between October 1991 and January 28, 1994, there had been 22,697 U.S. fighter sorties over northern Iraq. There have been several ground targets hit. On January 19, 1993, there were three incidents.

1) F4-G Wild Weasel fired a HARM radar-seeking missile at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile radar about 14 miles east of Mosul after Iraqi radar locked onto U.S. plane.

2) About one hour later, an Iraqi AA battery near the Saddam hydroelectric dam, about 25 miles north of Mosul, fired at an American F-16. The U.S. plane, which was not hit, did not return fire.

3) Two hours after second event, two F-16s were fired at by Iraqi AA site 12 miles north of Mosul. The F-16s dropped cluster bombs in response.

In addition, Iraqi planes continued to make shallow violations of the no-fly zone, apparently in an attempt to lure the U.S. planes near Iraqi AA sites.

On August 19, 1993, in what the Pentagon called one of the most serious clashes since the end of the Gulf War, Air Force jets bombed an Iraqi battery that fired two missiles at American planes. "There have been more than 20 incidents just in the past eight months, some minor, some serious," said the Pentagon spokesperson. "This is among the most serious." According to the Pentagon, at about 5:23 a.m. Iraqi time, Iraqi gunners fired two SA-3 surface-to-air missiles at Air Force F-4G and F-16 jets on routine patrol. The missiles missed, but in response the F-16 dropped unguided cluster bombs on the site, 5 to 10 miles west of Mosul. Eight minutes later, another F-4G and F-16 flew near the site and determined that it was still threatening after the F-16 dropped more cluster bombs. Two F-15Es flying nearby were then sent to drop four 500 pound laser guided bombs on the site.

The strikes against Iraqi air defense targets have successfully enforced the integrity of the no-fly zone and inhibited Iraqi military ambitions. The Iraqi forces have been shown several times that they cannot violate the no-fly zone with any hope of impunity. The air strikes have caused the Iraqis to modify their actions, but there are indications that Saddam Hussein is prepared to be content with occasional probes of the zone while waiting for the coalition to lose interest in enforcing the zone.

Though its military objectives have been realized, the northern no-fly zone has not achieved less explicit, political objectives. The integrity of the no-fly zone was sustained. The integrity of the no-fly zone is critical to the overall mission to protect the

Kurds. Since most of Iraqi military power is deployed facing the northern zone, there is a substantial risk that Saddam may attempt to take the Kurdish region by force quickly enough to present the coalition with the massive task of getting the Iraqi armed forces out. Preventing the Iraqis from making such a move can be achieved only through deterrence, but unlike in the southern zone, the terrain and geography do not favor a "no-move zone," unless coalition forces are prepared to strike at the first sign of an Iraqi offensive. Thus, Saddam must realize that both time and geography can be used to his advantage in the north if he plays his hand correctly. A sign that Saddam may be contemplating such a move would be preparations and training for a fast-paced combined arms operation.[7]

The coalition response to such an attack would rely on U.S. and allied combat aircraft in the region. These forces could generate hundreds of combat sorties per day, most of them ground attack. The no-fly zone also bans surface-to-air missile installations, thus coalition air assets could be expected to overwhelm anti-aircraft forces quickly. In light of this substantial force in place, Saddam would probably make his move when the United States or one of the coalition partners was occupied with a crisis or military operations elsewhere.

Southern Zone

In the south, Iraq has focused on destroying the marshes where the Shiite minority lives. Thus far Iraq has achieved this objective without air power, though as in the north, Iraqi forces confront the coalition air power and probe the no-fly zone periodically.

There have been a number of incidents in the southern no-fly zone. On December 27, 1992, a U.S. F-16 shot down an Iraqi jet, believed to be a MiG-25, which entered the southern no-fly zone. This was the first time an Iraqi aircraft had been shot down since the no-fly zone over portions of Iraq was declared by the United States in March 1991. The incident began at 10:20 am local when two Iraqi planes flew south of the 32nd. The Iraqi aircraft left when asked by U.S. aircraft for ID. Two more Iraqi planes, believed to have launched from the Al Kut airfield, then crossed the 32nd. They were approached by two U.S. F-16s. When the MiGs turned toward the U.S. planes, the U.S. planes asked the

7 "Saddam's Military Options," p. 69.

nearest AWACS battle-management plane for permission to fire, based on classified rules of engagement. One F-16 fired one Amraam, which struck the Iraqi plane. The Iraqi aircraft went down. U.S. forces permitted an Iraqi rescue helicopter to fly to the crash scene, about 20 miles south of 32nd.

On January 8, 1993, Baghdad rejected the allied demand that Iraq remove its newly deployed surface-to-air missiles in southern Iraq. Iraq had deployed about six SA-3s and some SA-2 missile batteries south of the 32nd. Iraqi officials must be trying to shoot down an aircraft in the hopes of taking a prisoner who would then be exploited for propaganda and negotiating purposes. On January 14, approximately 35 U.S., French, and British aircraft struck at least five Iraqi missile and radar sites. On January 17, 1993, an F-4G Wild Weasel blew up an Iraqi SA-6 surface-to-air missile battery with HARM missile. The Pentagon said the battery had locked onto two F-16s, two British Jaguars, and a French Mirage F-1. (See Figure F-3.)




Figure F-3. Map of the January 14, 1993 Strike
(Source: *The New York Times*)

Even though it was far less prominent than Desert Storm and was somewhat lost in the attention given to the northern no-fly zone, the southern no-fly zone, once established, held. As a mission to deny flight operations, however, the southern no-fly zone has been a success. The southern no-fly zone has been a vindication of the utility of land-based air assets: 8 to 12 airborne aircraft were required at any given time to maintain two on-station to enforce the ban and to respond to probes and other provocations and carriers could not sustain such a tempo for any length of time. Thus land-based air power was required. The use of land-based aircraft is not a political liability, since the host nations had to commit to the operation, which helped resolve regional issues concerning the freedom of action of the coalition air assets. Naval assets alone might have left the situation too ambiguous. There was no long-term alternative to land-based air power in this case.

As in the north, the political objectives associated with the southern no-fly zone were not realized. While the Iraqis could not challenge the no-fly zone with impunity, they were able to realize their goals through other means. In particular, Iraqi military operations against the Shiites were not prevented. One reason for this was that the political aspects of the southern no-fly zone were not realized, due in part to the fact that the United States could not get the Gulf War coalition to agree to conduct ground strikes against Iraqi military targets. This weakened the intended message to Iraq and may have been perceived as lack of unity or weakness within the coalition which would have encouraged Iraq's propensity to probe and violate the no-fly zone.

The long-term prospects for the southern no-fly zone depend on whether Saddam intends to realize his goal of uniting Iraq with its "nineteenth province," Kuwait. Though Iraq is not capable of taking and holding Kuwait now, the prospect of Iraq as a potential long-term threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia must be a factor in an assessment of security in the Gulf region. The fundamental issue is how to deter Saddam within acceptable cost and risk parameters.

American officials said that with attention in Washington turned to Somalia, a combat flight ban in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the transfer of power to a new administration, they viewed the January 1993 incident as a deliberate move by Iraq to test the willingness of the United States to back up its warnings with force. The Iraqis may also have been emboldened by the recent withdrawal of some of the American aircraft that have been used to enforce the ban on Iraqi flights south of the 32nd parallel. The aircraft carrier that had been in the Persian Gulf to help enforce the ban, the USS *Ranger*,

was sent to waters off Somalia in January at the request of the United States Central Command when Marine and Army troops were sent to the eastern African nation of Rwanda to safeguard the delivery of relief supplies. The *Ranger* was subsequently sent back to the United States from Somalia and replaced by the USS *Kitty Hawk*. The shifting of a carrier to the Somali coast marked the first time since the Gulf War that an aircraft carrier had been absent from the gulf region for several weeks, and the decision stirred debate in the Pentagon.

ALTERNATIVE FORCES

Rather than taking the time and expense to move ground forces into the Gulf region in response to Iraqi troop movements in the southern zone, U.S. air assets based in the United States could be used to enforce a "no-move zone." Using B-52 bombers based in the United States, for example, Iraqi military targets could be hit if they violated the "no-move zone," which could be imposed by the coalition partners or by a Security Council resolution, though the prospects for the latter would be considerably dimmer.

CHRONOLOGY

1989

June	The Bush administration issued a directive which urged normalization of relations with Iraq and major expansion of U.S. trade intended to moderate Iraq's behavior.

1990

August	U.S. policy on improving relations with Iraq formalized in NSDD 26.
August 1-2	Six U.S. warships, two KC-135s, a C-141 and warships of the UAE held short-notice exercises to send a signal to Saddam to avoid a conflict with Kuwait.
August	Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush ordered the beginning of Operation "Desert Shield." Within hours, two fighter squadrons of combat ready F-15s were launched from Langley AFB. The USS *Independence* headed for the Persian Gulf.

1991

January	Operation "Eastern Exit" evacuated 260 people from Somalia, using helicopters from the USS *Guam* and the USS *Trenton*.
February	The Gulf War ended. Fixed-wing flights banned.
March 3	U.S. administration wanted to maintain a much larger military presence in the Persian Gulf region than it had before Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to deter further Iraqi attacks. The plans, which were under discussion between U.S. and Arab leaders, envisioned rotating thousands of American soldiers through the region for months at a time and conducting large amphibious exercises on the Arabian peninsula. Squadrons of American combat aircraft would be positioned at gulf bases for similar periods. Large quantities of war materiel would be kept in the region. Navy would expand its presence in the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea. "You can deter aggression by having a U.S. presence in the area," said Secretary Cheney. "You can create a feeling of security and confidence on the part of our friends and allies in the region by having an enhanced U.S. presence in the region."
March	The 1st and 3rd U.S. Armored Divisions and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiments were deployed to the Gulf in an attempt to intimidate Iraqi military units that were fighting the Kurds.
April	Safe havens for Kurds established in northern Iraq.
June	U.S. troops deployed to Turkey to protect Kurdish refugees in Iraq.

Autumn	U.S.-Kuwait 10-year military deal signed. The pact did not include an American promise to deploy forces to the emirate if it is attacked, merely to consult with Kuwaiti authorities about what should be done.
December 15	Last of U.S. ground troops withdrawn from Kuwait.
1992	
January	The USS *Saipan*, with 3,000 marines and sailors, stationed in the Arabian Gulf until the end of January.
January	Kuwait does not have a volunteer army or a draft. Thus the armed forces are manned by Bedoons, stateless Arabs. The Kuwaiti air force has something like 40 F-18s, but that's it. Ground crews are foreigners.
May	U.S. Navy, which stations an aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf area 183 days a year, may increase this to as much as 270 days per year. The AF was instructed to send a team of fighters, bombers and support aircraft to the region for the period when no U.S. aircraft carrier is stationed nearby.
August	There were about 25,000 U.S. military personnel in Persian Gulf region in a Navy-Marine task force plus an air arm of 300 combat aircraft. Before the August incident there were 200 aircraft at regional bases (F-16 Falcons fighters, F-117A stealth fighters, F-15 strike Eagles, A-10 Warthogs tank killers, E-3 AWACS airborne warning planes, and reconnaissance aircraft). In all, an estimated 5,000 U.S. personnel deployed at those bases, with 70 aircraft in the region. Britain's Royal Air Force has tactical strike aircraft and refueling planes in the region as well, and the RAF also sent Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to the Gulf. The U.S. Navy has about 70 combat aircraft aboard the USS *Independence* in the Gulf south of Iraq—F/A-18 Hornet attack planes, F-14 Tomcat fighters, EA-6B Prowler electronic jammers, and A-6E Intruder attack planes. The Navy has nearly 15,000 sailors aboard some 25 ships in the waters surrounding Saudi Arabia. The *Independence* is accompanied by a battle group that includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. The cruisers carry an estimated 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
August	Lt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson was the commander of the American military task force dealing with the no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel.
August	U.S. and British aircraft were operating out of Gulf bases simultaneously for political purposes in this "monitoring" exercise.

August	The southern no-fly zone, code named Operation Southern Watch, established. President Bush announced that Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters would be prohibited from flying below the 32nd parallel. The "rules of the game" were communicated to the Iraqis directly through military channels.
August 25	Iraq "categorically rejects" any restriction on the movement of its aircraft, labeling the no-fly zones an attempt to divide the country.
November	President Bush defeated by Governor Bill Clinton.
November 15	Turkey, Iran, and Syria warn Kurds not to establish an independent state above 36th parallel.
Mid-December	U.S. forces deployed to Somalia, Operation Restore Hope.
December 27	A U.S. F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-25 after Iraqi jets breached a zone in southern Iraq in an apparent test of American resolve in the region.
December 30	President-elect Clinton said Saddam would be "making a big mistake" if he were to test American resolve during the presidential transition. "Our people are enforcing the no-fly zone and that's exactly what they should be doing."
1993	
January	U.S. carrier *JF Kennedy* and escort vessels with ca. 85 planes sent from Naples to the Mediterranean, where they could go through the Suez canal to Red Sea. Otherwise carrier-based attacks from the Mediterranean on Iraq would have to cross Turkey, a route which Turkey probably wouldn't allow.
January	Iraqi MiG-29 violating the northern no-fly zone was shot down by U.S. fighters.
January 2	Pentagon confirms Iraqi MiG-25 tried to intercept a U.S. U-2 on January 2.
January 8	U.S. administration stated, "The criteria is [sic] clear: That [the Iraqis] have to move the missiles and stop violating the no-fly zone."
January 13	President-elect Clinton, "I'm not obsessed with the man [Saddam], but I am obsessed with the standards of conduct embodied in those UN accords, and I think that if he were sitting here on the couch I would further the change in his behavior."

January 13	President Bush announced that 1,250 U.S. troops (battalion size) had been sent to Kuwait to act as deterrent against further Iraqi incursions. The Army troops were from the First Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas. The armored battalion would join ca. 300 U.S. special forces troops in a training exercise. The battalion uses 24 M1-A1 tanks, APCs, and artillery stored in Kuwait.
January 13	Carrier *Kitty Hawk*, the 52nd Attack Squadron (Navy *Intruder* aircraft) participated in attack on Iraq. Gen. Joseph Hoar, commander of the U.S. Cen Command at MacDill AFB near Tampa, FL, had overall command of the attack. U.S. Commander in the region was Maj. Gen. James Record of the USAF. Included in the force were F-117 *Nighthawk* Stealth bombers, F-16s, F-15s, F-18s. tankers, AWACS, reconnaissance planes and helicopters.
January 13	80 strike planes and 30 support planes took part in an attack on Iraq. U.S., France, and Britain bombed missile sites below the 32nd. All of the strike aircraft were launched from bases in the Gulf region or from the carrier *Kitty Hawk*. Raid restricted to attacks on surface-to-air missile batteries in southern Iraq and their associated infrastructure, mostly radar and low-level command bunkers.
January 14	United States had 18,500 military personnel in the gulf region, including ca. 12,500 aboard 13 Navy ships in the gulf. The carrier *Kitty Hawk* carries 75 aircraft.
January 17	U.S. launched an air strike on Iraq: A total of 45 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched. Each $1 million missile had a 984-pound warhead, compared with 2,000-pound iron bombs carried by fighter-bombers. Three ships, the Aegis cruiser *Cowpens*, the *Hewitt*, and the *William H. Stump*, were in the northern Persian Gulf ca. 450 miles from the target. The Spruance-class destroyer *Caron* was in the northern Red Sea, ca. 700 miles from the target. The cruise missiles took ca. 60-90 minutes to reach their targets. In the Gulf War, Tomahawks launched from the submarine *Pittsburgh* in the eastern Mediterranean were routed north through Turkey because of high-relief terrain. Pentagon said of 45 CM launched, 37 had struck their targets.
January 17	U.S. Navy cruise missiles struck Baghdad. The target was the Zaafaraniya complex, eight miles southeast of Baghdad, which is a large industrial park equipped with advanced computer-controlled machinery that the Iraqis had used in their nuclear weapons program. Rashid Hotel was also hit. Four cruise missiles may have been shot down.

January 17	In reference to the cruise missile attack, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said it "demonstrates the United States and the coalition's determination to demand Iraq's compliance with all UN resolutions." The attack was to "insure that Iraq never again acquires weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, biological." The decision to use cruise missiles instead of manned aircraft reflected the political imperative that no American pilots be shot down and captured in a raid over Iraq. The attack was scheduled for Friday (January 15) but was postponed while allies assessed whether Iraq would comply with UN demands.
January 18	Ten USAF F-15Es, four F-16s, and four British Tornadoes took off from Gulf bases to strike air defense command centers and radars at Najaf, Tallil, and Samawa. The fighter-bombers were supported by 51 air-to-air allied fighters, electronic jamming planes, planes with HARM missiles, AWACS, tankers, and other aircraft.
January 20	Governor Clinton was inaugurated as the 42nd President.
January 20	White House communications director George Stephanopoulos said, "We need to see Iraq change its behavior. We need full compliance with the UN resolutions."
May 4	U.S. forces withdrawn from Somalia. UN begins UNOSOM II. (Last U.S. troops withdrawn on March 25, 1994.)
August 19	USAF jets bombed an Iraqi battery that fired two missiles at American planes.
1994	
January 28	Since October 1991, there have been 22,697 fighter sorties over northern Iraq in support of Operation Provide Comfort.
June	U.S. warships launched a cruise missile attack on Baghdad in retaliation for the Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April.

Appendix G

CASE STUDY:
OPERATION ABLE ENTRY
(MACEDONIA)

Appendix G
OPERATION ABLE ENTRY

This case study explores the relationship between military assets and political and foreign policy objectives. The intent is not to present an exhaustive inventory of events in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The goal is to move toward a better understanding of how to improve the effectiveness and utility of U.S. forces used in "presence" and other political-military missions.

Since many of the UN resolutions relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina touch on issues related to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Bosnia case study is a useful companion to this case study.

BACKGROUND

Landlocked Macedonia, about as big as West Virginia with a population smaller than that of Brooklyn (2 million), is boxed in by countries with little interest in its continuation as a state. (See Figure G-1.) The population of Macedonia is divided between 65 percent Slavic Macedonians and 20 to 35 percent Albanian Muslims. Until World War II, Macedonia was part of Serbia; after 1945, it was a republic of Yugoslavia. In September 1991, Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia. (See the Chronology presented at the end of this appendix.)

This declaration of independence was not welcomed by the Athens government. Greece initially opposed the break-up of the Yugoslavian federation and recognition of its constituent republics as independent states. Alarmed by the impending loss of the final structural impediment to a reappearance of Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism, the Greek government sought to prolong the regional status quo until an agreeable alternative could be formulated. Eventually, however, Greece joined other European Community (EC) members and the United States in recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nonetheless, Greece remained adamantly opposed to the recognition of FYROM, or the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, and secured EC commitment in 1992 that the former republic would not be recognized until it relinquishes the term Macedonia, because that designation raises suspicions of territorial

ambitions.[1] To allay Greek concerns, Macedonia won membership in the UN under the interim name "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." FYROM was listed under the T's in the UN directory and became the only UN state prohibited from flying its national flag. (The FYROM flag includes the Thessaloniki Battle Star of Vergina.) In December 1993 and in early 1994, the United States and six members of the EC recognized FYROM under that name and began to establish diplomatic relations.



Figure G-1. The Former Yugoslavia and Neighboring Countries
Source: GAO/NSIAD 94-156BR

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1 Nicholaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 109, Number 4, Fall 1994, p. 661.

Albania warned the UN that in the event of conflict in Kosovo, Albania would intervene on behalf of the approximately 2 million ethnic Albanians (90 percent of the population of Kosovo) living there. A conflict in Kosovo would probably be a consequence of Serbia's revocation of Kosovo's status as an autonomous republic. Albania's threat exacerbated the existing internal tension in Macedonia, where the government claims that ethnic Albanians comprise around 20 percent of the population, while the government of Albania puts the figure at around 40 percent.

Because of the rugged terrain dividing Albania from Kosovo, Albanian forces would probably have to cross Macedonia to get to Kosovo, a route that would greatly expand the war in the Balkans. Since the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) had taken all of its heavy weapons, armor, aircraft, helicopters, and border monitoring equipment with it when it left in 1992, the 8,000-man Macedonian army needed a variety of assistance if there were to be any chance of stopping armed incursions across Macedonia's borders.

In November 1992, Macedonia's President Kiro Gligorov, who feared that Serbian elections on December 20 would bring hard-line nationalists into power in Belgrade, made a request for the urgent deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. On December 11, 1992, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 795, which called for the first ever preventative deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

Under the auspices of resolution 795, the UN established an UNPROFOR Macedonia Command, under a Brigadier headquartered in Skopje, with the mandate to do the following:

- Monitor Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and report all activities that might increase tension or threaten peace and stability, and
- Stand between forces that might otherwise clash.

The UN sent more than 1,000 peacekeepers to Macedonia, beginning on January 6, 1993. The first to arrive were 147 heavily armed Canadian mechanized infantry, with 14 trucks, 18 M113 APCs, and TOW anti-tank missiles. The Canadians patrolled Macedonia's 240–kilometer frontier with Serbia and Kosovo. On March 2, a lightly armed Nordic battalion (NORBAT) with approximately 700 troops was deployed. Commanded by Swedish Colonel Jan Isberg, the NORBAT, equipped with Finnish Sisu wheeled APCs, was comprised of 209 Norwegians, 221 Finns, 248 Swedes, and seven Danes. Commander of the UN force, Danish Brig. General Finn Saermark-Thomsen

said, "It is very, very good that we arrived here when we did. This way we've been able to engage in preventative diplomacy, not like in Bosnia where we are reduced to cleaning up the mess."

OVERVIEW OF THE MISSION

Since January 1993, when UN troops began to arrive, UN forces and ESCE have worked to defuse ethnic tensions and to shore up the government led by President Kiro Gligorov, who was a close associate of Yugoslavia's president Josip Tito.

Approximately 300 American troops arrived in May 1993. (The designation is Task Force 6-502.) President Clinton's decision to station forces in FYROM was surprising to some since the government of FYROM had not requested such a deployment.

The American unit keeps one platoon along the mountainous 15-mile American sector of the Macedonian border, one platoon in reserve, and one platoon at the base camp at Petrovee airport, near the Macedonian capital of Skopje. In addition, a platoon of infantry scouts patrols different sectors of the UN border at the request of Brig. Gen. Finn Saermark-Thomsen, commander of the 1,000 UN forces in Macedonia. The American forces, which replaced a Swedish contingent, patrol a 45-mile section of the eastern half of the Serbia-Macedonia border. The United States maintains nine permanent outposts in its zone of responsibility, which is intersected by the Belgrade-Athens highway. (See Figure G-2.)

AMERICAN INTERESTS

U.S. policy has been to protect the shaky but democratizing government in Skopje from the territorial pretensions of President Slobodan Milosevic of neighboring Serbia. In addition, the United States would like to prevent Serbian actions against Muslims in Kosovo which would create another serious refugee problem as well as cause a chain reaction among the regional states. The overall strategic interest is to prevent conflict in Kosovo from igniting the sixth Balkan War of this century.[2] Both President Bush and Clinton have warned Serbian President Milosevic that a Serb-inspired conflict in Kosovo would potentially result in direct U.S.-Serbian confrontation.

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2 Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Preventing A Sixth Twentieth-Century Balkan War," *Strategic Forum* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, Number 9, October 1994).




Figure G-2. Map of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Source: International Defense Review, 5/1993

The presence of the U.S. soldiers is aimed at preventing the bloody conflict in Bosnia from spilling into Macedonia and triggering a general Balkans war. Though the UN deployment is often referred to as a "preventative deployment," the mission is actually to deter the Belgrade government. U.S. forces in Macedonia are not equipped to fight and are not configured to monitor the Serbia-Macedonia border adequately. U.S. forces in Macedonia have no military purpose, they serve as a tripwire in the political function of deterring Serb aggression by suggesting the automaticity of American involvement. An additional political aspect of the presence of U.S. ground forces in Macedonia is that it diffuses somewhat the criticism from Europeans who point out that the United States has no forces on the ground in Bosnia. (Figure G-3.)




Figure G-3. Maps of Macedonia, The Former Yugoslavia, and the U.S. Forces
Sources: *New York Times, Washington Post*

DESCRIPTION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSETS INVOLVED

In 1993, USAREUR soldiers deployed within the republics of the former Yugoslavia. Over 540 soldiers serve under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In Operation "Able Sentry," a reinforced mechanized company from the Berlin Brigade participates in UN operations in Macedonia.

In April 1994, troops from the 3rd Infantry Division Germany left around the 20th for peacekeeping duties in Macedonia. Three C-130 flights carried 177 soldiers to Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav republic. About 25 other soldiers either deployed as an advance party a week earlier or were sent by rail with the unit's heavy equipment. The troops were scheduled to join 315 other 3rd Infantry Division troops already in Macedonia as part of UNPROFOR. The deployment of 180 tons of equipment for the new contingent began earlier when USAF C-141s flew the first of eight sorties

Grafenwöhr, Germany, to Skopje. The unit's heavy equipment included 14 M113 armored personnel carriers which moved by rail from Germany through Austria, Hungary, and Romania and then by truck to Skopje.

By May 1994, from an original force of 300, the blue-bereted American presence in Macedonia had increased to more than 520 troops, representing close to half the total UN force there. A second infantry company from the Germany-based 3rd Infantry Division was deployed there in mid-April, and three Army Blackhawk helicopters and 30 aviators were also sent. The total of 748 American personnel the former Yugoslavia make up only 1.9 percent of the total UNPROFOR force of 38,810.

AIR ASSETS INVOLVED

With the exception of transport aircraft, there were no air assets involved in this operation.

OUTCOME/ASSESSMENT

As of December 1994, the UN-led operation to bring stability to Macedonia has been a success. The prospects for success were greatly enhanced by the fact that UNPROFOR was deployed prior to any fighting. The local population had given its consent to the presence of UN forces in FYROM, making the mission much more of a traditional peacekeeping operation than the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example. Also, Albania's threat to march through Macedonia was not regarded as being particularly credible.

The presence of U.S. forces in UNPROFOR's Macedonia unit is credited with forcing Serbian President Milosevic to be more restrained in Kosovo and cautious in dealing with Macedonia than would otherwise be the case.

ALTERNATIVE FORCES

There does not appear to be any significant flexibility in the American choice of forces for the operation in Macedonia. The American forces filled a pre-determined slot in the UNPROFOR group in Macedonia. The mission, to patrol borderlines and roads, required ground troops. There may be a role for helicopters, but such a deployment would have required a greater political commitment from the United States and a much larger force (at least 300 more troops plus helicopters). In light of the lack of domestic political support for the deployment of U.S. forces on the territory of the former

Yugoslavia, particularly from those who have decried placing American forces "under foreign command," there may have been no politically acceptable alternative to the forces actually deployed. Since the American forces were deployed under a UN mandate, and in light of the fact that there was, first, no Macedonian request for U.S. forces, and second, an ambiguous threat, there was no clear or compelling justification for a U.S. deployment that would have exceeded the UNPROFOR requirement. An increase in the U.S. force would have raised serious domestic concerns over mission creep and protests at the UN over the Americanization of UNPROFOR.

Since the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia is one of deterrence, however, the question is, what will be done if deterrence fails? There are countless scenarios which describe how the fighting in the former Yugoslavia could spread to Macedonia. The basic theme many of them share is the view that Serbia will not be content with the acquisition of a few thousand square miles of territory in Bosnia. Instead, in order to fulfill the dream of Greater Serbia, Belgrade's attention will turn sooner or later to Kosovo and Macedonia. Such a conflict could easily expand to include Albania, Greece, and Turkey.

If U.S. forces come under fire, the issue will be whether to stay and fight, reinforce, or evacuate. In the unlikely event Serb forces attack the American forces directly, there is no way to evacuate the U.S. group by helicopter without leaving all heavy equipment behind. This would look like a rout even if it were a planned withdrawal. To evacuate the U.S. force by C-130, for example, the Americans would have to withdraw to the airport at Skopje. To get there, however, U.S. forces would have to cross at least one of the two most likely avenues of attack from Serbia into Macedonia. If an attack on U.S. forces is preceded by a Serbian attack on Kosovo, then the Americans would have to withdraw by land through a refugee stream that will surely be in the tens and perhaps in the hundreds of thousands—estimates range as high as 400,000.

The clearest case for alternative forces derives from the need to make Serbia understand that the United States will strike hard if the Serbs are responsible for causing huge refugee problems in Kosovo or Macedonia. Since it would be pointless to attack ground targets where Serbian forces and refugees would be commingled, the United

States must have a plan for striking targets in Serbia. The purpose of such a plan, however, would be to demonstrate how military force could be used to support a diplomatic solution. In the meantime, however, the best policy for the United States is to continue to use military force to maintain stable and enforceable boundaries that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, Albanians, and Macedonians respect.[3]

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3 Robert Kagan, "Truce? Expect a Wider War," *New York Times*, December 20, 1994.

CHRONOLOGY

Note: Since Macedonia is included in the UNPROFOR mandate for Bosnia, the Selected Chronology in the Bosnia case study should be referred to as well.

1991

Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia.

1992

November 11 — The President of Macedonia conveyed to the UN Secretary-General a request for a deployment of UN observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

December 9 — The Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report which recommended the expansion of the UN mandate to establish a UN presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

December 11 — The Security Council adopted resolution 795, which approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's first ever preventative deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

1993

April — UN imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia.

June 18 — The Security Council welcomed the U.S. offer to provide 300 troops to reinforce UNPROFOR's presence in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. In adopting resolution 842, the Council authorized the deployment of the additional personnel.

