

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**TOWARDS A VIABLE NATIONAL SECURITY
PROCESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

BY

COMMANDER FRED M. ROSA, JR.
United States Coast Guard

19960528 014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

100% QUALITY INSPECTED 1

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TOWARDS A VIABLE
NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Commander Fred M. Rosa, Jr.
United States Coast Guard

Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release. Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Departments of Defense or Transportation or any of their agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Fred M. Rosa, Jr. (CDR), USCG
TITLE: Towards a Viable National Security Process for the
21st Century
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 10 April 1996 PAGES: 33 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study begins with an overview of the emerging characteristics of the dynamic post-Cold War national security environment. Subsequent sections first highlight the rationale for continuing to reshape the national security process to correspond more closely to the new global environment and then outline several specific proposals to that end. The merit of these proposals derives from their focused objective of ensuring that the process is sufficiently comprehensive, systematic, future-oriented, and objective. While the highest national security premium must always be placed on principled and enlightened senior leadership, process initiatives such as those outlined may contribute to a Washington climate generally more conducive to political courage in the face of tomorrow's looming national security imperatives.

INTRODUCTION

As the dynamic post-Cold War era continues to evolve and present ever daunting challenges, several broad proposals for enhancing the existing U.S. national security process warrant careful consideration. Their merit derives from a shared focus on ensuring that the process is sufficiently comprehensive, systematic, future-oriented, and objective. The present paper begins with a review of the emerging characteristics of the post-Containment national security environment from the U.S. perspective. Subsequent sections first highlight the rationale for continuing to reshape the national security process to correspond more closely to the new global environment and then outline several specific proposals to that end.

As used herein,¹ the term *process* refers primarily to the fundamental approach and workings of the institutional mechanisms created to realize the overarching national security *vision* articulated by senior leadership -- a vision premised on enduring *national values* which in turn define specific *interests*. In theory, if often not in practice, this critical process has two essential outputs: (1) a *strategy* which serves as the overall national security blueprint for employing ways and means to realize the stated vision; and (2) *policies* which represent the ongoing application of that strategy to resolve specific issues as they arise. While a consideration largely outside the scope of this paper, in a broader sense, the process also serves as a catalyst and source of inputs for refining or even redefining the national security vision over time.

THE EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The primary and enduring theme during the almost forty-five years that the superpower conflict dominated the U.S. national security agenda was ensuring national survival. While economic prosperity and the promotion of core values were clearly related and important, the twin specters of nuclear holocaust or Soviet global hegemony remained dominant throughout this extended period.²

The national security context has changed dramatically, however, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.³ The U.S. is now the sole superpower in a transformed and as yet largely uncharted era no longer globally-transfixed by rival superpower conflict. This emerging new era finds all nations no longer constrained to perform their foreign policy calculus in the menacing shadows of the Cold War. The new era has not brought global peace, however, as numerous regional and intra-state crises (often stemming from longstanding ethnic tensions) have erupted into violent conflict over the past several years.⁴ Leading examples include Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia (all three of which cases are discussed briefly below), as well as both the Gulf War and the Kurdish question (primarily involving Turkey, Iraq and Iran) which remains a serious threat to regional stability in the Middle East.⁵

The new context is also dramatically different in at least three other significant respects: the globalization of the world economy; the dawn of the information age; and the increasing

prominence of transnational threats. These dynamic phenomena have already had profound impacts on the national security process and appear certain to remain influential factors.

The increasing globalization of the world economy is one of the most critical emerging realities for the national security establishment.⁶ While international trade per se is millennia old, today's markets are vastly more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. As recently as the early post-World War II era, even the larger economies of the leading powers were comparatively resistant (especially across the shorter term) to serious adverse impacts relating to developments abroad. Today that is not the case, as now many would suggest that "geoeconomics" has largely replaced "geopolitics."⁷ In addition to resource dependencies (such as that brought starkly to light by the oil crisis in the early 1970s), national manufacturing, financial, and even agricultural and employment markets are now increasingly interwoven. Two relevant examples include the controversial and anomalous "American content" definition now applicable to cars sold in the U.S.⁸ and the as yet poorly understood reciprocal impacts on U.S. and Mexican job markets stemming from the recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which took effect in January 1994.⁹

A second critical phenomenon relates to today's dramatic information age improvements in communications technology and the general level of shared awareness across the globe.¹⁰ CNN's intensive coverage of the Gulf War and the Somali crisis are but

two of many examples of how potent the media has become in focusing world attention and galvanizing governments and key players to action. The information age has also helped to revolutionize many aspects of warfare, ranging from the lethal effectiveness of "smart" bombs to quantum improvements in battlefield awareness and the introduction of sophisticated means of compromising the computer-based informational capabilities of potential adversaries.¹¹

