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WILDERNESS GUIDE:
PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE FOR THE COMMANDER IN BOSNIA

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
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.


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Abstract of

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The Intelligence Community has taken on the tough job of reducing the uncertainty that coalition task force commanders must face in conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW). Intelligence support to Bosnia peace operations presents a useful case study. The considerable efforts in Bosnia since 1992 have been well grounded in sound doctrine; however, this is not readily apparent because no subset of doctrine has been promulgated for coalition MOOTW. These precepts of such a needed subset have emerged from the Bosnia experience: (1) create an organization responsive to the commander's requirements that produces timely and accurate finished intelligence; (2) emphasize application of national and operational intelligence resources downward; (3) build communications connectivity up and down echelon to better disseminate intelligence; (4) acknowledge the enemy may be unknown, ambiguous, or not exist; (5) exploit tactical intelligence as it assumes a greater role, at times to the exclusion of national intelligence; (6) expect available resources to be scarce at some level; (7) adjust to national or organizational cultural differences; (8) unify effort; (9) emphasize sharing; (10) provide for complementary operations; (11) conduct liaison exchange; and (12) play the facilitating role of wilderness guide. Because of the burgeoning need for this new doctrine, it is time to codify our Bosnia experience. The coherence this doctrine lends intelligence support will enable the Commander to quickly orient his forces to a situation and step out smartly in the right direction. Intelligence support based on this doctrine will do what it is supposed to do--show the Commander the forest by guiding him through the trees.

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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE FOR THE COMMANDER IN BOSNIA

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement ties our future prosperity to a chaotic outside world, declaring that "we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests . . . without active engagement in world affairs."¹ For the military, this has meant more involvement as a coalition partner in military operations other than war (MOOTW), and the emergence of the combined joint task force (JTF) as a primary vehicle for operations. The Intelligence Community has taken on the tough job of reducing the great uncertainty that task force commanders must face.

The development of intelligence support to commanders conducting Bosnia peace operations presents a useful case study to assess how far the Community has come, and what it should do to support coalition MOOTW. Our considerable efforts in Bosnia since 1992 have been well grounded in sound doctrine covering the entire intelligence cycle;² however, this is hard to discern because no doctrine has been promulgated specifically for coalition MOOTW. The Community created the intelligence support structure ad hoc as an amalgamation drawn from a large body of doctrine in three different arenas: (1) operational level; (2) MOOTW; and (3) multinational operations. The experience points to major precepts of a needed new doctrine subset, and enlivens a Community role as "wilderness guide."

Support to the Operational Level Commander

Since the task force commander is key to the success of a mission, our

¹ U.S. President, Policy Statement, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1995), 33.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 5 May 1995), Joint Pub 2-0, II-2, defines intelligence cycle as the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. Its stages are: planning and direction; collection; processing; production; and dissemination.

intelligence support looks most like operational level intelligence support to him. From his unique operational level vantage point, the commander must make decisions on how best to employ tactical military forces to achieve desired strategic military aims.³ He can only accomplish this if intelligence informs him of enemy centers of gravity and the vulnerabilities he can exploit to overcome them. This awareness comes from intelligence that reflects a fundamental understanding of the enemy "at all levels--from the soldier to the nation."⁴ Three main tenets of operational intelligence support have stood out in Bosnia: (1) create an organization that is responsive to the commander's requirements and produces timely and accurate finished intelligence; (2) emphasize application of national and operational intelligence resources downward; and (3) build communications connectivity up and down echelon to better disseminate intelligence.

Headquarters U.S. European Command laid the foundation for a strong intelligence organization as early as the spring of 1992, when it established the 40 person JTF Planning Cell to begin contingency planning for possible missions in Yugoslavia. Three of the personnel were dedicated to addressing intelligence issues, which paved the way for the modest J-2 staff element of JTF Provide Promise, conducting our first humanitarian mission in Bosnia.⁵ Commander Herb Loughery described growing pains for the JTF Provide Promise intelligence organization from his perspective as director of the supporting Joint Intelligence Center in Naples, Italy:

I cannot over-emphasize . . . the importance of a capable and powerful intelligence organization resident with the commander. In the early stages of the JTF Provide Promise deployment to Naples, Italy, the concept of intelligence operations called for a light intelligence footprint forward . . . Very quickly, it became apparent this . . . was inadequate . . . Repeated

³ Michael L. Warsocki "Intelligence Within Operational Art," Military Review, March-April 1995, 45.

