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**BUILDING COMBAT POWER
THE ARMY'S MODERN LAND FORCE FINANCE**

BY

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
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BUILDING COMBAT POWER
The Army's Modern Land Force Finance

by

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ABSTRACT

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Command priorities into the next century will bring an era of dealing with regional warfighting and stewardship. Building Combat Power deals with stewardship at theater level. The paper argues that every warfighting commander needs to prioritize professional financial management "up front" to survive the challenges of modern military operations. The aim is to combine the two primary core competencies--finance operations and resource management operations; and advance the three features of modularity, connectivity, and mobility. At minimum, the paper describes how Force XXI Commanders will tailor and apply their modern land force finance capabilities across the full range of military operations. Relatedly, the paper builds an awareness to those who would have direction of, or would impact on, the soldiers and civilians who actually do financial management during operations. The target audience is, therefore, Army planners, interagency organizations, and wanting strategic level commanders.

BUILDING COMBAT POWER

The Army's Modern Land Force Finance

Introduction.

This paper examines how Force XXI Commanders will have the ability to tailor and apply the Army's modern land force finance capabilities at theater level. The aim is to combine the two primary financial core competencies--finance operations and resource management operations--under one command and control (C2) headquarters; and advance the three features of modularity, connectivity, and mobility to enhance the "up front" employment of modern finance forces within the framework of three simple statements:¹

1. The **modularity** of modern land force finance capabilities will allow commanders to tailor (limit) the number and types of finance units absolutely essential to contingency (mission) objectives.

2. The joint **connectivity** aspect of modern land force finance will allow commanders to apply finance capabilities across the full range of military operations.

3. The **mobility** of modern land force finance will allow finance forces to move on a moments notice, or in other words, to be at the right place at the right time, and adequately resourced with the right capability.

To grasp the need to combine finance and resource management operations under one headquarters, and to advance an awareness for the "up front" employment of this headquarters, is to master the paper's message. While advancing these three features--modularity,

connectivity, and mobility -- is no great doctrinal leap, making them clear and credible is key to helping planners and warfighting commanders properly employ modern land force finance assets for the building of combat power.

Core Competencies.

Finance activity is usually described in terms of military pay (support of payroll operations) and commercial vendor services (purchase of supplies). There are a wide range of finance activities that lie outside these definitions essential to the effective building of combat power. Essentially forgotten, these activities are lumped together under the heading of "central funding", or some similar title. The key activities of central funding relate to the currency and the accounting or flow of funds to ensure not one dollar is lost. In essence, this means finance is divided into two areas: finance and resource management, the core competencies used to build combat power.

Finance Operations. In essence, finance operations fall into five key areas: **currency and banking support, pay and travel operations, procurement operations, finance policy formulation, and accounting support.**² These specialized areas provide the finance officer strategic capabilities with doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives set by the theater Force III Commander and operational actions.

Resource Management Operations. The primary purpose of resource management is to track the flow and receipt of funds in the building

of combat power. Resource management operations also fall into five key areas: *funding operations, contract management, cost reporting, manpower requirements, and internal review.*³

Building Alliances.

*"New businesses are spawned by building alliances and leveraging core competencies in new business segments, by taking what you do well across businesses and creatively applying it in new, unexplored industries".*⁴

Gary Hamel
Industry Consultant

Leveraging Core Competencies. Core competencies represent the very essence of our existence. Each are unique, bundled sets of resources upon which management is built, which when combined, give rise to the concept of modern land force finance.⁵

The objective is to reveal points across the competencies that, when combined, generate new processes and provide commanders with the requirements they demand and soldiers with the benefits they expect.⁶

The success of modern land force finance operations calls for the elimination of barriers and acts of consensus with the clear understanding of an opportunity for growth.

What is at stake is the future of the entire Army Finance Corps, and the time horizon is the next 3 to 5 years. If today's Finance Corps does not restructure or combine its two core competencies, it will most likely die a slow, protracted death, with the memory of its contribution to the Army fading into history books and dusty museum displays along with the memories of the "good old days".

