

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST:
IS IT WORTH THE COST AND RISKS?**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY L. GROH
United States Army

DTIC QUALITY INSURANCE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited

19960531 052

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST: IS IT WORTH THE COST AND RISKS?

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Groh
United States Army**

**COL Jeffrey D. McCausland
Project Advisor**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public
release. Distribution is
unlimited.

**U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Jeffrey L. Groh (LTC), USA

TITLE: NATO Expansion to the East: Is It Worth the Cost and Risks?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 March 1996

PAGES: 43

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

President Clinton articulated his national security strategy as a policy of “enlargement and engagement,” published in February 1995. This policy has diverse implications as NATO formulates a strategy to accept new members from Eastern and Central Europe. This paper argues that it is in the interest of the United States to offer NATO membership initially to Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, known as the Visegrad Countries. The question of how and when to expand the Alliance is also discussed. This paper will examine the costs, risks, and benefits of NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe for U.S. national security. This study also looks at the United States’ core national interests in Europe. Then it assesses the challenges, both threats and opportunities, to these national interests as NATO begins to expand. This will lead into an analysis of the current national security strategy, in terms of national objectives (ends), national strategic concepts (ways), and national resources (means). Finally, a risk assessment of the strategy will generate possible recommendations to changes in the ends, ways, and means to accomplish the administration’s goal of a stable Europe through an expanded NATO.

INTRODUCTION

President Clinton articulated his national security strategy as a policy of "enlargement and engagement," published in February 1995. This policy has diverse implications as NATO formulates a strategy to accept new members from Eastern and Central Europe. This paper argues that it is in the interest of the United States to offer NATO membership initially to Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, known as the Visegrad Countries. This paper will also look at the question of how and when to expand. The significance of the enlargement of Europe is expressed in the national security strategy.

Our strategy of enlargement and engagement is central to U.S. policy towards post-Cold War Europe. European stability is vital to our own security, a lesson we have learned twice at great cost this century. . . . With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of new democracies in its wake, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity.¹

This paper will examine the risks, costs, and benefits of NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe for U.S. national security.

It is evident that the Clinton Administration is committed to expanding NATO. The Administration is pursuing a strategy that assumes expansion is a *fait accompli*.

By July of 1994, when President Clinton visited Warsaw, it was clear that the momentum within the executive branch had shifted in favor of rapid accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to the Washington Treaty. President Clinton assured the Polish parliament that NATO expansion was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how."²

The idea that NATO expansion is only a matter of when and how is a bit premature. The tough questions of expansion have yet to be answered. The recent release of the "Study on NATO Enlargement" is an example of emerging policy on the "how and why" rather than "who and when" the Alliance will expand.

When NATO invites other European countries to become Allies, as foreseen in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty and reaffirmed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, this will be a further step towards the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of a broad European security architecture. NATO enlargement will extend to new members the benefits of common defence and integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institution.³

There is much more work and debate to be accomplished prior to the first new member being accepted into the Alliance.

The strategic appraisal model will be used to analyze the Clinton Administration's national security strategy in Europe. First, it is critical to examine the United States' core national interests in Europe. Then it will be necessary to assess the challenges, both threats and opportunities, to these national interests. This will lead into an analysis of the current national security strategy, in terms of national objectives (ends), national strategic concepts (ways), and national resources (means). Finally, a risk assessment of the strategy will generate possible recommendations to changes in the ends, ways, and means to accomplish the administration's goal of a stable Europe through an expanded NATO.

U.S. CORE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN EUROPE

The first step in the critical analysis of the U. S. national security policy toward Europe and NATO is an analysis of core national interests by category and intensity. Three core national interests are worthy of discussion. Economic prosperity, promotion of values, and favorable world order are the core national interests that link the U.S. to the European continent. Analysis of U.S. core national interests in Europe will highlight the answer to "why" NATO should expand to the East.

The economic well-being of the United States is a vital national interest directly linked to the European economy.

The core U.S. interest in Europe is to prevent any power or combination of hostile powers from achieving a hegemonic position and thereby controlling the major industrial states of Western Europe. Such massive disruption of the European balance of power could pose a serious threat to America's security. The population and technological resources of Western Europe make that region a rich prize for large expansionist powers.⁴

The inability of national security policies to ensure free and open markets would be devastating to the U.S. economy. A detailed analysis of the specific economic statistics that link the U.S. to the European economy will highlight the vital national interest at stake.

U.S. direct business investments and exports to Europe play a major role in the economic vitality of this country. U.S. direct investment in Western Europe totals more than \$200 billion, and European affiliates of U.S. corporations earn an estimated \$850 billion per year from sales.⁵ A large portion of the U.S. economy is based on export flow to the open markets across Europe.

20% of U.S. exports go to Western Europe, totaling \$110 billion in 1992. Three million Americans work in the U.S. for affiliates of European corporations, and hundreds of thousands more owe their jobs to the increased demands for goods and services created by those European firms.⁶

These statistics point out the vital interests at stake today in European markets. There is potential for growth, in the future, with a stable and secure Europe, which includes the Visegrad countries.

The importance of the European markets will remain a vital national interest into the 21st century. In the formulation of national security policy, one must consider the importance for the potential economic growth as markets expand in Europe.

Europe's \$7.9 trillion economy is the largest in the world and constitutes a major foreign market for American companies. Our more than \$100 billion exports to Western Europe account for nearly one in every four dollars of exports, and over the past 10 years, total U.S. exports to Western Europe have more than doubled. . . . An economically strong Europe open to American exports and investment is critical to our international economic future. If annual European GDP growth averages 2.5 percent and we can reverse the recent trend of declining U.S. market share of

European imports, our exports can grow by another \$100 billion by the year 2000.⁷

The growth in exports will come as European countries begin to modernize their industrial complex. That could be a boom to U.S. manufacturers of equipment, and computers, software which will benefit from Europe's need to expand capacity and upgrade productivity, which lags U.S. and Japanese levels.⁸ In order to capitalize on future economic growth in Western Europe, as well as potential growth in Central and Eastern Europe, U.S. policy must be focused on stability in the region. NATO enlargement, to include the Visegrad countries, provides an opportunity to create a stable, secure, and integrated Europe.