⁴ Ibid., 48.

⁵ Allan L. Mink II, "JTF Planning Cell: Initial Response to the Yugoslavia Crisis," Military Review, March 1994, 69.

short-fused planning efforts required extensive intelligence support which could not easily be tasked to a remote site and received in time to be of use to the Commander.⁶

Only such a strong organization could provide the clear and detailed knowledge of a situation that a commander must maintain. Commander Loughery illustrated the craft of fusing information to produce useful intelligence for the commander in his anecdote about a false alarm:

We could find no supporting evidence for a Bosnian Serb buildup in the Posavina Corridor in preparation for an offensive [in early 1994]. Nevertheless, the story had developed a life of its own . . . and multiple bits and pieces of . . . information from operational reporting and technical means were drawn to it like a magnet Close coordination with U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina Command allowed us to refine the original unevaluated information and eventually debunk the theory of General Mladic's master stroke.⁷

Operational intelligence support places a premium on application of strategic or national intelligence to satisfy the commander's requirements. This is especially the case in the planning stages before troops are committed and credible tactical intelligence starts to flow in from the field.⁸ Accordingly, the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters in Sarajevo include National Intelligence Support Teams composed of national intelligence agency representatives who "know exactly what the commander needs [because] they see him every day They can reach back . . . right into . . . Washington, pull out the information, and pass it directly."⁹ The

⁶ Herbert A. Loughery, "The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia: Intelligence Support to and Coordination with Coalition Forces," Unpublished Briefing Script, U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Officers School, Newport, RI: 1995. He served from May 1993 until July 1994 as the director of the Joint Intelligence Center for JTF Provide Promise, the U.S. intelligence organization in direct support of the Commander responsible for U.S. and Allied operations in the former Yugoslavia.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Warsocki, 45.

⁹ U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing, Washington: 18 January 1996.

National Reconnaissance Organization has also distributed a new easily used "Fact-Pack,"¹⁰ a hard disk that contains the latest imagery of the entire country of Bosnia.

The operational commander relies heavily upon effective dissemination of intelligence to project his view of the battlefield to both seniors and subordinates, particularly in the realm of indications and warning. Deployment of advanced and expensive technology has been the key to this needed connectivity in Bosnia. The Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS) has made a tremendous difference with its high volume capacity to transfer any kind of digitized information and full motion video over a network called Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System. U.S. forces in Tuzla and the IFOR/ARRC headquarters have JDISS terminals, and there are extensions of this network among the NATO forces using a system called Localized Operational Capability-Europe. We have taken great strides since last summer. Specifically, "When Captain O'Grady was shot down, threat warning information reached him about a minute late Improvements have been made . . . so that kind of . . . information will get there . . . in time."¹¹ Commander Loughery observed an early tendency of both Naples and Sarajevo headquarters' intelligence operations to focus on internally supporting the respective Commanders and their planning staffs to the detriment of supporting them externally by simply getting the word out.¹²

Support to MOOTW

The vagaries of MOOTW in its different guises skew intelligence support in

¹⁰ Ibid. The senior Intelligence Community spokesmen added that "one of the intelligence outfits in-theater built 'Trip Tiks' just like you would get from 'Triple A.'"

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Loughery.

several problematic ways: (1) the enemy may be unknown, ambiguous, or not exist; (2) tactical intelligence assumes a dominant role, at times to the total exclusion of national intelligence; and (3) resources dedicated to the mission are invariably scarce at some level. Such prospects can easily lead to the frustration and pessimism expressed recently by many with regard to operations in Bosnia. "Troops were introduced . . . in order to maintain a peace that did not exist, in the hope of imposing a peace that could not be imposed."¹³ The inescapable facts remain, though, that political leaders have assigned the difficult mission, and the military must make the best of it.

Conflicts such as Yugoslavia's cannot be easily classified, and the "enemy" never properly identified.¹⁴ This struggle for equilibrium among the "South Slavs is not ancient, unless the term ancient encompasses the end of the 19th century, and it is not religious, although religion has played a part. The current conflict is primarily ideological and political."¹⁵ The MOOTW task force commander must grasp these ground truths of the "human terrain"¹⁶ from intelligence which provides him insight into "the cultural, social, political, and historical conditioning which define legitimacy and coercion."¹⁷ He otherwise lacks the knowledge necessary to protect his forces or leverage the local situation.