Unfortunately, the only reason we will remember the "good old days" is that there were so few of them.⁷

Unleashing the Power. Now is the time to unleash the power of each core competency. The answer lies in the approach. The essence of the approach is a "design as you go"--strategy in action.⁸ For example, pick a couple of initiatives requiring the capabilities within each core competency, and run with them. In time, the scope of yesterday's finance operations will pass on, with its name and legacy carried forward by a new corporate look. This look of strength, with an opportunity for career growth, will embody a sense of achievement and excitement for both military and civilian members within the financial community. This sense of movement among the members will unleash the power to drive the concept of the Army's modern land force finance forward into the 21st century.

What is Modern Land Force Finance?

"If we can't properly account for pay, procurement, supplies and equipment on the battlefield, we should question our existence - because that's our job."⁹

Brig. Gen. Roger Searce
Deputy Director for Finance
DFAS

An Opportunity for New Thinking. We win the nation's wars by exploiting our capabilities in space, air, land, and sea; employing joint operations; and focusing on depth, simultaneity, continuous operations, and clearly defined conditions for success.¹⁰ Modern land force finance is the bold change in how the United States Army

Finance Corps will restructure its theater level capabilities to shape and support the "battlespace in the round" contingency of the 21st century. Leaps in technology, advances in information operations, and using situation awareness to take anticipatory and responsive actions, provide today's Army Finance Corps opportunities to create entirely new kinds of organizations and doctrines for tomorrow. Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, during testimony before the Department of Defense (DOD) Roles and Missions Commission, stated, "Our purpose must not be to make yesterday perfect but to make ourselves as effective as we can ... for tomorrow."¹¹ As noted by General Sullivan, today's Finance Corps has an opportunity for new thinking. It can no longer be concerned with just making its existing organizations and present finance doctrine more effective than they are, but to create entirely new kinds of organizations and doctrines to exploit the explosion in technology while matching the times we live in.

A Framework for Strategy. Core demands and the expectations of our customers are the framework of our strategy. The foundation to this framework is the three doctrinal perspectives (levels) of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.¹² Together, these are the doctrinal footings that will guide the future needs of our customers.

a. *Core Demands.* The strategic core demands reflect what the theater Force XXI Commander expects of the finance force. The characteristics of successful strategic core demands can be described as modular in structure, centralized in planning, and a split-base operation capable of facilitating METT-T tailoring by the Force XXI

Commander. In split-based finance operations, the majority of the headquarters financial management structure will remain in the continental United States (CONUS) and support deployed forces through electronic information exchange.¹³ More importantly, characteristics of successful operational and tactical core demands must be described as an anticipatory force, not only ready, trained, and positioned, but primed to provide "911" finance service support to both individuals and organizations. The enhancing of our operational and tactical connectivity and mobility capabilities to support strategic core demands will be extremely useful in the creation of a well postured "anticipatory finance" force.¹⁴

b. *Expectations.* The expectations focus cuts across all three levels of war. In a world of eleventh-hour improvisation, crisis management, and ad hoc decision making, Force XXI Commanders will expect the meeting of "all" the financial needs of the deployed forces, as well as their family members and military communities at home stations. So when called upon, a key characteristic of meeting customer expectations will be that of operating under a concept of assured support (a predictive push and responsive pull system of financial support).¹⁵ Operating under this concept, the Force XXI Commander will have the assurance of required support on time, where required, and with the required resources.¹⁶ This will reflect positively on the warfighting and the Finance Command's contribution, which will come right back to the Finance Corps in its value and what finance can bring to the fight. Together, these core demands and expectations will be the driving force in thinking about the way

ahead.

What is the Role of the Finance Commander? The old maxim will still apply - "No one notices what we do until we don't do it."¹⁷ The role of the modern land force Finance Commander is best explained by the following:¹⁸

Land force Finance Commanders are very much in demand in war, who can often fall into obscurity in peace. Most deal with the operational and tactical science of war but often work for senior leaders who must delve into the strategic art of war. They emerge during war because the proper funding and accounting of war is now very much a science. They disappear during peacetime, because in peace, war is mostly considered an art.

The people who employ Finance Commanders are generals. Finance Commanders advise generals on financial policies and procedures, accounting activities, and serve as the general's "honest broker", while exercising command of his unit.

Standing along beside generals are planners. Most do not know much about Finance Commanders until they grow up to be generals - which they normally do. The target audience for Finance Commanders is, of course, planners and wanting strategic level commanders.

Once in a while a Finance Commander gets to be a general. In such case, his role is critical in building alliances, creating the free exchange of knowledge and capabilities, while bridging together the art and science of war. Finance Generals CAN make a difference!

Combining Core Competencies.

Common Ground. No matter how elegant the strategy, if the people in each respective competency do not share a common ground or a common mental or doctrinal framework, little will be done. Modern land force finance must have a strong identity built upon clearly defined values. It cannot suffer from an "identity crisis", with values ill defined or missing or it will die. And there is always the perception or danger of "giving away the store". The biggest barriers to the merging of core competencies are people, the way we work together and the way we protect our turf. Our focus should not be on short term mission objectives at the expense of the process as

a whole.

The Way Ahead. Meeting customer demands and expectations directs the need to get our financial house in order to effectively deal with stewardship at the theater level. General Gordon Sullivan, made this observation on stewardship:

"Simply stated, we must run the Army with less money. This begins with getting the most from the resources provided us; we have to be good stewards."¹⁹

Clearly, the way ahead must go well beyond the classical approach of finance operations to the soldier in the form of military pay. It includes the responsive funding of combat power and the allocation of limited resources against higher operational tempos captured under resource management operations. The answer lies in putting resource management operations under the managerial responsibility of the Finance Commander.²⁰

Simultaneous Stewardship. As a strategic Finance Commander, you know about both core competencies and what can go wrong. For instance, deploying units must be adequately resourced. Combat operations cannot be hindered by resource management issues. One deployed unit cannot be allowed to "break the bank". In such a scenario, the Finance Commander could collectively sustain the war and the Finance Corps lose the audit.²¹

Finance and resource management operations will increasingly have to cope with the demands of split-based operations. However, with spending and funding monitored by a single command and control headquarters, the finance commander, now has the ability to assess strategic theater level requirements, make recommendations, and

reduce risk.

Combining core competencies would go beyond the ability to efficiently get the operational level support to the right command at the right time, it would be *simultaneous stewardship!*²² So, "wiring" together both the finance and resource management core competencies to form an integrated network of information sharing and decision making is again the right answer to successful finance operations in the 21st century.

Organizational/Career Growth. Former president of CIGNA

Property and Casualty Gerry Isom, once said:

"The best growth opportunities lie between businesses, not within them."²³

What he appears to be saying is that each core competency standing alone does not typically have that many internal opportunities for revitalization. We need to collaborate beyond the boundaries.

Finance operations alone does not have the internal competencies modern land force finance needs to capitalize on new "career" growth opportunities. As noted by Colonel Tant, former 266th Finance Commander, the action to combine resource management operations with financial operations "will allow the Army to centralize and streamline the professional development and distribution of all officers associated with financial management".²⁴ Pay the king his shilling, and the queen too, if necessary. The most ambitious and challenging way to create new organizational strength and career growth is to doctrinally combine these separate core competencies through a structural merger placing both under the command and control of the Finance Commander.

The Need to be Lean and Fit. New technology and budget cuts that have made the future so unpredictable and uncontrollable are not barriers to overcome, but opportunities to be grasped and exploited. The successful marriage of these two competencies will guide the finance corps at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Each have withstood the test of time and together will serve as a bedrock of knowledge for the development of modern land force finance wartime doctrine. And as knowledge is the fundamental driver of success, the expanded doctrinal ability will display a "lean and fit" look for the Army's Modern Land Force Finance concept and its ability to properly account for pay, procurement, supplies and equipment on the battlefield and become a far more relevant measure of our Corps' value to the Force XXI Commander.

Key Features of Modern Land Force Finance.

Having determined that combining the finance and resource management core competencies is vital to modern land force finance operations, the next step is to ensure finance is ready to deploy on order.

"...the Army of the 21st century must be a dynamic and adaptive total force. As part of a joint team, it must demonstrate doctrinal flexibility, modularity and tailorability, connectivity, strategic mobility..."²⁵

Brig. Gen. Morris J. Boyd
Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
TRADOC

Anticipatory Finance. The real secret to the success of the Army's Modern Land Force Finance is to shift fundamental strategic

thinking with regard to the employment of financial management across the full range of military operations. To do this, and to meet the challenges prescribed by BG Boyd, modern land force finance must be an anticipatory force--featuring characteristics of modularity, connectivity, and mobility. In reality, we can no longer depend upon the freedom to build up forces as we did during Desert Shield/Storm. When called upon, the designated "911" finance force must be ready, trained, and strategically positioned to respond. In essence, the Army's modern land force finance must be able to move on a moments notice, able to go a long ways, and prepared to stay for a while. This focuses the concept of "battlefield repositioning".

Battlefield Repositioning. Today, ask any commander for a list of desired features for deployable forces, and the chances are that *modularity, connectivity, and mobility* will be close to the top. Once equipped with a clear picture of how finance is an added value with each of these three features, planners and Force XXI Commanders can focus on the "ways" to ensure the Army's modern land force finance can get to the fight.

a. *Modularity.* Finance is the one thing that Force XXI cannot afford to leave home without. If it does, it will never sustain its assets once off the ship, plane, or train. Force XXI is the road, while modularity is the vehicle through which we will move the Finance Corps of today into the Army's Modern Land Force Finance of tomorrow.

In the future, the velocity of war will no longer permit long buildup periods, and CONUS will, for the most part, be our principal

base of operations. Finance capabilities must be able to go from deployment to employment in record time. This requires organizational structures and processes that can not only deliver a wide range of finance services, but with smaller units. Finance Corps doctrine now identifies Finance Units deploying in a modular configuration (eg. detachments).²⁶ But, for a theater *in extremis* crisis, little can be done outside of an ad hoc tactical level finance support team (FST) flying into the theater to set up shop. A theater level force planning package does not exist.²⁷

1. Characteristics. Modularity is the ability to tailor and apply modern land force finance capabilities across the full range of military operations. The overarching strategic objective is to transform today's Finance Corps into a modern land finance force, tailored to be effective in any environment. Characteristics include foresight, flexibility, and force composition. Modern land force finance must give way to smaller, more agile units, with state of the art technology capable of responding quickly. It must also be able to project an appropriately tailored package, primarily from CONUS bases.

2. Early Wins. Modularity is clearly the most visible and telling measure of the overall capability and strategic direction of the Army's modern land force finance units. The essence of modularity is the ability to build combat power with the proper strategic and operational depth. The challenge then becomes selecting and prioritizing the organizational structures (financial needs) of the deployed force against the particular theater of war.

It is the operational level of war and below that the majority of wartime financial and resource management operations are conducted. It is the responsibility of the Finance Commander to ensure theater level commanders are capable of early wins by giving the advice and expertise to stay within statutory laws and prescribing proper financial policy. The aim is to advance the need to prioritize professional financial management "up front" in the building of combat power.

3. Two Key Enablers. On 7 October 1994, Saddam Hussein mobilized his forces and moved south towards the Kuwait boarder.²⁸ On 8 October 1994, the 13th Finance Group was alerted to provide a III Corps theater level C2 headquarters and planning cell for all finance operational elements in support Operation Vigilant Warrior. The command intent was to provide for all finance and accounting support, consolidate all funding requirements, and ensure funds were available to sustain operations.

