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**REFORM OF THE WEINBERGER/POWELL DOCTRINES:  
NEW CRITERIA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER**

BY

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REFORM OF THE WEINBERGER/ POWELL DOCTRINES:  
NEW CRITERIA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

by

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## ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Reform of the Weinberger/ Powell Doctrines: New  
Criteria for the New World Order

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 April 1996 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In the past, leaders of the United States have used several different frameworks to decide if they should commit their armed forces to combat operations. Frameworks, like the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines are no longer appropriate. The United States needs a new framework to guide these deliberations. This paper demonstrates that traditional frameworks are no longer appropriate and that current guidance is scattered over a myriad of publications. This essay proposes reforms to the process of political debate and a single, simple framework that can guide the debate. The framework is applicable to all potential combat operations.ii

It is June 1996 in Nairobi, Kenya. President Daniel Moi died of a heart attack one week ago. The authoritarian's departure left a vacuum during the first week that his deputies tried to manage. Had the first instances of civil disobedience, a strike at the state run electrical power company and looting in just one district of the city, been dealt with swiftly, the administration might have been able to hold things together. A system tuned to central direction became dysfunctional quickly. Looting and violence increased. The international community in Kenya, which numbers nearly 50,000, soon became the target of theft and violence from the have-nots. The airport became jammed as non-Kenyans fled the violence. The roads to Tanzania and the port city of Mombassa were clogged with vehicles, stopped at almost every village for extorted tolls. Representatives from both the Kikuyu and Luo tribes claimed the successor to Moi. Nairobi became a battle ground as violence parted the population along economic, then tribal lines. In New York, the United Nations Secretary General, in response to Security Council action, phoned the U.S. Ambassador to ask if the U.S. will lead a multinational coalition to: 1) perform a non-combatant evacuation, 2) restore order, and, 3) monitor U.N sponsored elections. Both tribes made announcements that this is an internal issue and outside, colonial-style interference will be resisted with force.

In this hypothetical scenario, we assume the administration, in probably the National Security Council, will evaluate the request in terms of: what are the U.S. national interests, what

are the risks, what is the desired outcome, and how will the American people respond? In general terms, this debate is timeless, in that it has been repeated in every administration in U.S. history. This paper will show that changes in the world must be accounted for in making these decisions. The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines (which will be detailed later) are dated, and do not fit current realities. The current administration's guidance is spread through several documents and is either too general or applies to only one specific kind of military action, like peace operations. The country needs a single, simple framework relevant to this time.

#### THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Although John Adams warned against the penchant to slay distant "monsters" he could not have imagined the magnitude and sheer number of monsters that would exist in the post-Cold War world.<sup>1</sup> He couldn't foresee that the U.S. would become the sole world superpower. General Colin Powell argues that because of this power and a moral obligation as "the world's last hope", we must lead the New World Order (NWO).<sup>2</sup> Americans, traditionally, have avoided this international calling, and expect that their leaders will carefully consider when to put the U.S. military into harm's way.

In the NWO, American attention and leadership are requisites to effective, serious problem solving. Our leadership in the Gulf War and in effecting a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina are examples of American leadership of coalitions to resolve conflict. At present, no other country has the ability

or will to assume the role. The United States will remain in this role for the foreseeable future or until another superpower emerges. Not every world problem is necessarily an American problem. The National Security Strategy proclaims that the United States is not the world policeman and that our engagements must be selective.<sup>3</sup> The United States will select those engagements that are most relevant to its interests and where its resources can make the most difference.<sup>4</sup>

Traditional frameworks for deciding an appropriate U.S. response may not be appropriate to the NWO. The Weinberger Doctrine was formulated during the Cold War in the context of an East-West rivalry. Opposing the formidable Soviet block threat, thus protecting the premier vital interest, survival of the nation with its institutions and values intact, dominated analysis for the potential application of military force. The world has changed. Threats to U.S. vital interests are largely in remission. Therefore, the United States may now look to lower order interests: important, peripheral, and humanitarian.<sup>5</sup>

#### THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE

By 1984, Secretary Weinberger<sup>6</sup> concluded that we could no longer afford to respond to every crisis militarily, and could not repeat mistakes of the Vietnam experience. In a November 1984 address to the National Press Club, he said, "Recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to

forfeit..."<sup>7</sup> In 1987, he concluded, Vietnam "had a profound impact upon the public and official attitudes toward the outside world...For the American people and their leaders, avoiding 'another Vietnam' became a kind of national obsession."<sup>8</sup>

The Weinberger Doctrine outlined six relatively strict criteria for judging if the U.S. should commit armed forces to combat operations. The distinction of combat operations from other military operations is important and will be addressed later. In short, the doctrine requires that:

- vital interests be threatened;
- that clear political and military objectives be specified;
- that there exists, or could likely exist, public support for the action; and
- that once committed, there is clear resolve to win the conflict.