A favorable world order is a vital national interest for the United States. President Clinton has stated, "The security of the North Atlantic region is vital to the security of the United States."⁹ The United States cannot allow the disruption of our economic interests in Europe due to instability. Expanded regional conflicts would interrupt the flow of trade in developing free markets, distract players involved, and drain resources. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke stated the American position on the linkage of security in Europe to U.S. national interests in a recent speech.

"The United States cannot afford to allow religious, ethnic disputes, economic instability threaten the peace in Europe and thus threaten our vital interests. The success of these democratic and market reforms makes us all more secure; they are the best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds uncorked by the end of the Cold War."¹⁰

The way to increase stability in the region is to assist the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in their transition to political, economic and military systems similar to the NATO allies. The intent of NATO enlargement is for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to work toward a common goal of reducing external and internal conflicts. NATO enlargement can serve as a means to reach the end state of a more secure and stable Europe.

The link between the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States is characterized by a set of basic democratic values. The core national interest, for the United States, to promote democracy throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is critical to the overall national strategy. The propagation of democratic and humanitarian values in Central and Eastern Europe is in the U.S. interest. Once again, this point is specifically stated in the U.S. national security strategy.

All of America's strategic interest—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy. . . . Our national security strategy reflects both America's interests and our values. Our commitment to freedom, equality and human dignity continues to serve as a beacon of hope to peoples around the world.¹¹

The administration is committed, through a strategy of engagement and enlargement, to promote basic democratic values throughout Europe as a core national interest. The U.S. core national interests in Europe of favorable world order, economic prosperity, and promotion of values present significant opportunities and challenges for U.S. national security.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO U.S. INTERESTS

The most dangerous threat to our national interests in Europe is an unfavorable world order. A fractionalized and chaotic Europe would affect all of the basic core interests in a negative manner. Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return to historical grievances have now replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe.¹² President Clinton linked U.S. security directly to the peace and stability throughout Europe. President Clinton stated, "For our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these nations succeeds in the

face of their own very significant economic frustrations, ethnic tensions, and intolerant nationalism."¹³

There are also very significant benefits to a favorable world order in Europe.

There has been a radical change in the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. The NATO allies agreed to "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, that defines NATO strategy with a new emerging world order since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" reaffirmed that NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter remains unchanged.¹⁴ The Strategic Concept recognized a shift in the military threat from the Soviet Union to regional instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. There is also an increased threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.¹⁵ These new threats generated a broad approach to security for the Alliance.

As a result, it is clear that collective defense remains the foundation for security of the alliance members. However, there is a distinct shift in emphasis to deal with the risks associated with the new world order. The Strategic Concept goes into significant detail describing the importance of cooperation and dialogue among all of the states in Europe to prevent crisis.

In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. . . . In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis

management measures.¹⁶

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" outlines NATO's strategy to achieve security and stability in Europe in a complex and rapidly changing new world order.

The security vacuum created in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact opened opportunities for the U.S. As Russia continues its tumultuous path toward democratic reforms, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe search for security arrangements. The U.S. security strategy of enlargement is an attempt to fill the vacuum.

An enlarged NATO, to include the Visegrad countries, will tend to stabilize the region by filling a security vacuum. And if reform fails in Russia, says James Baker, an enlarged NATO would at least "protect democracy" where it is showing signs of taking "firm root-in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest."¹⁷

A democratic and secure Central and Eastern Europe is an important step to protect U.S. core national interests in the region.

The most significant concern in Europe is the Russian reaction and response to an enlarged NATO. The threat in this area would be a return to nationalistic tendencies by Russia perceiving a new threat from NATO. At the end of August 1993 in Warsaw, President Yelstin signed a joint declaration with President Walesa which said that "in the long term, . . . a decision [to join NATO] taken by sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against . . . the interests of Russia."¹⁸ However, President Yelstin quickly succumbed to the near-universal consensus in Russia's political elite against NATO enlargement.¹⁹ This summer Gen. Lebed, one of President Yeltsin's strongest political rivals in the upcoming 1996 elections, stated NATO expansion "would mark the beginning of World War III." Now that outrageous line is echoed by President Yeltsin, who said on 6 September 1995 that NATO expansion would "plunge Europe into the flames

of war.”²⁰ This attitude could cause significant changes in Russian military strategy.

The threat being is that if Russia feels threatened it could start another limited cold war. Russia has threatened not to ratify the START II treaty aimed at substantially reducing strategic nuclear weapons there and in the United States. It has also threatened to abrogate the 1990 treaty reducing conventional forces in Europe (CFE), a pact that was central to ending the East-West military rivalry on the continent.²¹

Russian concerns with an expanded NATO must be considered as U.S. security strategy is formulated in the months and years ahead. The return to a limited cold war could be costly for the United States, in terms of military resources. A new cold war, more importantly, could threaten the Clinton administration’s progress for achieving a favorable world order. On the other hand, there are several significant defense opportunities for the United States as the Alliance expands to the East.

