

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



## THESIS

**AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS: WHO'S WINNING?**

By

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December 1995

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19960415 077

DEED QUALITY INSPECTED 1

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 1995	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS: WHO'S WINNING?	5. FUNDING NUMBERS
---	--------------------

6. AUTHOR(S) Diaz, Mary L.	
-------------------------------	--

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
--	--

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
---	--

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
---	------------------------

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

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This work concludes that the current drug war is failing. The emphasis (supply or demand) and the methodology (interdiction, etc.) need to be reconsidered; and, a new plan which has the support of political and enforcement leadership must be made--its objectives should be made clear, and its goals should be meaningful, measureable and achievable.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Counter-drug War, Narco-terrorism, Military involvement in drug war.	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 150
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR
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
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of


**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**


from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..... 139

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recently, Congress, the literary community, and the public at large have come to reconsider the war on drugs. There are many opinions regarding alternatives to this pseudo war or new measures to be taken in the war effort (such as medicalization and legalization), but the ongoing effort itself has escaped evaluation (to determine if the United States is winning this campaign).

Pharmaceutical treatments have thus far been unsuccessful in solving the addiction problem, therefore medicalization is not the likely solution. This approach, in fact, would further tax an already over-taxed medical system. While legalization squashed the profitability and allure of bootlegging in the post-prohibition era, the U.S. is not prepared to embrace it as a solution to the drug problem. Consequently, counter-drug efforts continue to follow the same basic course of action (with occasional modifications which do not significantly alter the overall effort).

From the prevailing attitudes, it seems that, like Vietnam, nobody wants to fight in this war and, it seems, nobody wants to win it (if winning is possible).

The intent of this thesis, then, is to explore the objectives of the war on drugs, and to determine if America is winning.

The biggest question posed by this thesis is "who's winning?" the drug war. On the whole, I would have to say that the drug traffickers are winning. They remain flexible and innovative which precludes them from getting bogged down in the same strict constraints which inhibit U.S. efforts.

This work concludes that the current drug war is failing. The emphasis (supply or demand) and the methodology (interdiction, etc.) need to be reconsidered; and, a new plan which has the support of political and enforcement leadership must be made--its objectives should be made clear, and its goals should be meaningful, measureable and achievable.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Congress has expressed the desire, in a recent budget proposal, to cut the counter-drug budget.<sup>1</sup> Over the past decade, the U.S. has actively participated in the war on drugs, but there are no clear indicators that we are winning this war. From this, I have drawn the conclusion that as far as Congress is concerned we are not winning the war on drugs so let's get out. If this is the case, then, they are not alone. Walter Cronkite recently spoke out against the drug war, saying, as others have said, that it "is a failure."<sup>2</sup> Judge James P. Gray, a California trial judge, concurs.<sup>3</sup>

Does building more prisons indicate that law enforcement is succeeding? Law enforcement is arresting more people, daily, on drug-related matters. More drug kingpins are turning themselves in than ever before, and a lot of drugs have been seized since war was declared on drugs. But, interdiction itself has such a small impact that it's seen by drug traffickers as just another cost of doing business. And, increasingly, new members join the

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<sup>1</sup>Reducing The Defecit, p.200. DOM-58 discusses reducing funding for Law Enforcement efforts to control illegal drugs.

<sup>2</sup>Hilton, p.4D. In this article, Hilton reviews a Discovery Channel episode featuring Walter Cronkite. Cronkite draws a comparison between the war on drugs and Vietnam.

<sup>3</sup>Gray, J.P., p.1.

drug game, taking the place of those who have surrendered, been arrested or killed.

The drug war as a whole is fraught with problems which stem from ill defined, amorphous objectives; politization of efforts and results; difficulty in identifying the enemy; too many chiefs; conflicting intelligence estimates; lack of sufficient prior planning and mobilization; and the setting of constraints in Washington (restrictive rules of engagement) which tie the hands of the field commander and preclude capture and or eradication efforts from succeeding.

As was the case in Vietnam, "the national behavior [has shown] a tendency to premature war-weariness and precipitate disenchantment with a policy which [has resulted in] a stalemated war."<sup>4</sup> From the prevailing attitudes then, it seems that, like Vietnam, nobody wants to fight in this war and, it seems, nobody wants to win it (if winning is possible).

The intent of this thesis is to explore the objectives of the war on drugs, and to determine if we are, indeed, losing this pseudo war. In doing so, I will attempt to answer the following questions: How do we measure success in this war? How do we objectively define failure? What are the indicators of success/failure? Additionally, the

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<sup>4</sup>Summers, p.39.

role of Congress, the military, the press, the public, and law enforcement in the success/failure of the pertinent policies will be reviewed.

This is an important area of study because it could serve to re-direct the course of action taken in the war on drugs. If nothing else, perhaps it will open a few eyes to the realities of the drug war and prompt the establishment of an investigative committee which could further study this war and alternatives to it.

## **B. BACKGROUND**

What drives the military's involvement in drug interdiction? In the brief study, which follows, I have stipulated a model for (see Figure 1.1), and examined the development of, the military's counter-narcotic role. It aids in the understanding of the driving forces behind military involvement in counter-narcotics operations and the existing risk to U.S. economic and political stability. The study will illustrate that it was in answer to public outcry, in all levels of society, that the national government declared illegal drugs to be a threat to national security. Later developments resulted in the military being assigned the lead agency role in detection and monitoring.

**Driving Forces Model:**




Figure 1.1

An increase in narcotics flowing into the United States drives an increase in drug use/crime.<sup>5</sup> This leads to public outcry which causes local and state governments to increase their attempts to thwart the drug problem and leads to increased complaints to, and requests for assistance from, the national government. This, in turn, drives national policy and forces policy-makers to declare a "war on drugs" (as a risk to national security) thereby enabling the use of national assets (the military) to combat this scourge. Allowing for non-linearity, public outcry could also be viewed as a driver of national policy (in the form of Political Action Committees) and a driver of drug use, in so far as some people use illegal drugs in rebellion against public opinion. In this same manner, national policy and

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<sup>5</sup>Johnson, B., p.187. A study done by Johnson, Wish, and Anderson (narcotic and drug researchers) illustrates the drug-crime linkage where the "income from specific crime events [were shown to have been] primarily expended upon drugs, particularly expensive drugs."

local/state reaction interacts with drug use/crime. Since drug use and crime increases are perceived by the national government as a threat to national security, interaction between these variables is obvious. Reaction at the local and state level is also affected by the policies put into action by the federal government (ie. new anti-drug laws to be enforced at the local and state government levels). Public outcry may also occur in response to national policies which require public involvement in combating the drug problem (ie. aid to rehabilitation programs). For ease in collecting statistics, however, a linear relationship (which best expresses the relationship between the variables) is assumed.

A factor which shall be controlled for is military availability. When the military is not otherwise engaged (ie. not involved in a protracted armed conflict, such as World War II, Korea, or Vietnam) it is available for new non-traditional missions--would even volunteer for them--and is, therefore, available for use in domestic issues otherwise handled by other agencies (such as drug interdiction normally handled by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)). Consequently, military availability is assumed to be a constant. Additionally, this study addresses the concepts of drug use and public outcry as driving forces

behind military involvement without exploring the behavioral factors which prompt drug use or public outcry.

In 1981, legislation was enacted which authorized the military to loan equipment and support to law enforcement agencies involved in anti-drug work. President Ronald Reagan recognized that the violence and corruption accompanying the drug business tends to destabilize source, transit, and demand countries, and on April 8, 1986, he signed a National Security Directive designating the international drug trade as a national security issue.<sup>6</sup>

The drug problem is evident even in our nation's capital. Washington D.C.'s anti-drug program conducts about 70,000 drug screens per year, testing each sample for five drugs.<sup>7</sup> Thirty percent of the juvenile arrestees in D.C., over seventy percent of the adult arrestees, and even higher numbers of probationers, have drug problems.<sup>8</sup> Seventy-two percent of the juveniles testing positive, and sixty-six percent of the adults, are positive for cocaine.<sup>9</sup> The outcry which these facts prompt is, perhaps, best represented by a statement given before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee by Fred B. Ugast, Chief Judge--Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

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<sup>6</sup>Mabry, p.3.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Senate Review, p.146.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.146.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p.146.

Drugs and violence appear to be overwhelming the justice systems of our nation's major cities. Although I would agree that each city has the responsibility for responding to its own emergency situations, I would submit that no city is capable of responding alone to the drug crisis we are all facing. The federal government must share in the funding of a comprehensive and coordinated response to the problem.<sup>10</sup>

In April 1988, the House Armed Services Committee announced, and began, a fundamental re-examination of the role of the military in drug interdiction. This was followed, in 1989, by a congressional declaration that illicit drug trafficking was a threat to national security. 1989 legislation assigned the Department of Defense (DOD) responsibility for detection and monitoring. Consequently, joint task forces were formed that included U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, aircraft and personnel dedicated to stopping the influx of illegal drugs into our country.<sup>11</sup> In keeping with the military's lead agency role for detection and monitoring, 1990 legislation stipulated that the DOD could operate equipment to intercept vessels or aircraft detected outside the United States in order to identify and communicate with suspect vessels or aircraft, and direct them to proceed to locations designated by the appropriate civilian agencies.<sup>12</sup> The 1990 expanded role remains in effect.

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.145.

<sup>11</sup>DON, p.23.

<sup>12</sup>GAO, p.15.

To test the driving forces model, an observation plan was set up for a twelve year time span (1980 to 1992). Rather than measure all of the variables, only four were chosen for measurement. The bold print, in this section, indicates the variables which were chosen for measurement (primarily due to the availability of data). (see Table 1 of Appendix A)

**Drug Flow** = (Drugs seized / Drug imports)<sup>13</sup>

**% Drug Crime** = (Drug related crime / Total crime)<sup>14</sup>

**Public Outcry** = (Drug related editorials / Total editorials)<sup>15</sup>

Local/State Reaction = (Drug enforcement resources / Total resources)

New National Policy = (Drug related policy debates/TTL policy debates)

**Military Involvement** = (DOD Drug budget / Total DOD budget)<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Three different sources were required to gather this data. Data for 1980, 1987, and 1988 was unavailable. The figures for drugs seized and imported for 1981 through 1985, and drugs seized for 1986, were obtained from Reuter, Peter, p.66 &74. The figures for drugs imported in 1986 were obtained from GAO, p.39. Finally, the figures for drugs seized and imported from 1989 through 1992 were obtained from ONDCP.

<sup>14</sup>Crime statistics were gathered from The Statistical Abstract of the United States and The World Almanac, examining the total number of drug arrests per subject year as compared to the total number of arrests for each year.

<sup>15</sup>The New York Times Index was used for indicators of public outcry. The number of drug-related editorials was matched against the total number of editorials.

<sup>16</sup>Figures for the DOD drug budget were taken from OMB, p.10-30 and Reuter. Figures for the total DOD budget were gathered from the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress.

Data analysis consisted of two multiple regression analyses using the drug flow, % drug crime, and public outcry variables (independent variables) against military involvement (dependent variable). The difference between the two multiple regressions is the time period considered (to focus on the difference, if any, between the years before and the years after the military became actively involved in the drug war). A simple regression analysis was done to test the relationship between drug crime and public outcry. Additionally, using the ANOVA bar plot function, these four variables were evaluated by each year.

Results of the driving forces study: Interpretation of the multiple regression (see Appendix A) suggests that the relationships between drug flow, % drug crime, public outcry, and military involvement are due to chance. However, given other research and literature, I believe that the hypothesis is still correct. Given that the military initially became involved in the drug war in the 1985 to 1989 time frame, the periods from 1980 to 1989 on the independent variables are the most significant when answering the question "what drives the military's involvement in drug interdiction?". A multiple regression analysis (Appendix A) which excludes the years after the military became actively involved (1990 to 1992) indicates

that the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is not due to chance.

The simple regression of drug crime versus public outcry (Appendix A) indicates a moderate relationship between changes in drug crime levels and changes in public outcry levels. Consequently, it can be inferred that an increase in % drug crime does drive an increase in public outcry, so that the model holds at these test points.

The bar plot for drug flow (Figure 1.2) shows a general increase over the years for which the information was available (from 1981 to 1986 and 1989 to 1992).




Figure 1.2

The overall observable pattern in the plot is similar to that in the % drug crime plot (Figure 1.3), although % drug crime falls off after the 1989 peak. Given the general pattern, it might be inferred that an increase in drug flow led to increased drug crime.

**Drug Crime in the U.S.**  
(drug arrests/ttl arrests)




Figure 1.3

The bar plot for % drug crime shows that after a peak in 1989, % drug crime settled down to moderately high levels. The measure of drug crime is based on drug arrests; consequently, the decrease in drug crime may be due to a change in policy (ie. a shift in focus from arresting "the man on the street" to arresting his supplier/dealer--less arrests, but higher pay-off).<sup>17</sup>

The bar plot for public outcry (Figure 1.4) shows a peak in 1986, 1988, and again in 1989 where it reached its highest peak and was followed by a decrease. Possible reasons for the decrease in public outcry, after its last peak, are: apathy, a shift in media focus, and public

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<sup>17</sup>DOJ Fact Sheet, Sep 1994, p.3. "The evidence indicates that drug users are more likely than nonusers to commit crimes, that arrestees and inmates were often under the influence of a drug at the time they committed their offense, and that drug trafficking generates violence."

perception that the "drug problem" was being handled, in so far as the suppliers and dealers are being dealt with.




Figure 1.4

It should be noted, that there is a one year lag between the initial high peak in drug flow and drug crime occurring in 1985 and the first high peak in public outcry (1986).

Lastly, the bar plot for military involvement (Figure 1.5) shows a gradual increase from 1982 to 1988 followed by a significant increase in the years 1989 to 1992. This occurrence coincides with the implementation of new national policies on military use in drug interdiction. (see, also, Figure 1.6)

**Level of Military Involvement**  
(DOD drug budget/ttl DOD budget)




Figure 1.5

**Level of Military Involvement**  
(DOD drug budget/TTL fed drug budget)




Figure 1.6

For the most part, the trends in Figure 1.6 follow that of Figure 1.5--although Figure 1.5 views the percentage within the military by using its counter-drug allotment matched against its own total budget, and Figure 1.6 views the percentage as one of many agencies receiving money (by using money allotted to the military matched against the total federal drug budget).

Overall, a cursory look at the bar graphs reveals a roughly linear relationship between all of the variables during the 1980s. However, in the early 1990s, a continued increase in drug flow and military involvement can be seen; whereas, there is a decrease in drug crime and public outcry. If the trend had continued upward, rather than decreasing from 1993 to 1995, it could have been basis for a new hypothesis in the 1990s.