The impact of the American experience in Vietnam is evident in this doctrine, but, even at its inception, the Doctrine did not find wide acceptance.

Even Weinberger had to concede that there would have to be exceptions. In his address to a January 1986 conference on low intensity warfare, he admitted that the United States should support legitimate governments in the arena of low intensity conflict.<sup>9</sup> Clearly, such operations could put American military elements into potential combat situations where other than vital interests are at stake. Surprisingly, within the same administration, Secretary of State George Schultz took exception to the Doctrine as too confining. He concluded that "...Vietnam taught us that power and diplomacy are complementary."<sup>10</sup>, and therefore an absolute criteria is adverse to effective foreign

policy. He also advised, "...we cannot opt out of every contest,...If we do, the world's future will be determined by others-- most likely by those who are...most hostile to our deeply held principles."<sup>11</sup>

Although the Weinberger Doctrine was intuitively appealing to decisionmakers and a frustrated American public in the aftermath of Vietnam, it did not receive widespread acceptance or use. Subsequent defense department officials, like General Colin Powell, would continue in efforts to define conditions for the application of military force.

#### THE POWELL DOCTRINE

In the aftermath of the Panama invasion of 1989, General Colin Powell<sup>12</sup>, in what has become known as the Powell Doctrine, reinforced and refined the Weinberger Doctrine. General Powell supported the pillar of clear political and military objectives, added the necessity of the application of decisive military force, and stressed that military operations must have finite time spans.<sup>13</sup> He was criticized by his own Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador to the United Nations. Secretary Aspin "...did not find a sort of checklist approach conducive to maintaining peace in this era and firmly placed himself in the 'limited objectives' school"<sup>14</sup>. In the early days of the Clinton administration, Ambassador Albright asked Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about, if we can't use it?"<sup>15</sup>

The intent of the Powell Doctrine was to ensure U.S. forces

are not committed to potential combat unless the civilian leadership has made the decision to see the crisis through to completion at all levels. There is clear emphasis on avoiding an incremental approach to conflict resolution. The "escalation" of the war in Vietnam during the Johnson administration is an example of an incremental approach. In contrast, the application of overwhelming military force facilitated the relatively quick conclusion of the Panama invasion in 1989. The Powell doctrine advocated deploying a decisive force, once a decision to intervene militarily was made. The decisive force might well deter an enemy while in the deployment stage, as in Haiti.

Critics claim that the decisive force element is inappropriate to low intensity conflict. F.G. Hoffman writes:

The so-called Powell Doctrine raises a concern when applied to unconventional or low intensity conflict situations. Taken to its logical extreme, under the overwhelming force concept and the lingering Weinberger doctrine, American military forces will not be committed to deter or signal American resolve. This should rule out assignment of U.S. military forces for presence and peacekeeping missions.<sup>16</sup>

Hoffman confuses overwhelming and decisive force. The decisive force in low intensity conflict is not necessarily that required to subjugate all possible enemies in the theater. The U.S. peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia is large and powerful enough to intimidate any one faction individually, but not all factions simultaneously.

The criticisms of Powell's doctrine stem from its Weinberger roots. By 1992, even Powell admitted: "There is no fixed set of

rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous."<sup>17</sup>

The Weinberger and subsequent Powell Doctrines were born of the frustrations of Vietnam and the apparent successes of Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War. Albert Wohlstetter warns, "Of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the lessons we draw from it."<sup>18</sup> Further, Newland and Johnson note:

...[all] too often our priorities are set according to the success or failure of any given situation...[and] decisions are made either in the euphoria of victory or the depression resulting from disappointment or defeat.<sup>19</sup>

Hoffman warned that not all the political and military convictions spawned in the aftermath of Vietnam are appropriate to the kind of clashes we will face in the future.<sup>20</sup>

The criticisms of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines are many. Sabrosky and Sloan concluded,

Weinberger's six tests...appear to create more problems than they solve and raise false hopes by offering easy solutions to complex problems...The six tests are not a substitute for professional and responsible political and military judgements and leadership when deliberating a recourse to war.<sup>21</sup>

#### THE UNITED NATIONS

Today, the debate is further complicated by new structures of the NWO and the sole superpower role of the United States. For the first time, the U.N. Security Council is effective in conflict resolution actions. The United Nation's role in peacekeeping has expanded dramatically. Although peacekeeping can be hazardous, it is not usually combat per se. Judging by

the debate in the U.S. Congress in December 1995 regarding execution of the U.S. brokered Bosnia Peace Accord, Americans are concerned about putting their military in harms way, even if it does not technically involve combat.