A significant benefit, of an enlarged NATO, in the security arena, is the stabilizing effect of the CEE countries working together within the integrated military and political structures of the Alliance. The close consultations among allies may assist to confront and reduce many of the existing regional conflicts. The overall objective is to assist the CEE countries to transition to civil control of their military forces, which is essential in the democratic reform process. A second order effect of an expanded alliance is the opportunity to negotiate with new NATO members for temporary basing rights as well as passage through land and air space to react to external or internal regional conflicts. The use of Hungary, as an intermediate staging base, for NATO operations in Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Treaty is a recent example. The ability to base U.S. troops in Europe, as well as Eastern and Central Europe on a contingency basis, gives the U.S. greater strategic flexibility to respond to crisis situations around the world. The possible use of these new countries as a springboard for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations on the southeast fringes of, as well as outside of, NATO’s traditional Area of Responsibility should not be

underestimated.²² It is not significantly more costly to base troops in Europe than to base them in the U.S., and a forward presence in Europe increases the potential size and speed of a U.S. response to crisis in the Mediterranean, Middle East, or South Asia.²³ Another important security benefit of NATO enlargement is the promotion of military interoperability throughout Europe with NATO forces. As nations move toward integration into the NATO military structure, technical compatibility between U.S. and European weapons systems and procedural compatibility would increase.²⁴ The security benefits of an enlarged NATO contribute to an integrated Europe that reduces the risk of regional conflicts. It is now appropriate to examine the administration's current security strategy as it relates to promoting and protecting our core national interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS

There are several national objectives (ends) associated with the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. It is important to concentrate on NATO enlargement as the means to achieve the desired end state of increased economic prosperity, and ensuring CEE countries, CIS, and Russia continue on a path toward democratization. The administration's strategy of incorporating the CEE countries into the Alliance is the means to establish a more integrated and stable Europe that reduces the chance for regional conflicts. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of NATO enlargement is to reach an end state of a secure and stable region that protects U.S. vital interests.

Expanding the Alliance will promote our interests by reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half-the region where two world wars and the Cold War began. It will help assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or sphere of influence. It will build confidence, and give new democracies a powerful incentive to consolidate their reforms.²⁵

Once a favorable world order is secured in Europe, the opportunities for economic prosperity for the U.S. will increase.

EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO EXPANSION

The potential for economic growth throughout Europe leads one to look at the expansion of NATO as well as the European Union. There is currently a debate in progress that the expansion of NATO should proceed in parallel with the European Union. Our national security strategy is specific on achieving this important objective.

The United States seeks to build on vibrant and open market economies, the engines that have given us the greatest prosperity in human history over the last several decades in Europe and in the United States. To this end, we strongly support the process of European integration embodied in the European Union and seek to deepen our partnership with the EU in support of our economic goals, but also commit ourselves to the encouragement of bilateral trade and investment in countries not part of the EU.²⁶

The expansion of the EU, to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is the correct approach to further economic prosperity throughout the Alliance. EU enlargement, like NATO expansion, is another means to reach the desired end state of an integrated and stable Europe. The other benefit of a parallel track of the expansion of EU-NATO is in the development of a Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).

The EU and NATO share many common strategic interests, as well as foreign and security policies. It is in the best interest of all parties to pursue a strategy of enlargement that has as a goal transparency of policies between the two organizations.

From the acknowledgment of common strategic interests it follows that NATO and the EU, though formally separate and autonomous, have mutual interest in each other's enlargement processes and in ensuring the broadest possible commonality of membership. This is not because of a bureaucratic imperative to achieve 'tidiness' between institutions; still less is it an admission of the weakness of Europeans and their perpetual dependency on the United States. . . . The purpose of having a European membership of NATO is to ensure that, to the greatest possible extent, Atlanticist and European approaches to key security issues remain in harmony.²⁷

The EU and NATO expansion debate is in its early stages. There are serious economic and security hurdles that must be overcome. The correct approach recognizes the need for a major and visible effort of harmonizing enlargement of both NATO and the EU.²⁸

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: A POSITIVE STRATEGY TOWARD NATO EXPANSION

Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the fundamental strategy working toward a more secure Europe to include new emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as many of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. PfP is the Clinton Administration's program for encouraging and promoting enlargement in the context of NATO.

With the adoption of the U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace, at the January 1994 summit, NATO is playing an increasingly important role in our strategy of European integration, extending the scope of European integration, extending the scope of our security cooperation to the new democracies of Europe. Twenty-Five nations, including Russia, have already joined the partnership, which will pave the way for growing program of military cooperation and political consultation. In keeping with our strategy of enlargement, PfP is open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as other European States.²⁹

PfP has rapidly grown in size throughout Europe and the CIS since the initiative began in January 1994. PfP shows great promise to increase stability in the region by promoting several important objectives.

A brief examination of the NATO Partnership for Peace invitation and framework document will highlight the fundamental principles of the program. A critical aspect of the program is to assist the countries aspiring membership in NATO in the transition to civil controlled militaries and embrace democratic ideals characteristic of current alliance members. The benefits of PfP, in the pursuit of democratic values, come from scheduled military to military contacts. The diplomatic and political consultation involved in this program is another means of nurturing the newly emerging democracies.

PfP allows the alliance members to continue to assess what requirements and criteria are necessary for membership. An examination of the "Study on NATO Enlargement," published in September 1995, points out the importance of PfP on the process of evaluating the readiness of countries to join NATO.

PfP INVITATION AND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

Heads of States and Governments participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Brussels issued the NATO Partnership for Peace invitation and framework document, on 10-11 January 1994.³⁰ This is the capstone document that outlines policy objectives of the program. The fundamental purpose of PfP is to assist in creating a stable and undivided Europe. PfP stresses increased contact among NATO members and Eastern and Central European countries, as well as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The most important political message is that there now is a consensus that the Alliance must expand to incorporate new members; PfP establishes a formal structure to move toward an expanded NATO.

PfP Membership is open to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance.³¹ The mechanism for this cooperation is through combined and joint military training and planning operations, based on peacekeeping, humanitarian, and search and rescue missions, as well as political and diplomatic consultations. Each participating country will develop an individual Partnership program, stating their goals and objectives. All plans will be monitored and updated through country liaison teams stationed in Mons, Belgium. An examination

of the stated PfP objectives highlights the depth of the program.