July 13 — The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on UNPROFOR's efforts in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

August 20 — A Nordic battalion based at Kjojila, east of Skopje, the capital of the former Republic of Macedonia, and a U.S. contingent of 315 troops which arrived in Skopje on July 20 deployed to the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

September 20 — The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council renew the mandate for UNPROFOR for a period of 6 months.

October	Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman, during a visit to the Albanian capital, Tirana, warned Serbia's leaders that the United States was drawing the line in Macedonia. "We would regard as a very serious matter any conflict in Kosovo inspired by Serb action and would respond," he said.
November	U.S. infantry task force in Macedonia marked 3 months of peacekeeper duty. The designation is Task Force 6-502.
December 16	Germany, Denmark, Britain, France, and the Netherlands moved to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia, a move bitterly opposed by Greece.
December 25	Observation Point Uniform 56-Alpha. FRYOM, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
1994	
January	UN dispatches more than 1,000 peacekeepers to Macedonia.
February 17	Greece forged ahead in its fight with Macedonia today, closing the former Yugoslav republic's main trade route and drawing angry protests from other members of the European Union. PM Andreas Papandreou, furious over Western diplomatic recognition of Macedonia, ordered that the northern port of Salonika be closed to all goods bound for landlocked Macedonia except for food and medicine. Greece is trying to press Macedonia to change its name and guarantee that it will not make claims on Greek territory.

Appendix H

SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENCE

Appendix H
SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENCE

This appendix contains interviews and documents concerning presence issues that have been compiled in the course of this study. Materials from the CORM have been drawn upon with permission. The material for each Service is presented here in the same order it was described in the main test, i.e., alphabetically for the principal Services. Material from the U.S. Coast Guard is also included.

1. U.S. Air Force
2. U.S. Army
3. U.S. Marine Corps
4. U.S. Navy
5. U.S. Coast Guard

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

15 DEC 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS
(Col Jack Wood)

FROM: AF/RO

SUBJECT: Assessment of Air Force Contributions to Overseas Presence

The USAF contributes to Overseas Presence with unique forces which are *globally deployed, globally capable, ready to deploy,* or *deployed in region.* These air and space forces incorporate numerous technological advances to provide a uniquely flexible and lethal contribution to America's presence strategy. USAF forces allow the U.S. to project power across the spectrum of conflict with reduced vulnerability, cost, and risk.

Globally Deployed Forces: Our space assets--people, ground stations, satellites and space support--are integral to the effective operation of most military forces. A constellation of reconnaissance, navigation, surveillance, communication and weather satellites provide unparalleled capability with limited risk. They contribute situation awareness on an increasingly complex battlefield. The USAF is the principal provider of space forces for DoD.

Globally Capable Forces: Forces which operate directly from the CONUS are globally capable. ICBMs, bombers, strategic mobility forces (tankers and airlifters), airborne surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and select fighters fit this category. They give our political and military leaders increased flexibility in options because they can respond to various situations anywhere in the world within minutes or hours. ICBMs and bombers provide responsive, survivable, flexible assurance to both America and our allies. Strategic mobility provides a unique capability to project fighting forces, provide humanitarian assistance, or provide aeromedical support. Often, airlift is the optimal way to exert presence--between June 1993 and June 1994, the USAF flew mobility missions into all but seven countries in the world. Airborne surveillance and reconnaissance operations, including AWACS and Joint STARS, complement space forces and provide

real-time information to CINCs and the NCA. Fighters, supported by aerial refueling, provide a variety of measured response options.

Forces Ready to Deploy: CONUS-based forces prepared to move to forward areas include fighter wings, composite wings and SOF forces, supported by aerial refueling. They mix strategic agility and lethality with the ability to mobilize quickly, swing to various theaters, and operate in austere environments. Within days, three USAF fighter wings can project themselves halfway around the world. Within a few weeks, the USAF can move and prepare ten wings to fight in any theator war. Within two days, USAF composite wings including multi-role fighters, heavy bombers, aerial refuelers and airlifters can be in any theater, capable of sustained operations. Composite wings are trained to strike in joint packages or to act independently. Special Operations Forces are often the force of choice in politically sensitive areas because of their unique cultural training and selective combat capabilities. Aerial refueling is indispensable to global mobility and flexibility. USAF KC-135s, KC-10s and HC-130s provide the necessary reach for combat forces, whether deploying from the CONUS or once those forces arrive in theater. Refueling allows forces to locate further from the front, reducing vulnerability and reducing airspace congestion.

Regionally Deployed Forces: USAF has a combination of forward-based forces, contingency basing arrangements, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and foreign security assistance programs. Our forward-based forces provide the first line of defense while assuring our allies and deterring potential enemies. Forward-based forces are not just the tip of the sword, but they are also essential for the rapid reinforcement by CONUS-based forces. Contingency basing arrangements provide infrastructure for efficient operations and regional deterrence without stationing forces overseas. These bases are a means of exercising readiness, interoperability, and regional commitment at a minimal cost. The USAF maintains scores of these sites in dozens of countries. FID and foreign security assistance programs demonstrate continuous U.S. commitment with our friends and allies worldwide. USAF personnel interact with citizens of other nations through professional military education and flight training programs. Finally, prepositioning equipment and supplies increases the combat credibility of our forces and visibly demonstrates U.S. regional interest. Prepositioning supports a strategy of presence by sustaining combat forces on short notice and reducing the initial logistic requirements. Forward-based logistics provide a key to rapid, forceful military response.

The primary job of our military is to deter potential adversaries from undesirable actions, and win wars decisively, if required. In a post-Cold War era, doing either presupposes the ability to project power. America's military strategy now centers on not only warfighting, but presence as well. The U.S. flag on the tail of our large mobility aircraft visibly demonstrates U.S. resolve, commitment, and presence around the world . . . everyday. The Unites States Air Force will continue to provide these unique global capabilities for both presence and warfighting.

CHARLES D. LINK, Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant for Roles and Missions

MEMORANDUM

To: ***The Record***
Date: ***October 13, 1994***
Subject: ***Interview with General Merrill A. McPeak***
By: ***Paul M. Cole***

This is an approved-for-distribution summary of my interview with General Merrill A. McPeak. The interview took place in General McPeak office at the Pentagon on October 12.

Presence is not a mission. It is especially not a mission that is the monopoly of any one Service. Presence is a characteristic of armed forces, like speed or mass or maneuverability. All armed forces, wherever they are located, possess the characteristic of "presence" to a greater of lesser degree.

We usually think of presence as a function of location, or geography. This is accurate as far as it goes, but we should also think of presence as a function of time. Russian armed forces have less presence in Europe today not just because they are now separated geographically from NATO's eastern frontiers but also because they would have to mobilize to return, giving the West time to react. In the same way, any foreign power contemplating action against US interests would have to reckon with the speed at which we can now deploy CONUS-based air and ground forces. Thus, the 82nd Airborne, stationed at Ft. Bragg, is "present" quickly, anywhere. Others know this and take this form of presence into account. CONUS-based long-range air forces exercise particularly effective "presence" because they can be overhead any spot on the Globe in less than 24 hours from a standing start.

It is difficult to quantify how much good the factor of "presence" actually produces. The US has kept a large deck aircraft carrier "present" in the Mediterranean for decades and that has not prevented five Arab-Israeli wars, the emergence of Gataffi in Libya, today's situation in the Balkans, and so on. I suppose it is possible to argue that the situation in the Med would have been even worse without the carrier. While this may be so, the point is that it's hard to nail down the carrier's contribution to "stability" in this region.

Cost, on the other hand, is rather easier to compute. The Navy prefers that only large deck carriers be counted as providing presence. But some authorities claim that middle-sized, amphibious carriers cost about one-third as much to operate as the large deck variety. I have not yet seen convincing evidence that amphibious carriers do not have identical, or at least similar, presence value. If this is so, then even the Navy has more cost effective ways to provide presence.

This is not an argument for zero large deck carriers. We do need some number of these ships. But the rationale for possessing as many as the dozen or so we are *planning* to operate has been based solely on the presence "requirement," and that argument needs strengthening before it justifies the large costs involved.

22 December 1994

The Army
The Central Element of
America's Overseas Presence

PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to provide the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) a description of the Army's contributions to Overseas Presence, one of the fundamental areas of the nation's National Military Strategy (NMS). It is provided in recognition of the CORM's effort to resolve the issue of "What changes, if any, in the roles, missions, and functions of the US Armed Forces should be made in view of the United States' post-Cold War requirements for overseas military presence."

DEFINITION: Overseas Presence is the sum total of proactive measures taken by the US government in the international arena to shape the environment in a manner favorable to the United States. Overseas military presence is a cornerstone of the National Security Strategy and a key element of the Nation's foreign policy of "engagement and enlargement." Military presence in this sense is defined as everything the Department of Defense does or maintains overseas to exert influence on foreign nations such as the activities of permanently stationed forces, routine deployments, exercises, military to military contacts, foreign military sales, etc.

ARMY POSITION: The Army, as the nation's strategic force for prompt and sustained land combat, remains the cornerstone of effective overseas presence. Overseas presence is multi-dimensional and executed by multiple, complementary means including not only forward stationed forces and prepositioned equipment, but also military-to-military contact, security and humanitarian assistance, combined exercises, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement and intervention operations. Overseas presence takes the form of permanently stationed forces and forces temporarily deployed, some on a regular, rotational basis. US forces overseas provide the most visible proof of our commitment to defend our interests and our friends and allies worldwide. The Army, as the primary land element of US military power in support of all aspects of overseas presence, plays a central role in our national capability for shaping the international security environment. The foundation of our Nation's overseas presence remains a trained soldier on the ground, promoting stability and thwarting aggression wherever deployed.

ORGANIZATION: This paper will address the following topics:

a. The Evolution of Overseas Presence

   1) Early 20th Century

   2) Post-Cold War

b. The Defining Strategic Concepts: Overseas Presence and Power Projection

   1) Overlapping and Interrelated Strategic Concepts

   2) Components: Influence, Assurance, Deterrence, Posturing for Crisis Response

c. The Elements of Overseas Presence: The Army's Role

1) Military to Military Contacts

2) Nation Assistance

3) Security Assistance

4) Combating Drugs and Terrorism

5) Regional Alliances

6) Arms Control

7) Confidence Building Measures

8) Military Operations Other Than War

a) Humanitarian Assistance

b) Peacekeeping Operations

c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

d) Sanctions Enforcement

e) Peace Enforcement Operations

10) Posturing for Crisis Response

d. Overseas Presence in Action: The Army

1) EUCOM

2) CENTCOM

3) SOUTHCOM

4) USACOM

5) PACOM

e. Conclusion

THE EVOLUTION OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE:

a. Early 20th Century.

1) US Army forces have been temporarily or periodically deployed to overseas locations in support of US security interests throughout our history and have been permanently stationed overseas since the end of the Spanish-American War. While adjustments in patterns of deployments followed changes to national security and national military strategy during this period, stationing remained fairly constant during the execution of our Cold War Strategy of Containment from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Army force structure was designed to support these overseas commitments and provide sufficient forces, when fully mobilized, to meet the greatest threat, that of a Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe. Other requirements for regional conflict were assumed to be met by forces designed primarily for conflict with the Soviet Union.

2) As a consequence of experience in two world wars and the emergence of the powerful Soviet threat, US leadership reassessed the traditional contribution armed forces had made to the attainment of policy goals. Containment implied forward stationing, and forward presence of US combatant forces to deter Soviet aggression and provide a capability for initial defense if deterrence failed. A broad examination of the use of US military forces since World War II shows that both the US political and military leadership had come to understand that "the armed forces -- by their very existence as well as by their general character, deployment, and day-to-day activities -- can be used as an instrument of policy in times of peace." Moreover, the post-World War II US experience in the application of force to advance interests generally followed the adage of Sun Tzu ". . . to subdue an enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Over the past 49 years, American armed forces have been committed to overseas operations, both in war and short of war, to protect or further US policy interests in specific regions. The overseas presence of credible US military forces, either permanently stationed or temporarily assigned, have served the nation's political leadership in delivering a strong message to friends and foes alike about the strength of the US commitment and the boundaries of US national interests.

b. Post-Cold War.

1) Since 1989, stationing of overseas forces has changed, particularly in Europe, in response to dramatic change in the global strategic environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the wide adoption of democratic political institutions and market economies now calls for a different mix of overseas presence tools. The new strategy of enlargement and engagement, developed to support US leadership in encouraging the emergence of free market democratic nations, increasingly relies upon use of military forces to enhance global stability. That stability is enhanced through expanded American influence generated by the military reassuring our friends and allies and deterring our potential enemies. Army forces deployed periodically into a region can demonstrate US commitment, assist host nation forces in nation-building, assist military forces in the difficult transition to a democratic society, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, provide enhanced capabilities for response through pre-positioning of equipment and supplies and access to facilities for strategic force projection, and exert influence upon military and political figures in host nations. Terms applied to this shift vary. From "forward defense" during the Cold War, to "forward presence" in the immediate period following the fall of the Soviet Union, to "overseas presence" today, the strategy calls for flexible, responsive, adaptable military forces that must accomplish a variety of tasks, including not only providing a credible overseas presence, but also countering weapons of mass destruction and supporting counter-terrorism and other national security objectives.

2) The new National Security Strategy (NSS) is very clear on the need for overseas presence:

> US forces must also be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime to deter aggression. Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitments to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains US familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.

Forms of oversees presence mentioned in the document include permanently stationed forces, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well as military-to-military contacts. It also notes that conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations (presumably including those deployed overseas) can perform a wide range of other important missions including combating terrorism and drug trafficking, overseas evacuation of Americans, training and advising friendly governments threatened by subversion, and disaster relief.

3) The regional section of the NSS, titled "Integrated Regional Approaches" provides some detail on Administration thinking about the size and form of overseas presence forces for several, but not all, of the regions specified. In Europe,

> . . . a force of roughly 100,000 US military personnel . . . will preserve US influence and leadership in NATO and provide a deterrent posture that is visible to both Western and Eastern Europeans . . . [T]his level of permanent presence, augmented by forward deployed naval forces and reinforcements available from the US, is sufficient to respond to plausible crises and to contribute to stability in the region. Such a force level also provides a sound basis for US participation in multinational training and preserves the capability to deter or respond to larger threats in Europe or to support limited NATO operations "out of area".

In East Asia and the Pacific,

> . . . [W]e will maintain an active presence and we will continue to lead . . . [A] continued, committed American military presence will serve as the bedrock for America's security role in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in this critical region. In addition to performing the general forward deployment functions . . . they contribute to deterring aggression and adventurism by the North Korean regime.

In Southwest Asia,

> ...The United States will maintain its long-standing presence, which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and prepositioned combat equipment. Since Operation Desert Storm, temporary deployments of land-based aviation forces, ground forces and amphibious units have supplemented our posture in the gulf region.

4) Overseas presence is an "essential element" needed to deal with regional threats. It is "the single most visible commitment" of our intention to defend both US and allied interests. Because overseas presence improves US crisis response capabilities, the US must continue to have " . . . a significant presence in key regions . . . [but] at

significantly reduced levels of forward-deployed forces. Nonetheless, even at reduced levels, presence forces are a key building block in the force structure recommended in the Bottom Up Review (BUR) and, "land-based ground and air forces constituted the majority of US forces stationed overseas. . . "


5) The presence mission has included a cross section of the nation's armed forces operating both separately and jointly. Today, however, the Soviet threat has disappeared. Limited military budgets and evolving missions emphasize the importance of operations other than war (OOTW). In this environment, the presence mission has assumed a greater significance in the pursuit of national interests. While many forces overseas continue to deter actions inimical to US interests, others are more focused on reinforcement of positive trends toward democracy and assistance in natural and man-made disasters.

OVERSEAS PRESENCE MISSIONS COMPARED

Missions	Old-Forward Defense	New Overseas Presence
Contain Soviet and surrogate expansion	Yes	No
Credible deterrence of an attack on U.S. allies -By stationed forces -By threat of rapid reinforcement	 High High	 Lower High
Defend U.S. allies against external threats	High	High, with reinforcement
Create conditions to negate emergence of regional military powers	Secondary Mission	Primary Mission
Maintain stable regional balance	Yes	Yes (but, in new regions)
Provide planning, reception, C2, for deploying forces and initial capability in crisis response	Secondary Mission	Primary Mission
Develop organization and plans and create conditions for success in coalition warfare	Selective	Broader
Support U.S. interests and host nation attack of mutual non-military threats (drugs, terrorism)	Limited	High
Influence development and restructuring of militaries	Secondary Mission	Primary Mission
Assist foreign militaries in nation-building	Low Priority	High Priority
Provide security assistance, including training, material, logistics support	High	High
Peace Operations	Low	High

The Defense Department, including the Army, now faces the dilemma of efficiently executing a range of tasks, in a cost effective manner, in an environment of uncertain, often ambiguous regional threats. The services will continue to execute overseas presence missions, with fewer and more stressed resources.

THE DEFINING STRATEGIC CONCEPTS: OVERSEAS PRESENCE AND POWER PROJECTION



a. The two fundamental strategic military objectives derived from the National Security Strategy are to promote international stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction and to thwart aggression through credible deterrence and the maintenance of a robust warfighting capability. Achieving these strategic objectives requires our military forces to perform three sets of tasks: first, to remain constructively engaged in peacetime; second, to attempt to prevent the eruption of conflict; and third, should conflict prevention fail, to fight and win our Nation's wars. The overlapping and interrelated strategic concepts that allow the military to execute these three sets of tasks are overseas presence and power projection.

b. The strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection are symbiotic in nature; each relies upon and gains its full expression through the other. Embedded in our approach to national defense is the assumption that we will attempt to resolve all of our military conflicts abroad; to do so requires the capability to project our military might to the point of decision. In their ultimate forms, both overseas presence and power projection are characterized by the deployment of a complete air, land, and sea force to decisively win a war on foreign soil. Given the clear intent of the National Security Strategy to preempt the potential for conflict by proactively shaping the environment in a manner consistent with our national interests, the more appropriate focus for overseas presence is upon the strategic tasks of peacetime engagement and conflict prevention and their associated supporting activities which range from the completely non-hostile (military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, etc.) to those just short of outright war (peace enforcement, posturing for crisis response, etc.).

c. The objectives of overseas presence fall generally into four interrelated categories: influence, assurance, deterrence, and posturing for crisis response.

1) Influence. Ultimately, all of the overseas presence activities seek to influence the attitudes and actions of foreign leaders. A fundamental objective of our pre-conflict military activity, whether at home or abroad, is to create a shared mental image of American power which is sufficient to force itself into the decision making process of every foreign leader. Regardless of their internal agendas, we seek to ensure that they are aware of American interests and respect the ability and commitment of America to protect those interests. It must be recognized that our objective of influence is the achievement of a "state of mind" within the ranks of foreign leaders and that the dominant element within the militaries of the vast majority of other nations lies with the leaders of their land forces. This well positions the US Army to serve as the most readily understood and recognizable source for generating influence within these foreign states. Supporting objectives to this pursuit of influence are assurance for our friends and allies and deterrence for our potential enemies.

2) Assurance. Is the supporting objective by which we seek to shape the environment by convincing our friends and allies that their interests and American interests align and that we remain committed and capable of protecting those shared interests.

3) Deterrence. Is the supporting objective by which we seek to shape the environment by convincing our potential enemies that the cost of interfering with American interests dwarf any potential benefit that may be gained from threatening those interests.

4) Posturing for crisis response. Is the activity which provides credibility to the belief that should assurance or deterrence fail, we retain the capability to unilaterally enforce American will and protect American interests. As such it serves as the transition condition between the worlds of perception (assurance and deterrence) and action. It is the capability to respond rapidly and effectively to crisis.

THE ELEMENTS OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE: THE ARMY'S ROLE

The breadth and depth of the Army's contributions across the elements of overseas presence clearly demonstrate the central role that the Army plays in the execution of this component of the NMS.

a. Military to Military Contacts. This terms applies to both a general description of all activities that bring Army personnel into direct contact with foreign military personnel and as a title to particular programs recognized and resourced as part of the regular budget process. Army forces that are forward stationed or forward deployed routinely come in contact with large numbers of foreign military personnel and their families, both in the execution of their official duties and through informal social contact. The impact of American soldiers and their families living and working among foreign populations cannot be overstated - they serve as constant ambassadors of good will.

1) Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). Formal exchange relationships have been developed with a large number of foreign militaries in which each country exchanges officers for service within the ranks of the other country for a period of one to two years. These rewarding experiences provide opportunities for mutual understanding and respect between military institutions and usually lead to the formation of lasting personal relationships.

2) Schools of Other Nations (SON) Program. Some officers selected for attendance at Senior Service Colleges and Command and General Staff College are sent to foreign equivalent schools to receive their education. This personal interaction can be credited with a large share of the credit for forming the fabric by which successful alliances, such as NATO, are held together.

3) Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program. This comprehensive and highly successful program takes selected Army officers and develops them as foreign area experts. Through an extensive development program that includes advanced civil schooling, intensive language training, and in-country assignment with study and travel opportunities, the Army fields a corps of highly specialized officers that can easily function within foreign societies in a variety of sensitive positions.

4) Defense Attache. Defense attaches are found on a large number of our embassy staffs and serve as the special military advisor to the ambassador. The Army routinely fills over 45% of our national defense attache requirements, usually drawing from the ranks of the Army FAO program.

5) Foreign Military Contact Program (FMCP). This program provides funding for Military Liaison Teams and traveling FMCP Contact Teams, Familiarization Tours for distinguished foreign visitors to the United States, expansion of the National Guard States Partnership program, and operation of the George C. Marshall Center.

a) Military to Military Contact Program. Deploys Army contact teams to assist designated military forces of Central / Eastern Europe and assigned Republics of the former Soviet Union develop into positive, constructive elements of society during the country's transition to democracy and free market economies.

b) George C. Marshall Center. Chartered by the Secretary of Defense to educate mid to senior executive level defense officials from Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE), including States of the Former Soviet Union, on defense planning procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic societies; to sponsor research and host information exchange activities on defense related topics with C&EE states; and to support NATO activities with the cooperation partners of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

6) Combined Training Exercises. The Army participates extensively in a wide range of combined exercises with our allies and friends that promote joint readiness and interoperability, enhance military professionalism, and help shape our basing, prepositioning, logistics support, and security agreements in each region of the globe. Just a few examples include BRIGHT STAR, the capstone joint / combined, multilateral exercise in Egypt, involving some 6,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines every other year; COBRA GOLD in Thailand is a similar joint / combined exercise conducted annually; and FUERZAS UNIDAS in Latin America is a regionwide series of bilateral and multilateral field and command post exercises.

b. Nation Assistance. Army nation assistance activities support a host nation's efforts to promote development, ideally through the use of host nation resources. In United Nations terms, nation assistance equates to peace-building operations. The interagency orchestration of all the elements of national power is essential for success. It supports the ambassador's country plan and the CINC's regional plans. The goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, to develop sound and responsive democratic institutions, to develop supportive infrastructures, to promote strong free-market economies, and to provide an environment that allows for orderly political change

and economic progress. These goals can be accomplished only through education and the transfer of essential skills to the host nation. Army combat support and combat service support forces, both in the Active and Reserve components, are particularly well suited for the conduct of nation assistance programs.

c. Security Assistance. Security assistance consists of the groups of programs authorized by the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (amended), the *Arms Export Act of 1976* (amended), and other related statutes. Through security assistance programs, the United States provides defense material, military training, and defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further its national policies and objectives. A predominant interface of the US Army with host nations occurs through the Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). This program has two primary sub components—the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP).

1) The IMETP is designed to enhance the proficiency, professional performance, and readiness of foreign armed forces. The US conducts international education and training in CONUS as well as in the host nation. This typically takes the form of formal courses, orientation tours, and on-the-job training.

2) The FMSP allows designated governments to purchase military equipment, services, and training from the US. The sale of defense items may require training on the operation and maintenance of military equipment. Mobile training teams, resident instruction in US Army schools, and similar methods are used to conduct this training. The FMSP differs from the IMETP in that the recipient pays for equipment, services, and training.

Occasionally situations require accelerated security assistance when allied or friendly nations face an imminent threat. During these surges of increased assistance, operations focus on logistical support but may require more forceful measures.

d. Combating Drugs and Terrorism. Army efforts principally support law enforcement agencies, the counterdrug efforts of other US agencies, the states, and cooperating foreign governments to interdict the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution.

1) Support to host nations includes assistance to their forces to destroy drug production facilities; collaboration with host nation armed forces to prevent export of illegal drugs; and nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to production, exportation, and distribution of drugs. Support to interdiction efforts centers on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit as well as integrating C3I systems. US forces may well assist host nation forces at war while they are in an Operations Other Than War posture.

2) Support for domestic counterdrug operations includes military planning and training assistance for domestic law enforcement agencies, Army National Guard participation, equipment loans and transfers, use of military facilities, and other assistance as requested and authorized. This support may expand as national policy and legal prohibitions evolve.

3) The Department of State is the lead US agency in combating terrorism overseas or on the high seas; the Department of Justice (the Federal Bureau of Investigation) has this responsibility within the US. The Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration) combats terrorism related to aircraft in flight within the

territories of the US. The Department of Defense supports each of these agencies in these activities with the Army as a major provider of forces and resources for the Department of Defense effort.

4) Combating terrorism has two major components: anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. During peacetime, the Army combats terrorism primarily through antiterrorism, which is comprised of those passive defensive measures taken to minimize vulnerability to terrorism. Anti- terrorism is a form of force protection and, thus, the responsibility of Army commanders at all levels. Antiterrorism complements counterterrorism, which is the full range of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Army elements, such as SOF, assist in this interagency effort by applying specialized capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents abroad. Counterterrorism occurs in conflict and war; antiterrorism occurs across the range of military operations.

c. Regional Alliances. Strong, credible alliances are the foundation for both conflict prevention and effective multilateral warfighting. Our security relationships with NATO, Japan, and Korea remain, as they have been for the last 40 years, our most important regional security alliances. The Army provides major forces on-site as central elements of the structures that support each of these fundamental military partnerships. Our participation as integral elements within alliance headquarters and staffs provides a basis for leadership, influence, and effectiveness which together provide the cohesion and interoperability essential to fielding a credible combined force. Today, over 65,000 soldiers are forward stationed in Europe; another 26,000 are forward stationed in Korea and Japan, with another 25,000 stationed elsewhere in the Pacific in direct support of those forward elements, plus 5,500 in Panama. It is the presence of these soldiers on the ground that serve as the most credible symbol of American commitment to our alliance partners.

f. Arms Control. Arms control focuses on promoting strategic military stability. It encompasses any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of military systems. This extends not only to weapons themselves but also to command and control, logistics support, and intelligence-gathering mechanisms. Selected Army units provide assistance in monitoring the proliferation of weapons and technology, in verifying the status of arms control agreements, and in demilitarizing munitions and hardware.

g. Confidence Building Measures. Army forces will continue to be directly involved in confidence building efforts to foster openness and transparency in our military operations as they are monitored by our potential foes. Implementation of the Vienna Document in 1992 is a concrete example of such efforts and includes information exchanges, exercise limits and observations, and demonstrations of military capability.

h. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of operations other than war. Our new strategy of engagement and enlargement has placed greater emphasis upon these capabilities to execute MOOTW missions which, if successful, eliminate the seeds of conflict and preempt the potential for hostilities long before conflict can erupt. Our doctrine for war complements that for operations other than war. Sufficiently flexible to accommodate different situations, many of the same doctrinal principles apply to both environments.

1) Army forces have participated in military operations other than war in support of national interests throughout its history. They have protected citizens at the edge

of the frontiers of an expanding America; built roads, bridges, and canals; assisted nations abroad; and served our nation in a variety of other missions.

2) While military operations other than war are not new to the Army, their pace, frequency, and variety, have quickened in the last three decades and even more so since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, the Army is often required, in its role as a strategic force, to protect and further the interests of the United States at home and abroad in a variety of ways other than war.

3) Army forces face complex and sensitive situations in a variety of operations. These range from support to US, state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement.

4) The Army conducts such operations as part of a joint team and often in conjunction with other US and foreign government agencies. Operations other than war are intrinsic to a combatant commander's peacetime theater strategy, an ambassador's country plan, or civil assistance at home. Army soldiers serve daily in this capacity: engineers help host nations build roads and improve infrastructures; military police assist in the restoration of civil order; medics provide inoculations and advice for preventing disease; mobile training teams enhance local militaries' expertise in securing their nations' interests. Operations in this environment can present a special leadership challenge since the activities of relatively small units can have operational—and even strategic—impact. The entire Army—active, reserve, and civilian components—is involved daily in operations other than war.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Humanitarian assistance operations use DOD personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters. In some circumstances, humanitarian assistance may include medical, dental, and veterinary care to rural areas of a country; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Historical Perspective

A humanitarian assistance operation conducted by a US Army civil affairs (CA) unit in the Republic Cameroon in Africa provided relief to a nation devastated by disease. In 1989, the US Embassy and the Ministry of Public Health in Cameroon proposed a campaign to inoculate citizens against meningitis, a disease that ravages that tropical country each year during the dry season. The embassy defense attache office (DA0) contacted USEUC0M and plans were drawn to support a humanitarian assistance exercise in conjunction with CA support. In February 1991, a medical team from the 353d Civil Affairs Command, working in conjunction with the host nation, inoculated more than 58,000 people against meningitis and treated an additional 1,700 people for other ailments. This exercise not only accomplished its humanitarian goals but also provided an opportunity for the unit to train and use its language skills. At the same time it enhanced the image of the United States with a grateful country.

1) Disaster relief operations fall within the overall context of humanitarian assistance. They are conducted in emergency situations to prevent loss of life and property.