Under Chapter VII of its charter, the U.N. can authorize the use of force to resolve conflict that threatens international peace and security.<sup>22</sup> Modern interpretation of Chapter Seven's scope includes Peace Enforcement. Peace Enforcement (PE) operations differ from Peacekeeping (Chapter Six of the U.N. charter) operations in that there is not necessarily an agreement to peace between the belligerents, and in all probability at least one does not want peace. Most analysts conclude that PE operations are combat operations.<sup>23</sup> There are no historical examples of successful PE operations, although the Secretary General has laid the conceptual groundwork for future operations.<sup>24</sup>

#### CURRENT GUIDANCE

The Clinton administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the U.S. role in the NWO. It emphasizes that the U.S. will not be the world's policeman, but will selectively engage to further its interests.<sup>25</sup> The strategy is a clear departure from the previous doctrines in that use of military force (in combat) is possible to defend "important" interests. These interests "...do affect importantly our national well being and the character of the world in which we live."<sup>26</sup> Application is limited to those instances where U.S. forces are likely to

accomplish their objectives, costs and risks are proportional to the interests at stake, and other means have been tried and failed.<sup>27</sup> Haiti is offered as an example.

The strategy states that U.S. participation in U.N. sponsored peace operations will be driven by the guidelines outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25 and using, "...the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces."<sup>28</sup> Later it notes that the President is committed to securing the active support of Congress for U.S. participation in these operations.<sup>29</sup> Although the President appealed to the Congress for support of troop deployments to Bosnia in December 1995, he was unable to win its support at that time.

Congressional debate in December 1995, revealed two important aspects of decisionmaking in this particular circumstance. First, although the national security strategy is rolled into one document by the administration, it is not a binding agreement between the executive and legislative branches. The administration discovered that many in Congress had not made the cognitive transition necessary to justify the use of combat forces to defend important interests. The debate was captured on the cover of the November 27, 1995 issue of Time magazine, which asked, "Is Bosnia Worth Dying For?"<sup>30</sup> Eventually, the executive branch tied the deployment to vital interests in the security of Western Europe, on the presumption that the conflict could spread into a wider conflict.

Secondly, the debate reflected a general lack of interest in

foreign policy actions on the part of the American people. In the end, Congress supported the deployment for two reasons: to preserve the credibility of the President in foreign affairs, and to show support to the troops whose deployment had, in fact, already started.

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) outlines administration policy for how the U.S. should: 1) vote for peace operations, 2) recommend U.S. personnel be involved in peace operations, and 3) establish guidelines for Chapter VII operations that might involve combat. The standards applicable to part 2 that differ from previous doctrine are: no specific level of national interest is required, and U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success. Further, in Chapter VII operations likely to result in combat, the directive requires:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust , as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.

Any recommendation to the president will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant<sup>31</sup>

The ambiguity of these standards is intentional. All three standards are very close to their Weinberger Doctrine predecessors. Clearly the drafters avoided a strict set of standards where a proposed operation's failure to accommodate just one single standard would eliminate the option entirely.

This is consistent with the positions of Schultz and Aspin, as well as both Weinberger and Powell.

#### CANADIAN EXAMPLE

Although Canadians have significant experience in U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations, they have not delineated specific criteria for PE operations. The criteria used by the Canadian government for peacekeeping operations, as stated in its 1994 Defense White Paper, are outlined below:

- Clear and enforceable mandate
- Identifiable reporting authority
- Peace agreement accepted by all parties
- Forces appropriate to the mission
- Defined concept of operations
- Effective command and control
- Clear rules of engagement<sup>32</sup>

Although the issue of national interests is not specifically stated, it is a fundamental truth that nation-states do not act unless their leaders believe the action is beneficial in some way to the nation. Even humanitarian actions are motivated by national interests. Possible interests could be prestige, appeasing political action groups at home, or investing in future economic opportunity.