Given that not all security risks are military in nature, "transnational phenomena such as narcotics trafficking also have security implications for both present and long-term American policy."<sup>18</sup> Since the United States' national concerns include: (1) credibly sustaining security with military forces that are ready to fight, (2) bolstering America's economic revitalization, and (3) promoting democracy abroad, the narcotics trade is not only a threat to American national security, but also to hemispheric security.<sup>19</sup> Given that the U.S. seeks to spread democracy and create/maintain a stable political environment in this hemisphere, drug trade (which promotes political or economic instability in Latin America) threatens the security of the United States.<sup>20</sup> "Even if the definition of national

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<sup>18</sup>NSS, p.1.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p.i.

<sup>20</sup>Mabry, p.5.

security were limited to military matters, illicit drug use is a threat" because people addicted to drugs do not make reliable soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines.<sup>21</sup> Given that the U.S. must maintain a standing military force, and be able to expand it in time of war, it can ill afford a habituated pool of personnel.<sup>22</sup> The U.S. aims to eliminate drug trafficking, both bilaterally and regionally, because it poses a serious threat to our security and to democracy as a whole. One way in which drug traffickers can be stopped is by denying them an infrastructure in which to operate. Proponents of substantially increasing the military's role argue that only the military is equipped and has the resources to counter powerful trafficking organizations, and that drug interdiction operations can provide realistic training and be conducted without substantial impact on military readiness.<sup>23</sup>

Given some idea as to how they became involved, and that the military is now involved in the drug war, how successful is the military and the nation as a whole? The remaining chapters will attempt to answer this question. The following chapter, in fact, will address the indicators of success/failure and how they might be measured.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p.3.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p.4.

<sup>23</sup>DPP, p.v.



## II. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

What is the role of the public, at large, in determining the terms and measures of success or failure in America's war on drugs? This chapter will endeavor to answer this question. However, the main objectives of this chapter are: (1) to objectively define success/failure; (2) to select indicators of success/failure; (3) to develop a means of measuring these indicators; and, (4) to objectively ascertain success/failure of the counter-drug war.

### A. DEFINITION OF SUCCESS/FAILURE

According to Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, failure is "a falling short" (not achieving one's objectives). Success is then defined as "a favorable or satisfactory outcome" (achieving one's objectives).

Bearing these definitions in mind, then, it might be useful, to consider what the objectives of different administrations have been; whether civilian and military agencies have shared the same objectives; if, and/or how, different administrations have measured success/failure; and whether counter-narcotics activities have achieved the desired objectives. If only some, rather than all, of the objectives are achieved is the operation still successful? This question stresses the importance of pre-established, clear, meaningful, measureable and achievable objectives

(which requires that mutually agreed upon objectives be put in place). Tactical and operational objectives should enable the achievement of the overall strategic objectives.

#### **B. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS/FAILURE**

Indicators which will be considered while evaluating the counter-drug program, are: education/awareness of the drug problem; attitudes toward drug use/crime; policies and characteristics of enforcement; organization and cooperation of agencies involved; and reporting practices. If the attempt to quantify the drug war is successful, then the indicators will show the area of success/failure in this ongoing campaign. Any insight gained from this process could aid policy-makers in re-focusing counter-drug efforts in order to alleviate, or overcome, present weaknesses.

#### **C. MEANS OF MEASURING THE INDICATORS**

In collecting data for, and developing a means of measuring the indicators of, drug war success/failure, it is necessary to try to break the indicators down into their component parts.

**Awareness** = number persons reached / ttl # people

**Attitude** = indifference to harm / ttl opinions expressed

**Enforcement** = # drug policies enforced / ttl # drug policies

**Cooperation** = # missions with other agencies / ttl missions

**Reporting Practices** = # arrests for drug-related offense / ttl arrests

#### **D. MEASUREMENT/EVALUATION OF THE INDICATORS**

Where possible, the means of measurement specified for each indicator was utilized; however, due to the data available, some of the indicators are evaluated in a different manner.

##### **1. Awareness**

With respect to the education/awareness indicator, there are advertisements (newspapers and magazines) and television commercials (such as those paid for by the Partnership for a Drug Free America); police programs (such as PAL--California's Police Activities League--which provides camping trips and other activities designed to keep kids away from drugs and out of trouble); and, there are school lecture programs (in-class instruction by teachers, or school assemblies taught by health and police professionals). The main idea behind this approach is that education leads to awareness and awareness leads to a change in attitude and thus behavior. The actual data on the numbers of ads shown, over the period of the drug war, was not readily available due to inconsistencies in numbers of ads/commercials provided to the local television stations

over the years and the short programming cycles (6 month periods) at these stations. The local stations had no idea regarding counter-drug spots--beyond those in the current cycle. Only one station (KCCN) was able to track how many of their commercial spots were counter-drug related (two out of thirty-seven).<sup>24</sup> According to KCCN's trafficker, each spot is expected to reach 200,000 people.<sup>25</sup>

Although the desired data is not readily available, it is assumed that, given their expected reach, the ads do have a role in shaping public perception. Consequently, newspaper editorials and polls, which ask what the most important problems in America are, enable the gauging of the awareness indicator. (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2)




Figure 2.1<sup>#</sup>

<sup>24</sup>KCCN is a CBS affiliate serving the Monterey Bay area.

<sup>25</sup>This number, provided by the commercial trafficker, is based on the number of households with T.V.s in the viewing area (Monterey Bay).

<sup>#</sup>The data for this figure, utilized in Chapter I, was drawn from the New York Times

As seen here, and mentioned in Chapter I, there is an initial peak in public awareness in 1986, followed by a decrease in 1987, then peaking again in 1988 and 1989 before once again decreasing. These peaks coincide with renewed declarations of the war against drugs.

### Most Important Problem Poll




Figure 2.2

Index (#drug edits/ttl edits = public outcry).

According to public perception, as illustrated in Figure 2.2\*, drugs are no longer one of the biggest problems facing our country. The highest peak in the public's perception of drugs as one of this nation's most important problems, 38 percent, occurred in November 1989 (bordered by the next two highest peaks which occurred in May 1989, 27 percent, and April 1990, 30 percent). These peaks in awareness of the drug problem coincide with increases in the numbers of drug-related editorials as well as political pronouncements regarding the drug war (such as the official declaration of the drug war, or a re-statement of the declaration during political campaigns). Consequently, the change in perception, or level of awareness, represented by the decrease in level of importance in more recent years may be the result of a highly publicized drug war (as long as people think the problem is being dealt with, it no longer holds top billing in their concerns). Another interpretation may be that the drug war has been placed on the back burner of the public agenda, since no recent declarations have been made by the president, therefore the level of public awareness has declined.

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\*The data used to construct this figure was obtained from the Gallup Poll, various years, portions of which were obtained from the Public Choice, Volume 83, 1995, p.22.

## 2. Attitude

Although the attitude indicator can be broken down into two components: (1) attitudes toward drug use, and (2) attitudes toward drug-related crime, it should not be forgotten that it is linked to awareness. In general, then, it can also be said that attitudes are linked to usage. Kids that don't think of drugs as harmful are more likely to try them. Attitudes, however, are difficult to interpret thus difficult to measure. Any attempt to measure this indicator would most likely require a great deal of supposition. However, a descriptive analysis (utilizing data on the level of arrests, the number of kids reporting drug use, what kids worry about, and views toward drug selling) could prove useful for this indicator. (see Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6)@

Regarding the level of arrests, as depicted in Figures 2.14 and 2.15 under "reporting practices," juvenile arrests saw an increase from 1983 to 1985 and decreased slightly for 1986 and 1987 before peaking in 1988 (after which, the percent of juvenile drug arrests tapered down to less than five percent of all juvenile arrests in 1991). The periods

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@The data used to generate these figures was obtained from DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p.1 (Figure 2.3), p.6 (Figure 2.5), and Reuter, p.xi (Figure 2.6).

of decrease appear to coincide with anti-drug declarations. Overall, the fairly consistent level of juvenile arrests suggests that the risks are being disregarded.




Figure 2.3

The trends in this figure show a general decrease in useage (from 1982 to 1992) among eighteen to twenty-five year olds which, as shown, is the highest use group. Although decreasing, the moderately high levels of useage among eighteen to twenty-five year olds suggests a complacent attitude toward the harmfulness of drugs. In 1982, the second highest use group was the twelve to seventeen year olds--although their useage increased in 1985, they were eclipsed by the twenty-six and up group. While use among the youngest group decreased from 1982 to 1992, use among the oldest group increased up through 1993. The slight, yet steady, increase in use by the older group also suggests a lack of concern over the harmful effects of

drugs (it also indicates that the use pool is getting older--thus in the later years of the drug war, more of the users spill over into the older grouping). A sharp increase in use by twelve to seventeen year olds occurred in 1993, while the increase for the latter two groups was only slight. In particular, eighth and tenth grade use of marijuana, cocaine, LSD, and other hallucinogens increased.<sup>29</sup> This upward trend illustrates that despite the fact that the drug war is still on, the message isn't getting out (this would seem to coincide with the decrease in public awareness). Another factor in the increased useage of drugs is the "permissive attitude toward marijuana," and the commonality of inhalants.<sup>30</sup> The permissiveness seaps through via entertainment media, such as movies and song lyrics. Although the adults, who were polled as indicated in figure 2.2, are less concerned about drugs in more recent years, youths--particularly those in the twelve to seventeen grouping--are worried. (see Figure 2.4)

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<sup>29</sup>DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p.3. (see chart in Appendix B)

<sup>30</sup>Brown, p.191.



being pressured into, the use of drugs more frequently than in past years.<sup>32</sup>




Figure 2.5

The decreases in each category, of Figure 2.5, occur at the same time. The trend in the peaks and valleys suggests a linkage between declarations of war and decreases in drug use by high school seniors (since these peaks coincide with peaks in awareness and occur in the general time frame of another declaration regarding the drug war--subsequent to

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<sup>32</sup>Another consideration, of course, is that the problems facing adults differ from those of children. Therefore their concerns, and the stress placed upon them, also differ.

which useage declines). What this trend also suggests, via the sharp increase in drug useage in 1993, is that the current administration (which is continuing the drug war) needs to make some sort of formal declaration against drugs.

**Adolescents' Views of Drug Selling (percent)**

Outcome	Frequent Dealers (n = 35)	Other Sample Members (n = 337)
	percentage seeing outcome as Very Likely in a Year of Drug Dealing	
Arrest	38	49
Prison sentence	25	37
Severe injury or death	50	61
Seller friends earn > \$1000/wk	59	19
Students selling at school earn > \$1000/wk	40	35

Figure 2.6

What the above chart suggests is that, although adolescents recognized that drug selling was risky, frequent dealers perceived the risks as being lower and the monetary benefits as being higher than that perceived by the infrequent or nonseller. In other words, the risks did not dissuade the frequent dealer from continuing the activity. Among these fifteen to seventeen year old inner city male respondents, only eleven percent used; whereas, sixteen percent sold

drugs.<sup>33</sup> In this instance, then, selling was not for the sake of acquiring the funds to support one's own use, but merely as an economic prospect.

Two additional figures (Figures 2.7 and 2.8) might also shed some light on drug use and the attendant attitudes.




Figure 2.7

The "ever" category shown in this 1993 survey is, as one would expect, the highest in percentiles--the highest among which is the twenty-six to thirty-four year old grouping. This is consistent with the fact that as the drug war drones on, the users are getting older. In the "past year" and "past month" categories, the highest percentile belongs to the eighteen to twenty-five year old grouping. This is consistent with the fact that in 1993 more teenagers tried,

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<sup>33</sup>Reuter, p.x.

and are actively using, drugs (as seen in Figure 2.5 above). Although they are not in the highest percentile, it is disturbing to note that the twelve to seventeen year old grouping surpassed the thirty-five and up grouping in past year and past month useage (the percentage of this younger grouping is close behind the twenty-six to thirty-four grouping). This would seem to indicate that the message of "harm" is not reaching--or getting through to--the pre-teen and teen-age users. In fact, a University of Michigan study, released in 1994, ascertained that teen-age attitudes toward drug use have, indeed, eroded.<sup>34</sup>




Figure 2.8

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<sup>34</sup>Brown, p.191. Given the old addage, "seeing is believing," perhaps part of what is driving this increased use of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines is the fact that "this new generation of young people did not witness the destruction these drugs caused in the past."

This pie chart shows the percentages (averaged over the life of the current drug war--from 1981 to 1993) of high school senior drug use. Clearly, the "ever" category has the highest percentage, and it will always have the higher percentage, because it covers a longer span of time--encompassing one-time use, casual use, and habitual use. Although the other two categories could encompass all uses as well, they tend to be more indicative of regular use. As shown in Figure 2.5, however, until 1993 there has been a general decline in all of these categories.

### **3. Enforcement**

The enforcement indicator consists of the policies regarding counter-drug operations and the corresponding characteristics of enforcement. Again, this indicator (particularly the characteristics aspect) is more descriptive and interpretative in nature and does not readily lend itself to measurement. Policies themselves do not remain constant, much less constant is the character by which they are enforced (during an election year, political candidates check the pulse of the people and play to their expressed concerns which are as fickle as the views of the politician). (see Figure 2.9\*\*)

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\*\*Meier, p.62.

