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THESIS

**U.S. INTERVENTION IN GRENADA, PANAMA,
AND HAITI: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST
PERSPECTIVE**

by

Julie Johnette O'Neal

December, 1995

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
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**U.S. INTERVENTION IN GRENADA, PANAMA, AND HAITI:
A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST PERSPECTIVE**

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of the requirements for the degree of

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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis uses *social constructionism* to examine the motives for U.S. intervention in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994). Content analysis is applied to news editorials, Congressional in-session remarks and Presidential addresses, remarks, and press conferences to link national rhetoric to U.S. intervention policy. The case studies identify a shift in the pattern of debate within and between the American public and policy makers simultaneous with the end of the Cold War. Review of the case studies suggests that in the future U.S. policy makers must contend with an intervention policy characterized by: a) multilateralism; b) vague, mutable national interests; c) obstructionist Congressional procedures; and d) an intolerance for casualties. Alone, the information provided by rhetoric is incomplete, but when combined with analysis of the external variables that affect the actions of states, the results are a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy and an insight into the nature of interventions in the post Cold War world.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the end of the Cold War, no topic has been as politically divisive for U.S. foreign policy as when, where, why, and how the United States should intervene abroad. American public opinion regarding U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti has run the gamut from total support to complete isolationism. These responses have seemingly centered around the extent to which U.S. national interests were at risk and objectives could be achieved with minimal U.S. resources.

This thesis examines the motives for U.S. intervention in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti using *social constructionism*; that is, by linking national rhetoric to military intervention. The case studies, spanning 1983 through 1994, were specifically selected in hopes of identifying a shift in the pattern of debate within and between the American public and policy makers simultaneous with the end of the Cold War. The national rhetoric is examined by applying content analysis to: a) news editorials; b) Congressional in-session remarks; and c) Presidential addresses, remarks, and press conferences.

This thesis purports that the uncertainty of the changing world order has resulted in complicated and

convoluted internal rhetoric surrounding intervention. In the absence of the monolithic threat that drove the U.S. approach to intervention during the Cold War, the United States is confronted with ill-defined national interests and a lack of consensus on foreign policy priorities resulting in the following: 1) the reemergence in the foreign policy arena of longstanding values (e.g., democracy and human rights) that were submerged beneath the superpower competition; 2) a reluctance to act unilaterally; and 3) an intolerance for casualties sacrificed to an ill-defined or marginal threat.

The rhetoric surrounding the three case studies indeed suggests that future U.S. policy makers must contend with an intervention policy chained by a) multilateralism; b) vague, mutable national interests; c) obstructionist Congressional procedures; and d) an intolerance for casualties. Though the United States still accepts leadership in coalitions and multinational peacekeeping missions, unilateral action by the United States is no longer acceptable to either the U.S. public or the global community. This move toward multilateral action (or at least authorization) as the norm has become a post Cold War political reality. Additionally, Presidents will confront a Congress that demands an active

role in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when that policy involves deploying U.S. troops. Following each instance of U.S. intervention, Congress has attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to invoke the War Powers Resolution and has used it to apply pressure on the President to bring U.S. troops home. Finally, the nature of U.S. national interests is so vague and subject to interpretation that policy makers would benefit by clearly delineating issues and objectives pertaining to intervention as soon as possible. This would help them guide the public debate and would facilitate consensus building. The "rally around the flag" phenomenon still follows the deployment of U.S. troops, and will likely continue if casualties are kept to a minimum.

Examination of the rhetoric surrounding these three most recent interventions in Latin America contributes to an understanding of the internal variables affecting U.S. foreign policy. The application of *social constructionism* implies that the meaning the American public and policy makers attach to issues shapes their beliefs about national interests. Because meanings and beliefs are constructed through ongoing interaction, they are constantly changing. When the public and policy makers of the United States convince themselves that issues justify intervention, U.S.

military forces are mobilized. Alone, the information provided by rhetoric is incomplete, but when combined with analysis of the external variables that affect the actions of states, the results are a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy and insight into the nature of interventions in the post Cold War world.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

Since the end of the Cold War, no topic has been as politically divisive as when, where, why, and how the United States should intervene abroad. American public opinion regarding U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War, Somalia's internal conflict, the Bosnia war, and the ousting of Haiti's military de facto government has run the gamut from total support to complete isolationism. These responses have seemingly depended upon the extent to which U.S. national interests were at risk and to the extent humanitarian objectives could be achieved with minimal U.S. resources. Loss of U.S. lives has become a sensitive subject in American opinion polls, unless the government can justify soldiers' deaths.¹

In Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers, David and Mady Segal compile and analyze U.S. peacekeeping operations--the latest challenge confronting U.S. interventionism. As they explore changes in the nature of the function of the U.S. Army, reconstruct the history of peacekeeping, and pose

¹Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and The People," Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, no. 6., November-December 1994, pp. 47-62.

unresolved challenges to future leaders, they conclude there are three basic approaches to society's relationship with the military: *functional*, *conflict*, and *social constructionism*. The *functional approach* explains the behaviors of organizations in relation to the way they serve society's needs. In this view, the armed forces are defined by their ability to meet society's need for national security. The *conflict approach* emphasizes the procedures that subordinate the interests of the military members to the interests of the policy-making elites. This approach is taken by Peter Calvert in The Foreign Policy of New States, in which he concludes that foreign policy is "the occupation of a very small elite dominated above all by considerations of their own political survival."

Social constructionism is a sociological perspective that emphasizes organizations as the product of human behavior. In this view, the military is the product of the beliefs and values of its members and of the members of the larger society with which it interacts. Given that the beliefs, values, and modes of interaction are constantly changing, so too is the role and identity of the military.²

²Dana P. Eyre, David R. Segal, and Mady Weschler Segal, "The Social Construction of Peacekeeping," in David R. Segal and Mady

The Segals use this approach to examine the motivations and responses of soldiers to the demands placed on them. It is the goal of this paper to apply the concept of *social constructionism* to the broader realm of foreign policy, specifically to the debate surrounding U.S. interventionism.

Applying *social constructionism* to U.S. foreign policy implies that the meaning the American public and policy makers attach to issues shapes their beliefs about national interests. Because meanings and beliefs are constructed through ongoing interaction, they are constantly changing. Likewise, the definition of national interests and perceived threat to those interests change. As the public and policy makers of the United States convince themselves that issues justify intervention, U.S. military forces are mobilized. In the United States, the evolution of the beliefs and meanings largely occurs in the exchanges among and between the President, Congress, and the general public. Thus Presidential speeches, Congressional debates, and public concerns manifested through news editorials all contribute to the when, where, and why of U.S. intervention.

Weschler Segal Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers Chap IV (Cal: Stanford University, 1994), pp 42-6.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the motives for U.S. intervention in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti using *social constructionism*, that is, by linking internal rhetoric to military intervention. The case studies in the following chapters attempt to identify a shift in the pattern of debate within and between the American public and policy makers simultaneous with the end of the Cold War. The hypothesis is that the uncertainty of the changing world order has resulted in complicated and convoluted internal rhetoric surrounding intervention. In the absence of the monolithic threat that drove the U.S. approach to intervention during the Cold War, the United States is confronted with ill-defined national interests and a lack of consensus on foreign policy priorities resulting in the following ramifications: 1) the reemergence in the foreign policy arena of longstanding values (e.g. democracy and human rights) that were submerged beneath the superpower competition; 2) a reluctance to act unilaterally; and 3) an intolerance for casualties sacrificed to an ill-defined or nonexistent threat.

B. FRAMING THE RESEARCH

To evaluate a shift in the internal rhetoric surrounding the decision to use U.S. military force, three

case studies are examined: Grenada, Panama, and Haiti. These case studies were chosen because the invasions occurred in the same region, spanned the collapse of the Cold War, and were implemented by the three most recent Presidential administrations.

The United States enjoys a peculiar relationship with Latin America, a relationship steeped in a history of U.S. intervention. Since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine declared U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere, the United States has formally and openly sent military forces into Latin America over thirty times. The Central Intelligence Agency, since its origin in 1947, has spearheaded covert military operations on at least four additional occasions.³ During the last decade, the Monroe Doctrine has only been mentioned in passing by policy makers, and never to justify intervention.⁴

³Frank Niess, A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New Jersey: Harry Drost, 1990.) Appendix 5 details a "chronology of major armed U.S. interventions in Latin America since 1853." Given that the chronology stops with the invasion of Grenada in 1983, I include the interventions in Panama, El Salvador, and Haiti in the count of thirty.

⁴Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

In most circumstances the United States prefers participation in multilateral military operations. The advantages to multilateral coalitions include shared costs, increased flexibility, and greater public support. Latin America is the only region in which the United has consistently opted for unilateral military action. The 1994 intervention in Haiti is the first exception, in that U.N. forces began replacing U.S. forces after the initial occupation. Even in Haiti, however, U.S. troops landed alone. The unique status of Latin America aside, the other advantage to choosing three case studies from the same region is the elimination of one more external variable (namely, regional biases in U.S. foreign policy) that could account for a shift in rhetoric.

The three case studies were also selected based on the time line they comprise. Not only are they the three most recent examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America (intervention narrowly defined as open and formal deployment of military forces to alter the characteristics or behavior of another country's government), they encompass the transition from Cold War balance of power to the current world order. In 1983, President Reagan explained the invasion of Grenada as the need to protect the United States

and the western Hemisphere from the spread of communism. In 1989, as the Soviet Union was already facing collapse, President Bush explained the invasion of Panama as the need to protect American citizens from one man--General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Five years later, in 1994, President Clinton attempted to explain the invasion of Haiti without citing the underlying need to protect American territory against an overwhelming flood of refugees. He focused instead on the restoration of a democratically elected government and on protecting Haitian citizens from human rights atrocities. The three cases span a mere twelve years and are within the same region; yet very different explanations were given to the American public and the global community to justify military action.

The time periods from which data is collected and analyzed vary according to each of the case studies. Each period begins with the first mention of the country in question by a Congressional or Presidential remark, or a news editorial. Data continues to be extracted until after U.S. military forces began arriving in the target country. For coding purposes this period is referred to as the Post Invasion Response Period (PIP), and allows comparison between the pre-invasion and post invasion rhetoric. The

number of days in the PIP also varies between case studies. Initially, when examining the Haiti and Panama invasions, I extended the analysis for three days following the deployment of troops and noticed no significant change in rhetoric within those three days, so I stopped, feeling I had adequately measured post invasion rhetoric. When examining the Grenada invasion, however, I discovered that there was not a significant amount of pre-invasion rhetoric, so I extended the PIP to include all data through the final mention of the invasion ten days after the deployment of troops. As there was no change in rhetoric over time during the PIP for the Grenada case study, I make the assumption that there was similarly no change in rhetoric over time in the Panama and Haiti case studies. Thus the PIP for each study provides a sufficient depiction of post invasion rhetoric.

C. METHODOLOGY

The national discourse surrounding the U.S. interventionism was examined by applying content analysis to the primary media of expression used by the President, Congress, and the general public. The President's official stance was taken from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and included all addresses, news conferences, and

official remarks concerning the case countries. Official messages to Congress and letters within the executive branch contain policy and not opinion or justification for direction; therefore they were not analyzed.

The most accurate and complete account of discussions in the Senate and House of Representatives is contained in the Congressional Record. Each instance a Congress member addressed U.S. policy toward a case country was treated as a separate and equal unit of analysis, whether the member spoke for two minutes or two hours, or submitted a written statement to the record.

The most transparent expression of public opinion available for content analysis is news editorials. To ensure a variety of demographic profiles, all editorials mentioning the case countries were retrieved from Editorials on File, an objective compilation of editorial opinion selected from over 150 daily North American Newspapers--including both the Wall Street Journal and the Billings (Mont.) Gazette. Given that the focus was U.S. opinion, all articles extracted from Canadian newspapers were discarded. Then, to enhance coverage of the mainstream debate, the data set included pertinent Op-Ed columns from the New York Times. In the third case study, Haiti, the analysis results

of the editorials were compared with concurrent Gallup Polls for commentary purposes only.

The completed data base, using all three sources, encompassed approximately two hundred units of analysis per case study--a comprehensive selection of main arguments and concerns within the policy maker and public arenas. The units were analyzed using an original coding scheme. The categories were formed from recurring ideas identified during an initial review of the editorials, Congressional remarks, and Presidential speeches. The debate was thus framed by the subject material rather than the analyst or external forces. The first reading of the materials generated fifteen to twenty subthemes that were collapsed into roughly seven main themes, depending on the case study. Each article was subjected to a second reading to determine and document which of the main themes dominated its content; then "1" or "0" was assigned to all categories of subthemes, according to their respective use or lack thereof.

D. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

1. Foreign Policy Research

Most literature about foreign policy and U.S. intervention focuses on the external factors that justify military interference and the steps needed to ensure a

successful mission. The literature of the early 1990's additionally mentions the relationship of public support to the decision by policy makers to intervene. In Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, Richard N. Haas depicts basic guidelines on when and how to use force to achieve a broad range of foreign policy objectives. He includes national interests, feasibility of success, and desirability of intervention as a few important considerations for policy makers. He notes that recent years have evidenced declining popular and Congressional support for military interventions, and suggests that tolerance for costs directly relates to the national interests at stake. He does not suggest that public opinion should be the dominant factor in determining whether to intervene, but concedes that a successful intervention often creates its own support in the aftermath.⁵ Arnold Kanter and Lenten F. Brooks edited a book that makes recommendations for future foreign policy decisions based on a review of force structure and available technology. Kanter and Brooks also stress the importance of clarifying national interests and comparing

⁵Richard N. Haas, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Press, 1994.)

the costs and benefits of military response to determine the nature of intervention.⁶

Writing during the Cold War, William V. O'Brian delved into the legal and moral guidelines that justify decisions to engage in or abstain from military interference. He outlined three situations that warrant intervention: (1) another international actor has intervened with armed force; (2) [U.S.] nationals and other foreign nationals are in clear and present danger because of a civil war or collapse of authority; (3) massive human rights violations of the subjects of the target state warrant humanitarian intervention.⁷ Thirteen years later, Ted Galen Carpenter remarked on the obsessiveness of the United States with maintaining stability in the world--a more difficult task since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and posited three very different occasions that justify intervention: (1) to prevent political instability in important client states; (2) to install or pressure regimes considered friendly to perceived economic and security interests; and (3) to coerce

⁶Lenten F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter (eds.) U. S. Intervention Policy for the Post Cold War World: New challenges and new responses, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1994.)