The national debate of December 1995, suggests the United States does not have a useful criterion to use in determining when to put its armed forces into potential combat situations. The simplicity of the Weinberger Doctrine is appealing, but other aspects make it inappropriate. The Canadian set is incomplete because it doesn't adequately address national interests. The National Security Strategy is not specific enough provide useful

criteria. PDD 25 is relevant only to peace operations, yet specifies that deployments need to be evaluated in the same terms as other military commitments, leading the practitioner back to the NSS. If strict criteria are inappropriate, then, a framework to guide rational debate and decision making is needed.

#### A REFORMED PROCESS

The process that led to the U.S. decision to deploy troops in support of the Bosnian Peace Accords in December 1995, was disappointing. First, informed discussion of the issue between the Administration and the Congress was subordinated to the balanced budget debate, and was not seriously considered by the Congress until the Dayton peace agreement was initialled. The President pledged U.S. military troops months earlier. Once the accord was initialled, the opportunity for serious discussion was compressed by the Thanksgiving break and by a blizzard in the Washington area that closed Congress for two days. By December ninth, advance echelons of the task force were enroute, and neither house of Congress had passed a resolution. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) remarked, "The proverbial train has left the station and our troops are already on board."<sup>33</sup> The process, which includes both the forum for the debate and the framework that will lead it needs to be reformed.

#### AN APPROPRIATE FORUM

Regardless of the doctrine, strategy, directive or policy, getting agreement within Congress that the appropriate issues are being discussed, is a challenge. The Administration needs to

organize key Congressional leaders to form an inner circle for informed discussion within an agreed framework. Built around the National Security Council, this inner circle can bring the issues back to Congress to guide the debate there. This is similar to the committee system used to resolve the budget. Although individual senators and representatives may be vocal, party leadership can point to the fact that its leadership was involved in shaping the administration's decision. In the December 1995 debate, junior Republicans in the House clearly used the discussion for political advantage. The place for serious discussion is not on the floor of a large assembly.

This proposal is a radical shift from current practices, and at first glance may appear to be in conflict with the separation of powers feature of the constitution. Neither the President or the Congress has pushed the War Powers Act to validation in the courts. A long succession of presidents have proclaimed their constitutional duty to formulate and execute foreign policy while the congresses have asserted their power to provide funds that permit execution. Congress also can steer public opinion for or against the president's proposal. Clearly, both executive and legislative branches must cooperate to execute foreign policy. In fact, recent presidents have informed senior congressional leadership of imminent military actions, after the policy decision was made. The proposal presented here formalizes the relationship somewhat, and allows discrete congressional review and input in the formative stages.

Two challenges for the inner circle are timeliness and security. Since Congressional input should be considered before the decision is made, Congressmen selected for the inner circle must protect the security of the administration's deliberations. Selection of legislators for the inner circle needs to consider three factors. First, selections should take advantage of the expertise that resides in the committees, such as, foreign affairs, and armed services. Second, because of the security concern, selections should insure inside information will not be traded for political advantage. The administration needs to carefully review past records and stress to potential inner circle members, the political and other consequences of a breach. Finally, party seniority needs to be represented so that recommendations can be guided through the appropriate houses. With these reforms in the forum, rational debate can be guided by an appropriate framework.

#### A NEW FRAMEWORK

I propose a new framework that is applicable to all potential deployments of U.S. troops into combat situations, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It is not practical to have multiple sets of criteria for different types of operations. What is needed is a simple framework that identifies the salient issues basic to the determination of whether the U.S. should put its armed forces into harm's way. It is outlined here:

1. U.S. forces should only be deployed to potential combat situations in

support of vital and important national interests.

- Caution should be exercised when evaluating national interests in terms of hypothetical consequences of action/inaction.

2. The proposed action is or would be supported by the American public.
3. The value of the national interest involved outweighs anticipated costs and potential risks.

By far the most important of these elements of the framework is national interest. The issue of categorizing interests is confused by the lack of standard terminology. For example, Nuechterlein describes 4 basic national interests with 4 levels of intensity. During the December 1995 debate over troop deployments to Bosnia, vital and important were the popular adjectives.<sup>34</sup> As a common frame of reference here, we will use 4 levels of national interest: vital, important, peripheral, and humanitarian, defined as follows:

Vital-- those issues that are of premier importance; could threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity, fundamental institutions, and core values of the nation.<sup>35</sup> The nation is prepared to expend considerable resources to influence these issues.

Important-- those issues that are disadvantageous to the nation's economy, military position, or prestige. The nation is prepared to expend limited resources to influence these issues.