The twenty-seven signatories of the Partnership framework have agreed to and will cooperate with NATO to pursue the following objectives:

- (1) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- (2) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- (3) maintenance of capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and / or the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- (4) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- (5) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic alliance.³²

The NATO enlargement study states that, "prior to joining the Alliance new members will settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."³³ PfP can assist in the resolution of potential conflicts through mutual trust and cooperation among nations to reach this goal. These basic objectives are intended to move the participating partnership countries toward accepting NATO's shared values of democracy, freedom, justice and peaceful cooperation.

BENEFITS OF MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACT

The fundamental element of PfP centers on scheduled combined military exercises between partnership countries. The first benefit of working with these new nations is their transition to functioning within the NATO military framework. The key is interoperability. These exercises will

develop procedures to work with compatibility of weapon systems, communication equipment, and command and control architectures. Aspiring countries are moving within their budgetary constraints, to begin the transition. One only needs to look at Poland's recent request to purchase F-16s as an example of a move toward weapons compatibility. Also, the ultimate objective of the Czech Ministry of Defense is to field an army which will share the operational concepts and qualities of the armies of Western Europe to the extent that the Army of the Czech Republic would be capable of full integration into NATO.³⁴ Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are among the most aggressive in pursuing changes to integrate into the NATO military structure.

Military capabilities are improving. All three countries presently belong to the PfP, which helps them pave the way for membership in NATO. All conduct courses in English, which is NATO's common language. Each country maintains elite rapid deployment forces, participates in United Nations peacekeeping operations, has established peacekeeping schools to improve performance, and pursues training programs that put principles into practice.³⁵

Interoperability is a significant benefit toward regional security of an expanded alliance. An aggressive schedule of exercises is critical to continue the momentum.³⁶

There were eleven major PfP exercises scheduled in 1995. The first major PfP exercise on American soil took place at the Joint Readiness Training Center, FT Polk, LA, 6 - 26 August 1995, entitled "Cooperative Nugget 95." The countries of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan participated in the exercise. This multinational force (4,000 U.S. and foreign troops) was charged with providing humanitarian aid and monitoring a peace treaty and cease-fire agreement between two previously warring countries.³⁷ There were numerous lessons learned gathered from "Cooperative Nugget 95" that will benefit all participating

nations.

“Cooperative Nugget 95” is an excellent example to demonstrate the benefits of military to military contacts in the diplomatic arena. Almost every nation participating sent extremely high level delegations to inspect the exercise. All visiting dignitaries received extensive briefings on the objectives of the exercise. These dignitaries had time to visit with their respective soldiers and discuss lessons learned. It was evident that all participating nations wanted to learn. They understood the importance of interoperability in the areas of weapons compatibility, tactics, techniques and procedures, and command and control. The NATO Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), serving to enforce the Dayton Peace Treaty, is the type of mission PfP was designed to prepare partnership countries to execute. Partnership countries, to include a Russian Airborne Brigade, are working together to enforce a peace in Bosnia to ensure regional stability. The importance of this combined task force executing a real world mission within the NATO military alliance structure is significant. The potential success of the IFOR may have a long term positive effect for regional stability.

PfP AND THE STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

The draft “Study on NATO Enlargement” published in September 1995 is a critical document outlining the purposes and principles for the enlargement of the Alliance. This document is being advertised as the “Blue Print for NATO Expansion.” The study points out the important economic, political and defense issues facing NATO on the eve of accepting new members. The NATO study will serve as a strategic framework for the process of enlargement well into the next century. The study articulates the importance of PfP as the fundamental strategy moving the alliance toward receiving new members. The study, once again, highlights the positive benefits of the political and

military contacts between nations.

The "Study on NATO Enlargement" stresses the role of PfP in preparing membership into NATO.

Active participation in PfP will play an important role in possible new members' preparation to join the Alliance, although it will not guarantee Alliance membership. Active participation in NACC/PfP will provide the framework for possible new members to establish patterns of political and military cooperation with the alliance to facilitate a transition to membership. Through PfP planning, joint exercises and other PfP activities, including seminars, workshops and day-to-day representation in Brussels and at Mons, possible new members will increasingly become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance, including with respect to policy making, peacekeeping and crisis management. . . . their participation in PfP will provide further important means to demonstrate such commitment as well as their ability to contribute to common defense.³⁸

PfP provides the necessary framework to demonstrate the important democratic principles and ideals that will be required of new alliance members.

The study also points out that the success of PfP will not come without costs. Several of the newly emerging democracies can ill afford the financial resources required to participate in the program. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have achieved moderate GDP growth but continue to fight inflation. However, the Czech Republic, for example, has significant work to be done in some key economic sectors, such as general infrastructure, utilities, money transactions, and banking interest rates.³⁹ Since the CEE countries are still in transitions to market economies, the Clinton Administration will commit resources to ensure that our national objectives are obtained in the North Atlantic Region. The FY 96 budget allocates \$60 million in military assistance for Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS under PfP. In addition, the Department of Defense budget request contains \$40 million for PfP activities more appropriately conducted under DOD authorities.⁴⁰ Also, \$25 million is proposed for Central European defense infrastructure, peace-

keeping and related programs. An additional \$25 million is requested for peace-keeping operations in Central Europe. \$7 million was requested for the military education and training program, which provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.⁴¹

Finally, although not directly related to PfP the FY 96 budget requested \$480 million through the Support for Eastern European Democracies (SEED) program to maintain our assistance for democratic and economic reform in Central Europe. These funds will promote small business development to spur job creation.⁴² The SEED program and the funds allocated to PfP are part of a total aid package to stimulate economic growth and move toward military integration of the CEE countries into NATO.