The Impact of Laws on Arrest Rates

Arrest Rate	Before Adjusted R-Square	Laws						After Adjusted R-Square
		Marijuana			Controlled Substance			
		Jail	Light	Decrim.	Fine	User	Dealer	
All Drugs	.7392	-	.22	-	-	-	-	.7768
Heroin/Cocaine	.7454	-	.13	-	-	-	-	.7548
Marijuana	.4442	-.16	.28	-	-	-	-	.5196
Sales	.6914	-.11	.15	-	-.15	-	-	.7215
Possession	.7228	-	.19	.13	-	-	-	.7672
Juveniles	.5683	-	.16	-	-	-	-	.5788
Blacks	.7483	-	-	-	-	-	.15	.7677
Female	.7174	-	-	.19	-	-	-	.7467
% Heroin/Cocaine	.6644	-	-	-	-	-.16	-	.6882
% Marijuana	.5746	-.18	-	-	-	-	-.24	.7811

Figure 2.9

As the chart depicts (via the negative relationship between user laws and serious drugs and the negative relationship between jail terms and marijuana), the stringency of some drug laws, particularly those concerning marijuana, is mitigated by enforcement personnel. Depending on enforcement priorities regarding drug laws (such as jail terms, fines or other penalties), which differ from state to state, policy enforcement itself will vary (particularly when a disparity exists in the penalties for different by-products of the same drug)<sup>36</sup>. Light punishments, for

<sup>36</sup>Crack cocaine and powder cocaine have different enforcement requirements. For example, to get a five year sentence requires 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder. (see "Comparing cocaine sentences" in Appendix B)

example, tend to be associated with more arrests; whereas, more severe penalties are associated with fewer arrests. In general, "law enforcement agencies [adapt] implementation policies to conditions in the policy environment," such as level of drug usage, urbanization, and ethnic make-up.<sup>37</sup>

#### **4. Cooperation**

The organization aspect of the organization and cooperation indicator would entail a review of the responsibilities assigned to each of the agencies involved; whereas, the cooperation aspect of this indicator merely requires a comparison between single agency missions and joint agency missions. As a rule, the military objective is to support efforts to interdict illegal drugs before they reach the United States. The focal point of civilian agency objectives vary according to their areas of responsibility. For some, such as the DEA, the primary objective is to reduce supply; whereas, other agencies are more attentive to demand reduction (such as local and state law enforcement agencies arresting users and taking pushers off the street in attempts to close open-air markets). Numerous agencies have a piece of the counter-drug pie (DEA, Customs, State

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<sup>37</sup>Meier, p.56. Meier's study also shows that states with higher percentages of black or hispanic residents have higher drug arrest rates. More black residents-->higher arrest rates for serious drug use and sales. More hispanics-->higher overall drug arrests, higher arrests for marijuana, sales or possession of drugs.

and local law enforcement agencies, and the Military to name a few). The budget for interdiction efforts alone is shared among eleven groups. (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11)<sup>##</sup>




Figure 2.10

As can be seen in the above figure, the DOD has had the biggest interdiction budget among this group of agencies. The first peak occurred in 1987 when the military became more involved in the drug war. After a drop in 1988, the budget began climbing again in 1989 and peaked out in 1992. The increasing amounts from 1989 to 1991 are an expression of the Bush declaration of war on drugs (which, as mentioned

<sup>##</sup>The data used to generate these figures was obtained from NDCS, pgs 235-238.

earlier, coincide with the peaks in public concern (1989 and 1990) indicated in Figure 2.2). Although its allotments saw a general increase from 1987 to 1995, INS still holds a distant second place to the DOD counter-drug budget. However, even given the increases, and peaks, in the DOD budget its allotment was second to the Coast Guard budget-- until 1991, when the DOD won out. Increases in the DOD budget coincide with the increased responsibilities given to it--through legislation (as mentioned in Chapter I).




Figure 2.11

Among the agencies charted in Figure 2.11, the Coast Guard received the highest counter-drug budget until 1992 when it was finally surpassed by the allotment to customs. Customs, however, did not surpass the DOD allotment until 1994. The

decrease in Coast Guard and DOD money is the result of a focal shift--from transit zone interdiction to source country interdiction.

The overall counterdrug picture (interdiction, investigations, international, prosecution, corrections, intelligence, state and local assistance, regulatory and compliance, other law enforcement, research and development, prevention, and treatment) involves even more agencies. (see Figure 2.12)\*# In 1996, the big winner, of course, is the DOJ which encompasses the FBI, DEA, INS, Interpol, U.S. Marshals service, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Prisons, and other Justice programs. One would naturally assume that the DOD would have garnered the second highest counter-drug budget. Surprisingly enough, however, the next highest amount budgeted was for Health and Human Services--followed by the Treasury, the VA, and then the DOD.

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\*#Ibid.

Counter-drug Pie [agency breakdown]




Figure 2.12

There are, perhaps, too many chiefs and not enough indians. This, of course, leads to political in-fighting (back-stabbing and glory-grabbing) which, needless to say, is not conducive to smooth operations. The organization of these differing agencies is not always conducive to inter-agency cooperation. Breakdown in cooperation also occurs when these diverse agencies pursue different objectives. For example, the CIA hindered DEA operations in Panama to protect their investment in Noriega. When Noriega proved to be no longer useful, and a handful to deal with, the CIA became more cooperative (allowing the U.S. military to invade Panama and capture Noriega so he could face criminal

charges in the U.S.).<sup>40</sup> Given these realities, one would suspect that every agency was pretending to be the lone ranger; however, some cooperation does occur. (see Figures 2.13 and 2.14)<sup>+</sup>\*




Figure 2.13

The peaks in cooperation (1985, 1989 and 1991) appear to coincide with renewed declarations of the war on drugs and with peaks in public awareness of the drug problem.

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<sup>40</sup>Levine, p.458.

<sup>+</sup>\*The data used to generate Figure 2.13 was obtained from the 1994 Statistical Abstract of the United States, p.207. It is based on DEA seizures via interagency cooperation/ttl DEA seizures (in thousands of dollars). Figure 2.14 was drawn from DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p.1.

**Percent Counter-drug participation of agencies with primary drug enforcement responsibility:**

Type of agency	Operation of special drug unit	Participation in multiagency task force
State police departments	85	91
All local agencies	28	55
Police departments	25	51
Sheriffs' departments	39	68

**Figure 2.14**

As Figure 2.14 shows, the tendency to cooperate is linked to a given agency's role in counter-drug law enforcement. If an agency had primary responsibility, within its jurisdiction, for drug law enforcement then its tendency to participate in multiagency task forces was higher.

**5. Reporting Practices**

Reporting practices can be broken down into four component parts: (1) number of juveniles arrested for possession of illegal drugs; (2) number of juveniles arrested for drug-related crime; (3) number of adults arrested for possession of illegal drugs; and, (4) number of adults arrested for drug-related crime. In many cases, however, only total numbers are given (without respect to the age of the accused). Therefore, composite numbers are utilized for evaluation. Where the four separate sets of numbers are available, the best way to evaluate/measure the

results is by comparing the number of arrests for each group across the years--bearing in mind, however, as mentioned in Chapter I, that a change in focus affects the types and number of arrests made. (see Figures 2.15 and 2.16)@\*

### Representation of Reporting Practices

(based on drug arrests/ttl arrests)




Figure 2.15

### Representation of Reporting Practices

(based on Juvenile arrests)




Figure 2.16

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@\*The data used to generate these figures was obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and the World Almanac. Figure 2.15 is slightly modified from that utilized in Chapter I.

For the most part, the trends in the juvenile arrest pattern mimic that of the adults depicted in Figure 2.15 (peaking at roughly the same time). This would seem to indicate that despite the "Just Say No" message of the 80s, juvenile drug use remained fairly constant until 1990. The decrease in juvenile drug use in the early 90s could be the result of enhanced school training programs which stemmed from the establishment of new American education goals (as well as renewed counter-drug declarations in 1989).<sup>43</sup>

#### **E. OBJECTIVES OF THE DRUG WAR**

The Department of Education has clearly delineated its objectives for safer and better education, but have the objectives for the counter-drug war been as clear? The National Drug Control Strategy Budget (which is subject to approval, and cuts, by Congress) is the president's way of making his counter-drug strategy known (via budget requests for certain activities). (see Figures 2.17 and 2.18).<sup>#</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Eric Digest, ER114, p.1. Six national goals resulted from the February 1990 education summit. The sixth goal focuses on "safe, disciplined, and drug-free schools," the aim being that "by the year 2000, every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning."

<sup>#</sup>NDCS, pgs. 235-238.

**National Drug Control Budget (millions)**  
(adjusted for inflation)




Figure 2.17

**National Drug Control Budget (millions)**  
(adjusted for inflation)




Figure 2.18

The Carter administration ended before the current war on drugs was instituted, therefore the key administrations involved in this war are the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. The budget requests, depicted in the above figures, will be used as a guide in determining each administration's counter-narcotics objectives. Bearing in mind that, although there are other areas, "the four major functional areas [in drug control spending include:] (1) demand reduction, (2) domestic law enforcement, (3) international, and (4) interdiction efforts."<sup>45</sup> Functional area two essentially folds into demand side efforts (along with prevention and treatment efforts), and areas three and four are supply side programs.

#### **1. General Trends**

On the whole, interdiction increased through 1991--experiencing a slight dip in 1986 and a more noticeable dip in 1988. In the 1992 to 1995 budgets, interdiction saw a decrease while corrections and investigations increased. In general, prosecution and intelligence dollars increased over the life of the drug war; international dollars saw a general increase until 1993 where it dipped and decreased through 1995 (with slight dips occurring in 1983 and 1988).

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<sup>45</sup>NDCS, p.10.

Corrections saw a steady increase until reaching an initial peak in 1990, after the dip in 1991 the amounts again increased until its pinnacle was reached in the 1995 budget. Overall, the allotment to treatment increased over the years of the war as did monies to prevention and research; state and local law enforcement dollars saw a general increase over the years although it did experience a dip in 1988 and another in 1992; regulatory and compliance dollars were kept at fairly low levels throughout the war although it did see an increase in the 90's. The amount allotted to other law enforcement increased until 1993, where it reached its peak before decreasing over the last two years.

## **2. Presidential Objectives**

The most stressed aspects in the Reagan administration (January 1981 to January 1989) were interdiction and treatment which were followed fairly closely by investigations and corrections--indicating that although the main emphasis fell on interdiction from the last year of the first term and throughout the second term, the primary objective called for both demand and supply reduction. In 1989, when the Bush administration came into office, the primary focus was again interdiction which was followed most closely by treatment, investigations, and corrections. In 1990, corrections surpassed interdiction, and treatment, indicating stricter laws in support of the nation's demand-

side efforts while maintaining efforts toward supply reduction (meaning that the increased numbers of people-- both suppliers and users--incarcerated in 1989, required more funds to provide for them). In 1991, interdiction again won out--hitting its highest point--and the money for corrections dropped significantly, indicating that the emphasis was once again on supply. After its peak in 1991, the allotment for interdiction has been on the decline; meanwhile, the allotment for corrections has increased indicating a shift in focus back to the demand side. In 1992, when the Clinton administration came into office, corrections had increased to once again surpass investigations but still fell below interdiction. Interdiction money was, however, surpassed by the allotment to treatment (and the budget for prevention was still more than the allotment for corrections) indicating a demand-side emphasis held in concert with a continued attack on the supply-side. From 1993 to 1995, treatment held the top spot, followed by corrections, and interdiction dollars during this period fell below prevention. Although supply-side efforts were being maintained, the stress in the latter years of the drug war has been on the demand-side.

## F. THE PUBLIC'S ROLE

What is the role of the public in determining the terms and measures of success or failure in the war on drugs? As mentioned in Chapter I, the public impacts policy-making through a number of ways, such as: (1) complaints to local and state agencies; (2) editorials; and, (3) political action committees. Policymakers consider where public concern meets with their political objectives and the national interests, then they draw up the terms/objectives which offers a best-fit solution. However, where measurement of program effectiveness is concerned, it appears to have been a self-evaluative process.

One of the problems with self measurement, is the skewing of data to support a given party's views (politicization). The following quote serves as an example of the political rhetoric which has plagued the drug war.

Drug use declined steadily and dramatically prior to the Clinton Administration, which undermined anti-drug efforts on all fronts.<sup>46</sup>

As a consequence of the Clinton administration's half-hearted effort to fight the drug war, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of drugs.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Walters, J.P. "Tonight Only: ABC Does Drugs." This article regarding "America's War on Drugs: Searching for Solutions," [an ABC News special], was entered into the House record by Hon. Gerald B.H. Solomon of New York, on April 6, 1995, to support his views on the drug war.

<sup>47</sup>Solomon, Gerald. "Redeclare the Drug War." A statement made by the Honorable Mr.

In another statement before the House, Mr. Solomon makes reference to permissive drug policy in the Carter Administration. Despite what the Honorable Mr. Soloman says, the national drug control budget has, for the most part, increased over the years of the drug war--regardless of who (democrat or republican) was in the office of president. (see Figure 2.19)<sup>++</sup> Essentially, as illustrated above, the significant change occurs in the focus of counter-drug efforts, not in the budget. (see Figure 2.20)


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Solomon, in the House of Representatives, on January 4, 1995.

<sup>++</sup>The data used to generate Figures 2.19 and 2.20 was obtained from NDCS, pgs 235-238. Inflationary adjustments were made using the GDP deflators found in the 1995 International Financial Statistics Yearbook, p.781. Since deflators were not available for 1995 and 1996, they were estimated.

**National Drug Control Budget (FY81-95)**

(in millions)



**Total Drug Budget in Stable Dollars**

**Figure 2.19**

Even after adjusting for inflation, the above pie chart clearly indicates that the counter-drug budget has increased each year. As the projected budget for 1996 indicates, the total amount obligated to the drug war has not changed significantly (despite Mr. Solomon's beliefs, the war has not been visibly weakened).

**1996 Federal Drug Control Budget**  
By Function




Figure 2.20

The pie chart in Figure 2.20 shows that the focus for 1996 will be on (1) treatment, (2) corrections, (3) prevention, and (4) investigations. Overall, this budget request represents a push toward community involvement; more research and analysis; and "a more balanced, long-term, and integrated approach that stresses efforts in the source countries."<sup>49</sup> In other words, the strategy calls for demand (thirty-six percent) and supply (sixty-four percent) reduction activities while enabling a greater flexibility in how communities manage federal drug control allocations.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup>NDCS, p.9.

<sup>50</sup>NDCS, p.15. "Of the total \$14.6 billion request for FY 1996, \$9.3 billion is for supply reduction programs and \$5.3 billion is for demand reduction programs."

### **G. ARE WE WINNING?**

Based on the data, and the criteria within this chapter, the counter-drug war has proven to be successful in some short battles--within the military, for example, due to zero tolerance policies and random urinalysis, the counter-drug campaign is fairly successful--but unsuccessful as a whole (meaning that, in the grand scheme of things, counter-narcotics activities have not achieved the overriding, desired, objective--to win the war on drugs). If only some of the objectives are met, then only the short game may be won--not the longer, or end, game. (see Figures 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23)\*.\*

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\*.\*Information for these figures was obtained from DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p.4. The 1993 figures for Cocaine, Heroin, and Marijuana (found in Figure 2.21) were obtained from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), "1993 Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network," Advanced Report Number 8, Dec 1994.

### Emergency Room Drug Mentions




Figure 2.21

As the above figure shows, cocaine use increased from 1988 to 1989, then took a dip in 1990 before once again increasing. After a decrease in 1990, heroin also resumed an increasing trend. Marijuana mentions, while increasing during the same time period as heroin, did not surpass heroin until the last year of the survey. 1988 through 1991 saw an overall decreasing trend in methamphetamine and PCP mentions. Although increases and decreases were noted, both LSD and methadone mentions remained at moderately low levels throughout. Drug abuse episodes rose from 1988 to 1989, and took a dip in 1990 before once again increasing. The first peak in 1989, and the subsequent decrease in 1990, is

consistent with increased awareness, public outcry, and a renewed declaration of war on drugs. The increases from 1990 to 1993, matched with those of drug mentions, indicate a general disregard for the effects and risks associated with drug use.<sup>52</sup>



Figure 2.22

The primary drug of choice among eighth graders, shown Figure 2.22, is inhalant--followed most closely by marijuana. Over the period of this survey, there were increases in the use of all but two drug types (other hallucinogens and steroids which peaked in 1992 before decreasing in 1993).