Peripheral-- those issues of minor importance, that if resolved in the interest of the nation would improve it's economic, political, military, or diplomatic status. The nation will dedicate minimal or no resources to influence these issues.

Humanitarian-- interest in resolving or limiting human suffering. Potential benefits are prestige and international goodwill. The nation may expend

limited resources to influence these issues.

Americans traditionally have difficulty acknowledging their self-serving interests. American leaders often claim to be committing U.S. resources in the name of principles, not interests.<sup>36</sup> The value of national interests, then, is to order the many potential demands on a nation's resources. They are useful in disciplining the decisionmaker to ask and answer a series of questions. Roskin writes, "The net impact of these questions is to restrain impetuous types from embarking on crusades."<sup>37</sup>

The full scope of American interests was captured by Newland and Johnson, "Like the British Empire at its height, one could truly say the sun never sets on American interests."<sup>38</sup> The question is, which ones are the United States most concerned about? The study of national interests is complicated by a phenomenon I call "growth of the chain of consequences," and by the elevation of an interest in value by a statesman. The chain of consequences is the possible connection between an action and an interest and other possible interests.

We need to be cautious in extending the chain of consequences too far, or every issue will become vital. Using Bosnia as an example, according to Posen and Ross,

Most of these [ethnic] conflicts do not engage the vital interests of any state-- they are strategically uninteresting. Yugoslavia contains no military or economic resources that would add or subtract from the security of any European great power. This is the main reason why the Europeans have behaved so sluggishly. Advocates of more direct U.S. engagement raise the specter of a wider

war as a threat to U.S. interests. But the widest war they can conjure up pits relatively weak military powers against each other over stakes as meager as Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>39</sup>

In October 1995, the Secretary of Defense declared Bosnia a vital interest. Two weeks later, he labeled Bosnia a place "where our vital interests are not threatened, but we do have an important stake in the outcome."<sup>40</sup> His office explained that while Bosnia was important, U.S. leadership of NATO was vital. The chain of consequences was then, that U.S. action was necessary to protect a vital interest.

The Carter Doctrine declared that access to Middle East oil was a vital interest. Today, that may not be the case. Oil reserves in the former Soviet Union, or domestic production may replace a cutoff of Middle East oil. Americans pay approximately a third of the price for gasoline compared to other developed nations. During the Cold War, Middle East oil was more important to Western Europe than it was to the United States. Strong allies were important to the security interests of the United States. However, a cutoff of Middle East oil could drive prices up to the point that domestic U.S. exploration and production could increase, therefore spurring the economy.

Looking objectively, access to Middle East oil was only a vital interest in that the West's loss in Gross National Product and hence total defense outlays would put it at strategic disadvantage vis a vis the Soviets.

Interests must be continually re-evaluated. Secretary Weinberger pointed out that, "American interests are nowhere

etched in stone, but are situational, influenced by our best judgement and basic values."<sup>41</sup> If there is more than one "if" in the consequence chain, the chain rapidly loses credibility. Many of today's vital interest may only be important interests tomorrow.

The U.S. must avoid the pitfall of looking at crisis situations as though action and possible consequences must always be anticipated unilaterally. Although situations may be cloaked in classified information, and getting quick, coalition commitments is difficult, we cannot rule out that other nations will be involved. Almost every post-Cold War conflict/ peace operation has involved coalition forces. To assume that the European powers would not 1) monitor the Bosnia situation closely and 2) act to contain the conflict is simply not realistic.

We must also be cautious that interests do not get promoted in rank due to the intensity and emotion of the debate. There is evidence this happened in December 1995, as the administration strained to get support for the Bosnia deployments. Roskin noted that secondary interests can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital.<sup>42</sup> He used Vietnam as an example. "Dean Rusk testified that South Vietnam had become a vital interest because we had sunk so much foreign aid into it."<sup>43</sup> Henry Kissinger later indicated that Vietnam had become a vital interest because we had sunk so many resources into it that U.S. credibility was on the line.<sup>44</sup>

In analyzing interests, it is important to avoid

sentimentality and emotion. In the past, the U.S. has tended to justify actions based on broad principles rather than identifying specific interests to be defended. Focusing on specific interests, e.g., access to Middle East Oil, and/or the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, will help identify objectives and end states. Roskin uses De Gaulle as an example of a statesman that correctly kept his focus on interests. He liberated colonies when he realized they were a net drain on France. He displaced U.S. Forces from France, realizing that because of the narrow strategic depth in Germany, the United States would be committed to early first use. He thus achieved his objective of enhancing the prestige of France while optimizing its resources.<sup>45</sup> He had to overcome popular emotional attachment to keeping the colonies in favor of promoting national interests.