Another information age impact is probably of greater significance across the long term. Summarized briefly, the explosion in both information availability and access to media (driven by remarkable advances in microcomputers, satellite systems and fiber optics) is transforming the economic and social structure of many countries.¹² Coupled with such other factors as the rise in ethnic violence and increasing global economic interdependence, the overall impact is profound. While cause and effect in this context is difficult to determine, two noteworthy manifestations of this complex phenomenon appear to be the recent surge of rising expectations (especially in developing nations)¹³ and the intensification of the ongoing urban migration trend worldwide (i.e., by 2020, 60 percent of the population is projected to live in cities, up from just 42 percent in 1985).¹⁴

The final new phenomenon worthy of particular note is that the recession of the Cold War has afforded the world community more opportunity to focus on the status and import of various adverse trends which heretofore competed poorly for attention.¹⁵

Typically transnational in nature and effect, these global trends with alarming portents include: the dramatic upsurge in ethnic violence; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems; the continuing population explosion; the increasing polarization of wealth (both abroad and in the U.S.); the growth of organized crime; the greater incidence of "failed states" among the poorer developing nations; the further deterioration of the ecosystem; and the recurring waves of refugees and economic migrants.¹⁶ A number of the foregoing trends appear to have accelerated in recent years; moreover, nearly all of these trends have already been a critical factor in one or more international crises triggering a U.S. response in just the few short years since the fall of the Iron Curtain.¹⁷ The Institute for National Strategic Studies recently characterized these transnational problems as "a significant and increasing threat to U.S. security" and noted that one common denominator among this broad range of issues is that "none are due primarily to the actions of governments."¹⁸

THE CASE FOR CONTINUING TO RESHAPE THE PROCESS

The "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" developed by the Clinton Administration represents tangible progress towards tailoring the national security process to the new global environment.¹⁹ Published in February 1995, the Strategy outlines what is in many respects a far-reaching vision highlighting the nature and significance of the various emerging "non-traditional" threats to national security. In contrast to

similar documents issued by his predecessors, the Clinton Strategy is premised on a much broader conception of the term "security."²⁰ Cases in point include its treatment of the issues relating to rogue states, environmental degradation, and refugee flows as well as its heightened emphasis on domestic prosperity and economic security.²¹

Of particular relevance, the Clinton Administration has clearly elevated economic issues within the national security context.²² The most prominent reflection of this increased emphasis was the President's establishment early in his tenure of a National Economic Council (NEC) essentially on a par with the existing National Security Council (NSC).²³ Moreover, his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 entitled "Organization of the National Security Council": (1) assigns the NSC the role of coordinating the integration of "all aspects of national security policy... domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council)"; and (2) adds both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy to the roster of NSC members.²⁴

Notwithstanding President Clinton's forward-leaning Strategy and related reorganizational initiatives, the national security record of the first post-Cold War Administration has received mixed reviews. Various informed assessments have concluded that the Clinton team has been frustrated in its efforts to develop and implement coherent, consistent and effective national security policies, in large measure due to the nature, number,

scope, and pace of the extant challenges.²⁵

Oft-cited examples include the Somali crisis, the subsequent Rwandan massacres, and the ongoing Bosnian situation. Critics allege that the first instance, notwithstanding the thousands of lives saved, represented a U.S.-orchestrated case of overreaching and mismanagement which ended as a widely-perceived "U.N. failure" -- a perceived failure with significant costs for both the U.S. and the world's leading international organization in terms of prestige and deterrent potential.²⁶ Soon thereafter, Rwanda saw the world community -- clearly "gun shy" in the aftermath of the Somali debacle -- fail to react in time to prevent over 500,000 deaths stemming from tribal violence.²⁷ The Balkan example highlights the perceived U.S. abdication of its leadership role in the U.N. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the Administration's profound difficulties in articulating the national security interests underlying the eventual U.S. deployment to Bosnia.²⁸

Another area frequently cited as problematic is the fundamental dissonance inherent in several major themes of the Clinton Strategy.²⁹ One example involves the concurrent emphasis on democratization and regional stability. At present, a number of U.S. key regional allies are patently undemocratic and increasingly under fire from internal forces militating towards democratic and economic reforms. As perhaps the leading case in point, to what extent does continuing support for the current autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states -- where

the real threat is arguably the progressive decay of political and economic structures -- imperil long-term U.S. national security interests in this critical region?³⁰ Another example is the tension between "engagement and enlargement" on the one hand and the isolation of such nations as Cuba and Iran on the other. Continuing the longstanding trade sanctions against Cuba and implementing the Iran component of the current Middle East "dual containment" strategy are understandably held by critics to virtually preclude positively influencing these unfriendly nations through mutual interaction and appropriate assistance.³¹

At a more fundamental level, despite some progress in this regard, the current national security process still retains its predominant "military" orientation.³² While not surprising in that the U.S. defined its national security almost exclusively in military terms for more than 40 years, this orientation is nonetheless out of step with the nature and complexity of current and evolving challenges. As is evident from much of the post-Cold War record, what is needed is a significantly recast process, with a broader focus across the entire spectrum from values and interests to the ends, ways and means of national security strategy and policy.

