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THESIS

PEACEKEEPERS ATTEND THE NEVER AGAIN SCHOOL

by

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December, 1995

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the lessons the U.S. Army drew from the war in Vietnam and how these lessons influence current Army attitudes toward peace operations. The thesis finds that the Army's failure in Vietnam contributes not only to the Army's aversion toward peace operations, but also to its reluctance to participate in any limited war.

It posits that culture has explanatory power in describing the Army's attitudes and policies toward peace operations. The thesis examines the development of the lessons of Vietnam, especially the emergence of the "never-again" school by surveying the articles written in *Army*, *Military Review* and *Parameters* about Vietnam and peace operations between 1972 and 1995. The thesis describes the Army's confusion over the meaning of Vietnam in the 1970s, shows the Army's building a consensus around certain lessons of Vietnam in the 1980s and examines application of these lessons of to peace operations in the 1990s.

Two events were influential in shaping the Army's understanding of the lessons of Vietnam: the publication of the book, On Strategy, in 1982 and a speech given in 1984 by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Harry Summers's book on America's failure in Vietnam and Secretary Weinberger's speech on pre-conditions for U.S. military intervention codified the Army's accepted lessons of Vietnam. These two events codified the many lessons of Vietnam into *The Lessons of Vietnam*.

The thesis concludes by focusing on how the lessons of Vietnam influence the Army's attitude toward peace operations attitudes and influenced its policy. It first describes how Operation Desert Storm curtailed the growth of the competing LIC subculture. Second, the thesis illustrates the hesitant attitudes of authors writing in the periodicals and the Army's reluctance to embrace peace operations. Autobiographies of senior officers are used to support the attitudes found in the the military journals.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the lessons the Army drew from the war in Vietnam and then to analyze how these lessons influence current Army attitudes toward peace operations policies, force structure and doctrine. Though no sweeping agreement exists about the lessons of Vietnam, this work posits that the Army's understanding of the lessons of Vietnam was distilled through the work of retired Army colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. and transformed into policy by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's six tests for the use of military force in foreign policy. The paper will argue that Weinberger's criteria became the accepted standard by which the Army and the President whether military intervention is appropriate. Though the focus of this thesis will remain on *Army* attitudes toward peace operations, it is obvious there is a relationship between Army attitudes and U.S. foreign policy in general.

B. THE QUESTION

Why does the U.S. Army think about peace operations the way it does? This thesis posits that, in part, the Army's views about peace operations are influenced by its collective experience in Vietnam. Drastic changes in the international structure (such as the collapse of the Soviet threat) are often not enough to jar the Army from its cultural paradigm. Further, ambiguity in the meaning of international events prevents the Army from acting on its experience. A new international equilibrium may not exist. Doctrinal and structural innovations are difficult when a clear threat is lacking.

Often innovation is a lengthy process and requires *sustained* change in the external environment.¹ With the increase of peace operations and other non-traditional military missions, one might expect to see the Army jump at the opportunity to obtain increased responsibilities and resources by participating in these missions. Assuming new roles and successfully accomplishing new missions could strengthen the Army's domestic power and prestige. Presidential directives, domestic political pressures, technological developments and even wars have attempted to change the Army's self-perception and doctrine.

¹ Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rosen talks about innovation in doctrine, structure and strategy. He concludes that whatever the cause of change, in periods of peace and even limited war, innovation takes time to become institutionalized.

C. CULTURE AND VIETNAM AS POSSIBLE ANSWERS

The main finding of this thesis is that current Army attitudes toward peace operations are both directly and indirectly a product of the Vietnam war. The majority of the Army reached a consensus on the lessons of the Vietnam war in the 1980s. The many different lessons of Vietnam became *The Lessons* of Vietnam. The Lessons have become a predominant school of thought in the United States Army. The Lessons are that the United States should not commit troops without the consent of the majority of the public; the United States should not commit ground forces unless there are clearly identified, attainable political and military goals; the United States should use force only with the intent of winning and by use of overwhelming force; the United States should only commit forces in defense of vital national interests; and when not in defense of a vital national interest, use of military force must be "legal" and support international law. Later in this thesis, the "other" lessons of Vietnam are described in their various shapes.

A predominant school of thought in the Army took the lead in formulating The Lessons of Vietnam. A less influential subculture developed other lessons of Vietnam, but these secondary lessons have not been fully institutionalized. Some of the "other" lessons of Vietnam are that overwhelming force does not always work; using military force in areas that are not vital to U.S. national security interests is feasible; military operations cannot be conducted in isolation of political guidelines; winning the hearts and minds of a foreign population is essential to limited war victory; and understanding foreign cultures is possible only through extensive education and training in customs, history and languages.

Both internal and external factors influenced the development of both sets of lessons. Internally, the Army's desire to improve its credibility caused it to institutionalize The Lessons into its doctrine and course curricula. Externally, an insurgency in El Salvador and a communist regime in Nicaragua caused the Army to develop The Lessons quickly. These events in Latin America also spurned development of other lessons.

D. RELEVANCE

This thesis is of value to the Army because it advances understanding of how Army resistance in adapting to contemporary threats could in some circumstances endanger the country's reputation and national security.² During the ebb and flow of warfare in the

² Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes*, (New York: Free Press, 1990). The book studies three types of failures in military operations. One type of failure is called the "failure to adapt" and its case study is the British at Gallipoli in August 1915. This section of the book is concerned with the operational level of analysis, but the idea has application to the strategic and policy levels.

history of the United States, the Army has latched onto its brief but glorious major wars. The Army downplays most missions not resembling a "big" war. Its most common duty, however, has been and appears to be for the foreseeable future, as "the nation's obedient and loyal military servant."³ The old Mexican Border Patrol mission, for example, may reintroduce itself as more than just a peripheral mission. Shake-ups in the global political situation have begotten "new" missions that the Army cannot and should not turn away from.

Justifying large defense budgets will be increasingly difficult in the future. In the past the Army justified its robust capabilities by referring to the Soviet threat. To retain even modest resources, the Army is now faced with the challenge of convincing Congress that a future Soviet-like threat exists. An alternative line of reasoning is that the increased requirement to intervene in internal conflicts or participate in peace operations requires substantial resources. Herein rest the two conflicting views of the Army's role in U.S. national security policy and hence, the Army's own understanding of that role: is the Army the multi-purpose servant of the nation or does the Army concentrate on setting the global standard for performance on the high-intensity battlefield?

The Army has a long tradition of fighting limited foreign wars and controlling domestic disturbances. In the twentieth century, however, the Army has resisted these reoccurring domestic and limited missions. A recent RAND Corporation study has identified various self-perceptions the Army could pursue in the post cold war world. The study postulates three major visions of the Army.⁴

First, the Army could continue to see itself as the defender of Europe. This view is centered on a "big" war in central Europe. Second, it could see itself as an expeditionary force, based in the United States but ready at a moment's notice to deal with the world's problems. This view is still a big-war outlook but with a non-European slant. Third, the Army could return to a role known well in its history as servant of the nation. The Army's primary mission in this vision is dealing with domestic unrest and continental security threats.

³ Carl Builder, *The Masks of War*, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1989) p.187.

⁴ John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus and Wayne Madewell, *The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision*, RAND Corporation Study, R-3882-A, June 1990, pp. vii, 23, 41-55. Prepared for the U.S. Army, Contract No. MDA903-86-C-0059. This RAND study extended Russell Weigley's argument in *The American Way of War*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973) and provided a useful point of reference for the Army's thoughts about itself. The RAND study specifically describes the Army's current vision of itself as the defender of Europe.

With the simultaneous changes in international order and talk of a revolution in military affairs, the Army should be cautious about its attachment to the big-war paradigm. If the Army continues to define itself as the defender of Europe and the champion of armored warfare, it may find itself ill-prepared to deal with America's next war, regardless of that war's characteristics or peculiarities. In this paper, peace operations (though often ill-defined) are chosen as representative of these "new," non-big-war missions. These types of missions were chosen because they are not futuristic, remote and hypothetical but because they are contemporary, abundant and hotly debated. In a sense, the growing importance of peacekeeping suggests that "the future is now" and that the Army must change if it is to prepare for today's conflicts.

Preparing for the next war instead of the last war has long been a goal of the armed services and vital to national security. The Army does not know when or where the United States' next war will be but it does know much about America's past wars. One past war that has been dissected extensively is America's experience in Vietnam. The war preoccupies American society and references to the conflict still linger in the country's foreign policy debates.⁵ As America contemplated intervention in Bosnia and as the United States withdrew from its commitment in Somalia, journalists raised the Vietnam connection⁶ after President Bush prematurely buried it in the wake of Desert Storm.⁷

E. PARADIGMS

A relatively wide consensus exists about the current Army paradigms of itself and warfare. Current Army doctrine reflects the way the Allies won the Second World War. The Army won that war by overwhelming the enemy with firepower, manpower and industrial-power.⁸ With a fully mobilized society behind it in the Second World War, the Army waged an extreme form of annihilatory warfare. Improvements on ways of waging total warfare were a growth industry. This mobilization resulted in the development of the ultimate weapon of destruction: the atomic bomb.

⁵ See, for example, Harry G. Summers Jr., Congressional Testimony, 15 June 1995. Summers testified before Congress on the inability of air power to bring a decisive conclusion to the war in Bosnia and repeatedly evoked the quagmire of Vietnam as an analogy.

⁶ A.M. Rosenthal, *The New York Times*, "Dole In Bosnia," Editorial, p. A17, April 18, 1995.

⁷ Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, *The Washington Post*, "Bush to 'Move Fast' on Mideast Peace," March 2, 1991, p. A13. President George Bush said, "It's a proud day for Americans and by God, we've kicked this Vietnam syndrome once and for all."

⁸ See, for example, Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War*.

When the Army fired the first atomic artillery shell in May, 1953 an Army officer noted, "it symbolized the addition of an awesome new weapon to the Army's arsenal but also symbolized the true beginning of the atomic era for the Army."⁹ This development led to the "pentomic" Army that was smaller and designed to be more mobile than the previous World War II and Korean War configurations.¹⁰ Though force size *decreased*, firepower *increased*. Warfare was being stretched to a previously inconceivable extreme with the introduction of "tactical" nuclear weapons.¹¹

This overwhelming use of force was indicative of the American Army's *preferred* way of war. Nineteenth century Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz would have been amazed how close armies could now come to waging what was for him only a theoretical extreme: absolute war.¹² Nuclear weapons proliferated at both the local and inter-continental levels and total war moved from a theoretically distant possibility to a realistically near probability. Initially, atomic bombs fit into the Army's cultural understanding of the overwhelming use of force. Eventually, the Army would learn the limits of nuclear weapons.

Reality regularly constrained the Army from waging this preferred type of total war. The reality of 1950 was that no country wanted to fight a nuclear war over Korea. Thus, Korea was the first nuclear-era limited war confronting the United States. Korea reintroduced the Army to the political constraints involved in warfare. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army was still thinking in terms of a global scale, high-intensity world war. General Ridgeway, commander of the Eighth Army and U.S. Commander-In-Chief (CINC) in the Far East admits, "The concept of 'limited' war never entered our councils."¹³

That cultural legacy, an aversion toward limited warfare, plagued strategists during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In the 1950s the Army wanted to bring the fight to

⁹ Robert A. Doughty, *Leavenworth Papers*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979) p.14.

¹⁰ A.J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986) p. 103- 127. The Pentomic Division consisted of five "battle groups" bigger than a battalion but smaller than a brigade, each with five companies. The net effect on troop strength was a 3,000 soldier loss per division. Bacevich's book provides a thorough survey of the development of the Army between the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

¹¹ Special thanks to Professor Patrick Parker, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, for explaining the myth of tactical nuclear weapons. Any use of a nuclear weapon on the European battlefield would have immediately had strategic implications. Once the government commits the Army to a war, the Army tends to want to wage that war in isolation from its political master. The Army's failure to grasp the absurdity of "tactical" nuclear weapon supports this tendency.

¹² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 75-80, 579.

¹³ Robert Doughty, *Leavenworth Papers*, p. 7.

the Chinese and use nuclear weapons if necessary. In the 1960s the political constraints again frustrated the Army, because they prevented total destruction of the enemy. The Army again wanted to wage the war in isolation from political considerations. This desire to be autonomous in the conduct of operations causes problems that continue to haunt Army strategists today. Despite the requirement to perform limited warfare tasks, the Army has spent a great deal of effort peripheralizing these non-big-war tasks.

F. ARMY CULTURE

Sociologist Karl Weick pointed out that, "there is no such thing as *experience* until a manager does something."¹⁴ Weick's point is that experience is isolated until it gets socialized and interpreted. He calls this process "enactment." Experience becomes meaningful when leaders act on or when they *test* experiences.

What the Army leaders did with the "experience" of Vietnam largely influenced that war's place in Army history. It is imperative to trace the development of what is often called the *Never-Again School* (i.e., the actions political and military leaders should never again take in the conduct of war or, perhaps some would say, foreign policy) because believers of this school of thought have built the Army's culture.¹⁵ The roots of this school reside in the military's frustration over not being allowed to bring the Korean War to a "decisive" conclusion by using overwhelming force. The Army decided that, "there should be no more limited, local wars fought by American forces on the Asian continent without the freedom to use any weapons in the American arsenal, including nuclear ones."¹⁶

The conclusion of the Korean war was dissatisfying to the Army. It wanted to avoid wars like Korea in the future. Specifically, the Army wanted to avoid the difficult tests that limited wars present.¹⁷ This avoidance in the 1970s helped shape the predominant

¹⁴ Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979) p. 148.

¹⁵ Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 261. Chapter 19, *The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy*, details the development of the Never-Again School. It also introduces the "Limited War" school. Pages 263-268 explain the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger-Secretary of State George Schultz debates over the use of force in U.S. foreign policy and the impact of Vietnam on their respective schools of thought.

¹⁶ Russell Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 451.

¹⁷ Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, p. 150. Fear of failure leads to the avoidance of testing. Since the Army failed under the political constraints of Vietnam, it wanted to avoid similar limited conflicts in the future. Though the Army scarcely admits it, the Army failed at counterinsurgency in Vietnam and subsequently avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency doctrine or forces.

Army culture. Army culture did not adapt itself to the realities of Vietnam and as a consequence that war was lost.¹⁸ This propensity to avoid the limited war test continues to shape Army culture.

America's understanding of the international environment demanded that the Army develop a strategy for stopping communism in Southeast Asia.¹⁹ One or two of Eisenhower's dominos tumbled, but the predicted catastrophic chain of events failed to materialize. Despite the supposed seriousness of the international situation and the threat to U.S. national security, the Army was unable to develop a victorious strategy in over ten years of trying.

Bureaucratic reasoning justified increased spending on equipment and training for the war in Vietnam. Yet the Army developed the helicopter, designed for use on a European battlefield, and applied it to Vietnam. It was common for the Army to innovate from the European scenario. Innovations were then adapted for other uses. It would have been in the Army's organizational interests to embrace the war and use it to increase its share of resources. Success would have guaranteed the Army much domestic status and access to even more resources. But as will be shown, many believed the Army never fully employed itself in the war in Vietnam.

The strength of Army culture was so strong that neither threats to the international balance of power nor enticements of increased prestige and resources could dislodge the Army from its big-war paradigm. The experience of Korea could not separate the Army from this paradigm. Only ten years after it first said "never again" about Korea, the Army faced an eerily similar challenge in Vietnam. Concerns about a regional conflict becoming a global conflict prevented the Army from waging a more total form of warfare in both cases. The Army tended to see increased military power as the solution to the problem in both Korea and Vietnam.

G. SEQUENCE

Chapter II elaborates the notion that culture has explanatory power in describing the Army's attitudes and policies toward peace operations. The chapter introduces competing theories that are also useful in explaining how the Army deals with the lessons of Vietnam.

¹⁸ Other factors contributed to America's defeat in Vietnam but the focus of this thesis is on the Army and its understanding of itself in the context of the Vietnam war.

¹⁹ This idea begs the question, how does a military stop a political ideology? For the Army, the answer is totally defeating the enemy and then having civilians reeducate the population. This was the WWII solution that could not be easily applied in Vietnam.

The methods and research design used to trace the development of the Vietnam lessons are also described.

Chapters III, IV, and V trace the development of the lessons of Vietnam and show how the never-again school progressed. These three chapters cover 23 years from 1972 to 1995. Each chapter addresses a period with distinctive characteristics. Each chapter covers a different number of years, which presents some statistical challenges. The break points, however, are purposeful. In each instance, a significant event marks the end of one period and the start of another.

Chapter III surveys the articles written about Vietnam and peace operations in the 1972-1981 period. Because America's military involvement ended in 1972, that year was chosen as the starting date of the research. Many events from which the Army drew lessons had not yet happened in Vietnam prior to 1972. Most of the articles are, not surprisingly, focused on Vietnam and not on U.S. involvement in one of the few U.N. sponsored peace operations of the era. This nine-year time span is referred to as the first "phase" or "period" throughout the thesis.

Chapter III shows a lack of consensus within the Army on its understanding of the lessons of Vietnam. The subjects written about in the periodicals referring to Vietnam were more numerous in this period than in later years. The overall number of articles devoted to Vietnam is low because the Army turned away from Vietnam and toward Europe. The shock of America losing its first war had not yet set in. The Army denied not only its responsibility to defend *all* U.S. interests, but also its responsibility in the loss of the war. Evidence from this chapter shows confusion over the meaning of Vietnam and explains the Army's reluctance to implement organizational action in the wake of its defeat.

Chapter IV describes the second phase which starts in 1982 and ends in 1989. This chapter's focus is on the Army's building a consensus around certain lessons of Vietnam and constructing meaning from the experience. This period's start is marked roughly by two events. The primary event was the Army's genuine attempt at organizational learning in 1979 by commissioning a study intended to move the Army beyond the stagnation of the 1970s. The research was eventually published as a book in 1982 and is used as the primary point of departure; the study represents a clear, official attempt to better understand the lessons of the Vietnam War. The other significant event, two years after publication of the book On Strategy, was a speech by the Secretary of Defense about pre-conditions for U.S. military intervention. Secretary Weinberger's

speech codified most of the Army's culturally accepted lessons of Vietnam. These two events cause the lessons of Vietnam to become *The Lessons* of Vietnam.

The period described in Chapter IV is characterized by the political-military turmoil in the Middle East and Latin America and the Army's response to that turmoil. Vietnam veterans wrote extensively between 1982 and 1989 about Latin America and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and referenced the Vietnam war. A LIC subculture, growing out of the Vietnam counterinsurgency experience, boomed during this period. This subculture made huge strides toward institutionalizing the "other" lessons of Vietnam-those lessons not embodied in the Weinberger doctrine.

Officers with company and field grade experience in Vietnam became general officers during this period. Many of these officers, fully indoctrinated into the dominant Army culture, rose to influential positions in both the Army and the American government. The positioning of these officers and the understanding of *The Lessons* of Vietnam help explain Army policy toward future LICs.

Chapter V focuses on how the lessons of Vietnam influence peace operations attitudes and influenced Army policy. Operation Just Cause in December 1989 marks the beginning of this period. The Panama invasion was in many ways a culmination of the Army's increased focus on LIC, Latin America and drug wars. Operations Desert Shield and Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union were two significant events influencing peace operation attitudes during this period.

Autobiographical accounts by senior Army officers start this chapter and show one manifestation of the accepted lessons of Vietnam. Articles written about peace operations, or U.S. intervention in general, are presented and support this tenuous Vietnam-peace operation relationship. Vietnam was on the minds of many authors as they wrote about peace operations; authors either directly reference the war or refer to its normative lessons.

II. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper identifies those factors influencing Army doctrine and structure. The argument presented here is that culture frequently influences doctrine more than the nature of the international system (the structuralist approach) or more than the Army's functional needs (the bureaucratic or organizational approach).²⁰

Theorists make arguments about strategic and political culture influencing foreign and domestic policy choices. The paper focuses on one aspect of larger United States strategic-political culture: the U.S. Army. Emphasis can be placed squarely on the Army's organizational culture as distinct from larger cultural considerations. At this level of analysis, the paper examines how culture has affected the US Army and its doctrine during the years between 1972, the year marking the end of US military involvement in Vietnam, and the present. Military culture provides just one possible explanation for doctrinal and organizational change and innovation.

Scholars have devoted attention to issues such as the amount of military power needed to secure a position domestically and residual power left to play a part in international politics.²¹ This study supports the notion that the U.S. military is firmly subordinated to its civilian leadership and no danger of a coup exists.²² Bureaucratic Army interests are pursued only to gain more resources and independence of action. The Army's ultimate goal is not to rule the United States.

Culture may not be a deterministic variable but is more often an intervening variable, mitigating or magnifying the impact of other causes of change.²³ Culture in this way works like a preference.²⁴ If options are available to a country, its culture would help to determine its choice of available options. In some cases a less successful end-state may be accepted if it is reached both within the means available and in accordance with the

²⁰ Elizabeth Kier, "Culture In Military Doctrine," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995) pp. 65-93.

²¹ Ibid. See also Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995) and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995).

²² Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," p. 27. For an interesting coup scenario, however, see Charles Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20. The article was the National Defense University winner of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition in 1992.

²³ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," p. 41.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 47.

cultural preference. In other instances, when international and regional power balances are ambiguous, organizations may attempt to manipulate the environment to their advantage.

B. STRUCTURAL AND BUREAUCRATIC APPROACHES

Three broad theories (structural, functional and cultural) are examined for their utility in explaining current U.S. Army attitudes toward peace operations, notably in light of experiences in Vietnam. Because they shape doctrine and structure, military attitudes are one factor influencing foreign policy. Attitudes are influential in areas beyond nuclear weapons and treaty negotiations.²⁵ Perhaps more importantly, they are relevant to policy decisions involving use of conventional military force. Those cases when use of a military force is contemplated, such as peace operations, are particularly pertinent.

The structuralist claims that the external environment is the deterministic cause of the organizational action. In this explanation, the organization and its members are motivated to act based on a momentous shift in international power relationships. States position themselves to balance against any emerging threats. Accordingly, they shape their armies in hopes of establishing a new equilibrium.

This approach posits that militaries develop similar doctrines given the same sets of environmental conditions and based on expectations about the future behavior of opponents. But failure to adapt doctrines, structures or procedures to foreign power configurations often results in failure and defeat.²⁶ Though structuralists agree that arriving at like doctrines and force structures is the result of an iterative process, they don't really say how many iterations might take place before sameness settles in.²⁷

Structuralists might agree that as the number of small countries defeating big ones increases, the higher the probability that states would shape their forces to deal with these apparent asymmetries in power. Structuralists would hypothesize that militaries would shift away from a "losing" paradigm and toward a "winning" paradigm. Unfortunately for structuralists, history is replete with examples of "Davids" defeating (or at least defending against) "Goliaths," even in recent decades. In the 1970s, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese

²⁵ See for example Roger Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, (Washington D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

²⁶ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: Free Press, 1990). The authors cite three major reasons for military failure one of which is a failure to adapt to changes in the environment, technology and organization. Also, Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984) provides an extensive application of institutionalization to military organization. He uses France and Germany between the World Wars as his case study.

²⁷ Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," p. 15.

communists affected a United States withdrawal. In the 1980s, Afghan “rebels” successfully repelled the Soviet expansion. In the 1990s, a few hundred seemingly undisciplined, poorly armed Somali clansmen were able to “defeat” the most powerful country in the world.