Especially until sides are drawn, intelligence must assess potential adversaries and provide specific indications of their intent to prevent surprise and

¹³ Jonathan Eyal, "The War in Yugoslavia: Some Preliminary Lessons," *RUSI Journal*, April 1995, 32.

¹⁴ Eyal, 31.

¹⁵ Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," *Daedalus*, Spring 1992, 143.

¹⁶ Dr. Larry E. Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," Unpublished Article, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, NC: December 1995, 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

offensive actions against friendly forces.¹⁸ The commander's priority intelligence requirement becomes more, "Who's targeting us?" than "Who are we targeting?" Much of the information gathering must therefore be directed toward the civilian population, sympathizers, terrorist groups and their weapons, and/or evidence of foreign support.¹⁹ Counter-intelligence assumes great importance. Senior intelligence spokesmen recently sought to allay concerns on this point in Bosnia by noting, "We are aware of the counter-intelligence threat posed by our association . . . with foreign elements in this environment, and are taking appropriate action about it."²⁰

However timely it may have become in Bosnia, national intelligence remains geared toward strategic conventional threats and generally pales in importance to tactical intelligence in MOOTW, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT). The commander needs detailed, police-type intelligence often obtainable only through "cop on the beat" presence and a highly developed HUMINT network. The intelligence organization needs as many regional experts and linguists as it can find. Moreover, intelligence collection plans must not overlook such overt lucrative sources as refugee interviews or news media,²¹ and should not neglect data concerning war criminals, whose prosecution can become a symbol of mission legitimacy. Senior intelligence spokesmen have alluded to the HUMINT network's highly advanced state in Bosnia, saying, "Somalia was . . . the precursor to what we're doing in Bosnia in terms of interaction between Defense, Central Intelligence, and perhaps other agencies involved in gathering HUMINT."²²

¹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 29 April 1994), J-2.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

²¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, J-5.

²² U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

Commanders in typically remote MOOTW can rarely draw upon the existing intelligence resources of a mature theater, and operational bias usually prevents allocating them abundant intelligence support resources of their own.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 acknowledges that "individuals assigned to observer groups may receive little or no support."²³ These operations fall short of war, and therefore do not rate total Intelligence Community commitment. In the words of a senior intelligence official, "We don't have a lot of intelligence . . . capabilities at work [in Bosnia] that we did . . . in the desert [Desert Storm]...This is not war. This is peace and peace enforcement . . . not large maneuver forces in active conflict."²⁴

Commanders in Bosnia are fortunate in having at their disposal much of a highly developed European theater intelligence infrastructure, ranging from the combined Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England, to complete automated storage and retrieval systems.²⁵ Their vulnerability lies in having their relatively small and fragile task force infrastructure overwhelmed by the massive influx of available outside intelligence resources. Their modest but highly evolved forward intelligence organizations provide the precision needed to avoid breakdowns and bottlenecks. The Commander depends on "the right man in the loop at the right moment" who can fuse data into a constantly evolving big picture and provide feedback for refining follow-on intelligence requirements.²⁶ Nothing enhances task force legitimacy and respect better than a demonstrated capacity to locate proper targets accurately, and to make punishment fit the crime both in severity and timeliness.²⁷ Good intelligence makes even modest firepower effective; poor

²³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, J-1.

²⁴ U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

²⁵ Loughery.

²⁶ Edward A. Smith, "Putting It Through the Right Window," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1995, 39.

²⁷ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe, Jr., The RAND Corporation, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 137.

intelligence wastes firepower or causes harm due to mistargeting.²⁸

Support to Multinational Operations

Multinational aspects of intelligence support continue what is done in the joint arena to cross organizational bounds and promote teamwork. Joint Pub 2-0 says this stems "from similar needs--to present an adversary a seamless force and for unity of effort of multiple force efforts."²⁹ As a testament to the progress we are making in jointness, our multinational intelligence support measures in Bosnia have sprung on the scene fully formed. They reflect strong adherence to the following principles of multinational intelligence support: (1) adjust to national or international organizational cultural differences; (2) unify effort; (3) coordinate intelligence sharing; (4) provide for complementary intelligence operations; and (5) conduct intelligence liaison exchange.³⁰