The funds allocated toward PfP and SEED are not large in comparison to the total U.S. budget. However, these funds are significant considering the overall trend favoring domestic issues. There will be continued debate on the amount of resources dedicated to the enlargement security strategy. The fiscal problems associated with the program can be solved. There remain many obstacles ahead for the 16 NATO members in the pursuit of an expanded alliance. The military to military contact, the diplomatic and political consultation, and the exposure to democratic values of PfP will assist in the transition to democracy of the CIS and Eastern and Central European countries. The objective of a stable and undivided Europe is enhanced through PfP.

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

There are several important risks associated with the expansion of NATO. The first risk involves expanding NATO to such an extreme, as to cause the Alliance to be little more than a "talking group." Should this occur, the ability to gain consensus would be destroyed. The second fundamental risk comes from a threatened Russia as NATO expands to her borders forcing a return

to a new Cold War. It is also important to look at the U.S. domestic risks to the policy of expansion. Finally, an examination of U.S. and alliance relations on the expansion of NATO will highlight additional risks.

There are two basic strategies that highlight the possibility of an expanded NATO. The first, anti-Russian broad expansionists believe in taking in not only all of the Soviet Union's one time Warsaw Pact satellites but at least some of the former soviet Republics, including the Baltic states and Ukraine, as well.⁴³ The anti-Russian broad expansionist strategy has serious implications for long term U.S./NATO-Russian relations. The idea of including all of the former Soviet Union's satellite states while excluding Russia is highly confrontational. This strategy would isolate Russia and bring NATO directly to her borders. This would contradict the administration's attempt to build a strategic relationship with Russia as NATO enlarges. An attempt to implement this strategy would cause a serious strain between the Alliance and Russia. A second strategy is supported by the all-inclusive expansionists.

They go as far to offer Russia membership. The all-inclusive expansionists see NATO as a political organization for defusing or resolving conflicts throughout the Continent before they escalate into armed conflict. The extent that they contemplate any military role for NATO, it would be as a collective security body- essentially a mini-United Nations rather than as a classic military alliance directed against a specific nation or nations. . . . The most prominent proponents appear to be former secretary of state James Baker, former UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and such scholars as Simon[Jeffrey Simon, Institute for National Strategic Studies].⁴⁴

The risk associated with the broad expansionist and all-inclusive expansionists is a dysfunctional NATO. Additionally, many of the countries suggested for NATO membership by this strategy, especially Russia, will have a difficult if not impossible job of meeting basic political, economic, and military criteria to gain membership.

The ability of the Alliance to reach consensus, since its inception in 1949, is the very basis of its success. The idea of adding up to twenty-five new members, including Russia, is difficult to imagine.

NATO cannot expand much beyond a certain size without sacrificing so much efficiency and readiness that it becomes dysfunctional. A NATO of nineteen or twenty members, as opposed to the current sixteen, might already approach or exceed the limits of its viability. If NATO is to work for anyone, it cannot work for everyone. That consideration will keep it from expanding much further.⁴⁵

Enlargement of NATO, to include more than the Visegrad countries, is not in the best interest of the Alliance and the U.S. If NATO is to remain a strong military alliance capable of making difficult decisions related to complex collective defense issues in the region it must not expand further than the Visegrad countries. NATO is an alliance that must be able to take action based on consensus of the allies to resolve security issues.

The United States should reduce our overall objective of bringing in the majority of aspiring democracies into NATO to only the Visegrad countries, in the foreseeable future. This author agrees with the anti-Russian limited expansions strategy toward NATO enlargement.

They implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that not all Central and East European nations are ready for NATO membership and that some would not add materially to the alliance's strength. They also concede that some additions would have a greater potential than others to provoke a rash Russian response. Although the limited expansionists would incorporate the Visegrad powers, they exhibit little enthusiasm about further expansion. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger; Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, former director of the National Security Agency; and Edward Rowny are among the notables who appear to be members of the anti-Russian limited expansion faction.⁴⁶

The reduced number of new members will assist in the alliance's ability to gain consensus on the overall direction of NATO into the 21st century. However, the U.S. should continue to work with other emerging democracies to meet the criteria for NATO membership. These countries should continue membership in PfP and transition to economies and military structures that will support the

Alliance's overall objectives of collective security.⁴⁷ The recognition of those countries that meet the criteria established in the NATO enlargement study and PfP could serve as an incentive to other countries in the years ahead.

THE RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP

The battle cry of those that oppose expanding NATO revolves around the risks associated with beginning a new Cold War with Russia. There are numerous academics and former statesmen espousing the position that a prompt expansion of NATO-bringing the Visegrad four into the fold quickly- would probably lead to Russian actions in Eastern Europe and in the area of arms control that would weaken, not enhance, European and American security.⁴⁸ It is an essential consideration that extending NATO membership eastward would alarm nationalist forces in Russia which already see the U.S. and NATO as "the probable enemy."⁴⁹ The rise of Russian nationalism is the basic fear of those opposed to expansion.

Russian Democracy is extra ordinarily fragile, and it is not inconceivable that the far right would attempt to make political capital out of an eastwards expansion of NATO, claiming it as evidence for its claims that Russia is surrounded by enemies. Russian nationalists among the military top brass might even try another coup.⁵⁰

As menacing as these risks may appear, it is possible to successfully manage them to secure U.S. national security objectives.

An important benefit of PfP is the development of a cooperative NATO-Russian partnership. Russia has signed the PfP framework document and will be a full player in the program. Russia, as a member of PfP, will be a partner in the development of a new European security architecture. The October 1995 PfP exercise, "PEACEKEEPER 95", involving 250 Russian troops and 250 American soldiers at FT Riley, Kansas was an historic event. The important point to make is that even with the

potential tension involved between Russia and the United States with the Bosnian crisis, START I and II, CFE negotiation problems, and NATO expansion the Russians remain committed to making PfP and the new NATO-Russian partnership work. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, best summed up the U.S. position toward Russia, on the eve of their membership into PfP, in 1994.