<sup>52</sup>See Table 15 of Appendix B for the actual numbers and for plots on total drug mentions (Figure B.1) and total drug abuse episodes (Figure B.2).

### Past Year Drug Use by 10th Graders




Figure 2.23

For tenth graders, shown in Figure 2.23, the drug of choice is marijuana. After a decrease in 1992, marijuana peaked out in 1993. 1992 also saw a decrease in the use of cocaine and other hallucinogens. The other drugs used by tenth graders (stimulants, inhalants, LSD, other cocaine, crack, and heroin) increased over the period of the survey. Although even the highest percentage for both of these groups (19.2) remains below twenty percent, it is not comforting (especially since the trends are increasing). Part of the problem that exists with inhalants is that they

are commonplace--every household has products which could be used as an inhalant. The wide-spread availability of these products suggests a lack of harmfulness.<sup>53</sup>

It seems that constant declarations are needed to spur agency actions and gain public awareness (which impact attitudes on use, the number of arrests made, and the level of agency cooperation).

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<sup>53</sup>Brown, p.192. Dr. Johnston was involved in the University of Michigan 1993 "Monitoring the Future Study." The study noted the increase in youth drug use from 1991 through 1993. This study also noted a decline in anti-drug attitudes.

### **III. WHY THE U.S. IS LOSING THE DRUG WAR**

Why is the United States losing the drug war? What role do economic indicators play in the decision to deal in illegal narcotics? What is the cost to American counter-drug agencies? These questions, as well as some others, will be considered.

In addition to the economics of the drug war, this chapter will discuss narco-terrorism and motivations for cartel and counter-drug agency armament, the militarization of the drug war as a whole and the impact of the drug cartel's armament on American society and on the United States' ability to counter the drug trade. To better answer the question of "why the U.S. is losing the drug war," the aforementioned aspects should be considered first. After all, they help paint the picture of where we stand in this war.

#### **A. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE**

##### **1. For The Drug Trafficker**

The economic perspective for the drug trafficker involves both drug profits and arms purchases/transfers. The primary reason drug trafficking has not been eradicated is the fact that it is a very lucrative business. The economic indicators that illegal drug dealers are most interested in include the risk-reward ratio, and return on

investment (the chance to overcome poverty is particularly appealing to low income entrants into the market).

Traffickers know that they may be caught and imprisoned, but in weighing the cost (possible jail time) against the benefit (lots of money) they generally elect to go for the money. (see Figure 3.1 below) It is the high rate of return which, in fact, compensates for the risks which accompany the drug trade. (see Figure 3.2 below)

### Selling Frequency and Earnings

Frequency of sales	%	Monthly Gross Income Median (\$)	Monthly Net Income Median (\$)
Daily (mean)	37	3600 (6800)	2000 (3600)
2+ days/wk	40	1330 (2510)	830 (1200)
1 or less days/wk	23	300 (740)	50 (160)

Figure 3.1<sup>@</sup>

As Figure 3.1 shows, frequent sellers made relatively large incomes--larger than could have been expected from legitimate activities.

### Estimated Risks and Necessary Compensations Per Year of Regular Dealing

Hazard	Number	Risk (%)	Compensation (\$)
Death	200	1.4	10,500
Injury	1,000	7	2,100
Incarceration	3,000	22	9,000

Figure 3.2<sup>#</sup>

<sup>@</sup>Reuter, *Economics of Crime*, p.ix. Members of the Rand corporation have done extensive studies regarding the economics of crime.

The chart, in Figure 3.2, represents the amount of compensation (built into the high earnings) that a dealer might expect given the risks of injury, imprisonment, or death. "The value [of life and freedom] depends on lifetime earning potential and attitudes toward risk."<sup>56</sup> Drug trafficking grosses "approximately \$120 billion annually."<sup>57</sup> For the dirt poor farmers of Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, who barely manage to scrape up enough for subsistence, cultivation of illegal drugs promises at least triple the income of legal crops. Consequently, for these individuals, the economic choice is obvious.

As shown in Figure 3.3, the profitability of these illegal crops increases at each point along the production chain (from crop cultivation to processing to distribution).

### Production Chain




Figure 3.3

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#Ibid., p.104.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p.103.

<sup>57</sup>Swisher, p.12.

After initial processing, "members of powerful drug cartels purchase the product for about \$160 to \$200 a kilo."<sup>58</sup> The next link prior to shipping to the distributor, final processing, increases the value by at least tenfold. The finished product is then smuggled into the United States where local distributors adulterate the product either with powdered milk or a like substance to stretch it out (thereby increasing the profit margin). "A kilo of cocaine from Colombia that is first sold in the U.S. for \$10,000 will eventually gross more than \$250,000 on the street."<sup>59</sup> Marijuana initially sold in the U.S. at \$5,000 a pound, retailing at \$450 an ounce, will net over \$2 million on the street. (Refer to Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix C) These illegal drug businesses are operated in the same manner as legal businesses which is what makes them so profitable. As with normal businesses, the drug trafficker assesses the "market and looks for ways to increase [that market] and their profits at the same time."<sup>60</sup> Part of the monetary profit is re-invested in the business (of producing drugs), part goes toward protection (such as armament or bribes), part is invested outside the business in areas that eventually benefit it (ie. in legitimate businesses which

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p.13.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

enable the laundering of drug money) as well as the drug producing territory (by making services available that improve quality of life); and, of course, the remaining portion goes to the cartel leadership.

What prompts drug cartels and their trafficking agents to arm themselves? How have arms sales to drug cartels (and the corresponding perpetuation of narco-terrorism) affected society? And, how has this armament impacted counter-narcotics efforts? There are several schools of thought governing motivations for acquiring arms. In order to answer the cartel armament question, it might be useful to review some of the existing opinions on motivational factors.

**a. Motivations For Arms Purchase**

What compels organizations (legal or otherwise) to arm themselves? According to Joel Johnson, motivational factors include: (1) regional, ethnic, and social strife; (2) replacements for old equipment and old technology; and (3) ally support which is typically initiated by the donor country in order to gain influence over the recipient, to help a friendly country to dissuade neighboring countries from adventurism, or to enable an ally to fight along with, or in lieu of, the donor country's military.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Johnson, J., p.111-116.

Keith Krause's theory of motivations for acquiring arms indicates that the driving factors are: (1) internal--securing the regime against internal threats or using military development as a vehicle for social and economic modernization; (2) regional--guaranteeing security, fighting wars and acquiring regional influence or hegemony; and, (3) systemic--the pursuit of status, power and prestige.<sup>62</sup>

In their article, Mark Suchman and Dana Eyre show that motivations vary across several theories. These theories are: (1) strategic-functional, (2) factional, (3) geo-political, and (4) institutional.<sup>63</sup> Strategic-functional motivation is based on security needs (internal and external concerns); factional motivation is the result of internal political interests; geopolitical motivation is based on systemic and regional conflicts; and institutional motivations for acquiring arms are driven by modernization and sovereignty issues.

Why do Cartel's and counter-drug agencies arm themselves? Is the corresponding arms proliferation productive or necessary? Is it too late, or even possible, to counter the drug war's arms proliferation? Given a basic idea of motivational factors, as discussed above, the armament question can now be considered. Although an

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<sup>62</sup>Krause, p.193.

<sup>63</sup>Suchman, p.140-147.

attempt will be made to answer the questions regarding proliferation, a complete intellectual debate is beyond the scope of this thesis.

At the heart of law enforcement's difficulty in countering the narcotics problem is the well organized infrastructure of illegal drug businesses. This industry, however, deals in more than just drugs. As the following discussions on cartel armament and narco-terrorism will show, arms, drugs and terrorism have melded together to create a new threat to global security.

#### **b. Armament By Cartels**

Clearly, arms transfers no longer merely concerns the acquisition and maintenance of national security by nation-states. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations and drug cartels are also arming themselves. In light of the aforementioned motivations, it would appear that drug cartels fit several categories. Cartels arm themselves for the sake of security--in defense of the drug trade\*; they hope to exert influence over others (internally, upon their own growers and traffickers, and externally, upon potential competition and political officers); and, they tend to have a global impact (for the scourge which they perpetuate impacts source, transit, and

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\*Konrad, p.57. "Resources [are used] to establish and enforce property rights."

destination countries). Therefore, cartels encompass Johnson's strife and ally indicators, Krause's internal indicator, and some aspect of each of Suchman and Eyre's theoretical models. Apart from the impact of weapons in a given battle, the presence of weapons offer the bearer strategic deterrence capability, prestige, and political power. Among the indicators within these three articles; however, there is at least one thread of comparison that shines through as most applicable to the cartel--security. As with all things--be it man, animal, or organizations--security is a basic need which serves as a foundation upon which life is built. Take away the foundation, and the structure will crumble. The primary reason for cartel armament, then, is that cartels seek to maintain their infrastructure by ensuring security within the operating environment.

Other militant groups--those who oppose communism--who are mired in ethnic conflict, or consumed by simple greed, also acquire their arms through illegal drug sales. Not to be overlooked, are countries in South East Asia which is rife with ethnic and social conflict. In Cambodia, for example, the surplus weapons from a war-time build up have found their way into the hands of drug traffickers.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Lintner, p.5.

Vietnam (aided by the collusion between political and criminal elements within Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Laos, North Korea, and Thailand) plays a significant role as a transit country for illegal arms and drugs.<sup>66</sup> (see map 1 of Appendix C) Vietnam's illegal arms clientele include: Philippine opposition groups, Burmese rebel groups, Sri Lanken Tamil Tigers, and India's Naga rebels.<sup>67</sup> Condoned via agreement with the military government, rebel Burmese armies openly use their arms in defense of the narcotics trade.<sup>68</sup> In fact, these ethnic armies not only protect drug labs, they sometimes participate in the processing of heroin. Drugs such as heroin, which is rampant within South East Asia, are smuggled throughout the world by Chinese, Nigerian, and Japanese gangs who take advantage of the strife stricken nations to feed their greed. These criminal gangs are generally ruthless and well armed.

### **c. Narco-terrorism**

In today's world, the threat of communism is replaced by yet another threat. This threat is Narco-terrorism and its main proponents are drug cartels. The inter-dependency of drugs and terrorism has increased to an unpredictable level. Often with the protection of a state

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p.18.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p.3.

apparatus, the drug cartels are free to pursue their livelihood of drug trafficking. Profits from this illegal business serve to fund their militant counterparts. Sometimes drugs are directly swapped for arms, but often it is the money from the illegal drug industry that purchases the arms for drug cartels, their militant factions, and the military and government officials who assist them in their endeavors. A prime example of this sort of arms transfer is the Bolivian Secret Service which supplied weapons to terrorists in exchange for narcotics which it then sold in U. S. and European markets.<sup>69</sup>

Narco-terrorism is evil and, unfortunately, its reach is global. But, what is Narco-terrorism and what is its goal? "Narco-terrorism is the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations."<sup>70</sup> The goal of this activity is "to weaken the moral fiber of the target society by encouraging widespread addiction, and by nurturing the socially enervating criminal activities that flourish around the drug trade."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Ehrenfeld, p.5.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p.xii.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p.xviii.

Marxist based governments around the world use the trafficking of illegal narcotics to finance and further their terrorist activities (a prime example being the Castro regime and its use of illegal drug sales to facilitate its campaign against Batista in its bid for power and to further its capability to export revolution in Latin America and beyond).<sup>72</sup>

According to Rachel Ehrenfeld, narco-terrorist organizations are steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology and may even receive their training from states which are aligned with communism (if not directly from Russia).<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, it is likely that Donald Mabry's assessment of drug trafficking and guerrilla organizations is quite accurate. Narco-terrorist organizations use "capitalist means and appetites to destroy capitalism."<sup>74</sup> In view of this, narco-terrorism's primary target is the United States since it is the leading capitalist country.

Countries such as Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba, Lebanon, and Peru, among others, maintain connections with Marxist factions, and other non-democratic organizations; they contribute to the development of narco-terrorism; and are successful in exporting drugs and

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<sup>72</sup>Mabry, p.4.

<sup>73</sup>Ehrenfeld, p.xv.

<sup>74</sup>Mabry, p.4.

terrorism to western countries--particularly the United States. The drug trade, then, is part of the economic process through which arms are acquired by governments around the world. The arms received vary from small arms (ie. rifles) to SAMs, artillery guns, mortars and rockets.<sup>75</sup> In fact, the PLO's illegal drug profits have enabled it to acquire more advanced arms.<sup>76</sup>

In the past, the association between narcotics sales and arms transfers has been, for the most part, ignored. Perhaps because the very idea is too shocking to comprehend--especially by the people in America's heartland--or, perhaps, because there were political strings which were too delicate to bear the stress of a firm stance on the issue (such as the United States' ties with Syria, in support of action against Iraq, during the Gulf War). The link between illegal drugs and armament can no longer be denied, and the motivations behind it must be understood in order to establish viable practices for countering it (policy decisions cannot and should not be made in a vacuum).

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<sup>75</sup>Ehrenfeld, p.73.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

Although the following statement was made by General Duan Xiwen in 1967, its words still ring true for many of today's third world freedom fighters who find themselves drowning in a sea of ethnic and political strife.

We have to continue to fight the evil of communism and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, the only money is Opium.<sup>77</sup>

Obviously, illegal drug trade is a symptom of the much deeper problems within supplying countries. This reality makes fighting the drug war all the more difficult. Rather than attempt a solution to the inner sickness, the Bush administration (and others) continued to focus on the by-product (drug-trafficking) and enhance the armament of counter-narcotics agencies. This strategy did more than ignore the inherent problems of supplier countries, it also "ignored the complex social and economic roots of the demand<sup>+</sup> for drugs within the United States."<sup>79</sup>

## **2. For The War Against Drugs**

The economic perspective for the war against drugs also involves arms purchases and transfers (mainly in support of

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<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p.11.

<sup>+</sup>Gergen, p.84. "The United States accounts for 5 percent of the world's population and consumes 50 percent of the world's cocaine."

<sup>79</sup>Hartung, p.136.

supply side interdiction efforts). This section will address economic issues regarding both the efforts of the demand side and the supply side of the drug war.