⁷William V. O'Brian, "U.S. Military Intervention: Law and Morality," The Washington Papers Vol. 7, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1979.)

unfriendly regimes.⁸ Galen stated that to maintain public support, U.S. leaders have exaggerated the importance of the conflict and emphasized the moral imperative of U.S. reaction, but the justifications have shown little resemblance to the underlying political, economic, or strategic motives for intervention.⁹

2. Public Opinion Literature

During the last decade, the literature on public opinion, its development and interpretation, has flourished. Vincent Price traces the historical and philosophical linking of the term "public", meaning common access and/or concern, and the term "opinion." He then divides the public into four categories: "elite, attentive, voting, and general."¹⁰ Unlike many of his counterparts who profess the masses to be uninformed and fickle, Price is impressed with the rational nature of societal discourse. Other sociologists, such as Joseph R. Gusfield, examine the process through which phenomena become issues for public

⁸Ted Galen Carpenter, "Direct Military Intervention," in Peter Schraeder (ed.), Intervention into the 1990's: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, Chap IX, (Boulder Col: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992) p. 154.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Vincent Price, Public Opinion (Newberry Park, Cal: Sage Press, 1992.)

debate and how society subsequently nurtures a framework for discourse.¹¹

In Faces of Internationalism, George R. Wittkopf explores the way average and elite Americans view their country's relations with the rest of the world and assess dangers and responsibilities. Like Price, he concludes that the public is far more sophisticated and structured than prevailing stereotypes insinuate. Wittkopf also alludes to the influential nature of mass beliefs that persuade policy making elites by ensuring foreign policy issues remain in the forefront as election issues. He says that the divisive sense in foreign policy stems not from apathy but from doubts about the nature and extent of American involvement in world affairs.¹²

The increasing connection between public opinion and U.S. foreign-policy making suggests the importance of determining what influences shape the collective foreign policy. In an age of increasing technology the impact of media coverage on formulation of political agendas and

¹¹Joseph R. Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving, and the Symbolic Order, (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1981.)

¹²George R. Wittkopf, Faces of internationalism, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990.)

opinions is of no little concern. Edna Einseidel, Maxwell McCombs, and David Weaver researched the effect of the news media on public opinion. They concluded that while the press helps legitimize issues raised by other social institutions, it does not set agendas. The press exercises influence in the raising of social issues, but it rarely alters opinions that are firmly held by the public.¹³

Similarly, Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin Page used analysis of television news broadcasts before and between opinion surveys to estimate the impact of news stories from various sources on opinion. They determined that while actions by media commentators, opposition leaders, and the President have a large effect on opinion, the impact of other news sources is negligible.¹⁴ Other reviews of the polls indicate that Americans are more concerned with domestic issues, even though most believe the U.S. should continue as a world superpower.¹⁵

¹³Edna Einseidel et al Contemporary Public Opinion: Issues and the News, (New York: L. Erlbaum Press, Inc. 1991.)

¹⁴Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The role of T.V. News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Jun 1992 v36 n2 pp. 227-242.

¹⁵Kenneth Jost, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Have Americans grown tired of world affairs?" CQ Researcher, July 15, 1994 vol. ,4 no. 26, p.603.

3. Social Constructionist Literature

The formulation of foreign policy and beliefs come together in *social constructionism*. Reflecting that view, Murray Edelman posits that government policies and solutions are determined by influence and ideologies. Just as political developments are the creation of the publics concerned with them, public opinion is a political symbol used by policy making strategists. In The Symbolic Uses of Politics, he explores the way ordinary peoples' values enter into the decisions of public organs and the extent to which procedures weight some groups' values over others. Rather than focus on the interests of officials and elites, like so many of his predecessors, Edelman addresses the importance of creating meaning and choosing language in politics, keying on the interpretation of events by the people affected by policy. The perception of political fact is the rock upon which is built a structure of beliefs; therefore, the same news accounts may generate contradictory factual premises. He uses the U.S. invasion of Grenada as an example.

For some Americans the invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a wise course of action because American medical students on the island were in danger of becoming hostages, and because of the related "fact" that Cuba was establishing a military base

there to support subversion in other Latin American countries. For other Americans and most European governments the medical students were in no danger and could have left on a commercial airliner if they wished, and the Grenadian political turmoil reflected internal social tensions rather than external communist threat.¹⁶

Along a similar line of thinking, Terrence Bell, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson compiled a collection of essays that claim politics is anchored in linguistics, but that the concepts that shape political beliefs and behavior change in reaction to real political events.¹⁷

Finally, *social constructionism* is epitomized in David Campbell's Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Security. Campbell denounces the realist framework of the anarchical state system. He posits that foreign policy is a series of interpretations or "readings" about the identity of domestic society and the challenges that threaten hegemonic understandings of American culture and practice. He does not

¹⁶Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, (Chicago, Ill: University of Illinois, 1985) p. 204. See also Edelman, "Contestable Categories and Public Opinion," political Communication, vol. 10, no. 3, July-Sep 1993, pp 231-243. For a critique of Edelman's theory see Lance W. Bennett, "Constructing Publics and Their Opinions," Political Communication, vol. 10, no. 2, April-June 1993, pp. 101-122.

¹⁷Terrence Bell et al, (eds.) Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1989.)

imply that foreign policy is set by domestic issues, but that the U.S. concept of American identity shapes U.S. relations with other countries. Threats to national security do not originate from outside the state. Instead, they are indigenously devised by a state's need to maintain an identity.¹⁸ When applied to the end of the Cold War, Campbell's conclusion would indicate that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not diminish an external threat, but left the United States with an identity crisis. The United States would then need to generate new threats to replace the Soviet Union, possibly resulting in greater numbers of interventions than during the Cold War.

E. THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS

Before delving into the realm of political debate, it is necessary to review the policy making process with regard to the roles of the President, Congress, and the American public. Only in a democracy are the rulers accountable to the ruled. The constraints placed on the three bodies recalls Alexis de Tocqueville's dilemma: how does a government sustain a cogent

¹⁸David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Security, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.)

foreign policy while satisfying the ideals of a democratic republic?¹⁹ Each of the three roles are examined below.

1. The President and Foreign Policy

When the U.S. founding fathers drafted the constitution, they allocated to the President the authority and responsibility to conduct war. To Congress, however, was reserved the authority to declare war and commit the nation to significant foreign involvement. Congress also maintained the Army and the Navy. The President, as Commander in Chief, was responsible for the negotiations of treaties and the daily conduct of diplomacy. Before any treaties were engraved in stone, however, they were ratified by two thirds of the Senate. Though an inspired effort at checks and balances, the founding fathers' system frustrated foreign and military affairs for the next 150 years.

The first major change to the checks and balances system was initiated during the Truman administration in 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 directly expanded the executive branch of the government and indirectly extended Presidential powers. The Act established the Department of Defense by combining the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. It also established the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National

¹⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol.1 (New York: Vintage Press, 1945) p. 243.

Security Council to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy. This expansion of the executive branch was in response to America's increased role in the world. It was designed to give the President increased flexibility. Like all bureaucracies, however, it added further constraints to the Chief Executive Officer and the policy making process.

Nathan and Oliver, in Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System, noted that Presidential power has run in cycles. The 1940's-1960's were the decades of the "imperial president." Congress consistently acquiesced to Executive initiative and consumed itself with other affairs. Then, following Vietnam and Watergate in the mid-1970's, presidential power was placed on a tight leash as Congress resumed a more active role in the policy process and the public monitored the government with increased interest. By the mid-1980's the pendulum reversed and Ronald Reagan as president (1981-1989) enjoyed tremendous leniency and freedom to pursue policy. Not even the Iran Contra scandal elicited electoral retribution, as seen by the 1988 election to president of former Vice President George Bush, who had been implicated in the affair. President Bush sustained enormous popularity following the Gulf War, until

domestic economic problems and the collapse of the Soviet Union sent the pendulum back the way it had come.²⁰

In short, the President is not the king of the hill commanding bureaucratic organizations to do his bidding. The President does assume office with his own set of priorities, which he attempts to implant through key appointments. But those appointments do not match the experience of an expansive foreign affairs bureaucracy. Throughout his term, the President is the focus of foreign affairs, and he proposes policy and structures the terms of the national debate; but he must contend with well-established institutions, a convoluted bureaucracy, and a ceaseless flow of foreign policy. Particularly now that the Cold War is over, the President is faced with a complex global environment that could prove less conducive to American power and American interests.

2. The Congress and Foreign Policy

Congress, as the constitutionally mandated partner of the President, has played an active role in U.S. foreign policy, to an extent varying over time. From the mid-1940's through the mid-1960's, when one party controlled both the Congress and the Presidency, majority leaders acted as "loyal and largely

²⁰James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System (3rd ed.), (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) p. 10.

uncritical lieutenants" of the President on foreign and defense policy.²¹ During this period there was a general sentiment among policy makers that constitutional checks and balances were impediments to the tasks of world leadership.²² The Vietnam War destroyed that consensus. Confidence in the presidency as the font of all foreign policy wisdom began to disintegrate; and Congress asserted its constitutional powers to a greater extent than had yet been seen in the twentieth century.²³

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was the most significant piece of legislation passed by Congress since the National Security Act of 1947. The War Powers Resolution, passed over a Presidential veto, required the President to consult with and report to Congress concerning the involvement of U.S. armed forces in any conflict and allowed Congress to stop a war at any time by passing a concurrent resolution. U.S. forces could be brought home by a simple majority vote of the House and Senate.

²¹James M. Lindsey, and Randall B. Ripley (eds.) Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, (Mich: University of Michigan Press, 1993) pp. 209.

²²Ibid, p. 72.

²³Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth W. Thompson The President, Congress, and Foreign Policy: A Joint Policy Project of the Association of Former Members of Congress and the Atlantic Council of the United States, (Lanham, Maryland: University of America Press, Inc., 1986), p. 18.

It also stipulated that the President report to Congress within forty-eight hours after beginning hostilities. It allowed the President to deploy troops for sixty days without Congressional approval and a subsequent thirty days to ensure a safe withdrawal.²⁴ During the 1970's, Congressional power was also increased through the creation of budget committees and the expansion of the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The mid-1980's brought a return to the Presidential upper hand in the relationship because Congress was facing internal crises. Congress has always been divided along party lines to an extent driven by the changing extremes of ideologies. The 1980's-1990's saw a shift in control of the Senate from Republican to Democrat and back again. It was a decade of frequent deadlocks between the parties. Then in 1989, the financial scandal involving several members of Congress and bounced checks painted an image to the public of arrogant elites who perverted the institution for their own interests. Several Senators and Congressmen stepped down or were retired by voters. January 1993 brought the newest, most junior Congress since WWII. In one year, the House and Senate became less predictable than they had been since Vietnam.

²⁴Lindsey and Ripley, pp. 211-212.

3. The Public and Foreign Policy

Noted historian Thomas A. Baily wrote, "If the ordinary American wants to know who shapes fundamental foreign policy, all he has to do is look in the mirror."²⁵ Because of the demands placed on foreign policy by democratic accountability, policy makers walk a fine line in their relationship with the public. Public opinion can neither be discounted nor can it be counted on in long term diplomatic design.

Eugene Wittkopf divides the public into three categories: "attentives," "inattentives," and the "mass public." The "attentives" are comprised of less than ten percent of the public and display levels of knowledge and ideas similar to the policy making elite. Likewise, the "inattentives" constitute less than ten percent of the public. They, however, have very low levels of information and demonstrate poorly formed views of foreign affairs. The remainder of the population, over eighty percent, possesses a basic knowledge and coherent attitudes even though they do not always display detailed factual knowledge of foreign

²⁵Thomas A. Baily, A Diplomatic History of the American People (10th ed., 1980) p.3, cited in Kenneth Jost, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Have Americans grown tired of world affairs?" CQ Researcher, vol. 4, no. 26, July 15, 1994, p. 611.

policy. Wittkopf, then, describes public opinion as built on an uneven factual base and interest level.²⁶

Daniel Yankelovich suggests that if the public is given all the facts, they will form intelligent opinions on foreign policy. Yankelovich's research during the Cold War revealed that two primary fears drove public opinion: (1) nuclear war threatening human existence; (2) Soviet expansionism threatening American cultural existence.²⁷ Without these fears it is more difficult for the policy makers to justify the deployment of troops to the public. Since a high degree of public support is the foundation of successful foreign policy in a democracy, the policy makers frequently resort to "hard sell" methods, exaggerating aspects of the situation that they hope will invoke support from the populace.

Public attitude has changed toward the role of the United States in the international community. Where once the use of U.S. military force was deemed inevitable, it is now seen as the extreme solution to conflict and only as a means to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to allies under attack.²⁸ The

²⁶Nathan and Oliver, p. 153.

²⁷Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harmon Starting With the People, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Press, 1988) p. 100.

²⁸Catherine M. Kelleher, "Soldiering on: U.S. public opinion on the use of force," Brookings Review, vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring

"rally 'round the president" syndrome of previous years no longer exists, if it ever did. Statistics have shown that while Presidential popularity and approval ratings consistently rise in moments of crisis (those that are prominently covered by the media), popular support recedes soon after.²⁹ The ambiguous and tense relationship between authority and accountability has become even more uncertain as the United States adjusts its leadership role in the new world order.

F. SUMMARY

As earlier stated, this thesis attempts to assess the motives for U.S. interventionism in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti by linking internal rhetoric to military intervention. The case studies in the following chapters attempt to identify a shift in the pattern of debate within and between the American public and policy makers concurrent with the end of the Cold War. But internal rhetoric alone will neither fully explain nor predict the actions the United States chooses to take in its foreign policy.

1994), p. 26.

²⁹Bradley Lian and John R. O'Neal, "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 37, no. 2, June 1993, pp. 277-301. Lian and O'Neal conducted a study of presidential popularity following major uses of force between 1950-1984. They determined that of 102 cases, the mean change in the President's approval rating was 0%, even among members of his own party.

Social constructionism, while linking internal rhetoric to U.S. foreign policy decisions, does not account for external variables, such as actions taken by de facto governments of the case study countries. *Social Constructionism* does not consider world events, related or otherwise, that may alter the U.S. foreign affairs agenda, nor does it consider pressures from the global community through organizations like the United Nations or through multilateral business organizations. It is also unable to account for covert variables that may influence foreign policy (such as the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship with General Manuel Antonio Noriega prior to the invasion of Panama), and the hidden agendas of policy makers who might be linking political issues together to achieve an unrevealed goal.

The importance of *social constructionism* is in its ability to reveal how the American public and policy makers are framing the issues of foreign policy--the reality they are constructing through their debates. The pieces of information on which the public and policy makers choose to focus is significant because their perceptions and reactions will influence foreign policy decisions. Whether the public and policy makers debate different issues is significant, as is the relationship of those debates with real world events. More than a commentary on a changing society, an understanding of society's beliefs and concerns and

how they are changing can aid political strategists in framing issues so as to gain public support and influence decisions of key policy makers.

In a summer 1994 interview with the Los Angeles Times, Henry Kissinger remarked that American foreign policy hinges on the "Symbiotic relationships between the President, the media, and the public. This concept was born out of the notion that the United States has a unique global responsibility and that the public needs to be affirmed of such a notion." Kissinger also indicated that it is "necessary to analyze what reality is imposing on us independent of our values...The query is [whether] the two [approaches] can be combined."³⁰ *Social constructionism* contributes to an understanding of the internal variables affecting U.S. foreign policy previously neglected by scholars. When combined with analysis of the external variables that affect the actions of states, the result is a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy.

