The Limits of Type D Coercive Diplomacy in Somalia.

Abstract

This thesis argues that the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 represents an attempt to use coercive diplomacy to re-create the Somali state. It further argues that the pre-conditions for a successful use of coercive diplomacy existed initially during the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) phase, but they quickly disappeared during the expanded mission of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This thesis proposes that UNITAF leadership were quite successful in accomplishing their limited objectives. Additionally, when UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, the expanded mandates and policies chosen by both the U.S. and the U.N. changed the conditions for success and led the UNOSOM II forces to war with members of the Somali militia.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 1995
Accession Number
ADA305985

Entities

People

  • John C. Harrison

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Foreign Relations
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Science
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Political Science
  • Recreation
  • Task Forces
  • United Nations
  • United States
  • United States Central Command
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies