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**GERMAN SECURITY POLICY:
THE OSTPOLITIK OF PROSPERITY**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The unification of Germany in 1990 has raised concerns about the emerging German security policy toward its easternmost neighbors, Poland and the Czech Republic. This study examines German security policy toward these countries since 1990 with a focus on political, economic, and military aspects of the developing German policy. Germany is an advocate of regional stability and economic prosperity by its use of European security institutions, political fora, and emphasis on regional stability that enhances economic growth while promoting demilitarization in the region.

The unification of Germany in October 1990 has raised concerns about future German security policy in Europe. Some observers predicted an aggressive Germany would dominate Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and evoke memories of *Mitteleuropa* (German hegemony in Central Europe). When German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed initial reluctance to guarantee Poland's western border in 1990, alarmists were quick to note the historical parallels in German history. Fortunately, this initial pessimism has proven unfounded and German security policy toward its neighbors has been characterized by restraint and simultaneous promotion of regional economic prosperity and political stability.

This paper will examine German security policy toward its two easternmost neighbors, Poland and the Czech Republic. These two countries share a common border with Germany, possess large German minorities in their territories, and suffered the most from German aggression in this century. Poland and the former Czechoslovakia were allied with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and insulated from normal relations with Germany during that period. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, European attention has focused on the emerging relationship of these central European nations.

Germany's primary interests in its eastern neighbors is to support developments toward stability and economic growth and discourage the emergence of excessively nationalistic militaries. The best means to ensure prosperity and security is to bring Germany's neighbors into European security institutions while

promoting mutual political and economic cooperation. This policy will create the regional framework necessary for Czech and Polish participation in Europe's future strategic evolution.

German national interests, security goals, and their unique approach to European security institutions are the factors shaping national security policy. The basic restraints on German security policy; the redefined military role, the Basic Law, and the influence of domestic public opinion provide visible restraints on German policy. Similar examinations of the security policies of Poland and the Czech Republic will reveal similarities with the German approach. This study will also reveal the peculiarities of their national interests and military establishments in the development of regional policies.

German security is no longer threatened by an invasion of the Russian Army. Instead Germany faces the uncertainties posed to regional stability by European ethnic conflict, transnational terrorism, civil strife in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the disruption of Germany's market economy by political instability. Since unification, Germany has faced these problems by actively promoting German and the CEE nations' integration into European security institutions and political forums. Germany has also taken the lead in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe.¹ The integration of the CEE states into European security institutions has become the cornerstone of German security policy. Chancellor Kohl has consistently maintained that "membership in NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) must be

united. . . ." ²

Germany has become a leader in the development of regional policy and is no longer a "front line consumer" of security policy.³ German Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, addressed German national interests in a speech to the Hans Seidel Foundation in 1995. He proclaimed that Germany was the "winner of history" and that preservation of the existing peace was essential to security and economic competition. He also stated that the "focus of interest" of German foreign policy should "preserve our ability to act and to function in the (Atlantic) alliance . . . our supreme foreign policy principle." Waigel declared that the three foci of German foreign and security policy were:

1. Strengthening the EU community of peace, stability, and prosperity and to gradually expand it to the east;
2. preserving and expanding the vital community of values and interest with North America;
3. living up to Germany's worldwide responsibility for peace, stability, and development, together with our partners.⁴

Waigel emphasized the German goal of a European federation that solves security problems by political means. German policy depends on continued demilitarized European integration that parallels the sustained growth of democracy and the free market in the former states of the WTO."⁵

German security policy since 1990 supports the foreign policy principles advanced by Mr. Waigel. The German *White Paper on Defense-1994* proclaims a "preventive policy . . . to intercept risks when and where they arise and before they escalate into an

acute conflict . . . the capability to defend remains the foundation of Germany's and the North Atlantic Alliance's security."⁶ The White Paper proclaims the need for a security policy oriented on the future guided by five central interests:

1. Preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
2. Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for the rule of law and prosperity in Europe means peace and security for Germany;
3. The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability;
4. The familiarization of our neighbors in Eastern Europe with Western structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a new cooperative security order embracing all the states of Europe;
5. Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world economic order based on market principles, for the security of the individual states is guaranteed only in system of global security with peace, justice and well-being for everyone.⁷