FURTHER ENHANCING THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS

There is no question that Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia have been formidable (perhaps even unresolvable) crises which any previous administration would have found equally challenging (although perhaps not sufficiently "threatening" in the

geostrategic Cold War context to mandate a significant response). It should also be noted that the current Administration deserves credit for achieving clear or apparent successes in other critical arenas, including: the NAFTA and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) accords; denuclearization in Russia and the Ukraine; the Partnership for Peace initiative in Central Europe as a transitional step towards (or perhaps an effective substitute for) NATO expansion; the Haitian intervention to restore the Aristide government; and further progress in the continuing Middle East peace negotiations.³³

Viewed from this more balanced perspective, the cited post-Cold War examples of unsatisfactory outcomes serve most appropriately not as an indictment, but rather as evidence of the need to explore options for further reshaping the national security process in response to the new global environment.³⁴ Several broad proposals intended to promote discussion along these lines are set forth below. Each of the proposals is either drawn directly from or inspired by the extant literature on the national security process.

Comprehensiveness

The first two proposals address the comprehensiveness of the process. While there is already general acceptance of the pressing need for greater comprehensiveness, to date few concrete and effective measures have been taken in this regard. As one senior official recently observed, "[w]e remain reluctant in this [foreign policy] community to accept a broader definition of

national security even when the facts cry out for such a definition."³⁵

The first process proposal calls for ensuring that all actual and potential threats to national security are appropriately identified, documented, and addressed. The initial focus of this first proposal is the numerous non-traditional or unconventional threats of external origin.³⁶ Typical examples include regional resource scarcities (e.g., Middle East water shortages in relation to population density), illegal mass migrations (e.g., Haitians, Cubans and Mexicans along the U.S. southern border), and foreign sources of environmental danger (e.g., deteriorating and poorly-maintained nuclear power plants located near international borders in Eastern Europe). For the most part, the Clinton Strategy highlights the threats in this external category and at least signals a greater U.S. resolve to counter them.

The case for comprehensiveness, however, also reaches inward to embrace such pressing issues as jobs, poverty, crime and health care -- issues which are increasingly polarizing the domestic agenda.³⁷ Traditionally, the national security context has had an international orientation, with a predominant and at times exclusive focus on external threats and related foreign policy. Today, this inherited orientation serves the process poorly for two fundamental reasons.³⁸ First, the domestic arena is itself a more and more disturbing (if not new) internal source of potent threats to national security. Second, as those

commentators who have coined the term "intermestic" have persuasively articulated, a nation's ability to withstand external threats is today strongly dependent on the preservation of a sufficient economic and resource base as well as a stable society. Together these considerations have far-reaching implications for strategy formulation and resource allocation -- simply stated, a progressively greater focus of U.S. national security will almost certainly need to shift to America's homes, schools, workplaces and streets.³⁹

Poverty and crime statistics are particularly telling in this regard. Advocates for the "primacy of the domestic agenda" ask how many external actors or conditions pose a greater threat to U.S. security today than the over 30 million Americans currently living below the poverty line or the nearly two percent of the adult population under continual supervision by prison or police authorities.⁴⁰ Tomorrow's picture is bleaker still, in that these populations continue to grow both in absolute terms and as percentages of the national population. Stark and compelling domestic statistics of this nature abound, strongly underscoring the mounting urgency of rethinking the traditional U.S. conception of national security.

Current U.S. bilateral relations with Mexico afford a striking illustration not only of the increasing significance of transnational issues, but also of how the line of demarcation between foreign and domestic policy issues is blurring in the evolving national security context. In essence, Mexico's two

"leading" exports to the U.S. are illegal drugs and immigrants, both of which pose serious domestic problems. An estimated 70 percent of the cocaine reaching the U.S. market passes through Mexico; nearly 50 percent of the Americans incarcerated in federal and state prisons are there for drug-related crimes; and the approximately 3.5 million unauthorized migrants currently living in the U.S. (the majority of whom are Mexican) compete with Americans for jobs and constitute a tremendous resource drain on social welfare programs.⁴¹ Viewed in this light, the NAFTA trade initiative and the more recent 20 billion dollar bailout of the Mexican peso are much more than single context (i.e., economic, domestic, or foreign policy) issues -- and could prove essential national security measures if a strengthened economy south of the border eventually helps to reduce the flow of illegal drugs and immigrants.⁴²