Proponents of the functional model would claim that organizational interests propel armies on courses of action from which these armies will secure “greater certainty, resources, autonomy, and prestige.”²⁸ Traditionally the argument is made that this pursuit of power and resources will lead to offensive doctrines. Functionalists argue that only civilian intervention will prevent an army from choosing an offensive doctrine. They reason that because the country on the offensive controls the tempo of the fight it gains an advantage on the battlefield.

If the nature of the international environment changes so much that an offensive doctrine is no longer justified, however, one would expect to see the organization adopt a doctrine that facilitates its playing a large role in the new system. If the old offensive paradigm was no longer valid, a functionalist would hypothesize that the Army would embrace its new mission. The survival instincts of an organization would cause it to embrace drastic changes to retain funding and to remain a player in the game of domestic or even international politics.

Though individual cases show how tempting this explanation is, there are many cases where armies did not pursue “faddish” doctrines or strategies once the international system changed. The theory has merit but does not explain all the phenomena in question. Though the bureaucratic quest for power and structural shifts in the international system undoubtedly provide answers for various changes of doctrine, structure and strategy, other explanations are useful. An increasingly large body of literature, for example, points to culture as an explanation for some of the choices armies make.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that culture is the most influential factor shaping current Army attitudes toward peace operations. This hypothesis expects to see the Army trying to twist the contemporary realities of peace operations into the old paradigm of overwhelming force. While other explanations have held sway over Army attitudes on different issues, the Army’s propensity for using overwhelming, highly mobile and mechanized force prevents it from effectively coping with the peculiarities of peace operations.

²⁸ Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” p. 88.

C. THE CULTURAL APPROACH AND CULTURAL SPLITS

Many political scientists have attempted to define culture. Intuitively people know what culture is; but when asked to describe culture, they regularly have a difficult time. Elizabeth Kier's definition is adequate: "the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meaning are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of the organization."²⁹ Armies share attitudes and values. These attitudes and values are important factors in doctrine, force structure and strategy formulation. They also shape how the army responds to changes in the external environment.³⁰

But identifying culture and measuring its effects is complicated. More than one culture can simultaneously survive in an organization, though one culture usually dominates.³¹ These two subcultures jockey for position within the organization, each one trying to become the dominant school of thought. The pulling and hauling of these subcultures can reduce the amount of power an army generates. The argument that a divided society reduces a state's power³² can be extended to a divided military; splits in the army prevent the state from generating maximum amounts of power by misallocating resources, raising doubts and reducing motivation. Furthermore, competing subcultures function more like ideologies and "play a direct and visible role in determining military policy."³³ This split in ideologies manifests itself in different views on the use of force in foreign policy and in organizational views on the role of the military in American society. These views have many variations and nuances.

One traditional split is between those who believe the Army is the defender of U.S. interests in Europe and those who believe the Army has a broader role as the nation's general military servant.³⁴ The Army's notion of being Europe's defender comes from land warfare experiences in both the First and Second World Wars. General military service is derived from tasks the Army traditionally performed when not engaged in war in Europe. This type of Army performs a broad range of tasks that includes patrolling U.S. borders and territories, providing domestic emergency services and building canals and dams.³⁵

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 69-70.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 70.

³¹ Alastair Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," p. 45.

³² Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," pp. 26-29.

³³ Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," p. 78.

³⁴ John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus and Wayne Madewell, *The Army in a Changing World*, pp. vii, 23, 41-55.

³⁵ Ibid, p. vii.

A second split evolved around the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. The dichotomous relationship between use of force and diplomacy existed long before Carl von Clausewitz wrote On War in the nineteenth century, but his work sparked U.S. Army interest in the subject. Clausewitz's famed, "War is . . . a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means"³⁶ is continually debated by officers in the Army.

Much of the debate revolves around to what extent war can be waged in isolation from its ultimate political purposes.³⁷ In this debate, the Second World War again proves influential. Because the American Army helped destroy the Axis Armies with little regard to political considerations (until the Summer of 1945), some members of the U.S. Army believe all wars should be waged with such totality.

Conversely, other officers look at the missions the Army conducted in the years the Army was not fighting in Europe and draw different conclusions about the use of force in politics. Total subjugation of the enemy may not always be possible. These officers remember the War of 1812, wars with Mexico, the Spanish-American War, Korea and Vietnam as examples of the Army's need for restraint. For them there is no "never again" mentality; they have a "probably again" mentality.

A combination of these competing views interacts to develop and define Army culture and subcultures. These different views have enough supporters to have maintained a presence in Army writings. They have developed into two schools of thought about the Army's role in American society. Evidence of these schools of thought is found in doctrinal and periodical writings across a broad range of military subjects.

D. VIETNAM, CULTURE AND PEACE OPERATIONS

This thesis examines the Army's cultural learning and development regarding the Vietnam War and its subsequent doctrinal and structural choices. The paper illustrates how the Army chose a position in this ideological split. It suggests a culturally-shaped understanding of Vietnam and peace operations. A subculture, rallying around counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and eventually "low-intensity conflict" in Latin America, unsuccessfully challenged the dominant Army subculture. The dominant Army

³⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.

³⁷ Army officers have written volumes about Clausewitz's On War. Many officers skip over the part where Clausewitz ties the military to its political-civilian master. Clausewitz knew that effective military operations require synchronized, mutually supportive political-military efforts-but always with the political instrument in the "fore." Rather than examine this part of On War, these officers highlight Clausewitz's views on "absolute" war and war taken to the "extreme"-the part that reinforces the Army's self-perception.

(sub)culture promotes the use of overwhelming firepower, manpower and industrial power in conquering an enemy and its army. As the Army has discovered, overwhelming firepower is not always the best strategy when conducting successful peace operations.

To measure this cultural bias one can trace debates on the nature of war and related subjects in professional military journals. Authors from the two competing subcultures tried to influence the Army's action by writing about their perceived lessons of Vietnam in these journals. It appears, however, that the Army heeded only the predominant subculture's recommendations. The Army took only selected lessons from the war and assimilated them into its practices.

Additionally, veterans serving in Vietnam in the early 1960s may have formed different judgments about the lessons of Vietnam than did fellow officers serving in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The nature of an assignment as an ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) advisor, with a Special Forces Group or in a Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) team varied drastically from an assignment on a long range patrol team (LRP) or in a mechanized unit. The former missions were focused on training and winning the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese Army and people. The latter missions were focused on killing the enemy. For a killer, winning the trust of the indigenous population was a secondary priority. For the teacher, killing Viet Cong was a secondary mission.

Because the war in Vietnam continued for so long and appears to have changed from one type of war to another, or at least to have gone through different phases of *one* war, it would not be surprising to find various and dissimilar lessons. This divergence of experiences explains much of the controversy surrounding the war and could hamper the Army's absorption of lessons not fitting into its present view of itself. As Elizabeth Kier notes, because culture "screens out parts of reality by limiting what we see and even what we can imagine,"³⁸ the Army runs the risk of losing some valuable experience through its cultural filter. What the Army does not act on, it loses.

Karl Weick discusses how organizations fail to test various aspects of an experience.³⁹ Consequently, leaders' failure to "enact" these lessons prevents them from ever "learning" from them. He claims there is no such thing as experience until leaders or

³⁸ Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," p. 78.

³⁹ Karl Weick, *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, pp. 147-169. In Chapter 6, *Enactment and Organizing*. (Weick, p. 150) Though the Army scarcely admits it, the Army failed at counterinsurgency in Vietnam and subsequently avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency doctrine or forces.

managers of an organization “do something” with the experience: i.e., enact those experiences.⁴⁰

In the case of Vietnam, the Army chose to enact only those lessons that fit in with the Army’s understanding of itself. The “something” that it did was return to a European focus. What it did not do was test further doctrine on counterinsurgency. As previously noted, fear of failure leads to the avoidance of testing.⁴¹ Though the Army scarcely admits it, the Army made a feeble attempt at counterinsurgency and failed in Vietnam. Consequently, it avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency doctrine or forces.

An example of how the Army may incorporate these cultural biases into its thought process is given below:

When an object is sampled only portions of it are pulled out for closer inspection but these are sufficient to give some indication of what is going on. Notice that after a sample has been extracted subsequent exploration would tend to confirm these hunches. Perceptual activity seems to move in the direction of self-fulfilling rather than self-defeating prophecies ⁴²

When applying Weick’s thoughts to a “sample” where the “object” is the Vietnam War, one sees how the Army may have reasoned its understanding of Vietnam. The “portions pulled out for closer inspection” are usually the involvement of North Vietnam in the conventional war from 1965-1975, the *success* of the Army against the Viet Cong or the American withdrawal in 1972, leaving the South Vietnamese on their own. These events are enough to indicate that the United States failed in Vietnam and was struggling to understand why. The extracted sample could be: the United States defeats the Viet Cong by 1969 but is withdrawn from the battlefield against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) by a hostile public and a back-stabbing government. “Subsequent exploration” is represented by the Army’s introspection and its “hunches” by its belief that the U.S. won all the battles but lost the war (and therefore it must be the government’s, the public’s or the media’s fault). “Perceptual activity” was done by authors writing articles absolving the Army and writing doctrine that avoids the problem. These writings reinforced the Army’s self-fulfilling prophecy that the U.S. Army should not fight wars where use of overwhelming force is restricted by civilian politicians (or that the Army won the war, thereby negating the need for examination). It would be painful for the Army to admit the self-defeating prophecy that the U.S. Army had no idea how to fight a war where it could

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 148.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 150.

⁴² Ibid, p. 154.

not simply overwhelm the enemy with military and industrial power (e.g., Vietnam or peace operations).

What *actually* happened in Vietnam is not as important as what the Army *thought* happened in Vietnam. What it thought happened in Vietnam reinforced its negative attitude toward limited war. What the Army thought happened in Vietnam resembles what it thinks will happen in peace operations.

E. METHODOLOGY

This paper finds part of the answer to the question of what influences Army attitudes toward peace operations by tracing debate on the various lessons of Vietnam over the past twenty-three years. The paper examines how the profession of arms, doctrine and strategy shape the Army's culture. The paper examines whether or not the commonly accepted lessons of Vietnam are applicable to the US Army today in describing its attitudes toward peace operations.

Two methods will be used to examine the origins and development of the current Army policy on peace operations. The first method uses an aspect of organizational theory that claims that individuals export their experience and knowledge to their organizations and that organizations subsequently develop policies around those accepted sets of ideas and experiences.⁴³ Experiences work their way into the Army through war veterans and eventually manifest themselves in doctrine and force structure. This approach will be called the *institutionalization* explanation.⁴⁴

A similar phenomenon occurred in the US Army in Vietnam. Individual experiences in Vietnam were varied. Interpretations of those experiences ranged widely as well. Each individual carried with him or her an understanding of the way the world functioned. Each person carried those beliefs with him into the post-war era and to his new environment. Value systems had been altered and the more influential individuals modified entire systems and organizations. But which of the many individual lessons were adopted by the Army and transformed into doctrine or policy? If the lessons of Vietnam were learned and adopted by the Army, there should be a solid trail of evidence, still visible today, in unofficial literature, official publications, training emphasis and perhaps even

⁴³ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, (Bergen, Norway: Universititforlaget, 1982), pp. 10-23, 54-68.

⁴⁴ See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.

organizational structure itself. Examining *what* is published in the policy debate should provide this evidence.

Conversely, if the lessons resided only in those with first hand experience, then traces of Vietnam references should dwindle commensurate with the number of Vietnam veterans. As the bulge of Vietnam-era officers on active duty shrinks, so too, should their influence on Army doctrine regarding conflicts similar in nature to the one in Vietnam. In this vein, the paper examines *who* is writing about *what* in the selected military journals.

This corollary to the institutionalization explanation claims that the experiences live on in the organization through individuals. Unless the beliefs of the individual are imbued into the organization, their experience departs with them when they leave the organization. If individuals make no effort to transfer their experiences or are simply unsuccessful in so doing, future generations will have a weak reference point from which to conduct future planning and operations. Even if valiant individual efforts are made at incorporating certain lessons, cultural impediments could prevent their assimilation into an accepted view or position. The Army has an implicitly historical understanding of its role as the defender of U.S. interests in Europe. Most recently it also became the inheritor of blitzkrieg-type war. Any lesson not supporting this culturally accepted understanding runs the risk of being marginalized. Unless an entire generation of officers agrees that the Army's role requires a paradigm shift, no significant lessons or changes will be implemented.

This method will be referred to as the *generational change* explanation. The generational change explanation may possibly support a cycles theory, whereby lessons, attitudes and behaviors are passed on in cycles from one generation to the next.⁴⁵ These two modes of inspection should yield measurable results.

The steady decrease of Vietnam veterans on active duty over time along with the number of authors with active duty experience writing about Vietnam should measure the generational change and effect. As the decreasing quantity of Vietnam veterans is juxtaposed onto the results of the research, one should expect to see an inverse relationship if the lessons were institutionalized; i.e. if the lessons of Vietnam are absorbed into the culture, the number of references to Vietnam when writing about peace operations should increase or at least remain steady as the number of veterans decrease. Alternately, if the generational change theory holds true, i.e. the lessons of Vietnam are adopted into the

⁴⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 43-45.

culture, the number of Vietnam references should taper off along with author retirements or departures (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Institutionalization, Generational Change and the Lessons of Vietnam.

Of course the institutionalization and generational change explanations will not answer every question raised. Other factors influencing the mentions of Vietnams are possible. In some cases the lessons of Vietnam may be so thoroughly internalized that the author under consideration finds alluding to Vietnam unnecessary. In other cases the editors of the periodicals may have some personal biases that influence not only the content of the articles, but also their titles, photos and captions. Perhaps the most likely factor influencing the number of references to Vietnam, however, will be an external event causing a shift in focus in the professional publications.⁴⁶ Understanding the nuances of structural change and doctrinal adaptation is important. The change in the international order has served as an independent catalyst for reexamination of the structuralist, bureaucratic and cultural theories in the field of international relations and civil-military relations.

To examine the relationship between the organization, the individual and the environment, a learning cycle model introduced by James March and Johan Olsen will be used.⁴⁷ They draw heavily on a complete learning cycle model formulated in previous

⁴⁶ A special thanks to Professor David Yost, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, for his assistance in clearly articulating other explanations of why references to Vietnam may or may not occur.

⁴⁷ James March and Johan Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, p. 57.

works.⁴⁸ March and Olsen, however, modify the model by examining an *incomplete* learning cycle. The model is portrayed graphically in Figure 2 with the double lines representing places in the cycle where the learning can be broken, disrupted or misinterpreted and thus, become incomplete.




Figure 2. The Four components of the Organizational Learning Model.

The concept of the learning cycle model is straightforward. Individuals possess certain beliefs based on their environment. These individuals then act on their beliefs, sparking organizational action. The organization then takes action to shape the environment or least function in the new environment.

Breaks or blockages in the learning cycle are expected between individual action and organizational action when the organization fails to institutionalize the individual's experience. This failure to institutionalize experiences can happen in three ways. First, individuals may not act on their beliefs or may do so in an unconvincing way. Lack of personal motivation and organizational prejudice could prevent individuals beliefs from being acted on. Second, the organization may be so rigid that it is unable to change. Inefficiency or "red-tape" could prevent the organization from assimilating individual experiences. Third, the range of individual beliefs and actions is so divergent that no clear

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 56.

message is sent to the organization. In this case, what the organization recognizes, it grasps, and what looks unfamiliar or complex, it filters out.

The thesis examines the Army's learning cycle regarding the Vietnam War and suggests a modification in the learning cycle between individual action and organizational action. A second problem occurs before the cycle even starts when ambiguous individual experience confuse individual beliefs. In the modified case, the writers would be trying to influence the Army's action by writing about their perceived lessons of Vietnam but the Army would not heed their recommendations. In the second case, veterans serving in Vietnam in an advisory capacity in the early 1960s may have formed different beliefs about the lessons of Vietnam than did fellow officers serving in a conventional American unit in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Because the war in Vietnam waged on for so long, it would not be surprising to find a wide distribution of lessons.

These divergent experiences no doubt explain much of the controversy surrounding the war. The model shown in Figure 3 shows what has potentially gone awry. Two different cultures grow in an organization. Individuals closely identifying with the beliefs embodied in these two subcultures take action to influence the organization. The organization, however, accepts only certain actions as legitimate. In this case, the Army's actions are developing doctrine and designing force structure. If the Army does not act on the lessons of the subcultures, then no restructuring or doctrine development would be expected. Also, for the weaker subculture to gain legitimacy, it must conform to the predominant subcultures methods.

If Desert Storm were examined using this model, no deviations in the cycle would be expected, but rather a continuous flow of beliefs, actions and responses. Because the war was short, operations were integrated and the experiences were similar its lesson are probably more focused. All this "learning" stems from an original environmental response starting with the American Civil War.⁴⁹ After the Union Army cycled the lessons through itself, it marched off to the First World War. After digesting those lessons (which complemented previous lessons learned, i.e. use of overwhelming force) it liberated Europe and won the Second World War.⁵⁰ The lessons of the Second World War (again,

⁴⁹ See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War, for the history of the American Army's propensity to conduct annihilatory warfare since the American Civil War.

⁵⁰ See Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1986). Though Krepinevich wrote this work in 1986 his observations about the Army's concept of war were prescient and his notions seem validated by the Army decisions in the wake of Desert Storm. He rightly explains that the US Army derives all of its significant doctrine from its experience in the Second World War and that it views Korea and Vietnam as aberrations. Doctrinaires made the realities of these wars fit

overwhelming force) then cycled through and brought America the Army that prevailed in Desert Storm.⁵¹




Figure 3. Incorporating Culture into the Organizational Learning Model.

March and Olsen point out ambiguity as one of the major reasons for breaks in the learning cycle is ambiguity. They describe ambiguity as a situation where it is not clear what happened or why it happened.⁵² In this situation, organizations will be slow to act on non-homogeneous lessons. Karl Weick points out a reason for not learning from previous situations is a failure to act on the perceived lessons.⁵³ Because leaders are afraid to fail, they avoid further tests of situations already known to be difficult. The Army draws conclusions and acts on some while avoiding the testing of others.⁵⁴

into the Army Concept of war. *The Concept* is the term Krepinevich uses throughout his book to describe the Army's dominant doctrinal paradigm and will be used throughout this thesis.

⁵¹ Harry G. Summers Jr., "Full Circle: World War II to the Persian Gulf," *Military Review*, February 1992, pp. 38-48.

⁵² James March and Johan Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, pp. 10-23 and 54-68.

⁵³ Karl Weick, *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, p. 150.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 147-169.

One major assumption thus far has been a relationship between the type of warfare waged in Vietnam and the type of *unwarfare* waged in peace operations. The intent is to establish a relationship in the literature between attitudes toward various forms of "limited" warfare and peace operations. The way people thought about Vietnam influences what they write about low-intensity conflict and ultimately, peace operations. These two types of operations at a minimum fall on the same end of the "spectrum of conflict," *away from total warfare*. Low intensity conflict and peace operations are also doctrinally linked by the Army.

Clear breaks in the literature and doctrine should appear regarding types of war, revealing an institutional schism at some point after America's defeat in Vietnam. Discussions of High and Mid-Intensity Conflict versus debate over Low-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency (HIC, MIC, LIC and COIN respectively). When and where do peace operations enter the debate? And later, after peace operations are part of the discussion, how do different UN Charter chapter actions influence the debate? Using the theories and methods outlined above as templates, along with the development of the lessons of the Vietnam war and the evolution of US involvement in UN peace operations, this paper should illuminate the reasons for current military attitudes about, and perhaps even our complex political policy toward, peace operations.

F. RESEARCH DESIGN

The primary method for extracting information about the Army, Vietnam and peace operations was content analysis. *Parameters*, *Military Review* and *Army* were the three periodicals searched. These periodicals were chosen because they most embody the general nature of the subject being investigated and are the most widely read by Army officers. The research starts with periodicals in 1972 and closes with the Winter or September 1995 issues. Going back further than 1972, a time when the US was still involved in Vietnam, would only provide inconclusive tactical, operational and strategic analysis. Not only was the war still on-going but also appreciable understanding of the "lessons" was unlikely.

Two search methods were used. First, the Air University Periodical Index was used with a few search words: Vietnam, peace operations, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace making. The initial search did not turn up a significant number of articles. The search was expanded to United Nations, Low Intensity Conflict, Doctrine and even Strategy. Although many more articles appeared as potentially useful it became clear

that a more detailed method would be necessary. For a second method, each issue of each periodical was examined for articles that had either peace operations or Vietnam as a primary or secondary topic.

This second search method resulted in 484 articles being included in the data set. Just skimming these articles for mentions of Vietnam and peace operations, several other trends surfaced. In trying to measure Army attitudes as the dependent variable, many of these trends seemed intuitively pertinent and consequently became their own independent variable.

Listed below are the thirty independent variables each article was coded for and a simple explanation of the coding if necessary:

1. *Article #*: 1 through 484

2. *Journal*: *Parameters*, *Army*, *Military Review*.

3. *Date*: Month and year. *Parameters* is a quarterly publication. March, June, September and December were used for the Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter issue dates, respectively.

4. *Author*: Last name, first name: When two or more authors were listed they were recorded in the order shown in the publication. The exception was if one author was recognized as a repeat contributor to the journals; that author was then listed first, regardless of his position in the original order.

5. *Background of Author*: Active Military, Retired Military, Civilian Academic, Government Civilian, Military Reserve, Foreign National, Both Retired and Academic, Dual Reservist and Academic, Unknown. Academic meant either graduate level education, or a professional journalist. Retired meant at least twenty years active duty. Military Reserve also included National Guardsmen.

6. *Vietnam Experience*: yes, no, unknown

7. *Main Subject*: The main subject of the article was listed. It ranged widely. Some examples include: Vietnam, peace operations, doctrine, logistics, force structure, personal accounts, LIC, professionalism, tactics, operations, strategy, special operations, reserves, VOLAR (volunteer Army), civil affairs, readiness and lessons learned/ history. Professionalism meant any topic dealing with the military or soldiering as a profession. Leadership, essays on Clausewitz and the Army as a career were examples of articles included under professionalism.

8. *Vietnam as Subject*: primary, mention, none

9. *Peace Operations as Subject*: primary, mention, none. See definitions above.

the author use the term 'spectrum of conflict'? If so, is it an article promoting low intensity or high-mid intensity paradigm?"

19. *Doctrine or Army Field Manual 100-5, FM 100-20 or 100-23*: Yes, No: "Does this article reference doctrine?"

20. *Use or Mobilization of Reserves or Draft*: Primary, mention, none. "Does this article discuss the role or mobilization of the Reserves, National Guard? Is the Draft or the Volunteer Army discussed?"

21. *Concept*: Pro, Anti, Unknown. Borrowed from the term Krepinevich uses to describe the Army's fixation with overwhelming firepower, armored warfare and Europe. The question asked was, "Does the author consciously address the divergent paradigms of war and take a position?" Most authors did not take a position.

22. *Advisors/SOF*: Primary, Mention, None

23. *National Interest*: yes, no. Items 23 through 28 are Caspar Weinberger's six tests for determining the use of military force in foreign policy. "Did the author mention this subject?" These items were mentioned by authors before Weinberger's speech.