We must continue military and political contact with Russia on our expansion of NATO through the Partnership for Peace. We cannot build the Europe we seek without a strong NATO Alliance. We cannot build it without a democratic Russia. We cannot build it without the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The "best possible future for Europe," which President Clinton invoked at the January [1994] summit, depends on all our nations working together in pursuit of common security interests and democratic ideals. That is the purpose of the Partnership, and it is the spirit in which we welcome Russia as a partner today.⁵¹

However, PfP is only an initial step toward full NATO-Russian cooperation.

The current U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation in Bosnia is a significant step toward developing a true strategic relationship with Russia to solve collective security issues in the region. Secretary of Defense Perry, in a recent speech, summed up the strategic significance of the Russian participation in the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force.

"We are also seizing the opportunity to advance the NATO/Russia pragmatic partnership--an opportunity to resolve our differences and pursue our common causes in a spirit of equality and cooperation. . . . It is clear that this arrangement, both in achieving it and in implementing it, will have its challenges. But our ability to establish this arrangement will demonstrate that there is a new NATO/Russian partnership at work. In effect, this agreement casts a long shadow on how we deal with all other security issues in Europe for decades to come. We are drawing a circle which includes Russia inside the circle, working with us, rather than outside the circle working against us."⁵²

The Administration must capitalize on this foreign policy success to continue to develop substantial policies that recognize the need to cooperate with Russia to develop a new European security architecture.

The United States must go much further to develop strategies that recognize Russian national interests in Europe. The Alliance should offer Moscow a strategic partnership to underscore the fact that expansion is not aimed against Russia, but that the integration of the East-Central Europeans will be balanced by increased cooperation with Russia in a broader all-European context.⁵³ Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed a two-track strategy worthy of serious consideration.

The proposal to Russia of a new joint structure should have two components: first, a formal treaty of global security cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation; second, a new mechanism for special security consultations with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. . . . The treaty would underscore that the expansion of NATO is not directed against Russia while leaving open the question of Russia's eventual membership. It would recognize the Russian quest for status and could provide for joint consultations regarding peacekeeping operations.⁵⁴

The two-track strategy goes beyond PFP to surface the significant Russian strategic issues with the expansion of NATO. This forum could be used to address Russia's security concerns of stationing NATO troops and nuclear weapons in new member countries. If a NATO-Russian partnership is truly to succeed, Russia must be convinced that NATO will not bring its military might to her borders, as expressed in the NATO Enlargement Study.⁵⁵

The two-track strategy could serve as a catalyst to renew debate on expansion. The progress of the debate has seemed to slow in the last few months for several reasons. President Yeltsin's recent illness, Duma elections, upcoming Russian presidential elections, the Bosnian negotiations, and subsequent Peace treaty are but a few examples. The proper presentation of the strategy could spark renewed debate at home and abroad with limited risks.

The idea of creating some form of a consultative mechanism between NATO and Russia is supported in general by U.S. official statement, and does not appear to controversial with the Administration. It is also supported by European governments. The European Union's declaration on relations with Russia in March 1995, in addition to calling for a NATO-Russia non-aggression agreement, supported the idea of

consultative arrangement. Because all members of the NACC, including Russia, already have a consultative arrangement with NATO setting up a separate one for Russia would demonstrate allied acceptance of Russia's importance as well as underline NATO's good intentions.⁵⁶

The combination of PfP and the two-track strategy present a cooperative framework to deal with Russia as NATO proceeds on a path toward expansion.

DOMESTIC RISKS FOR ENLARGEMENT

It has already been stated that the Clinton Administration is totally committed to the expansion of NATO. However, for this foreign policy objective to be met, the U.S. Senate must debate and ratify, by a two-thirds vote, all new members into the Alliance. A limited debate of the issues resulted in passing two legislative acts supporting expansion. The first was the NATO Participation Act of 1994. The NATO Participation Act authorizes the President to designate PfP countries to receive U.S. assistance if they meet certain specified criteria plus a criterion against having provided defense articles to terrorist states. The U.S. assistance program is to facilitate the transition of states to full NATO membership.⁵⁷ The second bill, The National Security Revitalization Act, passed in the House of Representatives in February 1995. The most important amendments are the following:

- Instead of leaving it to the President's discretion to establish a program to assist designated states in the transition to full NATO membership, the bill would mandate it.
- The Congress would "hereby" designate the four Visegrad states as eligible under this legislation, instead of stating that the President "may designate countries emerging from communism and participating in the Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia" if the President determines that they meet specified criteria and reports to relevant Congressional committees.⁵⁸

These two bills are only a superficial attempt to introduce the debate to the American people. Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), summed up the current status of presenting the expansion issue to the

public, "The administration has consulted with NATO allies, and initiated a study of the 'Why and How' of expansion, but there has not been any real consultation with Congress or the public."⁵⁹

There are two major issues that must be accepted by the American public before expansion has any chance of success. The first issue deals with the traditional security guarantees associated with Article V of the NATO Treaty, that an attack against one member is an attack against all.⁶⁰ The idea of sending American troops to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic or Slovakia during a conflict will probably be difficult to justify. "I don't think we as a country have discussed this significantly," said Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), a former chairman of the International Relations committee. "It seems to me that we have not really grasped the significance of sending young men and women from my home state of Indiana to defend the Hungarian border from Romanian attack."⁶¹ The NATO Treaty would also be interpreted to include a U.S. nuclear guarantee to new members. These specific security issues have yet to be presented to the public in any coherent format.

The second major issue, that will cause concern to the public and lawmakers, is the associated fiscal costs with expanding the Alliance. The expansion of NATO will not come free. The funds required to enhance infrastructure for the aspiring members will be significant.