Such operations may be in the form of immediate and automatic response by US military commanders or in response to domestic or foreign governments or international agencies. Army elements involved in international disaster relief operations are often responsible for supporting the implementation of assistance programs developed by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within the Department of State. The coordination of federal response to domestic disaster relief efforts are generally under the direction of FEMA, although immediate response is permitted to prevent loss of life and property. The military's global reach, its ability to deploy rapidly, and its capability to operate in the most austere environments make it ideally suited for these missions.

2) The Army can provide logistics support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims, establish emergency communications, conduct direct medical support operations, and render emergency repairs to vital facilities. The Army can also provide manpower for civil relief, or it can assist civil authorities with public safety.

Historical Perspective

A natural drought combined with the collapse of civil and social order in Somalia to produce a famine of Biblical proportions by early 1992. More than 500,000 Somalis perished from starvation and at least a million more were facing extinction. The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 751 establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with the mission of providing humanitarian aid and facilitating the restoration of civil order. On 15 August 1992, President Bush ordered the start of Operation Provide Relief to rush over 28,000 metric tons of critically needed relief supplies to Somalia and later expanded the mission with Operation Restore Hope to restore public order in Somalia so that relief supplies could be fully distributed. The United Task Force (UNITAF) ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations including a joint force of 28,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen built upon a foundation of the Army's 10th Mountain Division. By March 1993, these operations had clearly succeeded in their twin objectives of stabilizing the security situation and distributing relief supplies to effectively end the threat of mass starvation.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. The US may participate in peacekeeping operations unilaterally or when requested by the UN, with a regional affiliation of nations, or with other unaffiliated countries. US personnel may function as impartial observers, as part of an international peacekeeping force, or in a supervisory and assistance role. Once committed by the National Command Authorities, the Army can provide a full range of capabilities in support of the operation. In the vast majority of situations, the Army provides, at a minimum, the theater logistic support to sustain the forces of both national and international participants.

1) Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. These operations follow diplomatic negotiations that establish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate describes the scope of the peacekeeping operation. Typically, it determines the size and type of force each participating nation will contribute. It also specifies the terms or conditions the host nation intends to impose on the presence of the force or mission, and it specifies a clear statement of the functions the peacekeeping force is to perform.

2) The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations. It collects information through means such as observation posts, patrols, and aerial reconnaissance.

Historical Perspective

On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. The US responded immediately. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe dropped relief supplies over the Iraqi border. A joint team, comprised primarily of more than 6,000 soldiers from units which had just participated in Operation Desert Storm, eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in support of Operation Provide Comfort.

During the next four months, Army forces demonstrated agility, versatility. and deployability during operations other than war. Missions included providing supplies to refugee camps, construction, medical assistance, refugee control, PSYOP, and CA. Operation Provide Comfort was a joint and combined operation executed with no formal agreements between participating agencies and countries. It exhibited the unity of effort essential to operations of this nature.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. These operations may involve US citizens whose lives are in danger but could include selected host nation citizens or third country nationals. NEOs occur in a peaceful, orderly fashion or may require force. Army forces may conduct NEOs under the combatant commander in the environments of conflict or war.

1) Capabilities.

a) Army forces possess the personnel as well as the range of expertise and support equipment required to successfully execute any conceivable NEO mission. Army forces, supported by USAF strategic airlift or US Navy sealift, form the fastest and most flexible NEO team available in the Department of Defense.

b) The worldwide airfield infrastructure supports insertion of forces by airland or air drop via USAF strategic airlift to all major population centers as well as to all of the earth's land surface. Even in austere, underdeveloped areas such as Africa, all capitol cities have airfields capable of landing C-130s and C-141s; most can land C-17s and C-5s. There are more than 2,800 USAF suitable airfields worldwide. Additionally, C-130s are capable of landing on dirt and grass landing strips, dirt and hardball roads, and open fields.

c) Army rotary wing aircraft can self-deploy or can be forward deployed in C-17, C141, or C-5 aircraft, to intermediate or forward staging areas. Forces can be projected from staging areas into remote areas accessible only by rotary wing aircraft.

d) Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams train daily in every combatant theater with foreign nationals. Their unique language, cultural and military expertise makes them the most flexible and highly qualified force of choice for NEO missions. Supported by Army SOF and USAF SOF fixed and rotary wing aircraft, they can respond immediately and move rapidly to extremely remote areas to communicate with indigenous personnel and organize and execute an expeditious evacuation of American citizens and

selected third country nationals.

2) Limitations. Although there are no physical limitations to successful Army execution of NEO missions, there are limiting factors that affect all services. These include limited resources/force structure for multiple, competing missions and sovereignty issues.

a) Concurrent, full involvement in two major regional conflicts (MRCs) as well as one or more military operations other than war (MOOTW), would limit the capability of all services - US Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps - to support a large scale NEO mission. In that context, forces would be fully committed and might not be immediately available to support a NEO mission.

b) Sovereignty issues concerning whether a country will permit US overflight or other operations within its land borders or sovereign waters exist as political limitations only. Although these issues do not effect the *capability* of the services - US Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps - to conduct operations, they could impose limitations on the National Command Authority that would affect missions assigned. "Sovereignty" is not an Army issue, but a political issue potentially affecting all services equally.

3) Army forces possess the full range of capabilities to support NEOs in every combatant theater worldwide. There are no physical limitations that preclude Army participation in a NEO mission. There are limiting factors that affect not just the Army but all services. Army forces have supported NEOs in the past; we support them on a routine, continuing basis; and we remain prepared to support them in the future.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement options are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities. Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement, therefore, cannot maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared to apply elements of combat power to restore order, to separate warring factions, and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline.

i. Posturing for Crisis Response. One of the most fundamental Army contributions to Overseas Presence is the capability provided by forward stationed and forward deployed soldiers to provide a rapid and easily tailorable crisis response force. The capability to respond to regional crises, be they warfighting or OOTW, is one of the key demands of our National Military Strategy (NMS). The regional contingencies we may face are many and varied. US forces must be prepared for differences in terrain, climate, and the nature of the threat, as well as for differing levels of support from host nations or other allies. Army overseas presence forces are organized and equipped for a full range of crises that require sustained land operations or presence. Army overseas presence forces offer the National Command Authorities (NCA) a menu of forces with unique capabilities which complement those of other services and from which the NCA may tailor a crisis response force particularly well suited for the particular crisis at hand. Depending on the actual situation, Army overseas presence forces may serve as the enabling force by initially establishing a secure lodgment, or they may follow other contingency/expeditionary forces to expand a lodgment and transition into a sustained land operation. Army overseas presence forces include airborne, air assault, light infantry, and heavy armor/mechanized forces.

1) Airborne Forces are capable of responding to a crisis within hours to show US resolve or stabilize an escalating situation. These forces are organized as combined arms of light infantry, field artillery, and light armor and, when necessary, possess the capability to be air dropped for forcible entry without the support of friendly infrastructure. The primary deployment means of airborne forces is by strategic airlift.

2) Air Assault Forces are tailored specifically to hit hard and fast. Organic helicopter lift assets allow rapid mobility over all terrain to achieve strategic and tactical advantage in areas where ground infrastructure and road networks are limited or where rapid movement across or behind the battlefield can strike a decisive blow. Air assault forces can be either airlifted to the crisis area, deployed by a combination of airlift and sealift, or in some circumstances, self-deploy.

3) Light Infantry Forces are specifically organized for rapid deployment by strategic airlift. They provide a flexible and sustainable force for jungle, urban, and mountain operations where maneuverability/mobility is restricted or where terrain favors dismounted infantry position defense or economy of force operations.

4) Heavy Forces (armor and mechanized divisions) are capable of defeating the full range of enemy capabilities, including heavy armored forces. These forces provide the capability for fire and maneuver during high tempo maneuver warfare. Although a limited number of heavy forces could be airlifted to a crisis area, these forces are normally deployed by sealift. The Congressionally-mandated Mobility Requirements Study confirmed the requirement for Army heavy divisions to be deployed by a mixture of fast sealift ships, Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) ships, and slower sealift ships. A forward positioned afloat brigade-set of equipment and supplies creates the capability of closing a heavy brigade to a theater within 14 days, followed by 2 heavy divisions within 30 days. The afloat brigade package of equipment and supplies also provides a unique theater-level combat service support capability designed to provide sustainment to all services in their operations ashore.

5) The nature of Army employment dictates its structure; it requires the Army to have fully mobile maneuver formations of integrated armor, infantry, and attack aviation capabilities from battalion to corps (required to defeat enemy armored forces in modern mechanized warfare); further, the maneuver formations must be effectively combined with fire support, intelligence, air defense, engineer, logistics, communications, and command and control systems to create a force capable of decisive victory on the battlefield. The requirement for "prompt" operations and the need to effectively operate in a variety of terrain/conditions against a range of potential enemy threats, supports the need for each type of Army force -- airborne, air assault, light infantry, and armor/mechanized infantry.

6) Duplication of capabilities with other Services. While it is true that both the Army and Marine Corps forces possess the ability to respond to crises with land forces as outlined in DOD Directive 5100.1, their unique capabilities complement rather than duplicate each other. The Army's primary responsibility is "To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas." The Marine Corps' primary responsibility is "To maintain the Marine Corps, which shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advance naval bases and for the conduct of land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Marine Expeditionary Forces are particularly capable for crises requiring forcible entry by amphibious assault. The intended, though limited, overlap of

responsibilities between the Army and the Marine Corps provides alternatives for force use during a crisis to the NCA. Though similar in some respects, neither force is configured or trained to successfully execute the other's mission. The range of complementary capabilities provided by the Army contingency force and the Marine expeditionary force enables the attainment of the objectives of the National Military Strategy.

7) One of the essential elements of our national military strategy is to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win -- the concept of applying force to terminate conflicts swiftly, decisively, and with a minimum loss of life. The Army is unique in its ability to project combat power across a wide range of capabilities in force tailored packages, either from CONUS or from overseas, to achieve overwhelmingly decisive combat power. Periodic use of these forces through exercises also contributes to the NMS foundations by reaffirming the US commitment to its allies and its willingness to counter potential aggression.

8) The effectiveness of Army forces as both a strategic deterrent and a warfighting capability is significantly enhanced by the time-tested approach of functioning through forward presence to preposition forces and equipment, both ashore and afloat, in areas where potential conflict threatens national interests. The Army has over 125,000 personnel forward deployed, including nearly 30% of its total active fighting force, and an additional 20,000 to 35,000 troops spread over 80 to 110 nations routinely supporting the full range of MOOTW, to include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian and nation assistance, and other crisis response operations, plus routinely participating in the joint and combined exercises critical to maintaining effective alliances.

Historical Perspective

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm are instructive in the deployment/employment of crisis response forces. Initially, the Army's 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division was inserted to secure lodgments at the ports of Dammam and Al Jubail. These forces were followed by the lead elements of the Army's 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Air Assault Division of the 18th Airborne Corps at Dammam and by Marine Maritime Prepositioning Forces at Al Jubail, which were heavier and possessed a greater capacity to sustain the growing joint force. As more Army heavy forces and logistics infrastructure came into theater, the CINC's options for defensive and offensive operations were expanded, plus the Army commenced theater wide common logistics support. Meanwhile, Marine amphibious forces remained at sea compounding the enemy's dilemma.

In just the last 10 years, crises in Grenada, Panama, Kuwait (twice), Somalia, Ruwanda, and Haiti have required the NCA to actively employ every capability represented in the Army's overseas presence force. Today, with the expansion of Army prepositioned equipment and supplies, both ashore and afloat, the complementary capabilities of the Services have been enhanced, enabling a faster, stronger US response to challenges anywhere in the world. There is every reason to believe that crises will arise in the foreseeable future that will once again require the rapid response, flexibility, and unique capabilities of these forces to meet the needs of US national interests.

OVERSEAS PRESENCE IN ACTION: THE ARMY

The following sets of tables reflect current Army contributions to the execution of overseas presence by geographical theater.

TABLE 1
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: EUCOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
A. Protect the security and property of US citizens	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined Exercises	USAREUR HQS, V Corps (with Corps troops, Two Div (-), TAACOM, ADA Bde., Theater ADA Command, POMCUS, AWR-2 (Italy), ATLANTIC RESOLVE
B. Promote regional security, stability, and economic well-being	Permanently stationed forces Periodic / rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Same list as above plus Rwanda Marshall Center activities with FSU nations. Provide Comfort ABLE SENTRY in FYROM MEDFLAG (Botswana) Provide Promise (Zagreb) Provide Hope (Kazakhstan) National Assistance (Nigeria)
C. Preserve US NATO leadership	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same list as A above plus Marshall Center activities with nations. FSU, ATLANTIC RESOLVE REPLAY Exercise
D. Promote security of Israel	Periodic/rotational deployments Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Peacekeeping	MFO Battalion (non-USAREUR) Exercise Wing Crusader (SOF)
E. Promote Arab-Israeli peace	Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as D.
F. Prevent domination of region by a single nation.	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as B.

TABLE 1 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: EUCOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
G. Support Central/East European democratic reform	Combined Exercises Mil to Mil Contacts Security Assistance Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	PEACEKEEPER Exercise with Russia, Marshall Center activities COOPERATIVE BRIDGE PFP Exercise Silver Eagle (Poland) Exercise, Provide Hope (Kazakhstan)
H. Promote economic liberalization and free trade	Mil to Mil Contacts Security Assistance	Marshall Center activities with FSU countries
I. Implement Arms agreements	Mil to Mil Contacts Nation Assistance	Same as H.
J. Maintain access to regional facilities	Permanently Stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A.
K. Deter state sponsored terrorism	Periodic/rotational Deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation Assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Cyprus Air Bridge Provide Comfort Provide Promise Provide Hope IV (Kazakhstan)
L. Contain religious and ethnic instability and conflict or enforce UN sanctions	Periodic/Rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as K plus ABLE SENTRY (FYSOM) Marshall Center activities
M. Promote NATO "out of area" conflict resolution	Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Peacekeeping	Arctic Express (Norway-AMF(L)) Multinational Corps exercises ATLANTIC RESOLVE (CAX)
N. Provide humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	Provide Comfort Provide Promise Provide Hope IV
O. Reassure Russia against external threats to reform		Marshall Center activities with FSU nations PEACEKEEPER Exercise
P. Ensure access to markets and resources	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A.
Q. Prevent spread of WMD and their associated technologies	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A. SALT inspection teams

TABLE 2
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: CENTCOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
A. Protect the security and property of US citizens	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined Exercises	USAREUR HQS, V Corps (with Corps troops, Two Div (-), TAACOM, ADA Bde., Theater ADA Command, POMCUS, AWR-2 (Italy), ATLANTIC RESOLVE
B. Promote regional security, stability, and economic well-being	Permanently stationed forces Periodic / rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Same list as above plus Rwanda Marshall Center activities with FSU nations. Provide Comfort ABLE SENTRY in FYROM MEDFLAG (Botswana) Provide Promise (Zagreb) Provide Hope (Kazakhstan) National Assistance (Nigeria)
C. Preserve US NATO leadership	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same list as A above plus Marshall Center activities with nations. FSU, ATLANTIC RESOLVE REPLAY Exercise
D. Promote security of Israel	Periodic/rotational deployments Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Peacekeeping	MFO Battalion (non-USAREUR) Exercise Wing Crusader (SOF)
E. Promote Arab-Israeli peace	Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as D.
F. Prevent domination of region by a single nation.	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security Assistance Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as B.
G. Support Central/East European democratic reform	Combined Exercises Mil to Mil Contacts Security Assistance Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	PEACEKEEPER Exercise with Russia, Marshall Center activities COOPERATIVE BRIDGE PFP Exercise Silver Eagle (Poland) Exercise, Provide Hope (Kazakhstan)
H. Promote economic liberalization and free trade	Mil to Mil Contacts Security Assistance	Marshall Center activities with FSU countries

TABLE 2 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: CENTCOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
I. Implement Arms agreements	Mil to Mil Contacts Nation Assistance	Same as H.
J. Maintain access to regional facilities	Permanently Stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A.
K. Deter state sponsored terrorism	Periodic/rotational Deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation Assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Cyprus Air Bridge Provide Comfort Provide Promise Provide Hope IV (Kazakhstan)
L. Contain religious and ethnic instability and conflict or enforce UN sanctions	Periodic/Rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	Same as K plus ABLE SENTRY (FYSOM) Marshall Center activities
M. Promote NATO "out of area" conflict resolution	Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Peacekeeping	Arctic Express (Norway-AMF(L)) Multinational Corps exercises ATLANTIC RESOLVE (CAX)
N. Provide humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	Provide Comfort Provide Promise Provide Hope IV
O. Reassure Russia against external threats to reform		Marshall Center activities with FSU nations PEACEKEEPER Exercise
P. Ensure access to markets and resources	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A.
Q. Prevent spread of WMD and their associated technologies	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A. SALT inspection teams

TABLE 3
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: SOUTHCOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
A. Maintain access to Panama Canal	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Regional alliances	US Army, South HQs, infantry battalion, aviation battalion, MP command Deployments for Training (DFTs)
B. Impede the flow of illegal drugs into the United States	Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments	Deployments for Training (DFTs) Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) Detection & monitoring Intelligence sharing, FUERZAS UNIDAS
C. Promote democratization and human rights within the region and support fragile democracies	Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Periodic/rotational deployments Nation assistance Security assistance	US Army, South Hs, engineer battalion, med detachment, Subject matter expert exchanges, Medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETES)Veterinarian readiness training exercises (VETRETES)
D. Promote coalition building between and among countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR and the United States	Mil to Mil contacts Combined exercises Security assistance Nation assistance	School of the Americas Service COOP programs, Professional exchanges, Deployments for Training (DFTs) Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) FUERTES CAMINOS
E. Protect U.S. citizens and property	Combined exercises Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments	Same as A.

TABLE 4
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: USACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
A. Promote and protect US regional interests and participate in collective security agreements.	Permanently stationed forces Combined Exercises	XVIII Corps & III Corps with 3 Heavy Divisions, 1 Airborne Division, 1 Air Assault Division 1 Light Infantry Division, 1 Cavalry Regiment (heavy) 1 Cavalry Regiment (light)
B. Promote regional security, stability, and economic well-being	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Security Assistance Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Peacekeeping Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance	Same list above plus BRIGHT STAR, JTF Bravo, Honduras PROMOTE LIBERTY, Haiti JTF-6, Counterdrug, opns, ATLANTIC RESOLVE, ULTIMATE RESOLVE 95, FUERTES CAMINOS, ARCTIC EXPRESS
C. Preserve US global leadership	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Pre-positioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same list as B above plus FORSCOM elements are players in every major overseas exercise. RESTORE HOPE in Somalia (10th ID)
D. Preserve existing security agreements	Periodic/rotational deployments Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Peacekeeping	MFO Mission conducted by 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions rotate units through Sinai. VIGILANT WARRIOR deployments to support Kuwait.
E. Prevent domination of region by a single nation.	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Security Assistance Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Peacekeeping Nation Assistance Humanitarian Assistance	JTF Bravo, Joint/combined Engineer operations. Projects include building schools, clinics JTF-6 counterdrug operations interface with regional security forces. Multinational Force in Haiti to RESTORE DEMOCRACY.
F. Support Regional Democratic Reform	Combined exercises Mil to Mil Contacts	Mil-to-Mil contacts fostered through joint training in Caribbean and support for Cuban and Haitian refugee camps in GITMO and Panama.
G. Promote economic liberalization and free trade	Mil to Mil Contacts Security Assistance	Trained UNPROFOR Caribbean Bn in Roosevelt Roads to support Haitian Democracy. This will reinforce US position in Caribbean basin.
H. Maintain access to regional facilities	Permanently Stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts	Same as A.

TABLE 4 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: USACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
I. Counterdrug and Terrorism	Periodic/rotational Deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation Assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	JTF-6 works with national military and security forces in every way possible to counter drug trafficking. JTF Bravo in Honduras. PROMOTE LIBERTY in Haiti and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
J. Provide humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	JTF Bravo in Honduras

TABLE 5
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: PACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
A. Maintain stability on Korean Peninsula with goal of peaceful unification	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Prepositioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	USARPAC/EUSA/USARJ/ USARAKHQs, I Corps HQs, Two Divs, Sep Inf Bde, Two TAACOMs, Theater SOF Cmd, TEAM SPIRIT, AWR-4 and AWR-3, FOAL EAGLE, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, JUSMAG-K
B. Support peaceful resolution of territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands	Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Combined exercises	Logistics, medical, engineer support (Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan), JTF FULL ACCOUNTING
C. Support democratic and economic reforms	Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	COBRA GOLD (Thailand), BALIKATAN (Philippines), KEEN EDGE (Japan), ULCHI FOCUS LENS AND FOAL EAGLE (Korea), TIGER BALM (Singapore), UNMIC (Cambodia), SEA ANGEL (Bangladesh)
D. Promote democratic values and human rights throughout the region by expanding our alliances and coalitions	Humanitarian assistance Mil to Mil contacts Combined exercises Security assistance Nation assistance Peacekeeping Periodic/rotational deployments	Same as C. FREQUENT STORM (SOF) TANDEM THRUST (Guam, Tinian), ARCTIC SAREX (Canada), TEMPEST EXPRESS (PACOM AOR), YAMA SAKURA 27, ORIENT SHIELD, NORTH WIND (Japan), KANGAROO (Australia)
E. Sustain US engagement as a regional balancer to preclude the emergence of a regional hegemon	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Prepositioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Same as A, D.
F. Discourage regional military rivalries/arms races	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Prepositioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance	Same as C.

TABLE 5 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: PACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
G. Promote new, and existing multilateral security arrangements	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Prepositioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance	Same as D.
H. Improve relations with the PRC to influence further economic reform and democratization, engage in substantive dialog on global and regional security issues	Mil to Mil contacts Nation assistance Security assistance	PROVIDE REFUGE (Kwajalein, China), Civic Action Teams (SOF)
I. Maintain the international trading system	Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance	International Logistics Conferences, Civic Action Teams, Pacific Management Seminar (PAMS)
J. Protect American citizens and property of US citizens	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises	Same as A.
K. Honor treaty commitments	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Nation assistance Security assistance Prepositioned equipment Peacekeeping Mil to Mil contacts Humanitarian assistance	Same as A, D.
L. Maintain an enhanced global security partnership with Japan across the spectrum of economic, political, and security issues	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Nation assistance Security assistance Prepositioned equipment Peacekeeping Mil to Mil contacts Humanitarian assistance	Same as A, D.
M. Expand access to military and other support facilities in Southeast Asia as a foundation of security engagement in the region	Periodic/rotational deployments Prepositioned equipment Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance	COBRA GOLD (Thailand), BALIKATAN (Philippines), TIGER BALM (Singapore), TEMPEST EXPRESS (PACOM AOR), JTF FULL ACCOUNTING (Vietnam), AWR-3

TABLE 5 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: PACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
N. Demonstrate USG resolve to maintain a regional strategic deterrent posture	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Peacekeeping	Same as A, B, and D.
0. Prevent PRC-Taiwan conflict	Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Peacekeeping	Same as B, H
P. Successfully resolve North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation issues and deter potential North Korean aggression	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Prepositioned equipment Nation assistance	Same as A IAEA site inspections
Q. Prevent spread of WMD and their associated technologies and delivery systems	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance	Same as A, B, C and D IAEA site inspections
R. Increase focus on disrupting and dismantling the drug trade, thereby reducing its impact on U.S. security requirements and increasing regional security	Permanently stationed forces Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance	Same as D USARPAC's Engaged Relations Program (ERP), SOF/DEA team visits, and Civic Action Teams
S. Complete the fullest possible accounting for American POWs and MIAs lost in Southeast Asia	Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance	FULL ACCOUNTING
T. Deter state sponsored terrorism and civil disturbances	Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Security assistance Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Same as C, D

TABLE 5 (continued)
U.S. INTERESTS AND ARMY OVERSEAS PRESENCE CONTRIBUTIONS: PACOM

Political Interests	Army Contributions	Army Activities
U. Contain religious and ethnic instability and conflict or enforce UN sanctions	Periodic/rotational deployments Combined exercises Mil to Mil contacts Nation assistance Humanitarian assistance Peacekeeping	Same as B, C, D
V. Provide humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian assistance	Same as H OPERATION SEA ANGEL (Bangladesh), INIKI RESPONSE (Hawaii), EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY (Guam)

CONCLUSION.

The Army, as the nation's strategic force for prompt and sustained land combat, remains the cornerstone of effective overseas presence. Overseas presence is multi-dimensional and executed by multiple, complementary means including not only forward stationed forces and prepositioned equipment, but also military-to-military contact, security and humanitarian assistance, combined exercises, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement and intervention operations. Overseas presence takes the form of permanently stationed forces and forces temporarily deployed, some on a regular, rotational basis. US forces overseas provide the most visible proof of our commitment to defend our interests and our friends and allies worldwide. The Army, as the primary land element of US military power in support of all aspects of overseas presence, plays a central role in our national capability for shaping the international security environment. The foundation of our Nation's overseas presence remains a trained soldier on the ground, promoting stability and thwarting aggression wherever deployed.

Approved by:
MG Ellerson

DFI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

December 20, 1994

Subject: Interview with General Gordon R. Sullivan

General Sullivan is the Army Chief of Staff.

General Sullivan confirmed that the demand for Army resources in presence and other types of political/military missions has increased significantly in the past few years. He estimated that such uses of Army resources had grown 300 percent since the end of the Cold War. Illustratively, he noted that in August the Army had a force of at least five soldiers in 105 different nations. On average, he would guess that the Army deployed at least 20,000 soldiers in 70 to 80 countries on these misssions (excluding sites of permanent presence and attaches). Much of these types of operations were never noted in the media, such as training detachments and medical teams.

He said that the choice between maritime and ground-based forces depended upon the strategic concept relevant to the particular target of the presence mission. In some cases, as in Korea and Europe, a permanent presence on the ground was essential; in others, only an intermittent presence was necessary. For example, when the Egyptians and Israelis made peace, they wanted real American paratroopers in the MFO, not just destroyers in the Red Sea. On the other hand, destroyers transiting the Dardanelles from time to time is enough presence in the Aegean-Black Sea. Naval presence can only be effective up to a limit because it is never clear whether the card will be played. Over the horizon is over the horizon.

He noted the importance of prepositioned equipment to make large-scale Army presence missions possible. He said that prepo stocks in Diego Garcia alone were used three times in the last six months, including their movement to Mombassa in support of the Rwanda operation (although they did not have to be taken off the ships).

General Sullivan said that presence and other political/military operations "do not have to detract from readiness." He thought that "training schedules could be worked in." He noted, however, that as the Army becomes smaller, it will take greater initiative to figure out how to accomodate presence requirements. He noted the current experiment of an active/voluntary-reserve unit to support the Sinai deployment, for example, as a possible fore-runner of a deployment on the Golan in support of Israel-Syria peace. It was uncertain, he said, whether people would be found to volunteer for the operation.

In terms of the impact of presence on readiness, he said that the real issue was money. The higher op tempos required by these missions, as well as transportation costs, were taken from Army operating accounts and eventually from training accounts. This is what caused the recent problem with the three divisions, he said.

General Sullivan spoke favorably of the political consequences of meetings between high level military officials. He suggested that such visits were particularly important in countries in which the military played key roles in national politics. He noted that he had made 42 visits to foreign nations over the 3 1/2 years that he had been Chief. Some of these were related to equipment transfer or training programs, but others served strictly political purposes in terms of improving US relations with the receiving nation. He spoke particularly of the benefits of his exchanges with the Mexican Army chief of staff, who also served as Minister of Defense. He saw positive changes in this individuals attitudes toward military/civilian relations and the role of the press as a result of these exchanges. He also noted exchanges with the Brazilians as being particularly positive.

General Sullivan has also spent considerable time building relations with Russian counterparts. He noted that he and his wife had accompanied General Semyonov on a tour of the US and made a reciprocal visit to Russia. These led to the recent joint peacekeeping exercise in Russia and to additional planned joint exercises. General Sullivan noted that relations with the Russian military were problematical because of broader political issues between the two countries, but that the military to military dialogue was important. He said that the exchanges between US and Soviet/Russian armed forces since the mid-80s had resulted in a better understanding in Russia of the US and a greater appreciation for US strengths.

He said that throughout the world the US is now recognized as the premier military force, army as well as air force and navy, and that many countries patterned themselves after us. This was particularly important, he thought, in Eastern Europe. He noted several examples of such behavior, including NCO courses copied from the American model in Slovenia and Croatia, and the Rumanians using 100-5 as the basis for their doctrine.

He suggested that "presence" might be equated with "present for duty in the minds of the target." Visits and other kinds of exchanges, he said, were useful to teach these countries how armies operate in democracies and how forces behave in peacekeeping operations. He also noted that visits of high level military officials also sometimes permitted US diplomats to see foreign military officials that might not otherwise be permitted to meet. He mentioned a recent visit to Chile and the appearance of Gen. Pinochet at the US DCM's reception as an example of this.

Gen Sullivan also referred favorably to US Army/NG exercises in Central America. He noted that these operations had not only

improved the Central American infrastructure for possible military operations, but had "opened up whole areas of the region for economic development." In addition, while he was careful to note that one could not argue cause and effect, he said that it was interesting that Central American militaries were now playing a peaceful and democratic role.

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THE RETIRED OFFICER MAGAZINE November 1994 Pg. 54

STRATEGY FOR A NEW ERA

The enduring capabilities of the Marines Corps make it a certain force in an uncertain world.