24. *Win/End-State*: yes, no

25. *Political-Military Objectives*: yes, no

26. *Reassessment/Gradualism*: yes, no

27. *Public Support*: yes, no

28. *Last Resort*: yes, no

29. *Latin America*: Primary, Mention, No mention. "How was Latin America mentioned in this article?"

Several mentions of Vietnam occurred but they were not in the context of U.S. involvement. For example, articles about the French experience in Indochina or the Chinese-Vietnamese war were not included in the content analysis. Also, several personal accounts from Vietnam were printed but not included. Stories about the faithful fire-base dog or the dangers of venereal disease in Saigon were excluded. Similarly, the words "peacekeeper" and "peacekeeping" were sometimes used in the context of an intercontinental ballistic missile or the deterrent effect our conventional forces had on Soviet aggression in Europe.⁵⁵ Neither of these type of articles were included in the data set.

For purposes of this paper, the term "peace operations" is used to mean peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace making and all other derivations used to describe

⁵⁵ For an example, see the 1972 Secretary of the Army status report, Robert F. Froehlke, "Peace-Keeping with Pride and Integrity," *Army*, October 1972, pp. 16-19.

the use of military troops in either United Nations or multilateral missions. Usually these terms are used with the intention of describing an observer-type mission. Though Desert Storm was a U.N. sanctioned mission, it was not entirely characteristic of the type of peace operation or "limited war" envisioned here. One could, of course, argue persuasively that Desert Storm was both a "peace operation" and "limited" but compared to the operations in the decade before it and those military operations in the four years following it, Desert Storm was not limited. Also, some debate appeared in the journals about whether the attack on the U.S. Marine deployment to Lebanon in 1984 was a peace operation. As time wore on there was agreement that the Marine mission was a peace operation, albeit ill-conceived.

III. TOO HOT TO HANDLE: 1972-1981

A. OVERVIEW

Although approximately 500 articles were reviewed and included in the study, they represent a fraction of the material actually published in three periodicals: *Army*, *Military Review* and *Parameters*. Over 7,500 articles appeared between 1972-1995 and more than 2,800 in the 1972-1981 period alone. In this first ten-year period, only 162 of these 2,800 articles (5%) mentioned Vietnam.

Less than 10% of the total discussion in these journals revolved around the events of Vietnam or peace operations. The subjects of the other articles ranged from nuclear, chemical and drug wars to force planning, training and maintenance. Professionalism was the most frequent general subject. Of the 485 recorded articles, 87% mentioned Vietnam while only 20% mentioned Peace Operations. These figures include articles whose primary topic was either Vietnam or peace operations and those where these subjects were just mentioned.

The majority of authors had served in the military, and the majority of those serving were on active duty when they wrote their article. In all, 54% of the authors writing on both subjects claimed Vietnam experience either in their biography or in the text of their article. Sixty-six authors wrote more than once and several wrote three and four times; one author contributed to these three periodicals on these two subjects fourteen times.⁵⁶ The actual number of authors, and consequently the actual number with Vietnam experience, is significantly less than the 54% indicated above.

In 100 cases it was difficult to determine Vietnam experience. The authors' years of service were during the Vietnam years but vague descriptions like, "... served in command and staff assignments in CONUS (continental United States) and overseas," made it impossible to attribute Vietnam experience with any certainty. It was unclear if these authors were embarrassed about writing articles referencing Vietnam while not having served there or whether they assumed that since they were writing about Vietnam readers would assume first-hand experience. This ambiguity possibly represents severe internalization of the Vietnam war.

⁵⁶ Harry G. Summers Jr. authored 14 articles on these subjects. He authored many more that did not have Vietnam or peace operations mentioned. His voice becomes influential in the debate and will be shown.

Of the 232 authors writing about Vietnam as a primary subject, 126 (54%) actually served there. Of the 42 authors writing about peace operations as a primary subject, 19 (45%) served in Vietnam. Over 48% of the authors writing on both topics were on active duty in one of the US Armed Services regardless of Vietnam experience.

Eight foreign nationals made contributions to the literature and their observations were often incisive. A Canadian General nicely summarized the contemporary attitude in his review of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5:

There is hardly a reference to the recent Vietnam War with its potential for conflict with China—a profound change from a mere decade ago. Thus the strategic thrust of FM 100-5 clearly is directed toward Russia, its allies and the areas of the world influenced and supported by Russia.⁵⁷

This outsider perspective helped explain the Army's position for most of the 1970s.

B. THE ARMY'S SHOCK, DENIAL AND INTROVERSION

In the years immediately following the end of the American involvement in Vietnam the war seemed to be seldom discussed. As American involvement dwindled, so too, did the number of periodical pages devoted to the subject. The reverse seemed true in civilian academic journals.⁵⁸ Figure 4 shows the number of articles mentioning Vietnam between 1972 and 1976. The total number of articles appearing in the periodicals remained relatively constant during these same four years. In this same period 1,600 articles were published in the three journals.

Perhaps some distance needed to be placed between the events of the war and any meaningful commentary on them. Passions still ran high; Vietnam was too hot a topic to discuss.⁵⁹ After reaching a low point in 1976 the number of articles stabilized somewhat. By comparison the number of articles either *drawing on a preconceived lesson of*, or *claiming to identify a new lesson from Vietnam* declined into the 1980s. Figure 5 shows the decline.

⁵⁷ Dan G. Loomis, "FM 100-5: A Review," in *Military Review*, March 1977, p. 68.

⁵⁸ See for example, Joe P. Dunn, "In Search of Lessons: The Development of a Vietnam Historiography," *Parameters*, vol. IX, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95) pp. 28-40. The author provides an extensive bibliography of the literature on Vietnam, most of which come from civilian sources.

⁵⁹ Anthony Wermuth, "The Evolving Domestic Forum for National Security Debates," *Parameters*, vol. IV, no. 2, (June 1974), p. 72. Also, one author writing as late as 1990 said, "Although we are still too close in time to the Vietnam War to grasp fully all of its implications, the passing of time permits some aspects of the war to be judged less on emotion and more on the merits of the case." James B. Motley, "U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy," *Military Review*, January 1990, p. 15.




Figure 4. Early Mentions of Vietnam in the Periodicals.

From the subjects and tone of the articles there was no clear consensus on what the lessons of Vietnam really were. In the mid-1970s, some authors denied the loss of Vietnam. In 1973, the Commander of the US Army-Pacific wrote the following passage about the American experience in Vietnam,

What we did there was give the people of South Vietnam a reasonable chance to choose a way of life, free from intimidation or force. Men and women of the US Army went into Vietnam with their heads high and they came out with their heads high—*Mission Accomplished!*⁶⁰

Reading that passage today gives the reader an uneasy feeling knowing that history does not share the author's view that the Army accomplished its mission. With top officers expressing views like these in 1973, it is evident the Army would have trouble agreeing on and assimilating certain lessons in the decade to come.

⁶⁰ Fred C. Weyand, "The Army in the Pacific is a Visible Presence for Peace," *Army*, October 1973, p. 48.




Figure 5. Mentions of the Lessons of Vietnam Between 1972 and 1981.

The number of authors who had Vietnam experience and remained on active duty decreased during most of phase one. This trend indicates either an unwillingness or inability to write coherently about Vietnam. More officers with Vietnam experience wrote articles about peace operations in 1993 than did Vietnam veterans about Vietnam in 1973. Cultural impediments, like senior officers hypothesizing a victory and claiming heads were held high, prevented prospective authors from writing on the subject in those years immediately following the US troop exit. Most authors' experience probably did not leave them feeling victorious or motivated to write about the "win." Arguing with conventional wisdom about the war could jeopardize a career.

When the war *was* written about between 1972 and 1981, the number of articles written on the tactical and operational aspects of war nearly matched the number of articles on the strategic or policy levels. Phase one, however, had *proportionally* more articles written at the tactical-operational level than the other two phases.⁶¹ Figure 6 shows the

⁶¹ 76, 69 and 46 articles were written at the tactical-operational level in the three respective phases. 162, 203 and 111 *total* articles were written in each phase.

growing gap in the level of discussion, particularly between phases one and two.




Figure 6. Gap Between Tactical-Operational and Strategic-Policy Levels of Discussion.

The focus during this early period was on battlefield events. A representative article is titled, "On Heavy Artillery: American Experience in Four Wars."⁶² The article is the *Parameters*, Summer 1973 centerpiece, authored by a distinguished military professional and uses Vietnam as its capstone example. Another example is an article titled, "Give Me a Tank," where the author boosts armored warfare and harkens back to its superiority in the Second World War.⁶³ He gently comments that tanks were not of much use in Vietnam and implies that the United States should not fight in places where tanks are not useful. Lastly, an article entitled, "It's Knowing What's Out Front That Counts," describes tactical intelligence tasks on the battlefield.⁶⁴ The author assumes a geographical "front," an assumption that did not go unchallenged by soldiers who fought the illusive Viet Cong.

These examples show how authors viewed the war. World War II and even the Korean war paradigms did not agree with the realities of Vietnam. Most authors served in operational or tactical positions where they were not exposed to war policy or strategy

⁶² S.L.A. Marshall, "On Heavy Artillery: American Experience in Four Wars," *Parameters*, vol. VIII, no. 2 (June 1973) p. 2-20.

⁶³ Albert Garland, "Give Me a Tank," *Army*, November 1972, pp. 29-31.

⁶⁴ Robert S. Boothe, "It's Knowing What's Out Front That Counts," *Military Review*, November 1974, p. 13.

formulation. Even those authors (and editors) that were involved at a strategic level chose to focus on the operational aspect of the war.⁶⁵ As a result the early debate was limited to the events of the battlefield in Vietnam. Dialogue about the events in the office of the President, the halls of the Capital and the streets of America was still mostly taboo. From the cultural theory described earlier, taboo issues are generally not tested; they are avoided.

Challenging the Army's conventional wisdom about the Vietnam war—that the Army had indeed accomplished its mission—seemed unpopular. Articles obviously written as a reaction to the war often left out Vietnam as a subject or case and consequently did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the data set.⁶⁶ Other articles sought to address the subject in less legitimate ways including one authored by a Soviet colonel on limited warfare.⁶⁷ While the war was discussed, the reader is left with the impression that Vietnam was not lost, its lessons were of limited value and that wars like Vietnam were not welcome.

While the articles were evenly split between the strategy-policy and tactical-operational levels of war during this early period, the specific subjects discussed varied more than in the later phases. Figure 7 shows the number of subjects for all three phases.⁶⁸ This narrowing of the scope of the subjects shows the building of a consensus amongst authors. The large number in the 1972-1981 phase, however, shows a lack of consensus about the meaning Vietnam and its effects on the future of the American military.

Much has been written about the Army's professional failure and its need to rediscover the "operational art" and the profession of arms.⁶⁹ The civilian critique of the Army was much harsher than officers' criticism of the service. Gradually the subject of professionalism became a fashionable topic in military journals. In fact, *Parameters*

⁶⁵ For example, *Army* reprinted a portion of the eighth chapter of William C. Westmoreland's book, A Soldier Reports, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) and titled it, "Westmoreland in Vietnam: Pulverizing the Boulder," February 1976, pp. 36-44. In an introductory note, the *Army* editors describe the excerpt as Westmoreland's personal recollection of *strategy* development, but the description is mostly about the *operational* and even *tactical* levels of the war.

⁶⁶ See for example Roger Darling, "Analyzing Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, June 1974, pp. 54-66. Not one mention of Vietnam appears in this twelve page article. Pictures accompanying the text are from insurgencies in Bangladesh and Bolivia, but none from Vietnam. If Vietnam viewed as an insurgency why were no references made to it? Either the author and editor were internalizing the experience or they did not see any portion of the Vietnam war as a counterinsurgency. Roger Darling was not an active duty officer.

⁶⁷ T. Kondratkov, "What is a 'Limited War'?" *Military Review*, March 1974, p. 72. The article is a reprint from *Soviet Military Review*.

⁶⁸ A reminder that more articles were written in phase II but on fewer subjects.

⁶⁹ See for example, Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).

published its first issue in the 1970s to provide a forum to further the operational art of war.




Figure 7. The Decreasing Number of Primary Subjects When Discussing the Vietnam War and Peace Operations.

Even when the professional failure in Vietnam was recognized, it was not often attacked directly. Several articles communicate decay in the Army's professionalism. In, "Army's Military Arts Gap: Few Artists in the House," for example, the author calls for a revival:

The choice is a clear one. The military can continue its passive role in the development of the *higher levels of its art* or it can make a deliberate effort to develop an "in-house" capability for dealing on that plane. It is not the lack of talent. Thus far, it appears to be more a lack of a coherent plan.⁷⁰ (emphasis added)

The reader is left to assume that at the "higher levels of its art," the author is referring to the military leaders who were responsible for developing not only the war's *military* strategy but also for assisting in development of a *political-military* strategy. The implication is that these senior officers had not performed to standard. General William Westmoreland bore much of the blame, though it later became popular to say the Army was asked to do things it was not designed to do.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Edward B. Atkeson, "Army's Military Arts Gap: Few Artists in the House," *Army*, March 1975, p. 10.

⁷¹ Donald B. Vought and John C. Binkley, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite? The US Army Enters the 1980s," *Parameters*, vol. VIII, no. 2 (June 1978) p.25

Research from this study shows that in the early years of the 1970s debate on professionalism in the context of Vietnam remained relatively constant. Figure 8 shows the number of articles on professionalism during phase one. Roughly four articles per year appeared with professionalism as its primary topics while two or three articles just mentioned the subject. Though articles on other subjects may have included mentions of professionalism, those addressing Vietnam and peace operations averaged only around eight articles per year (less than half of the articles each year).




Figure 8. A Relatively Small Number of Articles on Vietnam Mentioned Professionalism.

Many of those articles referenced the military's being betrayed by high-ranking civilians and in fewer instances, senior military leaders. The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, the American public and limited war theorists all bore a share of the blame. The military's feeling of abandonment on the battlefield without the political will to sustain it or the tools needed to win were repeatedly written about.

For many officers, the outcome of the Vietnam conflict merely confirmed what they had known all along: the absurdity of fighting limited, protracted war . . . For these officers, the lesson of Vietnam was that the Army should return to doing what it did best: managing violence. 'Soldiers should be soldiers and not sociologists.' This position was officially articulated in 1976 by General Fred C. Weyand. In a 1976 article, then-Chief of Staff identified as one of the great mistakes of the war the Army being called on to perform nonmilitary tasks that were 'beyond its capability.' The implied solution for the future was for the military to concentrate on killing tasks to the exclusion of others. . . In some ways, the US Army professionals returning from Vietnam resembled the German Army of 1919 looking at the press and the anti-war elements in society as the perpetrators of a stab in the back.⁷²

⁷² Ibid.

Not all authors were as explicit in referencing the stab-in-the-back myth, but a direct reference was not uncommon.

In the same article, the authors footnote Sam Sarkesian who noted that 40% of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students found civilians responsible for getting the military into a war it did not want to fight. Figure 9 shows the number of articles mentioning a stab-in-the-back. About the same time that helicopters evacuated personnel from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon, the stab-in-the-back myth began growing roots.⁷³ The failure of Desert One halted a growing fervor for shifting blame off the military; the Iran hostage rescue attempt was purely a military failure. By 1980, mentions of betrayal were curtailed.




Figure 9. The Number of Articles Mentioning a Stab-in-the-back.

The CGSC students also questioned the role the senior officers played. In one version of a now famous story, a student at CGSC surprised a senior officer. In supposed no-holds-barred information-gathering sessions with general officers, students were encouraged to talk about problems in the officer corps. In one group, a student asked the general about the practice of falsifying reports and pressuring subordinates just to please higher headquarters. The general denied it ever happened in the unit the general commanded. Another student spoke up claiming to have falsified a report and told the

⁷³ See for example, DeWitt C. Smith Jr., "From Yesterday's Fears to Today's Realities," *Parameters*, vol. VII, no. 1 (Spring 1977) pp. 40-44. *Parameters* liked the article so much they ran it again in the Summer 1995 issue (pp. 63-67).

general that he was in the general's unit in Vietnam when he did it.⁷⁴ The general became indignant, pulled rank on the major and quashed the session's intended honesty and candor. Whether or not the general was aware of reporting problems is not as important as the fact that there *was* a problem. This anecdote shows that ethics, trust, honesty and dedication to the art of war were being violated at all levels. This type of environment was not conducive to the learning of painful lessons.

Civilian academics joined the chorus of military critiques. For example, Edward Luttwak published a 1980 article entitled, "The Decline of American Military Leadership." He writes:

There are plenty of engineers, economists, and political scientists in the officer corps -but where are the tacticians? There are the many skilled personnel managers, logistical managers and technical managers-but where are the students of the operational art of war? And at the top there are many competent (and politically sensitive) bureaucrats-but where are the strategists?⁷⁵

The military had abdicated its responsibility as warriors and protectors of the state. Military leaders acquiesced. The officer corps had become an Army of technicians and managers. Similarly, Bernard Brodie noted:

I mean that the professional military, with very few exceptions contributed little but resistance-especially resistance to the idea of restraint-and have continued ever since to contribute little or nothing to the understanding of the basic strategic-political problems of our times. That is not to be wondered at, because they have been improperly educated for that part of their job. They have, in fact, a trained incapacity for dealing with it, and their performance in Vietnam should be all the proof we need.⁷⁶

Peter Paret goes so far as to say that during this period, military history as a component of the operational art, was a field of study in danger of not having a "continual

⁷⁴ James Fallows, *National Defense*, (New York: Random House, 1981) p. 121.

⁷⁵ Edward Luttwak, "The Decline of American Military Leadership," *Parameters*, vol. X, no. 4 (Winter 1980-81) pp. 82-88.

⁷⁶ Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Foreign Policy*, Number 5, Winter 1971-72, was reprinted in the June, 1972 issue of *Military Review*. His article is in response to a previous one written by Colin Gray attacking civilian strategists' role in the war. Several articles were imported from *Orbis*, *Foreign Affairs*, and other civilian academic journals. *Parameters* even started a feature in each issue where the editor comments on a political-military piece published in an outside periodical. The editors also included a section titled, "A View From the Fourth Estate." Generally, the contributors in this section were either professors from civilian universities or well-known journalists. Occasionally, government officials or retired officers would print something in this section. When retired Colonel David Hackworth entered an article in this section, some readers were outraged. Readers blasted the editors for allowing Hackworth to contribute in the *View From the Fourth Estate* section because of his controversial resignation "in protest" over Army policy in Vietnam. Some judged him a turncoat and viewed him unworthy of the status afforded to other authors contributing in this particular section of *Parameters*. After Harry Summers retired and wrote in *A View From the Fourth Estate*, however, no one's ire was raised.

institutional presence in American higher education.”⁷⁷ He does recognize, however, that the service schools barely kept the tradition alive.

Part of the Army’s reprofessionalization effort did involve using military history and past military theorists as a basis for understanding the Vietnam dilemma. Hardly any references to Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, B. Liddell Hart and others were mentioned from 1972 to 1977; only one or two mentions (out of roughly 15 articles) of these theorists occurred per year (see Figure 10).⁷⁸




Figure 10. Mentions of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, B. Liddell Hart and other military theorists.

In 1978 a slight increase in the number of references to Clausewitz, and other military theorists began. This increase coincides with publication of a new warfighting doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, “Active Defense” and with efforts to invigorate the Army’s professional development program. Debate and controversies like the one at the CGSC seminar help stimulate use of these past military thinkers. Though Clausewitz provided an excellent forum to further the operational art, he was also used to legitimize the stab-in-the-back myth.

No one starts a war or rather, no one *in his senses* ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.⁷⁹ (emphasis added)

⁷⁷ Peter Paret, Understanding War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 217.

⁷⁸ Again as a reminder and for comparison, approximately 300 articles appeared on all subjects (nuclear weapons, training exercises, etc.) each year.

⁷⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 579.

This passage was oft quoted and paraphrased in articles between 1972-81. The not-so-subtle implication was that the senseless irrationality of civilian leadership got America into an unwanted war and with no coherent plan. This quote reoccurs in writings in following years. Awareness of a potential stab in the back is seen throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Even officers with no Vietnam experience mention the legacy of distrust.

C. THE YOM KIPPUR CONNECTION

One of the biggest surprises in the study was the number of articles referencing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.⁸⁰ What did the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam wars have in common? At first, the connection between Vietnam and the October 1973 war was not obvious, but eventually the Arab-Israeli war's influence on doctrinal development and the lessons of Vietnam was clarified. Both wars had an impact on the development of Army doctrine.

The Arab-Israeli war was referenced in 31 articles where Vietnam was mentioned. In most all of these 31 cases the author's attitude toward the war was one of fondness. The prevailing tone was not only that the Arab-Israeli war was the type of war the United States was trained to fight but also that it was the model for future wars. The implication was that Vietnam was the aberration and that it had few lessons to offer the US Army as it prepared for its true mission, "the first battle" on the plains of central Europe.⁸¹

The American Army's dubious experience of Vietnam was reinforced by observations of the October 1973 battles and gave a new twist to the U.S. Army's long-standing notion about war.⁸² In addition to overwhelming firepower winning wars, maneuver was a key to success. The Army, quantitatively inferior to the Soviets in conventional armaments, identified with the Israelis who fought outnumbered and won. The possibility of synthesizing the maneuver and firepower characteristics of war started the Army's rethinking of doctrine.

The publication of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 stirred some debate on doctrine. In 1975 and 1976 only one article whose primary subject was doctrine mentioned Vietnam. After the manual explaining Active Defense circulated in the Army the number of references increased. In 1977 there were seven references, in 1978, there were four and in 1979,

⁸⁰ In some cases the war in 1967 was cited. If the 1967 war was cited in the context of being the type of war the United States was capable of fighting, it was included.

⁸¹ Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, "Implications of the Modern Battlefield," *Military Review*, July 1977, p. 3.

⁸² John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984) p. 2.

seven references appeared. In most of these articles, Vietnam was a negative point of reference and was an example of how *not to conduct war* (e.g. by allowing civilian limited war theorists to sway policy makers' decisions). When the war was used positively it was at the tactical-operational level and demonstrated how *to win wars* (e.g. by having helicopters move soldiers on the battlefield and destroy the enemy).

Except for a two year dip in 1975 and 1976, approximately the same number of articles written about Vietnam or peace operations addressed organizational change throughout this first phase. As the decade wore on the Army became content with its organizational structure. No subculture pushing for change appeared. Accordingly, Figure 11 shows that fewer articles mentioned organizational change than those that did not, particularly from 1978-81. Whatever the Army thought of itself in this period relating to Vietnam, it was not reorganizing itself. On the occasions when organizational change was debated, history tells us the Army was slow to act on that debate.⁸³

There are two exceptions to this rule of lethargic change. Many articles addressed the acquisition of new weapons systems. The prevailing opinion was that the Army's ten-year fixation on Vietnam had caused it to neglect weapons development programs which allowed the Soviets to catch up.⁸⁴ Helicopters and the XM1 tank were the most discussed weapon systems. General Howze of *The Howze Board* fame wrote a series of articles on the original Army aviation stimulus: the use of helicopters and tactical innovation for use in the European theater. It was evident his articles were designed to rejuvenate thinking on the use of the helicopter fleet in Europe.