Sun Tzu said, "Know the enemy and know yourself,"³¹ but one must also know his coalition partners. The key to adjusting for national or organizational differences is to identify and understand them, particularly as they concern perceptions of a given situation or intelligence itself. For example, differing views on the nature of ethnic conflict in Bosnia could easily lead to misunderstandings and clashing expectations. One expert has said, "For the Americans, ethnic conflicts are social problems, not territorial issues. Yet for the Europeans, ethnic problems have a completely different meaning. Everyone abhorred the violence in Yugoslavia. But the Europeans instinctively understood what the fighting was all

²⁸ Ibid., 138.

²⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 2-0, VIII-2.

³⁰ Ibid., VIII-3.

³¹ Thomas R. Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time, containing the Art of War by Sun Tzu (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, March 1985), 28.

about.”³² Europeans see that “the struggle for national identity cannot be separated from any movement for democracy and human rights.”³³ Widespread awareness of these different outlooks within the coalition significantly enhances interpretation of intelligence based upon which partner produced it.

The very existence of intelligence creates a problem in dealing with the United Nations (U.N.) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are typically concerned with maintaining an impartial and non-threatening profile during peace operations. A U.S. Marine officer who served briefly in late 1993 with U.N. forces deployed to Macedonia reported that he “found ‘U.N. culture’ completely alien to our traditional method and practices in providing intelligence support to commanders ‘Intelligence’ itself is a dirty word, replaced by the euphemism ‘information.’ ”³⁴ He might have been surprised to learn that our own Joint Pub 3-07.3 provides, perhaps misguidedly, for such de-emphasis of intelligence in peace operations. “Once deployed, the commander’s authority to conduct intelligence operations may be severely restricted; therefore, the intelligence section may have to be submerged in the force structure.”³⁵ In his work with the U.N. in Bosnia, Commander Loughery observed that the U.N. “makes no formal provision in peacekeeping operations for an organic ‘intelligence’ capability and the sensitivities over ‘military information’ activities are very real, although not nearly as sensitive as when operations in the former Yugoslavia first kicked off.”³⁶

The best way to unify intelligence effort is to mandate a common overall intelligence picture. Since different staffs have their own requirements, this unfortunately does not spell the end of some duplication of effort. Commander

³² Eyal, 32.

³³ Banac, 169.

³⁴ Raymond J. Leach, “‘Information’ Support to U.N. Forces,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, 49.

³⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, J-1.

³⁶ Loughery.

Loughery witnessed the problem in providing intelligence support to air strikes in Bosnia:

Distinct U.S. and NATO staffs supporting the same commander . . . frequently resulted in tension The air strike and close air support are NATO and not U.S . . . missions. The target selection and approval process does not necessarily follow U.S. guidelines and requires U.N. participation. This means independent NATO target lists which must be supported by high quality imagery and target graphics. These in turn must be displayed to the U.N. decision makers during the final target board process.³⁷

Despite frustrations along the way, developing a free flow of raw data and intelligence among partners pays big dividends in achieving consistency. Commander Loughery noted, "This is not a one way stream of intelligence . . . from the U.S. to NATO and the U.N. We frequently gained far more from receiving their reporting or comparing notes. This is critical when there are two Commanders who must have a common view . . . of the battlefield. What conclusions they draw from this view is another matter."³⁸

Since one has to give something in order to get something in return, intelligence sharing primarily concerns devising efficient means to package, sanitize, and release intelligence while protecting sensitive or fragile sources. Joint Pub 3-07.3 directs that intelligence "must be formatted clearly and at an appropriate classification level to ensure its releasability to all operational forces involved. Authority to downgrade classification or to sanitize information . . . should be provided to the appropriate operational echelon."³⁹ The execution of this precept in Bosnia has entailed tremendous effort, but has become a major success. Senior intelligence spokesmen explained the process and results:

Early on, the entire Intelligence Community . . . put together . . . a big matrix . . . [that] lays out the different kinds of intelligence, how it can be

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, J-2.

either sanitized or directly released If you go into the Russian brigade commander's plot and compare it . . . to the American brigade commander's plot, it ought to be the same information On the Russian commander's plot, it will have a lot more of 'here's the fact without the source.' . . . It's working pretty smoothly.⁴⁰