Categorizing interests is important, especially for the world's only superpower. History has several examples of where stated interests led to reaction by other powers. In the 1930's, Japan misread our true interests in China. A less than careful proclamation of U.S. interests in the Pacific helped rationalize the invasion that led to the Korean War. In 1990, Saddam Hussein interpreted an ambassador's comments to mean the U.S would not respond to aggression in the Gulf. Equally dangerous is declaring certain interests to be vital but then not backing up your words with military power.<sup>46</sup>

The second pillar of the framework is whether the proposed

action is acceptable, or will be supported by the American public. Americans have a long history of isolationism, and the current population is no exception. By the end of October 1995, a Newsweek poll found that only 27 percent supported sending troops to Bosnia while 59 percent opposed it.<sup>47</sup> Richard Betts noted that, "Americans will not tolerate many body bags in the course of an intervention where vital interests are not at stake."<sup>48</sup> Time magazine noted that the United States faces a grave dilemma in the modern world, in that "America must lead, but its people may not let it."<sup>49</sup>

History shows that once provoked, as in World War II, or shown that vital interests are at stake, as in the Persian Gulf, the American people will support the employment of their armed forces. Acknowledging their predisposition to avoid engagements where less than vital interests are at stake, immediate public support, or lack of it, cannot drive any decision to deploy forces. Sabrosky noted, "Requiring any administration's planners to anticipate levels of public support before an intervention occurs, in short, is simply an exercise in futility."<sup>50</sup>

A snapshot of current American public sentiment reveals that those interests the public values may not be the same ones the government values or be the same that happen to emerge in a crisis. A recent Time/CNN poll showed that 73 percent of American adults think we should reduce our involvement in world politics and concentrate on problems at home. The survey also showed the top 5 foreign policy concerns as:

1. The flow of illegal drugs
2. Protection of American jobs
3. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
4. Controlling illegal immigration
5. Securing energy supplies<sup>51</sup>

The list has a definite inward focus. America, today, will have to be convinced by its leaders that employment of its armed forces is appropriate. Former Secretary of State Schultz saw that the essence of statesmanship is, "to see a danger when it is not self-evident; to educate our people to the stakes involved; then to fashion a sensible response and rally support."<sup>52</sup> The particular statesman this responsibility falls to is the President. Schultz promised, "...a president who has the courage to lead will win public support if he acts wisely and effectively."<sup>53</sup> Part of selling the American public is to be sure the cost/ benefit relationships make sense.

The third pillar of the framework requires that the anticipated costs and risks be proportional to the strategic objective sought. Betts describes a post-Cold War world in which, "...the stakes for the U.S. in most international conflicts-- and hence the benefits for fighting over them-- will be low... Logically, the price we should be willing to pay for those benefits should also be low."<sup>54</sup>

The United States freely expends dollars, technologies and weapons in conflict and is stingy only with regard to casualties. Virtually none of the December 1995 debate was over the dollar cost of the deployment. The heated debate was over the threat to the lives of the men and women of the deploying armed forces.

Weighing the human cost to the potential benefit is a difficult, but not impossible task. Although the military can predict approximate casualty figures, potential risks are difficult to project. For example, if anyone could have guessed that a single terrorist attack could kill 273 Americans almost instantly in Beirut, then the assessed potential risk would have been great. The three pillars of the framework can guide us through a determination of whether to commit forces to potential combat.

#### THE KENYA CASE STUDY

Let us now apply the framework to the scenario outlined at the beginning of this paper. Looking at the U.S. national interests in Kenya, there are no vital interests at stake. However, the safety of American citizens within the country is of importance.

One might try to argue that a cooperative Kenya is important to U.S. ability to influence events in central Africa. The recent past shows that Kenya made ports and airfields available to the United States to support humanitarian operations in Somalia. Kenya also cooperated when Americans were evacuated from Somalia in 1991. Area experts predict a cataclysmic disintegration of Zaire in the near future, pointing to the importance of Kenya's airfields and ports as a gateway to central Africa.<sup>55</sup> The next logical question to ask is: what are our interests in Zaire, then? At this point the analyst should note that the "chain of consequences" is starting to stretch. There is no evidence to support the proposition that whatever faction

eventually settles in power in Kenya will not cooperate with the United States with airfield and basing privileges or on any other issue. Practically, there are in fact other ways to get access to Zaire, should the need arise. In summary, the proposed noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is appropriate to protect U.S. citizens in the midst of the civil war (an important interest). The peace enforcement mission proposed by the United Nations does not serve to protect U.S. vital or important interests, and therefore should not be supported.