German reliance on the political, economic, and institutional framework of the Atlantic Alliance and its American partner encourages peaceful, competitive solutions to regional problems. This also places the German military in a peripheral position in projecting national power. Lothar Gutjahr has declared, "while national interests were enough to justify military interventions in his (Bismarck's) day, international repercussions of social instabilities and unrest are now aspects of Bonn's modern security and foreign policy thinking."⁸ The key to German security policy since reunification is the role played

by European security institutions, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU).

NATO developed a new strategic concept in 1991 that recognized the changes in the European security landscape. The supranational, nonspecific nature of new threats, such as international terrorism and weapons proliferation established requirements for NATO members to develop capabilities to operate outside traditional NATO boundaries in collective security and collective defense environments. The German government supported the NATO strategic concept and reaffirmed that NATO remained "the cornerstone of German security policy."⁹ Chancellor Kohl and former Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher supported the American presence in NATO as the best guarantor of regional stability and insurance against a resurgent threat from the FSU. With NATO and the United States solidified as partners in the European security framework, Western attention now focused on the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which met for the first time in 1991, became the European forum responsible for discourse between NATO and the former WTO members. The NACC assumed a political character that orchestrated organizational cooperation and dialogue among members. The Helsinki Conference of 1975 created the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation-OSCE in 1994) to implement Confidence and Security

Building Measures (CSBMs) and other treaty provisions designed to enhance mutual trust and confidence in security arrangements between members.¹⁰ The most recent institutional creation was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) established in January 1994. The PfP was designed to address the future expansion of NATO into those areas of Eastern Europe formerly dominated by the Soviet Union.¹¹ The PfP was designed to offer military cooperation, assistance and consultation to the former WTO countries in preparation for their eventual incorporation into NATO.

The NACC provided an institutional mechanism that addressed the issues of the emerging countries of Eastern Europe with firm German support. Germany became an advocate of Polish and Czech participation in the PfP to facilitate their quest for NATO membership. Germany also accepted the OSCE as a complementary institution to NATO and the NACC that helped to coordinate security policy with the Czech Republic and Poland and strengthen the pan-European security order.¹²

German support of these institutional innovations also reflects two larger ingredients of German foreign policy. First, the OSCE provides a ready-made mechanism that addresses German-Russian relations. With German, European, and former WTO members' participation in a pan-European organization, Russian fears of an independent Germany conducting foreign policy are assuaged.¹³ The OSCE mechanism also provides the international legal and political space for a prosperous and stable European economic base.¹⁴ This emphasis on the economic aspects of

security reinforced German enthusiasm for the nonmilitary aspects of security policy. As one scholar has noted, "Germany's strategy to improve its international position invokes elements of trading state politics and is being formulated within a security environment characterized more by "competitive interdependence . . . "15

German integration into other European organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and its military component, the Western European Union (WEU), reflects Germany's attitude toward European based organizations. German leaders view the EU as the "sheet anchor of Europe" by virtue of its focus on European political and economic unity. This focus serves to attract the reforming states of Eastern Europe and bury the old German concept of a *Wohlstandsgrenze* (prosperity border) between Germany and her neighbors. Germany supports Czech and Polish membership in the EU as a means to integrate regional trade policies and engage in political dialogue in the formation of common policies. The security feature of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) forum, receives German support of Czech and Pole membership to shape regional security policies.¹⁶

The Western European Union (WEU) has developed a European approach to defense policies outside the NATO framework designed to be the European pillar of NATO. Due to member initiatives, Germany and France created a Franco-German brigade as the forerunner to a future European army (Eurocorps, the next step of the WEU Franco-German cooperative effort will stand-up in 1996).

Other European countries have aired a variety of positions with varying degrees of concurrence. Some participants, such as Great Britain, are hesitant to exclude the United States from European security.¹⁷ Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher summarized this position by remarking, "Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe-Britain and France-are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European superstate."¹⁸ The Inter-Governmental Council (IGC) will address the future of the WEU in 1996 but a European security force "separate" from NATO is not anticipated. Germany will continue to push for Czech and Polish membership in the EU and WEU and support the United States presence in NATO.¹⁹

The German approach toward the European institutions reflects Bonn's unique multilateral approach toward regional organizations. The Germans view these institutions as complementary and mutually reinforcing "sowohl-als-auch" (this as well as that) as opposed to "entweder-oder" (either this or that). NATO and the United States provide security against threats to Europe. The OSCE establishes links to the former states of the WTO. It encourages the demilitarization and democratization of those states while the EU and WEU provide the fora for German involvement in the shaping of a future Europe federation. German integration into the European community has produced a "Europeanized" Germany defining its security policy in

economic and political terms and military integration. Germany has become the leading advocate of former WTO members' inclusion into the European community, specifically Poland and the Czech Republic. This policy ensures the peaceful transition of these two countries into market economies and stable neighbors and promotes continued German prosperity and domestic restoration.

While integration into European institutions anchors German security policy in European fora, the domestic factors exert restraints on German security capabilities. An examination of the German army (Bundeswehr) and its resourcing dilemmas show that the military does not possess the capability to conduct expansive foreign policy. The Basic Law has established the values of democratic control of the military and guaranteed the reliability and predictability of German defense policy. The current perceptions of German public opinion concerning foreign and defense policy also act as restraints on German security policy.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which met in Ottawa in 1990, addressed the role of the Bundeswehr (Bw). The CSCE dealt with the external aspects of German unification and left the internal facets of unification to the two German governments then pursuing the terms of unity. The members of the concurrent Two-Plus-Four conference that negotiated terms of unification were representatives of the four wartime allies and two German governments, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (Two-Plus-Four

negotiations). The conference addressed European security arrangements, the size and role of the German military, and the status of the German borders. NATO encouraged and obtained a unified Germany that remained in NATO. The Conventional Force Europe (CFE) negotiations of November 1990 resolved the issue of the role and structure of the Bw. Germany agreed to renounce Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) weapons and significantly, recognized the borders with Poland and the Czech Republic. Germany also pledged to forswear any territorial claims.²⁰ The talks established the foundation for the unification of Germany based on a restructured military establishment that alleviated Russian and European apprehensions of potential German military power.

The Bw initiated plans and programs to adjust to the new requirements established by the CFE treaty. Troop ceilings for the armed forces were established at 370,000 personnel with 345,000 assigned to the army and air force. Restrictions and limitations were also placed on specific weapons systems and vehicles.²¹ Germany also redefined the German armed forces' roles and missions by adding "NATO crisis management" functions to the traditional defensive role of the German defense establishment.

The Defense Planning Guidelines of the Bw and the White Paper 1994 defined the main role of the German army in crisis and conflict management situations.²² These developments dictated new force structure requirements demanding rapid response forces (Krisenreaktionskraefte) capable of rapid, mobile, self

sustaining capabilities in "out of area" missions. These documents also provided guidance for the continuation of a national defense force. The German parliament (Bundestag) slowed development of German military restructuring plans by directing spending priorities toward the restoration of the former GDR, an event that will likely push Bw modernization into the twenty-first century.²³ The source of manpower in the Bw remained conscription and the command and control of the armed forces revamped to reflect the territorial realignments incurred by unification and to accommodate logistical sustainment of the rapid reaction force requirement.²⁴

The Bw has consistently been in the lead within NATO for treaty compliance and displayed eagerness to fulfill its mandate despite the handicaps imposed by reorganization and limited resources. Defense Minister Volker Ruehe remarked in 1994 at a Munich security conference establishing the formation of the crisis action forces that the Bw could perform its "domestic defense roles" but was ". . . not yet capable of taking part in measures involving international crisis management . . . which includes extensive mobility for the transfer of forces."²⁵ Its continued compliance with regional arms control treaties enhances its reputation among alliance members and concurrently "considers the historically rooted perceptions of its neighbors" by integrating its armed forces into regional security institutions.²⁶