The process has been refined to the point that what used to take days to release can now be released quickly. Release of imagery intelligence, for example, has been reduced to an hour and a half, and "we'd like to make it faster."⁴¹ At some point, language itself becomes the only major impediment to sharing common knowledge. Fortunately for us, English is still widely used and understood. Senior intelligence spokesmen said our partners in Bosnia, even our former enemies and now partners, the Russians, are getting their text messages in English with no apparent loss of effectiveness in intelligence exchange.⁴²

Joint Pub 2-0 reasons logically that "because each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations or unique and valuable capabilities, the sum of intelligence resources and capabilities of the nations should be available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem."⁴³ All partners can contribute intelligence, ranging from the counter-intelligence best provided by host nations or local entities to the sophisticated technical data the United States invariably brings. Senior intelligence officials explained the set-up in Bosnia: "The United States is certainly the major intelligence source for U.S. forces. Each nation has its own responsibility to provide intelligence support to its own forces within the coalition. It's a shared arrangement. Other countries are making a substantial contribution [but] the United States [is] the primary supporting agency for a good

⁴⁰ U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 2-0, VIII-5.

deal of IFOR.”⁴⁴

Commander Loughery characterized the mix of intelligence sources before NATO ground forces arrived. “The intelligence operation in Bosnia [was] largely one of intensive [U.S.] imagery and photo reconnaissance coupled with operational reporting from UNPROFOR, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and NGOs.”⁴⁵ Specifically, he mentioned reliance upon easily-released U.S. U2 aircraft and tactical aerial reconnaissance data, including that from “a specially configured P-3 Orion with a high-resolution electro-optical imaging capability placed at Bosnia-Herzegovina Command’s disposal with a ground station at the Sarajevo headquarters for the downlinking of realtime still video.”⁴⁶ Senior intelligence spokesmen lauded the contributions of U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System.⁴⁷ Commander Loughery also cited less exotic, yet vital U.S. technological contributions to intelligence support, such as high speed, high capacity XEROX machines or a powerful information storage and retrieval system with a rapid full text search engine known as the Electronic Collateral Support System (ELCSS):

ELCSS became the most valuable tool at our disposal Many NATO and U.N. officers felt the U.S. had access to a magic pool of intelligence that was not being shared. In reality, the NATO intelligence organizations were receiving largely the same information, but they had no efficient means of archiving it and retrieving information in support of research and planning.⁴⁸

The United States still depended upon partners’ tactical observation reports, geopolitical insights, and other emergent gap fillers. Just as U.S. aircraft carrier

⁴⁴ U.S. Dept. of Defense, “Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor,” Background Briefing.

⁴⁵ Loughery.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ U.S. Dept. of Defense, “Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor,” Background Briefing.

⁴⁸ Loughery.

and amphibious intelligence organizations deployed to the Adriatic Sea called on the U.S. Army for ground order of battle imagery interpretation augmentation,⁴⁹ we depend on allies to fill shortfalls.

Liaison personnel are the real action officers of multinational intelligence support. They facilitate intelligence exchange and coordination, smoothing over the rough spots, and building trust, resilience, and flexibility into a difficult process. When we decided to start sending the Russians intelligence in Bosnia, we immediately planned to dispatch "a cell of persons"⁵⁰ to be stationed with them. On the negative side, liaison personnel pose risks in creating the temptation "for skip echelon tasking to and reporting from [them which] undermines the . . . Commander's prerogative in ensuring his view of the battlefield is articulated in reporting from his headquarters."⁵¹ At worst, they could be spies. Nonetheless, liaison has become a prominent feature of Bosnia multinational operations. We are not only sending liaison officers to previously unheard of places, but allowing them into some of our inner-most sanctums. Senior intelligence spokesmen gave an example of the amazing speed at which old barriers are coming down:

A couple of weeks ago there was an issue of foreign intelligence officers riding in U.S. reconnaissance aircraft--the RC-135, the P-3 aircraft--that are out there in theater It's always a delicate question to bring coalition partners actually on board the airplanes. This kind of thing in the past would take weeks to resolve--messages, phone calls. We had all the right people around the VTC [video teleconference] and solved it in about three minutes.⁵²

Community's Role as Wilderness Guide

Our intelligence support mechanisms are obviously well-engaged in Bosnia,

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

⁵¹ Loughery.