Public support for the NEO will be easy to win. Historically, the public has supported U.S. military operations to extract American civilians from harm's way. The only hesitancy that seems to emerge is when citizens disregard the embassy's direction to leave the country. In these cases, some factions will argue that citizens put themselves at risk by remaining in the country. In general, even if there is evidence that citizens ignored the embassy's warning, the public will still expect our government to protect its citizens.

Public support for the peace enforcement operation will be very difficult to secure. With no vital or important interests to tie to, Americans will not support this mission. Although the debate preceding the deployment of our troops to Bosnia was incomplete, limited support was garnered only by tying the operation to the survival of our leadership in NATO. Our recent experience in Somalia shows public and political intolerance for American casualties in conflicts and causes that cannot be

quickly understood. There is no politically significant ethnic group in the United States that could lobby for the "do something" option in the absence of threats to important U.S. interests. This pillar, then, would support the NEO and avoid the peace enforcement operation.

The final pillar of the framework deals with cost, benefit, and risk. The United States has a wealth of NEO experience, especially in Africa. In most cases, some agreement is reached in advance by the embassy with the warring parties to allow noncombatants to leave quietly. Usually the U.S. military only has to provide the means and insure that things don't go wrong. Our experience is that such operations are virtually bloodless. Therefore, the projected cost is reasonable compared to the strategic objective sought. Since there was not an important or vital interest associated with the peace enforcement mission, any cost would be unacceptable.

Risk is more difficult to evaluate. In the case of the NEO, one risk is that the citizens may become hostages before the evacuation. Here the joint task force may be placed in unanticipated jeopardy if it is not prepared to do a hostage rescue mission. The United States could lose face in its ability to apply its significant power. Another risk is that one party or another may not honor ceasefire agreements made through the embassy. Although the nature of the operation may become more violent, the U.S. military is usually able to escalate violence easily with an assembled overwhelming force. In this case, the

risk of casualties is higher, the risk to overall success is slight. Therefore, the risks associated with the NEO are acceptable.

The framework led us to the conclusion that the NEO was necessary, would be supported by the American people, and had reasonable costs and risks associated with it. This simple vignette demonstrated the utility of the framework. The framework should be viewed as a guide for rational thought, just like the Scientific Process. In the case of the latter, all would agree that although each experiment is different in scope and complexity, the process is constant and extremely useful. This framework can guide us to rational foreign policy decisions on the application of military force.

#### CONCLUSION

What, then, should America take from its experiences in combat? The first item is certainly, how it got into combat. Central to democracy is civilian control of the military. The military has an important stake in decisions concerning commitment of forces to potential combat and therefore has a role in shaping the decisions made by civilian leadership. The Weinberger Doctrine was strongly influenced by the Vietnam experience; Panama and Desert Storm enshrined the Powell Doctrine. Sabrosky and Sloan concluded that the six tests of the Weinberger Doctrine, "appear to create more problems than they solve, and raise false hopes by offering easy solutions to complex problems."<sup>56</sup> Acknowledging that the world is more

complex than ever, traditional criteria are obsolete.

The reforms of the decision making process in terms of the forum and framework offered here, then, do not form an absolute test. The NWO is too complex to allow absolutes. It is simply an appropriate forum and framework to guide discussion of difficult issues. McAllister predicts that future decisions will be even tougher, as the quick solution, military force, will be more and more "irrelevant to addressing the international issues Americans most worry about."<sup>57</sup> As Newland and Johnson concluded in their assessment of the Weinberger Doctrine, which is applicable to this new framework, it is "...not a substitute for professional and responsible political and military judgements and leadership when deliberating a recourse to war."<sup>58</sup> This framework is not the judgement, it guides the judgement.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The process used to determine if the United States should commit its military to combat should be reformed as follows:

- The Administration needs to expand access to the Security Council during deliberations of possible military action to include key Congressional leaders. This will allow early Congressional input and avoid some distracting political debate;
- This augmented council should use the following framework to guide its deliberations:
  1. U.S. forces should only be deployed to potential combat situations in support of vital and important national interests.
    - Caution should be exercised when evaluating national interests in terms of hypothetical consequences of action/inaction.