While the required redefinition of national security is clearly underway, the transition to a new and broader outlook is far from complete. As one example, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University recently published Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. This excellent reference -- which offers an overview of "specific trends, U.S. interests, and issues of concern to those who frame U.S. security policy" -- does not address the potential security threats originating directly from conditions within this country (some of which have external contributing causes).⁴³

The second process proposal, also related to enhancing comprehensiveness, calls for expanding the mandate (and the staff structure) of the existing NSC to encompass responsibility for all national security matters, including those arising outside the traditional context.⁴⁴ While the Clinton Administration's establishment of the NEC was consistent with the increasing importance of economic factors in national security, the overriding imperative is to ensure that all relevant factors (including those of an economic nature) are considered in a single, carefully-integrated process. In essence, the NEC may have been a case of "doing the wrong thing for the right reason" -- i.e., creating a separate and parallel staff structure to address economic considerations may have frustrated the very policy integration the initiative was intended to promote.⁴⁵

One senior U.S. diplomat recently urged that any attempt to separate international economic policy from international security policy is a "false dichotomy."⁴⁶ Approximately 25% of today's U.S. economy depends on foreign trade, and exports have driven most of the nation's recent growth. Moreover, the U.S. is at once the world's largest trading and largest debtor nation. These realities, coupled with the increasing relative significance of economic power in the national security context, suggest that the better approach may be to integrate the entire process beginning at the initial staff level. The current arrangement requires two principals (i.e., the National Security Adviser and the Assistant to President for Economic Policy) to

coordinate the efforts of their respective staffs and resolve any emerging differences.⁴⁷ Moving to a single national security staff would arguably promote better integration of economic and non-economic national security issues from the outset of NSC consideration.

Systematic Nature

The third proposal seeks to ensure that the national security process is adequately systematic in nature. Briefly stated, appropriate concrete steps should be taken to increase the depth, breadth, and overall rigor of analysis underlying the process. As discussed previously, all relevant actual or potential threats to national security, including those of a non-traditional or unconventional nature, must first be identified and documented. These threats should then be organized in a systematic hierarchy,⁴⁸ with each threat carefully analyzed to determine: (1) the essential actor or condition posing the threat; and (2) the specific related mechanism(s) by which the threat jeopardizes U.S. security interests. One example might be to identify the increasing global polarization of wealth as a core threat and then evaluate the various possible threat modalities (e.g., upsurge in illegal immigration, increasing susceptibility to exploitation by totalitarian regimes unfriendly to the West, further decline in safety of U.S. persons and interests overseas, etc.).

More analytical rigor in this regard would better support targeting scarce national resources to the critical areas where

they will likely have the most positive impact. A preliminary outline of a possible sequential approach -- drawn in significant part from several different sources⁴⁹ -- is as follows:

1. Determination of national security interests based on the national security values articulated by senior leaders;

2. Organization of the above interests into four priority categories (i.e., survival, core, important and peripheral);

3. Development of a threat framework based on the defined interests, to include:

- a. Categorization of each threat as either an actor or a condition;

- b. Identification of the corresponding means or actual/potential adverse impacts, respectively;

- c. Assessment of each specific threat, to include national security interest threatened; time frame (e.g., current, near-term, horizon, or remote), magnitude of threat, and probability of threat materializing; and

- d. Prioritization of threats (through a comparative risk assessment, possibly using a weighting system as a decision aid);

4. Preparation of a composite threat picture (including comparative risk assessments);

5. Analysis of aggregate resource availability together with the possible approaches to employing the available resources to counter threats; and

6. Development and continual refinement of the national security strategy as the optimal plan for harnessing the available ways and means to realize the ends defined by the overarching national security values.

As noted, the foregoing approach draws heavily on the contributions of experts from the national security establishment and certainly offers little that is novel. The outline is merely one of many possible systematic approaches to organizing the national security focus. Its value here derives primarily from the overall assessment of knowledgeable observers who believe that an adequately systematic and comprehensive approach is currently not in place.⁵⁰ Its absence in actual practice handicaps the national security process, particularly when called upon for short-fuse responses to fast-paced and urgent crises. Moreover, as noted earlier, given the scarcity of available national security resources, a more systematic approach is indispensable in terms of targeting these scarce resources most efficiently across the longer term (especially for crisis prevention initiatives).

Two examples serve to illustrate the potential advantage of a more systematic approach to the national security process. The first addresses the relationship between environmental shortages and conflict, while the second considers the development of sound regional security strategies.