⁵² U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Intelligence Support to Operation Joint Endeavor," Background Briefing.

but one still wonders if the Community is missing something. An effective way to check is to examine progress in the context of a simple role model. Since the mission is a journey of sorts through the wild post-Cold War landscape, the Community must be the "wilderness guide" by dint of its expertise and resources. The role of canoe guide for the Boy Scouts' High Adventure Program provides a convenient contemporary model.

The canoe guide, or "interpreter" as the Scouts now say, "acts as a resource person for the skills pertaining to camping and wilderness canoeing. He is a specialist with the equipment and food carried on canoe trips, [and] . . . has had training in the history of the canoe country and the special safety practices to be observed."⁵³ He takes groups of six or seven teenagers and one or two adult leaders on nine day canoe treks in the wilderness of the Minnesota Boundary Waters and Canadian back country. He knows the key to a successful trip is not so much his display of wilderness technique (important as that may be) as his ability to mold a group into a competent and confident crew. He must first gain their trust, then educate them, allocate responsibilities according to individual ability, and instill in them a desire to cooperate and a sense of pride in the expedition.

The guide is a coach, but also still a player. In the wilderness, some jobs don't lend themselves well to delegation, being too critical to the welfare of the entire crew to risk performance by anyone other than the expert. These might include navigation, cooking, or radio communication with base camp. Still, the guide can't paddle and portage every canoe, and must ultimately depend upon the successful performance of every crew member for his own well-being. Moreover, the guide is subject to the authority of the crew's adult leader, who may or may not be an experienced camper. The guide's challenge therefore is to facilitate without

⁵³ Boy Scouts of America, 1996 Northern Tier Crew Trip Planning Guide (Ely, MN: Northern Tier National High Adventure Programs, Boy Scouts of America-The Charles L. Sommers Wilderness Canoe Base, 1995), 23.

being overbearing, teach without patronizing, and lead through tact, perseverance, and inspiration. His effective performance is essential to the success of the trip, but he is not a one man show.

The Intelligence Community fulfills the support function of a canoe guide. The Community may not know a given territory precisely, but can rely upon its technical, analytical, and organizational capabilities to establish an effective support structure. The Community earns the trust and confidence of commanders through competence in providing useful, objective intelligence.⁵⁴ However, the real secret to success lies in educating and drawing commanders and partners into the intelligence process. The Commander can then drive operations more effectively by articulating his intelligence requirements better. Allies then start contributing worthwhile intelligence of their own. Every situation is different in detail, but the Community's great power represents a constant off which all else can be leveraged. Although it has taken four years to gear up, the Community seems to have embraced this leadership role with its assertive posture in Bosnia.

Conclusion

"An important function of all intelligence echelons," says Joint Pub 2-0, "is to benefit from significant operations, training, and intelligence experience."⁵⁵ The Community has done that in Bosnia with excellent results. The Bosnia experience has blazed a new path in marking these basic tenets of doctrine for intelligence support to the coalition MOOTW task force commander: (1) create an organization that is responsive to the commander's requirements and produces timely and

⁵⁴ One of the quickest ways to lose credibility is to report what is politically expedient, and not what is actually happening.

⁵⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 2-0, IV-14. It adds, "The Joint Universal Lessons Learned System should be used fully to document intelligence lessons learned." There are several JTF planning lessons learned concerning Bosnia in the data base.

accurate finished intelligence; (2) emphasize application of national and operational intelligence resources downward; (3) build communications connectivity up and down echelon to better disseminate intelligence; (4) acknowledge the enemy may be unknown, ambiguous, or not exist; (5) be aware that tactical intelligence assumes a dominant role, at times to the total exclusion of national intelligence; (6) expect resources dedicated to the mission to be scarce at some level; (7) adjust to national or international organizational cultural differences; (8) unify effort; (9) emphasize intelligence sharing; (10) provide for complementary intelligence operations; (11) conduct intelligence liaison exchange; and (12) play the facilitating role of wilderness guide.

Because of the burgeoning need for this new subset of doctrine, now is the time to codify our Bosnia experience for future use. The coherence this doctrine lends intelligence support will enable the Commander to quickly orient his forces to a situation and step out smartly in the right direction. Intelligence support based on this doctrine will do what it is supposed to do--show the Commander the forest by guiding him through the trees.

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