The other exception to the Army's inability to restructure itself was debate over mobilization of the reserves, use of the draft and an all volunteer Army. Authors agreed that the decision to mobilize the reserves during Vietnam hurt the military effort.⁸⁵ While a few authors saw problems with their exclusion in tactical and operational terms (bringing

⁸³ Seventy-four articles mentioned some type of change but the Army actually changed little in this context. Keep in mind that changes *were* occurring in the Army and they were written about but *not in the context of Vietnam or limited war*. Many articles not included in the sample addressed changes as a result of intermediate nuclear forces, as an example, but few dealt with change as an acknowledged function of Vietnam.

⁸⁴ Donn A. Starry, "A Tactical Evolution: FM 100-5," *Military Review*, August 1978, p. 3 and *Army* interview with General Fred C. Weyand in the October 1976 issue, p. 20.

⁸⁵ John D. Bruen, "Repercussions from the Vietnam Mobilization Decision," *Parameters*, vol. II, no. 1 (Spring 1972) p. 30. See also Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) for a detailed description of this process.

certain types and quantities to force on the battlefield) others saw the strategic blunder (failing to mobilize the reserves in effect isolated the public from the war).⁸⁶




Figure 11. The Decreasing Number of Articles Mentioning Organizational Change.

The Total Force Concept (TFC) was one of the accepted lesson of the war. This reorganization of the active-reserve force ratios is the result of the dual concerns of maintaining public support and the incremental approach to force sizing in Vietnam. The TFC placed large numbers of logistical units in the reserves while keeping many of the fighting units on active status. In effect, this prevented the President from going to war for extended periods without calling up the reserves. Relatively low numbers of articles debated the point because it was a readily accepted concept. The number of articles referencing the reserves an mobilization issues by year is shown at Figure 12.

⁸⁶ See Phillip D. Coleman, "Civil Affairs in Transition: Should We Question Present Doctrine?" *Military Review*, April 1975, p. 42 for an example of an article on the tactical and operational employment of reserve units. For a strategic or policy perspective, see Bruen, "Repercussions from the Vietnam Mobilization Decision."




Figure 12. Number of Articles Mentioning Reserve Mobilization, a Volunteer Army or the Draft.

The variable coded, *The Concept*,⁸⁷ was designed to show whether the author strongly supported a conventional, big-war paradigm. Conventional war was defined as anything looking like European land warfare in 1945, Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1973 or even the NVA sweep of the South in 1975. Figure 13 shows that in every year but one between 1972 and 1981, more authors favored a big-war paradigm than were against it. Though the absolute numbers seem low, they are not insignificant. Approximately half of the authors each year took a position. The large majority of authors did not take a strong position either for or against *The Concept* or wrote on a subject (or at a level) where the question was not relevant. It also should be pointed out that the mentions listed here were all *in the context of the Vietnam war*. Literally hundreds of articles during this period were devoted to past, present and future conventional war in central Europe. Because none of those articles mentioned the war in Vietnam or peace operations, however, they were not included in the sample.

⁸⁷ The term, *The Concept* is borrowed from Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*. On pages 4-7, Krepinevich defines *The Concept*. Briefly, he says that the Army "Concept" is the U.S. Army's approach to how wars *ought* to be fought.




Figure 13. In Every Year but 1977, More Authors Noticably Chose a Big-War Paradigm When Writing about Vietnam and Peace Operations.

When this preference for a big-war is combined with the lack of discussion on organizational change, it becomes clear that the Army's collective view of itself was not changing much in the ten years following the end of US involvement in the war. What the Army had done was look back for a familiar sign-post through the fog and ambiguity of the lessons of Vietnam war; central Europe and reserve mobilization were the two visible markers. The preference for mechanized, fire and maneuver warfare worked to filter out the less agreeable lessons of Vietnam.

D. PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations were a non-subject for most of this first period. Almost all references to peace operations were related to the US involvement in the Multinational Observer Force placed in the Sinai after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Only one or two articles per year even mentioned peace operations. Most articles were descriptive, explaining the mission and how soldiers spent their time. Frequently the connotations were less than inspiring. One article entitled, "How to Not Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for a UN Peacekeeping Operation," addresses the "new" mission. The author mentions the difficulty of taking trained killers and turning them into observers.

In preparing his unit, no leader can overlook the frustrating aspects of a task *where achieving nothing is the goal*, or living with the paradox of using a fighting force not to fight.⁸⁸ (emphasis added)

The author undoubtedly spoke for the majority of the Army when during this phase he notes that the goal of peace operations is "nothing." The author deserves credit for being prescient in his understanding the difficulties of a peacekeeper's mission but the title of the article and his tone reflect the Army's cultural view of such operations. This view is still present in the U.S. Army.

E. PHASE I SUMMARY

The organizational learning model pointed out breaks in the learning cycle. During this early period, two breaks in the cycle occur. The first break occurred when individual beliefs were not transformed into individual action. In the case of authors writing in military journals immediately after Vietnam, many officers did not write on articles based on the beliefs drawn from their Vietnam experience.

A second break in the learning cycle model occurs when individual actions are not translated into organizational action. In the case of the Army in Vietnam, two factors are at work. Primarily, the authors' inability to clearly reach consensus on the perceived lessons of Vietnam prevented the Army from implementing organizational action. The Army developed Active Defense in response to part of the failure but the Army took no steps to develop a counterinsurgency capability. Those officers acknowledging the failure of counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam chose not to develop new doctrine and procedures. Counterinsurgency doctrine was not tested for further applicability.

Additionally, authors on active duty faced institutional pressures from the service to comply with the accepted norms. Senior officer first complied with, then ignored and eventually denounced civilian limited war theorists. Any officer countering this established culture was surely marginalized. It would have taken courage to write an article contradicting General Weyand's position that the mission in Vietnam was accomplished. As other study's have shown, professional courage was lacking in the Army of the 1970s.⁸⁹ Those officers bold enough to say that the Army *had* lost in Vietnam and urge the Army to investigate a better strategy for the "next time" rather than turn its back on the

⁸⁸ James C. Wise, "How to Not Fight: Putting Together a U.S. Army Force for a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation," *Military Review*, December 1977, p. 20.

⁸⁹ See both James Fallows, National Defense, and Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command.

problem had little effect on organizational action. The best effort of the officer corps was TFC and Active Defense.

The nine years immediately after the end of the US involvement in Vietnam could best be summarized as a period of shock, denial and introversion for the Army. With the exception of a reversion to NATO-centric operations, moderate research and development and the sweeping TFC initiative, the Army did not change much. There were no sweeping changes being considered like a Counterinsurgency Division or giving increased status to a counter culture. Some observers of Army structure equate the development of the Light Infantry Division to a Counterinsurgency Division. Others see the creation of Special Forces as an independent branch of the Army as a huge institutional gain for critics of *The Concept*. These two sweeping changes eventually occur, but not until later in the 1980s.

The shock over the loss of Vietnam influenced what was written in the journals and appears to have influenced what was written in the Army's official publications. Certain subjects like why *the Army* lost in Vietnam were unofficially off-limits. As shown by General Weyand's comments there was often no perceived loss to write about. The majority of the participants were either numb or shocked by the Army's less than glorious departure from Vietnam, the attitudes of the people back home and the reactions of both civilian and military leaders.

The Nixon Doctrine was an obvious reaction to US failure and reinforced the Army's cultural notion that US troops did not have a role in limited war and only a narrow purpose in security assistance. US weapons and equipment were more useful than US personnel. The Army undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief when Nixon delivered his 1970 Guam speech announcing America's new policy.⁹⁰

Critics argue that during the Army's period of introversion efforts to reinvigorate itself it accomplished little by 1981. The total failure of *Desert One* in its attempt to rescue embassy hostages in Iran supported this stagnation argument.⁹¹ Of the many lessons of Vietnam, some had already begun to be accepted while others were filtered out. Senior Army leadership failed to integrate specific yet valuable lessons into doctrine. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people was an original aspect of U.S. strategy. Few authors came to its defense, however, between 1972 and 1981.

⁹⁰ Authors were aware of the impact the Nixon Doctrine would have on the Army and its concepts were generally accepted. See Raymond R. Battreal, "Thesis: Massive Retaliation, Antithesis: Flexible Response, Synthesis: The Nixon Doctrine?" *Military Review*, p. 65.

⁹¹ For a description of the *Desert One* rescue attempt and a brief discussion of the ramifications of its failure (particularly on joint and special operations) see John E. Valliere, "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst For Change," *Parameters*, Autumn 1992, p. 69-81.

The Army did manage to do a self-assessment in those years though the fruits were delayed for a decade. The benefits of the Army's reform, however, were not born out until the successful completion of Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait and Iraq. Other consequences would result in the Army roles in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua throughout the 1980s.

In response to external civilian accusations and the less direct internal calls for reform in the 1970s, General Walter T. Kerwin's, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army decided to make some good come of the increasingly apparent failure in Vietnam. In 1979, he directed the US Army War College to compile the various lesson of Vietnam, analyze them and address concerns. General Kerwin's intent when commissioning the study was to capitalize on the Army's growing interest in reforging itself into a capable and professional organization.⁹²

During this period the Army tinkered around the edges of its integral operations manual while denying any real necessity to fix its limited or unconventional warfare doctrine or practices. Force structure remained the same. War fighting doctrine had not changed significantly; plans and operations just got narrower, more Euro-centric and more tactical. FM 100-5 was overly focused on central Europe and provided little utility in other regions of the world where the likelihood of war was acknowledged to be higher.⁹³ By denying its role in non-NATO areas, the Army dangerously divorced itself from its responsibility of defending *all* US interests. What exactly the Army learned about itself in this introspective period, other than that it needed new weapons and to refocus on the first battle in Europe, is not entirely clear. The Army simply shelved many lessons of the Vietnam war particularly those dealing with non-armored warfare.

⁹² August 1995 phone conversation with Harry Summers who worked for Kerwin in 1979.

⁹³ Donald R. Morelli and Michael M. Ferguson, "Low Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective," *Military Review*, November 1984, p. 2-16. See graph on p. 7. Reprinted in George Edward Thibault, *Dimensions of Military Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987) p. 343.

IV. SHAPING THE CONSENSUS: 1982-1989

A. *ON STRATEGY*

The person charged with executing the War College study on the lessons of Vietnam was then Lieutenant Colonel, now retired, Harry G. Summers Jr. He was sent to the US Army War College with the mission of making some sense out of the often divergent lessons of the Vietnam War. His work eventually took the form of a book called, On Strategy, and was first published in 1981.⁹⁴

To reach its primarily military audience, the book used the principles of war from FM 100-5 and Clausewitzian analysis as its framework. Clausewitz and other military theorists had been revived in the profession of arms in the 1970s and Summers capitalized on it. Summers's book is,

now being used as student text at the Army War College, the Army Command and General Staff College and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and for selected seminars at the National Defense University, the Air and Naval War Colleges.⁹⁵

Clearly the Army attempted in the early 1980s to operationalize the lessons of the Vietnam war. In terms of the organizational learning model presented in Chapter II, the organization attempted to complete the learning cycle. The Army hoped to change the environment by extracting individual experiences and consolidating them through a study and institutionalizing the effort by requiring its officers read the book.

As the title indicates, Summers's book is about the strategy of the Vietnam War not its tactics. He assumes outright that the Army's operations and tactics were successful. His assumption avoids a myriad of "other" lessons of Vietnam. The lessons of Vietnam found in On Strategy are political-military and professional military lessons. In phase one 54% of the articles were written on strategy-policy subjects. In phase two, after Summers's

⁹⁴ In the phone interview, Summers explained that he was sent to the Army War College to compile the various lessons of the Vietnam War and draw some conclusions. Originally, his results were to be published as a paper within the Army and *for the Army*. After the paper gained widespread support by the Army elite it was put in the form of a book to reach a wider audience. The first edition of the book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1981) was soon put on the mandatory reading list at the War College and the Command and General Staff College. Colonel Summers also stated that there were some Generals who opposed the release of the book and it being made required reading. Among these he said, were member of the Special Operations community and the Army's Office of History.

⁹⁵ Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) p. 13. This edition of the book is essentially the same as the 1981 edition. Only the forward and the epilogue vary and even then only slightly.

publishes his book, 77% of the articles address strategy-policy subjects. On Strategy not only *stimulated* debate on the lessons of Vietnam, but it also *focused* debate onto political-military relations.

Summers's primary finding was that because no clear political objective was ever articulated, strategic direction was lacking. Consequently, even successful military operations and tactical exploits were contributing to an errant strategy, a strategy that could never win the war. In his now famous exchange with a North Vietnamese officer in 1975, Summers conveys his point:

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American Colonel.

The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.”⁹⁶

The two officers talked to each other on completely different levels of analysis. The North Vietnamese officer more clearly understood an Army's role in the politics of war. The American colonel was centered on an Army's role on the battlefield. The conversation reflects the American preference to wage war in isolation of its political master.

If political objectives were ever clear, Summers claims, they quickly changed and thus remained illusive. Twenty-two different reasons for US conduct of the war were cited versus only one for North Vietnam.⁹⁷ On this subject there is some agreement: because of transitory objectives or objectives put in negative terms (the U.S. objective is to *not* let North Vietnam win), political and military officials had no clear consensus on what the strategy was to defeat North Vietnam and stop communist expansion. What did “defeat North Vietnam mean?” Defeat its army? Or just force North Vietnam to stop supporting the insurgency?

The first theme of his book sets out to answer these questions. For Summers, the answer involves recognizing the need for civilian leaders to set *political* objectives so the armed services can develop complementary *military* objectives. Together the military and civilians develop a strategy to achieve those goals.

On a second point, Summers has gained equal notoriety, though the debate is still alive.⁹⁸ Summers concluded that the nature of the war was not properly identified. Was

⁹⁶ Harry Summers, On Strategy, p. 21.

⁹⁷ Hugh M. Arnold, “Official Justifications for America's Role in Indochina, 1949-67,” *Asian Affairs*, September/October 1975, p. 31. As seen in Harry Summers, On Strategy p. 140.

⁹⁸ See MacKubin Thomas Owens, “Vietnam as Military History,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 1993-94, p. 112 for a brief example. Also, in “Commentary and Reply,” *Parameters*, Autumn 1992, pp. 103-104, Summers and John W. Garner debate how the U.S. could have won in Vietnam. Paul F. Braim, “Vietnam:

South Vietnam fighting a full blown civil war or a war of aggression against North Vietnam? Or was the conflict a Vietcong counterinsurgency operating in South Vietnam?

Summers comes down on the side of the war of North Vietnamese aggression and proposes application of overwhelming US force as the solution.⁹⁹ He states that the US role should have been confined to (or allowed to depending on one's perspective) conducting a war against the aggressors, North Vietnam. In his solution to what would have won the war, US forces serve in conventional ground warfare role facing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in North Vietnam and patrolling the Laotian and Cambodian borders, but with no restrictions on crossing borders. In effect, that is what the Army did from 1965 to 1972. Defeating the NVA is a central point of Summers's solution, a dominant theme in establishing military objectives and an imperative in defining Clausewitz's *center of gravity*.¹⁰⁰ To his credit Summers fairly critiques his sponsor. The inability of the Army leadership to agree upon the nature of the war and determine what it would take to defeat the threat is a second theme of the book.

An opposing view is that the U.S. role should have been *assisting* the South Vietnamese government and Army (ARVN) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with specially trained US soldiers. This idea is best developed by Andrew J. Krepinevich Jr. in The Army in Vietnam. He claims the Army could have supervised successful COIN operations but the Army's institutional commitment to *The Concept* prevented it from doing so. *The Concept* is Krepinevich's moniker for Army doctrine, based on mechanized warfare in Europe during the Second World War. He claims the Army marginalized those wanting to shift focus onto COIN operations in Vietnam. The Army then clung too tightly to *the Concept*, eventually deploying conventional forces to fight unconventional warfare leading to the erosion of US will to fight. Krepinevich cites many other reasons for American failure in Vietnam but both he and Summers agree on one point: the Army was not properly used. In addition to assessing the nature of the conflict, applying a force of appropriate capability and size is definitely a theme of Krepinevich's book and a third point of Summers's book.

The Fighting Flares Again," *Parameters*, Autumn 1995, pp. 124-128, notes how Robert McNamara's book stirred the controversy again. Others like Sam Sarkesian, Larry Cable, Steven Metz and Andrew Krepinevich have written about the changing nature of the war and the feasibility of stopping the insurgency in its early phases.

⁹⁹ Harry Summers, On Strategy, pp. 170-173. Also, during a discussion on the topic Professor Larry Cable from the University of North Carolina-Wilmington described Summers's interpretation of a solution for Vietnam as taking the Air-Land Battle doctrine and just scaling it up or down to suit a purpose.

¹⁰⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 484-487, 597-599.

A fourth theme of Summers's work identifies the role of the American public in the war effort. Summers includes chapters on the Congress and the People and emphasizes the importance of obtaining their consent. He stresses public support as a *requirement* for conduct of war and discounts limited war theorists. Using Clausewitz's trinity of the army, the government and the people,¹⁰¹ Summers highlights the faulty way in which civilian limited war theorists influenced the administration to fight the war isolated from the American public. Vietnam was a war fought in cold blood, devoid of the emotions of the American people.¹⁰²

Summers's findings are insightful but carry with them a stab-in-the-back myth despite his claim to the contrary.¹⁰³ Though Summers denies this legacy and writes that the military did not always hold up its end of the political-military deal, he repeatedly connotes the failure of the civilian leadership to provide clear objectives, particularly at the Presidential and Secretary of Defense levels as the root cause of the Vietnam debacle.¹⁰⁴ He claims that by preventing soldiers from pursuing VC and NVA infiltrators into Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam political leaders artificially constrained the Army. He illuminates the discussion of constraints by introducing the subjects of limited war and "victory." He dismisses the idea that the war was unwinnable but harps on the need to overwhelm the enemy with ground forces and firepower.¹⁰⁵

Summers is no fan of limited war but he does grasp the relationship between limited means, limited objectives and victory. He realizes that,

... from the perspective of our total victory in World War II, Korea still looked like a defeat and it is only from the perspective of our actual defeat in Vietnam that we can see Korea was actually a victory.¹⁰⁶

Defining a "win" by determining a desired end-state and stating a clear objective was the fifth broad theme of Summers's work.

In both commissioning Summers's to write the book and the requirement that its officers read it, one sees the foundations for the Army's institutionalizing the lessons of

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 89.

¹⁰² Harry Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 62.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 33.

¹⁰⁴ Summers valiantly tries to stay focused on the military and its role in the political-military equation in an obvious and mostly successful attempt at strengthening the profession of arms (see, for example, p. 258). He continually lets his feelings of victimization show through, however (see, for example, pp. 34-35, 236, 246-249).

¹⁰⁵ Harry Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 172.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 170.

Vietnam. Not many veterans would argue with his selected lessons and conclusions. Indeed, his book gained wide support in the military and academic communities.¹⁰⁷ Both On Strategy and The Army in Vietnam were reviewed by the same retired general and the reviewer's personal bias, representative of the Army's cultural bias, shows.¹⁰⁸

Of the two accounts of US failure in Vietnam, Summers's work is more accepted probably because it was less offensive to the Vietnam-era military decision makers.¹⁰⁹ Dissenting voices on Summers's use of Clausewitz seldom appeared and when they did the seeds of the message did not fall on fertile soil.¹¹⁰

Summers's take on Vietnam, soon became the Army's official view because the On Strategy explanation fit better with cultural norms, i.e. *The Concept*. He omitted any tactical lessons and filtered out those that did not fit the Clausewitzian framework of analysis. Summers's assessment was a more satisfying apology¹¹¹ for what went wrong in

¹⁰⁷ See for example, Charles Maechling Jr. in *Parameters*, vol. XIV, no. 3, (September 1984) pp. 38 and 41. Stephen Peter Rosen Winning the Next War, p. 35 and Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, (New York, Penguin Books: 1991) p. 19 both cite Summers's conversation with the North Vietnamese Colonel regarding winning on the battlefield but losing the war and agree with his assessment. Two examples of periodical references of Summers's conversation are in, Cass D. Howell, "War, Television and Public Opinion," *Military Review*, February 1987, p. 71 and Max G. Manwaring and Robert M. Herrick, "A Threat Oriented Strategy for Conflict Control," *Military Review*, July 1987, p. 7. Perhaps most importantly On Strategy is recognized by Michael Handel, "Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini," (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992) p. 160, "Much is owed to the important and timely work of Colonel Harry G. Summers on the lessons of Vietnam War."

¹⁰⁸ Bruce Palmer reviewed both books in *Parameters*: Summers's book on pages 90-91 in the December, 1981 issue (he reviewed the original version of On Strategy published by the Government Printing Office-the one for "official" Army use) and Krepinevich's book on pages 83-85 in the September, 1986 issue. Palmer attempts to provide balanced reviews, finding both positive and negative points in each book but it is obvious in the first three sentences of each review where his favor rests. On Summers's book, "This is an extraordinarily good book that is well worth careful reading and study by every military professional. Its central purpose is to make a strategic appraisal of the Vietnam War from the point of view of the United States, a formidable task by any measure. The author . . . has done a remarkable job." On Krepinevich's book, "The author has devoted a good deal of research and thought to his subject. The result of his work, however, is disappointing-a long, rambling, one-sided discourse that lacks the balance, cohesion and objectivity of a truly professional and scholarly book. His *bete noire*, is what he calls, "The Army Concept," which he paints as a doctrinal mindset fixed rigidly on modern "mid-intensity" conventional warfare set in Western Europe against the Soviet Union; and his villains are, "the Army brass," (whoever they are) on whom he blames all American shortcomings in Vietnam." Unbelievers should read both reviews in their entirety.

¹⁰⁹ Summers is referenced 62 times in the articles reviewed. Krepinevich is only six times. Though not all authors shared Summers's opinions, most did; they often quoted him or referenced him as the definitive source on the subject. See also Palmer's comments in footnote 72 above.

¹¹⁰ Eric Alterman, "The Uses and Abuses of Clausewitz," Summer 1987, *Parameters*, pp. 18-32. This article is the author's only recorded contribution in any of the three journals. His assessment of Summers's use of Clausewitz is less than flattering.

¹¹¹ G. Murphy Donovan, "Sustaining the Military Arts," *Parameters*, September 1989, p. 14.

Vietnam than any other work at that point and probably since.¹¹² Figure 14 shows the increasing influence Summers's book in relationship to the articles referencing lessons of Vietnam.




Figure 14. The Impact of Harry Summers's Book On Strategy on Writings about the Lessons of Vietnam.

But Summers's view was still somewhat unpolished and not quite packaged for civilian policy-maker's consumption. Though his work circulated in military circles much of its theme involved the civilian leadership and policy makers. Summers's lessons needed the addition of political nuances and a powerful sponsor before it could be fully transformed from its original simple analysis to an official policy.

¹¹² In a conversation about the book with a classmate, a Lieutenant Commander and SEAL in the Navy said, "I don't know if that's the right interpretation or not, but it sure makes you feel good."

B. THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE

According to Michael Handel, Summers's book,

.... had a very positive influence on the development of the United States military's thinking on strategy in the early 1980s as well as (albeit indirectly) on the formulation of the *Weinberger Doctrine*.¹¹³ (emphasis original)

Indeed, shortly after On Strategy became required reading at the service schools, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a speech in which he identified six tests governing US military intervention. These tests would help determine whether or not the US should use military force in its foreign policy.

On 28 November 1984, Secretary Weinberger stated:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have, and send, the forces needed to do just that.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation.
6. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.¹¹⁴

Many of Harry Summers's "military" lessons of Vietnam find their way into Weinberger's six tests, the antithesis of American intervention in Vietnam.¹¹⁵ The *Vital*

¹¹³ Michael Handel, *Masters of War*, p. 160.

¹¹⁴ These points are taken from Weinberger's 28 November 1984 speech at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. as seen in *Defense*, January 1985, pp. 2-8. All emphasis added. Each test will be referred to by the emphasized abbreviation throughout the paper. These shortened names are also used as categories in the content analysis coding.

¹¹⁵ Summers stated that he was told by a third party that Weinberger's speech writer had read Summers book and been influenced by it. Also, In Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991) p. 89, he points out that General Colin Powell was Weinberger's military assistant and that Powell was intimate with the speech, its content and its formulation. Powell and Summers were contemporaries; Summers's book, *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*, (New York: Dell, 1992) p. xii, was written in honor of Powell, "Friend, Leavenworth Classmate and Outstanding Soldier whose strategic guidance led the way to victory in the Persian Gulf war." As will be shown, Powell's understanding of the lessons of Vietnam are nearly indistinguishable from those of his friend and classmate.

National Interest and *Last Resort* tests are the more political of Weinberger's six criteria and are not specifically discussed in *On Strategy*. Regarding Vietnam the *Vital National Interest* test debate is over whether or not President Eisenhower's domino theory proved valid. In retrospect, clearly US military intervention in Vietnam fails this test. Supposedly, if Vietnam fell to communism, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and eventually all of Asia would tumble like dominoes under the weight of Soviet directed expansion and also become communist. After conquering the South, Vietnam did war with neighboring Cambodia in what appeared to be the next domino. After Vietnam fought with China, however, it became apparent that communism was not a synthesized global political force. Without any U.S. intervention, the dominos quit falling, (at least in Asia). Through the benefit of hindsight, one can now see that defeating North Vietnamese communists was not a vital U.S. national interest. Of the six tests *Vital National Interest* was mentioned fourth most often (133 times or 27%) in the articles examined.

The *Last Resort* test is written in the finest tradition of just or legal recourse to war and historically not a concern of the profession of arms subject to civilian control. Not surprisingly it is the least written about of the Weinberger lessons(41 times or 8%). If one considers the Army's premium on the element of surprise, this low ranking makes sense. Giving the opponent every chance to submit their will necessarily negates surprise as a principle of war. Also, *Surprise* was a chapter in Summers's book. As will be shown, the *Last Resort* test evolves into a *multilateral* test and develops an odd relationship with the *Vital National Interest* criterion.

The *Win* criterion is a two part test and also supports an accepted *On Strategy* lessons. First, discourse about winning, and more recently, a desired "end-state" once again became a worthy topic of scholarly research. Entire books devoted to the subject were published.¹¹⁶ One author even stretched the point by reminding readers how some things had not changed much from the 1919-21 US involvement in Russia's Civil War and US involvement in Vietnam. The author claims both situations were rushed into with out a plan for an exit.¹¹⁷ How to get out became one of the criteria for determining US military intervention.

¹¹⁶ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) p. vii. Iklé flatly admits, "I worked on this book when American involvement in the war in Vietnam had become an agonizing search for an exit. The United States had become entrapped in painfully prolonged fighting, unable to marshal a strategy to end the war satisfactorily."

¹¹⁷ Edward W. Coffman, "The Intervention in Russia, 1918-1921," *Military Review*, September 1988, p. 71.

Total and limited war theorists argued this point of victory steadily throughout the 1980s, particularly as the US Naval presence in the Persian Gulf grew. The Schultz-Weinberger debates capture the controversy at the highest levels of policy. Their two positions on this criterion and the relationship between victory, end-state and objectives is contextual. Fred Iklé provides a dose of perspective.

Judged a bit coarsely, the United States lost the Vietnam War. The Gulf War was clearly won by the United States-if judged in military terms. In political terms, though, the verdict must wait. In the Vietnam War, the victory won by America's enemy was a Pyrrhic one. Hanoi, soon after its victory, became embroiled in prolonged hostilities in neighboring Cambodia from which it is still trying to extricate itself. Then, in 1979, Hanoi had to fight off a military incursion from China-its staunch ally in the long war against the United States. All this time, Vietnam's economy deteriorated so much that "victorious" Hanoi is now humiliatingly dependent on foreign aid, over which Washington-the defeated enemy-has much to say. Could it now be said that by seeking South Vietnam's total defeat and the humiliation of the United States, Hanoi, in fact lost the peace.¹¹⁸

Second, by stating, "If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all," Weinberger presents an all or nothing approach. Overwhelming force "guarantees" a win. By not allowing the Army to use overwhelming force in Vietnam, the government prevented the Army from winning: the stab-in-the-back. The *Win* criteria seeks to reassure the military there will never again be a stab-in-the-back. Winning was the second most mentioned Weinberger test in the selected articles (160 times or 33%).

Securing achievable political and military objectives was Weinberger's third test and was the third most discussed lesson of Vietnam (137 times or 30%). It echoes one of Summers's major themes. Weinberger's tests and Summers's points are nearly identical on this topic.

Reassessing Force Size, Composition and Disposition was the fifth most mentioned lesson of Vietnam and Weinberger's fourth test (89 times or 20%). Summers made the case for proper implementation of the military, using it to overwhelm the enemy. Weinberger's interpretation differed slightly from Summers's. Weinberger emphasized reassessment of forces based on shifting objectives while Summers focused on only one

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. viii. Not only does Iklé address the *Win* criteria but he also mentions Weinberger and addresses his other criteria. He even mentions the stab-in-the-back myth. In the revised edition, he states that when he first wrote the book that he purposely avoided mentions of Vietnam (p. viii) for fear of them taking on a "disproportionate weight," but admits that "the influence of the present is strong enough, without quoting from today's newspapers." A similar line of reasoning may be applied to authors writing in military periodicals about counterinsurgency and limited war immediately after Vietnam.

objective: destroying the enemy's military power. If the enemy Army was smaller than the US force, then US forces could be scaled down but still be large enough to overwhelm the opposing forces. Weinberger's perspective reflects his extensive political experience and knowledge that *total* destruction of the enemy is rarely the objective. This suggestion of shifting objectives (or having to send for reinforcements) did not fit well into the Army's cultural understanding of how Army's win wars and was the likely reason for it ranking as the fifth most mentioned of the Weinberger tests. Nevertheless, this test is congruent with the all or nothing implication of the *Win* criterion.

The number one lesson of the Vietnam war is the importance of gaining the American public support when committing forces. Despite the John Mueller study showing that public support was high *during* a large portion of the war, the level of debate here shows that *after* the war it was the greatest concern.¹¹⁹ As the war dragged on, into the 1970s, the public began to have doubts about the justification of the expense.

Figure 15 traces development of the mentions of public opinion. Between 1972 and 1981 only three to six mentions of public support were recorded per year. Public support was an issue for authors but as a subject remained inviolate. Starting in 1985, however, mentions drastically increased, reaching their height in 1988 with 25 mentions. Increased use of the military in both the Gulf and Central America caused authors to warn readers of the dangers of not having public support when committing the military.

Though designed for policy use at Secretary of Defense and Presidential levels, Weinberger's points were not lost on the military professionals. Though his lessons were discussed by authors before he formally introduced them, his sponsorship of specific lessons helped establish them as *the* lessons of Vietnam. In the first phase of the study only five authors mentioned the six lessons collectively in their articles. In the second phase, however, the number of articles mentioning all six Weinberger tests or footnoting his

¹¹⁹ John E. Mueller, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam," *The American Political Science Review*, June 1971, pp. 358-375. Mueller shows how support waned as the war dragged on. This sentiment was the predominant one in the included articles; failure to win wars quickly erodes public support.




Figure 15. The Increase in Mentions of Public Support During the Mid-1980s.

speech tripled to fifteen articles. Figure 16 shows the rise and fall of Weinberger's six tests in the literature along with mentions of Harry Summers's book. Several detailed articles specifically addressing the Weinberger Doctrine appeared in the professional journals authored by active duty officers.¹²⁰ Weinberger's speech would continue to influence authors in military journals in the 1990s.¹²¹

More subtly, many articles were written referencing the subjects Weinberger listed in his tests but referenced neither Weinberger or his speech nor Summers or his book.¹²² Institutionalization of specific lessons of Vietnam had begun. Authors stated these lessons as a matter of fact. Summers's and Weinberger's words were used, but the text was not supported with a footnote. Certainly authors had no intent to plagiarize; they simply assimilated the lessons and recognized them as the accepted cultural interpretation.

¹²⁰ For an early perspective see, David Twining, "Vietnam and the Six Criteria for the Use of Military Force," *Parameters*, vol. XV, no. 4 (Winter 1985-86) pp. 10-18. Twining also quotes Summers. Additionally, David H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," *Parameters*, vol. XVI, no. 3 (Autumn 1986) pp. 43-53. Petraeus footnotes dozens of excellent sources on this subject. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," *Parameters*, Spring 1987, p. 67. Part two of the article appeared in the June 1987 issue.

¹²¹ For 1990s' examples, see Edwin J. Arnold, "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests" in *Parameters*, Spring 1994, pp. 4-11, Thomas R. DuBois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait," *Parameters*, Winter 1991-92, pp. 24-38 and John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, pp. 27-37.

¹²² See for example, David Petraeus, "Korea, The Never-Again Club and Indochina," *Parameters*, December 1987, p. 59-70.




Figure 16. References to Summers's Book and Weinberger's Speech Increased Through the 1980s. In the 1990s Weinberger's Tests Were Extensively Applied to Peace Operations.

The Army War College sponsored an study and publication of a book on the Weinberger Doctrine and traced its roots back to the lessons of the Vietnam War: "It is clear that the views of former Secretary Weinberger were strongly influenced by the Vietnam War, where the United States won every major battle, but lost the larger war."¹²³ Though Summers had retired from active service and was not a member of the team that wrote this book, his influence is felt in both tone and words.

Weinberger's tests did not materialize out of thin air ten years after the end of American involvement in Vietnam but were in response to the sagging credibility of conventional US forces. First Vietnam, then a failed desert hostage rescue and finally the

¹²³ Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1988). p. 14. The edited work included essays by active duty officers, retired officers and academics. The words in the sentence are similar to those from Summers's book about his conversation with the NVA Colonel. This reappraisal does have a good critique of the tests. Also, George Schultz, in his book Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) pp. 649-650 gives his version of the problems with Weinberger's doctrine. He says following these test would have stopped the United States "dead in its tracks" on intervention in Grenada. He states that the tests were "the Vietnam Syndrome in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of leadership."

bombing of Marine barracks in Lebanon, left national and military pride in a pile of rubble. Within days of the barracks bombing President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada and the expulsion of "communist troops" from the island. Many viewed the operation as an excessive debacle but others saw it as the beginning of the resurgence of the US as a credible military power.

Though Weinberger's criteria were not yet publicly articulated, the tests were applied to the US intervention in Grenada: stopping communist expansion in the western hemisphere was a vital US national interest; stopping its spread and reinstating a democratic government were the political goals; rescuing students, destroying Cuban forces and capturing equipment were the military objectives; overwhelming the enemy with Special Operating Forces (SOF) and conventional land, sea and air forces would ensure victory; reinstating an anti-Cuban, democratic regime and returning students to school was the desired end-state; as initial missions were completed, the force size and composition were reduced; the operation was completed swiftly and successfully thereby assuring public support; though US actions may not have been a last resort, it proceeded under the auspices of collective security-the Organization of American States (OAS) asked for assistance. Application of each test could be debated at length but the groundwork had nonetheless been laid for future operations.

Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary Weinberger debated the use of force issue throughout the 1980s.¹²⁴ Coercive diplomacy and limited use of force had retained a measure of respectability as tools of U.S. foreign policy. As American assistance to countries in the middle-East increased during this period, so too, did limited U.S. military involvement. Protection of reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers was accompanied by oil platform attacks, airbus shoot-downs and F-111 air strikes. Though the Army was not in the fore-front of these middle-East controversies, its policy and attitudes were center stage in Central America.

¹²⁴ Clay T. Buckingham, "Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions," *Parameters*, Autumn 1985, reprinted in the Autumn 1995 issue on pp. 98-110. In describing ethical tensions officers face regarding the use of force, the author uses the Schultz-Weinberger debates to emphasize that the tensions exist at the highest offices of political-military affairs.

C. THE LATIN AMERICAN CONNECTION

Many claimed the Vietnam war was an aberration.¹²⁵ Future wars would be unlike the one fought in Vietnam. But ten years after the U.S. exit from Vietnam, an insurgency in El Salvador and a communist government in Nicaragua occupied much of the Army's strategic thought.¹²⁶ Debate over United States' involvement in the region reached its peak 1988.¹²⁷ Weinberger's tests were influencing the U.S. Army's involvement and kept commitment at the advisory level.

Despite the dwindling numbers of active officers with Vietnam experience, the number of articles written by them and referencing Vietnam remained relatively constant from 1972-1985, increasing only slightly. Beginning in 1986, however, dramatic increases occurred. Both the number of articles about Vietnam and the number of Vietnam veteran authors increased. Between 1986 and 1989, 159 articles were written referencing Vietnam, nearly as many as the Vietnam articles for the other 20 years combined. Mentions of Vietnam during this five year period did not decrease as a function of retirements and departures from the Army. Fewer numbers of Vietnam veterans were on active duty but the amount of references to Vietnam increased. Figure 17 shows the increase.

Only one feasible explanation accounts for the increased authorship on the subject by Vietnam veterans. The Vietnam war was on the minds of those authors writing about events in Latin America. When the frequency of articles referencing the political-military situation in Latin America graphed in Figure 18 with the number of articles referencing Vietnam, the correlation is striking.

As the conflict in Latin America became acute, concern over US intervention peaked. A total of 122 articles were written referencing both Vietnam and Latin America. Clearly, Vietnam was on the minds of the people concerned about US foreign policy toward Latin America. With titles like, "The Nicaraguan Domino" authors clearly conveyed a perceived linkage between 1960's policy in Southeast Asia and 1980's policy in Latin America.¹²⁸ Authors perceived linkages between Vietnam and Nicaragua much the way they would come to view linkages between Vietnam and Bosnia.

¹²⁵ See, for example, Cass D. Howell, "War Television and Public Opinion," *Military Review*, February 1987, p. 78.

¹²⁶ See, for example, Alden M. Cunningham, "U.S. Strategic Options in Nicaragua," *Parameters*, March 1988, pp. 60-72.

¹²⁷ 26 of 47 articles (55%) from 1988 mentioned the political-military situation in Latin America. This number was higher than in any other year of the study.

¹²⁸ Edgar O'Ballance, "The Nicaraguan Domino," *Military Review*, October 1983, pp. 2-10.

It is not surprising that there is an association between Vietnam and Latin America, but the *strength* of the relationship is revealing. Phrases similar to, “no more Vietnams” appeared regularly in these articles.¹²⁹ Also, references to tying the military's hand or unnecessary restrictions regularly appeared.




Figure 17. The Number of Vietnam Veterans Writing about Vietnam.

Nearly 25% of the articles mentioning the *Win* criterion also mentioned a stab-in-the-back syndrome. Articles just mentioning professionalism remained relatively constant throughout the twenty-three year period, while articles coded “stab-in-the-back” climaxed in the years 1985-1989. Five, eight, ten, six and five articles discussed betrayal in each of

¹²⁹ Examples include, Cunningham, “U.S. Strategic Options in Nicaragua,” p. 70. The January 1989 issue of *Military Review* is dedicated to Vietnam but many articles place the war and its lessons in the context of Latin America.




Figure 18. The Relationship Between the Number of Articles Mentioning Vietnam and the Number of Articles Mentioning Latin America.

these respective years. Figure 19 shows the sharp rise of concern about the civilian leadership getting the Army haphazardly involved in Latin America. Authors (and editors) in these years seemed determined to educate their readers on the similarities and differences between Vietnam and Central America and the dangers of confusing the two conflicts.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Morton A. Kaplan, "Misleading Parallels: Nicaragua and Vietnam," *Military Review*, November 1987, p. 81.




Figure 19. A Sharp Rise in Discussion of a Stab-in-the-back is Evident in the

D. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND DOCTRINE

In the mid-1980s, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) officially entered the Army vocabulary.¹³¹ The 1982 version of FM 100-5 introduced the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine but was yet to officially recognize LIC as term. The term had been mentioned sporadically in the early 1980s but 1985 was the first year that it was mentioned more than once in the same year. The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 divided warfare by “intensity” (High Intensity Conflict [HIC] and Mid Intensity [MIC]) and fully legitimized use of the term. The phrase became official and part of the accepted Army culture.

At first the term was designed to explain and incorporate contemporary realities, e.g. counterinsurgencies in Central America, rescue operations on Caribbean Islands and peace operations in the middle East. Counterinsurgency as a term, however, could not be used because of its Vietnam connotation.¹³² LIC was the replacement phrase and is the original connection between Vietnam and peace operations.

¹³¹ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], August 1986) pp. 8-9.

¹³² Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, “The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning,” *Parameters*, September 1988, pp. 35-36. Counterinsurgency “smacked of Vietnam defeat.” Also, Thomas J. Kuster Jr., “Dealing with the Insurgency Spectre,” *Military Review*, February 1987, p. 21. The author claims the United States was psychologically unprepared for another counterinsurgency war as a result of the failure in Vietnam; the term LIC helped soothe fears of the never-again school students. David Decker, “Civil Affairs: A Birth or a Stillborn?” *Military Review*, November 1987, pp. 60-64. The author makes the case the Army did not care whether it had a COIN doctrine or not.

Several authors recognized the absolute avoidance of counter-insurgency as mission, much the way Krepinevich noted in his book.¹³³ Krepinevich occasionally was mentioned, though his voice paled in comparison to Summers.¹³⁴ LIC as a replacement was called, “a nonsense phrase.”¹³⁵ The service schools all but stopped teaching the subject of counterinsurgency in the period after Vietnam¹³⁶ but Latin America changed all that.

President Reagan’s decision to support the counterinsurgency in El Salvador caused the Army to examine the doctrine it had shelved a decade prior. External events prompted decision maker choices, causing the Army to change. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict was published in final draft in June 1988. The manual was a synthesis of the “old” COIN doctrine and “new” contingency operation characteristics. The general concepts of FM 100-5 were applied to the LIC manual to make it familiar to the audience.

LIC seemed to help the Army both understand and explain events in Latin America. It helped prepare the Army for potential conflicts in the region and gave them a new paradigm in which to view these aberrant wars. Many articles had LIC as the main subject and were usually written as a reaction to El Salvador, Nicaragua and others.¹³⁷ More often than not, the American experience in Vietnam was drawn on.

Peace operations were also officially judged to be low in intensity. Peace Operations made up one of the three official subcategories of LIC along with terrorism and counterinsurgency.¹³⁸ Peace operations were peripheral missions for the Army and participation was infrequent. During the 1980s, only the Marine’s mission in Lebanon and the Army’s presence in the Sinai were mentioned in the journals. The exception was a comprehensive survey of the Latin American political-military situation and its potential for

¹³³ Rudolph C. Barnes, “The Politics of Low Intensity Conflict,” *Military Review*, February 1988, p. 5. Barnes says the Army, “threw the counterinsurgency baby out with the bath water” when revamping its doctrine.

¹³⁴ Krepinevich was mentioned a scant six times in this context and of having a sound argument. Krepinevich’s book never became *required* reading at the service schools. Also, this book had only three years to gain a following before Desert Storm crushed the LIC subculture. Summers’s book had a five year head start.

¹³⁵ Charles W. McInnis, “A Nonsense Phrase,” *Military Review*, May 1988, pp. 59, 64-69.

¹³⁶ Michael Pearleman, “The Fall and Rise of LIC Doctrine and Instruction,” *Military Review*, September 1988, pp. 78-79.

¹³⁷ During this second phase, 27 articles had Central or South America as its main subject. Of those 27 articles, only two did not mention Vietnam. Those two mentioned peace operations.

¹³⁸ John B. Hunt, “Emerging Doctrine For LIC,” *Military Review*, June 1991, pp. 51-60. This article provides a good overview of how COIN became LIC and how peace operations fell under the LIC rubric.

peace operation missions.¹³⁹ Almost by default, peace operations were categorized under the LIC acronym along with counterinsurgency, a dreaded hangover from Vietnam. COIN became synonymous with LIC in the 1980s. In the 1990s LIC would become synonymous with peace operations.

Equipped with the ALB terminology and as the Army furthered its introspection about what went wrong in Vietnam, soldiers began to associate Vietnam with a category: HIC, MIC or LIC. Describing war using a spectrum of intensity, veterans of the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam could discuss their experience with a new vocabulary and without strong stigma.¹⁴⁰ This categorization at first seemed to please the entire audience.

Soldiers that served as advisors in unconventional or civil affairs units or fought against the Viet Cong saw the fundamental difference between the type of war they fought and the type of war their peers fought in later years. These American soldiers' experiences in Vietnam resembled what the Army was doctrinally calling LIC and what they were reading about (or seeing) in Latin America. Even the terrain was similar. During the 1980s a competing subculture centered around Latin America involvement, LIC-counterinsurgency doctrine and the Vietnam lessons began to establish itself. Figure 20 shows how after an idle period in the 1970s, LIC and SOF mentions increased throughout the 1980s.

Conversely, the armored warfare that consumed the middle-East and caused the Army to "sweep away counterinsurgency doctrine"¹⁴¹ looked nothing like Vietnam's LIC. This mechanized warfare, however, did have some parallels to the October war's MIC characteristics. The Arab-Israeli conflict also looked more like the battles fought in the Second World War, though on a smaller scale. If the European Theater of Operations in World War II was HIC and Mitla Pass was MIC, then for the second generation Vietnam veterans Tet was MIC, too. Veterans operating from a big-war paradigm had a vocabulary to discuss their experiences as well. Conveniently, discussions about Vietnam could now

¹³⁹ John Child, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System," *Military Review*, October 1980, pp. 40-54.

¹⁴⁰ Two articles do a good job at capturing the proceeding debate about whether Vietnam was a war or an insurgency. Michael Brown, "Vietnam: Learning From the Debate," *Military Review*, February 1987, pp. 48-55 and James R. Ward, "Insurgency or War?" *Military Review*, January 1989, pp. 14-23. Ward cites Summers as the leading voice in the "war" school.

¹⁴¹ Cecil B. Currey, "Preparing for the Past," *Military Review*, January 1989, p. 10. Currey is the formerly anonymous author of the controversial "Cincinnatus" book and article decrying Army leadership in the Vietnam war.

take place with official terminology each subculture comfortably not seeing the other's point of view.




Figure 20. Special Operationing Forces (SOF) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Mentions Increased Throughout the 1980s. These mentions coincide with force structure and doctrinal innovations.