The key operational objective was to be positioned early on at each echelon of command with a verification of mission requirements. Operation Vigilant Warrior demonstrated that the finance command structure could respond at all levels of military operations. At the same time, the integration of a precision force with continuous situation awareness created efficiencies in capability. Both are two key enablers to the modularity feature.

Within the framework of Operation Vigilant Warrior, let's examine these two key enablers concentrating on what warfighting commanders possessed to get the early wins and survive the

operational level challenges of modern military operations.

Enabler 1: "Fly Away" Assault Packages: Early on in the theater of operation, the Finance Commander needed to function as a major subordinate command (MSC), provide guidance and policy, conduct daily operations and track missions, coordinate logistical support, track strength and personnel accounting, and perform staff coordination and liaison across the finance internal structure as well as with other MSCs and CONUS, Finance's principle base of operations. Keep in mind that what started out as an *in extremis* crisis response dictated immediate actions that did not allow detailed coordination or planning at any level. Fortunately, the 13th Finance Group Commander had the capability to deploy a variety of force packages both CONUS and OCONUS (See Appendix)²⁹.

The smallest force package able to deploy was the Initial Ready Team (IRT). The next size force package was the Theater/Group Ready Detachment (GRD). The IRT is part of the GRD. This would be a fully mission capable (FMC) "fly away" assault package with the requirement to provide C2 in the theater, provide a limited planning capability, and be equipped with the Defense Finance Battlefield System. In addition to these two standard deployment packages (IRT and GRD), specific force modules could be added to tailor to the needs of the region. The Theater Force Module (TFM) packages provide a balance of capabilities based on mission requirements, lift considerations, and theater constraints. The TFM may deploy as part of the IRT or as a separate deployment package in support of a task organized finance battalion. The "fly away" assault package for Operation Vigilant

Warrior was the TFM.

Enabler 2: OPLANS/CONPLANS: Finance Commanders must work closely with planners to ensure force packages are integrated in CINC OPLANS/CONPLANS and exercised in AORs most likely to be executed.

Much of the success of Operation Vigilant Warrior is credited to the support relationships and infrastructure built up during the 1991 Gulf War. For example, initial funding requirements and currency needs were supported by the Dhahran Forward Support Team (FST) out of the main United States Military Training Mission finance office home based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.³⁰ Host nation banking was again established with the Saudi American Bank to support all procurement, finance, and resource management operations in theater.

Modularity, with the help of these two key enablers, truly proved to be a force multiplier with regard to foresight, flexibility, and force composition. Actions included the successful "up front" deployment of a 13th Finance Group TFM as a planning cell with two follow on GRDs into a known theater. Life was good.

b. *Connectivity.* Operations Desert Shield/Storm proved to be a failure for the finance community in that finance units were unable to provide adequate financial control, update CONUS databases, and track critical financial information.³¹ Information, not money, will be the Force XXI currency of choice. Finance capabilities must exist to take information generated in theater, and then be able to update CONUS data bases. The Army recognized this during the Gulf War when trying to support logistics operations and individual soldier pay support via a CONUS-based automation service center. As Mr. William

Reilly, who engineered the first battlefield finance system, described:

"The deployment of a military van with a mainframe computer, which uses very expensive and scarce airlift, is not what the warfighting commander needs. The warfighter needs automation services but not the computer."³²

As a force projection Army, modern land force finance has the current capability of a stand-alone theater level system with the Defense Finance Battlefield System (DFBS). The DFBS can quickly move into, integrate with, and operate in any theater as an on-line or stand-alone configuration. DFBS has been used in several deployments, to include Operation Vigilant Warrior, and had served the theater well.