Current projections are that the world population will reach nine billion within 50 years, and that this development will

trigger increasingly critical shortages of such renewable resources as water and fish stocks.⁵¹ Careful study of historical data related to these phenomena confirmed a causal relationship between such shortages and violent conflict. More specifically, this research led to development of a detailed model capturing the interaction of the various factors in this causal relationship. The model's significance in the present context derives both from its value as an explanatory tool and its potential for use in targeting national security resources most efficiently to disrupt the expected cycle of increasing scarcity and violence.

Another scholarly contribution of comparable value used the concept of "pivotal states" to consider current U.S. foreign policy in the various regions across the globe.⁵² This thought-provoking and convincing study concluded that Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey are the pivotal nations within their respective regions in terms of long-range U.S. interests. The significance of this example is effectively underscored by the realization that current U.S. foreign policy arguably does not reflect the relative importance of these key countries to future national security.

On the one hand, the preceding examples are simply two among many worthwhile offerings in the relevant literature. On the other hand, they both serve to illustrate the type of rigorous analysis which the national security process will increasingly

need to assimilate and exploit in order to address the complex new realities of the emerging global environment. This appears unlikely to happen unless that process is reshaped to better accommodate such valuable and essential inputs.

Future Orientation

The fourth proposal relates to the future. An enhanced national security process should pursue a fuller understanding of the way in which the decision and implementation time frames associated with many global phenomena appear to be accelerating. In essence, there is real concern that the pace of various adverse trends has quickened, with a corresponding decrease in the window of time available for effective negation of the corresponding threats.⁵³ A better appreciation is required of how much more quickly certain known and predicted negative impacts will arrive on the national security event horizon. Without such an understanding, there is a tendency to put off resolving difficult issues, too often with reference to platitudes about the efficacy of future technology as a "just in time" problem solver.

In a related vein, a more meaningful and explicit means of affording appropriate weight to the future in the national security process should be expeditiously developed and implemented.⁵⁴ Today's process routinely considers various predictions and projections about the future. Yet these tools tend to focus invariably on the comparatively near-term future (i.e., rarely out beyond 50 or 100 years) and in any case

generally have decreasing political relevance in direct proportion to the remoteness of that focus. All too often, attempts to address even core threats that are not expected to materialize within the next few years trigger little more than fleeting and largely symbolic references to contemporary society's custodial obligations to succeeding generations.

The need clearly exists for a practical way to factor in the interests (some would assert "rights") of those Americans who are truly remote -- say a century or more away -- from our present. While obviously a difficult task (and one with strong ethical and other subjective dimensions), the failure to in essence make future stakeholders more tangible in the current process may bankrupt succeeding generations to an irresponsible extent.⁵⁵

Objectivity

The fifth and last proposal relates primarily to the urgent need to ensure that what is by nature a subjective and politicized process is sufficiently well-grounded in objective analysis and sound insights gleaned therefrom.⁵⁶ One way to address this need may be to establish a new advisory mechanism as an independent adjunct to the existing national security apparatus. This mechanism could promote a more detached and unbiased focus on issues which transcend the tenure of current elected and appointed incumbents.⁵⁷ While the national security process is admittedly intensively personality and value-driven, there are objective realities which should be brought into sharper focus by an entity that is less a hostage to short-term

political fortunes.

This proposal might take the form of a National Security Advisory Board, with members nominated by the President in accordance with specified criteria reflecting high standards of professional excellence to serve for an extended term of years. Requiring confirmation by the Senate would be an appropriate reflection of the important (and increasing) role of Congress in the evolving national security process.⁵⁸ A small but well-resourced Advisory Board could then support the national security process activities of both the executive and legislative branches through non-partisan assessments and expert staff work; moreover, the Board could facilitate process continuity, serving as a bridge from one administration team to the next.

As one example of its potential utility, the Advisory Board might be tasked to prepare a comprehensive biennial National Security Assessment (perhaps along the lines of the sketch outlined in the third proposal herein) which could serve to frame the focus and efforts of the national security process.⁵⁹ Publication of this document (or, if necessary, an unclassified executive summary thereof) would likely have an agenda-setting and constraining effect on the more overtly political workings of the national security process. While the President and Congress would be free in one sense to disregard the assessments and recommendations of the Board, doing so might entail some political risk -- especially if the new entity is successful in establishing a reputation for non-partisan excellence. The more

positive corollary is that senior officials genuinely seeking to champion national interests (who might otherwise be intimidated by entrenched parochial interests) may be encouraged to stay the course with the support of a credible new "honest broker" playing an appropriately constructive role in the process.

There is some precedent for this proposal in that several previous administrations have used ad hoc study groups as an adjunct to the NSC staff in an effort to glean new insights and insulate the initiative from bureaucratic interference.⁶⁰ One example was the high-profile Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy which delivered a 1988 report entitled "Discriminate Deterrence" calling for a revised U.S. military strategy.⁶¹ Proceeding further to create an independent standing body of this nature would likely require amendment of the National Security Act.⁶² Possible institutional models to consider in implementing such an approach include the Federal Reserve Board and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission.

The BRAC Commission model appears especially useful given its national security orientation and the avowed objective from the outset of negating the Congressional "pork-barrel" influence in developing recommendations as to which unneeded defense facilities should be sacrificed to generate the substantial "peace dividend" expected by the public at large. As one commentator observed, the entire BRAC process essentially afforded individual members of Congress "the political cover they needed to do what was right for the nation."⁶³

There is no assertion here that establishment of an Advisory Board would -- or should -- take the politics out of the national security process. Rather, if such a body of experts earns and maintains a reputation for objective and focused national security scholarship, the potential exists for framing the political aspects of the national security process in a more responsible and enlightened fashion. And while one might argue that there already exist numerous think tanks and institutes to perform this function, virtually all of them reflect -- or are at least perceived as reflecting -- one or more biases which limit their potential contribution. These organizations -- together with similar entities within government -- clearly contribute immensely to public awareness and debate relating to national security issues. Yet arguably none of them have the prominence, independence, or statutory mandate to enhance the process as would the proposed National Security Advisory Board.⁶⁴ Such an entity appears ideally suited to, as several observers described the objective, "shape and give pride of place to long-term and national interests over short-run and parochial ones."⁶⁵

In this vein, an adjunct yet independent body in a strong supporting role could facilitate moving the overall NSC-directed process more often beyond its customary reactive mode (some would say reactive "paralysis") to more proactive exploitation of key opportunities. As it stands now, the process of necessity allocates virtually all of its staff resources either to sheer crisis response or else to limited planning in relation to

particular events in the near term spotlight.⁶⁶

An Advisory Board might also promote a better integration of all the various sources of national power -- often categorized as military, political, economic, and informational -- in harnessing ways and means to implement the National Strategy.⁶⁷ Too frequently, especially in response to emerging crises, the military option is ready first and is thus chosen essentially by default owing to significant time pressures (typically media-induced).⁶⁸ An Advisory Board staff could provide an important head start on developing other options (or, even better, crafting preventive initiatives) given its greater opportunity to focus on the larger national security context -- as compared to the NSC staff's never-ending burden of responding to the relentless press of daily events and political dictates.

Finally, an adjunct body similar to that proposed could prove a catalyst for developing a core consensus in relation to a new grand strategy to replace the "polestar" of Containment.⁶⁹ No such new consensus appears on today's horizon. And while a strategy as straightforward as Containment may be neither achievable nor desirable in light of the evolving national security environment, at least broad agreement on some of the key issues (e.g., the thrust and extent of foreign aid, basic military intervention criteria, and the relevance of the domestic agenda) will likely prove essential.

This initiative has definite potential to improve the fundamental quality of the national security process.⁷⁰

Compelling logic suggests that such an effort may in fact prove essential to preclude or at least minimize national security outlooks and related policies aligned almost exclusively with incumbent political agendas and/or assessments of short-term feasibilities -- as opposed to current threat realities and validated future projections.

CONCLUSION

Promoting the development of an adequately comprehensive, systematic, future-oriented and objective national security process is an urgent priority if the U.S. is to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Yet while an improved process would be a major and essential step forward, the quality of leadership afforded the nation by the President and senior members of Congress will ultimately determine whether that process is a viable safeguard of U.S. national security.⁷¹ As one process participant recently observed, "in the final analysis, people of goodwill and intelligence will have to place national interests above political, personal or even organizational concerns if the United States is to be served well."⁷²

Without principled and enlightened leadership at the highest levels of government, initiatives such as those outlined herein will likely have only limited impact. An enhanced national security process, however, may contribute to a Washington climate generally more conducive to political courage in the face of tomorrow's looming national security imperatives.

END NOTES

¹Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 4-11; Richard A. Chilcoat, "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 1-7.

²Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 1-12.

³Ibid., 1-30; Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 528-529.

⁴Jordan, 529-532.

⁵Snow, 262-267.

⁶Ibid., 1-30.

⁷William G. Hyland, "Reexamining National Strategy" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 26-28; Jordan, 532.

⁸Snow, 20-21.

⁹David Bacon, "After NAFTA," Environmental Action, Vol. 27-3 (Fall 1995), 34-36, 39; William J. Clinton, "The President's Press Conference with President Zedillo (10 October 1995)," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 31, No. 41 (16 October 1995), 1798-1800.

¹⁰Snow, 1-30.

¹¹Leonard Sullivan, Jr., "Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 18-36.

¹²Martin Van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 11-27; Snow, 24-28.