So far, the administration has deliberately avoided announcing a dollar cost for expanding the alliance, on the grounds that it is premature. The Rand Corp. has estimated a total cost of \$20 billion to \$50 billion over a 10 year period, which would be shared in a manner yet to be determined between current and new members. The vagueness of these estimates has contributed to the air of unreality about the expansion debate in Congress.⁶²

The administration must get serious about the monetary resources involved with their expansion policy. The American people will be called upon to pay the bills. Credible studies must begin to look at the budgetary outlays required to expand NATO. Once the actual dollars are defined a new debate

will begin. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) stated, "When you have a price tag, and start talking about NATO infrastructure and the deployment of American troops, then a whole different set of players will get involved. These issues haven't been seriously discussed yet."⁶³ The policy solution to the domestic issue brings us full circle to the question of "why" expand NATO.

The administration, to gain public and congressional support for NATO expansion, must begin a serious and credible campaign to educate the American people on the vital national interests at stake in the region. A Gallup/USA *Today* poll conducted in January 1994, just prior to the January NATO Summit meeting that agreed on the Partnership for Peace Program, reflected considerable support for allowing Central and Eastern European states to join NATO.⁶⁴ As for American support for NATO, polls of the American public in recent years have indicated relatively strong support for NATO and U.S. membership in it.⁶⁵ The administration should build on this base of support along with the 23 million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe to further the cause of expansion in Congress.⁶⁶ The education campaign must be attacked as vigorously as the current Medicaid/Medicare budget fight, in order to be effective. The public must understand the specifics of the financial costs and security guarantees to be given to new members. The President may believe that NATO expansion is a matter of "how" and "when" but convincing the American people of the "why" is the critical answer for success. The education campaign should be presented by the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, across America. The President must rally supporters of expansion in the House of Representatives and the Senate to debate a critical, detailed, and specific policy toward an expanded alliance.

U.S. legislators must be exposed to all of the critical issues involved in the complex strategy of enlarging the Alliance. All of the implications of the strategy have yet to be fully articulated in the

Capitol. It is necessary to come up with new and imaginative ideas to get the issues on the table.

Senators and congressmen need to be exposed to the same discussions and dialogues with their European counterparts as are ministers, but at present there is little opportunity for this. We need a forum in which participants can discuss not only defense and security concerns, including Bosnia and the future of NATO, but also trade and economic issues and other potential areas of discord.⁶⁷

British Secretary of State for Defense, Malcolm Rifkind, has proposed a solution to this problem.

Use an Atlantic Assembly to bring together significant numbers of senators, congressmen and parliamentarians on a regular basis, giving it the responsibility for hosting regular meetings devoted to issues of transatlantic importance whether in security or other fields. The proposal for dialogue among legislators would apply with equal force to others in public, professional and business life on both sides of the Atlantic. The Atlantic relationship needs a new infusion of ideas and perhaps a new transatlantic charter covering the whole spectrum of common interest, best expressed in a new Atlantic Community.⁶⁸

The regular interaction between key U.S. and European legislators will educate those with the final authority to make NATO enlargement succeed. The benefits of a revised "Atlantic Community" would be felt at home as well as throughout the entire alliance. This idea could foster a feeling of true U.S. commitment to understand the issues for our European allies, and at home, the implications for U.S. interests.

ALLIANCE POLITICS

There is no question that the U.S. needs the full support of the 16 members of the Alliance for expansion to move forward. Article 10 of the NATO Treaty states that, "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."⁶⁹ Currently there is consensus, across the Alliance, to the idea of expanding NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. The Brussels Summit [1 December 1995] communique reaffirmed that the Alliance:

remains open to membership. . .[and] expects and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our east [Accordingly, they made a decision to begin an extensive study] to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership.⁷⁰

NATO's enlargement study brings the criteria and modalities of the process to the table. The key to success, within the Alliance, becomes the articulation of the "who" and "when".

The next critical step in the expansion process is to determine, using the NATO Enlargement Study criteria and PfP, exactly which countries should be offered membership. There has been much debate on this subject over the past few years. This paper has argued, and is in line with the current consensus of alliance members, that the Visegrad countries are among the top candidates.

There appears to be a powerful consensus in favour of grouping Poland and the other three Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) together as high priority candidate countries for both NATO and the European Union, with perhaps more than a scintilla of doubt about Slovakia.⁷¹

Therefore, the Alliance must work in the halls of the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Western European Union, and most importantly the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to shore up a firm consensus on membership. Once the membership issue is formalized, then the process turns to a time line to offer membership.

A detailed, deliberate, and methodical time line could achieve acceptance of new NATO members beginning in the year 2000. However, there are several crucial political issues, in the U.S. and Russia, that will halt progress on the enlargement of NATO. It seems realistic, that with the upcoming U.S. and Russian presidential elections in 1996, that little substantive movement will occur this year.⁷² This topic has proven extremely emotional for the Russian political elite. Therefore, a quick decision on NATO expansion also could prove fatal for President Yeltsin in the upcoming Russian presidential election. President Yeltsin's defeat may not prove to be in the best interest of

the Alliance or specifically, for the U.S. Finally, the expansion issue is far from developed in the U.S. Senate. Thus, ratification of accepting new members in NATO in the Senate is unrealistic for the near term.

There still remains much diplomatic and political work to be done internal to the Alliance and in the U.S. to approve a time line to grant new membership. The next two to three years should be spent preparing the American public and Congress for the ratification process to except new members in NATO beginning in the year 2000. Our allies, with U.S. leadership, should continue to pursue a similar path in finalizing consensus toward the acceptance of the Visegrad countries. The European Union's intergovernmental Conference (IGC), in 1996, should serve as a forum to finalize positions on the progress of EU-NATO expansion.⁷³

A parallel intensive diplomatic effort must be achieved with Russia over the next three years. The NATO-Russian partnership agenda should be established immediately in the PfP, OSCE, and NACC. The substance of the agenda would be based on working the specific details of a NATO-Russian non-aggression treaty and a special consultative mechanism to discuss Russian concerns on NATO expansion. A deliberate approach toward Russia, over the next three years, could prove fruitful in demonstrating that NATO is not trying to threaten Russian interests or create new dividing lines in Europe. It is realistic to believe that a successful diplomatic solution to the Russian question could be achieved by 1999. The Russian problem solved, the Visegrad countries could be granted NATO membership by the turn of the century.