However, in the context of operational connectivity, the DFBS does have its limitations. There are two shortfalls within its operational level connectivity - communications and hardware. First, without a dedicated circuit, split-based operations will not take place and key financial transactions will not be made. Second, deploying finance elements need to be able to communicate from a remote site where no other standard military form of communication (MSE or commercial) is available.

1. Characteristics. Connectivity is the ability to move information between the theater and CONUS (split-based operations) using standard military communication networks. Modern land force finance needs an operational level capability (battalion and below). Characteristics include continuity, cooperation, and interoperability.

2. Early Wins. While we will continue to recognize the levels

of war as useful in defining military responsibilities, the capturing of timely and accurate financial data must also cut across all levels of war. The key to achieving operational level connectivity is to bridge the passing of critical technical financial transactions by means of communications on the battlefield; thereby, achieving strategic objectives. While access to a dedicated circuit can usually be available at some point during most large-scale operations, early access is generally not available.³³

3. Critical Links. Conflicts between the strategic level and the operational level forces must be resolved.³⁴ Deploying operational elements (TFM, IRT) must have immediate communications capability until deploying signal units arrive. Once deployed, current strategic communication levels for financial systems focus on home station support and do not fully address requirements at the operational level. However, CONUS based operations require real-time information and a theater-wide financial awareness of costs and accounting data. Critical links must be made.³⁵ Various platforms must be developed for the digital battlefield to pass information seamlessly across the three levels of war. With this in mind, and through the efforts of an Army Warfighter Exercise put on by the 10th Mountain Division to test Force XXI initiatives, the finance community identified two critical connectivity links.³⁶ These links are necessary to leverage the hardware and communication capabilities and improve operations from contract payments, to budget and accounting data, to the individual soldier pay support.

Link 1: Lap-top PC systems: This capability supports both

modularity and mission execution. Modularity is supported with regard to remote operations, while mission execution is supported by providing the same capabilities as the home station. In essence, this connection between the operational and strategic levels allows modern land force finance to upload soldier pay inputs, capture contract costs, and pass accounting data by using Army signal assets (Link 2) to update CONUS data bases.

Link 2: Army Signal Assets: Army Signal assets, such as MSE, can significantly enhance the financial situational awareness between strategic objectives and operational financial transactions. By linking these levels of input, a profound capability to pass financial information seamlessly across the battlefield will be realized.

These links form the continuity, cooperation, and interoperability of the modern Army finance forces. They provide the connectivity to link the financial systems currently at the strategic communication levels to the operational and tactical levels of the deployed forces. Connectivity is achieved between strategic objectives and operational technical financial transactions. Life is good.

c. *Mobility.* The modular feature targeted a leaner flexible structure, while the connectivity feature focused on the increased demands for assured communications due to the new tailored look (reduction) of the finance "footprint" on the future battlefield.

The mobility feature targets a better, faster, and highly mobile response capability. One of the lessons learned from the Persian

Gulf War was that the Finance Corps needed to concentrate on mobility readiness. During the past several years, the Corps has instituted a number of finance features, such as force composition and the DFBS to enhance strategic mobility.

But mobility means different things to different people. The battalion or detachment commander is concerned about his ability to perform specific missions. His view of mobility is generally limited to his span of control. The higher the level of command - Finance Command and above - the broader the commander's interests become. The problem is that finance mobility, as evaluated against the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), is focused on unit mobility at the battalion level and below.³⁷ Such a tactical, or at best operational, indicator does not provide a clear picture to many of the strategic leaders within the finance and accounting community.

1. Characteristics. Mobility is freedom of movement. Long response times are historically symptomatic of many of the fundamental service characteristics of the financial system. Improving response time represents a fundamental challenge. Mobility is essential for accomplishing such a fundamental challenge and supporting a rapid response force to multiple regional contingencies.