Introducing levels of intensity allowed two schools of thought to develop. The “war” school rallied around *On Strategy* and *The Concept* while the “insurgency” school lacked a seminal work to promote its ideas. Toward the end of the 1980s, Krepinevich’s *The Army in Vietnam*, the best antithesis to Summers’s *On Strategy* thus far, allowed students of the insurgency school to better express their views. As Krepinevich and others pointed out, however, the insurgency school was at an institutional disadvantage since Korea or even World War II. As a inferior subculture it would have difficulty having a voice in the planning of Army strategy and operations. The new terminology at least provided a vocabulary for the schools to at least learn from the debate about the war.¹⁴²

By using the terms high, mid and low to describe intensity of war, however, the subculture concerned with “low-end” irregular, guerrilla and unconventional war was still

¹⁴² The labels “war” and “insurgency” school are taken from Michael L. Brown, “Vietnam: Learning From the Debate,” pp. 48-55.

subordinated. The predominant (sub)culture, the one successfully promoting *The Concept*, had retained the upper hand. But significant changes were taking place.

In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act quietly but drastically changed the way America wages war. On the political end of the spectrum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) was created to address the use of SOF in the increasing number of limited military engagements. On the military end of the spectrum the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created. The SOCOM Commander was supposedly given equal footing with the other CINCs and had a direct line to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The ascendancy of both these positions represent the growth of a subculture born out of failure in Vietnam and that matured in the Persian Gulf and Latin America.

E. PHASE II SUMMARY

After the introspection of phase one, the Army hammered out its understanding of Vietnam largely through the work of Summers and others supporting his thesis in the periodicals. Despite the claim that Vietnam was so complex that the war did not lend itself to learning easy lessons,¹⁴³ Weinberger and Summers established very similar positions on the lessons of Vietnam. The *many* lessons of Vietnam were distilled into a *few* lessons. Table 1. shows the decrease in the number of subjects despite the increase in the number of articles written on the subjects. For the Army these lessons interacted with the experiences in Central America where limited training operations and advisory missions represented official US involvement but obfuscated its level of commitment: the Army's version of gunboat diplomacy. Gradually a consensus was formed around the Summers-Weinberger points.

The Army did take some organizational steps during this period as a reaction to international events. First, a perceived need to get troops to Europe quickly (primarily to show resolve) gave rise to the concept of power projection and rapid deployment forces. Fortunately for the Army, the sparsely-equipped light infantry divisions designed to fly to Europe were also well suited for use in the underdeveloped jungles of Central and South America. If they were properly trained at home and employed in those tropical jungles as "genuine light infantry," then they could be successful in COIN, LIC¹⁴⁴ and eventually peace operations.

¹⁴³ Timothy J. Lomperis, "Giap's Dream, Westmoreland's Nightmare," *Parameters*, June 1988, pp. 18-32.

¹⁴⁴ William S. Lind, "An Operational Doctrine for Intervention," *Parameters*, December 1987, p. 32.

Increasing Number of Articles Decreasing Subjects		
Phase		
	I	II
# of subjects	58	51
# of articles	162	203

Table 1. The Number of Articles on Vietnam and Peace Operations Increased from the 1970s to the 1980s but the Number of Primary Subjects Decreased.

Second, as the Army continued to refine its AirLand Battle doctrine it emphasized the mission of the “deep battle.” Operating in eastern Europe, deep behind enemy lines, would become an essential part of a NATO victory. SOF units trained for this mission. Reconnaissance and the deep battle were their pieces of the big-war paradigm pie. Again, fortunately for the Army, these special operation soldiers with above average intelligence and gifts for language were also well suited to perform the advisory missions that would come to characterize US involvement in Central America.¹⁴⁵

Special Forces became its own branch in the late 1980s, theoretically giving it equal status with the other branches of the Army. More Light Infantry Divisions were added from the original number and given increased funding; these divisions contributed to the “contingency corps.” Other events ranging from the momentous Goldwater-Nichols Act to the more mundane establishment of the Joint Readiness Training Center, indicated the growth of an alternative Army subculture.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ See, for example R. Lynn Rylander, “SOF After the Rise,” *Military Review*, February 1989, pp. 87-89.

¹⁴⁶ Goldwater-Nichols created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and gave even more credibility to the subjects of LIC, insurgency-counterinsurgency, unconventional war, terrorism and direct action. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was designed on the National Training Center (NTC) model but modified to address low and “mid” intensity conflicts. Battalions in every Light, Air Mobile or Airborne division rotate through JRTC and receive training on LIC.

Establishment of ASD/SOLIC and SOCOM were supported with increased hours on LIC subjects in the service schools.¹⁴⁷ These changes helped the Army address the types of missions falling under the LIC category. Because they ran against the institutional grain, however, they most always had to be sold as supporting the Army's conventional mission.¹⁴⁸ The Army allowed these capabilities to be developed but not at the expense of its conventional mission.¹⁴⁹

The political-military events in Latin America contributed to the growth of this LIC subculture. Its growth and recognition may have lain dormant for years if not for the turmoil surrounding Daniel Ortega, Contras, Cartels and El Salvador. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the events in Latin America fortified the lessons of Vietnam or whether the lessons of Vietnam were sufficiently established to be cogently applied in keeping the US out of conventional war.

The synergy of these issues-the memories of Vietnam, the reality of Latin America and the continuing need for advantages against the Soviets in Central Europe-seemed to have deepened a latent split in the Army's culture.¹⁵⁰ Though the LIC community had made institutional gains, conventional war in Europe was still the dominant paradigm in the Army. Moreover, peace operations as a sub category of LIC was anathema:

As for peacekeeping activities, we have seen that a man standing in the middle of the road gets hit by trucks (or Silkworms) going both ways. Peacekeeping is for diplomats; blood and steel are for soldiers. . . We have no patience for prolonged low intensity conflict like Vietnam.¹⁵¹

Contemporary events, however, challenged old assumptions. As the nature of the Soviet threat became dubious, the old paradigm seemed in danger of being made an equal of, if not subordinate to, the competing subculture. Heavy divisions with all their tanks and armored personnel carriers were being inactivated in the states and sent home from Europe. Assignments in Light Divisions were esteemed and SOF recruiting efforts blossomed. Rangers Instructors trained Drug Enforcement Agents for Latin American

¹⁴⁷ Pearleman, "The Fall and Rise of Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction," p. 78.

¹⁴⁸ William J. Olson, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge," *Military Review*, February 1989, pp. 7-17 and Pearleman, "The Fall and Rise of Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction," p. 78.

¹⁴⁹ Michael W. Menser, "Light Infantry and Change," *Military Review*, December 1987, pp. 53-57.

¹⁵⁰ Daniel P. Bolger, "Two Armies," *Parameters*, September 1989, pp. 24-34. Bolger acknowledges this cultural split but with a different twist. He sees one part of the Army as a "display" or "show" Army and the other part as an expeditionary Army-the one that fights the wars (since Vietnam).

¹⁵¹ Michael W. Symanski, "Hoist With the LIC Petard," *Military Review*, September 1988, p. 24. This article was the 1988 writing contest first prize winner.

operations. With the increasing tension between the United States, Colombian Cartels and corrupt dictators, the war on drugs seemed more important than the war on Communism.¹⁵² Amidst all the prospects for change, how did these accepted lessons of Vietnam influence Army attitudes? Would the lessons of Vietnam not embodied by Summers and Weinberger be institutionalized or would they escape?

¹⁵² See the March 1990 issue of *Military Review* for a deluge of articles on drug wars.

V. APPLICATION: 1989-1995

A. PANAMA, COLD WAR COLLAPSE AND COMPETING CULTURES

On December 20, 1989, while U.S. troops were engaged in Panama, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State James Baker and General Powell briefed the press in Washington D.C. They answered questions as if passing Weinberger's tests.¹⁵³ Questions included: Why was the US invading, particularly at this point? What were the objectives? What types of units conducting the operation? How large was the force? How were they going to accomplish their mission? Was this invasion legal?

Cheney, Baker and Powell answered questions: Protecting American lives, establishing the duly elected President, ensuring uninterrupted operation of the Panama Canal and destroying drug-corrupt General Manuel Noriega and his Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were the objectives; by allowing the Army's best Light Infantry, Airborne and Special Forces units to swiftly knock out PDF strong-holds with the overwhelming force there would be certain victory and no tying the military's hands. Intelligence was good enough to give a reasonable chance of apprehending Noriega. He had been warned he should step down and was given a last chance to cooperate. With this effort to make the war "legal,"¹⁵⁴ how could the American public not be supportive? The question and answers suggest the Panama invasion was the first deliberate application of the lessons of Vietnam.¹⁵⁵

Both of the competing subcultures participated in the planning and execution of the operation and each applied its own lessons from previous wars. For promoters of *The Concept*, overwhelming firepower was the key to success. Bringing more troops and weaponry to bear than the opponent worked in both world wars, it worked in Grenada and it worked in Panama. Nothing succeeds like the success of destroying the enemy's forces-the enemy's center of gravity. Even the special operations troops performed on reduced scale the tasks that they would perform in a conventional, linear, mid-intensity AirLand

¹⁵³ *New York Times*, December 21, 1989, IA18-20.

¹⁵⁴ For a detailed justification of the Panama invasion, see Abraham Sofaer, "The Legality of the United States Action in Panama," *Colombia Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 29, 1991, pp. 288-292. Sofaer was George Bush's legal advisor during the Panama invasion.

¹⁵⁵ The lessons Vietnam were present throughout the debate on Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s. These examples were avoidant (using the lessons of Vietnam to avoid war) whereas Panama was interventionist (using the lessons to win war). Peter F. Herrly, "Middleweight Forces and the Army's Deployability Dilemma," *Parameters*, September 1989, p. 52, acknowledges that fear of "another" Vietnam kept troops out of Latin America and posits it will prevent any development of a genuine "LIC" force.

Battlefield: conducting stealthy reconnaissance missions and disrupting the enemy's "rear area." Operation Just Cause was viewed as the model for future conflicts and seen as a justification of the AirLand Battle Doctrine.¹⁵⁶

For the alternate or limited war paradigm the war offered different opportunities. First, the Army's next war was positively not going to happen in central Europe. The month before the Panama operation, unification smitten Germans toppled the Berlin wall. The Army needed to focus its energy and resources on other missions; LIC was accepted as the most likely future engagement.¹⁵⁷ Panama provided an opportunity to adjust institutional priorities from armored warfare to "other" types of warfare.

Second, the utility of SOF, Airborne and the Light Infantry Division, during this operation were exemplary. Rangers, Green Berets and SEALs proved their ability to fit into the accepted paradigm. Men wearing green berets would be quick to note, however, that their special skills, familiarity with the people, above average IQs and ability to speak the language was essential.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, the largest American airborne operation in over 40 years successfully paralyzed the PDF.¹⁵⁹ Light-fighters nimbly maneuvered in both urban and jungle terrain smashing strongholds and rooting out Noriega's "Dignity Battalions."

Third, the Army fought a war with very few tanks involved. Some armored personnel carriers were used, but the predominant source of firepower was the infantryman with his ensemble of unarmored, portable weapon systems. Intelligence, synchronization and mobility were at a premium in this war. Information about the PDF and Noriega's location were the two critical pieces of information in this short war.¹⁶⁰ Quickly tracking him prevented him from leaving the country.

As a result of the success in Panama and the preoccupation with Desert Shield/Storm, mentions of Vietnam dropped to an eight year low.¹⁶¹ There was not much reason to remember past failures. Still, authors recognized the divergent trends in the Army

¹⁵⁶ *Army* interview with Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, "U.S. Army 1993: Power Projected, Contingency Oriented," *Army*, April 1993, p. 25.

¹⁵⁷ A typical spectrum of conflict diagram shows LIC as the most likely type of war but the lowest level of risk. Nuclear war is the least likely type of war but the highest risk.

¹⁵⁸ *Army* interview with Lieutenant General Wayne Downing, Commander United States Army Special Operations Command, April 1992, p. 24. See also Carl Stiner, "The Strategic Employment of Special Operation Forces," *Military Review*, June 1991, pp. 2-13.

¹⁵⁹ Victor M. Rosello, "The Airborne is *Not* Obsolete," *Army*, September 1992, pp. 40-44.

¹⁶⁰ Bernard Trainor, "Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops," *New York Times*, December 21, 1989, IA21.

¹⁶¹ In 1991, 16 mentions of Vietnam, the lowest number since 1983 and the ninth lowest number of the entire twenty-three year period.

and tried to come to grips with the effects of the end of the cold war. Counterinsurgency forces and doctrine evolved into LIC forces and doctrine. LIC doctrine would soon become synonymous with peace operations doctrine.¹⁶²

Military Review awarded first prize in its 1991 writing contest to an article describing a force structure for the post-cold war world.¹⁶³ In the article the author recognizes one facet of the cultural split. Similar to earlier articles on the United States "two Armies," this author makes the case for small wars being handled by the "contingency" Army. Full mobilization of the "reinforcing" Army, made up of the Reserves and the less easily deployable active, stateside units would be required to fight anything larger.

Desert Storm, replete with mobilization of the reserves, proved to be a windfall for supporters of *The Concept*. The LIC subculture had grown in strength throughout the 1980s. With the easing of east-west tensions, "peace-dividend" became a fashionable buzz-word. Expensive mechanized units were slated for inactivation. Had Desert Storm not occurred the dominant Army paradigm would have been under extreme pressure to make severe reduction in its armored forces.¹⁶⁴

B. SCHWARZKOPF, DESERT STORM AND VIETNAM

Despite the surge in light forces and LIC doctrine, the Army had still primarily prepared for armored warfare. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent refusal to leave, provided the United States the chance to showcase its military might. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was the commander of US forces in Desert Storm and Vietnam veteran. He had bitter experiences during and after Vietnam and brought feelings of resentment to the war against Iraq. In fact, Schwarzkopf claims nearly every general officer in the Gulf War had served in Vietnam and had experienced feelings of abandonment and betrayal.¹⁶⁵ In Schwarzkopf's autobiography he emphasizes that the war in Vietnam heavily influenced him.

Schwarzkopf is a product of the organizational learning model applied to Army officers coming out of Vietnam. While other soldiers left military service disenchanted with their experience many others, including Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell chose to stay

¹⁶² Donald B. Vought and Michael A. Babb, "Support For Insurgencies, Nike or Nemesis?" *Military Review*, January 1990, p. 17 describes how peacekeeping missions grew as a part of LIC doctrine.

¹⁶³ Jeffery A. Jacobs, "A Mobilization Force," *Military Review*, November 1990, pp. 3-10.

¹⁶⁴ See for example Daniel P. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," *Parameters*, Autumn 1991, pp. 28-39.

¹⁶⁵ Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take A Hero*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) p.441

in, rose to high levels of leadership, took individual action and ultimately influenced the Army's organizational action. Schwarzkopf's influence was felt at the tactical and operational level, but driven by past events at the strategic and policy levels. He is a manifestation of the Second World War-"no more Vietnams" culture.

Schwarzkopf was able to right some Vietnam wrongs during the 1990-91 Gulf War because of his powerful position. As Commander In Chief (CINC), Central Command (CENTCOM), Schwarzkopf was at the pinnacle of the military hierarchy. Along with Powell who was serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Schwarzkopf answered only to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

When planning defensive operations as ordered by President Bush during the Desert Shield phase of the war, Schwarzkopf philosophized about the "can do" attitude prominent during Vietnam:

The U.S. military in Vietnam had been accused of regularly sugar coating the truth in an effort to please the President and on the basis of bad information the President made some disastrous decisions. We are not going to repeat that mistake.¹⁶⁶

A consummate student of the never-again school, Schwarzkopf expressed his concern about the ethical conduct of officers. Professionalism was his cherished value. Subsequently, he made a concerted effort not to give overly optimistic views of the threat and the status of the war to either the public or the National Command Authority.¹⁶⁷ There would be no false reports in this general's command. Candor in relations with the media, the public and civilian leaders was a priority.

More evidence of his understanding of the lessons of Vietnam manifests itself regarding his thoughts on body counts and the media. He encourages his readers:

Think back to what caused the disenchantment of the American public with Vietnam: they felt they were constantly being misled with false body counts and optimistic talk about the light at the end of the tunnel.¹⁶⁸

With thoughts of Vietnam in mind, Schwarzkopf exhorted his leaders never to lie to the citizens of the US when giving interviews or holding press conferences. He was aware of

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 347.

¹⁶⁷ In keeping with his stab-in-the-back theme, Summers wrote in "Full Circle: World War II to the Persian Gulf," p. 48, "In the Gulf War, as in World War II, there was no reference to "national command authority," a Vietnam-era euphemism for whoever, *if anybody*, was making the key decisions for the war." (emphasis added). Given that Summers knows full well who the NCA is, and was, his attempt to place blame obviously reflects his distrust of civilian leaders.

¹⁶⁸ H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, p. 399.

the role public opinion plays in military operations and wanted to keep the public's support. These demonstrated concerns about candor and public support are a result of two of the Summers-Weinberger lessons: get the support of the people and guard against a stab-in-the-back.

The role of the media was the tenth most frequent subject of the nearly 100 coded subjects. Figure 21 shows the most frequent subjects of the study. Relations with the media were a sensitive subject because of what the Army's perceived to be biased reporting during the Vietnam war. In large part the media was held responsible for turning the American public against the war.




Figure 21. The Media was Often seen as a Participant in the Stab-in-the-back Conspiracy.

During Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was exposed to over-involvement of politicians as well as military acquiescence. Watching generals acquiesce in civilian decisions on strategy issues and reporting useless body-counts help explain Schwarzkopf's desire to not repeat the mistakes of Vietnam. But all of Schwarzkopf's assignments in Vietnam were at the

operational level. His understanding of the strategy and policy lessons of Vietnam had to be reinforced through what he learned in military schools, what he heard from fellow officers and what he read in the journals. Only from these post-Vietnam experiences were his opinions about political-military relations solidified.

More applications of the lessons of Vietnam surface in his autobiography concerning political-military relationships. Schwarzkopf did not want Washington developing the target list and he did not want the President "issuing orders to the tail gunner in a bomber."¹⁶⁹ He wanted to keep responsibilities straight and was satisfied with the way things went,

. . . . unlike the way things had gone in Vietnam, the U.S. chain of command worked as it should. . . The President had been Presidential, the Secretary of Defense had concentrated on setting military policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had served as the facilitator between civilian and military leadership and as theater commander, I'd been given full authority to carry out the mission.¹⁷⁰

A final and salient point in understanding a Schwarzkopf-like view of political-military relations is evident in the way Desert Storm ended. *Winning* was one of Weinberger's tests. Having an end state in mind would supposedly prevent a conflict from dragging on indefinitely or becoming a quagmire. Political leaders were not supposed to ask the Army to fight a war and then tie the generals' hands behind their back.

Why didn't Schwarzkopf take the coalition force or even the US all the way to Baghdad and "finish the job?" The answer for Schwarzkopf is that neither the American public or the Coalition governments would have supported continued operations into Iraq. One of Summers's lessons of the Vietnam war-the "political" constraint preventing US ground troops from operating outside the confines of South Vietnam proper-was deftly "learned" by the Army and applied in Desert Storm. In Vietnam, an artificial border constraint overstated the concern of the executive branch that China or the Soviet Union would perceive offensive ground operations into North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia as escalation or an attempt to "capture" a neighboring country. As applied to Desert Storm, the Weinberger Doctrine gave the Army the troops and authority to get the job done-the authority Schwarzkopf claimed he had been given.

In Desert Storm Schwarzkopf was aware of this problem and was concerned that Iraqi commanders believed that U.S. troops would not cross the border into Iraq. He thought Iraqi units might consider hiding beyond the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, "like the North

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 428.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Vietnamese troops that hid in Cambodia.”¹⁷¹ Unlike complacent generals in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf insisted on having the authority to go across the border, not to capture the capital or control the country, but to destroy the enemy Army. The Iraqi Army was the center of gravity. Schwarzkopf wanted his hands free going after the Republican Guard and George Bush decided to loosen the political-military knot.

Schwarzkopf believed one difference between Vietnam and Desert Storm was a UN resolution providing a legal basis for the expulsion operation. No such pretense existed in Vietnam.

If we look back to the Vietnam War we should recognize that one of the reasons we lost world support for our actions was that we had no internationally recognized legitimacy for our intention in Vietnam.¹⁷²

Schwarzkopf's comments echo Weinberger's *just war* concerns. His introducing the issue of multilateralism in the use of US forces, however, often conflicts with other criteria. Multilateralism rose in popularity because of Soviet approval and Chinese abstention of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Schwarzkopf was caught in this burst of liberalism, but with the arrival of complex peace operations, multilateralism was overshadowed by the *National Interest* test. In the years after Desert Storm, stopping famines and brutal “genocides” would not be in the United States *Vital National Interests*. The United States would help when it could: when the intervention passed the Weinberger tests.

Soldiers are often the first to deplore war, but too much hesitation could be construed as cowardice.¹⁷³ Being non-interventionist under the auspices of the Weinberger Doctrine makes hesitation seem more like support of policy than dereliction of duty. Because the influential Caspar Weinberger incorporated the military lessons of Vietnam into the political ones, the Army feels assured it will never again have to fight an “unpopular” war. When the Army does recommend the use of force in limited situations, it is more confident that some version of the Weinberger Doctrine will be used, nearly guaranteeing success. The Army enjoys the Presidential and Congressional acceptance of these tests because it frees them of some responsibility in extremely tough and complex missions.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 401.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 579.

¹⁷³ See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957) for an elaboration of this notion.

C. POWELL, VIETNAM AND PEACE OPERATIONS

Though Colin Powell was an integral part of Desert Storm, he also stayed on active duty long enough to have an impact on peace operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Desert Storm enjoyed the luxury of dealing with a conventional Iraqi threat. Restore Hope in Somalia and UNPROFOR (the U.N. Protection Force) in Bosnia, presented an ill-defined problem. Powell was left to deal with these more unconventional conflicts. As with Schwarzkopf, Powell was heavily influenced by his experience in Vietnam and his indoctrination into Army culture.

Powell's understanding and correction of the Vietnam syndrome played itself out differently than Schwarzkopf's experience. Powell recalls a renewed interest in the teaching of Clausewitz in his National War College Class (NWC) of 1975-76. "It was a good time to be at the NWC. In the wake of Vietnam, the soul searching-the-what-went-wrong-syndrome created lively ferment."¹⁷⁴ Powell remembers his affection for a Clausewitz passage already shown to be influential:

'No one starts a war, or rather no one *in his senses* should do so, . . . without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it.' Mistake number one in Vietnam. Which led to Clausewitz's rule number two. Political leaders must set a war's objectives, while armies achieve them. In Vietnam, one seemed to be looking to the other for the answers that never came. Finally the people must support a war. Since they supply the treasure and the sons, and today the daughters too, they must be convinced that the sacrifice is justified. That essential pillar had crumbled as the Vietnam war ground on.¹⁷⁵(emphasis added)

Most of Weinberger's tests are embodied in this one passage: enough *force* to *win*, political-military *objectives*, obtaining *public support* and making sure the war is *justified*. Powell reintroduces the tempting notion that those who start wars without weighing costs and developing a plan are senseless back-stabbers.

