Operational Art in Modern Chinese Warfare.

Abstract

This paper investigates the Chinese concept of operational art in tne twentieth century. A dichotomy has traditionally existed in Chinese doctrine which professes a lead-power status in Asia while emphasizing anti-professionalism in the military. This political- military relationship has severely limited the PLA to function effectively at the operational level of war for past and possibly future power protections operations. This paper will examine the limitations that traditional Chinese military dogma and Maoist doctrine has placed on the PLA's operational level of war capabilities in conventional campaigns beyond China's borders. This impact will be assessed in the Korean War (1950), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnam War (1979) case studies. Finally, the lessons China learned from these wars and resulting revisions of its military will be provided for assessment purposes in operational planning.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 12, 1996
Accession Number
ADA307331

Entities

People

  • Peter R. Ofstedal

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Army
  • Artillery Units
  • Doctrine
  • Governments
  • Korean War
  • Military Doctrine
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Planning
  • Military Training
  • National Politics
  • New York
  • Students
  • Training
  • Vietnam War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Asian Economic Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design