³⁰Tony Day and Doyle McManus, "Photo-op Foreign Policy," New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 42-44.

II. GRENADA: OPERATION URGENT FURY

This Chapter illustrates one example of national rhetoric during the Cold War, when commonly held beliefs about the Soviet Union and the possibility of nuclear attack added a fearful dimension to U.S. foreign policy. During this period, the U.S. impression of the world was reminiscent of old movies in which two cowboys faced each other at high noon. The United States was the defender of freedom and justice and the Soviet Union wore black. The U.S. approach to intervention was driven by perceived threat to U.S. citizens, democracy, and peace. But it also hinged on a national perception of the United States as the good guy, the lone heroic defender of its own.

Given the Cold War beliefs about the world, during the Grenada invasion President Reagan had to convince the American public that a) a Communist dictator was directly threatening the lives of U.S. citizens on the island; b) the Soviet Union was maneuvering into a position to threaten the United State; and c) that the United States was acting benevolently and heroically. In fact, the only domestic opposition to the Grenada invasion came from a minority of the public and Congress who remained unconvinced of the threat to U.S. citizens and who feared the United States was

adapting imperialist characteristics similar to the Soviet Union.

A. THE INVASION

At 5:30 a.m. on October 25, 1983, approximately 1900 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers began landing at Pearls and Pt. Salines airports on the island of Grenada. A small additional force was provided by six Caribbean states. Resistance was stronger than expected; there were more Cubans on Grenada than had been estimated by U.S. sources. By 26 October, however, most pockets of Cuban and Grenadian resistance were eliminated and U.S. troops were able to evacuate U.S. citizens through Pearls Airport, which had been closed since a coup on 19 October. The invasion, dubbed Operation Urgent Fury, was the first large-scale, overt U.S. military intervention in the Western Hemisphere since the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.

President Reagan said that the United States was responding to a call from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to help restore law and order in Grenada, where Prime Minister Maurice Bishop had been overthrown and assassinated by hardline members of the ruling New Jewel Movement (NJM) the previous week. U.S. relations with Bishop had been strained at best, but the new

leadership under General Hudson Austin was even less conducive to regional stability. Grenada's ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union fostered fears in the United States and surrounding Caribbean countries of Soviet expansion in the region. Additionally, General Austin imposed a twenty-four hour curfew and ordered his soldiers to shoot violators on sight. This action was interpreted by the U.S. government as a threat to approximately 1,100 U.S. citizens living in Grenada, most of whom were medical students at St. George's University School of Medicine. President Reagan called the operation a "rescue mission;" Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, Chairman of OECS, called it a "response to countries comprising one region asking for support."¹ Others were not so generous.

World leaders reacted negatively to the attack. France, Canada, and West Germany harshly condemned U.S. action, as did the majority of delegates to the Organization of American States. Even Reagan's closest European ally, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, expressed "very

¹Facts on File, vol. 43, No. 2241, October 28, 1983, pp. 809-10.

considerable doubts" about the invasion to President Reagan.²

The U.S. Congress and the American public were caught off guard by the invasion, and opinion was divided as to whether or not the United States should have intervened. Congress raised questions as to the legality of the invasion and debated the applicability of the War Powers Resolution.

This chapter examines the U.S. rhetorical debate surrounding the Grenada invasion and notes among other themes an overwhelming concern for the safety of U.S. citizens as well as a fear of Communist expansion. Prior to analysis of the rhetorical themes in the U.S. public, Congressional, and Presidential arenas I will explain the case study's research design.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN

The time period examined in this case study extends from March 21, 1983 through November 4, 1983 for the public opinion data set and Presidential remarks data set. President Reagan initiated U.S. public discussion on Grenada on March 21, 1983 when he showed pictures of the Soviet-sponsored airport under construction on the Island. His warnings of Soviet expansionism in the region prompted an

²Ibid., p. 812.

editorial response on March 31, 1983, the first editorial collected for the U.S. public opinion data set. Almost all of the debate in these two data sets, however, occurred after October 25, 1983. The Congressional remarks data set begins on October 25, 1983 and continues through November 4, 1983.

The time period for the Grenada case study is much briefer than the next two case studies, Panama and Haiti. Prior to and during the invasion of Grenada, the United States was preoccupied with the multinational peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. On October 23, 1983, two days prior to Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, over 200 U.S. Marines were killed in Beirut during a suicidal bomb attack by a Lebanese terrorist. Neither Congress nor the American public anticipated President Reagan's decision to divert forces to the Caribbean. The national debate, therefore, did not commence in full force until the ten days following the landing of troops. For the purposes of this thesis this time period is referred to as the Post Invasion Period (PIP).

Figure 2.1 depicts the number of editorials, Congressional remarks, and Presidential remarks with regard to the Grenada invasion from March 21, 1983 through November

4, 1983 for the respective data sets. The completed data base, using all three sources, included 116 units of analysis comprised of 45 editorials, 115 Senate and House remarks, and 9 Presidential addresses, remarks, and press conferences.

The debates within the public, Congressional and Presidential arenas are examined separately. Each section contains an overview of the basic arguments surrounding the invasion, followed by a discussion of the main themes and secondary themes that emerged during the debate. The analysis does not include changes in rhetoric over time. Due to the Brief time span, such changes did not prove significant. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, all dates refer to the year 1983, unless otherwise noted.

C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON GRENADA

The data set for public opinion contains one editorial dated March 31, one week following the President's speech on Soviet expansion. Grenada was not mentioned again in the editorials until 21 October, and the concern was still limited to perceived Soviet threat. Fifty-two percent of the editorials (24 of 45) were printed during the two days immediately following the invasion, 26 and 27 October.

Public opinion was divided over the invasion. Fifty-one percent (23 of 45) supported the President's decision, 40 percent (18 of 45) opposed the invasion, and nine percent (4 of 45) voiced no opinion about the invasion at all, but focused only on the Soviet threat. Concerning the latter category, it should be noted three of the four editorials were printed prior to 25 October, when thoughts of military action in the Caribbean were far from the public mind.

Four main themes emerged in the public editorials: a) safeguarding U.S. citizens; b) curbing Soviet expansion; c) negativism toward U.S. imperialism; and d) the question of legality.

Those in favor of the intervention were primarily concerned with safeguarding U.S. citizens and countering the Soviet threat (see Figure 2.2). Forty percent (9 of 23) focused on protecting the U.S. medical students as a main theme, and 60 percent (14 of 23) mentioned the concern as a subtheme. The other major concern was the potential Communist threat. Forty percent (9 of 23) of the editorials cited Soviet expansion and Cuban influence as a main theme, and 74 percent (17 of 23) mentioned it as a secondary theme. The remaining 20 percent of the pro-invasion editorials were concerned with liberating the oppressed Grenadians and

responding to the call for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Aiding the OECS also appeared as a subtheme in 48 percent (11 of 23) of those editorials.

Those opposed to the President's decision focused on U.S. imperialism. They compared the U.S. invasion of Grenada to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and criticized the gunboat diplomacy characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. imperialism was the main theme of 67 percent (12 of 18) of these editorials. The same 67 percent of the editorials refused to believe that there was a real danger to the U.S. medical students on the island. A secondary theme citing no real threat to U.S. citizens was found in each of the editorials criticizing U.S. imperialism. An additional criticism was that the United States had violated international law. Seventeen percent (3 of 18) referred to violations of OAS treaties as a main theme and 50 percent (9 of 18) referred to such infractions as a secondary theme.

Some subthemes appeared in both pro- and anti-invasion editorials (see Figure 2.3). One recurring subtheme focused on the negative response of the other World leaders. Sixty-one percent (11 of 18) of editorials opposing U.S. action

stated that the United States had alienated its allies over the Grenada invasion. Thirteen percent (3 of 23) of those in favor of the invasion also noted the negative stance of U.S. allies but were not concerned. Rather, they were adamant that the United States would act to protect its citizens and interests regardless of world opinion. With regard to Communist threat, 51 percent (23 of 45) of all editorials were concerned about the Soviet buildup and Cuban influence as a secondary theme. Even those opposed to the invasion acknowledged the threat, they just did not believe it was sufficient to justify invading Grenada. Twenty percent (9 of 45) of all editorials also voiced a concern for U.S. troops and casualties as a subtheme. This was no doubt influenced by the deaths of 200 U.S. Marines in Lebanon on October 23. The United States was now involved on a second front and the public wanted troops brought home quickly.

D. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON GRENADA

The majority of Congress was in favor of the invasion, though they resented not being consulted first. Fifty-six percent (64 of 115) supported the President's decision, 31 percent (36 of 115) opposed the invasion, and 13 percent (15 of 115) voiced no opinion on the invasion at all but instead

focused on procedures and how to invoke the War Powers Resolution as quickly as possible.

As in the public editorials, those members of Congress who supported the deployment of U.S. troops did so to protect the U.S. medical students and to curb Soviet expansionism (see Figure 2.4). Rescuing American citizens was mentioned as a main theme in 50 percent (32 of 64) and as a subtheme in 68 percent (44 of 64) of the pro-invasion Congressional remarks. The Communist threat was a matter of concern in 27 percent (17 of 64) of the remarks as a main theme and 56 percent (36 of 64) as a secondary theme. Coming to the aid of the OECS was the main theme of 13 percent (8 of 64) of the remarks and was a subtheme of 27 percent (17 of 64). An additional topic mentioned significantly as a subtheme was the promotion of democracy. Sixteen percent (10 of 64) discussed the promotion of democracy; however, it was mentioned only by those who supported the invasion. The remainder of remarks did not discuss the issue at all.

Of the Congressional remarks opposed to the invasion, 53 percent (19 of 36) criticized U.S. imperialism. As with the public, most of these remarks (14 of 36) claimed that U.S. citizens were in no real danger. The remainder of the

opposition remarks were more or less equally divided between concern for casualties, legal issues, and the War Powers Act (see Figure 2.5). Many congressional remarks cited violations to international law, specifically OAS treaties, as well as infractions to procedures outlined in the U.S. Constitution. The illegality of the invasion was a main theme in 14 percent (5 of 36) and a subtheme in 36 percent (12 of 36) of the remarks.

Additional subthemes mentioned only by those opposed to the invasion included negative world opinion, ineffective diplomacy and a decline in credibility. Negative world opinion was mentioned as a subtheme by twenty-five percent (9 of 36), who criticized the United States for alienating Great Britain and other allies over Grenada. Nineteen percent (7 of 36) said the United States would not have had to invade Grenada if President Reagan had met with Prime Minister Bishop earlier in the year when Bishop had tried to mend his relationship with the United States (see Appendix A). Finally, 17 percent (6 of 36) thought the invasion had resulted in a decline in U.S. credibility both with European allies and in the region.

Unlike the public, which was concerned about Soviet expansion regardless of how they felt about the invasion, in

Congress only those who supported the invasion commented on the Communist threat. Though Communism represented the second highest concern in pro-invasion discussion, the Soviets and Cubans were mentioned only once as a main theme and three times as a subtheme in the remainder of the remarks.

The War Powers Act, on the other hand, was an issue that cut across all stances on the invasion. It concerned the whole of Congress for several reasons. Many members focused on legal procedures and U.S. Constitutional issues, including when and how the President is authorized to deploy U.S. troops and verbiage of proposed amendments. Others members were concerned about bringing troops home as quickly as possible (see Figure 2.5).

E. THE PRESIDENT ON GRENADA

President Reagan began warning the United States of Soviet expansion in Grenada in the spring of 1983. In March, he showed photos of the Soviet-sponsored airport under construction, and in April he again discussed the strategic significance of that airport as a jumping off point for the Soviets.³ He did not mention Grenada to the

³Weekly Compilation of Presidential Remarks, March and April 1983, pp. 442, 642.

public or press again, however, until troops had been deployed and the invasion had begun. At that point his primary concern was for the U.S. citizens on the island. The Soviet buildup was mentioned only once after the invasion. Figure 2.6 illustrates the President's dual concerns regarding the invasion.

Operation Urgent Fury was a rescue mission, according to the President. The United States was responding to a threat to the safety of the U.S. medical students at St. Georges University Medical School who were being prevented from leaving the island and who might be shot if they violated General Austin's curfew. Reagan also mentioned (4 times out of 9) as a secondary issue that the United States was aiding the OECS (see Figure 2.7). He never addressed the position of Great Britain or other European powers, but insisted that the United States was responding to a call from its Caribbean neighbors.

Democracy was not mentioned by the President until November, and then it was only mentioned twice and always in conjunction with liberating the oppressed people of Grenada. Clearly it was not a key issue (see Figure 2.7). As for the U.S. military, however, President Reagan ardently praised the performance of the Marines and Rangers in every address

and press conference following the invasion. Possibly due to the Beirut bombing that killed 200 marines 23 October, as well as to pressure from Congress regarding the War Powers Resolution, he began discussing bringing troops home as early as 3 November--nine days after the invasion.

F. CONCLUSION

Because President Reagan surprised the U.S. Congress and the public with the invasion of Grenada, the time period for the Grenada data set was primarily limited to the Post Invasion Period (PIP). Rhetoric surrounding the events leading to the invasion was unavailable, if not nonexistent. The limited time span might have skewed the impression of support for the invasion because the PIP has typically been a period of increased support for the President and his decision to deploy troops. Given the "rally around the flag" phenomenon, it is interesting to note that though the majority of the country appeared to support the invasion, the margin of that majority was small (51 percent of public editorials and 56 percent of Congressional remarks). Two factors could have contributed to the persistent divisiveness: a) lack of time for the public to fully comprehend the situation in Grenada and raise issues of

concern prior to the invasion; or b) external variables such as the simultaneous operation in Lebanon.

Though President Reagan began by warning against Soviet expansionism in the Caribbean, by the time he deployed U.S. troops to Grenada he was only talking about rescuing U.S. citizens. In case he needed further justification, he was responding to a request from the OECS, the United States' Caribbean neighbors.

Congress and the U.S. public also believed the United States should protect its citizens--if the citizens were actually in danger. Those who supported the invasion believed the medical students were at risk of being held hostage or shot, those who opposed the invasion believed there was no real danger to the students. Though not specifically mentioned in any of the data sets, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 through 1981 probably contributed to concern for U.S. residents in Grenada. Congressman Robert G. Toricelli (D, NJ) told press reporters on November 11, 1983 that "years of frustration were vented by the Grenada invasion. I hardly get a call where people don't mention the Iranian hostage situation."⁴

⁴Facts on File, November 11, 1983, p. 857.

As for the Communist threat, the public was torn between their fear of the Soviets and their fear of becoming like those they hated. They did not want the Soviets and Cubans gaining influence or strategic advantage in the United States' backyard, and all acknowledged that this was a real possibility. But they did not want the United States to condemn Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and then conduct Soviet style operations in the Caribbean. Those who perceived U.S. actions as defensive and as a rescue mission supported the invasion, those who perceived U.S. action as offensive and imperialistic opposed the invasion.