By Gen C.E. Mundy Jr.,
U.S. Marine Corps Commandant

Fifty years ago this month, Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen were setting the stage for the final act of World War II in the Pacific. Having liberated Guam in the summer of 1944—at a cost of 7,000 Marines and 900 soldiers—U.S. forces prepared the next punch. Adm Chester Nimitz was organizing his sea-based forces for an early 1945 assault on the volcanic citadel of Iwo Jima. The harsh demands of island warfare tested human endurance but validated the indispensability of the combined-arms team concept of America's Marines.

Those immense joint combat operations of a half century ago were born of necessity. America learned several lessons from World War II. Perhaps the most important lesson was that the individual, unique capabilities of the services were irresistibly powerful when combined in a cooperative team effort. Today, in the aftermath of the 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) Defense Reorganization Act and in a climate of declining budgets, the four services working closer together in peace than at any time of ned conflict.

When former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Colin Powell looked at the capabilities of the services in his congressionally mandated "1993 Roles and Missions Report," he concluded that, on the whole, we had a fairly well-balanced "family" of complementary capabilities. Obviously, there was some overlap, but these minimum redundancies closed gaps in capabilities, ensured a desirable "seamlessness," and reduced risk to acceptable levels as our joint family of military "tools" worked together to meet the mission requirements of regional commanders in chief.

Since the "Roles and Missions Report," a number of other reports have taken on these same issues. The Department of Defense (DoD), the base force, the "Bottom Up Review," and the now-sitting Roles and Missions Commission are all examining defense organization. This process isn't limited just to the DoD. Within the Department of the Navy, the reports "From the Sea" and "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" both represent significant attempts by the naval services to more closely align our capabilities with the demands of strategy. A common theme of all these reports has been the distinction between complementary, reinforcing overlap, which prevents dangerous capability gaps in our defense structure, and needless duplication of functions.

The roles and missions debate is not about interservice rivalry and parochialism; instead, it is about shaping the right balance of interservice capabilities that our ition needs. It is about balancing the projected threats against a prudent, creative application of scarce resources. It is not a zero-sum game, in which one service must lose for another to win, because the nation is winning through the evolution of a better, more appropriate joint force structure for this era of regional tensions.

The roles and missions debate is really misnamed. "Roles" are actually the broad and enduring purposes for which the services were established by Congress. Functions are the more specific responsibilities, assigned to a service through executive action, that permit the service to successfully fulfill its legally established role. In turn, each of the military departments and services, coordinating with the others and with the unified and specified commands, is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. That is, the services are responsible for developing the "capabilities" to fulfill specific combatant functions and for administering and supporting such forces. Commanders of the unified and specified commands, using the forces and capabilities assigned to them, are responsible to the president and secretary of defense for accomplishing the military "missions" assigned to them. Thus we have roles, capabilities, and missions. The services provide forces and capabilities to the war-fighting commanders in chief, who in turn accomplish their assigned missions.

Therefore, unless the very existence of a particular service is an issue, neither roles nor missions appear to be a very useful focus, nor does the force structure used by the services to create capabilities necessary to provide the functions. The debate must focus on functions and capabilities. To do that, we must first ensure an under-

ing of just what is required; that is, to see what capabilities are needed, to see where they are located, and then to determine if they are enough, too much, or too little.

What is being discovered is that our new strategy requires forces that possess robust sustainability, a sound combined-arms organization that can be precisely measured to the diplomatic or military nuances of the situation. What we are seeing, in my view, is an amphibious renaissance. The end of the 20th century truly marks a high-water mark in the use of flexible, capable, forward-operating forces, and a quick look around shows that the renaissance is occurring the world over. From Europe and NATO to the Pacific, nations are carefully reviewing the new strategic environment, balancing the budgetary need for smaller forces against emerging operational requirements for forces with broad utility. They are discovering, again, that amphibious forces are ideally suited to post-Cold War contingencies, and they applying the resources to ntain and, in many cases, xpand them.

That is why Marines are confident participants in the deliberations of the recently established Roles and Missions Commission. The enduring capabilities of Navy-Marine amphibious forces appeal to the war-fighting commanders in chief who require, ever more frequently, a force-in-readiness that can do much more than fight. They need forces that can provide assistance at any time, anywhere, across a bewildering spectrum of engagement. A classic example of this flexibility is the performance of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)—MEU (SOC)—and Amphibious Squadron 1, a balanced sea-based air-ground-logistics team of 2,000 Marines built around a battalion landing team, a composite helicopter-attack jet squadron, and a logistics element forward-deployed in Navy amphibious assault shipping.

Deployed in early 1994 for normal forward-operating missions, by mid-April the amphibious ready group (ARG) and the MEU (SOC) found themselves conducting multiple operations and were spread from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where Marines and the *USS ederick* were participating in an exercise; to Mogadishu, Somalia, where more Marines, seven aircraft, and two amphibious platforms served as a "covering force" for United Nations forces; to Mombasa, Kenya, where the MEU headquarters monitored operations; and, finally, to Bujumbura, Burundi, where 330 Marines, seven aircraft, and an MEU (SOC) forward headquarters from the *USS Peleliu* prepared to evacuate Americans from Rwanda if required. Similar operations if conducted in the United States would stretch from Washington, D.C., to Sacramento, California.

These forces had no logistic or political footprint ashore, but they were active participants in U.S. foreign policy literally across the entire continent of Africa. The key to their effectiveness was the fact that they were supplied from sea bases, stepping lightly on already over-stretched host-nation infrastructure. Amphibious ships and 2,000 Marines spanned the face of a continent, deterring, assisting, and watching. Flexibility like this is unique to the amphibious sea-air-ground-logistics team. What the ARG/MEU (SOC) did off the Horn of Africa continues the Marine tradition. We have always fought in "every clime and place," and there is reason for it. Marines, with their Navy partners, can be carefully measured to the precise diplomatic nuance required by any situation.

These attributes are recognized in the Department of the Navy's white paper "From the Sea," the Navy-Marine Corps' strategic concept for our current era of troubled peace. Rather than revolutionary, the concept is an evolutionary process. The naval services are now reemphasizing amphibious forces, mine warfare forces, and other capabilities that received lesser priority during the long Cold War. "From the Sea" stresses what naval forces can do ashore—by using our control of the oceans and by basing and operating our forces from sea bases rather than relying on a shrinking number of overseas land bases.

Because of our ability to operate from the sea, from amphibious and tactical aircraft platforms that are unencumbered by basing requests or overflight problems, we can conduct subtle and controlled engagement across the broad spectrum of diplomatic and military interaction. Because of this, Marines can come ashore rapidly for humanitarian purposes, as we did in Bangladesh, India, northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, to aid countless millions of threatened peoples on the brink of death. Also, when needed, we can move into rapidly planned and executed combat operations.

This is a critical point for defense analysts who think only in terms of war fighting. In fact, our nation fights

major wars about every 20 years, but we operate small, crisis-response, war-avoidance forces every day. Sailors and Marines are out at sea, in Navy ships, like the 11th MEU (SOC), where they are combat-ready at a moment's notice. Preparation for war must not result in a diminution of our abilities to do crisis-response and war-avoidance operations like those that took place in Rwanda, off Haiti, or Cuba this year; or in Bangladesh, Liberia, Somalia, Kuwait, the Philippines, and Haiti in years past. As an example, in 1991, Marines were involved in the evacuation of nearly 20,000 citizens and diplomats, assisted 2 million refugees, and deployed 90,000 Marines to combat. We retain that kind of capability and operational flexibility.

While Marines still view a forward-operating presence as the single greatest deterrent to conflict, we must, and do, prepare for higher intensity maneuver operations—the heart of "From the Sea." Maneuver operations are either a crisis-response or war-fighting style that emphasizes our strengths: the synchronized use of rapid maneuver and quick decision-making built on the inherent flexibility of sea basing. The rapid response to crisis or the seizure or securing of ports and airfields by forward-operating Marines can enable the entry of larger Marine, Army, and Air Force elements, as necessary.

The Marine Corps that continues to meet these unique requirements is smaller than at any time since 1950, at the eve of the Korean War. Today, we're about 174,000, down from a Desert Storm high of 196,000. This reduction of 22,000 Marines comes from a force with a two-to-one "tooth-to-tail" ratio; meaning that without much of a "tail," our cuts have come almost entirely from teeth—our operating forces. The remainder are, today, at the highest rate of peacetime operations in history.

This, then, is our future as I see it: a golden age for naval forces, especially amphibious forces, an era where Marines are going to be used more and more frequently for diverse and challenging tasks—from major regional contingencies to peacekeeping, to deterrence, to everything in between. The Marine Corps will continue to provide what some have termed the most general purpose of the general purpose forces, with strategic agility, on-scene presence, self-sustaining capability, and high flexibility for a variety of crisis-response demands. And when the time comes to fight, as Marines have in every major conflict in which our nation has ever been involved, Marines will fight—and win. During the early days of the Korean War, a British military observer sent this dispatch:

The situation is critical and Miryang may be lost. The enemy has driven a division-sized salient across the Naktong. More will cross tonight. If Miryang is lost ... we will be faced with a withdrawal from Korea. I am heartened that the Marine brigade will move against the Naktong Salient tomorrow. They are faced with impossible odds, and I have no valid reason to substantiate it, but I have the feeling they will halt the enemy. These Marines have a swagger, confidence, and hardness. ... Upon this line of reasoning, I cling to the hope of victory.

—T.R. Fehrenback, *This Kind of War*

The next morning, the Marine brigade and a regiment and its supporting aircraft group attacked. A day later, 4,000 North Koreans lay dead, 34 artillery pieces were captured, and the North Korean division was annihilated. The British observer was vindicated.

Today the structure of the Marine Corps has been reduced; we have fewer resources to call upon, but we're confident that we have the vision to be a key element of this and future national military strategies. While the world has changed from that November of 50 years ago when American planners put together the final act of World War II and from that November five years ago when the Berlin Wall came down, the usefulness of Marines in peace and war endures. The Marine Corps will continue to carry out the intent of the 82nd Congress: "to be most ready when the nation generally is least ready," to do more with less, and to do it well, as it has for the past 219 years. The capabilities the Corps provides are enduring. It is a certain force in an uncertain world.

DEFENSE WEEK
Oct. 24, 1994
Pg. 6

DOD Outlines Strategy, Priorities For Shifting R&D Program Missions

BY MARK CRAWFORD

The Department of Defense is restructuring its science and technology agenda in response to a climate of shrinking budget resources and a reduced commitment to research and development.

To deal with the "demands of the Post Cold War era," said Anita Jones, the director of Defense Research and Engineering at DOD, the department is creating a new blueprint for its science and technology programs. Fundamentally, it emphasizes efficiency in research to lower costs, and focuses on rapid development and delivery of innovations to the armed forces.

Affordability in defense technologies will be a requirement driving R&D programs, according to Jones, who noted that "the department for the first time is proactively developing technology that has the potential to be the basis for both military and commercial products."

The importance of science and technology to DOD is not diminished, stressed Jones, but it will be pursued in a broader context than in the past. "Through technology, the military can develop less costly materials, optimize manufacturing processes, and improve methods of maintenance," said Jones in a statement accompanying the release of its *Defense Science & Technology Strategy* and its *Defense Technology Plan*.

Toward this end DOD is planning some sweeping changes in the size and structure of its research estab-

PRES [14]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

3 Oct 94

Dear Dr White,

I appreciated the opportunity to brief you and the commission during our 20 September 1994 presentation on my vision of Navy's enduring role and its future. I believe it is worthwhile to reemphasize two issues critical to the roles and missions discussion.

In addition to those items proposed on Navy/Marine Corps Service Day, I recommend the commission assign the following functions to forward deployed naval forces:

- Air and sea superiority in support of interventions abroad.

- Projection of air and ground power in the initial phases of a regional crisis.

While Secretary Dalton discussed these issues in some detail in his 1 September 1994 letter to you, I think Dr. Blechman's *Key West Revisited: Roles and Missions of the U. S. Armed Forces in the Twenty-first Century* presents additional persuasive arguments to assign air/sea superiority and air/ground power projection as Navy functions.

In part, Blechman writes, "Achieving and maintaining total dominance of the sea margin adjacent to points of intervention abroad, and of the airspace above it, is a prerequisite for any sea-based effort to protect U. S. interests overseas." He continues, "Sea-based forces can be made ready for intervention, and can be kept ready in international waters for a substantial period of time as a crisis unfolds...The use of sea-based forces, in other words, preserves the greatest flexibility for U. S. decision-makers..." I find this logic compelling.

Recognizing air/sea superiority and air/ground power projection functions as relevant in peacetime crisis deterrence as well as in war will guarantee that our nation's decision-makers have "the right tools in the tool bag" to deal with the unforeseen circumstances which we will undoubtedly face in the future. I am confident that the unique flexibility and leverage

which forward deployed naval expeditionary forces provide from sovereign bases afloat will remain a cornerstone of national security.

Sincerely,

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable John P. White
Chairman, Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces
1100 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1200F
Arlington, VA 22209

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D C 20350-1000

1 September 1994

The Honorable John P. White
Chairman, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
1100 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1200F
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Dr. White:

Thank you for the opportunity to identify issues the Commission might profitably study regarding roles and functions within the Department of Defense. As a backdrop to these recommendations, and to the discussion we will be having over the next months, I would like to stress three principles that risk being slighted in the course of an otherwise commendable pursuit of efficiencies.

First, overlap of some functional capabilities is often a good, and sometimes a necessary thing precisely because required capabilities derive from assigned functions. Quite different functions may require the same (or similar) capabilities. For example, the range of capabilities represented in naval aviation derives from requirements for success in naval and littoral warfare, the primary function of the Naval Service. Balanced air warfare capabilities are especially important in a number of plausible conflict scenarios where there is no prior assurance of base access for land-based tactical air. Moreover, the fact that similar capabilities needed to execute legislated roles exist in sister Services is a powerful hedge against surprise and an important means of minimizing risk. Differentiation nurtures alternative solutions to often imperfectly anticipated developments. Competition among components in DoD is a powerful spur to innovation. In these especially uncertain times, the needs for innovation and risk avoidance are at least as compelling as the need for economy. I hope the Commission will give the first two of these variables as much attention as it gives the third.

Second, the Commission should look skeptically upon proposals (and existing arrangements) to establish boundaries between organizations along technological rather than functional lines. The gross weight of airplanes or vehicles, their methods of propulsion and other such differentiation changes in significance as technology changes. Technology provides the tools to accomplish assigned Service roles; impeding access to the most cost-effective tools is both fiscally unsound and strategically shortsighted.

Third, while the Military Services, like all entities, operate with less than perfect efficiency, they are remarkably capable organizations. Those two for which I am the present trust-holder, the Navy and the Marine Corps, have provided manifold returns to defense expenditures and service of exceptional quality for the more than two centuries of this country's existence. Along with our sister Services, I can think of no organizations that have done so much, so well, so often, and so crucially for this nation. The record that results is rich in tradition, but it would not be successful were it not also rich in adaptation. In this light I encourage the commission to applaud and reinforce the core of what we have, even when it may recommend possible improvements.

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Turning to what may usefully be done, I would recommend that the Commission include the following nine topics in its review:

a. Assess our requirement for sea-based forces overseas for Presence and Crisis Response, and assign the Navy and Marine Corps primary functions in providing combat ready forces forward for deterrence of conflict, promotion of interoperability, crisis control and to enable the deployment of heavier CONUS-based forces. For almost half a century since WW II, our forces have been sized, structured and resourced predominantly by reference to a major war contingency. The requirements for that contingency have been met largely by sizable, ready garrison forces on the continent of Europe (and in Northeast Asia) reinforced rapidly from the United States. That strategic landscape has changed. Today the bulk of our heavy forces and land-based tactical air has been redeployed home. While our vital interests are still largely across the ocean, the indisputable trend is to base more of our power projection potential in CONUS. The importance of combat ready, credible sea-based power (ground forces and air power) has increased proportionally as both a significant deterrent and as a capability to preempt crises and prepare the battlefield. The Bottom-Up Review recognized this change in adding presence as a force sizing criterion in addition to the requirement for two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). We believe that the Commission can perform a valuable function in reaffirming the value of "forward presence" to the success of our crisis-response and war-fighting priorities of the United States and by thinking through its implications for all Services as an effective means of meeting our national security objectives in an uncertain and changing world. A statement of this Department's view of itself in this context is provided at the enclosure.

b. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. Were theater ballistic missile defense to be assigned to the Navy as a primary function, the nation could count on a self-deployable, mobile, and versatile defensive umbrella to protect force concentrations, amphibious objective areas, and the Sea/Air Ports of Debarkation (S/APODs) at the threatened ends of our lines of strategic approach. This capability will be of vital importance in the initial phases of a regional conflict as we prepare for the arrival of heavy, lift-intensive land-based systems. Sea-based theater ballistic missile defenses offer one additional advantage which may allow them to defend much larger areas than land-based systems: they can be more easily and flexibly positioned relative to the likely launch sites to expand the defended area and to increase the effectiveness of defensive weapons.

c. Strategic Sealift and its Protection. Strategic Sealift is the maritime bridge to ensure that heavy ground forces are delivered, and that all land-based forces (including air forces) are supported and resupplied in conflict. At present, the provision to support sealift to other services is a collateral function of the Department of the Navy. The commission should consider whether the importance of strategic sealift and its protection in the current strategic environment does not warrant its elevation to a primary function as is presently the case with strategic airlift, a primary function of the Department of the Air Force.

d. Space and Information Systems Architecture. There is sound and long-standing rationale for retaining strong joint participation in all dimensions of space activities. Careful leveraging and rationalization of all available technological support to our smaller war-

fighting forces will be increasingly crucial to ensure that we can execute the national military strategy. The key objective has always been to capitalize on space-based assets through viable Service components, effective R&D programs that provide innovative and state of the art technology, and by Service requirements articulated in terms that are meaningful to war-fighters. This is particularly true with regard to the dissemination of surveillance, intelligence and targeting data and associated requirements for ground and sea-based terminals. The recurring proposals to consolidate and centralize overlook that Service requirements for data and intelligence from space-based systems are complementary rather than competitive.

e. MRC Scenarios (Planning Horizon). The Commission should consider the adequacy of two MRCs as the principal yardstick for planning and programming defense resources. Each of these contingencies represents a very near-term backward-looking threat environment, which does not accommodate a more future-oriented focus in military program planning. Both the complexity of the strategic environment, and the pace of technological, political and economic change suggest a need for additional planning factors and aids to programming as hedges against emergent threats to U.S. interests. Moreover, it does not seem likely that all cases of concern are lesser cases that can be presumed to be handled by preparing for two MRCs. The Commission would make a substantial contribution if it recommended improvements in the PPBS system to take account of these facts.

f. Expansion of Defense-Wide Activities. In recent years, responsibility for program development and execution in many areas has shifted from the Service Secretaries to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, and other defense-wide activities. Centralization has occurred in contract management, environmental clean-up, logistics, health care, financial services, information technology, Special Operations, and many specific R&D programs such as ballistic missile defense. The total resources allocated to these centralized activities and programs now approximate those available to any individual Military Department. In addition, large portions of the nation's surveillance and intelligence functions — increasingly vital to the effectiveness of military operations -- are centralized outside the Department of Defense. Some of this centralization certainly has been beneficial in lowering costs and facilitating joint operations, but it has some troubling aspects. It inhibits the consideration of tradeoffs among these programs and also between them and the programs that remain under Military Department purview. Additionally, distance from the customer reduces pressures on the managers of these centralized activities to effect efficiencies. Finally, I am concerned that we too often program first for "fenced" central activities and only residually for fleet and field activities. The Commission could make a substantial contribution by addressing this trend from a third-party perspective.

g. The Evolution of Interservice Relationships. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms have done a lot of good. However, at this point, seven years into their implementation, a review of joint structures and processes is warranted. Relevant questions include, for example: Does the enhanced weight of the CinCs and their understandable concern for near-term readiness unduly diminish our ability to balance resource allocations to ensure long-term readiness? Is an expanded role for the JROC desirable or undesirable? Do the requirements for joint staffing interact with DOPMA to good or bad effect in the training of officers? Shouldn't the Navy retain a primary function in those applications of special warfare critical to the success

of Naval campaigns, such as support of amphibious assaults and raids, combat SAR, mine hunting/neutralization, and clandestine reconnaissance? These issues should be examined in light of initiatives to further centralize and consolidate warfare capabilities.

h. **Incentives for Cross-Service Support.** There are numerous instances in which each of the Services depends upon another as sole provider of a critical service. Naval aircraft often depend on the Air Force for strategic tanking; forces deployed in a contingency are supplied by Navy ships; the Army buys conventional munitions for every Service. Unfortunately, incentives for optimal cross-Service support are often lacking and this systemic weakness is a disincentive to increased reliance on sole-provider arrangements. Each Service has requirements that other services are tasked to fill which, if unfilled or misprioritized, preclude mission accomplishment. The Commission could perform a valuable service by assessing and improving cross-Service support incentives.

i. **An Orphan Issue.** Inter-Service competition and functional overlap have minimized those instances where gaps in coverage exist. Where gaps can be identified, however, they very much warrant attention. The threat of biological warfare provides one case that I would encourage the Commission to consider, both because of its significance in and of itself and because it is representative of a type of concern. Low cost, ease of delivery, substantial proliferation and psychological impact indicate that biological weapons may be weapons of choice for an adversary confronted by overwhelming U.S. conventional power. Our investment in countering this threat does not seem to me to be proportionate to its probability and its magnitude. Amongst other substantial factors there are reasons of particular relevance to the Commission that suggest why this orphan issue develops. For example, the priority and assignment of this mission is unclear; the threat is of a non-traditional character; and relevant responsibilities are shared with civilian agencies as well as within the Department of Defense. The Commission might profitably determine whether and why this threat receives less than proportionate attention and then suggest corrective measures. It might also address the implications of this analysis for the assignment of roles and missions generally.

I appreciate having the opportunity to provide recommendations to the Commission. I welcome any further opportunities for discussion and stand ready to address any of these areas directly with you, the other Commissioners, or members of your staff.

John H. Dalton

Enclosure

Functions of the Navy and Marine Corps:
Peace, Crisis and War

Naval forces function within the full spectrum of international relations in peace, crisis, and war. In peacetime, we maintain forward deployed combat power in those theaters in which our vital interests are present. In peacetime we will:

-- deter strategic attacks on the United States and its allies by deploying highly-survivable strategic forces;

-- deter other forms of aggression against our friends, allies, and U.S. citizens at home and abroad;

-- build interoperability with regional friends and allies;

-- reassure U.S. citizens and our allies of our readiness, capability and determination to secure vital interests accessible from the sea; and,

-- perform "operations other than war."

Our peacetime posture provides a balanced range of Naval and littoral warfare capabilities, including the gamut of carrier capabilities for air superiority and strike warfare, expeditionary forces with embarked Marines capable of assault both over the beach and via vertical envelopment, Naval surface and subsurface forces for sea control and sea denial, and Naval special warfare forces.

In the face of crisis, we will reinforce our forward formations and maneuver deployed Naval forces to signal: capability, heightened concern, and the determination to apply force as required. Naval forces are especially relevant to crisis situations, when sovereign base access and multinational collaboration can be problematic, and where unilateral action may be the catalyst needed to facilitate coalitions. Naval capabilities which have special application include:

-- the means to undertake intensified surveillance of a critical region, both from international waters and air space or within territorial limits by clandestine means;

-- the maneuver of Naval forces at sea, especially the ability to aggregate dispersed units into larger, more capable formations to display (or conceal) significant combat power;

-- the application of sea-based Marine forces in operational maneuver from the sea to mount amphibious raids and the seizure of ports and littoral airfields to facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces;

-- precision strikes applied against point targets, especially those critical to the subsequent defense of key installations or facilities;

-- the capability to mount limited special warfare operations from the sea;

-- the means to extract U.S. and friendly personnel from threatened locations in non-permissive situations; and,

-- the means to establish and enforce limited maritime embargoes and flight denial regimes within the reach of sea-based tactical air.

If conflict threatens, the Combatant Commanders intend to use warning time to continue reinforcing Naval forces already forward for crisis management. In a notional scenario, two of the three deployment hubs provide the initial surge to support the threatened theater. Available deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups converge at the scene of impending conflict. Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, already forward deployed, along with ready carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups still in CONUS, are directed to close.

Carrier air wings are augmented with additional air crews and aircraft and the carrier battle groups combine to establish battle forces. The total force is capable of sustained, around-the-clock strike and combat support air operations. Tomahawk-capable ships and submarines provide added flexibility to strike planners. Expanded amphibious task forces are merged to make up an amphibious based Marine Expeditionary Force, fully capable of forced entry should that be required as the crisis deteriorates. In a major conflict, the introduction of one or more MPS Squadrons with the amphibious force provides the Combatant Commander with a highly mobilized lethal combat force fully sustained from its sea-based source.

Together the Naval expeditionary force will include capabilities to assist in halting enemy offensives and supporting the deployment of heavier ground forces and land-based tactical air forces by dominating the littoral battlespace.

In sum, the Navy and Marine Corps are unique in capabilities critical to advancing and defending our transoceanic interests in peacetime, in crises, and in the event of conflict. This responsibility to advance and protect vital interests abroad with forward deployed forces is the principal role of Naval forces.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

October 17, 1994

Subject: Interview with Admiral [redacted]

I met with Admiral [redacted] in his office to discuss the use of armed forces for political/military missions and, specifically, his experience in the Balkans as [redacted] of the taskforce charged with enforcing economic sanctions, the arms embargo, and the no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia.

Admiral [redacted] began by stressing the uniqueness of each situation. He stated that both national characteristics and the characteristics of individual situations made it difficult to generalize across political/military incidents. Illustratively, he suggested reviewing the different characteristics of Somalia and Bosnia.

In the specific situation in the Balkans, he concluded that limited demonstrations of force had marked, positive effects. He stated that the interception of ships in the Adriatic attempting to violate the economic sanctions affected the perceptions of the leader of Serbia, Milosevich, profoundly, causing him to understand that the sanctions would have real impact on his country and causing a marked change in his strategic behavior -- from direct support of the Bosnian Serbs to greatly circumscribed behavior.

He also stated that the shoot-down of Serbian aircraft on February 26th had a marked impact on Milosevich. He noted that when the UN was authorized only to monitor the no-fly zone, there were persistent violations of it. Once the resolution was passed permitting NATO to envorce the NFZ, and the shoot-down occurred, these probes ended. There have been no further attempts to violate the no-fly zone by fixed wing aircraft since the Feb 26 incident.

The limited air strikes which NATO has carried out in response to Serb violations of agreements on the ground have had more limited effects for two reasons. First, their very limited nature have constrained their impact; more powerful strikes would likely be more effective, he said. Second, Milosevich was not the effective actor in these situations, which are controlled by local Bosnian Serb commanders. These people perceive different stakes in the situation and have different values.

In terms of the pattern of response, Admiral [redacted] stated that the typical UN operation, which builds only gradually up to forceful action, tends to reduce the political impact of military operations. Sharp, immediate actions, he believes, are more likely to get the attention of the target.

In terms of future operations, Admiral [redacted] believes that NATO could be an effective enforcer for UN-sanctioned missions, so long as everyone concerned is realistic about the situation on the ground and the military requirements to carry out the mission successfully. It is especially important, he noted, to distinguish between chapter VI and chapter VII missions.

Admiral [redacted] believes that planned US force levels are adequate for likely political/military needs in the foreseeable future. Obviously, he noted, such operations could not be carried out simultaneously with the conduct of two MRCs. But, for example, he noted, at least with respect to the Navy, it is possible to carry out both Haiti and the former Yugoslavia while implementing an MRC in the Gulf. In all cases, he suggested, it is desirable to keep the pol/mil operation brief, so as not to affect readiness adversely.

He stated that the maintenance of a continuous presence in a region has important benefits for political/military operations. Not only does it familiarize the service with the region, but it gives it a leg up in deploying forces when the contingency occurs. He noted that 11 days after the Gulf deployment began, the Navy/MC provided 58 percent of the forces there.

In summary, he noted that the key point in political/military operations is to convince the target that the US has the <u>will</u> to carry out its threats or promises. This often, he said, requires a demonstration of the willingness to actually use firepower.

BMB

PRES [12]

U.S. Department of Transportation

United States Coast Guard

Commandant
United States Coast Guard

2100 Second St. S.W.
Washington, DC 20593-0001
Staff Symbol: G-CX
Phone: (202) 267-1285

AUG 12 1994

The Honorable John P. White
Chairman
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
100 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1200F
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. White:

On behalf of Secretary Peña, I am pleased to have the opportunity of participating in the review of the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces. While the Coast Guard is small in size in comparison to its sister services, it continues, as it has throughout our nation's history, to play an important role in our national defense.

As a maritime military force, the Coast Guard brings to the table core capabilities that both augment and complement the Navy. Recent studies conducted by the Navy and Coast Guard (NAVGUARD) Board have identified modern, post cold war roles, missions, and functions where the Coast Guard serves as a force multiplier for maintaining or improving naval combat effectiveness. Clearly, it is an appropriate, efficient, and cost effective use of the Coast Guard to continue this relationship with the Navy.

Furthermore, as a maritime operating agency with regulatory and enforcement responsibilities, the Coast Guard is closely identified with in size, mission, and capability by most of the navies throughout the world. As such, we are a unique non-threatening, humanitarian, yet military instrument for achieving national security objectives. Through security and technical assistance, and joint/combined exercises, the Coast Guard is frequently used by the CinCs as the force of choice in achieving forward presence, good will, and the advancement of national influence. These Coast Guard capabilities should continue to be an available resource to the CinCs and I am committed to that end.