¹³Gene Stephens, "We Are Facing a Global Crime Wave," USA Today, July 1995, 27.

¹⁴Walter H. Corson, ed., The Global Ecology Handbook (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 29.

¹⁵Hyland, 32.

¹⁶Lester R. Brown, Hal Kane, and David Malin Roodman, Vital Signs: The Trends that are Shaping Our Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 15-21; David Jablonsky, "Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order," (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 81-85; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1995/96), 18-27; Gareth Porter, "In the U.S. Interest: A Focus on the Environment is Crucial for America's Future National Security," EPA Journal, April-June 1993, 36-38; Sullivan, 1-8.

¹⁷Snow, 1-30.

¹⁸Hans Binnendijk, ed., Strategic Assessment 1995: Security Challenges in Transition (Washington: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 173.

¹⁹White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (Washington, D.C., 1995), i-iii.

²⁰Don M. Snider, "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 13.

²¹White House, "National Security Strategy," 1-33.

²²Michael Ruby, ed., "Rethinking America's Role," U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 1994, 104.

²³James F. Miskel, "The Clinton NSC" [Undated article published by U.S. Naval War College and reproduced by permission by U.S. Army War College in Readings entitled War, National Policy & Strategy (Course 2, Vol. 3: Academic Year 1996), 1-5]; Snow, 73, 104, 258-259.

²⁴White House, "Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2: Organization of the National Security Council" (Washington, D.C., 1993), 1.

²⁵Raymond Seitz, "America's Foreign Policy: From the Jaws of Victory," The Economist, 27 May 1995, 21-23; Ruby, 104.

²⁶John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/February 1994), 56, 65-66.

²⁷Andrew Purvis, "Specter of Genocide," Time, 5 February 1996, 34.

²⁸Seitz, 23; Snider, 12.

²⁹Hyland, 28-30; David Silverberg and Francis Tusa, "Shadow Over the Gulf; Iran is Preparing -- But for What?", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1995, 24.

³⁰Vahan Zanoian, "After the Oil Boom: The Holiday Ends in the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), 2-7.

³¹Peter Hakim, "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," The Brookings Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 46; Robert Waller, "The U.S. Middle East Security Strategy," Middle East International, No. 506 (August 4, 1995), 16-17.

³²Gregory F. Treverton and Barbara A. Bicksler, "Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?", in Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 407-408, 421.

³³Snider, 12.

³⁴Jordan, 538-539.

³⁵J. Brian Atwood, "Towards a New Definition of National Security: The New Strategic Threats," Vital Speeches of the Day, 2 November 1995, 136.

³⁶Ibid., 136-137; Sullivan, 2-6.

³⁷Peter G. Peterson and James K. Sebenius, "The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda," in Rethinking America's Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 57-93.

³⁸Jordan, 532-534; Snow, 24-27.

³⁹Peterson, 59-60, 85-93.

⁴⁰Ibid., 66-69.

⁴¹Kevin Fedarko, "Bad Neighbors," Time, 29 May 1995, 40; Binnendijk, 173; Christopher Mitchell, "International Migration as an Issue on Today's Inter-American Agenda," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Fall 1994), 98-99.

⁴²Bacon, 34; Clinton, 1798-1799.

⁴³Binnendijk, v-ix.

⁴⁴White House, "PDD 2," 1-4; Miskel, 1-5; Christopher C. Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), 129-130.

⁴⁵Treverton, 422-425; Snider, 18.

⁴⁶Seitz, 22.

⁴⁷Miskel, 3.

⁴⁸Robert D. Blackwill, "A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," in Europe in Global Change, ed. Verner Veidenfeld and Josef Janning (Guterloh, Germany: Publisher Berpelsnenn, 1993), 100-103.

⁴⁹Ibid.; Hyland, 42; Ruby, 104; Roskin, 4-11.

⁵⁰Snider, v; Hyland, 41-42.

⁵¹Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," in Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, eds. Sean M. Lynne-Jones and Stephen Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 5-40.

⁵²Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1996), 33-51.

⁵³Brown, 15-21.

⁵⁴Peterson, 85-93.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Atwood, 137.

⁵⁷Snow, 146-178.

⁵⁸Ibid., 107-145.

⁵⁹Snider, 17.

⁶⁰Jordan, 216.

⁶¹White House, "Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy" (Washington, D.C., 1988), 1-69.

⁶²Snow, 8-11.

⁶³Thomas G. Donlan, "Earning the Peace Dividend," Barron's, 24 January 1994, 10.

⁶⁴Snow, 193-204.

⁶⁵Treverton, 432.

⁶⁶Snider, 16.

⁶⁷Chilcoat, 2-4.

⁶⁸Snider, 19.

⁶⁹Treverton, 407-408, 429-432.