The issue of allies, whether Caribbean or European, was secondary and subject to manipulation. Those who supported the invasion said the United States was aiding the OECS. Those who opposed the invasion did not mention the OECS but said the United States had alienated its closest allies. Though Great Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany were mentioned by name, the United Nations (U.N.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were never discussed. When those opposed to the invasion cited infractions of international law, they referred to OAS treaties, not U.N. agreements. On the rare occasion that public editorials or Congressional remarks supporting the invasion mentioned the

negative opinion of U.S. allies, they expressed disgust at the lack of support for the United States, particularly on the part of Great Britain. The United States was going to protect its citizens and its interests regardless of the opinions of lesser powers.

For the United States, the Cold War as depicted through the U.S. invasion of Grenada was a time to a) protect American citizens; b) guard against Soviet expansion; and c) be prepared to act unilaterally to accomplish the former. Allies and legality with regard to international and domestic procedures were secondary and all other issues were even more insignificant.

The following chapter will reveal changes that occurred in the national rhetoric as the United States no longer faced a familiar enemy. By 1989, the Soviet Union had begun its transition into the Combined Independent States (CIS), taking with it an aspect of the U.S. national identity. Who was the United States if not a defender against the evils of Communism?




Figure 2.1




Figure 2.2




Figure 2.3




Figure 2.4




Figure 2.5




Figure 2.6




Figure 2.7

III. PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE

During the invasion of Grenada, both the national identity of the United States and the U.S. approach to intervention was driven by a perceived monolithic Soviet threat. During the late 1980's, however, the Soviet Union was weakening as a great unilateral power. The United States, no longer faced with a serious Communist threat, looked elsewhere to define foreign policy priorities, and found the answers in modifications of familiar themes.

This chapter illustrates U.S. national rhetoric during the critical transition period between the Cold War and the post Cold War era. During the invasion of Panama, the U.S. fear and hatred of the Soviet Union was recast as the hatred of a single man, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. General Noriega was threatening the lives of U.S. citizens indirectly through drug trafficking and directly through physical assault on those living in Panama. No longer faced with a great unilateral opponent, the United States initially showed signs of reluctance to act unilaterally. Before authorizing the unilateral invasion of Panama, President Bush had to convince the American public and Congress that a) a brutal dictator was threatening the lives of U.S. citizens; and b) the United States was the only

power capable of removing this dictator and the threat he posed to freedom, justice, and the American way of life.

A. THE INVASION

It is possible the Panama crisis was born on June 6, 1987 when Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, the former Chief of Staff of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), held a press conference following his forced retirement. The Colonel accused General Manuel Antonio Noriega of rigging the 1984 presidential elections, murdering a Panamanian activist, planting a bomb on former president Omar Torrijos' plane, and many other devious crimes. For the first time, the Panamanian public was made aware of conflict within the PDF.¹

It was not until early 1988 that the conflict became an interstate contest between the United States and Panama. In February 1988, two U.S. Grand Juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida indicted Noriega on charges of drug trafficking. From that point the animosity between the United States and Noriega escalated until December 1989 when Noriega declared Panama to be in a state of war against the United States. The Panama Defense Forces subsequently harassed U.S. service

¹John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 1.

members, interrogated and beat a U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife, and killed a U.S. Marine lieutenant. President George Bush responded to these attacks by ordering U.S. troops into Panama on December 19, 1989 to "protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States."²

While examining U.S. rhetoric surrounding the Panama invasion, this chapter notes a significant recurrence of anti-Noriega sentiment and a noticeable decline in preference for multilateral action over unilateral U.S. response. Before examining rhetorical themes in the U.S. public, Congressional and Presidential debates I will explain the case study's research design.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN

The time period examined in this case study extends from April 1, 1989 through December 21, 1989 for the public and President data sets. Though tensions between Noriega and the U.S. government had been growing since 1988, discussion of possible U.S. responses beyond economic sanctions commenced only as the May 7, 1989 Panamanian presidential election drew near. April 27, 1989 marks the

²President George Bush's Address to the Nation announcing U.S. military action in Panama, December 20, 1989, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1989, p. 1974.

first statement by President Bush concerning the U.S. position regarding the impending election. The first editorial of the year representing public opinion about Noriega and Panama was printed in the *New York Times* April 25, 1989. Because the U.S. military invasion occurred on December 19, 1989, the Post Invasion Period (PIP) for the President and public data sets is represented by information dated December 19, 1989 through December 21, 1989.

The time period for data collection within the Congress data set differs slightly because Congress was not in session during the U.S. invasion in Panama. Thus the time period extends from April 1, 1989 through January 30, 1990, when Congress provided their initial feedback on the invasion. The PIP for the Congress data set includes remarks (seven, in total) made in the Senate and the House from January 23, 1990 through January 30, 1990. Following January 1990, congressional discussion turned to other issues and only briefly returned to the invasion when considering when to withdraw U.S. troops.

Figure 3.1 depicts the number of editorials, Congressional remarks and Presidential remarks concerning the Panama invasion from April 1, 1989 through the PIP for the respective data sets. The completed data base, using

all three sources, included 263 units of analysis consisting of 134 editorials, 117 Senate and House remarks, and 12 Presidential addresses, remarks and news conferences.

The debates within the public, Congressional, and Presidential arenas are examined separately. Each section begins with an overview of the basic arguments surrounding the invasion. This overview does not include analysis of changes in rhetoric over time. It extracts the dominant ideas from the entire nine month period preceding the dispatch of troops as well as the initial feedback representative of the day of invasion (PIP). In each section, following the overview, the main themes and secondary themes are discussed. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, all dates refer to the year 1989, unless otherwise noted.

C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON PANAMA

The majority of the U.S. public was opposed to the invasion of Panama throughout the preceding months (see Figure 3.2). In May, 51 percent (26 of 51) opposed U.S. military action, followed by 40 percent (4 of 10) opposition in September, and 53 percent (19 of 36) opposition in October. Not until the PIP did the public support U.S. military action, when 88 percent of all editorials (15 of

17) responded in favor of President Bush's decision to send in troops.

Before the invasion, over 50 percent (26 of 50) of opposing opinion focused on a preference for multinational action over unilateral U.S. response (see Figure 3.3). Support for a combined multinational response gradually decreased, however, and on December 21, the majority (15 of 17) of the news editorials favored unilateral action by the United States to safeguard U.S. citizens.

Three main themes emerged in the public editorials: a) strong anti-Noriega sentiment; b) support for multilateral response; and c) debate surrounding the October coup attempt. The emphasis place on these themes shifted between May, when public dialog on Panama commenced, and the PIP, when the dialog was nearing completion (see Figure 3.4). In May, the primary focus was on multilateralism and anti-Noriega sentiment. Following the invasion, however, the emphasis was on safeguarding U.S. citizens.

From May through December strong anti-Noriega sentiment flooded the editorials (see Figure 3.5). In May, after Noriega stole the elections, the U.S. public was convinced that Noriega was a villain and that the Organization of American States (OAS) and the global community should take

action against him. In May, Anti-Noriega sentiment represented 27 percent (14 of 51) of main themes and 63 percent (32 of 51) of subthemes. In September, it represented 30 percent (3 of 10) of main themes and 90 percent (9 of 10) of subthemes. In October, it represented 12 percent (4 of 36) of main themes and 33 percent (12 of 36) of subthemes. Following the invasion, it represented 12 percent (2 of 17) of main themes and 77 percent (13 of 17) of subthemes. The relatively low number of references as a main theme in October and during the PIP was because the public had shifted focus to the coup and American citizens living in Panama.

Interest in Panama waned June through September until the coup attempt October 3, 1989 (see Figure 3.1). The coup participants had expected U.S. assistance but President Bush refrained from ordering U.S. troops stationed in Panama to participate. Only 10 percent (12 of 117) of the public disagreed with the president's decision in the editorials. Twenty-one percent (25 of 117) of the editorials applauded the president's decision and 69 percent (80 of 117) focused on the necessity for a unified policy without taking a stance on the coup at all.

In November, Panama again disappeared from the editorials and did not appear again until December 21, 1989; at which time, the public overwhelmingly supported the U.S. invasion to protect the lives of U.S. citizens (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). U.S. citizens, not even mentioned prior to the PIP, appeared as a main theme in 53 percent (9 of 17) of the editorials that day. Democracy and the Panama Canal were not issues in the public mind. Even drug trafficking was not an issue of concern; it was mentioned only in a long list of Noriega's character flaws.

Significant trends in the sub-themes included a steady decline in support for multinational response (see Figure 3.3). In May, 67 percent (34 of 51) of the news editorials supported multinational response over unilateral action by the United States. By September this support had declined to 30 percent (3 of 10) of editorials. In fact, 20 percent (2 of 10) of the editorials voiced the opinion that multinational institutions (i.e., the OAS, the U.N. was not mentioned) were ineffective and the United States should think about other options. By October, only 22 percent (8 of 36) of the editorials supported multinational response. During the PIP, only 18 percent (3 of 17) editorials

maintained that a multinational response would have been preferable to U.S. action.

As a subtheme in October, after the coup, the public was concerned about clear U.S. policy and unified government departments working as a team to prepare for a response to the Panama situation. Thirty percent (12 of 36) of editorials in October were concerned about a unified policy as a subtheme.

As a subtheme the Panama Canal was always present in the back of the public minds. While they were spewing criticisms of Noriega's character and the terrible things he was doing in Panama, somewhere in the editorials was a feeling of "oh yes, the Canal, the United States needs to watch out for that..." The Canal was consistently present as a subtheme in approximately 25-30 percent of all editorials regardless of month or date.

Unlike the Haiti intervention, during the Panama invasion, editorials were not greatly concerned about U.S. credibility with the global community, democracy, or vaguely defined national interests (except the specific mention of the Panama Canal). The American public hated Noriega and though they initially preferred that the global community handle the affair, when the OAS proved ineffective and

Noriega started harming U.S. citizens they dismissed multilateral action and said, "The United States looks out for its own people....," "Somebody should take care of Noriega..." "...and then there is the canal to think about..."³

D. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON PANAMA

From the time the Panama crisis was first mentioned in Congress in May through the initial feedback on the invasion in January 1990, the majority of the House and Senate refrained from making a pro/con statement regarding U.S. military action. Out of 134 remarks, 82 percent voiced no opinion on the possibility of U.S. invasion. Of the 12 percent (16 of 134) who favored the invasion, the main reason was that Noriega was a villain. The remaining 6 percent (8 of 134) opposition was due to support for multinational response. Discussion was bipartisan and equally represented in the House and the Senate.

Congress, like the public, primarily focused on the nefarious characteristics of Noriega. Anti-Noriega sentiment amounted to 28 percent of all main themes for the duration of the data collected. There was, however, a

³Editorials on File, Vol. 20, No. 24, December 16-31, 1989, pp. 1475-1481.

decline in Congressional interest in Noriega's finer qualities (see Figure 3.6). From May through June, anti-Noriega sentiment represented 32 percent (23 of 73) of the main themes and 62 percent (45 of 73) of the subthemes; in October, 24 percent (11 of 45) of the main themes and 40 percent (18 of 45) of the subthemes; and by the PIP anti-Noriega sentiment was reduced to only 14 percent (1 of 7) of all main themes and 28 percent (2 of 7) subthemes of Congressional remarks.

In May, Congressional focus was on Panama's elections and being prepared for Noriega to steal them. During this time and immediately following in June, they espoused democracy as a main theme in approximately 26 percent of the remarks for those two months (see Figure 3.7). Later, however, they rarely mentioned it. As a subtheme, a similar pattern occurred. Democracy was a subtheme of 45 percent (25 of 56) of May remarks. By October, however, it was only evident in 7 percent (3 of 45) of the remarks.

The Panama Canal accounted for approximately 13 percent of all main themes from May through the PIP. It was consistently present as an issue though never prominent as a main theme. As a subtheme the Canal was mentioned in 41 percent (23 of 55) of the remarks in May but only in 16

percent (7 of 45) of the remarks in October. Concern for the security of the Canal apparently declined over time.

As with the public, Congress appeared to lose faith in the effectiveness of a global response and the OAS's abilities to cope with Noriega and the Panama crisis. Support for multinational response was present in 21 percent (13 of 56) of Congressional remarks in May as a main theme but was only mentioned three times in the following months. As a subtheme, approximately 37 percent (21 of 56) of Congressional remarks voiced support for multinational action in May, but this support had declined to approximately 5 percent (2 of 45) of remarks in October.

In October, following the coup attempt, the Senate was preoccupied with procedural issues and ensuring the president had the authority to involve U.S. troops in Panama should that be his decision in the future (see Figure 3.8). Amendments were drafted and debated. Procedures for deploying troops and approving Canal authorities were the focus of approximately 25 percent (11 of 45) of all remarks in October, though they were never mentioned previously and only once following October. Concern over a unified policy also emerged in October as a subtheme. Approximately 29 percent (13 of 45) of October's remarks stated that the

government agencies needed to work together to articulate a clear policy for the U.S. toward Panama and Noriega. Response to the coup attempt in October was divided. Approximately 38 percent (17 of 45) of the remarks stated the U.S. should have supported the coup with military reenforcement. Twenty-seven percent supported President Bush's decision not to involve the United States in the coup. Stances on the coup transcended party lines.

An unexpected subtheme that emerged was the concern over the Communist threat. May through July, Soviet response and threat from Communism was mentioned in 11 percent (8 of 74) of Congressional remarks. It was never mentioned after July. In 1989, the Soviet Union was declining in status as a superpower and the Cold War was coming to an end. Congressional concern over the Soviet Union early in the Panama crisis was seemingly reflexive and reminiscent of a previous mind set. The fact that concern over the Soviet Union did not emerge at all during the Haiti Intervention indicates that Congress ultimately evolved from the Cold War mind set.

Unlike the news editorials in during the Panama invasion, Congressional remarks commented on drug trafficking as an issue separate from Noriega's character.

Still, it was not a key issue. Drug trafficking was only mentioned as a main theme in 6 percent (8 of 134) of Congressional remarks, and as a subtheme in 11 percent (15 of 134) of remarks.

On the whole, Congress, like the American public, had an aversion to Noriega, and wanted him out of Panama. Democracy and multinational responsibility were key issues initially (in May), but by October they were rarely mentioned. Congress was focused on U.S. foreign policy toward Panama and procedural concerns in October, though they still thought Noriega was a vile criminal. As a whole they refrained from opinions on whether the United States should invade Panama. Congress was not even in session when President Bush made that decision. In January 1990, when they had their first chance to respond to the invasion, four remarks supported the invasion, two remarks were opposed, and one remark abstained from an opinion, simply commending the performance of the U.S. military members while carrying out their orders.