I understand that the other Chiefs will be speaking with the commission about their individual Service roles in the near future. I would welcome a similar opportunity to discuss these issues and to answer any questions the members may have with regard to the Coast Guard's roles, missions, and functions as one of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Sincerely,

R E Kramek

ROBERT E. KRAMEK
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant

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PRES 3

U.S. Department of Transportation
United States Coast Guard

Memorandum

Subject: ROLES AND MISSIONS COMMISSION ON THE ARMED FORCES

Date: 23 NOV 1994
3000

From: G-CBU

Reply to: G-CBU-2
Attn. of: LCDR Buschman
267-6984

To: G-ODO

1. Enclosed is the approved response to the Roles and Missions Commission question you requested for the Overseas Presence Team; please have your representative deliver it to the team.

EM Shaw

Encl: (1) Response to Roles and Missions Question

Copy: G-CX
CAPT Shaw

ROLES AND MISSIONS

QUESTION. WHAT IS THE COAST GUARD'S ASSESSMENT OF OUR CONTRIBUTION OF SERVICE CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE PRESENCE OBJECTIVES? IN ANSWERING THIS QUESTION, YOU SHOULD ADDRESS: WHAT METHODS OR MEASURES DOES THE COAST GUARD EMPLOY (SUCH AS HIGH LEVEL VISITS, DEFENSE ATTACHE ACTIVITIES, MILITARY SALES, DIRECT MILITARY AID, TRAINING PROGRAMS [INCLUDE IMET AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE TEAMS], SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES, EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, EXERCISES, SMALL UNIT EXCHANGES, MEDICAL AND CIVIL ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE, PORT CALLS, ETC.) TO AFFECT "ASSURANCE" AND "INFLUENCE" OBJECTIVES IN SPECIFIC REGIONS/NATIONS, IF AVAILABLE, THE AMOUNT OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPLIED TO EACH TYPE OF ACTIVITY WOULD BE HELPFUL, AS WOULD BE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE MEASURES IN ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES IN YOUR AOR. (GROUP BY CATEGORIES: GOOD, BETTER, BEST)

Answer. The Coast Guard has several ways in which it provides an overseas presence or otherwise affects "assurance" and "influence" goals. Each of these is described briefly below and is categorized by its relative effectiveness in achieving USCG international objectives.

CATEGORY I. BEST.

* Combined Operations/Exercises. The Coast Guard takes advantage of opportunites to conduct combined operations with foreign counterparts. For example, recently the USCG has conducted law enforcement operations with Colombia and Panama. In the case of Mexico, we conduct eight "coincidental" operations per year with the Mexican Navy which have proven to be very successful. Also, the USCG participates with the U.S. Navy in UNITAS and the West African Training Cruise (WATC). We have also placed USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) on Dutch and UK ships in the Caribbean. In Operation Bahamas and Turks & Caicos (OPBAT), the USCG works closely with the Bahamians in anti-narcotics operations.

* Shiprider Agreements. The Coast Guard has shiprider agreements with the following countries for maritime law enforcement purposes: the Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, and Panama. Shiprider negotiations are under discussion with Colombia. The Coast Guard has a shipboarding agreement with Venezuela, and a pursuit and entry agreement with Antigua and Barbuda. A shipriding agreement exists with the Royal Navy West Indies Guardships (WIGS) in the Caribbean, and a similar agreement with the Dutch Navy is in the trial stages. In the area of fisheries enforcement, the Coast Guard has a shiprider agreement with China.

* Mobile Training Teams. A mobile training team (MTT) consists of 5 or fewer USCG personnel who are dispatched to foreign countries for up to 4 weeks to provide training in Coast Guard related activities. Since 1985, the USCG has trained 76 countries and dependent territories with a student population of over 4,500. The primary subject of training has been Maritime Law Enforcement but has also included Search and Rescue, small boat operations and maintenance, seamanship and marine safety. We have also deployed dedicated teams to assist countries in assessing their Coast Guard like organizations for establishment or improvement. We have provided this type of assistance to the United Arab Emirates, Cape Verde, Kazakhstan, Bolivia, Panama, and Colombia. This type of team works closely with host nation personnel to map out future development of their maritime forces. A summary of USCG MTT's in FY94 is attached.

Although not categorized as training, the Coast Guard has also participated for the last two years in USEUCOM's Military-to-Military Contact Program. This program allows the Coast Guard to host foreign nationals at various USCG facilities for familiarization visits and send small teams of USCG personnel to E. Europe to discuss various Coast Guard missions and methods. We have sent teams to Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under this program and have discussed topics including resource management and budgeting, chief petty officer leadership, and shipboard operations. We have also hosted delegations focused on operational organization and maritime training infrastructure. During FY95, we are beginning similar programs with Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine funded by DOD "Nunn-Lugar" funds.

NOTE: All direct assistance to other countries is done under the auspices of the Departments of State/Defense on a reimbursable basis with the exception of cost-waivers for international cadets at the Coast Guard Academy. A list of international training statistics, including reimbursed amounts, is attached.

* Other In-Country Assistance Teams. In addition to MTT's as described above, the Coast Guard has the capability to provide longer-term, in-country technical assistance. Currently, we are maintaining teams in Bolivia and Panama to assist in their anti-narcotics law enforcement programs. Also, the Coast Guard has a Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) in Antigua, funded by Security Assistance, which helps keep Eastern Caribbean boats operational.

* Resident Training. Each year, approximately 150 students from over 60 countries attend over 200 courses of instruction at Coast Guard schools. The 72 courses open to international attendance expose the students to many aspects of Coast Guard operations, and more than half of the students take advantage of their time in the U.S. to undergo on-the-job training with our

operational units. While enrolled in Coast Guard schools, international students have an opportunity to learn about our culture, institutions, and our commitment to human rights. Participation in these training programs is paid for through funding programs, such as International Military Education and Training funds (IMET), Foreign Military Financing funds (FMF), or host country funds.

The Coast Guard accepts a limited number of qualified international students for attendance at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. There are presently 19 international cadets at the Academy, and in the past 23 years, 96 cadets from 25 countries have graduated from the Academy. A 1984 Academy graduate is serving as Commandant of the Barbados Coast Guard, and other Academy graduates serve in leadership positions around the globe.

* Liaison officers. The USCG has a number of different types of liaison officers. Coast Guard attaches serve in Defense Attache offices in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. There are CG Liaison Officers at the U.S. Embassy in Panama, the U.S. Mission to the UN, and PACOM. There are Security Assistance officers at EUCOM (2), ACOM, SOUTHCOM, and CENTCOM. In addition, there are three officers at the Department of State, and five officers seconded to the International Maritime Organization: three at IMO HQ in London, a regional consultant in Puerto Rico, and a staff member of the World Maritime University in Sweden.

The CG is currently restructuring its offices in Europe and Japan/Singapore. These new offices will have responsibilities for overseas marine inspections of U.S. flag vessels and international liaison.

* Participation in International Organizations. The Coast Guard works to establish worldwide standards so we can better ensure the safety of U.S. property, citizens, and the environment. We act as the lead agency representing the U.S. with such organizations as the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Lifeboat Federation. The standards developed by these organizations substantially impact the maritime community and the world economy and affect the Coast Guard in many mission areas. The United States has been able to ensure that standards developed and adopted by these organizations are largely compatible with our domestic goals and policies.

CATEGORY II. BETTER.

* High-level Visits. The USCG sends and receives a number of high level delegations from many countries. These visits range from courtesy calls on the Commandant to meetings addressing

policy and operational-level issues. Foreign visitors range in rank from cabinet level officials and flag officers to vessel commanders and training specialists. These meetings help build strong relationships between the USCG and our counterparts overseas. The past years has been particularly useful as the USCG welcomed first-ever visits from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and South Africa. The Commandant travelled overseas to enhance an already solid relationship with Norway, a long-time maritime ally, and to nurture a developing relationship with Russia. The Vice Commandant travelled to South America to meet with the Panamian National Maritime Service (coast guard) and the Argentine Prefectura Naval (coast guard).

* Personnel Exchanges. We have four exchange officers. Three are pilots with the Canadian Forces and UK's Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. There is also an afloat operations exchange with the Royal Australian Navy.

* Ship Visits. Our ships make foreign port calls and often engage in professional exchanges with counterpart services. Over the last two years port calls were made to the Baltic countries, Poland, Russia, UK, Cape Verde, Morocco, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, Micronesia, and various Caribbean nations. The USCG participates in Operation TRADEWINDS where CG cutters exercise with various Caribbean nations.

CATEGORY III. GOOD.

* Foreign Military Sales (FMS). There is minimal involvement in the FMS program. FMS funds some CG international training. In terms of equipment, there is only one active case with the French on the overhaul of hydraulic pumps for Falcon jets. The CG is exploring the possibility of participating in the FMS program with regard to its new 47' boat and some excess aircraft and vessels.

SUMMARY OF U.S. COAST GUARD MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
For Fiscal Year 1994

COUNTRY	TYPE TRNG	FUND SOURCE	MTT DATES	NO. STUDENTS
Malaysia	SAR	DIR	24 Jan - 04 Feb 1994	18
Marshall Islands	MSAF	DOI	24 Jan - 27 Jan 1994	35
Mexico	DMLE	INM	24 Jan - 28 Jan 1994	33
Mexico	DMLE	INM	31 Jan - 04 Feb 1994	21
Micronesia, Federate	MSAF	DOI	31 Jan - 03 Feb 1994	50
Republic of Palau	MSAF	DOI	07 Feb - 10 Feb 1994	30
Honduras	DMLE	INM	07 Mar - 11 Mar 1994	30
Norway	SAR	P	07 Mar - 24 Mar 1994	24
Peru	DMLE	INM	07 Mar - 19 Mar 1994	33
Dominican Republic	DMLE	PIM	14 Mar - 18 Mar 1994	12
Dominican Republic	DMLE	INM	14 Mar - 16 Mar 1994	20
Honduras	DMLE	INM	14 Mar - 18 Mar 1994	11
Honduras	DMLE	INM	14 Mar - 16 Mar 1994	12
Peru	MSAF	INM	19 Mar - 31 Mar 1994	28
Colombia	DMLE	PIM	02 Apr - 30 Apr 1994	19
Colombia	DMLE	PIM	02 Apr - 30 Apr 1994	11
Colombia	DMLE	INM	02 Apr - 30 Apr 1994	22
Bolivia	MSAF	INM	04 Apr - 08 Apr 1994	20
Colombia	DMLE	INM	04 Apr - 30 Apr 1994	11
Bolivia	DMLE	INM	02 May - 06 May 1994	7
Caribbean Region	DMLE	INM	16 May - 20 May 1994	23
Caribbean Region	DMLE	INM	23 May - 27 May 1994	21
Indonesia	MSAF	INM	06 Jun - 17 Jun 1994	30
Micronesia, Federate	SAR	DOI	06 Jun - 07 Jun 1994	5
Micronesia, Federate	SAR	DOI	07 Jun - 09 Jun 1994	6
Estonia	DMLE	PIM	13 Jun - 17 Jun 1994	32
Mexico	DMLE	INM	13 Jun - 17 Jun 1994	12
Mexico	DMLE	INM	18 Jun - 25 Jun 1994	13
Poland	DMLE	PIM	20 Jun - 24 Jun 1994	30
Uruguay	DMLE	INM	27 Jun - 07 Jul 1994	27
Philippines	DMLE	INM	14 Jul - 28 Jul 1994	64
World Maritime Unive	MSAF	DIR	01 Aug - 05 Aug 1994	24
Turkey	DMLE	INM	08 Aug - 12 Aug 1994	24
Argentina	MSAF	INM	15 Aug - 26 Aug 1994	29
Ukraine	DMLE	INM	15 Aug - 24 Aug 1994	20
Ukraine	DMLE	INM	15 Aug - 26 Aug 1994	32
Colombia	MSAF	INM	26 Aug - 03 Sep 1994	49
Republic of Palau	SAR	DOI	29 Aug - 31 Aug 1994	7
Micronesia, Federate	SAR	DOI	01 Sep - 02 Sep 1994	3
Tunisia	FMLE	PIM	05 Sep - 16 Sep 1994	26
Poland	MSAF	PIM	10 Sep - 24 Sep 1994	30
El Salvador	DMLE	PIM	12 Sep - 16 Sep 1994	24
Marshall Islands	SAR	DOI	13 Sep - 14 Sep 1994	5
Colombia	SAR	PIM	19 Sep - 30 Sep 1994	25
El Salvador	DMLE	PIM	19 Sep - 21 Sep 1994	20
Micronesia, Federate	SAR	DOI	19 Sep - 20 Sep 1994	6
Morocco	DMLE	PIM	19 Sep - 23 Sep 1994	40
Micronesia, Federate	SAR	DOI	21 Sep - 22 Sep 1994	3

TOTAL NO. OF MTTs: 48

TOTAL NO. OF STUDENTS: 1,077

TRAINING TYPES:
SAR = Search and Rescue
MSAF = Marine Safety
DMLE = Maritime Law Enforcement (Drugs)
FMLE = Maritime law Enforcement (Fisheries)

FUND SOURCES:
DIR = Direct
P = FMS
PIM = IMET
DOI = Dept of Interior
INM = International Narcotics Matters (Dept of State)

INTERNATIONAL TRAINING STATISTICS

	RESIDENT TRAINING			OCONUS TRAINING		
FY	NO. OF COUNTRIES	NO. OF STUDENTS	NO. OF QUOTAS	NO. OF COUNTRIES	NO. OF TEAMS	NO. OF STUDENTS
94	51	134	209	30	39	882
93	49	158	249	26	35	689
92	51	161	227	30	37	928
91	50	144	207	30	40	1,090
90	49	153	183	30	35	972
89	50	120	144	32	36	1,008
88	51	92	111	30	26	866
87	52	144	172	20	16	N/A
86	47	155	186	5	8	N/A
85	50	130	198	3	3	24
84	38	N/A	233	5	7	131
83	37	N/A	220	3	5	95
82	32	N/A	203	3	4	142
81	26	N/A	118	1	1	29
80	19	N/A	70	0	0	0
79	19	N/A	72			
78	24	N/A	68			

N/A - DATA NOT AVAILABLE

NOV 25 '94 06:28PM COGARD G-000 HQ DC P.8

Appendix I

CINCs' PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENCE

Appendix I
CINCs' PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENCE

This appendix contains interviews and documents concerning presence issues that have been compiled in the course of this study. Materials from the CORM have been drawn upon with permission. The material for each Command is presented here in the same order it was described in the main text:

1. U.S. ACOM
2. U.S. CENTCOM
3. U.S. EUCOM
4. U.S. PACOM
5. U.S. SOUTHCOM
6. U.S. SOCOM



DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

1 December 1994

Dear Dr. White,

USACOM, in close coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, and all Unified Commands has been actively engaged in refining the size and composition of our overseas forces. Our ongoing efforts, as well as the findings of the Commission on Roles and Missions, will help ensure that we properly manage our limited resources. We are very appreciative of your interest in this vital issue.

The issue of overseas presence, in one form or another, has been debated since the first days of our Republic. As the strategic landscape has shifted, we have adjusted our overseas presence and re-evaluated the mix and rhythm of our force requirements. There is little doubt as to the overall utility and purpose of presence -- assurance, influence, deterrence, and crisis response. These purposes are as valid today as they have been for the past 200 years, however, it is the depth of our resources and the nature of the threat that should tailor our response. The type or method of presence, whether permanently forward based or rotational, requires constant and comprehensive review to ensure it is proportional to the threat. Such a review permits us to make the best use of <u>all</u> the capabilities in our Nation's armed forces - at a time of diminishing resources. We are no longer simply concerned with containing a single adversary. Today, we must be ready to respond to diverse set of regional and ambiguous threats. USACOM can offer a unique perspective to the review process.

The Unified Command Plan, signed by President Clinton on September 24, 1993, directed USACOM to execute geographic CINC responsibilities, train and integrate joint forces, and provide these forces to warfighting CINCs. For USACOM, this evolutionary change translates to both a permanent AOR responsibility and an expanding role in both providing and tailoring global and theater level presence.

Warfighting Commanders are now, and will become increasingly more, dependent on USACOM trained, CONUS-based <u>joint</u> forces. New strategic and fiscal realities have necessitated continuing analysis of U.S. response requirements. As a nation, we have placed increased emphasis upon development of appropriate joint warfighting mechanisms to make the best use of the capabilities of all our forces. Establishment of USACOM was a first, positive step in coping with these new strategic realities to ensure we are addressing the right problem sets. Certainly changes in our response to new strategic realities will continue to occur, but any change will be

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evolutionary, not revolutionary - dependent upon the political and diplomatic implications of overseas presence.

Since the end of World War II, a pattern of overseas presence has evolved to support our strategic goals. As an example, the United States has maintained naval and ground forces in Europe and the Far East on a continual and rotational basis since 1945. The support requirement has now changed; logic would dictate that old paradigms for presence should do likewise. It is time to reconsider what is really required and what has simply become automatic. Deployment should occur because there is a requirement, not simply to fill a schedule. Residual Cold War deployment patterns can and should be modified in relation to existing threat patterns. Much of our current investment in overseas presence can be supplemented or offset by making flexible use of combined and joint force capabilities.

We are faced with the reality of affordability. We can do better if we become more flexible in developing methodologies to respond to new challenges and by breaking old models if they no longer apply. During the Cold War, our presence had to be constant. A transition to a capabilities-based paradigm for presence would afford us the flexibility and strategic agility needed to meet emerging challenges with diminished resources. Flexible application can be determined by asking ourselves these questions: What is the right force mix, given the demise of the adversaries for which present forces have been developed? What is the requisite rhythm and frequency of rotational forces? Does presence have to be constant or can it vary in response to need? Can the form of presence be modified by technology? Does information connectivity with allies allow a change to traditional patterns? As the joint force integrator, we have and are continuing to contribute in forming the response to these questions and others. The task is substantial. It is not easy to overcome 40 years of "habits" in one year, but this continual process of appraisal will lead to positive change.

USACOM occupies a unique vantage point, made possible by the 1993 UCP change, as both a geographic Unified Command and the Joint Force Provider and Integrator. An important first step we have taken to cope with the presence issue is in fully exploiting the complementary group merits of trained joint forces, deployed and readily available from CONUS. With our JTF 95 initiative, we have seized the opportunity to dynamically assemble, train, and provide joint service capabilities to meet theater CINC requirements. Each joint task force/group has been tailored to meet national goals and objectives while being responsive to fiscal realities. The forces have been trained to fight together; they are ready and flexible, able to act with forward deployed forces, surge forces or myriad combinations. Their composition and training have been shaped for the full spectrum of response, from major regional contingencies to operations other than war. The JTF presence concept is not limited to maritime presence, nor is it applicable only to the European/Nato theater. The capabilities of our Air Force assets and our ability to strategically deploy and employ trained ground forces can be fully utilized around the globe. The strengths inherent in this concept can be further exploited and amplified in concert with allied and coalition

forces. JTF 95 is an important first link in the process to use the full spectrum of capabilities resident in our nation's armed forces for future presence and response requirements.

To summarize the macro-level analysis, the global situation now allows for a rethinking of the organization and structure of overseas presence. The cost of doing "business as usual" is prohibitive and may be counter-productive to our ability to respond to emergent situations in non-traditional areas. Effective use of joint and combined capabilities will permit the most economical use of military resources.

Each AOR is unique, with varying "prescriptions" for success in terms of presence. USACOM's AOR meets that paradigm. Largely maritime in focus in the past, we have been responsible for providing safe lines of communication to Europe, as well as providing the NATO springboard through our bases in Iceland and the Azores. Our Caribbean basin activities have been more readily visible in recent years, as witnessed in our continued focus on Cuba, and as most recently displayed in Haiti. While seeking the expansion and encouragement of regional democracies, our permanent overseas presence within the AOR has been deliberately limited. We have been proactive in adjusting our presence profile during the last several years in response to world changes and long term strategic needs. To illustrate, in coordination with the Department of State and host nations, we skillfully tailored our facilities and manpower in Iceland and the Azores as conditions dictated.

The proximity of our AOR and the availability of training facilities allows us to reduce or eliminate rotational presence requirements. Because presence does not have to be limited to military units or permanent establishments, USACOM has tackled the broader task of blending all interagency tools, available programs, and allied contributions to meet AOR requirements. The synergy of teamwork and interagency cooperation provides the desired end state - regional stability.

The success of our initiatives is best illustrated in the combined regional response to restore democracy in Haiti. While there was clearly a convergence of political will and a need to act, USACOM already had mechanisms in place to exploit the opportunity to respond. We seized the opportunity to nurture the good will developed through regional alliances and obtained the seaport and airfield basing rights necessary to facilitate deployment and migrant interdiction. Coupled with our innovative use of joint and combined forces, and working with the interagency, we were able to successfully and peacefully restore the legitimate government.

Further testimony to the value of coalition building was witnessed in the successful deployment of Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) forces to St. Lucia in response to disturbances resulting from the Spring, 1994 banana strike. RSS elements were also involved in St. Kitts to quell internal upheaval following Fall, 1993 elections and recent prison riots. In these instances direct U.S. intervention was not required. The RSS, acting through its own determination, demonstrated that measures can be undertaken by coalition partners in the interest of regional stability.

USACOM's approach to develop programs and exercises is designed to build strong coalition and alliance capabilities, enhancing our influence within the region and assuring our allies that we will remain engaged to maintain stability. Within the USACOM AOR, we have attained our regional objectives through combined exercises, foreign military financing, international military education and training, and professionalization seminars and conferences.

Flag level professionalization seminars such as the Caribbean Island Nation Security Conference (CINSEC) have proven instrumental in furthering the assurance and influence factors of overseas presence. Similar beneficial gains have been realized in our Joint Overseas Training (JOT) program which combines Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) construction and medical/dental projects with planned Exercise Related Construction (ERC). ERC supports our objectives by satisfying political, economic, and military goals and providing excellent unit training in a joint/combined environment.

Among the exercises which provide valuable utility to AOR overseas presence purposes is Tradewinds. An annual combined field/command post exercise, Tradewinds is designed to enhance U.S., U.K. and Caribbean Defense and Police organizations in the performance of combined operations in support of regional security goals and objectives. While currently centered in the Eastern Caribbean, Tradewinds has the potential for expansion in the near-term to include all island nations within the USACOM AOR and provide even more in the way of Caribbean-wide interoperability preparedness and combined capabilities.

Equally effective is UNITAS, an exercise program designed around a series of port calls and naval contacts with South American navies. UNITAS is designed to foster greater cooperation, good will, interoperability, and professionalization among regional maritime forces. A summary assessing this and other programs is attached.

USACOM is not dependent upon a regularly scheduled rotational presence to assure and influence our allies. Our forward based presence is on the downward glidepath. We are working closely with our allies to ensure the "build down" is in accord with our treaty obligations. We do need the capability to surge fully trained, rapidly responsive forces, ready and able to operate effectively in a joint/combined environment - as we did for enforcement of UN sanctions against Haiti (UNSCR 917), migrant interdiction and safehaven operations, and Operations Uphold / Maintain Democracy. Most important, we need the capability to maintain, sustain, and strengthen our current Nations Assistance and exercise programs as the security environment will continue to demand adaptation.

In summary, the USACOM overseas presence program de-emphasizes permanent presence and emphasizes flexibility and strategic agility. By minimizing our profile and relying on a variety of joint and combined resources, we are able to rapidly deploy forces when required and in the proper composition. Refining our ability to manage increasingly limited resources is not a new concept at USACOM. Thus, our vanguard programs, which are convergent with interagency and allied programs, have been innovative by design and necessity. We have tailored our programs to add value and achieve unity of effort without adding the costs of permanent presence.

H. W. Gehman, Jr.

H. W. GEHMAN, JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Commander in Chief

USACOM OVERSEAS PRESENCE PROGRAMS

COMBINED EXERCISES

TRADEWINDS	ANNUAL COMBINED FIELD/CMD POST EXERCISE CENTERED IN EASTERN CARIBBEAN FOCUSING ON RSS NATIONS DEFENSE AND POLICE FORCES. OVERALL ASSESSMENT GOOD.
JCET	PLATOON SIZED TRAINING FOCUSING ON LIGHT INFANTRY OPS, COMMS, FIRST AID, NAV SKILLS. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BETTER.
MIST	SMALL DETACHMENT TRAINING FOCUSING ON GOVT INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROGRAMS SUPPORTING DRUG AWARENESS. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BETTER.
UNITAS	NAVAL EXERCISE WITH SOUTH AMERICA DESIGNED TO FOSTER COOPERATION AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE REGION. OVERALL ASSESSMENT GOOD.
JOT	COMBINES HCA CONSTRUCTION AND MEDICAL/DENTAL PROJECTS WITH ERC. MILITARY FACILITIES ARE USED JOINTLY BY US AND HOST NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CJCS EXERCISES. THERE ARE EIGHT PROJECTS EACH FY 95 (HCA USD 630K; ERC USD 1.08M). OVERALL ASSESSMENT BEST.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

FMF/IMET	PROGRAM SUPPORTS DEFENSE, MARITIME AND POLICE FORCES AND FOCUSES ON EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO SUPPORT COUNTER NARCOTICS, MIGRANT AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE. (FMF FY94 1.09M, FY95 ZERO; IMET FY94 .8M, FY95 .5M). OVERALL ASSESSMENT BETTER, HOWEVER, LIMITED BY LACK OF CONSISTENT FUNDING LEVELS.

CONFERENCES

CINSEC	ANNUAL FLAG-LEVEL CONFERENCE FOR CARIBBEAN DEFENSE CHIEFS AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS, SENIOR DOD AND DOS OFFICIALS AND US, UK AND CANADIAN REGIONAL PLAYERS. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BEST.

OVERSEAS PRESENCE

SUPPLEMENT: Wednesday, November 30 , 1994

ISSUE TEAM

NORFOLK
The Virginian-Pilot Nov. 28, 1994 Pg. 1

NATO MAY COMBINE ITS FORCES TO TRIM COSTS

A NORFOLK-BASED OFFICIAL LIKES THE CONCEPT, AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF CUTTING DEPLOYMENT BY NAVY TO THE MED.

GEN. JOHN J. "JACK" SHEEHAN

Occupation: Commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command; NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
Personal: Age, 54; Born Aug. 23, 1940, in Somerville, Mass. Married to the former Margaret M. Sullivan of Boston. They have four children: Kristen, Catherine, Karen and John.
Education: Bachelor's degree in English from Boston College, 1962; master's degree in government, Georgetown University.
Career: Commissioned a second lieutenant in 1962. Served in various command positions ranging from company commander to brigade commander in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Served combat tours in Vietnam and Desert Storm. Staff positions included duties as regimental, division and service headquarters staff officer, as well as joint duty with the Army, secretary of defense and Atlantic Command. Most recently, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By JACK DORSEY
STAFF WRITER

NORFOLK – Dwindling defense dollars may force the militaries of separate nations to fight as one, with the army - in one scenario - coming from land, the air force from Sweden and the navy from Norway.

That's the view of Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, one of NATO's top commanders as the alliance's military leader in the Atlantic and North American regions. Sheehan, who took command earlier this month, is the first Marine to serve in what had been a Navy post for 50 years. He wears two hats as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and as commander of the the United States Atlantic Command, or USACOM. Both are based in Norfolk.

The concept of combined joint task forces" has taken hold within the United States military, with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine personnel working as one in particular missions.

For northern Europe, where allied nations have made substantial cuts in defense since the end of the Cold War, the concept also holds promise.

I think it is entirely possible in my lifetime that you will see a kind of regional approach in the north that will have a CJTF capability," said Sheehan.

"You will have a real kind of approach to defense that is coherent, combined and joint. But, frankly for each of the countries, it is cheaper."

Such an arrangement is less likely among NATO allies at the other end of Europe, in the Mediterranean.

As you get down there you clearly have culture and history that works against you. Each nation comes to the table with its own prejudice, one way or the other," he said.

Sheehan is looking at NATO's future role at a time when questions are being raised about whether the alliance has outlived its usefulness. Sharpening the debate is U.S. reluctance to play a bigger role in Bosnia, where troops from European countries are working as peacekeepers. Hundreds have been captured and held hostage in recent days.

Some analysts maintain that Europe can handle the smaller crises of today on its own now that NATO's common foe - the Soviet Union - has fallen.

Still, U.S. officials insist common goals will keep NATO together as it approaches its second half-century. And the United States remains the most powerful military force in NATO's European-North American sphere of influence.

Sheehan said that within its own ranks, the United States has some adjustments to make to face the post Cold War-world. He raised the prospect of shrinking a top military post - the U.S. Southern Command, now based in Panama. The command must move anyway, as Panama takes over the Panama Canal in the next few years.

Why not move it all the way to the United States, Sheehan suggested. If you reduce your troop levels by 30 percent, why are you keeping Cold War headquarters? It doesn't make sense.

We are not going to invade South America. They are all democracies."

Just three weeks into his new command, Sheehan already is steering his NATO command away from its traditional role as a maritime operation.

For the first time, Sheehan said, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic will have a U.S. Army colonel reporting to him - the commander-in-chief of the Iberian Atlantic, off the coast of Portugal.

Sheehan wants to introduce even more land forces into the mix as he carries out the jointness approach pioneered by his predecessor, Adm. Paul David Miller. Miller was architect of the reorganized USACOM. He pushed joint service cooperation about as far as it has been pushed in the 10 years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act required closer cooperation among the service branches.

Shrinking militaries are forcing even more changes in NATO, Sheehan said.

On the U.S. side we are clearly coming at this issue of joint training," he said. How do you put together a joint training capability that gives this nation the most for its investment? How do you then convince the system to deploy this force on an as required' basis?"

That, too, is a concept Sheehan said he will try to sell to his superiors.

An example: Shortening the six-month Mediterranean deployment.

The U.S. has maintained a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean on a near continuous basis since the end of World War II, mostly at the insistence of the NATO alliance. More than 10,000 people from Hampton Roads come and go with each battle group rotation.

Sheehan questions whether the Mediterranean should be the automatic destination - even whether the ships should go at all unless they're called for.

My intent, very frankly, is to pose the issue to the chairman (of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and say Look. Here is an asset that has a special operations capability, a Marine capability, a Navy capability, an Air Force capability and an Army capability. It is available during this time frame. You pick the period you want it to deploy.'

If it is three months, we send it for three months. Maybe not to the Med. Probably . . . off Somalia as the U.N. presence draws down.

You ought not to deploy just because it is on the schedule. They are deployed because there is a requirement. It is your investment."

There will come a day, he said, when America's military forces are truly trained as one force. How will I know it is successful? When the chairman calls and says You don't need to send it. I will call you when I need it.'

Then I will declare victory and walk off center stage."

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PRES [9]

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101
3 August 1994

John P. White
Department of Defense
Commission On Roles And Missions of the Armed Forces
1100 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Dr. White:

As requested, I am providing the Commission several issues to examine in the development of your roles and missions report to Congress.

- Forward presence and crisis response roles. The advancement of U.S. vital interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) requires credible overseas presence, with its concomitant deterrent value, and the capability to win a major regional contingency should deterrence fail. Political, cultural, and fiscal constraints preclude us from maintaining a robust permanent forward ground presence in the AOR. We have offset these constraints with ashore and afloat prepositioning, a vigorous joint/combined exercise program, and a solid security assistance program. Nevertheless, naval expeditionary forces offer balanced, sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible forces perfectly suited to the requirements of the region. Their ambiguity of intent, discreet presence, proximity and power make them the forces of choice for deterrence and in-place crisis response. Their availability and capabilities reduce risk to early deployed forces, control escalation, and enhance seamless sequencing and transition to war. As such, recommend that the commission define forward presence and crisis response as the primary roles for the Naval Services and assign them a primary function of conducting littoral warfare, encompassing sea-based power projection from surface, subsurface, and naval aviation platforms, amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces, and their influence well inland beyond the traditional boundary of the high water mark. The requirement for increased Naval forward presence in the USCENTCOM AOR does not reduce the requirement for enhanced strategic airlift and sealift critical to power projection of follow-on heavy forces.

- Heavy forces for two Major Regional Contingency missions. Both of the most likely Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) highlighted in our National Military Strategy require heavy (armored and mechanized) forces for mission success. In the USCENTCOM AOR, the expanse of desert terrain makes these heavy forces uniquely suited with their mobility and firepower as the force of choice for defeating the enemy's full range of capabilities. Acting in concert with air and naval forces, this balanced team is key to USCENTCOM war plan execution. Through our ongoing analysis of the two MRC strategy, it is now becoming

(10)

clear that there is a shortfall in the number of active Army heavy forces. Further, the necessity for adequate heavy forces conflicts with the requirement to conduct operations other than war. Efforts to satisfy both needs is diluting our heavy force capability and creating a potential imbalance which puts our two MRC strategy at risk. Moreover, budget constraints create additional pressure to compel the Services to fund light forces over heavy since they are cheaper. Accordingly, the Commission should review the clear requirement for sufficient active heavy forces to execute the two MRC strategy as well as the need for adequate lighter forces for other contingencies to insure the proper apportionment is achieved.

- Joint force packaging responsibility of USACOM and the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging. This function duplicates responsibilities and often conflicts with the needs of the regional CINCs who are ultimately held accountable as the warfighter. This current arrangement also adds another tier, and a vague command relationship, between the supported CINC (integrator) and the Service (provider). The concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP) is not the panacea for forward presence, deterrence, and crisis response. Force structure, roles, missions, and functions decisions should not count so heavily on AJFP; rather joint synergism in general, so that we may reduce forces to a point where they are strategically flexible but not operationally hollow.

- Area Of Responsibility geographic boundaries. Under current boundaries specified in the Unified Command Plan, there are certain crises in the USCENTCOM AOR that could necessitate expanding the operating area to include portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to support maritime operations. Accordingly, realigning boundaries to conform with warfighting realities is in order. Consistent with these ocean area modifications is a case to incorporate the nations along the eastern coast of Africa into the USCENTCOM AOR. Enclosed is a representation of the proposed boundaries recommended by USCENTCOM.

Time permitting, you may want to obtain General Peay's perspective at his earliest possible convenience. In any event, do not hesitate to contact me if the Commission desires to explore these or other roles and missions issues in the future.

Sincerely,

J. P. Hoar
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander in Chief

Enclosure

Received
9 AUG

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

15 December 1994

Dear Dr. White,

Thank you for your useful and thought-provoking letter of November 16th. You have asked the right questions on the right terms; I want to respond accordingly.

You expressed an interest in the issues of forward presence in general and requested examples of specific programs. Europe is where we have the majority of our forward stationed forces and where our presence matters most; I will concentrate on issues there.

The purposes of forward presence are tightly related--*assurance* and *influence* in the military realm are really what our friends and allies think about our *deterrence* and *crisis response*. That is why they are hard to measure--they are about what people and nations think, which is rarely clear, and always subject to "change without notice."

This fact makes important dimensions of the subject difficult to perceive. To understand truly what our forward presence contributes to national security, for example, we must notice what our friends and allies don't think as well as what they do think. Most nations in Europe today:

- don't think about security as a purely national issue;
- don't think about pursuing national goals by military force;
- don't think about using military power to leverage themselves a degree of influence out of proportion to their true economic, political, and demographic positions.

Although there are some exceptions to my statement, what is important is that most nations have not broken the Cold War habit of thinking about collective security. That is true in the West, even truer in the East, and accounts for the eagerness among the Partners of the Partnership for Peace for NATO membership. It is most advantageous to all involved. There are a thousand bloody years of European history to tell us what the alternative is.

Our military presence maintains that habit of thinking. Our presence is intrinsically collective; we neither have nor want territory in Europe, and are here only by invitation. For that reason we are not only enormously strong, we are uniquely safe. We do not impose our will on smaller nations gratuitously; nor are we in a position to do so. We are pan-European; most European countries have U.S. military presence in some form. We thus embody and protect a consensus and a way of thinking that helps everyone, even after the original threat has disintegrated. That is a large and valuable contribution our forward presence makes to *influence* and *assurance*.

Presence not only creates the environment in which our influence is welcome, it adds credibility to our leadership. Because our words are connected to resources -resources and capabilities actually present in the region, as opposed to merely promised--they have a special weight. You rightly observe that the effect is "not readily observed." We have recently had an object lesson in its importance in Bosnia, where our leadership with our allies was limited because our presence was limited.

There is still the possibility that our presence and our leadership could fail. Should that happen, history tells us that Europe will likely evolve toward a dominant power, without any U.S. influence. For reasons having to do with geography and national pride, as much as anything else, the resulting dominance could be as oppressive and dangerous as previous historical domination proved to be. And, over time, it will increase those tensions which have exploded twice this century, with disastrous effects on our national interests.

Overall, the contribution our forward presence makes to our own interests is largely invisible, until it is needed. It is also perishable. If I may put it this way, belief in the U.S. must be renewed on a daily basis. In peacetime that is done by:
- our manifest readiness;
- our level of training;
- our modernization;
- and, above all, the visibly high quality and deep dedication of our servicemembers.

None of these break out as individual line items in the budget, but they are central.

It is important that we be clear about these fundamentals. They are the foundation which supports all our other activities.

Turning to those other activities and the more specific requests in your letter, they are both complex and, of themselves, serve our national interest. This command's strategy and approach to developing and managing programs among 83 different countries is embodied in the USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System (TSPS). Through an organization of country desk officers, regional working groups, and steering committees, TSPS links together the Command's efforts and coordinates it with both the organizations in Washington and ambassadors in theater. It also gives me an overall view so I can put resources where they will do the most good.

You also wanted to know "methods or measures your command employs or coordinates . . . to affect 'assurance' and 'influence' objectives in specific regions/nations." If I were to do that comprehensively here, you would have a letter longer than you want to read. I've had my staff put together a list of the kind of activities you are interested in, and I've attached it to this letter. For reasons that you can well understand, I am wary of "good-better-best" grouping. Instead, I have used anecdotal evidence to emphasize the effectiveness of selected programs.

I encounter daily the effectiveness of all forms of our forward presence in furthering U.S. interests. As the commander of a large and credible American force stationed on this side of

the Atlantic, speaking with senior military officials who are graduates of a U.S. school (courtesy of IMET), whose forces are equipped and organized based on various forms of security assistance, and whose country itself hosts U.S. forces, I can assure you of the effectiveness these programs have in supporting our national interests. Take away all those elements of forward presence, and my influence, not to mention my "assurance" and "insurance" are greatly reduced. The critical linkage of these programs are important for policy makers at State, Interagency Groups, DoD, and Congress not to underestimate.

I have no doubt about the importance of our forward presence but I know it is a "hard sell" in Washington. *Deterrence* is measured in the undetectable units of what didn't happen. The ways of *influence* are difficult to trace and having a lot of it doesn't always mean that you get exactly what you want.

Even as we wrestle with the daily puzzles of resource allocation, indeed, <u>especially</u> then, we must remember that we are harvesting the fruits of nearly a century of struggle and sacrifice. We can bequeath to our children and grandchildren a better world than our parents and grandparents ever knew.

Warm regards,

GEORGE A. JOULWAN
General, U.S. Army

Encl

Honorable John P. White
Chairman, Commission on Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces
1100 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1200F
Arlington, Virginia 22209

ROLES AND MISSIONS COMMISSION

METHODS OR MEASURES TO AFFECT ASSURANCE AND INFLUENCE

A. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP):

Purpose: A bilateral U.S. military outreach program which assists designated nations in developing successful military models. It rests on a foundation of genuine mutual interests in the values and characteristics of democratic processes and institutions. Information and ideas are shared by traveling contact teams (TCT), familiarization tours (FAM), and exchanges.

Assurance/Influence:

1. A major element of my active engagement strategy and the most visible U.S. initiative.

2. In less than 2 years, acceptance of an American style democracy with strong civilian control and accountability over their military forces have resulted:

a. Hungary passed legislation which formally and legally places the Minister of Defense between the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister.

b. Six countries, for the first time, codified the rights of soldiers into national law using our UCMJ as a model.

c. Five nations established or transformed their chaplaincy programs, not as guardians of political correctness, but with emphasis on the care and human needs of the soldiers.

d. Recognizing that the military is accountable to the public, seven nations have founded public affairs offices in their military structure.

e. Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia are incorporating or developing NCO Corps founded on the U.S. military model--a true citizen soldier. Professionalization of the NCO Corps is a priority.

f. The Czech Republic reorganized their Corps/Brigade system based on the U.S. Army model.

g. Hungry established a Home Defense Peacekeeping center and graduated its first company of peacekeepers. This action promotes active participation in PfP exercises and potential out of area operations.

3. People make the difference:

a. U.S. Army Sgt offered a commission in the Albanian army, but declined.

b. U.S. Army Capt offered a battalion command in Estonia, but declined.

4. Trade with Eastern European and former Soviet States in 1992, 1993, and 1994 increased by 13%, 19% and 46% respectively.

Approximate funding per year: $16 million

B. **Marshall Center (MC):**

Purpose: Provides instruction in Defense Management under the over-arching theme of democratization and civilian control of the military to civilian and military defense officials from the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CEE/FSU). Conducts two courses per year (19 weeks each) for approximately 80 students per class.

Assurance/Influence:

1. Another element of my active engagement policy.

a. The inaugural class graduates 14 Dec 94; there are 75 students from 23 countries. The majority of the students are Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel; however, there are also a number of high ranking officials including a senator, three presidential advisors, a Major General, and an AF Deputy Chief of Staff.

b. In five years, more than 1000 senior officials will graduate. Most will hold high ranking government positions and be key points of contact; military officers (O-5 and O-6 level), Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, legislators charged with oversight of defense matters, and diplomats throughout Central and Eastern Europe including Republics of the Former Soviet Union.

2. European support for the MC is far-reaching.

a. Offers of free faculty members have been received from Germany, Great Britain, Austria, and Switzerland.

b. The German government signed a Memorandum of Agreement with HQ USEUCOM on 2 December 1994, which provides for 18 German military and civilian employees

at no cost to the Marshall Center (MC). The German government has agreed to provide additional funding up to 3 million German marks annually to the MC.

c. The Slovak government has offered a complex in Bratislava to create a "Marshall Center - East".

d. Specific requests received from Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary for the Center to tailor its courses to those government officials who cannot attend the five-month curriculum.

3. The Marshall Center has hosted seven conferences over the past 18 months on varying themes of democratization. Two notable conferences are:

a. The Peacekeeping Conference (Nov 93) with 131 attendees from more than 35 countries.

b. North Atlantic Assembly Parliamentarian 10-day Seminar (Aug 94) with 49 parliamentarians from 14 CEE/FSU nations

Approximate funding per year: $15 million

C. <u>Partnership for Peace (PfP):</u>

Purpose: To extend stability toward the East, provide a consultation mechanism and pursue democratic reform while deepening military relationships by preparing nations for peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance operations. Currently, 23 countries have signed the framework document.

Assurance/Influence:
1. Democratic values are promulgated in Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia:

a. The Minister of Defense is now a civilian post; establishing civilian control of their military establishments.

b. A new democratic constitution with emphasis on human rights was approved.

2. Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia are supporting U.S. sanctions in both Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina at great expense to their economies.

3. Slovenia is permitting the use of airspace and airfields in support of air operations for Deny Flight.

4. Hungary is permitting the use of airspace to fly NATO AWACS aircraft in support of Deny Flight.

5. PfP exercises are contributing towards East West interoperability, working towards common standards, and transitioning to combined peacekeeping operations.

a. The first PfP exercise was held in June 94 with 12 nations participating or observing.

b. We achieved another historic opportunity when 25 nations (to include Russia) participated in two peacekeeping land exercises, Cooperative Bridge hosted by Poland and Cooperative Spirit hosted by Netherlands, held in September and October 1994 respectively.

c. Cooperative Venture, a maritime exercise, provided 14 nations the opportunity to cooperatively exercise through ship maneuvers, search and rescue support, and other peacetime maritime activities.

6. Italy and Romania offered to host NATO PfP exercises in 1995.

7. The Turks and Greeks are likely to host PfP exercises in the Southern Region by 1995.

8. By providing assistance to these nations, we reach our objective of interoperability with NATO and further the process of these nations participating in UN sanctioned operations.

Approximate funding per year: $30 million

D. **Foreign Military Sales (FMS):**

Purpose: The system to accommodate government-to-government sales of military equipment, mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, spare parts and other advice and assistance services.

Assurance/Influence:
1. Strengthens coalitions with friends and allies and cements strong military relationships. Successfully persuaded Tunisia and Morocco to play key roles in promoting the Middle East peace process and peacekeeping operations.

2. Foreign Military Financing (FMF), special grants or loans to finance the acquisition of U.S. defense articles under FMS, encourages non-NATO nations to take an active role in maintaining regional stability. Dedicated forces to peacekeeping operations for UNAMIR, UNOSOM, and UNIFIL were trained, equipped, deployed and re-deployed through FMF; e.g., Morocco in Somalia and Senega, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tanzania in Liberia.

3. Almost all of FMF spent in the U.S. translates directly into jobs and supports a strong U.S. defense industrial base - a critical element of our national defense.

4. Enhanced interoperability/integration of military assets with non-NATO allies and a dependency on continued U.S. industrial support.

a. Finland purchased 64 F/A-18s Hornets for $2.5 billion -- the most expensive acquisition in its history.

b. Switzerland purchased 34 F/A-18s for $2.4 billion over seven years. Additional purchases of U.S. equipment are expected.

5. Foreign Military Sales, in addition to Direct Commercial Sales, in the EUCOM's AOR alone accounted for $8 billion. This translates to approximately 320,000 U.S. jobs.

	Grants	Loans
Approximate funding per year:	$14 million	$855 mil

E. International Military Education and Training (IMET):

Purpose: Provides professional military education and management, and technical training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The basic IMET program, together with the Congressionally-mandated Expanded-IMET program, promotes mil-to-mil relations, and exposes international military and civilian officials to U.S. values and democratic processes. To date, students from 65 countries have participated.

Assurance/Influence:
1. African and Central/Eastern European countries are moving forward in restructuring their militaries to support democratic values. Most international students from these countries were sent to the U.S. to experience first hand our democratic values through U.S. schooling and exposure to America's small towns and cities.

2. Graduates from these programs are the future military and political leaders of their countries. U.S. exposure emphasizes civilian control of the military forces and the defensive nature of the military.

a. The Czech Republic: An Army War College graduate is responsible for restructuring their Armed Forces and an Air Command and Staff College graduate heads their mil to-mil program.

b. Portugal: Eighty percent of the senior leadership in Portugal are IMET graduates.

c. Turkey: Twenty percent of all flag officers are IMET trained.

d. The Presidents of Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia are all IMET graduates, as are the MODs from Bulgaria and Slovakia, and the Chiefs of Defense from the Netherlands and Norway.

e. EUCOM AOR: More than 500 senior civilian and military leaders are IMET trained.

3. Over the years, familiarity with U.S. doctrine has led IMET graduates to purchase U.S. equipment over other European competitors. In addition, IMET graduates provide potential access for other U.S. government agencies -- Commerce, Treasury, etc., and U.S. businesses.

4. IMET graduates are a reliable vehicle for the Embassy post to influence the behavior of local national security forces.

5. Immediate support and favorable base rights negotiations for Desert Storm were directly attributable to IMET graduates.

6. Nowhere in the AOR is IMET so important as in Africa. IMET is critical to maintaining mil-to-mil relationships; promoting democracy and a professional military ethic; and reinforcing the importance of regional peacekeeping roles.

	# of Students	Cost
Approximate funding per year:	1,777	$27 mil
Average $152 K/student		

F. <u>VIP/High Ranking Officer Visits:</u>

Purpose: HQ USEUCOM establishes working relationships and cooperation among current international military leaders.

and provides positive reinforcement of U.S. policies and increased country team access to national decision makers.

b. West Africa Training Cruise (WATC):

Purpose: WATC is a combined USACOM/EUCOM program to provide interaction and training between U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and naval and ground personnel of those countries receiving ship visits. During FY93 three African nations participated in maneuvers with the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships during visits to West Africa. WATC provides, at no cost to USEUCOM, excellent support to promoting mil-to-mil contact, humanitarian/civic assistance and training for both the African and U.S. militaries.

c. Biodiversity:

Purpose: To support conservation and biological diversity projects in sub-Saharan Africa -- maintain wildlife habitats and develop wildlife management, fisheries and plant conservation. FY93 funding was $12.8 million. The program effectively uses the existing military organization as the prime mover for projects in direct support of non-lethal programs that promote conservation, tourism, and encourage self-sufficiency. It encourages African militaries to engage in nation building activities.

PA90M

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

2 December 1994

Dear Mr. White,

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the major issues being reviewed by the Commission on Roles and Missions. We believe the Pacific Command is addressing effective and efficient solutions to many of these challenges. We have an aggressive strategy that goes beyond employing forces solely to meet crises as they arise. It attempts to shape a future and a region that reflect our values and our views on economic growth, political progress, and military cooperation.

We call this strategy Cooperative Engagement. It encourages the sort of bilateral and multilateral interaction that supports peace and democracy among the 45 nations comprising the Pacific Command's area of responsibility. We conduct thousands of events annually and track them in order to measure our forward presence footprint. In FY 1994, we conducted 218 small scale exercises and over 100 lesser training events including multilateral exercises with Russia, Canada, Japan, Thailand, British Forces Hong Kong, and Singapore. We also conducted or sponsored 18 multilateral symposiums and conferences, and scores of staff talks and exchange programs. We manage this dynamic process with a matrix of Cooperative Engagement. It allows us to measure our forward presence footprint and evaluate the effectiveness of resources in accomplishing our national ends. Forward presence is the key to Cooperative Engagement.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM taught us the value of having as many regional friends as possible for ship, aircraft, and personnel access to ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities enroute to the Middle East. However, soon after our success in the Gulf War, we withdrew from U.S. facilities in the Philippines. This experience suggests there are no new bases in the future, and therefore our strategic goal is increased access to places. We envision greater efficiencies through multilateral military activities in the region. Our goal is to enhance interoperability with nations in the region and share the burden of security. This will allow us to remain constructively engaged in regional security issues and prevents a leadership vacuum which could develop along lines counter to both U.S. and local interests.

I am enclosing a paper on USPACOM that addresses how we develop and manage programs to achieve assurance and influence objectives, our methodology and funding, and a few examples of our successes.

Sincerely,

R. C. MACKE
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. John P. White
Chairman, Commission on Roles and Missions
1100 Wilson Blvd. Suite 1200F
Arlington, Virginia 22209

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND OVERSEAS PRESENCE AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO ASSURANCE AND INFLUENCE

INTRODUCTION

Cooperative Engagement is the U.S. Pacific Command's strategy for developing and managing programs to achieve "assurance" and "influence" objectives in support of the interests of the United States and its Asia-Pacific neighbors by:

- Promoting comprehensive security cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
- Building on a platform of strong alliances and bilateral relationships to sustain military stability and economic growth.
- Fostering an environment conducive to multilateral cooperation in solving security challenges.
- Deterring aggression and providing for adequate crisis response capability through forward presence.
- Integrating all components of America's national power -- economic, political, social, and military.

Cooperative Engagement is a future-shaping strategy that affordably employs limited means, but exploits all available ways of achieving desired ends. Ultimately, our strategy earns its future-shaping potential when we can innovatively and efficiently manage and orchestrate the means and ways to achieve the following desired end states:

a. In peace, we engage other nations with available means and encourage other nations to participate in forward presence activities.

b. In a crisis, our goal is to deter hostilities and instill cooperation of other nations in the region sharing mutual security concerns.

c. In conflict, we will prevail over our foes. While USCINCPAC prefers a coalition approach and enlists the support of our many friends and allies in a multilateral response, we are prepared to act unilaterally, if necessary, to secure U.S. interests.

ACCOMPLISHING OUR ENDS

Forces, assets, funds, and programs are the means to accomplish our ends. We plan, train, exercise, and operate with over forty nations in the region to carry out missions such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian/civic assistance. Bilateral security interests provide opportunities for political and economic dialogue as well. Beyond traditional roles of military forces--a flexible and adaptable process to deal with the international environment.

Cooperative Engagement uses the means available to USINCPAC, in three principal ways, to achieve desired ends spanning the full spectrum of relations among nations. The means include a force level of 354,000 personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard. These assets are provided by the service component commanders who are responsible for maintaining the training and ready status of these forces on a daily basis. Funds are provided via the Service Program Objective Memorandum which is influenced by the Pacific Command Integrated Priority List.

There are three ways to employ means. First, forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts, in addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat. Second, strong alliances provide active and high-profile opportunities to exercise, train, and work with allies and friends; building strong bilateral relationships; developing compatible operating procedures; encouraging multilateral dialogue and agreement; and lending credibility and demonstrating U.S. commitment to alliance partners. Finally, we have established a two-tier Joint Task Force concept, to deal with crisis response to rapidly deal with contingencies, to deter an aggressor, or to fight to win as part of a coalition, or even unilaterally if U.S. interests are threatened.

U.S. Pacific Command, along with the other unified commands, does not directly participate in the annual budget process. Funding for this headquarters is provided annually by the Navy for travel, administration, equipment, and supplies. That does not mean, however, that we are without influence in development of the annual DOD Budget Submission. The CINCs participate in both the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). JSPS is the formal consultation by which the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CINCs of the combatant commands assess current strategy, proposed programs and budgets, and proposed military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives. PPBS and JSPS provide the CINCs with a voice in critical choices affecting the best possible mix of missions, forces, equipment, and support to the combatant commands. Both processes are interrelated and allow for continuous assessment providing flexibility to today's rapidly changing global environment.

While providing strategic focus, Cooperative Engagement reaches out to other nations in the region to encourage their participation through USCINCPAC's process of adaptive forward presence by tailoring presence, programs, and actions across the continuum of operations.

MANAGING ENGAGEMENT

Forward presence is essential to our concept of operations. It ties together U.S. interests and objectives and takes on many shapes. These can include high level visits, defense attaché activities, military sales, military-to-military contact programs, exchange and training programs (including IMET and training assistance), multilateral seminars and conferences, exercises, small unit exchanges, humanitarian and civic assistance, port calls, band visits, and staff talks. The goal is to optimize our efforts to support the entire area of responsibility, institutionalize a process that supports greater unity of effort and synchronizes forward presence activities.

Managing engagement is a challenging and complex problem with over forty bilateral relationships and no over arching security arrangements in the region. A smaller force structure and fewer resources to support our interests constrain future effectiveness. Developing essential relationships in an era of reduced resources increases U.S. leverage to resolve regional threats, maintain stability and promote crisis prevention. There, we promote coalition building and multilateral activities before a crisis arises. The bottom line for managing engagement:

- Interoperability with our regional friends and allies contributes to peace and regional stability and increases transparency with respect to military capabilities and intentions.

- Multilateral military activity promotes security dialogue, trust, and understanding, thereby enhancing the framework for crisis response in the region.

- Engagement increases opportunities to use available repair and training facilities without having to return to U.S. ports and airfields for maintenance and proficiency/readiness.

We foster long-term regional stability which facilitates the growth of promising Pacific regional markets for U.S. exports, in accordance with our national economic strategy. These relationships make multilateral crisis response easier by developing a full awareness in our subordinate commanders of the strengths and weaknesses of other regional militaries and nurturing doctrinal and tactical interoperability. To have broad influence and bridge the vast physical separation created by the Pacific, we must be forward.

THE COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT MATRIX PROCESS

The U.S. Pacific Command has developed a universal process for unified commands to manage forward presence activities, planning processes, and allocation of scarce resources. We call it the Cooperative Engagement Matrix. The Matrix provides the staff with a data base to formulate recommendations, prioritize forward presence activities, and conduct comparative analyses for

commanders. The Matrix emphasizes unity of effort, provides a way to deconflict activities, and justify the means to support U.S. regional goals and objectives in an era of reduced resources. The Matrix provides commanders with oversight of forward presence activities to ensure they have the right tool for the right time and place in the future.

We group nations in the region by strategic relevance and provide component commands with engagement objectives for every country. On a quarterly basis, we gather information from the staff and component commands, and build a data base for the entire region. The data base provides a broad overview of the entire region and permits us to track these against goals and objectives for each country. Quarterly assessments of the Matrix enable us to avoid over engagement, judge whether the command is effectively meeting its goals, and determine shortfalls. The last part of the process is to provide guidance to component commanders through quarterly review and feedback.

COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT MATRIX ASSESSMENT

The Cooperative Engagement Matrix Assessment (CEMA) reflects the level of forward presence activity and military-to-military contact programs by country. It is an assessment of emperical data in the Cooperative Engagement Matrix for USCINCPAC and component commander consumption. The Matrix depicts three groups of countries. Group I consists of countries that are treaty allies and those that USCINCPAC has identified as a high/special interest in tracking forward presence activities. Group II includes newly developed countries and operating locations of Joint Task Force FULL ACCOUNTING. Group III consists of all others.

CEMA charts depict military-to-military contacts throughout USCINCPAC's area of responsibility. CEMA correlates forward presence levels in Group I, II, and III nations directly with U.S. security concerns. Except in situations where military-to-military contacts are suspended, USCINCPAC's goal is to engage all nations in the region at an appropriate level commensurate with the availability of resources.

Based on a review of military activity within pre-established categories, USCINCPAC determines if U.S. goals and objectives are being met within current resources. A recommendation is then made to increase or decrease resources to meet country and regional objectives. The assets discussed earlier are the means available to USCINCPAC to support the Cooperative Engagement Strategy.

The U.S. Pacific Command has no discretionary funds available to support the engagement strategy. USPACOM is wholly dependent on the largesse of the State Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services for what limited resources are available. These include the people, the Operations and Maintenance funds required to maintain trained and ready forces and base/stationing costs, JCS

strategic lift, CINCs Initiative Funds, Security Assistance Funds (including IMET), Military-to-Military Contact Program funds, and Title 10 funds for developing nations. All are currently under funded which stresses the bilateral and multilateral ties supporting our strategy in the region.

The relative importance and effectiveness of the elements of overseas presence are listed below in the order of effectiveness in meeting USPACOM goals. They are ranked based upon the Integrated Priority List, which reflects the war fighting requirements for the theater. Due to the situation on the Korean peninsula, our requirements are focused on credible deterrence, robust war fighting capabilities in order to "fight to win," and regional stability for the remainder of the theater.