Additionally, Powell was serving as Weinberger's assistant when the Secretary gave his National Press Club speech announcing the six tests. Powell applauds Weinberger for developing these criteria and credits him (along with Ronald Reagan) for, "the resurgence of the US as a respected and credible military power after the debacle of Vietnam and Desert One."¹⁷⁶ Powell admits using the Weinberger Doctrine as the CJCS when advising presidents on the use of force.¹⁷⁷ He thought the tests were useful guides

¹⁷⁴ Colin Powell, My American Journey, (New York: Random House, 1995) p. 207.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 207-208.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 315.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 303.

but that making them public and official policy, "would lead potential enemies to look for loopholes."¹⁷⁸

In his autobiography Powell regularly references Vietnam-one time in 1992 and on the subject of a peace operation in Bosnia. When asked by the *New York Times* why the US could not assume a "limited" role in the Balkans he recounts,

I had been in limited military involvements before, in Vietnam for starters. I told the Times reporter, 'As soon as they tell me it's limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not.'¹⁷⁹

This attitude reflects Weinberger's *Win* criteria and the Army's preference for total wars using massive force. Limited warfare was anathema for Powell and he immediately equates it to not winning. No end-state, short of destruction of another country's military might satisfies Powell or even Schwarzkopf. Yet, this was the mission presented to the Army in Vietnam: defeat the enemy but with restrictions on pursuit of its forces. Peacekeepers in Somalia were given a similar task: control the belligerents without going directly after their forces.

In the passage above, Powell's ambiguous use of the word "they" is telling. It connotes the stab-in-the-back myth which Summers denies ever took root in the Army. Another excerpt, this time from President Bush's 1992 Department of Defense farewell ceremony, supports Powell's sensitivity to this notion,

Mr. President, you have sent us in harm's way when you had to, but never lightly, never hesitantly, *never with our hands tied*, never without giving us what we need to do the job.¹⁸⁰ (Emphasis added)

Not only was Powell sympathetic to the stab-in-the-back idea, but he also recognized the *Win* and *Reassess Force Size* tests. The essence of these tests was ensuring the in-theater commander had sufficient forces and equipment to achieve the political objectives (i.e., not forcing the Army to fight with one hand tied behind its back). To Powell's (and Schwarzkopf's) credit, traces of the stab-in-the-back myth come without lasting resentment. The lessons serve only as a reminder of the duties and responsibilities of the professional officer. The legacy of constraint, however, is still pervasive.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 558.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 567-568.

¹⁸¹ An interesting example from the late 1980s is illustrative. The graphic on the title page of one article shows a picture of an American eagle struggling to take flight because it has a chain around its leg. Richard D. McCreight, "Strategy, Technology and the Capacity to Act," *Military Review*, April 1988, p. 44.

Powell brings the Vietnam-peace operation connection full circle in his autobiography. On two occasions Powell compares the Serbs (and Croats and Muslims) to the North Vietnamese. First, he compares them because of their ability to match their objectives to their military actions.¹⁸² Second, he recognizes the U.N.'s *nation-building* in Somalia to the U.S. mission in Vietnam (where he first heard the phrase).¹⁸³ In Colin Powell's writing, Vietnam provides a dominant reference point regarding use of force in military operations. His experience in Vietnam shaped beliefs about peace operations. Those never-again beliefs are pronounced in his autobiography.

Powell put his own words to the Summers-Weinberger concepts and developed what is now sometimes called the "Powell Doctrine." Again the words, tone and intent are similar to his predecessors. Powell narrows the list of criteria to four:

1. Force should only used as a *last resort*.
2. Military force should be used only when there is a clear cut *military objective*.
3. Military force should be used only when we can *measure* that the military objective has been *achieved*.
4. Military *force* should be used only in an *overwhelming* fashion.¹⁸⁴ (emphasis added)

Schwarzkopf and Powell were not alone with Vietnam experience nor his position of influence. General William "Gus" Pagonis, the top logistics officer during Desert Storm and the man responsible for mobilizing the American defense industrial complex, was also a Vietnam veteran. Pagonis acknowledges the Army's effort in the 1970s to incorporate the reserves into the TFC and credits his organization as a validation of that restructuring.¹⁸⁵ He recognized the insulation the Army experienced in Vietnam as a stumbling block to success and correctly attributed failure (in part) to the lack of reserve units/individuals participating in the war.¹⁸⁶ Over 70% of Pagonis's 80,000 soldier support command was made up of reserve soldiers.¹⁸⁷ Activating the reserves attached America to its Army and mobilized public support for the war.

Summers devotes entire chapters to the ideas about which Schwarzkopf, Powell, Pagonis and hundreds of others have written. These retired generals, however, wrote their autobiographies at the end of illustrious careers, out of the Army's bureaucratic reach.

¹⁸² Colin Powell, My American Journey, p. 577.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 580.

¹⁸⁴ As seen in Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, p. 7.

¹⁸⁵ William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992) p.100.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, pp. 101, 172.

Vietnam's influence on these generals' understanding of the Army, its employment and its relationship to American politics is both strong and specific.

D. VIETNAM, THE PERIODICALS AND PEACE OPERATIONS

Colin Powell was not the only military officer to note a similarity between the situation in Vietnam and the one in Bosnia. Two Air Force lieutenant colonels noted:

The belligerents in Bosnia display a commitment equal to that of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies, while societies in Haiti and Rwanda resemble those of Somalia in terms of sophistication.¹⁸⁸

Similarly, a former U.S. Army War College professor noted that the U.S. inability to properly apply force in Vietnam was repeating itself:

If the type of power is wrong for the setting (e.g., heavy tanks to counter Vietnamese or Afghan guerrillas; air power to stop a three-sided civil war) you are undertaking an infeasible strategy.¹⁸⁹

Most of the authors writing in this period were on active duty (65 authors or 56%). This percentage was higher than the other two phases.¹⁹⁰ The Spring, 1994 issue of *Parameters*, for example, contains four articles on peace operations. Three of the articles directly linked the American understanding of its experience in Vietnam to use of military force in peace operations. The fingerprints of *On Strategy*, Weinberger, Powell and Latin America are all over these articles. The authors debate the pros and cons of American military involvement overseas using the influence of Vietnam on the U.S. role in U.N. peace operations.¹⁹¹

In general, authors during this period did not enthusiastically embrace peace operations.¹⁹² Authors used phrases like the "trauma of Vietnam" to warn readers how devastating limited conflicts could be.¹⁹³ Ultimately these three authors conformed to the

¹⁸⁸ Mark Codfelter and John M. Faucett, Jr. "The RMA and Air Force Roles and Missions and Doctrine," *Parameters*, Summer 1995, p. 27.

¹⁸⁹ Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," *Parameters*, Winter 1994-95, p. 12.

¹⁹⁰ In phase I, 50% and in phase II, 43% of the authors were on active duty.

¹⁹¹ Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," p. 10.

¹⁹² Darien Kearns, "The Need for U.N. Criteria in Peace Operations," *Military Review*, July 1994, p. 40, "The United States should not commit large combat formations to peace keeping operations." See also John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," pp. 36-37 and Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," p. 10-12.

¹⁹³ Frederick J. Chiaventone, "Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting," *Military Review*, August 1991, p. 70.

Weinberger convention, applying the lessons of Vietnam to peace operations and methodically explaining the six-tests.

A contentious point in these articles was the clash between two of Weinberger's tests. The *Last Resort* test evolved into a *legal* test, represented by extensive U.S. justifications for its intervention in Panama, Iraq and Somalia¹⁹⁴. Because of near unanimity of the U.N. vote, the *legal* test became the *multilateral* test. Despite some uses of force passing the multilateral test, U.S. vital national interests are not always threatened. Edwin Arnold recognized these tensions and noted the increasing weight of the multilateral test. He cites Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia as examples of U.S. involvement in countries where no vital national interests were at stake.¹⁹⁵

Of the four authors connecting the Summers-Weinberger-and now Powell-doctrine to peace operations the Spring, 1994 *Parameters* issue, three were on active duty (one recently left active service and entered the reserves) when they wrote. To find dissenting opinions on use of force in limited wars the reader must look to civilian or foreign authorship.¹⁹⁶

In the 1980s, the majority of the authors promoting limited military intervention in the Latin American LIC were civilians. Similarly, in the 1990s very few of the remaining 87 authors avidly supported the use of force in peace operations. When they did support a limited use of force position, the authors were usually civilians. Figure 22 shows the number of military and civilian authors arguing that the Army needs to look beyond its preoccupation with *The Concept*.

Authors wrote 28 articles mentioning both peace operations and Vietnam between 1990-1995. In 1993, for the first time, more articles in the periodicals were written mentioning peace operations than were written mentioning Vietnam (see Figure 23). Vietnam and peace operations were either linked directly¹⁹⁷ or through the use of the

¹⁹⁴ See F. M. Lorenz "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," *Parameters*, Winter 1993-94, pp. 27-53, as an example of this increasing awareness of a need for "legal" intervention.

¹⁹⁵ Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," p. 10.

¹⁹⁶ James H. Allan, "Peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf," *Military Review*, August 1991, p. 56-63, is a retired Canadian officer. Regina Gaillard, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," *Military Review*, June 1991, pp. 30-41. Gaillard provides an excellent description of the tensions between civic action-peacekeeping and military operations, pp. 39-41. Of course more criticism was voiced in newspapers and other, non-military periodicals. An editorial in the *New York Times*, for example, pointed out that the Powell Doctrine was too restrictive. The article points to the success of the NATO air strikes as the reason the Serbs came to the negotiating table. Eric Schmitt, "Powell Takes a Hit," *New York Times*, 29 October 1995, Section 4, p. 4

¹⁹⁷ Regina Gaillard, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," *Military Review*, June 1991, pp. 30-41.

Summers-Weinberger points.¹⁹⁸ Criteria for determining intervention was topical during this post- Operation Just Cause period, also. Authors saw a need for rules governing the Army's employment.¹⁹⁹




Figure 22. More Civilian Authors Were Against the Army's Rigid Emphasis on "The Concept" than Active Duty Military Authors.

On one hand, many of these articles used Vietnam to show how fear of another Vietnam kept the US out of Bosnia, caused withdrawal from Somalia and restricted combat troops from going to Rwanda.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, several articles invoked the successes

¹⁹⁸ See for example, "Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," *Military Review*, September 1993, p. 20-21 and Darien Kearns, "The Need for UN Criteria in Peace Operations," pp. 34-42.

¹⁹⁹ Two examples are James H. Allan, "Peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf," and Darien Kearns, "The Need For Criteria in UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Military Review*, July 1994, pp. 34-42. Both articles reference a need for a criteria determining intervention and recommend tests similar to Weinberger's. Neither author, however, directly references or even footnotes Weinberger's tests.

²⁰⁰ Jeffrey Record, "Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization," *Parameters*, Autumn 1995, pp. 24, 26. Summarizing an argument made by A.J. Bacevich, Record writes that the "Pentagon is still so petrified by the prospect of another Vietnam that it has deliberately blocked attempts to prepare effectively for unconventional conflict" Also, Victor Rosello, "Lessons From El Salvador," *Parameters*, Winter 1993, pp. 103, 107-8, succinctly connects the

of Desert Storm,²⁰¹ Provide Comfort and (pre-October 1993) Restore Hope as the burial of the Vietnam syndrome.²⁰² In both cases, however, Vietnam was invoked as a convenient metaphor to remind readers of the dangers of unwinnable wars, adversarial political-military relations and a hostile public.




Figure 23. More Articles were Written about Peace Operation than were Written about Vietnam for the First Time in 1993.

Twenty-eight articles that had peace operations as a main subject were written from 1990-1995, compared to six and eight between 1972-81 and 1982-1989, respectively. The level of discussion in most of the articles aimed at the political-strategic level. Figure 24 shows the difference in the number of articles written at the policy-strategy level as compared to those directed at the tactical-operational level. This data may support a growing belief that military-technological advances are blurring the distinction between tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.²⁰³

lessons of Vietnam to El Salvador and applies them to Bosnia. On p. 101 Rosello notes that the "specter of another Vietnam" was the rallying cry for opponents of U.S. foreign policy in Central America.

²⁰¹ Michael Mazaar, "Middleweight Forces for Contingency Operations," *Military Review*, August 1991, p. 33.

²⁰² Thomas DuBois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait," *Parameters*, Winter 1991-92, p. 37. "Succinctly put, the Vietnam syndrome, at least in its more literal and paralyzing forms, has been relegated to history." John F. Hillen, "U.N. Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," p. 32.

²⁰³ See for example, Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, p. 33 and David Jablonsky, "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Parameters*, Autumn 1994, p. 18.




Figure 24. The Narrowing Gap Between Articles Written at Different Levels of War.

On the strategic level, political-military relations, foreign policy, and military strategy were three subcategories. Every article coded specifically at the political-military relations level mentioned Vietnam, even if its primary subject was political-military activity in a peace operation. An enduring legacy of Vietnam in the periodicals, appears in this relationship between poor military and governmental cooperation and inability to implement an effective national and military strategy.

Professionalism as a subject dipped early in this period but resurfaced as a dominant subject. The dramatic changes of 1990, 1991 and 1992 precluded the luxury of writing about the “art” half of the military arts and sciences. The operating tempo for all the services was high during these years. Accordingly, the pages of the journals were filled with descriptions of wars and deployments. This increase in operating tempo also partially explains the narrowing gap between the number of policy-strategy articles and the number of tactics-operations articles.

Clausewitz, however, was still being referenced regularly. One author used the quote that Summers and Powell learned in prior years to show how senseless uniformed leaders could be.²⁰⁴ The editors even extracted the quote and enlarged it as a caption, in effect using the connotation as an advertisement for the article.

²⁰⁴ Darien Kearns, “The Need for U.N. Criteria in Peace Operations,” p. 41.

Awareness of the stab-in-the-back myth persisted during and after Desert Storm.²⁰⁵ Authors recognized the importance of civilian-military interface, particularly in politically sensitive peace operations. One article titled the "U.N.'s Vietnam," immediately prepares the reader for applying the lessons of Vietnam to peace operations.²⁰⁶ Trying to be positive, another author emphasized the need for the military to educate civilians on missions the military does successfully.²⁰⁷ Still a different author implies, however, that the Army should speak up when civilian leaders ask soldiers to perform missions ill-suited to the Army. His comments resemble those of General Weyand in 1976 and Colonel Summers in 1982.

Several authors noted that civilians asked the Army to do something that was not in its "tool kit."²⁰⁸ Many of these articles on peace operations acknowledge the impact of political constraints both on the battlefield and in Washington; the Rangers-in-Somalia incident was even mentioned as causing former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's resignation.²⁰⁹ Whether or not the government was asking service members to perform missions they were not culturally capable of performing became a question of some debate.

The specific question became: were soldiers capable of being both warfighters and peacekeepers? Often this question was associated with a specific chapter of U.N. Charter. Chapter Six actions were viewed as the traditional peacekeeping mission where soldiers intervened as observers after a cease-fire was reached by both belligerents. U.N. missions separating the Arabs and Israelis in the Sinai or Greeks and Turks in Cyprus are classic examples. Chapter Seven missions were defined as more violent operations authorizing "U.N. forces" to conduct offensive operations under the aegis of the U.N. Charter's

²⁰⁵ See for example, F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," p. 38. Lorenz mentions the restrictive rules of engagement in Somalia and in a footnote (27) compares the restriction to those placed on the military in Vietnam.

²⁰⁶ Timothy L. Thomas, "The U.N.'s Vietnam," *Military Review*, February 1994, p. 47-55. The title of this article shows how the American experience in Vietnam is seared into the minds of so many authors when it comes to using U.S. forces in limited conflicts like peace operations.

²⁰⁷ John F. Hillen, "U.N. Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," p. 35. Also, Allan R. Millett, "Why the Army and the Marine Corps Should Be Friends," *Parameters*, Winter 1994-95, p. 39, "The number of lives lost may not be large in absolute terms, but they may be proportionally large when compared with the number of people deployed. Such is a characteristic of *counterinsurgency and peacekeeping*. Who is ready to teach this lesson to American politicians if not the Army and the Marines?" Emphasis added to show, once again, how authors connect peace operations with counterinsurgency.

²⁰⁸ Debate over the peacekeeping vs. warfighting mission is on-going. See for example David Jablonsky, "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," p. 31, William A. Stoft and Gary L. Guertner, "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters*, Spring 1995, pp. 30-42 and Regina Gaillard, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," pp. 30-41.

²⁰⁹ David Jablonsky, "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," p. 26.

Article 51 and self-defense. The Korean War and Operation Desert Storm are the most popular examples of Chapter Seven actions; the second U.N. mission in Somalia (UNISOM II) is the lesser known example.

The current twist on this old debate is whether U.S. troops are capable of effectively participating in police-action oriented peace operations.²¹⁰ Some believe the U.S. troops are trained to act with extreme violence and that a passivity switch cannot not simply be turned on. Retired Canadian General Bruce MacKenzie spoke at the CGSC at Fort Leavenworth in 1993 and promoted the notion that the United States role in U.N. mission should be executing "kick in the door" Chapter Seven missions. He baldly stated that U.S. troops are the best in the world at warfighting but that Army culture prevents soldiers from performing well under the restriction of Chapter Six peace operations. His comments drew applause from the audience, many of whom were veterans of either Desert Storm, Somalia or both.²¹¹

This debate captures the differences in ideologies of the two Army cultures. Promoters of *The Concept* and The Lessons of Vietnam would agree with MacKenzie's notion that U.S. soldiers are not suited for certain types of missions. Individuals trying to further the other lessons of Vietnam would argue that through training and education soldiers in the Army can *become suited* to perform well in these limited engagements.

Several articles on organizational change appeared during these years-no surprise given the enormous shifts in international power relationships. Cold war collapse had necessitated reexamination of the force structure. Force structure, for example, was the main topic of 15 articles between 1990-95, compared to 17 and 10 between 1972-1981 and 1982-1989, respectively. Figure 25 shows the proportionally greater emphasis on force structure in the third phase.

Despite the rhetoric on change, though, authors noticed some hypocrisy:

Clearly, we are an Army that treasures adaptability. We chant the mantra of the continuous challenge of change, and we have added versatility as a tenet of Army operations. Paradoxically, we suffer from an institutional blind spot in our vision of adaptability. That blind spot is organization-more specifically *reorganization*. For all practical purposes we simply don't do it.

You doubt this? . . . Have you noticed that, except for the aberration of the Pentomic experiment, we have not substantively reorganized the US division since World War II? . . . What about the light divisions? They are poorly conceived and under not

²¹⁰ Discussion over the Army's role as a police force was evident, though sparse, during the 1970s. See, Martin Blumenson, "The Army as Cop: Not a Role It Relishes," *Army*, May 1976, p. 50-56. Not surprisingly, the author is a civilian.

²¹¹ The author was present for MacKenzie's speech.

small amount of institutional pressure. . . We revise our doctrine. But we do not reorganize. . . Reorganization is viewed as a consequence not a technique.²¹²

David Fastabend's comments highlight the Army's rigidity regarding change.




Figure 25. Despite the Actual Changes in Phase II, a Greater Percentage of Articles Written in Phase III Addressed the Topic of Force Structure Changes.

In the 1980s, external (structural) events caused some change in the Army. The need to deal with LIC pushed the Army to develop doctrine and units to deal with the LIC threat. Recent changes in the international balance of power, however, do not appear to the Army to be permanent enough to cause a reorganization.

Alternately, internal (bureaucratic) rigidity was softened by the events of the 1980s. Desert Storm, however, reversed this process of thawing the frozen cold war paradigm. The parochial interests of the mechanized infantry and armor proponents received a reprieve from increasing pressure to change to nature of the Army and its mission.

Army bureaucracy seems intent on keeping its old paradigm. The Army's recent efforts to develop a force structure for the twenty-first century were paltry. The findings of the Army's Force XXI study, heralded for the past two years, was recently sent back to

²¹² David A. Fastabend, "Checking the Doctrinal Map: Can We Get there from Here with FM 100-5?" *Parameters*, Summer 1995, p. 39-40. Allen L. Tiffany, "A Light Infantry Division with More for the Fight," *Military Review*, August 1991, p. 45, argues that twenty years after Vietnam the Army still does not have a division to fight in restricted terrain.

the drawing board. The recommendations were rejected because there were no significant changes.

This organizational foot-dragging defies arguments of both the structuralist and the functionalist. The functionalist might argue that the Army is simply sticking with doctrine and structure that won the cold war (and the three big-wars before it). The extinction of a Soviet or similar threat and the emergence of too many new threats, however, provides the Army with the opportunity to seek out new roles, missions and resources. Peace operations are only one of many missions the Army could latch onto to increase its power and prestige. Counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism round out the field of current missions the Army could preoccupy itself with. The Army, however, seems content with its place in society: responsible only for fighting the nation's massive ground war. Unfortunately, the Army might be waiting for the war that will never come.

Organizational change as an under current remained relatively stable as shown in Figure 26. The increase in mentions of organizational change as a secondary subject coincides with publication of the Army's doctrinal manuals, supporting David Fastabend's notion that the Army talks change and changes its doctrine but does not reorganize itself. Increases are visible in the year of publication or the year immediately following publication of major doctrinal manuals.

Peace operations were thought of as LIC.²¹³ As missions, peace operations were a subset of LIC. As terms, they shared the Army's disfavor. One author suggests:

LIC began life as a euphemism. The term reflects our failure in Vietnam and our long dislike (not entirely dissipated) of discussing it. We had used counter revolutionary, counterinsurgency, stability operations, internal defense and development and maybe *other terms*. Whenever there coded meaning was discovered and the government was suspected of planning for another Vietnam, the name was changed.²¹⁴(emphasis added)

By mentioning "other terms," the authors unwittingly foreshadow inclusion of peace operations in this collection of taboo terms. This passage recognizes the Army's (and Colin Powell's) allergy to limited war. LIC and peace operations had become synonymous with limited war and were treated as maladies.²¹⁵

²¹³ For an example, see Waldo D. Freeman, Robert B. Lambert, Jason D. Mims, "Operations Restore Hope: A U.S. CENTCOM Perspective," *Military Review*, September 1993, p. 63.

²¹⁴ John B. Hunt, "Emerging Doctrine For LIC," *Military Review*, June 1991, p. 54. Also, Victor Rosello, "Lessons From El Salvador," p. 100, notes that in the 1980s the word "advisors" was changed to "trainers" because of the negative Vietnam connotation.

²¹⁵ Daniel P. Bolger, "A Power Projection Force: Some Concrete Proposals," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, p. 50




Figure 26. An Increase in Mentions of Organizational Change as a Secondary Subject Occurred in the Years New Doctrinal Manuals were Published.

The doctrine developed in the 1980s to deal with peace operations had few historical UN peace operations to use as guides. There were only ten U. N. peace operations from 1945 to 1985.²¹⁶ The United States did not participate at all in many of these; when it did it was largely in logistic and diplomatic roles. The original intent of UN peace operations was to *not* involve the superpowers. Increasing demand, however, required superpower involvement. Between 1988 and 1993 the Security Council approved an additional 13 missions.²¹⁷ Peacekeeping became a growth industry²¹⁸ and the United Nations wanted the United States to be Chief Executive Officer.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Michael Lind, "Alboutros," *New Republic*, June 28, 1993, p. 18.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Boutros Boutros Ghali, "Empowering The United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1992, p. 89 and Laurence Martin, "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry," *The National Interest* Summer 1993, p. 3. With the increased number and complexity of missions, Boutros-Ghali offered specific definitions in *An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary General (New York: United Nations, 31 January 1992), p. 11. After some debate, the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement have become accepted categories. Peacekeeping is the traditional mission consisting of third party forces monitoring an established cease-fire. Peacemaking refers mostly to diplomatic efforts brokering a cease fire. Peace enforcement usually is identified with missions where forces operate under a mandate from the United Nations and force is authorized to return peace to a chaotic situation (as in Somalia) or as a reprisal against an act of aggression (like Desert Storm).