E. THE PRESIDENT ON PANAMA

On the morning following the invasion of Panama, President Bush stated the goals of the United States toward Panama had consistently been to safeguard the lives of

American citizens, defend democracy, combat drug trafficking, and protect the Panama Canal. The invasion was actually initiated, he said, in response to Noriega's attacks on U.S. citizens in Panama. He said that the United States would continue to seek answers to problems in the region through multilateral diplomacy, but in this instance diplomacy had failed. This address, delivered on the morning of December 20, 1989, was the first time the President commented on the use of military force to intervene in Panama.

The main themes of the President's remarks changed through the months preceding the invasion. In April and May, he talked about the importance of democracy, and the position of the United States toward the stolen elections. In June, he espoused the merits of the OAS and multilateral response. In August and September, he condemned Noriega. In October, he mentioned safeguarding U.S. citizens and democracy, and on the day of the invasion, he spoke of his concern for American lives.

Though the main themes shifted through the months, the subthemes in President Bush's remarks were very consistent. Democracy was mentioned as a main theme only in April and May, but as a subtheme it was present in 83 percent (10 of

12) of presidential statements--all but two press conferences in October. Safeguarding U.S. citizens did not appear as a main theme until October, but it was mentioned as a subtheme in 50 percent (6 of 12) of Presidential statements, beginning in May. Anti-Noriega sentiment was a main theme of President Bush in May, September, and August, and was a subtheme in 50 percent of his remarks.

The President actually said very little about Panama. He commented on the crisis to the press and the public on average only once a month. The exceptions were during May and October, when the Press repeatedly asked about the elections and the coup, respectively. During May there were three sessions concerning Panama and during October there were four. The possibility of U.S. invasion, however, was never mentioned. The President did not focus on drugs or the Panama Canal, and he responded to questions about the failed coup attempt only when asked. The main focus of his messages shifted over time from democracy to anti-Noriega sentiment to safeguarding U.S. citizens. Yet all three themes were consistently present in the undercurrents of his remarks and specified goals concerning the Panama crisis.

F. CONCLUSION

In all three realms of debate, public, Congressional and Presidential, initial support for multilateral action was high but declined over the months preceding the invasion. By October, the public and policy makers of the United States lost faith in the effectiveness of multilateral organizations, chiefly the OAS, at handling the Panama crisis. In the end, the United States took the matter into its own hands.

Of all the possible concerns of the United States--the Panama Canal, drug trafficking, the spread of democracy in the hemisphere--the main theme of the crisis was ousting the villain Noriega. According to U.S. national rhetoric, the proverbial last straw was Noriega's actions threatening U.S. citizens in Panama. Concern for the Canal and the future of the Canal Treaty was prevalent, but not prominent. Democracy was much the same.

Congress was preoccupied with procedures and policy. Most members refrained from taking a stance on U.S. invasion. Congress was the only body even remotely discussing the Soviet reaction to U.S. policy, and even they discussed it only early in the year.

The public was adamantly opposed to U.S. invasion and favored a global response until President Bush ordered in the troops. Then they rallied around the flag and overwhelmingly supported the invasion because the United States had to protect its citizens.

Noriega's attack on U.S. citizens was just the excuse the President needed finally to get rid of Noriega. The OAS could not or would not oust Noriega. Covert and diplomatic attempts to depose him had failed, as had the October coup by Panamanian citizens. Noriega was both an embarrassment and a threat to the United States. So the United States sent in additional troops, instated Endara as the duly elected President of Panama, and proceeded to hunt down Noriega and bring him to justice. Perhaps, if Noriega had not attacked U.S. citizens, the United States would not have responded with invasion. Perhaps it was only a matter of time before the United States became intolerant of him regardless of his threats to U.S. service members. The fervor in the national rhetoric was due to an increasing aversion to the man and his actions. Though as in years past, the chief concern was safeguarding U.S. citizens, this invasion was not strategic in nature. It was personal.

The transition period between the Cold War and the post

Cold War era altered the American view of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and the U.S. national identity. Americans were releasing their long held paradigms about the U.S. role in the world and were struggling to define new national interests. Though national rhetoric initially returned to the Soviet Union, the reaction was more reflexive than representative of a real concern. Ultimately, the United States applied the Cold War fear of threat to U.S. citizens and the American way of life to General Noriega. The U.S. national identity as the lone defender of justice in the hemisphere was initially suppressed as the United States attempted to wait for a multilateral removal of the dictator, but old concepts prevailed as the United States took matters into its own hands.

The following chapter will reveal further changes in the national rhetoric as the United States struggled to further identify its new role in a world without the balance of two opposing super powers. By 1994, the United States had reconciled with the former Soviet Union, the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It had led the United Nations in vanquishing Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Again the United States faced self-

examination. With no enemy to face, what did the United States stand for and whom did it stand against?




Figure 3.1




Figure 3.2




Figure 3.3




Figure 3.4




Figure 3.5




Figure 3.6




Figure 3.7




Figure 3.8

IV. HAITI: OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY

During the invasion of Grenada, the U.S. approach to intervention was driven by a perceived Soviet threat. During the Invasion of Panama, that perceived threat was transferred to the image of General Noriega, but the underlying themes surrounding intervention still resembled Cold War debates. The only novel concept introduced during the Panama crisis was that the United States should attempt to act in conjunction with other world organizations instead of unilaterally--a concept that was short-lived as the United States ultimately took matters into its own hands. By 1994, multilateralism had become the norm (the global community would accept nothing else) and Americans had begun to identify the United States as a team player. The 1991 Persian Gulf War served to enhance this national self-image when the United States (now more **pquarterbackp** than **plone rangerp**) led a team of U.N. forces to defeat Saddam Hussein.

This chapter illustrates national rhetoric in the post Cold War era, when American uncertainty regarding the nature of future conflicts and the role of the United States in the global community pervaded U.S. foreign policy. During the U.S. intervention in Haiti, President Clinton had to convince the American public and Congress that a) Turmoil in Haiti threatened U.S. national interests; b) the United

States had a duty to defend justice and democracy throughout the world; and c) the United States would have the assistance and support of other governments and their forces. In the case of Haiti, the U.S. public and Congress never did acknowledge a threat to U.S. national interests, and the majority of opinion opposed the intervention over the issue. An interesting phenomenon, however, occurred once the intervention was accomplished without any casualties. The country supported the President's decision regardless of national interests involved as long as no lives were lost. National rhetoric had changed since the Grenada invasion and with it changed the U.S. approach to intervention.

A. THE INVASION

On September 18, 1994, while 61 U.S. military aircraft were en route Haiti, the country's illegitimate military government talked with U.S. mediators and agreed to relinquish power. In exchange for amnesty, the military junta promised to restore the democratically elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by a military coup in 1991. U.S. Forces began arriving in Haiti on September 19, 1994 to facilitate Aristide's return. President Clinton announced the agreement in a televised address from the White House a few hours after the military

leaders had conceded to terms outlined by a U.S. triumvirate comprised of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), and General Colin Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The way was paved for a "peaceful" arrival of U.S. military forces and President Clinton had fulfilled an ultimatum delivered to Haiti's de facto government on September 15, 1994. "The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear. Your time is up. Leave now or we will force you from power."¹

The intervention was very controversial in the United States, following as it did on the heels of the failed peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Neither Congress nor the American public were prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops in a situation in which there was no threat to U.S. national interests, and in another peacekeeping mission with unclear goals. The debate surrounding the use of military force was more emotionally and politically heated than that surrounding the Grenada and Panama case studies.

This chapter examines the most recent case of U.S. intervention in Latin America (Haiti in September 1994), to identify patterns in the internal rhetoric of the U.S.

¹Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, No. 37, 1994, p. 1779.

public and policy makers. As in the previous studies, the intent is not to prove why the United States intervened, but to illustrate the different rhetoric used by the public and policy makers to justify intervention in the case of Haiti. The research design of the case study is once again laid out prior to analysis of the key arguments surrounding the intervention and the recurring main themes and subthemes of the debate.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN

The time period examined in this case study extends from February 1, 1994 through September 21, 1994. Though Haiti reemerged several times as a U.S. foreign policy issue following President Jean Bertrand Aristide's exile in 1991, the country was not viewed as a potential candidate for formal U.S. military intervention until 1994. The time period for data collection commences February 1, 1994 because February marks the first return of Haiti to U.S. headlines following the *USS Harlan County* incident in October 1993 (see Appendix C).

On October 11, 1993, the *USS Harlan County* steamed into Port au Prince, Haiti, carrying 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian military trainers. Their mission was to begin implementing the Governor's Island accord, which called for "aid in

modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and the creation of a new police force."² They were greeted by small boats blocking their appointed berth and approximately 100 armed thugs (allegedly backed by the military junta), chanting "We are going to turn this into another Somalia."³ Despite the public humiliation to the White House, the *USS Harlan County* was ordered to withdraw. The Clinton administration not consider an intervention of Haiti prudent at that time, based on lessons learned from the failed peacekeeping mission in Somalia about the difficulties involved in extricating forces following peacekeeping operations.⁴ The public soon forgot the incident and Haiti disappeared from the headlines until February 1994, when the United States attempted to negotiate a peace agreement between exiled President Aristide and the military de facto government. From February through September, the tiny country was the

²Tom Masland, "How Did We Get Here?" Newsweek, September 26, 1994, p. 27.

³Ibid., p. 28. Approximately one week prior, 18 U.S. soldiers had died in Somalia; television crews filmed a mob dragging corpses through the streets. That event led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Somalia peacekeeping mission. The United States was not desirous of a similar occurrence in Haiti.

⁴Ibid. White House views obtained through a Newsweek interview with White House Press Secretary, Dee Dee Meyers in October 1993.

object of increasing attention by the United States public and policy makers (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 depicts the number of editorials, Congressional remarks, and Presidential remarks from February 1, 1994 through the Post Intervention Period (PIP), September 21 of the same year. The completed data base, using all three sources, included 240 units of analysis comprised of 140 editorials, 185 Senate and House remarks, and 15 Presidential addresses, remarks and news conferences.

U.S. troops began landing on Haitian soil on September 19, 1994, therefore September 19-21, 1994 is referred to as the Post Intervention Period (PIP) for the purpose of examination of the rhetoric in this case study. By September 21, 1994 most military forces had arrived and the U.S. public and policy makers provided initial feedback on the intervention through editorials and congressional debates. Throughout the remainder of this chapter all dates refer to the year 1994, unless otherwise noted.

Prior to discussion of the themes found in the debate is an overview of the basic arguments surrounding the intervention. The overview does not include analysis of changes in rhetoric over time, but extracts the dominant ideas from the entire time studied. Changes in debate are

examined in detail during the discussion of main and secondary themes. The rhetoric of the U.S. public and policy makers was divided as to whether the "peaceful" deployment of troops in Haiti constituted an "invasion" or "intervention." Given the peaceful nature of the military deployment, I prefer the term "intervention" for this case study.

The Haiti intervention appeared more difficult to justify than the previous two case studies in that the issues discussed preceding the Haiti intervention were both more plentiful and more ambiguous. Eight main themes emerged to frame the debate surrounding the intervention: *national interests, democracy, credibility, refugees, sanctions, human rights, politics, and casualties.*

C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON HAITI

As with the U.S. invasion of Panama, the majority of editorials adamantly opposed U.S. military action in Haiti throughout the months preceding the intervention (see Figure 4.2). The first editorials appeared in February, but the notion of intervention was not broached by the American public until May, when the United Nations broadened sanctions and President Clinton initiated at-sea interviews for fleeing refugees. In May, most editorials still

discussed the issues surrounding Haiti--sanctions and refugees--without mentioning intervention at all. Only 23 percent (5 of 22) of editorials considered intervention a viable option; 35 percent (7 of 22) were opposed to the idea. By July, when U.S. forces began work-ups for potential operations in Haiti, 67 percent (16 of 24) of the editorials spoke out in opposition to intervention. Opposition continued through mid-September, when 50 percent (11 of 22) of the editorials maintained staunch opposition to deploying U.S. forces. Then, during the PIP, as news of the intervention flooded the networks, the public rallied behind the President; and 66 percent (19 of 29) of the editorials applauded the "bloodless" intervention.

Those opposed to the intervention primarily insisted the national interests of the United States were not threatened by turmoil in Haiti, therefore intervention was unwarranted (see Figure 4.3). The lack of U.S. national interests at stake constituted 47 percent (29 of 62) of the main themes and 50 percent (31 of 62) of the subthemes in editorials opposing the intervention. An additional 16 percent (10 of 62) of the public opposed such action on the grounds that President Clinton was merely trying to improve his political standing, and that was not a sufficient reason

for deploying U.S. troops. U.S. credibility in the region and the problems created by the influx of refugees were also cited as insufficient reasons to intervene.

Most of the editorials in favor of the intervention appeared after troops had landed and no casualties had been incurred. Thirty-one percent (16 of 51) of all pro-intervention editorials were in favor of the intervention because it was "bloodless" (see Figure 4.3). An additional 31 percent (16 of 51) supported the intervention to preserve the credibility of the U.S. role as hegemonic power in the western hemisphere. They worried that "tin horn" dictators and other world powers were not taking the United States seriously because of waffling U.S. policies. As a subtheme, credibility was mentioned by 65 percent (33 of 51) of pro-intervention editorials, 37 percent (23 of 62) of anti-intervention editorials and 26 percent (7 of 27) of those who had no opinion on whether the United States should intervene but were still concerned with the U.S. image in the world community. Twelve percent (6 of 51) of supporters for the intervention said that the sanctions imposed by the United States and world community had failed and they favored intervention as the last resort.

Three lesser themes emerged in pro-intervention and anti-intervention editorials: a) democracy; b) refugees; and c) human rights. Democracy was mentioned by 8 percent (4 of 51) of supporters as a main theme and by 31 percent (16 of 51) as a subtheme. Supporters of the intervention were in favor of "restoring" democracy that had been stolen from the Haitians by a brutal dictator. Democracy was mentioned as a main theme by 6 percent (4 of 62) and as a subtheme by 24 percent (15 of 62) of those opposed to the intervention on the grounds that democracy could not successfully be imposed on another sovereign state. They cited Haiti's long history of authoritarian regimes implying that Haiti had never known "true" democracy.

Refugees were also mentioned by pro-intervention and anti-intervention editorials usually cued by a change in the President's refugee policy. In May, President Clinton announced that for the first time, the United States would no longer directly return the "boat people," but would process them at sea, offering asylum to victims of political repression. But the White House grossly underestimated the number of Haitians who would set out to sea in response to the policy change. Instead of the 2,000 a week they had predicted, the U.S. Coast Guard by late June and early July

was rescuing between 2,000 and 3,000 a day while additional hundreds drowned.⁵ The U.S. public, particularly residents of Florida were concerned and divided on the refugee issue. Eight percent (4 of 51) of news editorials favoring intervention argued that military action was necessary to halt the flood of refugees into Florida. Almost 10 percent (6 of 62) of those opposed to the intervention argued that the U.S. refugee policy needed to be altered to provide for Haitians. They said the U.S. policy discriminated against blacks--after all, the United States was not invading Cuba to keep Hispanic refugees from reaching U.S. shores.