The very profitability of the illegal narcotics business is what makes combatting it so difficult. "Despite the more than \$26 billion the Reagan and Bush administrations have devoted to enforcing anti-drug laws [and the more than \$4 billion devoted by the Clinton administration], drug trafficking continues to plague the United States."<sup>80</sup> In fact, drug traffickers have more than ten times the government's anti-drug budget available to them, collectively, to utilize either in finding new routes, re-packaging the product or taking other measures to ensure that they get their product to market (such as the use of semi-submersibles as seen in Figure 1 of Appendix C).<sup>81</sup> As can be seen by the tables, (see Tables 3 through 5 of Appendix C) production efforts have not been eliminated (in fact, there appears to have been a general increase despite concerted efforts to preclude it).

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<sup>80</sup>Swisher, p.13.

<sup>81</sup>Konrad, p.65. If a disparity exists in regional drug policies, cartels merely shift their base of operations to a more amenable location--similarly, if addicts cannot get what they want from one region, they may migrate to a region which enables their activity. To counter this would require policy coordination and migration restrictions, but the former "may involve high transaction costs of finding an enforceable agreement," and the latter would "impose a burden on those (including addicts) who want to migrate for reasons other than evading drug law enforcement."

### a. Armament By America

Drug cartels and militant factions are not the only ones arming themselves. Whether the stakes warrant it or not, America has armed its law enforcement agencies in support of its counterdrug program--perhaps in effort to lend more teeth to anti-narcotics policies; but, definitely militarizing this pseudo war. Narcotics enterprises, which have developed thanks to illicit drug profits, "have helped criminal authority grow at the expense of legitimate state authority."<sup>82</sup> The motivations, then, behind America's armament of counter-drug agencies is for security against the undermining influence of drugs within America (externally driven internal conflict) and to maintain its influential ties with other countries which are also fighting this scourge. Since economic revitalization is also important to American policy-makers, its export of arms is also tied to the economic security of industry. Consequently, the United States has provided arms to Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, etc.) to back their efforts against narcotics (link to security and ally support motivation indicators). (See Figures 3.4 and 3.5)<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>Lee, p.209.

<sup>83</sup>See also Figures 2 and 3 of Appendix C.

**Foreign Military Sales Deliveries (in thousands)**

	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	260	11,618	20,378	17,918	12,580
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	7,177	29,995	34,098	29,757
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	321	592	876
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	238	2,291	-	-

Figure 3.4\*

**Foreign Military Construction Sales Deliveries (1000s)**

	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,929	1,750	1,957	1,441
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	316	2,065	2,024
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure 3.5\*\*

In August of 1989, Bush approved the shipment of \$65 million in military aid to the government of Colombia for use in its counter-drug war.<sup>86</sup> The armament of the Andean nations, as shown in the charts, by far exceeded federal assistance to the states and localities within the United States. Included in the arms supply were: twenty Huey helicopters; one blackhawk med-evac helo; small aircraft (such as the A37 fighter jet); assault boats; and a

\*FMS, p. 20-23.

\*\*Ibid., p. 26-27.

<sup>86</sup>Hartung, p.135.

variety of firepower.<sup>87</sup> Although the intent behind the assist to the Andean countries was to reduce the over-dependence (economically) on the drug trade, the result was an increase in human rights violations. The tactics utilized by armed Andean forces smacked of "Vietnam era pacification tactics" wherein the peasantry were saved (from cartels and guerillas) by being destroyed.<sup>88</sup> Though it has been reported by the Clinton administration that there will be less emphasis placed on military and law enforcement approaches to the drug problem and more emphasis placed on demand reduction, "the U.S. continues to give ample arms aid to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and numerous other client states in the name of fighting drug trafficking."<sup>89</sup>

Since in many countries narcotics trafficking and guerilla factions are inextricably linked, narco-terrorism is fastly becoming a top priority issue. In the U.S., however, the focus remains primarily on the drug trafficking component of the problem. American Joint Task Forces provide intelligence for in-state assistance to the Drug Enforcement Agency as well as mobile radar deployments along our nation's border to detect and monitor drug smuggling activities. As mentioned in chapter one, the military also

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p.136.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p.137.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p.139.

provides sea and air monitoring as part of its continued participation in America's counter-drug efforts. In fact, the U.S. Navy recently acquired a new drug smuggler radar to assist in these efforts in the vicinity of Puerto Rico. This \$10 million radar system known as Relocatable Over The Horizon Radar (ROTHR) is designed to detect drug smugglers' vessels or planes as they attempt to transport illegal drugs into Puerto Rico.<sup>90</sup> Information technology is utilized to track cartel money-laundering processes (insofar as it assists in determining where the money is, how much is there, where it is going, and to whom or what it is to be credited).

The non-defense military industry sector is using the drug war to preserve their economic base in a post-cold war society. The weaponry which this industry convinced our government to sale is not effective for non-conventional use. Counter-drug teams need communications and surveillance equipment to track down drug traffickers, not conventional warfare weapons. The supply of such weapons merely adds to the problems of the drug war. Their availability in supply countries elevates the opportunities for armament of the very organizations which are exporting drugs and terrorism.

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<sup>90</sup>Leavitt, p.3A.

The best way to stop drug trafficking involves denying the traffickers an infrastructure within which to operate. As with the child's game, "King of the Mountain," if the King can't be toppled by brute force, then his feet have to be knocked out from under him (by cutting away at his foundation). The feet, or foundation, in this instance is the drug trafficker's infrastructure and his market. If the market is dissolved, the Kingpin falls (ie. by cutting demand). This can be accomplished without further proliferation of arms among national and international counter-drug organizations. Information warfare and technology "provides the necessary conditions for achieving victory," particularly against the infrastructure, whereas the military technical revolution supplies the sufficient conditions for success (especially if a revolution in doctrine, concerning how these traffickers are dealt with, were to come about).<sup>91</sup> The Military Technical Revolution is a new paradigm intended to facilitate the military's desire, and necessity, to fight smarter and with fewer resources.<sup>92</sup> I believe that we, the U.S., can turn the tide in our favor. It will, however, take a revolution in doctrine which will overcome our traditional bias towards the use of "immoral

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<sup>91</sup>Arquilla, p.25.

<sup>92</sup>For a little more insight on information warfare and technology as related to the Military Technical Revolution, see Appendix C.

acts." That is to say, we should not let ourselves get "wrapped around the axle" over taking down a drug kingpin. Traditionally the U.S. has been repulsed by the mere thought or suggestion of direct action against a "leader," but how far must we stretch this sense of morality? A drug kingpin is not the leader of a country (at least, not in all cases) and should not be accorded the same fair and moral treatment which is rendered onto legitimate national leaders.

**b. Impact on Counter-drug Efforts**

**(1) Militarization**

As evidenced by previous discussion, the drug war has indeed become militarized. The arming of drug cartels, and the scourge of drug trafficking overall, has had a negative affect on American society. Each echelon of the illegal drug industry, from the cartel's farmer to the pusher on American streets, is arming itself against its enemies which may include their clientele, other drug traffickers, and law enforcement. The impact on society is obvious--increased drug related crime which tends to undermine and destabilize legitimate authority. Drive-by shootings have become common place in inner city neighborhoods. Warring factions of dope suppliers, whether fighting for turf or a bigger share of the illegal drug market, have spilled the blood of innocent victims throughout America.

The counter to this epidemic involves arming the agencies fighting against the illegal drug industry (which has resulted in a militarized drug war). Cartels supply their people with the latest weapons available, enabling them to escape capture and prosecution by law enforcement. Counter-drug agencies have responded by increasing their ability to exchange fire with these factions. However, the corresponding proliferation of armament in the drug war (as each side ups the ante) has not significantly checked the supply of drugs. More, bigger, or better guns is not the solution to the drug war.

While initially the militarization would not have fit Bush's use of force requirements, it has gone too far to be reversed.<sup>93</sup> It is too late for non-proliferation and counter-proliferation would require more assets and

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<sup>93</sup>Reisman, p.30-31. The following quotes were pulled from a speech made by President Bush at West Point on 5 Jan 93.

Military force is never a tool to be used lightly, or universally. In some circumstances it may be essential. In others, counterproductive. I know that many people would like to find some formula, some easy formula to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force.

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Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.

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But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete.

interaction than is currently being applied to the counter-narcotics war itself. The U.S. may, in fact, have bitten off more than it can chew.

This militarization of the antinarcotics effort [will] have little impact on the production and importation of drugs even as it [has already] embroiled the U.S. in guerilla wars in Peru and Colombia and fueled human rights abuses by the notorious military forces of the Andean region.<sup>94</sup>

Getting involved in protracted conflict with militant organizations within source countries not only goes against Bush and Clinton's use of force intentions, it is ineffective and counterproductive.<sup>95</sup>

## (2) Legal and other Economic Costs

Unintended consequences of the declaration of war on drugs and the corresponding militarization of counter-narcotics efforts is that these policies may have thrown a wrench into U.S. criminal prosecution capabilities.

The present convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of *any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.*<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Hartung, p.137.

<sup>95</sup>Reisman, p.31. The following quote was drawn from President Clinton's inaugural address.

When our interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community defied, we will act--with peaceful diplomacy when possible, with force when necessary.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p.221. Article 2 of Geneva III Convention.

The convention, then, applies to Manuel Noriega who at the time he came into U.S. custody was the head of the Panamanian Defense Force. When someone like Noriega, a convicted felon and known arms and drug trafficker, can be considered a prisoner of war (POW) and treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the system has gone awry.<sup>97</sup> Massive payments were made to Noriega so that the CIA could take advantage of his intelligence capabilities and influence over other Central American Military leaders. Noriega's reward in this relationship (while it lasted)--in addition to the money, was a free reign to smuggle weapons to the Contras and drugs to the United States. Not only did Noriega's "services" cost American taxpayers a lot of money over the years, but so did his prosecution and the appeals process (his lawyers appealed to the courts regarding his POW status).<sup>98</sup>

"Police [agencies] have shifted resources to make more drug arrests."<sup>99</sup> This re-allocation means that other crimes are not being pursued as aggressively, thereby making it easier for perpetrators of non-drug crimes to pursue their activities at reduced risk levels.

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p.219.

<sup>98</sup>Scott, p.65. Originally recruited in 1959 by the Defense Intelligence Agency, he went on the CIAs payroll in 1967.

<sup>99</sup>Sollars, p.26.

Another result of the war on drugs is, as was the case with alcohol prohibition, that the vice for illicit drugs has created a lucrative market for the traffickers. Any costs incurred in production are, for the most part, passed on to the consumer.<sup>100</sup> If the cost becomes too prohibitive, the trafficker will cut corners and ship a bad product. The unregulated substances which then reach the streets are life threatening. Consequently, there is growing support for peaceful resolutions to the drug war.<sup>101</sup> Negotiated surrenders would reduce bloodshed. And, should legalization occur, lethality of these drugs could be controlled and preclude unnecessary deaths.

Armed protection for growers and traffickers at worst precludes, and at best inhibits, arrest and interdiction. In the Huallaga Valley of Peru, Coca growers are under the armed protection of the Maoist Shining Path Guerilla Movement.<sup>102</sup> Any attempts against this organization, by American forces, will most likely result in a Vietnam style protracted conflict. The highest cost, or harshest impact on American counter-drug efforts, of the

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<sup>100</sup>Konrad, p.63. "Given that the demand for drugs per addict is relatively inelastic, criminal activity strongly increases with price, and thus non-addicts not only lose the resources needed for financing addiction, but also incur a lot of additional costs [such as those associated with medical assistance (if injured), replacement of lost items, and security against future property crime]."

<sup>101</sup>Lee, p.208.

<sup>102</sup>Hartung, p.138.

cartel's armament is the loss of life. In order to distance itself from an active "combat role" on the "warfront," Corporate Jets, Inc.--the aire apparent to the CIA's Vietnam War front company (Air America)--"was hired to fly U.S. helicopter gunships, transport planes, and crop dusters used by American drug agents and foreign police officers in operations barred to U.S. military personnel, like raids on cocaine laboratories."<sup>103</sup> Regardless of whether they are well-payd civilians or the average military member, the situation created by the proliferation of arms is just as deadly.

#### **B. REASONS FOR FAILURE**

Why is the United States losing the war on drugs? There are numerous opinions regarding the failure of the current drug war, but as different as they are from one another, and although they are bent to prove some alternative approach (ie. legalization or medicalization), they really drive home the same few points--that we are failing, that a change needs to be made in our present approach, and that the failure is the result of not just one

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

thing but of many factors (which alone wouldn't seem to have much effect, but taken together have caused the whole effort to fail). Figure 3.6 illustrates this failure.




Figure 3.6

As this figure clearly shows, the amount of drugs being imported by far exceeds the amount of drugs being seized. Consequently, the drugs are still being distributed on American streets and, even more disturbing, they are still getting into the hands of kids.

According to Congressman Solomon, "young people's perception that drugs are risky is declining, and society has stopped pounding home the theme that drugs are dangerous." While I agree that the perception of risk may be declining, I disagree that it is because society is not

putting out the danger message. As mentioned previously, there are commercials and advertisements which preach about danger; however, kids are getting a mixed message due to movies and lyrics. Another part of the problem is complacency on the part of citizens. Until recent years, communities did not take ownership of counter-drug policies as related to them (therefore kids, as well as adult drug users, did not feel compelled to abide by these policies).<sup>104</sup>

According to Arnold Trebach, author of The Great Drug War, the U.S. is losing the war on drugs because: (1) our drug laws are irrational; (2) we delude one another into thinking that certain dangerous drugs, such as alcohol and tobacco, are less harmful than others (ie. heroin); (3) we do not have the capability to manage a successful drug war; (4) our leaders have declared all users of illicit drugs to be "the enemy;" (5) the drug war does not deal with the most important problems related to drugs (ie. abuse, crime and corruption); and, lastly, (6) hysteria and hate are dominating the public discussion.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Within the last year, communities in Chicago, Santa Cruz, and elsewhere throughout the U.S., have gotten fed up with dope dealers ruining their communities and now they are fighting back (by taking the dealers to court, or by suing property owners for allowing their property to be used as a place of business for dealers).

<sup>105</sup>Trebach, p.2-5.

It can also be said that the U.S. is losing the war on drugs because: (1) the White House Drug Policy Office has no real power; (2) not enough is done to discourage drug exporting nations; (3) the military is not as involved as it should be; (4) open air drug markets have not been put out of business; and, (5) drug testing programs are not used widely enough.<sup>106</sup>

Regardless of how much money the government throws at the problem, amorphous objectives preclude it from succeeding. It is difficult to know when you have won if the objectives are ill-defined or constantly changing (change in focus, change in attitudes, budget fluxes, etc.). Clearly, confused objectives lead to confused strategy (which also leads to failure in execution). It was in fact confusion over objectives which plagued the conduct of war in Vietnam.<sup>107</sup> Apparently, we are slow to learn from history for we continue to repeat prior mistakes.