2. Operational Mobility. Measures of mobility are important to the Army leadership and assist in evaluating go-to-war capabilities. The Finance Corps' traditional role of supporting throughout the battlefield will not change. But, in order to perform in the Force XXI environment, Finance must become totally mobile so that it can support land operations that are fully integrated, joint, and more

often than not, multinational. Availability and serviceability of equipment all factor into a units mobility level of readiness.

As strategic mobility has improved through "key enablers" within the modularity feature, and "critical links" within the connectivity feature, operational mobility issues must also be addressed. "Do we have sufficient equipment and lift assets to support the fight? Can we respond in a timely fashion to meet the needs of field commanders?" Mobility is most critical during operations when Corps and Divisions move 100K or more a day. Answers to these and other questions require a more indepth measure of mission capability at the operational level. In essence, without adequate mobile support equipment, soldiers will continue to spend more time setting up than supporting the fight.

A Capability Based Force.

Changing Military Role. The fall of the Soviet Union, fiscal constraints, and the movement from a bi-polar global confrontation to a regional conflict strategy, has caused the restructuring of America's military forces.³⁸ In essence, we are driving toward a more CONUS-based force. As a result, military commitment worldwide has increased significantly. Recent operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia, have resulted in high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) which has kept finance capabilities visible and decisively engaged.

Designing the Right Force. This paper has proposed the finance force planning strategy of combining core competencies based on the

world as it is today and how it is expected to be in the early years of the 21st Century. Ideally, this type of force structure assures the warfighters the most capable and least costly strategic finance force while offering new organizational and career growth opportunities.

The paper also argues that every warfighting commander must prioritize the deployment of finance assets "up front" by employing the features of modularity, connectivity, and mobility. This is a truly focused and realistic strategy based on capability and growth. This is also vital when dealing with our military's downsizing and fiscal constraints.

Ultimately, by combining the two core competencies using the modularity, connectivity, and mobility features, the strengths of a capability based force become more clear in the building of combat power.

Recommendation.

Combine the two primary core competencies--finance operations and resource management operations--under a single headquarters.

Modularity:

- Create a TFM "Fly Away" Headquarters Support Package
- Ensure Force Packages are Integrated into OPLANS

Connectivity:

- Provide Lap-top PC Systems to Support Remote Operations
- Use Army Signal Assets for Telecommunication Needs

Mobility:

- Delineate Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Needs
- Establish "Timeliness" as the Overall Desired End-State

Conclusion.

A New Philosophy of Support. A key measurement of an effective strategic finance force is to properly account for pay, procurement, supplies and equipment on the battlefield. Clearly, the answer is to put finance operations and resource management operations under a single Finance Commander.


With the shape of conflict changing, future operations will probably occur with unknown host nation support or infrastructure. While the threat may be harder to define, the essential capabilities are not. First, it comes down to a question of timeliness... "How fast can finance react to speed the building of combat power?" The solution is *modularity*. If properly configured and aligned, and if properly employed, modern finance will provide a balance of capabilities based on mission requirements, lift considerations, and theater constraints.

Second, the ability to manage the flow of information represents the basis for the new finance look: hence, the need for *increased connectivity*. The military is replete with examples of increased connectivity: ATMs replacing cashiers, credit card purchases, and bar-code scanners. These are applications that streamline work and produce efficiencies. Simply stated, commanders want velocity and paperless battlefield processes through assured communications, such as the DFBS. All this compresses time and space, which makes it

possible to do more in less time. With the focus today on cutting costs and saving time, efficiency through connectivity can prove to be of critical strategic importance. In essence, connectivity has become the dominant feature of modern land force finance.