Human rights, like refugees, were not a major concern expressed in news editorials. Safeguarding human rights provided a justification for intervention for 8 percent (4 of 51) of supporters as a main theme and 43 percent (22 of 51) as a subtheme. Those who refrained from judgement on whether the United States should intervene expressed concern over human rights violations in 9 percent (2 of 27) of main themes and 33 percent (9 of 27) of subthemes. Opposition to U.S. intervention in Haiti did not mention human rights at all.

⁵Ibid., pp. 30-34.

D. GALLUP POLLS ON HAITI

Unlike the previous case studies, several public opinion polls were taken prior to the Haiti intervention. Strictly for commentary, I compared the Gallup polls with the news editorials from the data set. There were a few discrepancies due to the phrasing of the questions and the specific responses allowed in the Gallup Polls (see Appendix D) but the results were fairly consistent. As in the editorials, the polls found that most of the public was opposed to the intervention. Telephone interviews conducted 14-15 July indicated that even if diplomatic efforts and sanctions failed to restore a democratic government in Haiti, only 11 percent of Americans thought the United States should deploy troops. By subsequently rephrasing the question, however, the Gallup poll determined that if other countries were involved, 54 percent of the public would favor sending U.S. troops as part of a multi-national coalition. The remaining 46 percent were opposed to sending troops regardless of who else was involved.

Two months later, 14-15 September, Gallup again conducted telephone interviews prior to and immediately following President Clinton's address on 15 September. In that sample group (phoned twice), support for sending troops

as part of a multinational coalition jumped from 40 percent prior to the President's speech to 56 percent following the address. Conversely, opposition to sending the troops dropped from 49 percent before the Presidential address to 43 percent following the address. Though support for the intervention had increased, more than four in ten viewers remained unconvinced the United States should take military action in Haiti.

The difference between the news editorials and public opinion polls lay not in the reasons behind opposition and support, but in the emphasis placed on those themes. The Gallup Poll determined that, of the reasons cited in the president's 15 September address, the public supporters of the intervention found three most persuasive: a) human rights; b) refugees; and c) democracy (see Appendix D). The news editorials supporting the intervention, however, were more concerned with U.S. credibility and only mentioned the above themes as less important concerns. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents in the Gallup Poll expressed skepticism about the President's motives for deploying troops and thought at least one of his reasons was to improve his own political standing. Similar themes were found in the editorials.

The Gallup Poll results indicated the same trend of opposition to the intervention as the news editorials. Though the 43 percent opposed to military action reflected in the Gallup Poll was slightly lower than the 50 percent indicated by the news editorials, the gap between the Gallup Poll and the news editorials is misleading because the Gallup Poll stipulated an option of multilateral military action. The gap could also be increased by the propensity of individuals to submit editorials in opposition to issues more often than to support them. A consensus in silence, however, is difficult to gauge, and the similarities between the Gallup Poll results and the news editorials reinforces the validity of news editorials as a reliable data set for social constructionist purposes.

E. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON HAITI

In the realm of policy makers, support for intervention was divided along party lines. Eighty-three percent (112 of 135) of the Republicans' remarks were spoken in opposition to the intervention and 17 percent (23 of 135) voiced no opinion on whether the United States should intervene. Of the Democrats' remarks, 24 percent (12 of 50) were in favor of intervention, 30 percent (15 of 50) were opposed and 46

percent (23 of 50) voiced no opinion on the floor (see Figure 4.4).

Congressional members supporting the intervention claimed the United States had a duty to restore the stolen democracy in Haiti. Restoration of democracy was the focus of 50 percent (6 of 12) of the pro-intervention remarks as a main theme (see Figure 4.5). Thirty-three percent (4 of 12) of pro-intervention remarks commenced during the PIP, 19-21 September, only after it became apparent that no blood would be shed. The only other reason mentioned for intervening in Haiti concerned domestic politics cited in 17 percent (2 of 12) of pro-intervention remarks. Members of Congress were concerned about answering to their incumbents and to influential groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus.

Of those opposed to the intervention, 65 percent (62 of 127) said the United States had no national interests at stake (see Figure 4.5). Domestic political concerns were also mentioned as 20 percent (26 of 127) argued that intervention could not be justified to improve the political standings of the President or members of Congress. Nine percent (11 of 127) claimed intervention would not return Haiti to democracy, either because Haiti had never been

democracy, regardless of political trappings, or because democracy could not be imposed on a sovereign state at gunpoint. An additional 9 percent (11 of 127) of Congressional opposition applauded the bloodless intervention, but said that the lack of casualties still did not justify the action taken by the President.

Unlike the news editorials, Congressional remarks did not reflect an overriding concern for the credibility of the United States with the global community (see Figure 4.5). Credibility was not mentioned by any of the Congressional supporters of the intervention, though 31 percent (16 of 51) of the pro-intervention news editorials stipulated U.S. credibility as a plausible reason to deploy troops. Only 5 percent (7 of 127) of Congressional remarks opposed to the intervention focused on U.S. credibility as a main theme, claiming it was an insufficient reason to intervene. As a secondary theme U.S. credibility was consistently mentioned in an average of 20 percent to 25 percent of both pro-intervention and anti-intervention congressional remarks from May through the PIP. In July, 46 percent (13 of 28) of all Congressional remarks were concerned with U.S. credibility as a secondary issue, probably in response to the President waffling on U.S. refugee procedures.

As in the news editorials, human rights was the least cited main theme at only 1 percent (2 of 185) of the Congressional debate (see Figure 4.5). It was raised as the primary issue only once in May and once in July. As a secondary theme, it was consistently mentioned through September, but in less than 20 percent of the remarks. The exception occurred in May, when Congress referred to human rights violations in 32 percent of the remarks, probably in conjunction with the new White House policies tightening sanctions and welcoming refugees.

In Congress, the issue of refugees was mentioned as a main theme by 5 percent (6 of 127) of those opposed to the intervention, 22 percent (10 of 46) of those with no verbalized opinion on the intervention, and not at all by the Congressional remarks supporting the intervention (see Figure 4.5). The issue was discussed initially and most significantly in May in response to the Presidential decision regarding the Haitian refugee policy, then was never mentioned after July. As a secondary theme, 41 percent (76 of 185) of Congressional remarks opposed allowing incoming refugees on Florida's shores from May through PIP. Congress mentioned the discriminatory refugee policy with regard to blacks and the pressure being applied

by the Congressional Black Caucus only once in March, twice in April, and once for the final time in May.

F. THE PRESIDENT ON HAITI

Unlike President Reagan and President Bush, who remained silent on the deployment of troops prior to initiating the Grenada and Panama invasions, President Clinton mentioned possible intervention in Haiti for the first time in May, four months prior to the intervention. He expressed no further opinion regarding intervention, however, until late August when he again implied that intervention was a "viable option."⁶

The justification the President gave for the intervention focused on both the restoration of democracy and the protection of U.S. national interests (see Figure 4.6). Restoration of democracy was the focus of Presidential speeches in May and September, only. The President used democracy to sell the tightening of sanctions in May, and then to justify military action in September. Between June and August, President Clinton focused on

⁶President Clinton had actually sought and gained U.N. approval for intervention of Haiti during July 21-31, 1994. On 05 August, Congress tabled an amendment that would have mandated congressional approval of the intervention. It was not until after these events that the President's remarks to the public discussed the viability of a military option.

refugees and human rights. Democracy was not mentioned once.

National interests as used by the President included Haiti's proximity to the United States, the U.S. interest in promoting stability in the region, the interests of Haitian Americans living in the United States, and the welfare of U.S. citizens living in Haiti. The only time the President removed his focus from national interests was during July when the administration was preoccupied with finding safe havens for refugees (see Appendix C).

Unlike Presidents Reagan (Grenada) and Bush (Panama), President Clinton consistently insisted that a multilateral coalition would respond to the Haiti crisis (see Figure 4.8). He was not asking the United States to be the "Lone Ranger." He even went so far as to gain U.N. approval for the intervention before informing Congress of his decision. His placement of U.N. support over that of Congress infuriated the latter. But though the Senate and the House took floor votes and unanimously argued that the President should consult them prior to deploying troops, they failed to reach consensus over the matter of legislation, so the issue was tabled.

President Clinton responded to reporters' questions regarding Congress only when pressed. On 03 August, he stated, "I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get [Congressional approval.]" The President subsequently addressed the political tension pervading the nation in September during a news conference when he spoke positively of increasing public and Congressional support. On the day of the intervention, he remarked that he would not rule the country by a "public opinion poll."

Though President Clinton consistently touched on the arriving refugees as a secondary theme, (see Figure 4.7), he only directly addressed the issue as a main theme during a news conference in July. Even in May, when he opened the doors to the fleeing Haitians, he clothed the issue in the rhetoric of democracy. The President briefly mentioned welcoming refugees in May and June. In July and September, however, he discussed halting the influx. He never acknowledged the issue of discrimination in his policy, even to discount the charge.

Human rights violations were another minor theme in presidential remarks (see Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7). On 14 September, President Clinton elaborated on the horrendous human rights violations committed by the Haitian military

junta in a news conference. Outside of that conference, human rights violations were acknowledged only as a secondary theme in 11 of 12 Presidential remarks. President Clinton cited such violations as almost an afterthought in every month except July, when he refrained from mentioning the violations because the United States was being overrun with arriving refugees and he was attempting to effectively manage the increase.

G. CONCLUSION

The Haiti intervention occurred at a time when the United States was struggling to define its national interests and its role in the post Cold War world. As a result, the national debate was comprised of a gallimaufry of issues, any of which was given precedence at a given time. Three concerns were dominant however: 1) U.S. national interests as interpreted by the public and Congress were not clearly at stake; 2) preservation of U.S. credibility with the world community was at stake; and 3) multilateral action and authorization were overwhelmingly preferred to a unilateral response by the United States. Concern over casualties, though not specifically addressed prior to the invasion, was evidenced by the fact that the

country did not rally behind the President's decision until the intervention was accomplished without bloodshed.

According to American public opinion, as expressed by supporters of the intervention in news editorials, the United States intervened to preserve credibility in the global community, particularly in the western hemisphere. Public opposition to the intervention stemmed from the perceived lack of national strategic interests. The majority of the public opposed the intervention up to the day troops were deployed, but during the PIP, when no casualties had been incurred, they rallied behind the President. For all his questionable motives, the President was perceived as their great leader, who dispatched a diplomatic triumvirate to ensure a peaceful intervention.

The majority of Congress opposed the intervention even after it was accomplished because they, like the American public, failed to ascertain definitive U.S. national interests at stake. The few supporters of the intervention in Congress claimed the United States intervened in Haiti to restore an overthrown democratic government, though many Congressional members believed the intervention represented an attempt to remedy domestic political tension.

The President alone maintained that the United States intervened because U.S. national interests included promoting democracy and stability in the region. He led the nation "kicking and screaming" toward an unpopular intervention, then redeemed his cause at the last moment by negotiating a peaceful removal of the junta, and a return to democracy gently encouraged by the presence of U.S. forces.

Unlike the Panama invasion, multilateralism was not addressed as a main theme during the Haiti intervention. As a subtheme, however, support for multilateralism was prominent in all three realms of debate: public, Congressional, and Presidential (see Figure 4.8). As reflected in the Gallup Poll, the public was more supportive of deploying U.S. forces as part of a multilateral coalition than of unilateral U.S. military action. This sentiment was reflected in the news editorials as well. Support for multilateral action gradually increased from May through August, but took a sharp drop in September, when the news editorials were opposed to U.S. intervention in Haiti regardless of whether other nations were involved. During the PIP, support multilateralism was again high on the public agenda as they looked to U.N. forces to relieve U.S. troops occupying the island (see Figure 4.8).

Policy makers were divided on the issue of multilateralism. Congressional remarks revealed that Congress did not think the United States should intervene in Haiti in either a unilateral or multilateral form. As a subtheme multilateralism was present in less than 20 percent of Congressional remarks every month. The President, however, deliberately maintained that multilateral action was essential. From July through the PIP, President Clinton referred to a multilateral coalition in 100 percent of his remarks with the exception of August when in 50 percent (1 of 2) of the press conferences during the month, he focused only on the national interests of the United States at stake and failed to mention the preparations of the United Nations.

The concern for U.S. support and multilateral action, then, was of significant concern as a subtheme to the U.S. public and therefore to the President from the early months preceding the intervention through the PIP. The fact that multilateralism was not mentioned at all during the Grenada invasion and that initial strong support for multilateralism significantly waned during the Panama invasion indicates that the move toward multilateral action evident during the

Haiti intervention is a product of the post Cold War environment.

The discussion of credibility and domestic politics by Congress and the public stemmed from lack of confidence in the President's ability to handle foreign policy issues and lack of trust between the Congress and the President. The President knew he would have to battle a republican Congress over the intervention and probably feared being undermined when he needed their support. Congress disliked being left out of the loop and worried that President Clinton was establishing a precedent for future foreign policy decisions. The American public keyed into the tension on Capitol Hill, and that exacerbated their uncertainties.

Concern over casualties was not mentioned by the public prior to deploying troops. During the PIP, however, the lack of casualties was the primary reason for the shift of public support for the intervention. The bloodless nature of the invasion was mentioned as a main theme in 66 percent (19 of 29) and as a subtheme in 100 percent (29 of 29) of news editorials during the PIP. Congress began mentioning a concern for potential casualties in May as a reason to oppose the intervention. From May through September it represented an average of 10 percent of the main themes and

60 percent of the subthemes. Though the majority of Congress remained opposed to the intervention, 17 percent (2 of 12) of main themes and 83 percent (10 of 12) of subthemes in the remarks recorded during the PIP expressed relief at the lack of casualties incurred. The President began mentioning concern for the safety of troops on 18 September, when he announced U.S. troops were to be sent to Haiti. When he subsequently announced to the world that the intervention was successful, he focused on the fact that it was accomplished without one casualty.

A subtheme not seen in either the Grenada or Panama case studies was the concern for the financial costs of the intervention (see Figure 4.7). This theme probably emerged as a result of the severe defense budget cuts during the Clinton administration that led to a streamlining of military training and deployments. Financial costs referred to the expense involved in deploying military forces, maintaining logistical support during the occupation of Haiti, and providing financial aid packages to facilitate Haiti's return to democracy. Though the news editorials never reflected a concern for the financial burden, Congress mentioned it as a subtheme from May through the PIP in an average of 25 percent of remarks. President Clinton

mentioned the financial expense of the intervention in one third (4 of 12) of his remarks as a subtheme (see Figure 4.7). He specifically addressed the cost of a proposed AID package to Haiti at a meeting with the multinational coalition on Haiti one week prior to the intervention.

The discussion of refugees by Congress and the public was cued by Presidential speeches and policy shifts. The policy shifts were in turn influenced by lobbyists and interest groups and the appearance of red flagged words such as "racism" and "discrimination." To a lesser extent, some aspects of the rhetoric regarding refugees were born out of sentiment and fear. Sentiment stirred the hearts of the public to protest the poverty and human rights violations in Haiti and welcome the refugees. Subsequently, fear of being overrun, of a diminishing lifestyle, mobilized the public to protest the huge influx of refugees.