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<sup>106</sup>These points were drawn from the listing of William Bennett's strategy for winning the drug war which was entered into the House Record on 6 Apr 1995, by Mr. Solomon of New York. This "bold strategy" which Solomon believes that Congress should consider calls for government to "empower and demand action from the largely irrelevant White House Drug Policy Office; place economic sanctions against drug exporting nations; transfer control of drug interdiction to the military; identify and dismantle drug trafficking organizations; block grant drug enforcement funding; demand some presidential leadership in the war on drugs; close open air drug markets; and, expand drug testing programs."

<sup>107</sup>Summers, p.144.

Additionally, policy-makers have difficulty in identifying the enemy (is the enemy the people who are addicted to drugs or the pushers, distributors and cartels who make those drugs available?); as mentioned in chapter II, there are too many chiefs (too many agencies have a piece of the counter-drug pie)--"for every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander;"<sup>108</sup> there are conflicting intelligence estimates (and the withholding of information--between the CIA and DEA, for example)--and the National Drug Intelligence Center is underutilized when, logically, it should be the central intelligence gathering function for the war on drugs; and, a lack of sufficient prior planning and mobilization (which causes poor judgement and poor management)--failure is imminent if an "army" is committed without first committing the people; consequently, it is important to mobilize national will when committing the government to "war."<sup>109</sup> Yet another problem in the drug war concerns restrictive rules of engagement set in Washington which tie the hands of the on scene commander (if, for example, a naval vessel

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p.266.

<sup>109</sup>Duffy, p.18. In fact, operation snow cap, a joint U.S. DEA and State Department venture, meant "to provide armed DEA agents to assist police in Peru and Bolivia in search and destroy missions on cocaine processing facilities" was poorly planned. The DEA agents were not adequately trained for paramilitary operations and some of them did not speak spanish.

happens upon a possible drug smuggling vessel it is permitted to monitor that vessel but not board it--unless a Coast Guard representative, or other counter-drug liaison, is present)--"offensive action is necessary to achieve decisive results and maintain freedom of action."<sup>110</sup> These flaws, along with attitudes regarding drug use, mental sovereignty, and the scapegoat syndrome, lead to a battle on the wrong front. Also, as mentioned earlier, counter-drug policies overlook the fact that drug use and abuse is not limited to illicit narcotics. Rather, legitimately produced drugs also present a problem. (see Tables 6 and 7 of Appendix C)

Two prime examples of failure in the execution of counter-drug operations involve the DEA and the CIA. Via "Operation Green Ice," the DEA laundered money for drug traffickers in order to collect intelligence on the cartel's inner workings (insofar as shipping and trafficking methods were concerned).<sup>111</sup> When rumors began to circulate that the undercover female was a DEA agent, an international bust was set (for September 25, 1992). On the one hand, the operation succeeded in arresting 192 cartel members, (they

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<sup>110</sup>Summers, p.151.

<sup>111</sup>A&E, Ch 35, "Under Cover," American Justice, 6 Sep 1995.

were mostly financiers). On the other hand, the operation failed because cartel leaders remained isolated from the money.

The CIA exhibited poor judgement and poor management in its attempt to infiltrate a Venezuelan cartel (with the assistance of the Venezuelan National Guard). Their plan was to keep the cartel happy, corroborate and facilitate the distribution of illegal drugs by delivering it to the U.S. and allowing it to hit the streets.<sup>112</sup> This, they believed, would gain the traffickers' confidence and lead to valuable drug intelligence on the Colombian cartel--particularly information leading to the capture of Pablo Escobar. In the end, no valuable intelligence was received.<sup>113</sup> The worst part of this operation was that at least 1000 kilos of cocaine reached the U.S. (funded by U.S. tax dollars).<sup>114</sup>

The use of pharmaceutical intervention to assist in the rehabilitation process is seen as a failure because it is a violation of an individual's mental sovereignty (since this treatment may preclude enjoyment of other aspects in life while it inhibits the pleasure created by the addictive

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<sup>112</sup>CBS, "The CIA's Cocaine," 60 Minutes.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid. The lack of intelligence was cited from a DEA interview, who was circumvented in this operation.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

drug). In any case, these efforts have proven unsuccessful. Consequently, efforts toward medicalization, alone, would not solve America's drug problem.

Additionally, "by focusing on the objects of the drug war (the drugs and the drug traffickers), it is easier to deny responsibility for the causes of the drug problem."<sup>115</sup> Although an effort is being made on the demand side, in terms of awareness and rehabilitation programs, it is not stemming the tide. The awareness program consists of school lectures (which do not occur in every community), advertisements and T.V. commercials (such as President Clinton's plea to stop drug-related violence--accompanied by a 1-800 number--or spots by the Partnership For A Drug-Free America--which are not carried on all local stations).

Some rehabilitation facilities are federally funded, thereby enabling indigent or low income persons to get the help they need to "kick the habit." However, not all such facilities have adequate funds to help the growing number of addicts. Privately funded institutions are too expensive for the average person, thereby limiting their options. There are simply not enough rehabilitation facilities equipped to handle those who cannot pay their own way.

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<sup>115</sup>Swisher, p.56. Underlining added for emphasis.

For their part, police agencies have increased the number of arrests of users and street pushers and judges have sentenced increasingly large numbers of drug offenders to prison. But there are not enough prisons to hold them and building more prisons requires more time and money than is currently available. Besides, locking up the users does not cure them of their habit--it merely takes a hiatus. The inability to get the public's "focus on the [true] enemy and on the political objectives to be obtained by the use of force was the crux of our strategic failure" in Vietnam and it has been repeated in the counter-drug war.<sup>116</sup>

Without meaningful, measureable, and achievable objectives the government will never know if, when, or how they are winning. As Zig Ziggler (a motivational speaker in the 1960's and 1970's) would say, they don't "see the reaching [of a goal]." Perhaps this is why Congress wants to cut the counter-drug budget (yet another flux). Granted it is increasingly expensive to deal with the problem, but it is too soon to quit.

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<sup>116</sup>Summers, p.46.



#### IV. CONCLUSION

At the onset of the thesis process, I was willing to consider such concepts as legalization and medicalization; however, after reviewing numerous articles for and against these methods, I am not convinced that either program is the sole solution to the drug problem which tears at the fabric of our society. While legalization might mean governmental regulation of quantity and purity, and allow more monies to be distributed to prevention and treatment programs (through taxation), it does not preclude the fact that abuse will still occur. (see Figure 4.1)<sup>\*\*\*</sup>

**The Magnitude of the Drug Problem**

Drug	Frequency of drug use (millions)	
	Past month	Once or more weekly
Caffeine	178	178
Alcohol	106	47
Tobacco		
Nicotine	57	57
Smokeless	7.1	7.1
Marijuana	12	6
Nonmedical use of any psychotherapeutic drug	3.4	Unknown
Cocaine	2.9	0.9-2.2
Crack	0.5	0.3
Inhalants	1.2	Unknown
Hallucinogens	0.8	Unknown
Heroin	1.9	0.6

Figure 4.1

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>Bayer, p.94.

Regardless of the prevailing attitudes toward illegal drugs, illicit drugs and controlled narcotics are not the most abused substances. As the above chart indicates, Caffeine, Alcohol, and Tobacco, all of which are legal, are the most used (and abused) substances. Clearly, then, legalizing a substance does not preclude its abuse.

Medicalization presupposes that the medical community is perfectly capable, and successful, in treating addicts. When the truth is that only those with the addiction can guarantee their recovery (and not all addicts are ready, willing, or able to do so).

To even consider such approaches to the problem causes an individual to be lumped in with the likes of Pablo Escobar, Manuel Noriega, and others of that ilk (by the honorable Mr. Solomon--whose opinions are reminiscent of McCarthy and the Red Scare). This would seem to lend credence to Trebach's belief that the government and law enforcement have stirred up irrational fears as a result of the war on drugs. I would certainly hope that this is not the case. Some fear is healthy--in the right dose, it could be used to preclude drug use amongst potential new users, and casual users, and to reduce use among habitual users.

The United States has not clearly identified the sources of the threat that the drug-consumption problem poses to its national security; instead, the American

government has merely decreed that illegal drug use is a problem. And, the favored tactic to fight this problem is to arrest all the users.

The real enemy in this war on drugs is not the American people; it is those states and organizations who combine drugs with terror in a still largely clandestine war against western societies, above all, the American one.<sup>118</sup>

There is no question about it, a solution must be found and soon.

[Narco-terrorism] has no justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible means, ignoring the values of human life, freedom and dignity. It must be fought relentlessly and without compromise.<sup>119</sup>

Since the U. S. is the main target of narco-terrorism, it must be the leader in solving the drug problem which enables these narco-terrorists to operate. A proliferation of arms exists among narco-terrorists and law enforcement, but an effort to demilitarize the drug war might well prove fruitless.

More time has been spent on addressing the symptoms rather than the cause of America's drug problem. Consequently, a "cure" has not been found. Clearly, supply-side efforts have failed to bring viable solutions to the third world's poverty stricken--for whom drug crops are the most lucrative source of income. It is especially difficult

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<sup>118</sup>Ehrenfeld, p.185.

<sup>119</sup>Reisman, p.305.

to resist the drug trade when a drug kingpin sets himself up as a town's, or territory's, patron--supplying the quality of life items which would not have otherwise been made available.

Demand-side efforts have failed to extinguish the desire to use illicit narcotics which drives demand and makes the supply of these illegal products profitable--the higher risks (of arrest, injury, or death) associated with drug sales creates profit-sharing in so far as the street dealer earns more money when the product is successfully delivered to the consumer thereby precluding a loss to the distributor.

Failure to [identify the enemy, as well as the root cause of the drug problem,] means the war will still be fought on the wrong front, in the wrong way, with little or no chance of victory.<sup>120</sup>

The best way, perhaps, to fight this pariah, and the scourge they perpetuate, is to refocus on the demand side of the drug problem. Granted previous administrations have taken steps toward the demand side, but they were by far outweighed by supply side efforts. The desired result of demand side efforts is a reduction in demand which will reduce the profitability of drug sales and thereby decrease the amount of dollars available for arms and re-supply (replacement of lost shipments).

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<sup>120</sup>Ehrenfeld, p.186.

Attempts have been made to reduce American dependency on the illegal drug trade, but not enough has been done. An advertisement or commercial here or there may have an impact on the casual user or the non-user, but does little to preclude the use of illegal drugs by the addict. Consequently, more money should be poured into the rehabilitation process. Judge James P. Gray, a California trial judge, would definitely concur with this point. He points out that rehabilitation, not more prisons, is the answer (this means, of course, that many of the present day and near future parolees will require drug treatment and aftercare--accordingly, they will have to be monitored more closely than past parolees--to preclude new drug offenses).

If ever there was a case for a war on two fronts, the drug war is it. Since narco-terrorism has been overlooked in the past, and, or placed on the back burner for far too long, the United States can ill afford to ignore it now. Correspondingly, the U. S. cannot cease the fight on the supply side (where narco-terrorists presently prevail). But the demand side of the problem should not be forgotten. More must be done to treat the causes, not just the symptoms of this global illness.

The only hope for drug policy is a concerted effort of drug prevention which upholds the notion of no drug use, drug interdiction, and drug treatment. If we soften our hold on an already vexing problem, we will [continue to] lose the war.<sup>121</sup>

This requires, of course, that all drug laws be enforced regardless of their stringency. Because not enforcing a law renders it null and void.<sup>122</sup>

This "war," then, requires many tactics which should be executed simultaneously, with the same impetus--no one program should operate in a vacuum--or the campaign will continue to fail. On the supply-side, more should be done to offer an economic alternative to the growers and protect them from the coercive tactics of narcoterrorists. The traffickers must be disassociated from political power and their infrastructure destroyed.

On the demand-side, a new plan must be drawn up that allows for accountability (and must be given the time and opportunity to work). Clearly, constant shifts in focus inhibit the potential of a set plan, or program, to succeed. Before focus is shifted, the program in question should be evaluated for effect. Another declaration, having the full support of government leadership, should be made. Community involvement is a must--when the community takes ownership of

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<sup>121</sup>Solomon, Gerald. In a statement given in the House of Representatives, "Drug Decriminalization in Holland has increased Crime and Addiction," 2 Mar 1995, p.E499.

<sup>122</sup>Meier, p.55.

a process, they are empowered by it and are more successful as a result. More effort should be expended on prevention than has been in the past. Treatment is important, but unless more is done to prevent new users from entering the market, then treatment will fall even further behind the demand for it.

In a sense, then, medicalization must be linked to prevention and enforcement efforts must be linked to community efforts. In the grand scheme of things, demand efforts must be linked to supply efforts--the effect of one should enhance that of the other. In other words, our supply-side efforts (ie. penetrating a cartel to get inside information on the infrastructure) should not allow drugs to be shipped to the U.S. and distributed on American streets--this undermines demand-side efforts.

What General Omar Bradley once said of the Sicily invasion holds true for the counterdrug war as well--the result of the mixed form of planning utilized in this campaign is that there is

no single [person] who could conceive the operation as a whole, impose on it [their] own imprint, see it through in practice and accept responsibility for the consequences.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>Blair, p.160.

The standards in the drug war should be set by a third party and the measurement deduced by comparing reality to the ideal standard (ie. technical expertise). In this way, a citizen's group, or disassociated agency, could have a valuable role in determining the terms and measures of success in the war on drugs. This would, perhaps, serve to cut down on the politicization of counter-drug efforts. As suggested by Goldstein and Kalant,

one way to use technical expertise instead of politics to formulate more rational policies would be to apply the model of the FDA, whose mission is to match the degree of regulation to the actual danger [that] each [drug] presents.<sup>124</sup>

We must also be willing to accept that "total victory is an illusory goal."<sup>125</sup> We can at best hope to contain or reduce American consumption of illegal narcotics, but we can never expect to eliminate it.

In short, if America wishes to persist in this war, we need to: clearly define our objectives; properly identify the enemy; mobilize assets for both demand and supply-side efforts; make more efficient use of prior planning-- instituting accountability; eliminate the "too many chiefs" syndrome (by having one person or agency head up the war or by assigning explicit areas of responsibility for each of

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<sup>124</sup>Bayer, p.95.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p.93. "The practical aim of drug policy should be to minimize the extent of use, and thus to minimize the harm."

the participating agencies); consolidate intelligence estimates to cut down on conflicting reports (ie. have the National Drug Intelligence Center collect and distribute intelligence to participating agencies); reorganize the rules of engagement so that the field commander's hands are not tied; stop trying to fight a war of attrition (wherein the enemy sets the time, place, and nature of engagement); and de-politicize the battle and results therefrom (by obtaining a consensus, from governmental leadership, on the policies and procedures of the drug war--to avoid republican versus democrat accusations for failures).