Finally, out of all the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War, *mobility* readiness ranks at or near the top. The Finance Corps must be at the right place at the right time, and adequately resourced with the right capability. It is essential to determine what resources are available and what missions the theater commander wants accomplished. This will underscore our commitment to speed the building of combat power and to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

STRUCTURE COMMAND AND CONTROL



Endnotes

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9. DFAS Public Affairs, "Learning Finance in a Tactical Environment," DFAS, The DOD Accounting Firm, vol. 2, no. 7 (August 1995): 9.
10. LTG Paul E. Blackwell, "Winning the Wars of the 21st Century," Army 1994-95 Green Book, vol. 44, no. 10 (October 1994): 130.
11. David L. Hansen, "Budget - Vision - Force XXI," Resource Management (4th Quarter 1994): 10.
12. Army Field Manual 100-5, 1-3.
13. LTG Johnnie E. Wilson, "Power - Projection Logistics Now ... And in the 21st Century," Army 1994-95 Green Book, vol. 44, no. 10 (October 1994): 141.
14. Army Field Manual 100-5, 3-3.
15. Department of the Army, Logistics Integration Agency, The Army Strategic Logistics Plan, 6 February 1995, 6.

16. Ibid.

17. Sander H. Heller, "The Finance Corps, You Can't Afford to Go to War Without Us," Resource Management (December 1991): 11.

18. P D Foxtton, Powering War, Modern Land Force Logistics, Brassey's Series in New Battlefield Weapons Systems and Technology (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), 9. The central theme of the text is an adaptation of "But What is a Logistician?".

19. Evan L. Williams, "More Than Just Watching the Till," Resource Management (4th Quarter 1994): 6.

20. Hugh B. Tant III, Finance Corps: Reformulated for the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 17 May 1993), p. 21.

21. Steve Anderson, "Split Operations: The Dozen Dirtiest Questions," Army Logistician (November - December 1995): 21.

22. Gouillart, 201.

23. Ibid., 203.

24. Tant, 21.

25. GEN William W. Hartzog, "Crossing the Threshold Into a New Age," Army (May 1995): 27.

26. Army Field Manual 14-7, 6-1.

27. A multiple constituency relationship between DFAS and the Theater Force Module (TFM) is firmly in place to ensure mission accomplishment. The DFAS Crisis Command Center is on-line and Mr. Ed Kufeldt is ready to execute theater requirements on request. This execution of joint crisis management capability to date will ensure a future customer dividend.

28. William M. Landrum III, "After Action Review (AAR) -- OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR," memorandum for Commander, 13th Corps Finance Group, Saudi Arabia, 27 November 1994.

29. Diagram was based on a Military Pay Process Brief, dated 22 September 94, I directed while serving as Commander, 15th Finance Battalion. Modification includes the addition of the GRD and TFM. My thanks to CSM Robert T. Mills and SFC Alice Pomeroy for their valued assistance... they made a difference.

30. Kufeldt, "Finance and Accounting Operations in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia," memorandum for Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Arlington, VA, 9 December 1994.

31. Patrick T. Shine, "DFBS Concept Paper," memorandum for DFBS Conference Attendees, Fort Hood, TX, 22 September 1995.

32. William R. Reilly, "IFBS: A Purple Platform," DFAS, The DOD Accounting Firm, vol. 1, no. 4 (September 1994): 4.

33. Ibid. What was available, however, was access to the INTERNET via deployed routers. The Air Force combat communications groups routinely provide this service via REACH BACK as do Army tactical signal brigades. The Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled joint communications support element also provides INTERNET access from tactical employment locations.

34. Shine, enclosure 1.

35. Cory W. Mahanna and James Gagliarducci, "Army Aviation Bridges Communications on the Battlefield," Military Review (May-June 1995): 42.

36. Patrick T. Shine, "Advance Warfighter Exercise," briefing for Tenth Finance Board Attendees, Indianapolis, IN, 14 December 1995.

37. Department of the Army, Training the Force, Army Field Manual 25-100 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 November 1988), Glossary 3. Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS): The major functions occurring on the battlefield and performed by the force to successfully execute operations. The seven systems are: (1) Maneuver, (2) Fire Support, (3) Air Defense, (4) Command and Control, (5) Intelligence, (6) Mobility and Survivability, and (7) Combat Service Support. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) must be integrated throughout each of the BOS.

38. Hartzog, 22.

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