RANK

FORCE STRUCTURE/OPTEMPO
MULTILATERAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES
BASE/STATIONING INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REGIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The following anecdotal evidence provides striking examples of the success of our Cooperative Engagement Strategy.

a. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As a strong measure of USPACOM influence, nations throughout the region provided access to ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities for personnel, ships, and aircraft transiting the theater enroute to the Middle East. Beyond access, U.S. influence was instrumental in Japan's commitment of mine sweepers and billions of dollars to offset the expenses of U.S. and coalition force, and in Korea's support of sealift, in kind support, and offset of U.S. expenses.

b. Places, Not Bases. Assurance and influence are best reflected in Singapore's offer to host small U.S. Air Force and Navy detachments in order to retain some vestige of permanent overseas presence in Southeast Asia. This followed the Philippines Government decision not to renew leases to Clark Air Base and U.S. facilities at Subic Bay. It is a measure of trust and the desire for the U.S. to remain engaged that Singapore invited the U.S. to maintain a permanent presence, and its neighbors offered access to airfields, training ranges and maintenance facilities. Additionally, regional political leaders acknowledge U.S. contributions to regional stability, and have expanded the scope of ASEAN to include Senior Minister security dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

c. UN Peacekeeping Operations. Regional participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations is a recent phenomena that is an outgrowth of U.S. regional assurance and influence. Three principal factors leading to regional participation in UN

peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kuwait, and the Middle East are:

- U.S. military training and education programs. Participation in combined exercise programs, IMET, unit exchange programs, and bilateral staff talks has raised the quality of forces in the region, and promoted the role transition from internal self defense to national defense and sovereignty. Regional military forces, schooled in U.S. doctrine and operations, have raised the proficiency and comfort level of regional militaries participating in UN peacekeeping operations. This prompted many of the positive responses to UN requests for an international force in Somalia, Mozambique, and Haiti.

- Desire to be responsible members of the international community. At the end of WWII, nations in the region emerged from the shadow of European colonialism only to combat the insidious threat of internal insurgencies. During this period, the U.S. provided the framework for regional stability which allowed nations to focus on political and economic reform. Having overcome many obstacles on the road to independence, Asian nations desire the equality, respect, and recognition accorded to European nations and are willing to commit the resources to achieve these goals.

- Remain engaged with the U.S. There is strong regional desire to politically and militarily align with the U.S. in UN peacekeeping operations. This is a win-win proposition for the region because it keeps the last remaining superpower engaged in the region, and prevents a leadership vacuum which could develop along lines counter to both U.S. and local interests. Participation in UN peacekeeping ops also relieves the U.S. of some of the burden for far-flung regional security which enables the U.S. to continue to provide uninterrupted regional stability.

d. Cooperative Engagement is USCINCPAC's strategy to secure U.S. interests in the Pacific and to promote regional stability essential for economic development and democratic progress throughout the region. The results of our efforts are evident in many nations in this theater. For example:

- In Korea and Cambodia we support the very existence of democracy with U.S. forces and support of United Nations efforts;

- In Thailand and the Philippines our military programs serve to foster military restraint, encourage the democratic process, and discourage the use of force to solve political issues;

- In India, the world's largest democracy has found common ground with the United States in our desire for regional stability and our use of modest military cooperation to promote an increasingly productive dialogue;

- And, in Russia, Mongolia, Nepal, and Bangladesh, military outreach programs, including personnel exchanges and multinational conferences, provide some of our basic, least expensive, most symbolic, and yet substantive contacts. Clearly, our military programs with these nations and others have had, and continue to have, a direct effect on the health of democracy and the depth of democratic sentiments among military and civilian leaders as well as the people at large.

CONCLUSION

U.S. regional effectiveness is expected to continue to grow in the future in relation to our strategy of Cooperative Engagement. The extent to which our political and economic interests are fulfilled in the future, will be determined by the degree to which we remain actively engaged in the dynamics of the region. That is to say that U.S. assurance and influence can be measured by our ability to have adequate, well trained forces that are forward deployed and engaged with friends who share our interests and are willing to deal with the realities. The result will be an Asia-Pacific region that continues its dynamic economic and political growth with the U.S. as a leading player, partner, and beneficiary.

SOUTHCOM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO AA 34003

November 21, 1994

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Office of the Deputy Commander in Chief

Mr. John P. White
Chairman, Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces
1100 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1200F
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. White:

The SOUTHCOM staff has prepared the enclosed response to your queries on how we achieve our strategic objectives in this theater and achieve the "assurance" and "influence" objectives you mentioned. SOUTHCOM has a unique role to play in fostering our nation's security interests within the Western Hemisphere. That role will expand as our country becomes more engaged with the Americas, through increased trade opportunities and political openings that come from working with the democratic nations within this region. The Summit of the Americas, which will occur in Miami, Florida next month, is a clear indication of the importance this region holds for the future of he United States.

SOUTHCOM is an organization uniquely configured to face the challenges of the post-cold war era. Our organization, its structure, and the people who work here are keyed to the difficult challenges of what the military calls "Operations Other Than War." To SOUTHCOM, most of these "operations" are not new. We have been intimately involved in "low intensity conflict," "humanitarian and civic action," "peacekeeping," peace enforcement," "counterdrug," "disaster relief," and scores of other missions that characterize the new world "disorder." These missions have been part of our charter for decades and we have a wealth of knowledge and experience performing them. Simply put, we at SOUTHCOM believe that what we do, we do better than anyone else.


I hope the information we have provided will be useful to your commission. General McCaffrey looks forward to sharing with you his perspectives on the Unified Command Plan. We will be forwarding his "think piece" to you shortly. In the meantime, if there is anything else we at SOUTHCOM can do to assist your efforts, please do not hesitate to call the SCJ5 Project Officer, COL Leon Rios, at DSN 313-282-4715/3512, or commercial 011-507-82-4715/3512.

Very Respectfully,

Enclosure

J.B. PERKINS, III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Commander in Chief

USSOUTHCOM



Perspective for Roles and Missions Commission on Overseas Presence

For Official Use Only
Limited Distribution

21 November 1994

PURPOSE

- TO PROVIDE SOUTHCOM STRATEGY FOR MANAGING PROGRAMS TO ACHIEVE ASSURANCE & INFLUENCE OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
- TO ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
- TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTHCOM STRATEGY FOR A REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND EMPLOYING "BELOW THE LINE" RESOURCES AND MEANS


SOUTHCOM STRATEGY

- RECOGNIZES UNIQUE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF THE AMERICAS AND ITS PROXIMITY TO (AND INCLUSION OF) THE UNITED STATES
- SEEKS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL SECURITY & STABILITY, PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, AND ENHANCE MILITARY SUBORDINATION TO CIVIL AUTHORITY
- EMPHASIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF MEANS (RESOURCES) THAT FACILITATE THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

SOUTHCOM "FACTS"

- MODEL FOR FUTURE REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMANDS WITH AN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) FOCUS
- PROBABILITY OF MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY (MRC) LOW THIS DECADE
- PROBABILITY OF LESSER REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES (LRC) & OOTW HIGH
- KEY ROLE OF NON-DOD ACTORS AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
- USE OF "BELOW THE LINE" FORCES VS. "ABOVE THE LINE FORCES" TO ACHIEVE ASSURANCE & INFLUENCE OBJECTIVES

PROPOSED SOUTHCOM REGIONAL STRATEGY MODEL



SOUTHCOM RESOURCES ("MEANS")*



COMBINED EXERCISES

MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING EXERCISE (MEDRETE)

DETECTION & MONITORING

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCE (FMF)

& VETERINARY READINESS TRAINING EXERCISE (VETRETE)

UNIT LEVEL EXCHANGES

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EXCHANGES (SMEE)

JOINT PROCESS ACTION TEAMS (JPAT) & TACTICAL ANALYSIS TEAMS (TAT)

DEPLOYMENTS FOR TRAINING (DFT) & MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTT)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION & TRAINING (IMET)

INTELLIGENCE SHARING

HUMANITARIAN & CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA)

STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS

***BELOW THE LINE FORCES**

FOUO/LIMDIS

SOUTHCOM PROGRAMS ("WAYS")

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN

INTELLIGENCE SHARING
COMBINED EXERCISES
FMF & IMET
HCA PROGRAMS
STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS
DFTs & MTTs
UNIT LEVEL EXCHANGES
PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES
OPGs, TATs, JPATs
PSYOPS PROGRAMS
DETECTION & MONITORING



MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACT

COMBINED EXERCISES
FMF & IMET
SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS
DFTs & MTTs
SERVICE COOP PROGRAMS
UNIT LEVEL EXCHANGES
HCA PROGRAMS
PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES

NATION ASSISTANCE

CIVIL AFFAIRS SEMINARS
ENGINEER ACTIVITIES
MEDRETES & VETRETES
DOD EXCESS PROPERTY
SMEEs
DFTs & MTTs

"MEANS" OFTEN SERVE MULTIPLE PROGRAMS

EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

- COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN

GOOD:

- ⇨ PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES
- ⇨ STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS
- ⇨ DETECTION & MONITORING

BETTER:

- ⇨ COMBINED EXERCISES
- ⇨ DFTs & MTTs

BEST

- ⇨ INTELLIGENCE SHARING
- ⇨ TATs & JPATs

EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

- MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACT

  GOOD:

  - ⇨ UNIT LEVEL EXCHANGES
  - ⇨ STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS
  - ⇨ PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES

  BETTER:

  - ⇨ COMBINED EXERCISES
  - ⇨ HCA PROGRAMS

  BEST

  - ⇨ FMF & IMET (SCHOOLS)
  - ⇨ DFTs & MTTs

EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

- NATION ASSISTANCE

  GOOD:

  - ⇨ PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES
  - ⇨ STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS
  - ⇨ SMEEs

  BETTER:

  - ⇨ DOD EXCESS PROPERTY
  - ⇨ CIVIL AFFAIRS SEMINARS

  BEST

  - ⇨ HCA PROGRAMS
  - ⇨ ENGINEER/MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

  ⇨ INCREASED NUMBER OF COMBINED EXERCISES (*FUERZAS UNIDAS*) WITH ANDEAN RIDGE COUNTRIES (ECUADOR, COLOMBIA)

  ⇨ IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN COUNTRIES (BEFORE MAY 1994)

  ⇨ INCREASED NUMBER OF HOST NATION RIDERS ON US COUNTERDRUG AIRCRAFT

  ⇨ INCREASED CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY FORCES (OPERATION BORDER CRUNCH)

  ⇨ IMPROVED ACCESS TO KEY SOURCE COUNTRY MILITARIES

  ⇨ IMPROVED HOST NATION POLICE/MILITARY COOPERATION IN CD EFFORTS

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACT

  - ⇨ REAL CHANGES IN HOST NATION MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
  - ⇨ INCREASED MILITARY SUPPORT TO MAINTAINING CIVIL AUTHORITY AND ACCEPTING CIVIL CONTROL
  - ⇨ INCREASED MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND TRAINING
  - ⇨ INCREASED REGIONAL COOPERATION (*CABAÑAS* I & II, CENTAM 94)
  - ⇨ IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING
  - ⇨ INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN *UNITAS* VISITS
  - ⇨ IMPROVED CIVIL-MILITARY CONTACT
  - ⇨ IMPROVED VISIBILITY OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS (BUDGET, JUSTICE) TO CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
  - ⇨ INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF MILITARY WITH NGOS

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- NATION ASSISTANCE
  - ⇨ IMPROVED INFRASTRUCTURE (ROADS, SCHOOLS, BRIDGES, SANITATION, & HEALTH FACILITIES) *FUERTES CAMINOS* (EL SALVADOR, BELIZE, COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA HONDURAS, PANAMA, URUGUAY)
  - ⇨ IMPROVED HOST NATION ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES (EXCESS EQUIPMENT, TRAINING)
  - ⇨ IMPROVED BASIC MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CARE IN REMOTE AREAS
  - ⇨ INCREASED INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE BASIC HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DUE TO SCHOOLING OPPORTUNITIES
  - ⇨ IMPROVED CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES OF HOST NATION MILITARIES
  - ⇨ INCREASED SUPPORT TO EACH COUNTRY TEAM'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

RECENT SOUTHCOM SUCCESS STORIES

EL SALVADOR*

- CONTINUED SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING PEACE ACCORDS
- TRANSITION OF MILITARY (ESAF) FROM COMBAT-ORIENTED FORCE TO A PEACE-TIME FORCE
- WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT FOR *FUERTES CAMINOS* (3RD EXERCISE TO BEGIN IN JAN 95)
- SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN PROFESSIONALISM OF ESAF
- DEVELOPED MODEL PROGRAM IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (HIGH STRATEGIC STUDIES COURSE)
- INTEGRATED COUNTRY TEAM STRATEGY FOR SUPPORTING THE PEACE PROCESS




*ALTHOUGH MUCH SUCCESS, MUCH WORK REMAINS TO ENSURE WE "WIN THE PEACE"

RECENT SOUTHCOM SUCCESS STORIES

BRAZIL*

- OPENING TO MILITARY HAS REAPED POLITICAL BENEFITS
- INCREASED ACCESS TO MILITARY HAS IMPROVED OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP
- HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGE VISITS AND STAFF TALKS ARE NOW OCCURRING BETWEEN U.S. & BRAZILIAN MILITARY
- INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY




*THE LARGEST NATION IN SOUTHCOM'S AOR IS BECOMING A REGIONAL PARTNER

POTENTIAL SOUTHCOM SUCCESS STORIES

PERU*

- UNDER U.S. SANCTIONS SINCE APRIL 1992
- COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED BY LACK OF U.S. SUPPORT
- COUNTRY EXPERIENCING A SOCIAL/ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
- TERRORIST THREAT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED
- CONSISTENT ECONOMIC GROWTH
- INFLATION UNDER CONTROL
- POPULATION SUPPORTS FUJIMORI ADMINISTRATION AND POLICIES
- MILITARY PROUD OF SUCCESS AGAINST TERRORIST THREAT. TURNING ATTENTION TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS




*PERU WARMING TO U.S. SUPPORT. WILLING TO WORK TOGETHER, BUT NOT SUBORDINATE TO U.S CONTROL.

SOUTHCOM "LESS THAN SUCCESS" STORIES

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

- SOUTHCOM EFFORT HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE, BUT LITTLE TO SHOW
- NO REAL INFLUENCE ON DRUG AVAILABILITY IN U.S.
- AERIAL INTERDICTION NOT COST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF EMPLOYMENT OF ASSETS
- NEED FOR A NEW REGIONAL APPROACH IN CONCERT WITH PDD-14
- CURRENTLY REASSESSING BEST UTILIZATION OF LIMITED ASSETS



○ RADAR SITES

CONCLUSIONS

- SOUTHCOM UNIQUELY CONFIGURED TO ACHIEVE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE AMERICAS
- SOUTHCOM POLICIES AND STRATEGIES BEST SUPPORT A REGIONAL CINC'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE AMERICAS
- SOUTHCOM EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYING THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAS
- SOUTHCOM PROVIDES THE BEST MODEL OF A REGIONAL UNIFIED CINC FOR A POST-COLD WAR ERA

PRES [32]

LTC BROWN, J5
6756
10 NOV 1994

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Assessment of Special Operations Forces Contributions to Overseas Presence

FACTS:

1. Special Operations Forces (SOF) make unique contributions to the geographic CINC's overseas presence efforts. These joint, tailored, rapidly deployable, and uniquely trained forces give CINCs influence, reassurance, deterrence and crisis response capabilities. These units have vast operational experience (139 countries in FY94), are regionally oriented, language trained, and culturally attuned. Specifically trained to interact with host country personnel, these experienced, mature, low profile professionals provide one of a kind support to overseas presence. USSOCOM receives only 1.2% of the DoD budget and its military manpower is only 1.7% of the total force. Yet SOF is increasingly seen as a strategic economy of force option since employment involves inherently small numbers of troops and at relatively low cost. USSOCOM annually expends approximately $45 million dollars in Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) funds for both the Joint and Combined Exercise Training (JCET) and CJCS Exercise Programs.

2. SOF contributes to overseas presence by favorably influencing events abroad, providing reassurance to allies, deterring aggression and providing a rapid crisis response capability through the following activities:

a. Forward Deployed Forces. The small size and cultural/language orientation of these forces make them ideal participants in activities with host nation forces who are easily overwhelmed by large troop formations. Since these forward based SOF are under the combatant command of the geographic CINC he can take advantage of their capabilities to influence, reassure, deter and respond to a crisis.

b. CONUS Based Crisis Response. Designated SOF units are able to respond to any geographic CINC's requirements within a few hours. These units provide a CINC with unique options when planning contingency operations or when responding in crisis situations.

c. CJCS Exercise Program. SOF units participate in up to sixty exercises per year. To support this program, USCINCSOC expends approximately $29 million dollars annually from MFP-11 funds. Almost all of these exercises are conducted in the geographic CINC's theater. However, occasionally an exercise will be conducted in CONUS with foreign units under this program. For example SOUTHCOM has conducted exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, with forces from Latin America. This allowed that CINC to expand his

influence to include activities outside his area of responsibility.

d. Joint and Combined Exercise Training (JCET). These events are coordinated between the geographic CINC, to support his theater strategy, and SOF units to support the training requirements outlined in their Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). The regional Special Operations Command (SOC) develops a plan that supports this strategy and meets the unit training requirements. USSOCOM then schedules and resources these planned events. These deployments are, by definition, executed with host nation's forces. Each deployment leaves a legacy of influence and reassurance which helps deter future crises. This legacy often lasts for years and makes SOF an effective tool to implement overseas presence strategies. The value of this program is evident by the 225% global increase in frequency over the last four years. In FY91, 986 JCETs were conducted worldwide. In FY 94 that number grew to 2,216. In support of these FY94 deployments USCINCSOC expended $15.5 million dollars in MFP-11 O&M funds.

e. Special Activities. SOF are involved in special activities around the world in support of geographic CINC requirements. Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT) are present in many US embassies to assist country teams in their counter drug operations. Disaster Area Relief Teams (DART) have deployed in support of humanitarian relief efforts. Active Overt Peacetime PSYOP Programs (OP3) engage small teams of specialists with host nation governments from the ministerial level to the tactical level. Small SOF teams are facilitating demining operations around the world. SOF provide Regional Survey Teams (RST) to support the Integrated Survey Plans (ISP).

3. As geographic CINC's implement their theater strategies of influence, reassurance, deterrence and crisis response, they increasingly turn to SOF. This testifies to the value they place on SOF's unique contributions to overseas presence.

Appendix J

CARRIER PRESENCE PLANNING

Appendix J
CARRIER PRESENCE FORCE PLANNING

Overseas deployment of maritime forces has been the centerpiece of the United States presence strategy. Thus we have been examining options for employing carriers to generate overseas military presence, with the objective of determining how many carriers are required in the force structure to generate a given level of presence under a given set of management alternatives. We define levels of presence in terms of the fraction of time that a carrier is present in three overseas theaters—the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific Ocean—and the distance from each theater at which one can consider the carrier to be present—the tether length. The potential management alternatives we consider include variations in the transit time of the carrier from its homeport to the theaters, carrier deployment time, alternative homeports, and variations in carrier PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO. This paper describes the model we use to compute the carrier requirement as a function of the level of presence and the management alternatives. It presents the results of our analysis in terms of the number of carriers required in the force structure under various combinations of levels of presence and management alternatives.[1]

FORCE PLANNING APPROACH

This section of the paper describes the model we used to calculate the carrier force requirements and gives the carrier management alternatives and levels of presence considered in the analysis.

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[1] While we discuss aircraft carriers in this paper, we have also used the model to project requirements for amphibious assault ships under various theater coverage and management alternative combinations. The model is constructed such that one could use it to estimate presence force structure requirements for any class of ship.

IDA Force Presence Model

IDA used its modification of the Navy's Force Presence Model, version 1.0, to project carrier requirements.[2] The IDA Force Presence Model (and the Navy model) starts from the levels of theater coverage provided from each carrier homeport (in terms of the fraction of time a carrier from each homeport is present in the theater) and calculates the number of carriers required to be based at each homeport. The model also calculates, as a function of the operation cycle length (time between overhauls) and total deployment time during the operation cycle, for the carriers deployed to each theater, the relationship between personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO, fraction of time crews spend in homeport and in homeport area) and carrier operational tempo (OPTEMPO, the number of steaming days available per quarter in homeport area). The improvements for the IDA model incorporate the effect of "tethering" carriers to theaters, or counting them present in the theaters at user-selected distances or times away from the theaters.

The model calculates as follows the number of carriers required to be based at each homeport, for each homeport and for each theater to which carriers are to be deployed from that homeport:

$$\frac{\textit{Carriers} = \textit{Operation Cycle Length} + \textit{Overhaul Length}}{\textit{Time Present in Theater During Operation Cycle}} \quad \frac{\textit{Coverage}\ (\text{in percent})}{100},$$

where

Operation Cycle Length is the time in months between overhauls

Overhaul Length is the time in months spent in a single overhaul

Coverage is the fraction of time carriers from the homeport will be present in theater

Time Present in Theater is the time in months during its Operation Cycle that a single carrier would spend in theater.

Operation Cycle Length and *Overhaul Length* are driven by maintenance requirements (alternative maintenance schedules can change both values, however); *Coverage* is as desired by the user; and *Time Present in Theater* is given by:

Time Present in Theater = Deployment Time in Cycle - Total Transit Time in Cycle,

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2 This work follows upon work done at the Center for Naval Analyses concerning the possibility of increasing forward naval presence with a fixed force structure. William F. Morgan, *The Navy's Deployment Arithmetic—Can It Add Up to a Larger Navy?*, Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 94-2, August 1994.

where

Deployment Time in Cycle = *Number of Deployments* x *Deployment Length,*

Total Transit Time = *Number of Deployments* x *Transit Time per Deployment,*

where

$$\textit{Transit Time per Deployment} = 2 \times \frac{(\textit{Travel Time} + \textit{Delay Time} - \textit{Tether Time})}{30.4 \text{ days/month}},$$

where

Travel Time is the distance from the homeport to the theater divided by the ship *Speed*, divided by 24 hours/day.

Delay Time is the time in days spent during each leg of the deployment in port visits or maintenance stops,

Tether Time is either a user-selected value (in days), or a user-selected *Tether Distance* (in nautical miles) divided by the ship *Speed*, divided by 24 hours/day.

The *Number of Deployments* (per Operation Cycle) and the *Deployment Length* are selected by the user, but both variables affect the relationship between PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO and thus must be selected carefully to allow the carriers to meet Navy PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO guidelines. The ship *Speed*, the *Delay Time*, and the *Tether Time* are also selected by the user.

Given values for the variables above, the model calculates OPTEMPO (in terms of steaming days in homeport area available per quarter) as a function of PERSTEMPO (fraction of time spent in homeport) and the variables given above (*Operation Cycle Length* is abbreviated as *OC*):

$$\text{OPTEMPO} = 91.25 \text{ days} \times \frac{(\textit{OC} - \textit{OC} \times \text{PERSTEMPO} - \textit{Deployment Time in Cycle})}{\text{qtr} \qquad (\textit{OC-Deployment Time in Cycle})},$$

The relationship above allows the user to see whether, given the employment options selected, the carriers can still meet Navy PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO goals. The user can also employ the relationship to examine tradeoffs between the two policies.

Model Variables

Table J-1 shows the employment options IDA examined for the carriers in terms of the model variables, the current values for each variable, and the variations examined.

Table J-1. Carrier Employment Variables

Variable	Current Value	Variations Examined
Coverage (%)	75 (Med and IO), 100 (W Pac)	0-100 (for each theater)
Speed (kt)	14	16, 18
Delays (days)	10	5
Deployment Length (mo)	6	6.25, 6.5, 6.75, 7, 8
Homeporting	as slated for 1998	shift 1 CVN to Atlantic

The carrier management alternatives we examined were combinations of the current values and the variations of each variable. For variables reflecting personnel and carrier operational tempo (those other than Coverage), we selected minor perturbations of existing values to stay within current Navy policy guidelines, except when we were determining how much change in a single variable was required to change the total carrier requirement by at least one whole carrier.

CARRIER EMPLOYMENT ANALYTIC RESULTS—THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

Table J-2, *Carrier Presence Analyses*, and Table J-3, *Carrier Management Analyses*, contain the results of our analyses. Table J-2 shows the impact of theater coverage requirement on force size. Coverage is expressed in terms of the percentage of the time a carrier is present in theater and force size is given in terms of active carriers. For this part of the analysis we assumed that all carriers would be employed under current management policies. In selecting values for the coverage of each theater, we assumed that at no time would two adjacent theaters be "uncovered"; thus the coverage values in adjacent theaters must always add to 100 percent or more.

Table J-3 shows the impact of the management alternatives on force size requirements. It gives examples of management alternatives that would reduce the carrier force size required to maintain a given level of coverage in each theater.[3] In analyzing carrier management, we selected alternatives that required the minimum perturbations of the current policies and produced changes in the carrier force level equal to one or more whole carriers. In other words, we rejected options that produced changes less than one whole carrier and options that were greater perturbations of existing policy and produced a change

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[3] The tables are not comprehensive in that other combinations of management alternatives exist that will produce the same force structure requirements. The tables are merely intended to show representative combinations.

of one carrier, but did not produce a change of at least two carriers. The 15-carrier chart corresponds to continuous carrier presence in all theaters. The 11-carrier chart corresponds to the current policy of 75 percent presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and 100 percent presence in the West Pacific Ocean. The 15-carrier and 11-carrier rows of the charts show the current values for all policy variables. Where no value for a variable is given with an employment option, the value is equal to the value under current policy.

Table J-2. Carrier Presence Analyses (Current Management Policy)

Coverage (%)			Force
Mediterranean	Indian Ocean	West Pacific	
100	100	100	15 (+1)
75	100	100	13 (+1)
50	100	100	12 (+1)
25	100	100	11 (+1)
0	100	100	9 (+1)
100	75	100	13 (+1)
100	50	100	11 (+1)
100	25	100	9 (+1)
100	0	100	7 (+1)
75	75	100	11 (+1)
50	75	100	10 (+1)
25	75	100	8 (+1)
75	50	100	9 (+1)
75	25	100	7 (+1)
50	50	100	8 (+1)
75	100	75	12 (+1)
50	100	75	11 (+1)
25	100	75	9 (+1)
0	100	75	8 (+1)
100	100	75	13 (+1)
100	75	75	11 (+1)
100	50	75	9 (+1)
100	25	75	7 (+1)
75	75	75	10 (+1)
50	75	75	9 (+1)
25	75	75	7 (+1)
75	50	75	8 (+1)
75	25	75	6 (+1)
50	50	75	7 (+1)

Table J-3. Carrier Management Analyses
(Continuous Coverage in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and West Pacific)

Force	Management Alternatives			
	Speed of Advance (kt)	Port Visits Enroute (d)	Deployment Length (mo)	Shift CVN to Atlantic Homeport
15 (+1)	14	10	6	no
14 (+1)	16			
		5		
			6.25	
13 (+1)	16	5		yes
	18	5		
	16		6.25	
		5	6.25	
			7 (to IO only)	
12 (+1)	18	5	6.25	
			7	yes
	16		7 (to IO only)	yes
	16	5	6.5	

Table J-3. Carrier Management Analyses (Continued)
(75 Percent Coverage in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, 100 Percent in West Pacific)

Force	Management Alternatives			
	Speed of Advance (kt)	Port Visits Enroute (d)	Deployment Length (mo)	Shift CVN to Atlantic Homeport
11 (+1)	14	10	6	no
10 (+1)	18			
	16	5		
	16		6.25	
		5	6.25	
	16			yes
			6.5	
			6.75	
9 (+1)	18	5	7 (to IO only)	yes
			7	
	16	5	6.5	yes

Appendix K

CRISIS RESPONSIVENESS ASSESSMENTS

Appendix K
CRISIS RESPONSIVENESS ASSESSMENTS FOR PRESENCE ALTERNATIVES

One of the Joint Staff's four objectives of military presence is to enable combat forces to provide an initial crisis response. This paper assesses the differences in crisis responsiveness of the four presence postures considered under the Overseas Presence Task: the current posture (Posture I), a higher-maritime-presence alternative (Posture II), and two lower-maritime-presence alternatives (Postures III and IV). The paper first describes the four presence postures in terms their attributes relevant to crisis response. It then presents our criteria for assessing the differences in crisis responsiveness of the postures. Finally, it presents our assessment of the crisis responsiveness of each posture.

THE PRESENCE POSTURES

Posture I—The Baseline

Under Posture I, today's presence posture, a combination of forces from all four Services contribute to achieving the objectives of presence. Maritime and land-based forces are routinely deployed to key regions, supplementing forward stationed forces. In a crisis, additional forces are deployed as required.

The regional CINCs have stated requirements for military presence in addition to those forces stationed forward and those participating in military to military engagement. The CINCs require that of a carrier battlegroup (CVBG) and an amphibious ready group (ARG) be continuously present in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and West Pacific Ocean

Today's naval force structure of 11 CVBGs (plus one deployable training carrier), under current Navy management policies, is insufficient to provide the required coverage even though the force structure contains one CVBG above that required to fight two major

regional conflicts (MRCs).[1] The coverage shortfall is reconciled by accepting 75 percent CVBG coverage in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean theaters and keeping CVBGs in theaters adjacent to "uncovered" theaters on "tethers" within fixed distances from the uncovered theaters. Continuous coverage is maintained in the West Pacific theater by the CVBG and the ARG homeported in Japan. Because the homeporting arrangement is so efficient from the perspective of providing presence, this assessment does not consider changing the maritime presence in the West Pacific under any of the alternative presence postures.

Posture II—Continuous Maritime Presence

Under Posture II the Navy would provide continuous coverage in all three theaters with a CVBG and an ARG. There would be no gaps in coverage and no need to tether forces to adjacent theaters. This posture would require a larger CVBG force structure.[2] Land-based forces would continue to provide presence and crisis response capabilities as in Posture I.

Posture III—Reduced Maritime Presence Supplemented with Land-Based Forces

Under Posture III the Navy would provide 100 percent coverage of the three theaters with joint force packages for presence and crisis response. In the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean these force packages would center on either a carrier (CV or CVN) or an amphibious assault ship (LHD or LHA). In the West Pacific the package would center on CVBG plus an ARG as configured now. The deployments of carriers and amphibious assault ships to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean would be scheduled so that each theater would be covered half of the time by a CV/CVN package and half of the time by an LHD/LHA package. At all times there would be a CV/CVN package in one theater or the other. Thus Posture III would require 50 percent coverage of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean theaters by a carrier and 50 percent coverage by an amphibious assault ship (the

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1 Today's force of 11 ARGs is sufficient to provide continuous coverage in all three theaters under slightly different management policies. Today the ARGs deploy to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean on a schedule somewhat different from that which the CVBGs follow. Because the carrier force structure is more tightly constrained with respect to forward presence than is the amphibious assault ship force structure, this paper focuses on the CVBG.

2 See James S. Thomason et al., "Force Structure Assessments for Presence Alternatives," *Presence Analyses for the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, Draft Final, April 1995.

coverage of the West Pacific would remain at 100 percent by a carrier and an amphibious assault ship).

There are many conceivable variations of joint force packages for presence and crisis response. In the example considered here, CV/CVN-based packages would retain their tacair capabilities and some cruise missile (TLAM)-capable escorts, but would also be assigned special forces capable of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and other missions, and infantry units capable of air, air-land, or ship insertion. These forces would be trained to work with the package. Land-based combat infantry units overseas or in CONUS would be on call to respond as required. The LHD/LHA-based packages would retain NEO and many other standard ARG capabilities, but would have additional TLAM-capable escorts and would be bolstered by the active, organized support of land-based air assets that would train with the package and would be on call to the regional CINC.

Posture IV—Restructured Areas of Responsibility to Reduce Maritime Presence Requirements

Posture IV would retain the traditional CVBG and ARG as the centerpiece of forward naval presence, but would combine the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean into a single area of responsibility which the Navy would cover continuously. The CVBG and the ARG would remain together but would split their time equally between the two locations. The West Pacific would be covered as it is today, by a CVBG and an ARG continuously. Thus Posture IV would require the same carrier and amphibious assault ship overseas deployment as Posture III: 50 percent coverage of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and 100 percent coverage of the West Pacific.

Land-based forces would continue to provide crisis response capability in both theaters and as per Posture III we would enhance the number and quality of the overseas activities and exercises that contribute most to achieving the CINCs other presence objectives. If necessary, Posture IV would include the prepositioning of additional materiel overseas to meet the MRC force arrival requirements given in the *Defense Planning Guidance*.

CRISIS RESPONSIVENESS ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

We selected two criteria to assess the crisis responsiveness of the presence postures: the capability of the potentially available forces to perform the military functions that the CINCs might require in a crisis, and response time. The adequacy of a force under both criteria is essential to effective crisis response. If a capable force arrives on the scene

of a crisis too late to prevent unacceptable damage to U.S. interests, the response will be a failure. Likewise, if an insufficiently capable force arrives on the scene even immediately, it will be unable to prevent unacceptable damage to U.S. interests and thus the response will be a failure. This section presents a representative set of military functions the CINCs might require in a crisis and our assessments of the capabilities of the crisis response forces to perform them. It then describes how we calculated response times for the crisis response forces likely to be available to the CINCs. To facilitate our analyses we divided crisis response forces into three general categories: maritime forces, land-based forces stationed in or deployed to the theater in which the crisis occurs, and land-based forces operating from CONUS. These categories reflect generally the forces' means of deployment (and thus response time), their capabilities to perform the representative set of military functions, and the potential for political restrictions on their use.

Having presented our criteria for assessing the crisis responsiveness of military forces, we note that the capability to respond quickly is not the only capability important for military forces to possess in a crisis. In some circumstances it is necessary for a force to sustain itself over the course of a crisis or to loiter in the vicinity of a crisis for an extended period of time, ready to carry out military functions. Nevertheless, sustainment and loitering are not critical at the beginning of a crisis. Therefore, while the United States does need forces with those capabilities, the forces need not be deployed the same way as forces the United States relies upon for *initial* crisis response. Fort this reason, and because overseas deployment requirements currently drive the size of the force structure with respect to presence, we do not expressly consider the capabilities of forces to sustain themselves or loiter here.

Military Function Performance Capability

We selected a set of representative military functions that the regional CINCs might need to be performed in a crisis so that we could assess the feasibility of performing the functions with the forces available under the four presence postures and assess the time it would take the forces to perform the function and thus respond to the crisis. Our selection of the set of functions was based upon discussions with the Services, other active and retired officers, and current and former U.S. government officials. The set is not necessarily comprehensive but consists of functions that are demanding and that illustrate the differences between the different types of forces available under the different postures under a range of circumstances. In some cases we excluded functions that would be performed by the same forces that would perform a function we included. For example,

we included NEO but not the seizure of an airfield because both would be performed by an ARG or by Army airborne or airmobile forces and a NEO may require the seizure of an airfield.[3] In all cases, we tried to exclude those functions that were not time critical and thus did not bear on the crisis responsiveness of the presence postures.

We included the following functions in the set.

A **MRC Air Wing Emplacement:** moving a carrier air wing or Air Force composite fighter wing to Southwest Asia or Korea to fight at the beginning of a major regional conflict.

B **Noncombatant Evacuation:** moving Marine, Army, or SOF units into position to perform the function. The size of the force would be driven by the circumstances of the crisis, but for the purpose of this assessment we limit consideration to forces up to a MEU(SOC) or an Army airborne brigade task force. In some cases the function may be infeasible with maritime forces and in some cases infeasible with CONUS-based airborne forces.

C **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief:** moving Marine or Army forces to the affected area and beginning the flow of further personnel or supplies. We assume that this function could be performed by an ARG, an Army airborne task force based in theater, or an Army airborne task force based in CONUS.

D **Strike against Short-Time Visible Targets:** tactical air power (carrier air wing or Air Force wing) or cruise missile strike against a short-lived or intermittently appearing target with a window of visibility of less than 6 hours. An example might be a national leadership target or a combat unit moving in the open. We assume that this mission is infeasible with CONUS-based assets because of flight times.

E **Air Defense:** defending an asset against air attack at its location. This function would be performed by tactical air power or surface-to-air missiles (either land-based or sea-based). This function is distinguished from a strike against enemy airfields, which we would classify as a strike against point targets or short-time visible targets (see functions D and F). It would not be feasible with CONUS-based assets because of the distances from CONUS to the theaters.

F **Strike against Point Targets:** strike by in-theater land-based or maritime tactical air power, CONUS-based bombers, or cruise missiles against a non-perishable point target.

G **Strike against Area Targets:** strike by tactical air power or bombers against a surface area target. Examples would be railroad yards or deployed ground combat units. We assume that this mission would be infeasible with cruise missiles because of the high cost of firing a large number of missiles.

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[3] This is not to say that a MEU(SOC) (carried by an ARG) and Army airborne and airmobile forces have identical capabilities or that any of them could perform a NEO or seize an airfield under all possible circumstances. Our intent is merely to portray a reasonable, representative set of military functions for crisis response to illustrate the differences in responsiveness of the presence postures.

One can see from this list of functions that in many cases each function could be performed by maritime forces, in theater land-based forces, or CONUS-based land-based forces. This is especially true for maritime forces and in-theater land-based forces. If the United States has political access to a base in-theater, land-based forces will be able to perform many if not all of the same functions as maritime forces. Thus for most crises a CINC will not be restricted to using one class of forces—he will have a choice—so the unavailability of a single class of forces usually will not prevent effective crisis response.

Force Response Time

We measured force response time from the time of an order to perform a military function was given to the time at which the effects of the function were felt at the scene of the crisis. We calculated response times for the three categories of forces as follows.

Maritime Forces

For maritime forces we calculated response time to be the time it would take a carrier or amphibious assault ship to steam from its location at the onset of a crisis to a position from which it could carry out military functions as required by the CINC. For example, the response time for an ARG ordered to conduct a NEO would be the time from when the ARG was ordered to move to the crisis location to the time at which the first Marines could go ashore.

We assumed for this analysis that CVBGs and ARGs would move about the theaters and that crises would occur at random locations within the theaters. Thus we could not predict precisely how far a CVBG or ARG would be from any given crisis when it broke out. One can, however, project a likely distribution of distances from crises by assuming that at the time any crisis broke out, the CVBGs and ARGs would be at random locations somewhere within the theaters to which they were deployed and that the closest CVBG or ARG, depending on the function to be performed, would respond to any crisis. By employing Monte Carlo simulation techniques (essentially repeatedly picking crisis locations and ship locations at random and recording response distances), one can project a likely distribution of response distances and from that calculate worst case, best case, and average response times.[4]

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4 For a more detailed description of the method, see the Addendum at the end of this paper.

Land-Based Forces in Theater

For land-based forces in theater we calculated response times to be either the time for a force already stationed or deployed in theater to plan and begin to execute a function within its range, or the time for a force located away from the crisis (in theater but out of range, in another theater, or in CONUS) to plan a function, deploy to a base near the scene of the crisis, and begin to execute the function. For example, the response time for a composite fighter wing in Saudi Arabia to perform a strike mission in Kuwait would be the time from when the wing was ordered to make the attack to the time the first munitions hit the target. The response time for an Army unit in Europe to perform a NEO in Africa would be the time to plan the mission, plus the time to marshal the unit, plus the time to deploy to a base and begin the NEO.

Response times for land-based forces in theater will vary with the initial location of the responding force, the nature of the responding force, the circumstances under which a function is to be carried out, and in some cases the size of the force required to perform the function. Unlike maritime forces, however, in most cases land-based forces that have to move to the scene of a crisis will do so by air; thus land-based forces' potential transit times will not vary nearly as widely as maritime forces' potential transit times. Instead, variations in in-theater land-based forces' response times will be driven by variations in planning times, marshaling times, and preparation times at the scene of the crisis. Therefore, we took a best case-worst case approach to projecting in-theater land-based forces response times. For the worst case, we obtained estimates from the Services and from other active and retired officers regarding the time it would take, after an order to respond was given, for the units required to perform each of the representative military functions to deploy from CONUS to a bare base at the scene of a crisis and begin to perform the functions. For the best case, we assumed that at the time an order to respond was given the units would be present at an operating base within range of the crisis, so response time would consist mainly of planning time, and for most crises would be less than one day.

Land-Based Forces in CONUS

To estimate response times for land-based forces in CONUS we took an approach similar to the one we took for in-theater land-based forces. We obtained estimates from the Services and from other active and retired officers regarding the time it would take, once an order to respond to a crisis was given, for the units required to perform each of the representative military functions to move from CONUS to the scene of the crisis and

execute the function *without relying on any other base*. For a strike mission, for example, this would involve bombers flying from CONUS directly to the target and back. For a NEO, for example, it would involve an Army airborne unit flying from CONUS, dropping or landing at the scene of the crisis, performing the evacuation, and flying back. Again, like land-based forces in theater, because the variations in transit times for forces based in CONUS will be much smaller than those for maritime forces, we took a best case-worst case approach.

THE CRISIS RESPONSIVENESS OF THE PRESENCE POSTURES

This section presents our assessment of the crisis responsiveness of the four presence postures. Because today's force structure provides some maritime forces for the expressed purpose of forward military presence, some of the postures envision different maritime force structures and deployments. Because today's land-based force structure is governed by the requirements of fighting two MRCs, however, none of the postures envision different land-based force structures or deployments. Thus the presence assessment has force structure and deployment implications only for maritime forces.[5] Furthermore, because differences in deployments are contemplated for maritime forces alone, the fundamental differences in the crisis responsiveness of the postures are driven by differences in maritime force presence.

The crisis response assessment begins with an assessment of the crisis responsiveness of the four presence postures with respect to maritime forces alone. It then turns to an assessment of the crisis responsiveness of the postures with respect to land-based and maritime forces together.

Maritime Forces

The differences in crisis responsiveness of maritime forces across the four presence postures is based on the differences in the response times of the forces under the postures. The presence postures, for the most part, do not include changes in the structures of maritime force units (CVBGs and ARGs) and thus do not include changes in maritime force unit capabilities with respect to performing any military functions.[6] While our crisis

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5 The presence assessment may have an implication for equipment prepositioning if it is decided that it would be necessary under Postures III or IV to preposition additional materiel in Southwest Asia to meet the force arrival requirements of the MRC there.

6 Posture III as now configured does include the deployment of a NEO-capable adaptive joint force package on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. That may have an impact on the CVBG-based package to perform some military functions like NEOs or some air operations.

response criteria are military function performance capability and response time, because the postures do not envision changes in the functional capabilities of maritime forces our assessment of the crisis responsiveness of maritime forces is dependent on response time alone.

Another point to keep in mind is that the real difference in the crisis responsiveness of the four postures is *less* than is apparent from the differences in responsiveness with respect to maritime forces. As discussed above, maritime forces in the form of CVBGs and ARGs can perform all of the military functions we identified as being critical to crisis response but not under the circumstances of all foreseeable crises. Land-based forces in theater or in CONUS can also perform many if not all of the functions critical to crisis response, but again, not under the circumstances of all foreseeable crises. However, there is considerable overlap where land-based forces, either in theater or in CONUS, can perform the same functions as maritime forces under the same circumstances. A change in the deployment of maritime forces will change their crisis response time and thus potentially the level of risk associated with a given crisis. However, because of the overlap in functional capability between maritime and land-based forces for many functions under many circumstances, any change in risk associated with changes in maritime force deployment will be less than that apparent from the resultant change in maritime force response time.

Tables K-1 and K-2 present the response times of the maritime forces (CVBGs and ARGs) in each theater under each posture. The times given are the overall average, the covered average (the average when the CVBG or ARG is present in the theater), the uncovered average (the average when the CVBG or ARG is not present in the theater), and the worst case (the maximum response time, when the theater is uncovered and the ships in the adjacent theaters are as far from the crisis as possible). All times are rounded off to the nearest day.

Table K-1. Maritime Force Response Times (CVBG in days)

Posture	Theater	Overall Average	Covered Average	Uncovered Average	Worst Case
I	Med	3	1	7	12
	IO	4	3	5	11
II	Med	1 (-2)	1	N/A	4 (-8)
	IO	3 (-1)	3	N/A	8 (-3)
III	Med	4 (+1)	1	7	12
	IO	4	4 (+1)	5	11
IV	Med	4 (+1)	1	7	12
	IO	4	4 (+1)	5	11
All	W Pac	2	2	N/A	5

Differences in response times from Posture I are given in parentheses; positive values indicate a slower response, negative values a faster response

Table K-2. Maritime Force Response Times (ARG in days)

Posture	Theater	Overall Average	Covered Average	Uncovered Average	Worst Case
I	Med	4	2	10	17
	IO	5	5	8	15
II	Med	2 (-2)	2	N/A	6 (-11)
	IO	4 (-1)	4 (-1)	N/A	12 (-3)
III	Med	6 (+2)	2	10	17
	IO	6 (+1)	5	8	15
IV	Med	6 (+2)	2	10	17
	IO	6 (+1)	5	8	15
All	W Pac	2	2	N/A	7

Differences in response times from Posture I are given in parentheses; positive values indicate a slower response, negative values a faster response

The tables show that the difference in overall average response times for both CVBGs and ARGs is no more than two days in the Mediterranean, one day in the Indian Ocean, and zero in the West Pacific. For the covered averages it is the same in the Mediterranean and West Pacific and changes only by one day under some of the postures in the Indian Ocean. In the worst case the times are the same under Postures I, III, and IV and reduced in Posture II because under it the theaters are never uncovered.

To tie our analysis of the crisis response times of maritime forces under the postures to the military functions laid out previously, Table K-3 shows the average and

worst case response times for maritime forces for each theater for each function for Posture I (today's baseline), and the changes in response times that would result from going to Postures II, III and IV. The differences in response times within each theater result from the different response speeds of the CVBG and the ARG.[7] There is no difference in response time for strike against point targets because that function could be performed by TLAM-capable surface combatants that are present continuously in all three theaters today and would be under all three alternative postures.

Because the only difference in crisis responsiveness across the presence postures is the difference in maritime force response times across them, the results above, on their face, indicate that the difference in crisis responsiveness boils down to an average of one day in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. Recall, however, that there is considerable overlap in military functional capability between maritime forces and land-based forces. *Thus the real change in risk associated with the different presence postures is, in fact, less than one or two days in average crisis response time.* The next section of the analysis, which treats the responsiveness of the total force package under each posture, illustrates that further.

Total Force Packages

The previous section showed that the difference in crisis responsiveness across the four presence postures results only from a difference in maritime force response time. Now we will show explicitly that because under many circumstances land-based forces can perform many of the same military functions as maritime forces, and in many cases can respond faster than maritime forces, the risk associated with a change in presence posture is less than that produced by a change in the response time of maritime forces alone.

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7 Posture III shows an improvement over Posture I for the NEO and Humanitarian Relief functions because of the infantry units that would be stationed on the carriers in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean under that posture. In some cases, however, the forces on the carrier alone would be too small to perform the function, and Posture III would be equal in responsiveness to Posture IV.

Table K-3. Posture Crisis Response Times

Maritime Forces for All Postures (days)

	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Posture I (baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	17	17	12	12	4	12	9	15	15	11	11	8	11	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. average	-	4	4	3	3	1	3	4	5	5	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Posture II change																					
a. worst case	-	-11	-11	-8	-8	0	-8	-1	-3	-3	-3	-3	0	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average	-	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Posture III change																					
a. worst case	-	-11	-11	0	0	0	0	0	-4	-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average	-	-2	-2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Posture IV change																					
a. worst case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average	-	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater
Tomahawk missile capable task force

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

- • Function potentially infeasible
- - Function not required or average not meaningful

Tables K-4 through K-8, below, show the crisis responsiveness of the presences posture, considering the total force package that would be available to the CINCs. For each posture, in each theater, the charts show the crisis response time for each of the military functions presented earlier, assuming the use of only maritime forces (row 2), only land-based forces based in CONUS (assuming in-theater base access is denied) (row 3), only land-based forces based either in CONUS or in theater (assuming base access is granted) (row 4), or the best combination of all forces (row 1). A black dot (•) indicates that under the given circumstance the force may not be able to perform the function in question.

For each function, for each type of force, the charts show best case times, worst case times, and an average or most likely time. A dash (-) indicates that an average is not meaningful because the force cannot perform the function under some circumstances or that the function requirement does not exist (there is no MRC in the Mediterranean). For the combination (row 1), the best case is the lowest of the best case for maritime forces (row 2.c) and the best case for land-based forces, assuming base access is granted (row 4.c); the average is the lowest of the average of maritime forces (row 2.b) and land-based forces, assuming base access is granted (row 4.b); and the worst case is the lowest of the worst case for maritime forces (row 2.a) and the worst case for land-based forces, assuming base access is denied (row 3.a). The basic premise is that it is possible that access to all bases in theater will be denied, but it is likely that access to at least some base will be granted.[8]

The tables show that if land-based forces can perform a function, their response times will be faster than maritime forces' times for the typical case—one in which the United States has access to a base in theater from which land-based forces can operate. Land-based forces will be faster in all cases in which they can perform the function from CONUS, except when maritime forces happen to be located closer than two days steaming time from the scene of the crisis. It is only in those cases in which the United States does not have access to a base in theater, and that the function cannot be performed from CONUS, that the response time of maritime forces will limit the response time to the crisis.

Table K-8, compares the total force package crisis responsiveness of all of the postures by displaying the total force package response times for each crisis response function for Posture I (row 1 of the Table K-4) and the changes in total force package

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8 That premise is supported by our investigation of 100 crises over the past 10 years which showed that in almost every crisis the United States had access to some base in theater from which land-based forces could respond.

response times associated with Postures II, III and IV (the differences between the values in row 1 on Tables K-5 through K-7 and the values in Table K-4). Table K-8 shows the differences for each military function in each theater. The table includes an additional average response time for instances in which the United States could not obtain base access in a theater. That average corresponds to the lowest of either the average for maritime forces or the average for CONUS-based land based forces, for functions that may always be performed from CONUS (Humanitarian Relief and Strike against Point Targets).

Table K-8 shows that the differences in crisis responsiveness of the four presence postures is small. In the event the United States can obtain base access in theater, the postures do not differ at all. That is because typically land-based assets can deploy to the scene of a crisis as fast as or faster than maritime assets. In the event the United States cannot obtain base access in theater, Postures III and IV differ from Posture I only by one or two additional days in average response time, for those functions that CONUS-based forces might not be able to perform. Under the same circumstances, Posture II differs from Posture I by 1 or 2 fewer days in average response time and by 8 to 11 fewer days in worst case response times.

Table K-4. Posture I Crisis Response Times (days)

	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. Respond with Total Force																					
a. worst case	-	17	2	12	12	1	1	2	15	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Respond with Maritime Assets																					
a. worst case	-	17	17	12	12	4	12	9	15	15	11	11	8	11	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. weighted average	-	4	4	3	3	1	3	4	5	5	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access denied)																					
a. worst case	-	•	2	•	-	1	1	2	•	2	•	-	2	2	2	•	2	-	-	2	2
b. average	-	-	1	•	-	0	0	2	-	1	•	-	1	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	1
c. best case	-	1	1	•	-	0	0	2	1	1	•	-	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	1
4. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access granted)																					
a. worst case	-	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:

A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
B Noncombatant Evacuation
C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
E Air Defense
F Strike vs. Point Targets
G Strike vs. Area Targets

• Function potentially infeasible
- Function not required or average not meaningful

Table K-5. Posture II Crisis Response Times (days)

	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. Respond with Total Force																					
a. worst case	-	6	2	4	4	1	1	2	12	2	8	8	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Respond with Maritime Assets																					
a. worst case	-	6	6	4	4	4	4	8	12	12	8	8	8	8	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. weighted average	-	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access denied)																					
a. worst case	-	•	2	•	-	1	1	2	•	2	•	-	2	2	2	•	2	•	-	2	2
b. average	-	-	1	•	-	0	0	2	-	1	•	-	1	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	1
c. best case	-	1	1	•	-	0	0	2	1	1	•	-	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	1
4. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access granted)																					
a. worst case	-	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:

A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
B Noncombatant Evacuation
C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
E Air Defense
F Strike vs. Point Targets
G Strike vs. Area Targets

• Function potentially infeasible
- Function not required or average not meaningful

Table K-6. Posture III Crisis Response Times (days)

	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. Respond with Total Force																					
a. worst case	-	6	2	12	12	1	1	2	11	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Respond with Maritime Assets																					
a. worst case	-	6	6	12	12	4	12	9	11	11	11	11	8	11	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. weighted average	-	2	2	4	4	1	4	5	6	6	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access denied)																					
a. worst case	-	•	2	•	-	1	1	2	•	2	•	-	2	2	2	•	2	•	-	2	2
b. average	-	-	1	•	-	0	0	2	-	1	•	-	1	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	1
c. best case	-	1	1	•	-	0	0	2	1	1	•	-	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	1
4. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access granted)																					
a. worst case	-	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

- • Function potentially infeasible
- - Function not required or average not meaningful

Table K-7. Posture IV Crisis Response Times (days)

	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. Respond with Total Force																					
a. worst case	-	17	2	12	12	1	1	2	15	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Respond with Maritime Assets																					
a. worst case	-	17	17	12	12	4	12	9	15	15	11	11	8	11	5	7	7	5	5	5	5
b. weighted average	-	6	6	4	4	1	4	5	6	6	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access denied)																					
a. worst case	-	•	2	•	-	1	1	2	•	2	•	-	2	2	2	•	2	•	-	2	2
b. average	-	-	1	•	-	0	0	2	-	1	•	-	1	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	1
c. best case	-	1	1	•	-	0	0	2	1	1	•	-	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	1
4. Respond with Land-based Assets (base access granted)																					
a. worst case	-	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
b. average	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
c. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

- • Function potentially infeasible
- - Function not required or average not meaningful

Table K-8. All Posture Crisis Response Times (days)

Posture	Mediterranean Sea							Indian Ocean							West Pacific Ocean						
	Military Function							Military Function							Military Function						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1. I (baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	17	2	12	12	1	1	2	15	2	11	11	2	2	2	7	2	5	5	2	2
b. average without base access	-	4	1	3	3	0	0	2	5	1	4	4	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1
c. average with base access	-	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. II (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	-11	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-3	0	-3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	-2	0	-2	-2	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. III (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	-2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. IV (change from baseline)																					
a. worst case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. average without base access	-	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. average with base access	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d. best case	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Maritime Assets:
CVBG, ARG, or in-theater Tomahawk missile capable task force

Land-based Assets:
Air/Ground assets based in CONUS or in theater

Crisis Response Military Functions:
- A MRC Air Wing Emplacement
- B Noncombatant Evacuation
- C Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- D Strike vs. Short-Time Visible Targets
- E Air Defense
- F Strike vs. Point Targets
- G Strike vs. Area Targets

- \- Function not required or average not meaningful

ADDENDUM: METHOD OF PROJECTING RESPONSE TIMES FOR MARITIME FORCES

When projecting initial crisis response times for maritime forces, we assumed that CVBGs and ARGs would move about the theaters to which they were deployed and that crises would occur at random locations within the theaters. We used a Monte Carlo approach to project a likely distribution of response times for forces for each theater for each deployment posture. From the distributions, we calculated average response times and identified best and worst cases.

First, we assumed that at the time any crisis broke out, the CVBGs and ARGs would be at random locations somewhere within the theaters to which they were deployed and that the closest CVBG or ARG, depending on the function to be performed, would respond to any crisis (also at a random location within the theater of interest). Thus, for each randomly occurring crisis we obtained a distance in nautical miles from the nearest CVBG or ARG to the crisis. We represented the theaters as lines running roughly along the coasts of the theaters (or from west to east through the middle of the Mediterranean Sea) and represented locations within the theaters (for ships and crises) as points on the lines. We assumed that the theaters connected at the Suez Canal (Mediterranean and Indian Ocean) and the Strait of Malacca (Indian Ocean and West Pacific) and allowed ships from one theater to respond to crises in an adjacent theater.

Next, to produce a likely distribution of crisis response distances, we repeated the random selection of crises and ship locations and recorded the response distance for each repetition. For all of the cases in this analysis we repeated the calculation 100,000 times to obtain a statistically valid representation. We performed a batch of repetitions for each theater for each combination of theater coverages that was possible under the presence postures we considered. To obtain a final distribution of response times for a posture, we weighted the results of each batch according to the fraction of time that the coverage combination would be in place under the posture.

The following example projects the distribution of response times for CVBGs in the Mediterranean theater under Posture I (today's baseline, with 75 percent coverage in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean). There are three relevant coverage combinations for the Mediterranean theater under Posture I: 1) CVBG in the Mediterranean and the Indian

Ocean (50 percent of the time), 2) CVBG in the Mediterranean but not in the Indian Ocean (25 percent of the time), and 3) CVBG in the Indian Ocean but not in the Mediterranean (25 percent of the time). Thus, to project a final distribution we must project distributions for each of the coverage combinations and weight them according to the fractions of time they occur. To project a distribution for combination 1), we pick a random location for a crisis in the Mediterranean (somewhere on the line running for 1,950 nmi from the west end to the east end of the Sea) and random locations for the CVBG in the Mediterranean (somewhere on the same line as the crisis) and the CVBG in the Indian Ocean (somewhere on the line running for 6,200 nmi from the Suez Canal, roughly along the southern coast of Asia, to the Strait of Malacca). We then take the distance and time to be the distance and time (distance divided by ship speed) from the closest CVBG to the crisis (note that the CVBG in the Indian Ocean might be closer than the CVBG in the Mediterranean). We repeat this process 100,000 times for coverage combination 1. Then we do the same for combinations 2 and 3. Those calculations yield distributions in terms of the number of times out of 100,000 that the CVBG response is equal to so many days (i.e., falls between whole numbers of days). In this case the range of response times is from 1 day to 12 days. After computing the distributions for the coverage combinations, we multiply each of the values in combination 1 by 50 percent, combination 2 by 25 percent, and combination 3 by 25 percent and add them to yield the distribution for the Mediterranean Sea for Posture I. The adding of distributions is on a day by day basis, so that, for example, the final fraction of responses falling between 2 and 3 days would be equal to the fraction of responses between 2 and 3 days for combination 1 times 50 percent, plus the fraction of responses between 2 and 3 days for combination 2 times 25 percent, plus the fraction of responses between 2 and 3 days for combination 3 times 25 percent.

The example calculation is repeated for each theater for each posture to yield distributions for all of them. Average response times for each distribution are calculated by averaging all of the responses that make up the distributions. Thus we calculated an average for each posture for each theater.

Appendix L

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

Appendix L
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BUR	Bottom Up Review
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief, Central Command
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Southern Command
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CONUS	Continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
DoD	Department of Defense
EUCOM	United States European Command
FACS	Force Acquisition Cost System
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Order
NMA	Naval Management Alternatives

O&E	Operations and Maintenance Funds
O&S	Operations and Support Funds
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	United States Pacific Command
SLEP	Service Life Extension Program
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAF	United States Air Force

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

The National Security Strategy of the United States depends heavily on an effective mix of military power projection capability and day-to-day overseas presence of military assets in key regions. With the end of the Cold War, many central elements of U.S. national security strategy are coming under close scrutiny. One of these is overseas presence. How much is necessary? What forms best promote key U.S. objectives? Are there sensible new approaches to the funding and management of presence activities? This study develops a conceptual framework for thinking about overseas presence, compiles and analyzes the first all-Service chronology of discrete presence incidents over the last decade (1983-94), conducts six detailed case studies of presence operations, compiles a record of the perspectives of each major DoD component concerning overseas presence, and develops a methodology for comparing the effectiveness of alternative presence postures, including a set of costing principles that can be used to evaluate alternative presence postures. The study recommends that DoD move toward a more output-focused presence requirements process, building on the strengths of the expanded JROC and CINCACOM's Joint Adaptive Force Package Process.

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