APPENDIX A: CHAPTER I DATA

This appendix contains the data table and regression charts utilized for data analysis in the background section of Chapter I of this thesis.

Table 1  
Data for figures 1.1 through 1.5

Years	Drugs seized	Drug imports	Drug flow	Drug Rel.Crime	TTL crime	% Drug crime
1981	1.7	53	0.03	477.3	8096.8	0.059
1982	5.08	62	0.08	565	10062	0.056
1983	8.92	86	0.1	617	10287	0.06
1984	13.35	144	0.09	562	8922	0.063
1985	25.03	132	0.19	1000	11098	0.09
1986	27.22	138	0.2	1000	12833	0.078
1987				811	10796	0.075
1988				850	10150	0.084
1989	99.2	532	0.19	1076	10503	0.102
1990	107.3	502	0.21	869	11250	0.077
1991	111.7	587	0.19	781	10744	0.073
1992	137.8	577	0.24	920	11893	0.077

Drug Rel.Edits	TTL editorials	Public Outcry	Drug Budget	TTL Budget	Mil. Involvement
15	2038	0.007	33.6	170617	0.0002
13	1888	0.007	62.5	197609	0.0003
8	1649	0.005	79.4	221751	0.0004
9	1452	0.006	88.5	243289	0.0004
6	1492	0.004	136.3	268924	0.0005
24	1575	0.015	188.7	287527	0.0007
11	1610	0.007	504	293648	0.0017
31	1497	0.021	200.6	300832	0.0007
34	1520	0.022	503.8	309003	0.0016
25	1633	0.015	799.1	320313	0.0025
6	1456	0.004	1042.5	276000	0.0038
8	1560	0.005	1226	274500	0.0045

Table 2  
Data for figure 1.6

Year (FY)	DOD Drug Budget	TTL Drug Budget	Mil. Involvement
1981	33.6	1067.7	0.031
1982	62.5	1272	0.049
1983	79.4	1537.8	0.051
1984	88.5	1900	0.047
1985	136.3	2294.3	0.059
1986	188.7	2466.1	0.077
1987	504	4231.5	0.119
1988	200.6	4317.1	0.046
1989	503.8	6390.5	0.079
1990	799.1	9758.9	0.082
1991	1042.5	10455.7	0.1
1992	1226	11151.8	0.11
1993	1140.7	11161.9	0.1
1994	815	10937.5	0.075
1995	852.1	11564.9	0.074

Multiple regression analysis for the years  
1980 through 1989

**Regression Summary**

**MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents**

Count	7
Num. Missing	3
R	.952
R Squared	.907
Adjusted R Squared	.814
RMS Residual	3.759E-4

**ANOVA Table**

**MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents**

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	3	4.143E-6	1.381E-6	9.777	.0466
Residual	3	4.238E-7	1.413E-7		
Total	6	4.567E-6			

**Regression Coefficients**

**MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents**

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	-.002	.001	-.002	-2.950	.0600
DRUG FLOW	-.007	.004	-.523	-1.575	.2133
% DRUG CRIME	.042	.018	.863	2.281	.1069
PUBLIC OUTCRY	.073	.031	.563	2.385	.0971

**Confidence Intervals**

**MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents**

	Coefficient	95% Lower	95% Upper
Intercept	-.002	-.005	1.914E-4
DRUG FLOW	-.007	-.021	.007
% DRUG CRIME	.042	-.017	.100
PUBLIC OUTCRY	.073	-.024	.170

**Residual Statistics**

**MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents**

# >= 0	4
# < 0	3
SS[e(i) - e(i-1)]	7.301E-7
Durbin-Watson	1.723
Serial Autocorrelation	-.060

Multiple regression analysis for the years  
1980 through 1992

Regression Summary

MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents

Count	10
Num. Missing	3
R	.756
R Squared	.571
Adjusted R Squared	.357
RMS Residual	.002

ANOVA Table

MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	3	1.808E-5	6.026E-6	2.662	.1420
Residual	6	1.358E-5	2.264E-6		
Total	9	3.166E-5			

Regression Coefficients

MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	4.617E-4	.003	4.617E-4	.156	.8814
% DRUG CRIME	-.043	.059	-.338	-.720	.4986
PUBLIC OUTCRY	.027	.102	.089	.263	.8014
DRUG FLOW	.026	.011	.946	2.387	.0543

Confidence Intervals

MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents

	Coefficient	95% Lower	95% Upper
Intercept	4.617E-4	-.007	.008
% DRUG CRIME	-.043	-.188	.103
PUBLIC OUTCRY	.027	-.222	.276
DRUG FLOW	.026	-.001	.052

Residual Statistics

MIL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents

# >= 0	5
# < 0	5
SS[e(i) - e(i-1)]	1.596E-5
Durbin-Watson	1.175
Serial Autocorrelation	.334

Simple regression analysis for the independent variables Public Outcry and Drug Crime

Regression Summary  
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime

Count	12
Num. Missing	0
R	.595
R Squared	.354
Adjusted R Squared	.290
RMS Residual	.006

ANOVA Table  
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	1	1.718E-4	1.718E-4	5.489	.0411
Residual	10	3.131E-4	3.131E-5		
Total	11	4.849E-4			

Regression Coefficients  
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime


	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	-.012	.009	-.012	-1.244	.2419
Drug Crime	.289	.123	.595	2.343	.0411

Confidence Intervals  
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime

	Coefficient	95% Lower	95% Upper
Intercept	-.012	-.032	.009
Drug Crime	.289	.014	.563

Residual Statistics  
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime

# >= 0	3
# < 0	6
SS[e(i) - e(i-1)]	.001
Durbin-Watson	2.001
Serial Autocorrelation	-.056



## APPENDIX B: CHAPTER II DATA

This appendix contains the data tables, charts, and some graphs, utilized for data analysis, and graph generation, in Chapter II of this thesis.

Table 1  
Representation of Public Awareness

Years	Drug Rel.Edits	TTL editorials	Public Outcry
1981	15	2038	0.007
1982	13	1888	0.007
1983	8	1649	0.005
1984	9	1452	0.006
1985	6	1492	0.004
1986	24	1575	0.015
1987	11	1610	0.007
1988	31	1497	0.021
1989	34	1520	0.022
1990	25	1633	0.015
1991	6	1456	0.004
1992	8	1560	0.005

Table 2  
Most Important Problem Poll

Date	Percent
January 1985	2
May 1985	6
July 1986	8
January 1987	10
April 1987	11
September 1988	11
May 1989	27
November 1989	38
April 1990	30
July 1990	18
January 1991	5
March 1991	11
April 1991	10
May 1991	10
September 1991	12
November 1991	10
March 1992	8
August 1992	6
January 1993	6
September 1993	6
January 1994	9
July 1994	7

Table 3  
National Household Survey:  
Trends in the percent of self-reported illicit drug use

Year	12-17	18-25	26 & up
1982	27.6	65.3	24.7
1985	29.5	64.3	31.5
1988	24.7	58.9	33.7
1990	22.7	55.8	35.3
1991	20.1	54.7	36
1992	16.5	51.7	36
1993	26.5	51.7	36.5

Table 4  
Drug Use by High School Seniors

Sr. Class	Ever	Past year	Past 30 days
1981	65.6	52.1	36.9
1982	64.4	49.4	32.5
1983	62.9	47.4	30.5
1984	61.6	45.8	29.2
1985	60.6	46.3	29.7
1986	57.6	44.3	27.1
1987	56.6	41.7	24.7
1988	53.9	38.5	21.3
1989	50.9	35.4	19.7
1990	47.9	32.5	17.2
1991	44.1	29.4	16.4
1992	40.7	27.1	14.4
1993	42.9	31	18.3

Table 5  
1993 National Household Survey (past drug use):


Age	Ever	Past Year	Past Month
12-17	17.9	13.6	6.6
18-25	50.9	26.6	13.5
26-34	61.1	17.4	8.5
35 & up	29.9	6.3	2.8

## COMPARING COCAINE SENTENCES

Federal mandatory minimum drug sentences are based on drug weight. In a law that critics call racist, crack cocaine is treated 100 times more severely than powder cocaine.


How the 100-to-1 ratio affects sentences:

■ crack  
■ powder



Note: sentence is doubled if defendant has a prior offense

### RACE, ETHNICITY OF CRACK DEFENDANTS (Fiscal 1994)



Source: USA Today, Oct 25, 1995, p.4A

Figure B.1

Table 6  
National Drug Control Budget by Agency  
Adjusted for Inflation

Year (FY)	DOD	Natl Park Svc	Land Mgt	Indian Affairs	Territorial/Internatl Affairs	INS
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0.1
1982	3.6	0	0	0	0	0.1
1983	7.5	0	0	0	0	0.2
1984	11.7	0	0	0	0	0.3
1985	45.7	0	0	0	0	0.3
1986	90.5	0	0	0	0	0.6
1987	357.9	0	0	0	0	15.2
1988	86.8	0	0	0	0	16
1989	315.6	0	0	0	0.5	49.9
1990	543.4	0	0.2	0	1	48.6
1991	716.6	0	0.2	0	1.2	59.7
1992	800	0	2.2	0	0.7	63.4
1993	578.8	0	2.5	0	0.7	65.1
1994	355	5.5	0	0.1	0.4	67.1
1995	344.6	5.3	0	0.1	0.4	83.1

Year (FY)	Coast Guard	FAA	Customs	Other
1981	158.6	0.1	85	0
1982	243.4	0.1	91.8	0
1983	277.1	0.1	79.8	0
1984	408.6	0.1	147.7	0
1985	422.5	0.1	204.6	0
1986	340.5	0.1	205.2	0
1987	488.3	0.1	324.1	6.9
1988	467.5	0.7	291.1	7.2
1989	603.1	3.1	409.5	0
1990	661.2	9.3	488.3	0
1991	681.9	15.7	459.7	0
1992	403.7	14.1	551.3	0
1993	282.4	11.2	444.5	0
1994	281.5	14.9	452.8	0
1995	266	6.6	412.8	8.7

Table 7  
1996 National Drug Control Budget

Before adjusting for inflation		Adjusted to compare with 1980 dollars	
Agency	Drug Budget	Agency	Adjusted Drug Budget
Agriculture	29.5	Agriculture	25
Natl Svc Corp	53.9	Natl Svc Corp	45.6
DOD	812	DOD	687
Education	627.7	Education	531
Health	2396.6	Health	2027.6
HUD	290.3	HUD	245.6
Interior	35.8	Interior	30.3
Judiciary	586.5	Judiciary	496.2
DOJ	6709.9	DOJ	5676.7
Labor	80.4	Labor	68
ONDCP	156.9	ONDCP	132.7
Sm. Bus. Adm	0.1	Sm. Bus. Adm	0.1
Social Sec	202.4	Social Sec	171.2
State	213.3	State	180.5
Transportation	371.6	Transportation	314.4
Treasury	1042	Treasury	881.6
Information	8.4	Information	7.1
VA	929.5	VA	786.4
TTL Drug Budget	14550.4	TTL Drug Budget	12310

Table 8  
Percent Cooperation  
(based on DEA seizures with other agencies/ttl seizures)

Years	DEA	Interagency Cooperation	TTL seizures	% Cooperation
1985	171888	74456	246344	0.3
1988	483355	187936	671290	0.28
1989	659802	316082	975884	0.32
1990	886184	220643	1106827	0.2
1991	705003	251957	956960	0.26
1992	669581	209478	879058	0.24
1993	547800	120999	668800	0.18

Table 9  
Representation of Reporting Practices (Adult Arrests)

Years	Drug Rel.Crime	TTL crime	% Drug crime
1981	477.3	8096.8	0.059
1982	565	10062	0.056
1983	617	10287	0.06
1984	562	8922	0.063
1985	1000	11098	0.09
1986	1000	12833	0.078
1987	811	10796	0.075
1988	850	10150	0.084
1989	1076	10503	0.102
1990	869	11250	0.077
1991	781	10744	0.073
1992	920	11893	0.077

Table 10  
Representation of Reporting Practices (Juvenile Arrests)

Years	Drug Offenses	TTL Offenses	% Drug Crime
1983	57	1030	0.055
1984	65	1034	0.063
1985	76	1112	0.068
1986	73	1151	0.063
1987	73	1154	0.063
1988	82	1164	0.07
1989	78	1207	0.065
1990	69	1274	0.054
1991	59	1338	0.044

Table 11  
National Drug Control Budget (millions)  
Adjusted For Inflation

Year (FY)	Interdiction	Investigations	International	Prosecution	Corrections	Intelligence
1981	243.7	147.3	46.6	49.2	61.1	16.1
1982	338.9	174.6	65	58.4	84.4	18.9
1983	364.6	284.2	64.6	73.4	107.8	22.5
1984	568.3	329.7	77	98.2	119.6	24.8
1985	673.3	407.8	91.1	126.9	179.8	29.5
1986	636.9	460.4	126.4	150.1	221.5	30.5
1987	1192.5	628.9	195.1	208.7	351.3	41.7
1988	869.4	738	191.9	280.2	539.9	48.4
1989	1381.6	920.4	291.5	373	895.1	51.2
1990	1751.9	1090.4	500.1	455.9	1780.7	64.9
1991	1935	1229.2	604.4	556.7	1207.2	99.3
1992	1835.4	1318.4	618.4	671.3	1423.7	92.3
1993	1385.1	1299.6	479.7	725.9	1591.7	138.3
1994	1177.4	1477.9	295.7	719.2	1584.9	261.8
1995	1127.6	1509.6	270.2	741	1797.3	275.5
State/Lcl	Regulatory & Compliance	Other Law	Research	Prevention	Treatment	
19.2	12.9	0	53.3	60.2	358.1	
18.5	15.8	0	47.9	75.4	374.1	
25	20	0	56.7	96.2	422.8	
26.9	18.5	0	65.7	103	468.1	
42.7	21.6	0	78.2	121.8	521.5	
52.8	12.4	22.3	84.7	124.1	544.2	
271.5	15.8	64.5	139.2	392.3	730.3	
171	20.1	77.9	157.5	426.1	796.4	
320.4	28.6	110.8	221.1	695.7	1101.1	
696.5	28.5	185.5	327.7	1238	1638.9	
968.9	30	192.7	429.5	1411.5	1791.3	
929.5	29.4	256	472.4	1440.7	2064.3	
973.5	58.2	562.9	456.6	1426.6	2063.8	
1012.7	49.6	303.9	467.1	1433.9	2153.2	
1118	44.2	294.2	469.2	1610.8	2307.4	