In summary, the trends exhibited by the rhetoric surrounding the Haiti intervention show an increasing desire to act multilaterally; to limit conflict to defending U.S. national interests; and to preserve U.S. credibility. To a lesser degree, the trends point to minimizing casualties and avoiding additional financial burdens.

The majority of the public and Congress opposed intervention until the PIP, when troops had deployed and the public rallied behind the President. The statistics gathered through the Gallup Poll indicated the U.S. public was much more willing to support the deployment of troops as part of a multi-lateral coalition, than as the sole force responsible for Haiti's welfare (see Appendix D). Aware of public sentiment, the President packaged the intervention as a joint military action. He deliberately gained the support of the United Nations and planned the diplomatic negotiations and intervention with the support of the multinational coalition on Haiti. In support of the intervention, public news editorials keyed on the importance of U.S. credibility, while Congress and the President focused on furthering democracy. Following the deployment of troops, all rhetoric focused on the lack of casualties. In opposition to the intervention, public editorials and Congress both cited the lack of national interests at stake. The President was alone in maintaining that intervention in Haiti furthered U.S. strategic interests.




Figure 4.1




Figure 4.2




Figure 4.3




Figure 4.4

Congressional Main Themes on Intervention

Percentage of Remarks




Figure 4.5

The President on Haiti

Main Themes in Presidential Remarks




Figure 4.6




Figure 4.7




Figure 4.8

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has assessed motives for U.S. intervention in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti by examining excerpts from the public, Congressional and Presidential discourse surrounding the interventions. The larger purpose of this thesis, however, is to link evolution in foreign policy to evolution in national rhetoric. The exchanges between the U.S. public, Congress, and President are significant in that they help shape the national concept of both the identity of the United States and the threats to that identity. These concepts have evolved since the Cold War and the decline of super power rivalry and resulted in a gradual alteration of U.S. foreign policy, particularly concerning intervention abroad. Prior to exploration of the implications of these changes for future policy makers is a review of the major themes extracted from the case studies and an assessment of trends in the U.S. approach to intervention.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

National rhetoric indicates that the United States conducted the Grenada invasion in 1983 to: a) protect U.S. citizens; b) curb the Communist threat; and c) aid the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). There was no discussion of multilateral action. Though U.S. public

and Congressional opposition to the invasion cited the negative response of world leadership, those who supported the invasion countered with the fact that the United States was assisting the OECS in response to the organization's request. Congress was concerned with the legality of the invasion, both with regard to international law and U.S. constitutional procedures. Some held that the United States had violated the Organization of American States (OAS) principles by intervening by force in Latin America and reverting to gunboat diplomacy. Others held that the OECS request superseded those principles. Congress was also concerned that they were not consulted prior to the invasion according to the requirements of the War Powers Act and sought retroactively to invoke the Resolution, thereby limiting the deployment of U.S. troops to 60 days. Democracy and concern for casualties were present in both the public and policy makers' debates, but not significantly so.

In 1989, during the invasion of Panama, the issues were somewhat different. During the months preceding the invasion, there was a preponderance of anti-Noriega sentiment and a desire to act in accord with the world community (ie., the OAS). With the invasion and the period

that followed, focus turned to protecting the U.S. citizens in Panama that had come under occasional attack by Noriega's thugs. Anti-Noriega sentiment transitioned into concern for protecting U.S. citizens from his regime. Multilateral diplomacy was gradually deemed ineffective at removing Noriega and was replaced by the feeling that unilateral action by the United States was the only way to get the job done. Following the Panamanian coup attempt in October, when the United States seemingly passed on a golden opportunity to assist in routing Noriega, both the U.S. public and Congress were concerned by the lack of coordination among U.S. government agencies and the lack of a unified policy. Congress immediately set to drafting an amendment giving the President the authority to deploy troops if warranted, and spent a great deal of time debating Constitutional procedures. Congress and the President mentioned democracy, but only when Noriega stole the elections in May of 1989. By the December 1989 invasion, democracy was no longer a significant issue. Concern over Soviet response also appeared in the Congressional debate prior to the invasion, but only briefly. As with Grenada, on the day of the invasion there was talk only of protecting U.S. citizens.

In September of 1994, the United States intervened in Haiti. A plethora of issues pervaded the debate surrounding the invasion but a few were key: a) whether U.S. national interests were threatened; b) whether democracy could or should be imposed on a sovereign state; c) an insistence for acting multilaterally; and d) prevention of casualties. The majority of the U.S. public and Congress opposed the intervention because they felt no national interests were at stake. The President, however, insisted that the promotion of democracy and stability in the Caribbean was directly related to U.S. national interests. Promotion of democracy was debated to a lesser degree. The President and those who supported the invasion maintained that the United States had a duty to encourage and protect fledgling democracies, particularly in the western hemisphere. Those opposed to the invasion argued that it the imposition of democracy on another state was a contradictory and impossible task.

Though never a main theme in the debate, the concern for a multilateral response was a consistent undercurrent, even through the intervention. The President insisted that the United States would not play the "Lone Ranger" in Haiti. He not only ensured that the invasion had U.N. support, he arranged for U.N. organizations to assume responsibility for

monitoring Haiti's development after U.S. troops departed the island. As early as May 1994, the public, and to a lesser degree Congress, argued that the situation in Haiti was a global responsibility that called for a multilateral response. Preventing U.S. casualties was also a major concern. Congress began mentioning it as early as May 1994, the public began in August 1994. It was largely because the intervention did not result in a single loss of life that support shifted in favor of the President's decision to deploy troops.

Additional themes debated at length during the months preceding the Haiti intervention included: a) preserving U.S. credibility with the global community; b) questioning the President's political motives for the invasion; c) debating the President's sanctions and refugee policies; and d) human rights violations. Financial costs of the intervention emerged for the first time as a concern of Congress and the President, perhaps related to defense budget cuts. This was also the first of the three case studies in which Congress was divided along party lines with regard to support for the intervention. Both parties, however, agreed on one issue--the President should have consulted them before he deployed U.S. troops.

Though each of the interventions involved issues specifically related to the incidents such as anti-Noriega sentiment with Panama and refugee policies with Haiti, some general trends can be traced through the case studies. Table 1 summarizes differences in emphasis from the Grenada invasion during the Cold War to the Haiti intervention of the post Cold War era. The number of "X's" in each row indicates impressionistically the relative emphasis of the various topics.

U.S. RHETORIC ON INTERVENTION			
Contrast Between Emphasis			
	Cold War (Grenada)	Transition (Panama)	Post Cold War (Haiti)
U.S. Citizens	XXX	XX	X
Communist Threat	XXX	X	
Multilateral Response (Coalition Building)	X	XX	XXX
Democracy	X	XX	XXX
National Interests			XXX
U.S. Procedure (Congress only)	XXX	XXX	XXX
U.S. Credibility	X	X	XX
Casualties	X	X	XXX
Human Rights			XX
Financial Costs			X

Table 1.

Rhetoric indicates a shift away from fear of Soviet threat and concern for the safety of U.S. citizens living abroad. The Soviet Union was a major factor defining U.S. foreign policy. The threat-driven approach to intervention was understood by the public and policy makers alike. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is less, if any, consensus about U.S. foreign policy priorities. The shift away from concern for U.S. citizens depicted in Table 1 is misleading because there has been no recent threat to U.S. citizens. The United States has typically justified invasions by acting to protect its citizens and there is no reason to doubt this trend will continue.

Absence of a threat-driven approach to intervention has created a need to find a new consensus on when and where to intervene. Hence the new emphasis during the Post Cold War on U.S. national interests, a term vaguely defined at best and completely subject to interpretation and debate. The increasing concern for promoting democracy and safeguarding human rights are partly a result of this attempt to define national interests and the U.S. role in the world. Rhetoric also indicates a shift in favor of multilateral response. During the Panama invasion, multilateralism was attempted, but gradually disregarded as ineffective by the public and

policy makers. During the post Cold War period, multilateralism has become a political reality.

Concurrent with multilateral responsibility and role definition for the United States is a growing concern for U.S. credibility, both with its allies and with upstart dictators. Previously, neither the U.S. public nor policy makers gave much thought to how the United States was viewed in the world. The U.S. role as a balancing superpower was understood and respected, at least by those in the United States. Congress remains very aware of its role in U.S. policy and continues to debate U.S. procedure with regard to deploying troops. In all three of the case studies Congress fumed over not being consulted by the President and debated whether to invoke the War Powers Resolution. This will no doubt continue.

An additional shift that is very significant for intervention is the increasing lack of tolerance by the U.S. public and Congress (who must answer to constituents) for casualties. During the Cold War, there was concern for U.S. casualties when crises like the Iranian hostage situation and the Beirut bombing brought them to the forefront. But the increasing intolerance for even a single loss of life has only developed during recent years. During the post

Cold War period there has even risen a concern for minimizing opposition casualties that could yield a myriad of political and military ramifications.

Finally, with the Haiti intervention surfaced a concern for financial costs of deploying military forces and participating in nationbuilding activities abroad. As the United States contends with an increasingly unacceptable national deficit, military deployments will be streamlined. Inevitable defense budget cuts will likely result in the increasing emergence of financial costs as another main theme in future debates on foreign intervention.

B. ASSESSMENT OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

As earlier stated, this thesis attempts to assess the motives for U.S. intervention in Latin America by linking internal rhetoric to military intervention. Internal rhetoric alone, however, will neither fully explain nor predict the actions the United States chooses to take in its foreign policy.

Social constructionism, while linking internal rhetoric to U.S. foreign policy decisions, does not account for variables external to the United States that encourage intervention. External variables, such as General Austin's imposition of a "shoot on sight" curfew in Grenada, General

Noriega's attacks on U.S. service members, and the Haitian military junta's abandonment of the Governor's Island accord influenced both the rhetorical debates and U.S. policy regarding those countries. Events elsewhere in the world may also affect U.S. policy toward a particular region. Seemingly unrelated events can alter national agendas. The Somalia peacekeeping mission may have delayed U.S. military action by: a) taking precedence over the Haiti situation; and b) leaving the United States loathe to later enter a similar ambiguous conflict. The Bosnia-Herzegovina hostilities, on the other hand may have represented conflicts the United States was seeking to avoid by becoming preoccupied with the Haiti invasion.

The *social constructionist* approach also fails to consider pressures from the global community through organizations such as the United Nations or through multinational business organizations. These pressures will become increasingly effective as the trend toward multilateralism continues. Finally, the approach fails to account for surreptitious variables that may have influenced foreign policy, to include the hidden agendas of policy makers who link political issues together to achieve an obscure goal.

The importance of *social constructionism* lies in its ability to reveal how the American public and policy makers are *framing* the issues of foreign policy--the reality they are constructing through their debates. The piece of information on which the public and policy makers choose to focus is significant because their perceptions and reactions will influence foreign policy decisions.

Sometimes this influence is part of a cyclical relationship involving "real" events. In Haiti, for example, there was a feedback loop between U.S. national rhetoric and external response. The initially verbalized support for democracy and fleeing refugees (as well as pressure from political groups) caused the President to alter U.S. refugee policy toward Haiti which spurred a flood of refugees into Florida. The incoming masses contributed to a shift in national rhetoric from democracy and welcoming refugees and to a focus on national interests, which included preventing refugees from reaching American territory. The feedback loop represented by this one example will likely grow more prevalent as future policy makers seek to build a national consensus prior to intervention.

Whether the public and policy makers debate different issues is significant, as is the relationship between the debate and real world events. The result of such research is more than a commentary on a changing society. An understanding of society's beliefs and concerns and how they are changing can aid political strategists in framing issues to gain public support and influence decisions of key policy makers.

In conjunction with the *social constructionist* approach, the content analysis method of analyzing the debates also fails to account for the external variables that do not appear in editorials and remarks. Though subjective articles such as editorials are straightforward in their messages, analyst interpretation can not help but influence coding. The main themes and subthemes were drawn from the articles rather than imposed on them, but the selection of themes is subject to a certain amount of interpretation. Additionally, the binary method of coding the subthemes as present "1", or not present "0", does not allow for further differentiation between the subthemes that could be included in a grading scheme of "1 - 5." The binary method, however, simplifies the coding and leaves less to the interpretation of the analyst.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY

If the rhetoric surrounding the three case studies is to be considered, then future U.S. policy makers must contend with an intervention policy chained by a) multilateralism; b) vague, evolving national interests; c) obstructionist Congressional procedures; and d) an intolerance for casualties.

Though the United States still accepts leadership in coalitions and multinational peacekeeping missions, unilateral action by the United States is no longer acceptable to either the U.S. public or the world community. It is significant that the "assertive multilateralism" representative of the early Clinton administration has been replaced by "cautious" multilateralism, not by unilateralism as has happened during earlier administrations. This move toward multilateral action (or at least authorization) as the norm has become a political fact of life in the post Cold War world.¹

In addition to multilateralism, Presidents will always have to contend with a Congress that demands an active role

¹Linton F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter (eds), U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1994) pp. 129-30.

in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when that policy involves deploying U.S. troops. Following each intervention, Congress has attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to invoke the War Powers Resolution and has used it to apply pressure on the President to bring U.S. troops home.

Finally, the current nature of U.S. national interests is so vague and subject to interpretation that policy makers would benefit by clearly delineating issues and objectives with regard to intervention as soon as possible. This would help guide the public debate and facilitate consensus building. The "rally around the flag" phenomenon during the Post Invasion Period (PIP) is still present, and will likely continue if casualties are kept to a minimum.

The internal rhetoric surrounding the three most recent interventions in Latin America contributes to an understanding of the internal variables affecting U.S. foreign policy. Alone, the information is incomplete, but when combined with analysis of the external variables that affect the actions of states, the results are a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy and an insight into the nature of interventions in the post Cold War world.

APPENDIX A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF GRENADA:

- 1979 Mar 13 - Grenada's Prime Minister Eric Gairy overthrown in bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop, who assumed position; constitution suspended; a People's Revolutionary Government known as the New Jewel Movement (NJM) established.
- Apr 16 - U.S. State Department threatened curtailment of aid to Grenada if Bishop continued close relations with Cuba.
- Nov 17 - Bishop announced project to build new airport with Cuba; U.S.-Grenada relations further deteriorated.
- 1980 May - Deputy Prime minister Bernard Coard visited Soviet Union.
- Nov - Ronald Reagan elected U.S. President.
- 1982 Apr - Reagan addressed Bishop's Cuban and Soviet relations with Caribbean prime ministers.
- Jul - Bishop again visited the Soviet Union.
- 1983 Mar 23 - Reagan cited Soviet buildup in national televised address and showed reconnaissance photos of Soviet-sponsored airport under construction in Grenada.
- Apr 27 - Reagan addressed joint session of Congress and mentions Grenada and its potential for becoming key link for Soviet-Cuban and terrorist activities in Caribbean and Central America.
- May, Jun - Bishop visited Washington D.C. and tried to meet with Reagan who refused. Bishop instead met with National Security Advisor William Clark and low-level State-Department personnel.
- Aug 25 - IMF approved \$14.1 million loan for Grenada, over U.S. opposition.