²¹⁹ Elaine Sciolino with Paul Lewis, "U.N. Chief Has To Direct Peace Efforts at U.S., Too," *New York Times*, October 16, 1993, p. Y7.

Just as LIC out grew FM 100-5 and earned its own FM 100-20, so too, did peace operations. Because of distinctly different characteristics, peace operations (as a sub category of LIC) earned its own manual. In 1993, the Army published FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, to address the subject. The manual used a mix of FM 100-5 principles of war, LIC environmental characteristics and the addition of a new doctrinal tenet to address peace operations.²²⁰

FM 100-23 was a step in the right direction for doctrinally dealing with these UN missions, though the manual's publication and dissemination came after the initial spate of post cold war operations. Undoubtedly, updates and changes are forthcoming. The doctrine is, however, the manifestation of a Vietnam-COIN-LIC-peace operations thought process. This honest but incomplete doctrinal effort mirrors the Army's collective thinking on peace operations.

Peace operations receive secondary status in FM 100-5 as only a component of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Interestingly, of the 12 illustrative historical examples listed in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, not a single mention of Vietnam can be found. The mainstream Army was satisfied to peripheralize Vietnam-like operations into separate, subordinate manuals. FM 100-20 and FM 100-23 are two such manuals.

Of the 41 articles where peace operations were the primary subjects, only 17 mentioned doctrine. There were only 17 total articles written about peace operation where doctrine is mentioned. Doctrine and peace operations still are not thought about concurrently. Versatility was introduced as a tenet to help the Army cope with the complex post cold war missions. As Fastabend pointed out, however, versatility is an insufficient panacea.

After a burst of Special Operating Forces (SOF) activities in the mid and late 1980s, references to SOF dropped in 1990, 1991 and 1992. In 1993 an increase in mentions represents the increased role of SOF soldiers in Kurdish humanitarian relief and Somali street fighting. SOF had been institutionalized and the efforts of the Goldwater-Nichols Act were coming to fruition.²²¹

The SOF community still struggles with its dual identity. SOF must fit into to both subcultures. It must fit into *The Concept* for practical and bureaucratic reasons: to maintain

²²⁰ The four old tenets-agility, initiative, depth and synchronization-are still included in peace operation doctrine but, "versatility" was added to FM 100-5 and 100-23 in 1993. See James R. McDonough, "Versatility, the Fifth Tenet," *Military Review*, December 1993, pp. 11-14.

²²¹ Wayne K. Maynard, "The New American Way of War," *Military Review*, November 1993, pp. 12-14. The author notes an institutional shift toward SOF.

funding and a seat at the planning and policy table it must conform to convention. SOF must also fit into the limited conflict culture for political and structural reasons; the country needs a force capable of conducting limited military operations in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Figure 27 shows the fluctuation in mentions including spikes in 1986, 1988 and 1993.




Figure 27. The Rise and Fall of Mentions of Special Operating Forces (SOF).

E. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM:

The lessons of Vietnam had taken two divergent paths during the 1980s and the 1990s have not brought them closer together. The utility of the lessons of history in the periodicals is shown at Figure 28; the percentage of the articles mentioning either a lesson from Vietnam or a lesson from some other conflict is shown. Lessons from *other* wars seemed more useful to authors in this third phase, more so than in the previous two. This graph also shows, however, that The Lessons of Vietnam are still very much alive in the professional journals. Despite not having Vietnam war experience, authors continue to use Vietnam war as a reminder the dangers of not garnering public support, not having clear political-military objectives and not using overwhelming force.




Figure 28. More Lessons from Other Conflicts were Referenced in Phase III (1990-1995) Than the Other Phases.

These Summers-Weinberger-Powell Lessons have been institutionalized. One step in the organizational learning cycle was made complete by individuals writing both books and periodical articles. This individual action resulted in complementary organizational doctrinal development. For many, the organization's action was justified by Desert Storm. The Army assisted in changing the environment by defeating Iraq, changing the regional balance of power and increasing its prestige at both home and abroad. The success of Desert Storm reinforced many individual beliefs about the role of the Army.

Conversely, problems in Somalia reinforced the Army's notions that it is not suited for fighting limited wars (unless conducted within the narrow confines of the Weinberger Doctrine). In this case of limited use of military force, the learning cycle may also appear complete but in the negative sense. Individuals believe the Army could not succeed in the constrained environments of Korea, Vietnam and Somalia. The Army does not embrace

peace operations.²²² It acknowledges peace operations but treats them peripherally.²²³ The Army enacts no lessons. Rather, it avoids the difficult test of limited conflicts. The Army's *un*learning cycle in limited conflict is completed.

The alternate lessons of Vietnam have been captured but in less conspicuous ways. The torch bearers of these lessons struggle to keep a cultural split from becoming a chasm.²²⁴ Currently these less popular lessons have no strong political sponsor to promote their institutionalization. George Schultz's ideas on how to use the military never gained support or popularity with the generation of Vietnam veterans the way Caspar Weinberger's concepts did. No strong political figure has stepped forward in a position or with a personality similar to Schultz's to help shape popular opinion. Many civilian strategists support use of force in diplomacy but the military avoids this idea.

Many of these lessons linger in the offices of the ASD/SOLIC and in the halls of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School but rarely find their way into official military documents. Even the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Directorate of History and Museums' history of Special Forces allots nine bland pages to its ten-year training commitment in El Salvador. It dedicates 23 enthusiastic and often rambling pages to its barely year-long fighting commitments in Desert Storm and few months in Somalia.

The best known of the lesser discussed lessons of Vietnam-one kept alive mostly by retired military officers and academics-is that overwhelming force does not always work.²²⁵ The corollary to this lesson is the "hearts and minds" lesson. Living with a people, getting to know their culture, sharing rather than forcing ideas are all aspects of a less popular, "how we could have won Vietnam" school of thought.²²⁶ These lessons

²²² The Army has used other countries experiences to support its aversion to approaches to war. Karl Weick, *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, p. 151. talks about "vicarious learning." The Soviet failure in Afghanistan and the British success in the Falklands are two example of vicarious learning. In their own ways, these two wars reinforced the Army's self-perception and notions about how to wage war.

²²³ In Harry Summers's latest book, he makes the case for keeping peace keeping peripheral. This position is one of his recommended "Ten Commandments" for guiding U.S. strategy formulation. See Harry Summers, *The New World Strategy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) p. 224.

²²⁴ Steven Metz, "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War," *Parameters*, Autumn 1995, pp. 31-41.

²²⁵ For example, Jimmie F. Holt, "LIC in Central America: Training Implications for the US Army," *Military Review*, March 1990, pp. 14-15, Rudolph C. Barnes, "The Diplomat Warrior," *Military Review*, May 1990 p. 59 and Peter Maslowski, "American Values and American Values," *Military Review*, April 1990, p. 18

²²⁶ James B. Motley, "U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy," p. 12.

were partially applied in Central America and they can be applied in peace operations. These lessons are not captured in the Summers-Weinberger theses.²²⁷

Political legitimacy was also a recurring lesson of Vietnam. Some of the authors' stab-in-the-back bitterness was directed at the South Vietnamese government. The South's chaotic and complex political system was seen by some as *the* reason the United States was not successful in Vietnam. Some warn against similar situations in peace operations and use warring Somali clans as an example. Nation-building was not coded but it seemed to be an avoided term in the 1970s and 1980s. When it came to the fore in U.N. discussions on Cambodia and Somalia, many authors dubiously recalled efforts in Vietnam.

Two other lessons that appeared sporadically throughout the journals included the importance of coalition and joint operations. Command and control were major points of Harry Summers but did not easily translate into Weinberger's tests. Evidence of this concern is present in the controversy surrounding U.S. forces serving under foreign military generals. Though the United States has a history of participating in allied operations, it has not always demanded that its units be commanded by Americans at the tactical and operational level of war.

Though not coded, mentions of joint operations were non-existent prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. After the Army realized the implications of this law, authors gradually reflected impacts of the change. Operations in Panama and Iraq highlighted the "jointness" of future wars. The controversy over jointness continued into peace operations. Army helicopters being deployed to Haiti on Navy aircraft carriers was just one example of the increased difficulties of joint operations.

The Army is not really in serious danger of losing these "other" lessons of Vietnam. They are escaping, however, into civilian and academic circles where their credibility will be severely damaged. Fortunately for the Army and the American people, a generation of *soldiers*, though in the minority and at risk to their careers, worked hard at developing COIN and LIC doctrine and capabilities. Undoubtedly, peace operations and similar missions will be present in the years ahead. The country will call on the Army to deal with these challenges and be grateful to those worked diligently to institutionalize the counter-culture lessons of Vietnam.

²²⁷ In fact Summers belittles the "hearts and minds" lesson in a discussion on centers of gravity in The New World Strategy, p. 43. He acknowledges that the Clausewitzian trinity (government, army, people) applies to the United States and that the American public is very much the U.S. center of gravity. Paradoxically, Summers does *not* see that *other* countries' publics (their hearts and minds) are *their* centers of gravity.

Failure to implement these lessons may not immediately jeopardize America's national security, but being afraid to use the military instrument of power in political discourse is a violation of the Army's beloved Clausewitz maxim: war is a continuation of politics by other means. Damage to United States credibility regarding use of force could result from failure to properly execute a sensitive and internationally popular peace operation. Would-be challengers (either state or sub-state) to international and regional security may seize the opportunity to act if they perceive a U.S. hesitancy to commit its military.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. WHAT HAPPENED?

1. What Was the Question?

This thesis set out to answer a question about Army thinking and attitudes toward peace operations. The answer was not found in a trivial, "no more Vietnams" metaphor. Army attitudes have been shaped by failure in Vietnam, counterinsurgency in Central America, armored warfare in the Middle East and peace operations on four continents.

2. The 1970s

As was shown in Chapter III, the confusion and shock of the 1970s nearly paralyzed the Army's organizational development. The Army was in disarray after Vietnam and refocused its energy on the one thing it knew it could do well. It had been tested on the European battlefield and proved victorious: to Europe the Army would return.

The Army shied away from strategic issues and leaned toward operational and even tactical issues. The Army turned away from limited conflicts and vicariously learned from the Arab-Israeli war. The Army used the October 1973 war as a model for future conflicts and a partial justification for its reorientation toward conventional mechanized warfare. Though the Army made some doctrinal changes, it narrowed its doctrinal focus and refused to develop a method for future success in wars similar to Vietnam.

No wide agreement existed about the meaning of the Vietnam war. Authors in *Army*, *Military Review*, and *Parameters* wrote about a wide range of topics regarding Vietnam. As a profession, the Army was not esteemed. It was criticized by the American public, civilian academics and government officials.

3. The 1980s

Motivated in part by this harsh criticism, the Army seized the opportunity to reestablish itself as a credible fighting force in the 1980s. Chapter IV described the significant events influencing the Army's understanding of Vietnam.

First, the Army published an influential book explaining what went wrong in Vietnam. The book placed some blame on the Army but spread it around enough to make the Army feel better about itself. Harry Summers's book, On Strategy, made sense to most of the Army.

Second, a Secretary of Defense adopted many of the lessons of Vietnam promoted by the Army in the 1982 book, On Strategy. Caspar Weinberger gave his 1984 speech outlining six tests for the use of military force in operations overseas. With the work of Summers and the words of Weinberger, the Army had found a comfortable road map for future interventions, doctrine development and force structure changes. A fundamental purpose of the analyses by Summers and Weinberger was to keep the United States out of ill-defined limited wars.

Third, the threat of communism in the western hemisphere seemed to revive the Domino Theory. A communist government in Nicaragua and an insurgency to overthrow the government in El Salvador forced the Army to reassess its preparedness for limited conflict. Fear of the United States becoming involved in "another Vietnam" was commonplace. Many active duty military officers wrote in the journals about the difficulties of using the Army to deal with the problems in Latin America.

The Army developed some capabilities to deal with low-intensity conflict in the 1980s. The establishment of Light Infantry Divisions, the expansion of Special Operations Forces and the publication of a Low-Intensity Conflict field manual indicated the Army's recognition of a limited or unconventional war threat. Because of the Army's reluctance to support these developments solely for use in limited conflicts, many of the innovations were sub optimal. Light forces had to fit into the central European battle scenario. Consequently, training and doctrine were compromised by dividing efforts between two missions: big war in central Europe versus limited warfare on other continents.

This division was strong enough to effect a split in ideologies. Though the differences in ideologies had long existed, events of the 1980s allowed a competing subculture to attain status within the larger Army culture. In addition to political turmoil in Central America, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 laid the foundation for this competing subculture to become institutionalized. The creation of joint warfighting commands gave special operations and "contingency" units a powerful new sponsor. The creation of a new office in the Department of Defense gave this community a vehicle for policy influence. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and the United States Special Operations Command were indicators of the subculture's growing influence.

Both subcultures participated in the 1989 Operation Just Cause, marking a transitional period in war paradigm shifts. The Army's dominant culture, still centered on mechanized war in Europe, was dealt a heavy blow. The Army leadership ordered the

deactivation of heavy forces focused on a Soviet threat. The impending unification of East and West Germany and the conciliatory policies of the Soviet Union left the Army without an easily identifiable threat.

4. The 1990s

Chapter IV showed how the Army applied *The Lessons* of Vietnam to peace operations. Enthusiasm over the organizational changes of the 1980s was dampened when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Operation Desert Storm was a throw back to the big-war paradigm. The Army had prepared steadily for that war and had only just recently begun to shelve *The Concept*. The U.S. Army's success in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq helped the dominant Army culture surge past the limited war subculture in terms of influence. Desert Storm halted the growth of the competing subculture.

American government officials and Army officers viewed the success of Desert Storm as a burial of the "Vietnam syndrome." The United States proved that it was not afraid to act decisively, use force, risk casualties and be successful. The Lessons of Vietnam developed by Summers and Weinberger were refined in the 1980s and meticulously applied during Desert Storm.

Almost immediately after Desert Storm was over a new type of mission emerged. United Nations Peace Operations sprang up in Iraq, Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda. The Army was caught on a fence. Before Desert Storm, the Army prepared itself for conflicts similar to these "new" peace operations. In the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, though, it marginalized them.

These peace operations had many characteristics of the war in Vietnam and the Army wanted no part of them. The Army reluctantly participated in these operations half-convincing itself that the successful approach taken in Desert Storm was applicable to other environments. The Army hoped that *The Lessons of Vietnam* had been institutionalized at the policy-maker level, thereby protecting the Army from "another Vietnam." The fine political performance in Desert Storm reinforced the Army's wishful thinking.

The U.S. Army Ranger raid on Somali outlaws in October 1993 was one event that brought the "never again" rhetoric into public view. Losing 18 of the United States' finest troops to a bunch of bandits did not sit well with the American public. The Vietnam syndrome may have been buried in the sands of Iraq, but Vietnam's never-again legacy was still very much on people's minds. Public opinion quickly called for a return of U.S. forces from Somalia. There would be no Vietnam in Somalia.

A second event was the United Nations' authorization of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though European allies pressured the United States to participate in this mission and to re-demonstrate its Desert Storm prowess (this time in stopping a genocide), the American public would not allow it. Fear of an involvement in an "unwinnable" war was evident in the military periodicals: authors often used Vietnam and Somalia or Bosnia as parallel examples. Vietnam had influenced America's attitude toward peace operations.

The Army was caught slightly off-guard by the increasing number of peace operations. The 1980s effort to lighten the Army's force structure was reversed after Desert Storm. The Army had deactivated at least one armor division in the late 1980s, but reactivated because of Desert Storm. After Desert Storm, the Army inactivated its premier Light Infantry Division-the one that enjoyed so much success in Panama. It was also reducing and relocating other units, making them unable to deploy. The Army was, it suddenly realized, not trained or organized for its most frequent form of conflict. The Army's cultural aversion toward limited war had prevented it from fully developing a capability to deal with less than mid-intensity wars. The innovations it had arduously developed throughout the 1980s were almost reversed by the success of Desert Storm. Internal conflicts, humanitarian catastrophes and violations of international law in remote regions have not proved to be serious threats to United States security. The Army has therefore not adjusted its organization, doctrine or training to meet these apparently transient threats.

B. BUREAUCRATIC AND STRUCTURALIST THEORIES

A bureaucratic politics or functional theory argument does not answer the question presented in the introduction. Why the Army thinks the way it does about peace operations is not because of a quest for domestic power or international prestige. Certainly in the 1970s the Army's efforts at reprofessionalization were motivated by a desire for credibility, but once the Army found the respect it was looking for, it was content to stay within its previous limits.

In fact the bureaucratic explanation falls short when explaining the slow growth of special capability forces in the 1980s and the non-existent growth in the 1990s. Bureaucratic politics prevented the Army from embracing a low-intensity conflict paradigm. The Army had a significant investment in a big-war paradigm. If the Army had been driven by bureaucratic politics during these years, it would have embraced innovations oriented toward defeating Latin American communist and narcotics threats, containing internal wars

and dealing with humanitarian calamities. Some improvements were made during the 1980s and history will probably show the Army's level of emphasis on low-intensity conflict to have been appropriate. Currently, however, no innovations are underway to help the Army conduct these peace operation missions.

International circumstances influenced the Army more than any bureaucratic motivations. In the 1970s the perceived conventional Soviet threat drew the Army back to Europe. This perception justified its minor doctrinal changes and lack of organizational developments. In the 1980s, the threat in Latin America caused an increased emphasis on low-intensity war capabilities and doctrine. The Soviet communist bloc had one more team member in Nicaragua and was about to get another in El Salvador. It was this change in the structure of the international system that influenced the Army's decision to innovate, *in spite* of its own bureaucratic preferences. In the 1990s, there is no significant evidence of Army innovation meeting the challenges of peace operations. The Army inactivated units traditionally tasked with executing these limited conflicts.

This inaction by the Army defies a structuralist explanation of the Army's doctrinal and organizational choices. The international system has changed so drastically that no threat to United States conventional military power exists. One would expect, then, to see the United States guard against other possible threats to its position. The most immediate threats on the horizon are those presented by instability, internal conflicts, humanitarian crises, weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism and violations of international law. Today these threats are often dealt with multilaterally sometimes under the auspices of the United Nations.

But the United States has rejected extensive involvement in United Nations operations. It prefers to work with smaller groups of allies or coalition partners. Accordingly, the United States has not developed a coherent strategy for working with the United Nations or executing peace operations. The United States enjoys a preeminent position in the international order today. The U.S. Army should not, however, be caught unawares by what it sees as a peripheral threat to America's security.

C. ARMY CULTURE

The Army's culture has influenced peace operation doctrine and organizational structure. Before the 1970s the Army had not had to deal with failure, because its use of overwhelming force had always achieved country's objectives. There was little first hand experience in overcoming a military defeat. The stalemated end of the Korean war did not

force the Army to come to grips with defeat. Culturally, the Army had no mechanism for institutionalizing the lessons of defeat. Its culture did point toward a possible solution to understanding the defeat in Vietnam. The arguments articulated by Summers and Weinberger provided an interpretation of the lessons of Vietnam that allowed the Army to avoid far-reaching self-criticism. As a result, a thorough examination of COIN doctrine was never conducted. The Army's long-standing culture, validated by many pre-Vietnam historical experiences, encouraged the Army to return to something identifiable. It returned to a focus on Europe not because of the international threat or bureaucratic self-interests, but because it was culturally unprepared to deal with failure and preferred to emphasize experiences of success.

In the 1980s, Army culture slowed the development of forces designed to deal with limited war. During this period, the Army's culture reinforced the normal resistance to change of every bureaucracy. Real changes in the international structure, however, pressured Army culture. Army culture was then modified by both *The Lessons of Vietnam* and the "other" lessons of Vietnam. By the 1980s, the Army had begun to develop an understanding of what the war in Vietnam meant. Vietnam became the antithesis of Army culture. The Army believes overwhelming force was not used in Vietnam. The Army sees its inability to use all its might as the reason the United States lost the war.

A strange synthesis emerged between the development of *The Lessons of Vietnam* and the expansion of communism in Latin America. While the dominant Army culture worked hard to keep the United States out of conventional war in Latin America, the growing subculture implemented effective counterinsurgency plans. In some senses, counterinsurgency had not changed that much since Vietnam. Proponents of this mission claimed that the Army had just not executed its doctrine properly in Vietnam. The rest of the Army, which was not involved in Latin America, seemed both surprised and envious of the success of the operations.

In the 1990s, the Army shifted positions quickly and showed how its culture really had not changed drastically. The Army hurried back to the big-war paradigm after Desert Storm. The changes that had seemed to prepare the Army for the 1990s were repressed by the Army preference for conventional war on a major scale. The Army did not see Desert Storm as the aberration. Vietnam and Latin America were the aberrations. Desert Storm supported the fine tradition of overwhelming force. This tradition was established during the Civil War by the Union Army, was first brought to Europe by the American

Expeditionary Force during World War I and epitomized during World War II by the units commanded by General George S. Patton Jr.

The Army's culture prevents it from embracing peace operations in the 1990s. These missions are highly politicized. That politicization is the part of Clausewitz's theory on war the Army sometimes forgets. The Lessons of Vietnam have contributed to the Army's belief that the Army has no business in limited wars. The Army has a slim usable tradition dealing with such missions. Police actions are not consistent with the American Army's self-perception. The Army does not "do" mountains, cities or jungles. It does deserts and plains: anywhere with a good line of sight. These positions are articulated by the authors in the Army-oriented periodicals. They are the voice of the dominant Army culture. These positions explain why the Army thinks the way it does about peace operations. These positions are reactions to the Army's defeat in Vietnam.

D. UNITED STATES CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY

In Presidential Decision Directive Twenty-Five (PDD 25), President Clinton established guidelines to determine when US military intervention abroad is appropriate. Ten years earlier, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger suggested six tests for the use of military force in foreign policy. The criteria in the so-called Weinberger doctrine and PDD 25 show many similarities. They are similar in both intent and words. This thesis has shown the relationship between Weinberger's tests and the Army's understanding of the Vietnam war. The military must understand both sets of lessons from Vietnam. Invoking Vietnam remains a powerful tool in U.S. foreign policy debates.

The most current Secretary of Defense Report to the President and the Congress lists eight criteria for the use of force.²²⁸ Five of the eight criteria match Weinberger's almost word for word. Only the *Last Resort* criterion has been omitted. It seems reasonable to presume that Secretary Perry may have been heavily influenced by his Army advisors when writing this report. The lessons of Vietnam, the principles of the Weinberger Doctrine and the Never-Again School, have made their way into America's policy toward peace operations and all other uses of the military.

²²⁸ William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], February 1995) pp. 16-17.

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