⁷⁰Peterson, 57-93; Blackwill, 100-103; Peters,
Conflict, 18-27.

⁷¹Treverton, 430-432.

⁷²Snider, v.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atwood, J. Brian. "Towards a New Definition of National Security: The New Strategic Threats." Vital Speeches of the Day, 2 November 1995, 135-138.
- Bacon, David. "After NAFTA." Environmental Action, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1995), 33-36, 39.
- Binnendijk, Hans, ed. Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University (Institute for National Strategic Studies), 1995.
- Blackwill, Robert D. "A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," in Europe in Global Change, ed. Verner Veidenfeld and Josef Janning, 100-119. Guterloh, Germany: Publisher Berpelsnenn, 1993.
- Bolton, John R. "Wrong Turn in Somalia." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/February 1994), 56-66.
- Brown, Lester R., Hal Kane, and David Malin Roodman. Vital Signs: The Trends that are Shaping Our Future. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.
- Butts, Kent Hughes, ed. "Environmental Security: A DOD Partnership for Peace." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.
- Chase, Robert S., Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy. "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (1996), 33-51.
- Chilcoat, Richard A. "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- Clinton, William J. "The President's News Conference with President Zedillo (10 October 1995)." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 31, No. 41 (October 16, 1995), 1798-1804.
- Corson, Walter H., ed. The Global Ecology Handbook. Boston, Beacon Press, 1990.
- Donlan, Thomas G. "Earning the Peace Dividend." Barron's, 24 January 1994, 10.
- Fedarko, Kevin. "Bad Neighbors." Time, 29 May 1995, 40-42.

- Garten, Jeffrey E. "Trade and Foreign Policy: Reflections on Economic Diplomacy." Presentation before the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, 11 July 1995.
- Hafner, Donald L. "Presidential Leadership and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy," in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David A. Deese. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Hakim, Peter. "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba." The Brookings Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 46.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," in Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, eds. Sean M. Lynne-Jones and Stephen Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, 5-40.
- Hyland, William G. "Reexamining National Strategy." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
- Jablonsky, David. "Paradigm Lost?: Transitions and the Search for a New World Order." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
- Jablonsky, David. "Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb. American National Security: Policy and Process. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "The Coming Anarchy." Atlantic Monthly, February 1994: 44-76.
- Metz, Steven. "America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Miskel, James F. "The Clinton NSC." Undated article published by U.S. Naval War College and reproduced by permission by U.S. Army War College in Readings entitled War, National Policy & Strategy (Course 2, Vol. 3: Academic Year 1996).
- Mitchell, Christopher. "International Migration as an Issue on Today's Inter-American Agenda." Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Fall 1994), 93-110.
- Neu, C. R. and Charles Wolf, Jr. The Economic Dimensions of National Security. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

- Nuechterlein, Donald E. America Overcommitted. Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 1985.
- Peters, Ralph. "After the Revolution." Parameters, Vol XXV, No. 2 (Spring 1995): 7-14.
- Peters, Ralph. "The Culture of Future Conflict." Parameters, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1995-1996): 18-27.
- Peterson, Peter G. and James K. Sebenius. "The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda," in Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, ed. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992.
- Porter, Gareth. "In the U.S. Interest: A Focus on the Environment is Crucial for America's Future National Security." EPA Journal, April-June 1993, 36-38.
- Purvis, Andrew. "Specter of Genocide." Time, 5 February 1996, 34-36.
- Roskin, Michael G. "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Ruby, Michael, ed. "Rethinking America's Role." U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 1994, 104.
- Seitz, Raymond. "American's Foreign Policy: From the Jaws of Victory." The Economist, 27 May 1995, 21-23.
- Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991.
- Silverberg, David and Francis Tusa. "Shadow Over the Gulf: Iran is Preparing -- But for What?" Armed Forces Journal International, August 1995, 24-25.
- Snider, Don M. "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown. Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Stephens, Gene. "We Are Facing a Global Crime Wave." USA Today, July 1995, 26-28.
- Sullivan, Leonard Jr. "Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

Taylor, Charles W. Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

Treverton, Gregory F. and Barbara A. Bicksler. "Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?", in Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, 407-433. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Selective and Flexible Engagement." Washington, D.C., 1995.

Van Creveld, Martin. "The Fate of the State." Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 4-18.

Waller, Robert. "The U.S. Middle East Security Strategy." Middle East International, No. 506 (4 August 1995), 16-17.

White House. "Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy." Washington, D.C., 1988.

White House. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." Washington, D.C., 1995.

White House. "Presidential Decision Directive 2: Organization of the National Security Council." Washington, D.C., 1993.

Zanoyan, Vahan. "After the Oil Boom: The Holiday Ends in the Gulf." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74. No. 6 (November/December 1995), 2-7.