- Sep 27 - NJM Central Committee members passed resolution to split Bishop's duties with Bernard Coard.
- Oct 08 - Bishop departed Grenada for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with a return stopover in Cuba.
- Oct 10 - The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, announced dates for public hearings on a new constitution being drafted by a special commission headed by Trinidad lawyer, Alan Alexander.
- Oct 12 - Rumors circulated that Bernard Coard and his wife were trying to kill Bishop; streets of St. George's empty as rumor spreads. Bishop, asked to relieve tension, denied rumor on radio.
- Oct 13 - Meeting held to discuss joint leadership issue; Bishop accused of initiating rumor, expelled from NJM for refusing to share power with Coard and placed under house arrest.
- Oct 14 - Rumors of an attempted coup in Grenada swept the Caribbean. Information Minister Selwyn Strachan announced at noon that Bishop was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. At 1530, government radio announced Coard's resignation.
- Oct 15 - Kendrick Radix, Minister of Agriculture, led a rally urging crowd to support Bishop, and resigned as minister; arrested along with several others.
- Oct 18 - General Hudson Austin, Grenada's army commander, gave account of events leading up to crisis on Grenada State Radio. Unison Whiteman Announced resignation of five ministers, including himself; students protested--"No Bishop, No School."

- Oct 19 - Bishop rescued from House arrest by supporters, but is subsequently killed by soldiers along with five other prominent NJM members. Revolutionary Military Council led by General Hudson Austin assumed leadership of Grenada. Twenty-four hour "shoot on sight" curfew imposed through Oct 24.
- Oct 21 - The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met in emergency conference in Barbados to discuss Grenada situation; leaders decided on invasion.
U.S. Marines and 10 ship task force rerouted from en route Lebanon to Grenada.
- Oct 22 - OECS formally requested U.S. and Britain's participation in invasion. U.S., Canadian, and British diplomatic officials flew to St. George's to investigate status of their nationals in Grenada and to assess situation.
- Oct 22-23 - Caribbean Community (Caricom) heads of government met in Port of Spain, Trinidad, to discuss Grenada situation. Diplomatic and trade sanctions imposed against Grenada.
- Oct 25 - **U.S. Marines and Rangers and a small force from six Caribbean states invaded Grenada.** U.S. Press banned from location for alleged security reasons.
- Oct 26 - U.S. troops opened Pearls airport and evacuated U.S. citizens (approximately 500 U.S. medical students).
- Oct 31 - Press ban lifted; U.S. military conducted daily escort trips for Press from Barbados.
- Nov 04 - U.S. Government released press copies of Arms Pact Agreements between Grenada, Soviets, Cuba, and North Korea.
- Nov 15 - Interim government of Grenadian technocrats appointed to guide Grenada until elections are held.

Sources: Schraeder, Peter J. (ed). Intervention into the 1990's. (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.)
Additional information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts on File and Congressional Quarterly.

APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF PANAMA

- 1987 Jun 06 - Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera confessed to his own crimes on behalf of the regime and charged Noriega with electoral fraud, drug trafficking, and Hugo Spadafora's (Panamanian Activist) murder. The PDF was split. Unprecedented public protest ensued.
- Jun 27 - The Panamanian Senate passed resolution 239, calling on Noriega et al to step down pending investigation, and expressed support for the restoration of democracy.
- Jun - President Reagan's administration supported popular nonviolent opposition to Noriega through the National Endowment for Democracy and unofficial contacts with various leaders.
- Aug-Nov - Retired Admiral Daniel J. Murphy attempted a private "back channel" mission to negotiate Noriega's resignation. The mission failed.
- Dec - Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Richard Armitage, met with Noriega to strongly support Noriega's graceful departure from power.
- 1988 Jan - U.S. worked through Panamanian official and advisor to Noriega, Jose Blandon to outline Noriega's phased return to the barracks. Noriega rejected the plan.
- Feb - U.S. issued indictments against Noriega (drugs).
- Feb 28 - Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle was impeached after trying to fire Noriega.
- Mar 16 - U.S. supported coup attempt defeated. Officers were imprisoned.

- Apr-May 25 - Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak attempted negotiations with Noriega, (agreeing to drop indictments), and failed. U.S. enacted sanctions.
- 1989 May 07 - Panama's election monitored by outside observers.
- May 09 - President Bush denounced the election as fraudulent and called on Noriega to resign.
- May 10 - Panamanian Government annulled the election, claiming foreign interference.
- May 11 - President Bush ordered 20,000 additional troops to Panama, and recalled the U.S. Ambassador to Panama. All service members and their families in Panama were moved onto military bases.
- Jun/Aug - U.S. supported multilateral negotiations, but the OAS failed to reach consensus among Panamanian government, opposition, and military.
- Aug 08 - U.S. arrested 29 armed Panamanians in a restricted area during a military exercise in Panama.
- Aug 09 - PDF detained two U.S. servicemen. U.S. troops closed a combined U.S.-Panamanian Base until their release.
- Sep 01 - Francisco Rodriguez sworn in as president of Panama. Rodriuez, a friend of Noriega was nominated by the Council of State after efforts to form a transitional coalition government failed. President Bush refused to recognize the new government and called for stricter sanctions.
- Oct 03 - Second PDF coup (passively supported by U.S.) failed. Participants were executed.

- Dec 15 - Noriega appointed "Maximum Leader of the struggle for national liberation" by Panama's National Assembly. The Assembly also declared Panama in a "state of war" against the U.S.
- Dec 16 - First Lt Robert Paz, U.S. Marine Corps, died from wounds received when a car carrying four U.S. soldiers was fired upon as it ran a PDF roadblock near U.S. military Headquarters. Two U.S. witnesses to that event, a Navy officer and his wife were brutally interrogated by the PDF.
- Dec 17 - A U.S. Army Lt. (thinking he was about to be fired upon) shot a Panamanian policeman near Military headquarters. Washington interpreted these events as a pattern of escalated threats to U.S. personnel. **President Bush gave the order to implement Operation Just Cause.**
- Dec 19 - U.S. conducted nighttime invasion with approximately 13000 troops in addition to those permanently stationed in Panama.
- Dec 23 - U.S. deployed 2,000 additional troops.
- Dec 24 - Noriega took refuge at Catholic ambassadorial residence in Panama City.
- 1990 Jan 04 - Noriega surrendered to U.S. officials.

Sources: Schraeder, Peter J. (ed). Intervention into the 1990's. (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.) John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 1. Additional information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts on File and Congressional Quarterly.

APPENDIX C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF HAITI

- 1990 Dec 16 - Populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide won Haiti's presidential election in a landslide.
- 1991 Sep 30 - Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a bloody coup led by Gen. Raoul Cedras. OAS imposed sanctions against Haiti.
- 1992 May 24 - President Bush deployed the Coast Guard to intercept and repatriate Haitian "boat people." Presidential Candidate Clinton criticized Bush's policy, saying he would "try to turn up the heat and try to restore the elected government and let the refugees stay here."
- 1993 Jun 14 - President-elect Clinton reversed opinion and announced that he would continue Bush's policy of repatriating fleeing Haitians.
- Jun 16 - U.N imposed oil and arms embargo against Haiti.
- Jul 03 - Haitian leaders met under U.S. auspices at Governor's Island and agreed to restore Aristide and the elected government by October 30, 1993.
- Oct 11 - Armed Haitians prevented U.S. and Canadian engineers aboard the *USS Harlan County* from coming ashore at Port-au-Prince to aid in reconstruction projects called for under the Governors Island Agreement.
- Oct 21 - The Senate rejected an attempt to prohibit defense appropriations from being spent on an invasion of Haiti unless U.S. citizens are at risk. The Senate approved a sense of the Senate amendment that all military activities in Haiti should have prior approval from Congress unless there is an imminent risk to U.S. citizens in Haiti.

- Oct 30 - Aristide remained in exile in the United States.
- Nov - President Clinton sent six warships to the area to enforce U.N. sanctions reimposed following the violation of the Governor's Island Accord.
- 1994 Feb 15 - U.S. urged Aristide to embrace peace plan by parliament calling on Aristide to name a prime minister to form a broad-based government. The hoped for result was that Cedras would resign and parliament would grant amnesty to the military leaders. Aristide refused in a split with the White House.
- Feb 20 - At least five Haitian Refugees drowned en route Florida.
- Feb 28 - U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 141 Haitian refugees, forcing them to disembark their unsafe boat in international waters.
- Mar 02 - Aristide criticized U.S. immigration policy to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
- Mar 10 - Three Aristide supporters were shot in Miami, Florida. Year total of people killed by military in Haiti reached seventy.
- Mar 23 - U.S. Congressional Black Caucus called upon President Clinton to adopt an 11-point program that included political-asylum hearings for Haitians in international waters, and the resignation of Lawrence Pezullo, Clinton's special envoy to Haiti. Called Clinton's current policy "racist."
- Apr - Haitian military increased repression and terrorist tactics. U.N. human rights monitors reported 112 summary executions since Jan 31.

- Apr 11 - Florida Governor sued the U.S. government for reimbursement of expenses spent on social services spent on illegal immigrants in the state, many of whom were from Haiti.
- Apr 12 - Randall Robinson, director of TransAfrica, began hunger strike to protest U.S. policy.
- Apr 21 - Six House Democrats were arrested for staging a protest sit-in at the front of the White House.
- Apr 22 - U.S. Coast Guard intercepted over 400 Haitians in a wooden freighter in U.S. territorial waters and escorted them ashore in Florida. The refugees were held in custody by immigration officials because of an outbreak of violence on board the Haitian ship.
- May 06 - U.N. broadened Haiti embargo to halt private aircraft travel and all goods to Haiti except food, medicine and cooking fuels. Embargo went into effect on May 22, 1994.
- May 08 - Pres. Clinton set new asylum policy to include at-sea political-asylum interviews of Haitians in international waters. William H. Gray replaced Lawrence Pezullo as the special envoy to Haiti.
- May 11 - Defiant military junta appointed Emile Jonaissant provisional president.
- Jun 10 - Political Asylum interviews continued at sea and at safe havens. President Clinton cut off U.S. commercial flights to Haiti and tightened other sanctions.
- Jun 28 - Clinton re-opened the refugee processing station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to process Haitian refugees.
- Jul 04 - Additional 150 refugees drowned en route Florida.

- Jul 06 - As thousands of Haitians took to the seas, Clinton announced that only those who applied for asylum from offices in Haiti would be allowed in the United States. Boat people would be returned or taken to safe havens.
- Jul 07 - U.S. forces, including 2,000 marines stationed off the shores of Haiti reportedly practiced for invasion. Panama withdrew as a candidate for safehaven.
- Jul 11 - Junta ordered Human Rights monitors out of Haiti.
- Jul 21 - Clinton sought U.N. approval for invasion of Haiti. Authorization granted July 31, 1994.
- Aug 05 - The Senate tabled an amendment that would have mandated congressional approval before invading Haiti.
- Aug 28 - Approximately 20 U.S. military police and 45 Haitian refugees sustained injuries during a four-hour long altercation at Guantanamo Bay refugee processing center.
- Sep 15 - Clinton issued televised ultimatum to Haitian dictators during national address: "Leave now or we will force you from power."
- Sep 18 - The Carter delegation met with the Haitian military leaders who agreed to relinquish power. Military aircraft were dispatched en route Haiti. Clinton announced the agreement in a national address.
- Sep 19 - U.S. forces began arriving in Haiti.
- Sep 20 - Additional 1800 U.S. marines landed in Cap-Haitien.

Source: Information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts on File and Congressional Quarterly.

APPENDIX D. GALLUP POLL SURVEY QUESTIONS

July 15-17, 1994:

1) Question: "Next on the country of Haiti...if all other diplomatic efforts, including economic sanctions, fail to restore a democratic government in Haiti, which of the following do you think the United States should do to reach that goal: Send U.S. military troops to Haiti, but only if other countries participate with the United States; send U.S. military troops to Haiti, regardless of whether or not other countries participate with the United States, or do you think the United States should not send military troops to Haiti at all, in order to restore a democratic government there?"

Response: Send troops with others - 43%; Do not send troops - 41%; send troops unilaterally - 11%; no opinion - 5%.

September 14-15, 1994:

1) Question: "Here are some reasons President Clinton has given for sending U.S. troops to Haiti. Please tell me whether you think it is worth sending U.S. troops to Haiti for each of the following reasons, or not.

First,...Next,...(RANDOM ORDER)

a. "To stop the abuse of human rights by the current government in Haiti."

Response: Worth it - 67%; not - 31%; no opinion - 2%.

b. "To reduce the flow of Haitian refugees to the U.S."

Response: Worth it - 56%; not - 43%; No opinion - 1%.

c. "To promote democracy in Latin America by restoring the democratically elected government in Haiti."

Response: Worth it - 55%; not - 43%; no opinion 2%.

d. "To maintain U.S. credibility in the world by carrying out Clinton's pledge to remove the current military government in Haiti."

Response: Worth it - 40%; not - 58%; no opinion - 2%.

2) Question: "If all other diplomatic efforts, including economic sanctions, fail to restore a democratic government in Haiti, do you think the United States should send military troops to Haiti along with troops from other countries, or should the United States not send military troops to Haiti at all?"

Response: (Sep 14, pre-speech), Send troops - 40%; do not send troops - 48%; other - 1%; no opinion - 12%.

Response: (Sep 15, post-speech), Send troops - 56%; do not send troops - 41%; other - 1%; no opinion - 2%.

3) Question: "In general, did you find the arguments President Clinton made for sending U.S. troops to Haiti very convincing, somewhat convincing, not very convincing or not at all convincing?"

Response: Very convincing - 27%; somewhat convincing - 39%; not very convincing - 17%; not at all convincing - 16%; no opinion - 1%.

4) Question: "If Clinton is going to send U.S. troops to Haiti, do you think he should first get approval from Congress, or do you not think so?"

Response: Get approval - 63%; approval not necessary - 35%; no opinion - 2%.

5) Question: "If Bill Clinton does send troops into Haiti, do you think improving his own political standing will be his main reason for sending U.S. troops to Haiti, one of his reasons; or not one of his reasons?"

Response: Main reason - 14%; one reason - 44%; not a reason - 41%; no opinion - 1%.

6) Question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States has interests in Haiti that are worth protecting by sending U.S. troops to that country."

Response: Agree - 44%; disagree - 51%; no opinion - 5%.

Sources: David W. Moore, "America Hesitant About War in Haiti," The Gallup Poll Monthly, July 1994, pp. 30-31, and David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, "After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor of Haiti Invasion," Gallup Poll Monthly, September 1994, pp. 16-17.

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