2. The proposed action is or would be supported by the American public.
3. The value of the national interest involved outweighs anticipated costs and potential risks.



## ENDNOTES

1. Henry Kissinger, "How to Achieve the New World Order," Time, 14 Mar 94, 74,

2. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 92/93, 32-35.

3. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House, 1996), 11.

4. Ibid., 7.

5. Definitions:

Vital-- those issues that are of premier importance; could threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity, fundamental institutions, and core values of the nation. The nation is prepared to expend considerable resources to influence these issues.

Important-- those issues that are disadvantageous to the nation's economy, military position, or prestige. The nation is prepared to expend limited resources to influence these issues.

Peripheral-- those issues of minor importance, that if resolved in the interest of the nation would improve it's economic, political, military, or diplomatic status. The nation will dedicate minimal or no military resources to influence these issues.

Humanitarian-- interest in resolving or limiting human suffering. Potential benefits are prestige and international goodwill. The nation may expend considerable resources to influence the issue.

6. U.S. Secretary of Defense from 20 January 1981 to 23 November 1987.

7. Caspar W. Weinberger, "Six Major Tests on Use of Combat Forces," Speech to the National Press Club, Washington D.C., 28 Nov 1984, printed in the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 Dec 94, 2.

8. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to Congress, FY 1987, Budget, FY 1988: Authorization Request for and FY 1987-1991 Defense Programs, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 79.
9. "A Low Intensity Speech of Electrifying Significance", Washington Times, 5 March 1986, 45.
10. Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, eds, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, (Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1988) 151.
11. John M. Collins, "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations", Parameters, XXV no. 4 (1995): 55.
12. General Powell served as National Security Advisor from 5 November 1987 to 20 January 1989, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 October 1989 to 30 September 1993.
13. Harold Means, Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman-- Statesman/Soldier, (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc, 1992), 273.
14. F.G. Hoffman, "The Powell Doctrine- Prudent or Inflexible Response?", Marine Corps Gazette, 78 no. 2 (1994), 23.
15. "The Talk of the Town", The New Yorker, Oct 2, 1995, 35.
16. Hoffman, 23.
17. Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead", Foreign Affairs, no. 32 (Winter 92/93): 32.
18. Hoffman, 22.
19. Samuel J. Newland and Douglas V. Johnson, "The Military and Operational Significance of the Weinberger Doctrine", in The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine", eds. Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloan (Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1988), 131.
20. Hoffman, 22.
21. Sabrosky and Sloan, 136-138.
22. Charter of the United Nations and Statutes of the International Court of Justice, (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1968), 23.
23. Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, (Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 4.

24. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, (New York: The United Nations, 1992), 24-27.
25. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: The White House, 1996), 11.
26. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House, 1995), 12.
27. Ibid. 12.
28. Ibid. 17.
29. Ibid. 17.
30. Cover Caption, Time, 27 November 1995, Cover.
31. Office of the President, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, (Washington DC: Office of the President: 1994), 5.
32. Canada Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), 23.
33. Pat Towell, "Congress Reluctantly Acquiesces In Peacekeeping Mission", Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report, 53 no. 47 (1995): 3668-3671.
34. In the 1996 National Security Strategy, economic well-being is described in one paragraph as a vital interest while those things that "...affect importantly our national well-being..." are described as important interests. The analyst ponders, is economic well-being a vital or important interest?
35. John M. Collins, "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations", Parameters, XXV no. 4 (Winter 95-96): 54.
36. Henry Kissinger, "How to Achieve the New World Order", Time, May 14, 1994: 75.
37. Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy, (Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 17.
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39. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Strategy and Force Planning, (Newport RI: US Naval War College Press, 1995), 4.
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42. Roskin, 16.
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44. Ibid. 17.
45. Ibid., 9.
46. Ibid., 5.
47. John Barry and Bob Cohn, "Starting the Hard Sell", Newsweek, 30 October 1995, 56.
48. Richard K. Betts, "What Will it Take to Deter the United States?", Parameters, Vol XXV no. 4 (Winter 95/96): 75.
49. J.F.O. McAllister, "Uncertain Beacon", Time, 27 November 1995, 41.
50. Sabrosky, 151.
51. McAllister, 44.
52. George Schultz, "Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity.", Department of State Bulletin, Vol 86 no. 2108 (Mar 1986): 16.
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54. Betts, 72.
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58. Sabrosky and Sloan, 138.

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