The German Basic Law (constitution) provided the legal

restraints on the use of the military. When Germany began to rebuild its armed forces in 1954, the military was created for defensive purposes only. The Bw was based on the concept of the citizen in uniform and the idea of "Innere Führung" (Inner Leadership), an attempt to reconcile military duties with the rights and duties of soldiers as citizens. This concept was established to deter the rise of German militarism by educating the individual soldier and grounding the military ranks in democratic ideals. Article 87 of the Basic Law prohibited the use of the military except in the role of "defensive actions." Any war of aggression, or the support of it, is forbidden by Article 26. This was a basic tenet of the FRG that found rigid adherence across political party lines in the Bundestag as well as fierce support by the German populace.

The Gulf War of 1990-91 opened the debate on the possible participation of German forces in "out of area" missions under United Nations auspices. Political and diplomatic ramifications of the German "nonparticipation" in the Gulf fueled arguments over the role and legal justification of the armed forces in the international arena.²⁷ Germany, unified in the wake of the Cold War, had to find if it could assume greater responsibility by participating in international military actions. Arguments split along party lines in the Bundestag and a case was presented to the Federal Constitutional Court for adjudication. In July 1994, the Court ruled that German military forces may participate in multinational military operations out of NATO territory if these

operations take place under the auspices of the United Nations and if they are approved by the Bundestag "in principle" (Chancellor's majority vote) prior to deployment. This ruling ended a security policy controversy of long standing in Germany and went to the "heart of the question" of Germany's international role.

Foreign Minister Kinkel's opinion of the Court's ruling was indicative of the German government's policies. "We have now finally achieved clarity . . . but we will not move away from the 'culture of restraint'. There will be no militarization of German foreign policy."²⁸ Integration into existing regional security institutions and uncompromising emphasis on demilitarization characterized compliance with one of the more significant constitutional rulings in modern German history. These events opened the door for limited German participation in U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia. Polish and Czech leaders were supportive of the Court's ruling and concurred with the parameters of the political debate.

German public opinion has also been a significant restraining factor in shaping security policy. The RAND Corporation conducted a survey of German public opinion in 1994 and identified significant findings of political impact. The German people have jettisoned Cold War paradigms and "broadened their strategic horizon" by focusing on new security challenges. In one study, Germans identified "another Chernobyl (80%)" as the most critical threat to German vital interests. Proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction (69%) and the spread of extreme nationalist movements (69%) were the next ranking threats. Ranked sixth with a 42% response rate was public concern for regional and ethnic conflict in Europe.²⁹ The German people supported the principle of Bw participation in national defense (93%) but support quickly diminished on issues of German defense support to specific countries. The greatest amount of support was found for Bw participation in a preemptive NATO strike against a nascent Libyan nuclear capability (54%) but only 25% favored defending Poland against Russian attack.³⁰ Questions were not asked about potential scenarios involving the Czech Republic yet three out of four Germans (76%) believed that Germany has a special relationship toward "Eastern Europe."³¹ As reflected in this study, Germans remain reluctant to provide unilateral security guarantees for the emerging eastern democracies. Ronald Asmus declared in a review of the study he undertook for RAND:

If Germans are reticent to assume certain new security or defense roles, such reticence must . . . be seen against the background of German history, residual concerns over German power, and the lack of consensus among Germany's own allies and neighbors as to what is really expected from Germany.³²

The domestic restraints placed on the use of the German military are also formidable. Within the framework defined by the Constitutional Court, the Bundestag, and NATO, and absent clearly defined public support, unilateral German military action is improbable today. The reliance on German economic and political means in focusing its security policies becomes more

evident.

Polish Security Policy

The policies of Poland and the Czech Republic require examination within the context of regional security. Although different in origin and qualitatively diverse in military structures, the policies of these two countries parallel the German approach to security policy.

The problems facing Poland during its emergence from communism and the process of German unification centered on borders, German minorities in Polish territory, and accounting for Poles victimized by the Germans in World War II. Although the Warsaw Treaty of 1971 recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the official border between West and East Germany and Poland, the formal legal settlement was deferred until formal unification of Germany in 1990. Chancellor Kohl initially withheld formal German recognition of these borders due to domestic German politics once the Berlin Wall collapsed in the Fall of 1989.³³ German domestic debate continued until the Two-Plus-Four talks in November of 1990 when the two countries signed the treaty recognizing existing border lines. This signing was followed by the German-Polish Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation in June of 1991.

This treaty addressed German minority rights in Poland by guaranteeing them the same rights afforded to similar minorities according to the OSCE. Polish minorities who had suffered at the hands of Germany in World War II were promised compensation by a

foundation to be created by the German government. The minority issue was defused and moved toward resolution and border openings were expanded between the two countries. Local ethnic riots in both countries forced both parties to establish more stringent visa requirements in 1990 yet migration continues unabated until today.³⁴

The treaties created the political framework that opened the way for the development of Polish security policy vis a vis Germany. As the first post-Communist Polish Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated, "Poland's road to Europe leads through Germany."³⁵ Polish officials were aware of the historical importance of German relations and advocated rapid integration into the European security framework as the primary means to guarantee Polish security. Polish military doctrine focused on a purely defensive force with no country identified as overtly hostile to Poland. Participation in international peacekeeping operations was articulated but hindered by modernization deficiencies. The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland proclaimed the tenets of Polish security as "cooperation with immediate neighbors, the pursuit of membership in NATO, and efforts to build a national system of military defense."³⁶ The declared motivation behind this policy was the promotion of mutual trust between neighbors and the establishment of "transparency" in military and security affairs that permitted mutual monitoring of military activities.³⁷

Poland quickly began a series of military exchanges with NATO countries and launched a vigorous campaign for admission to NATO via the PfP with full German support. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that "Germany will serve as Poland's advocate and work for as rapid as possible an expansion of NATO and the European Union."³⁸ Polish and German officials were in the forefront of membership aspirations despite Poland's constitutional quandaries and military modernization problems.

The Polish government's relationship between the President, legislature, and military is poorly defined. The political leadership has deferred the command and control issues pending future NATO review of its membership application. The Polish Army remains a conscript based force of less than 230,000 personnel and has not developed a proper force structure mix between its combat and support units. The preponderance of aging Soviet equipment in the army inventory is incompatible with NATO forces and inhibits modernization. The dwindling defense budget has hampered the military's ability to modernize with new equipment acquisitions and the creation of a professional army based on voluntary enlistment. These decreased levels of resourcing and increased modernization requirements for the military have slowed but not extinguished the struggle for NATO compatibility.³⁹ Polish efforts to gain membership in European security institutions depend on the management of its financial and economic resources and ability to fashion a pluralistic government capable of controlling its military while concurrently

expanding its free market economy.⁴⁰ Germany is aware of these problems yet views the necessity of extending European security guarantees to the eastern borders of Poland as the overriding determinant of their regional relationship.

Poland, due to its geographical position in Europe, relies on integration into European institutions and development of "neighborhood stability" with adjoining countries. Germany has become Poland's largest trading partner, a position formerly held by the Soviet Union (trade reached a total value of U.S. \$11 billion during the first eight months of 1995).⁴¹ Polish societal woes such as, high unemployment (15.3%), rising crime rates, and structural reform of governmental health and education systems, require the creation of domestic industry and flow of capital into the country. Germany has taken the lead in providing aid, capital flow, and management expertise into Poland in an attempt to help the Poles promote stability.⁴²

The Polish policy of integration into NATO with German sponsorship contributes to the deescalation of potential conflicts with Germany. The early bilateral resolution of the border and minority issues suggested a willingness of both sides to address long standing issues and pursue integration into regional security institutions that may, in the long term, contribute to the deterrent impact of the Western alliance. Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, in his first foreign visit after the Fall election, visited Germany in January 1996. The President declared that his visit was a "symbolic statement"

underscoring Poland's commitment to the West and despite the recent political changes in Poland (Kwasniewski was elected as a communist). Poland would continue to seek membership in NATO and the European Union as the cornerstone of regional stability.⁴³

Czech Republic Security Policy

German-Czech relations have not evolved as smoothly. The main objective of Czech foreign policy is to gain membership in the European community as fast as possible. The main issue between the Czech Republic and Germany has been the issue of German minorities in the Czech Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia expelled approximately three million citizens of German origin at the end of World War II. When the communist regime of Czechoslovakia collapsed in 1989, expectations arose among the Sudeten Germans that the new government would apologize and agree to compensation for private property seized during the expulsion. After a series of intense discussions between representatives of the two governments, the Czechs decided to defer talks indefinitely and shelve the minorities issue. Instead, they concentrated on the establishment of democratic institutions and a market economy following the formal split with Slovakia.⁴⁴

The Sudeten issue continues unabated into 1996 characterized by verbal skirmishes between the parties based on domestic politics rather than the conduct of rational foreign policy. The Czechs face parliamentary elections in 1996 and their political leadership is uncompromising toward German demands for compensation. They view German politicians as obdurate and

catering to the wishes of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU-coalition partner with the ruling Christian Democratic Union of Chancellor Kohl) which represents a majority of the expellees.

Czech President Havel stated over a radio broadcast in January 1996 that the unresolved dispute with Germany "is not a matter of importance. We are capable of living side by side even without this (joint Czech-German declaration) and even without this issue being resolved, or without taking any steps leading to the solution to this problem."⁴⁵ A prominent Czech journalist, Adam Drda, declared that the Czechs "flopped" on the Sudeten issue by not compromising with the Germans in favor of the larger foreign policy issue-membership in the European Union.⁴⁶

The involved parties have postponed formal resolution of bilateral issues. The Czechs continue to push aggressively for NATO membership as the panacea to security problems and interstate relations. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus stated that bilateral relations with Germany are not "on the agenda" for the upcoming Bertelsmann Forum that will address the expansion of Europe in 1996.⁴⁷ The Czechs will pursue unilateral integration into European institutions despite the difficulties with the Germans.

Lacking a formal agreement with Germany, the Czechs developed security policy in a strategic vacuum in their rush to the West. The Soviet Union had collapsed, Czechoslovakia had split into two countries in 1993, and the presence of a unified Germany on the border encouraged the nascent Czech Republic to

seek ties with existing western security institutions at the expense of bilateral relations. Jaromir Novotny, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Directorate of the Czech Ministry of Defense, stated that the strategic vacuum obliged the Czechs push for prompt integration into western security systems while simultaneously promoting "Western support of our own interest."⁴⁸ The PfP became the primary vehicle for this initial integration with the Germans acting as chief advocate of Czech integration into NATO.

Czech security interests focused exclusively on integration and cooperation with the Western alliance as the best guarantee of ensuring democratic advances and a free market economy. Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic de-emphasized bilateral relations with Germany and other neighbors and pushed for accelerated European integration as the basis for security.

In the realm of military integration into NATO, the Czech military is designing new command and control systems based on brigade based land forces capable of integration into NATO military structures. The Czech Republic has a conscript based army equipped with aging Soviet equipment. Corresponding decreases in the defense budgets have hindered efforts to professionalize the Army and modernize equipment.⁴⁹ The Czech Republic is considered to have the most advanced military of the former WTO members. Their reputation is supplemented by a solid reputation for professionalism as evidenced by eleven United Nations sponsored peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.⁵⁰

The Czech Republic has also established formal democratic control of the military by means common to western democracies. The Czech Republic has a free market tradition that predates their communist experiences and encourages outside investment. The main trading partner of the Czech Republic is Germany and, like Poland, the Republic has been a leading recipient of German aid and investment.⁵¹

Czech security policy, rooted in unilateral integration into the European security framework, operates at the expense of a bilateral relationship with Germany or other CEE states. Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College has concluded, "Prague's unilateralism precludes regional cooperation and unity among the most Westernized successor states and leaves them divided and adrift."⁵² The myopic focus on Czech integration into European institutions may serve to harmonize the community's interests, but fails to overcome differences with Germany.

Conclusion

German security policy has adopted a broad outlook with a distinctly European focus. Germany's cooperative approach through multinational organizations emphasizing demilitarization permits German leadership to pursue security interests through nonmilitary means. The burdensome costs of a large military establishment are minimized permitting the dedication of German resources to the restoration of the former GDR. German encouragement of shared prosperity with its easternmost neighbors also increases Germany's leverage with the developing economies

of Poland and the Czech Republic while minimizing their prescribed disadvantage in the military realm.

The German military remains capable of implementing limited defensive strategies but is restrained by force restructuring, frugal parliamentary spending, and prescriptive constitutional mandates that inhibit its ability to project power. The German political leadership's desire to erase the historical burdens of pre-1945 Germany place immeasurable restraints on the use of the German military in unilateral actions. Lacking offensive military capabilities within a politically restrained environment, Germany cannot implement a unilateral or exclusively military security policy.

The European option has replaced the German or Russian option in regional interstate relations. German concerns now lie with the preservation of international stability, restoration of the former GDR, and economic security. German integration into European institutions and promotion of Polish and Czech membership have become requirements for coping with challenges to the east in the near future.

ENDNOTES

1. An excellent examination of the changing role of NATO since the collapse of the Soviet Union can be found in John S. Duffield's article, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 109, Number 5, 1994-95. Duffield's treatment of "denationalization of security policy" and the German rationale in supporting NATO are treated on pp. 775-784.
2. FBIS-WEU-95-190, "The German Handwriting Can Be Seen Clearly", 2 October 1995, p. 9.
3. Christopher Bluth, a critic of German foreign policy, maintains that Germany is having trouble adjusting to its new role in the international system. He argues that German development of specific national interests is not likely to occur in the near future due to German inability to define concrete national interests after the Cold War. See Christopher Bluth, "Germany: Defining the National Interests", World Today, Volume 51, Issue: 3, March, 1995, pp. 51-55.
4. FBIS-WEU-95-221, "Waigel Speaks on Foreign Policy, EU, NATO", 16 November 1995, pp.8-9. See the White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of German and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, German Ministry of Defense, p.40 for published foreign policy goals.
5. Ibid., Waigal, p. 11.
6. Ibid., White Paper, p. 37.
7. Ibid., The White Paper, p. 40. James Sperling has offered an analysis of German security interests in, "German Security Policy in Post-Yalta Europe", found in German Unification Processes and Outcomes, edited by M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, p. 276. Mr. Sperling posits that the objectives of this policy include the acceleration European demilitarization which will create an environment favorable to German economic interests which have leverage with the other European states.
8. Lothar Gutjahr, "Competitive Interdependence: Germany's Foreign Policy in a Changing Environment", Strategic Review, United States Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C., Summer, 1995.
9. Helmut Kohl, "Die Streitkräfte als wichtigstes Instrument der Sicherheitspolitik," 13 December 1988, in Presse and Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, 175 (16 December

1988), pp.1550-1551.

10. George A. Joulwan, General, "NATO's Military Contributions to Partnership for Peace: The Progress and the Challenge", NATO Review, Volume. 43, Issue 2, March 1995, pp. 4-5.

11. An excellent study of the PfP can be found in William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young's essay, Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 15 August 1994.

12. Former German Foreign Minister, Hans Genscher, along with the Czech government representative, advocated an increased role for the OSCE in the field of security by proposing United Nations type "blue helmet" missions for the OSCE. While not accepted at the time, this proposal is indicative the firm advocacy of German and Czech commitment to European security integration. See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Zweites Treffen des Rates der Aussenminister der Teilnehmerstaaten der KSZE," 30 January 1992, Bulletin, 12 (4 February 1992), p. 83.

13. The German rationale for supporting institutional integration into the European security framework and German concerns with the states of the former Soviet Union and the current government of the Commonwealth of Independent States are addressed by James Sperling. Ibid., pp. 261-284.

14. In 1990, the Germans held an OSCE conference in Bonn that added an additional focus on economic cooperation in Europe. The OSCE document produced "...obligated the non-market economies of Europe to institute price reform, implement policies that would lead to currency convertibility, and adopt the principles of the market economy". Ibid., Sperling, p. 268.

15. Ibid., Gutjahr, p. 26.

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