Table 11 cont'd

Year (FY)	TTL Drug Budget
1981	1067.7
1982	1272
1983	1537.8
1984	1900
1985	2294.3
1986	2466.1
1987	4231.5
1988	4317.1
1989	6390.5
1990	9758.9
1991	10455.7
1992	11151.8
1993	11161.9
1994	10937.5
1995	11564.9

Table 12  
1996 Federal Drug Control Budget (by function)

International	399.1 mill	14.6 bill	2.7
Interdiction	1278.4 mill	14.6 bill	8.8
Intelligence	334.0 mill	14.6 bill	2.3
Investigations	1843.1 mill	14.6 bill	12.7
Prosecution	947.9 mill	14.6 bill	6.5
Corrections	2419.0 mill	14.6 bill	16.6
State/Lcl Enforcement	1513.2 mill	14.6 bill	10.4
Regulatory/Compliance	103.7 mill	14.6 bill	0.7
Other Law Enforcement	339.8 mill	14.6 bill	2.3
Treatment	2826.6 mill	14.6 bill	19.4
Prevention	1974.9 mill	14.6 bill	13.6
Research	570.7 mill	14.6 bill	3.9

Table 13  
Drug use by Military Enlisted

Year	Past 30 days	Past 12 months
1980	27.6	36.7
1982	19	26.6
1985	8.9	13.4
1988	4.8	8.9

Drug use by Military Enlisted  
(percent reporting use)




Figure B.2

Table 14  
Emergency Room Drug Mentions

Year	Cocaine	Heroin/Morphine	Marijuana/Hash
1988	101578	38063	19962
1989	110013	41656	20703
1990	80355	33884	15706
1991	101189	35898	16251
1992	119843	48003	23997
1993	123300	63000	70035

Year	Methamphetamine/Speed	PCP	LSD	Methadone
1988	8992	12346	3835	2486
1989	8722	8042	3421	3150
1990	5236	4408	3869	2617
1991	4887	3470	3846	2632
1992	6563	5282	3499	2812

Year	TTL Drug Abuse Episodes	Year	TTL drug mentions
1988	403578	1988	668153
1989	425904	1989	713392
1990	371208	1990	635460
1991	393968	1991	674861
1992	433493	1992	751731
1993	466900		

### Emergency Room Drug Mentions




Figure B.3

### Emergency Room Drug Mentions




Figure B.4

**Table 15**  
**Past Year Drug Use by 8th and 10th graders (percent)**

Drug Type	8th graders			10th graders		
	1991	1992	1993	1991	1992	1993
Marijuana/Hash	6.2	7.2	9.2	16.5	15.2	19.2
Inhalants	9	9.5	11	7.1	7.5	8.4
LSD	1.7	2.1	2.3	3.7	4	4.2
Other Hallucinogens	0.7	1.1	1	1.3	1.4	1.9
Cocaine	1.1	1.5	1.7	2.2	1.9	2.1
Crack	0.7	0.9	1	0.9	0.9	1.1
Other Cocaine	1	1.2	1.3	2.1	1.7	1.8
Heroin	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7
Stimulants	6.2	6.5	7.2	8.2	8.2	9.6
Steroids	1	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.1	1

**Table 16**  
**1993 High School Senior Survey past drug use:**

Drug	Ever	Past Year	Past Month
Marijuana	35.3	26	15.5
Cocaine	6.1	3.3	1.3
Crack	2.6	1.5	0.7
Stimulants	15.1	8.4	3.7
LSD	10.3	6.8	2.4
PCP	2.9	1.4	1
Heroin	1.1	0.5	0.2



APPENDIX C: CHAPTER III DATA

This appendix contains maps, charts, tables, and quotes utilized for analyses made in Chapter III of this thesis.

Table 1  
Cocaine Indicators

Cocaine Prices				
Quantity	Area	1991	1992	1993
Kilogram	National Range	\$11,000-\$40,000	\$11,000-\$42,000	\$10,500-\$40,000
	Chicago	\$18,000-\$30,000	\$17,500-\$37,000	\$20,000-\$30,000
	Los Angeles	\$12,000-\$28,000	\$11,000-\$20,000	\$14,000-\$20,000
	Miami	\$14,000-\$25,000	\$13,500-\$25,000	\$16,000-\$24,000
	New York	\$14,000-\$29,000	\$12,500-\$35,000	\$17,000-\$25,000
Cocaine Purities				
Kilogram	National Range	86%	83%	82%
Ounce		72%	74%	70%
Gram		59%	64%	63%
Cocaine Laboratory Seizures in the United States				
Number of Seizures		4	4	1


Table 2

U. S. Marijuana Prices

Commercial Grade	1990	1991	1992	1993
Wholesale (pound)	\$250-\$3,000	\$400-\$3,000	\$300-\$3,000	\$300-\$5,000
Retail (ounce)	\$25-\$300	\$40-\$550	\$40-\$450	\$25-\$450
Sinsemilla				
Wholesale (pound)	\$400-\$4,100	\$500-\$6,000	\$650-\$9,600	\$1,000-\$9,500
Retail (ounce)	\$80-\$350	\$100-\$450	\$125-\$650	\$75-\$1,000

THE DRUG TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE DRUG TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA



C H I N A

SOUTH CHINA SEA

12

BHUTAN

INDIA

BANGLADESH

BURMA

BAY OF BENGAL

RANGOON

THAILAND

ANDAMAN SEA

VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

LAOS

VIENTIANE

Luang Prabang

Muong Sing

Chiang Rai

Hong

Chiang Mai

Son Mai

Mae

Salween

Homong

Moumein

Bangkok

Chonburi

Pallin

Da Nang

Phnom Penh

Koh Kong

Chi Minh City

Hanoi

Dien Bien Phu

Luang Prabang

Muong Sing

Chiang Rai

Hong

Chiang Mai

Son Mai

Mae

Salween

Homong

Moumein

Bangkok

Chonburi

Pallin

Da Nang

Phnom Penh

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Chi Minh City

Hanoi

Dien Bien Phu

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Moumein


Bangkok

Chonburi

Pallin

Da Nang

Phnom Penh



*Seized semi-submerisible in profile: length—22 feet.*

Figure C.1

Table 3

<b>COCAINE PRODUCTION</b>				
<b>Potential Cocaine HCl Production by Country, 1992-1993</b>				
		<b>Net Coca Cultivation (hectares)</b>	<b>Estimated Coca Leaf Yield (metric tons)</b>	<b>Potential Cocaine HCl Capacity (metric tons)</b>
<b>Bolivia</b>	1992	45,500	80,300	245*
	1993	47,200	84,400	255**
<b>Colombia</b>	1992	37,100	29,600	60
	1993	39,700	31,700	65
<b>Peru</b>	1992	129,100	223,900	650-695
	1993	108,800	155,500	450-485
<b>Potential Cocaine HCl Production</b>			1992	955-1,000
			1993	770-805

Source: *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, April 1994*

**Table 4**  
**Illicit Opium Poppy and Opium Production Estimates**  
**(Major Source Countries)**

			<b>Net Opium Cultivation (hectares)</b>	<b>Potential Opium Yield (metric tons)</b>
<b>Southeast Asia</b>	<b>Burma</b>	1992	153,700	2,280
		1993	165,800	2,575
	<b>Laos</b>	1992	25,610	230
		1993	26,040	180
	<b>Thailand</b>	1992	2,050	24
		1993	2,880	42
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>Colombia</b>	1992	20,000	20
		1993	20,000	20
	<b>Guatemala</b>	1992	730	negl
		1993	438	4
	<b>Mexico</b>	1992	3,310	40
		1993	3,960	49
<b>Southwest Asia</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	1992	19,470	640
		1993	21,080	685
	<b>Iran</b>	1992	unk	unk
		1993	unk	unk
	<b>Lebanon</b>	1992	negl	negl
		1993	440	4
	<b>Pakistan</b>	1992	8,170	175
		1993	6,280	140
<b>Total Potential Opium Production</b>			<b>1992</b>	<b>3,409</b>
			<b>1993</b>	<b>3,699</b>

Table 5

<b>MARIJUANA PRODUCTION ESTIMATES (Selected Foreign Areas of Cultivation)</b>			
		<b>Net Cultivation (hectares)</b>	<b>Net Production (metric tons)</b>
<b>Belize</b>	1992	54	50
	1993	49	49
<b>Colombia</b>	1992	2,000	1,650
	1993	5,000	4,125
<b>Jamaica</b>	1992	389	263
	1993	744	502
<b>Mexico</b>	1992	16,420	7,795
	1993	11,220	6280

**Foreign Military Sales Agreements (in thousands)**

	FY50-FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,584	34,070	16,689	15,183	20,877
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,390	45,201	58,113	31,484	21,849
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	462	1,674	315	318
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	864	4,965	799	-

Figure C.2\*

**Foreign Military Construction Sales Agreements (1000s)**

	FY50-FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,897	1,415	4,147	5,822	3,207
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	428	922	8,236	452	93
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure C.3\*\*

\*FMS, p.6-9.

\*\*Ibid., p.12-13.

## INFORMATION WARFARE APPLICATION Military Technical Revolution

Information warfare and technology is a crucial part of the current push toward a revolution in military affairs, but is the United States ready for this revolution? The limiting factor in the United States' achievement of the "system of systems," which is the core of the revolution in military affairs, is the military's "ability to tap into and integrate the technological acceleration underway in the commercial sector."<sup>128</sup> (see figure C.4) Although technology doesn't win wars, an advantage can be gained if new technologies and tactics are combined in a creative manner.




Figure C. 4

Source: Blaker, J., "A Vision," p.8.

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<sup>128</sup>Blaker, p.8.

Innovation is the driving force behind the "system of systems" which is found in three technologies: digitization, computer processing, and global positioning. *Digitization* allows compression, enhancement and mathematical manipulation of information prior to transmission.<sup>129</sup> *Computer processing* allows digitized information to be manipulated rapidly.<sup>130</sup> And *global positioning* allows for real time, precise, location and targeting of tangible objects.<sup>131</sup> Battlespace awareness, pictured in figure 4 above, relies on the sensing and reporting technologies of reconnaissance and intelligence systems; advanced C4I relies upon information sifting and transferral technologies; and precision force use refers to action (which includes offensive information warfare) taken based upon the information generated by the preceding two systems.<sup>132</sup>

With a shrinking force structure, the advantage gained by information warfare is crucial to success in future campaigns. The sooner the transition to the new revolution in military affairs is made, the longer U.S. dominance can be maintained. For, "today, the real risk lies in

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<sup>129</sup>Owens, p.38.

<sup>130</sup>Blaker, p.8.

<sup>131</sup>Owens, p.38.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

hesitating, and the real pay-off will go to the bold, the innovative, and the inventive."<sup>133</sup>

### **Current Capabilities**

What are our infowar capabilities? Today's capabilities consist of: hacking, computer viruses, electronic jamming, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (with onboard cameras), spy planes, psy-ops plane, stealth planes (with precision guided munitions), a suit-case sized device that generates a high-powered electromagnetic pulse (developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory), Force Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment system (a virtually omniscient computer system which converts radar signals into a three dimensional picture--this enables a battle group's admiral to view graphics of both friendly and hostile air craft--and may lead to micro-management), and, in June, the first class of sixteen infowar officers graduated from the National Defense University (they were trained in a broad spectrum of infowar tactics--from defending against computer attacks to using virtual reality to plan battle maneuvers).<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p.39.

<sup>134</sup>Waller, p.41.

## Future Capabilities

Our future capabilities are also steeped in technological developments. "By the year 2010, the Army [expects to have digitized] the battlefield, linking every soldier and weapons system electronically."<sup>135</sup> The military will have more sophisticated information processing equipment and smart weapons. Biosensors will be used to sniff out the enemy. And ground troops will have a hi-tech helmet with components such as earphones and microphones, a heads up display, thermal imaging sensors and night-vision goggles; all of which will enable the warrior to maintain constant communications with other ground troops, leaders, and the area coordinators; to be continually updated with positioning and intelligence information; and to maintain visibility during night operations.<sup>136</sup>

In the future, perhaps, "the distinction between civilian and soldier may blur, with more private contractors needed to operate complex equipment on the battlefield."<sup>137</sup> It is the risk we run as our military becomes increasingly more technical. The counter to such sophistication, however, is not itself sophisticated or costly. "Much of the technology needed to attack information systems is low-

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<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid.

cost, widely available, and just as efficient."<sup>138</sup> All it takes is a computer, a modem, and a willing hacker. An infowarrior is not readily identifiable, and he/she need not be a rocket scientist to wreak havoc in computer or communications systems. Disruption can occur at any juncture in the communication chain (shown in figure 5 below) thereby making it difficult to detect and counter. Accordingly, information warfare has an important place in the defence of our national security goals.

#### **Components of a Communication System**

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**Source ---> Transmitter (signals ---> channel) ---> Receiver**

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Figure 5

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<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p.43.

Table 6

Selected Dangerous Drugs Price Information

<b>Wholesale Prices</b>				
	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>
Methamphetamine (oz)	\$500-\$2,400	\$500-\$2,500	\$300-\$2,500	\$400-\$2,600
PCP (oz liquid)	\$100-\$1,000	\$150-\$1,000	\$150-\$1,000	\$200-\$1,500
LSD (du)*	\$0.30-\$3.50	\$0.25-\$4.00	\$0.30-\$5.00	\$0.30-\$5.00
MDMA (du)	\$2-\$20	\$2-\$20	\$5-\$20	\$5-\$20
<b>Retail Prices</b>				
	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>
Methamphetamine (g)	\$50-\$150	\$50-\$150	\$30-\$200	\$45-\$150
PCP (1 cigarette)**	\$5-\$70	\$5-\$70	\$5-\$70	\$5-\$70
LSD (du)	\$1-\$10	\$1-\$15	\$1-\$15	\$1-\$10
MDMA (du)	\$5-\$30	\$7.50-\$45	\$10-\$30	\$8-\$30

Table 7

<b>Legitimately Produced Narcotics</b> (retail prices)				
	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>
Codeine/ Glutethimide (set)	\$7-\$17	\$6.50-\$14	\$6.50-\$14	\$6.50-\$14
Hydromorphone (Dilaudid) (4 mg)	\$20-\$60	\$15-\$68	\$15-\$80	\$15-\$70
Pentazocine/ Tripelemnamine (set)	\$8-\$20	\$7.50-\$20	\$7.50-\$20	\$7.50-\$20

Narcotics/Analgesics and Heroin  
Substitutes/Supplements

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