CONCLUSION

The strategic end state of a stable and secure Europe through an expanded NATO is well worth the associated costs and risks. Security and stability in Europe is a U.S. vital interest. The budgetary

costs to participate in PfP are well worth the benefits achieved by moving the militaries of the CEE countries toward NATO integration. The funds allocated toward the Support for Eastern European Democracies (SEED) will stimulate small business growth and the move toward market economies in the CEE countries. European economic prosperity will contribute to the stability in the region and benefit the U.S. through increased trade and investment.

The most significant risk associated with the expansion of NATO is the Russian reaction. The Partnership for Peace program in concert with a strong NATO-Russian partnership is an appropriate strategy to assist in the expansion of NATO, to manage risk. The NATO-Russian partnership, required for a new security arrangement in Europe, is enhanced through Russia's participation in PfP and establishing a joint NATO-Russian consultative mechanism in the OSCE. A NATO-Russian strategic partnership could be useful in solving many of the complex security issues, such as the Bosnian peace implementation mission, throughout the region. The desired result is to demonstrate to Russia that the expansion of NATO does not threaten her security while offering NATO membership to the Visegrad countries by the year 2000.

NATO will continue to ensure collective security throughout the region well into the next century. The Alliance must stand firm that countries offered admission must meet political, economic, and military criteria established in the NATO enlargement study. The ability of the Alliance to integrate more than the Visegrad countries and remain an integrated military and political structure capable of gaining consensus to take action is questionable at best. A political strategy that attempts to push for the enlargement of NATO beyond the Visegrad countries will seriously jeopardize U.S./NATO-Russian relations. The NATO-Russian strategic relationship must be given a chance to flourish into the next century. It is critical that Russia stay focused on continued path toward

economic and democratic reforms and not be threatened by NATO enlargement. U.S. and NATO allies should focus their attention and resources on the integration of the Visegrad countries. The enlargement of NATO should not go beyond this point.

ENDNOTES

1. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement ([Washington D.C.]: The White House, February 1995), 25.
2. Paper from presentation at a conference on NATO Enlargement, sponsored by Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) Herstmonceux Castle, Sussex: December 8-10, 1995, Douglas T. Stuart, "Symbol and Substance in the U.S. Debate Over NATO Enlargement," Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, 24. See also Michael Dobbs, "Balancing Domestic Political Costs After the Rhetoric is Spent," The Washington Post, 7 July 1995, sec. A, p. 24.
3. "Study On NATO Enlargement," (gopher://marvin.stc.NATO.INT/00/natodata/ENL/derek.txt), World Wide Web, September 1995, p. 2. See also Geoffrey L. Williams, "NATO's Big Debate," NATO Review (Web Edition) 43, no. 3, (May 1995): 9.
4. Ted G. Carpentar, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 36. See also, The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 25. See also, Gary L. Geipel, "Expanding NATO: Good for Europe and Good for the U.S.," Hudson briefing Paper no. 161, February 1994, 5.
5. Gary L. Geipel and Robert Dujarric, "Europe 2005 Turbulence Ahead and What it Means for the United States," Hudson Institute Executive Briefing, 1995, 28.
6. Ibid.
7. Business America, "Traditional Export Markets," 115, September 1994, 77.
8. Sharon Reier, "Across The Atlantic," Financial World, 6 December 1994, 68. See also, Jurgen Gaulke, "Europe's Lukewarm Recovery," Fortune, 3 October 1994, 24.
9. William Clinton, "Partnership for Peace: Building a New Security for the 21st Century," US Department of State Dispatch (January 1994): 3.
10. Richard C. Holbrooke, "The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security," US Department of State Dispatch, (17 April 1995): 325. See also Ibid., 319.
11. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995, 23. See also, Clinton, "Partnership for Peace: Building A New Security for the 21st Century," p. 3.
12. Richard C. Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs, 74 (March 1995): 38.
13. Clinton, "Partnership for Peace: Building A New Security for the 21st Century," p. 3.

14. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook , Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995, 237.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 234.
17. Michael Kramer, "The Case for a Bigger NATO," Time, 10 January 1994, 37.
18. Stanley R. Sloan and Steve Wehrel, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: From Cold War to Cold Peace?" Congressional Research Service Report 95-594 S, 15 May 1995, 12.
19. Ibid., p. 11.
20. Adrian Karatnycky, "The Russian Front-Runner," The Wall Street Journal, 22 September 1995, sec. A, p. 14. See also Warren P. Strobel, "Yeltsin Doesn't Want NATO Expansion," The Washington Times, 1 February 1996, sec. A., p. 20.
21. Matthew Evangelista, "Why Russia Opposes Expansion NATO Stay Away From My Door," The Nation, 5 June 1995, 795.
22. John M. Collins, "NATO's Military Enlargement Problems and Prospects," Congressional Research Service Report 95-1160 F, 1 December 1995, p. 1.
23. Geipel, "Expanding NATO: Good for Europe and Good for the U.S.," p. 5.
24. Ibid.
25. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 27.
26. Ibid.
27. Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams, "NATO Enlargement and the European Union," The World Today, May 1995, 85. See Also, Richard C. Holbrooke, "Advancing U.S. Interests in Europe," U.S. State Department Dispatch, 6 no. 12, (20 March 1995): 211. Secretary Holbrooke states, "The extension of the union eastward will be immensely important both politically and economically. It will integrate and stabilize the two halves of Europe. Expansion of NATO and the EU will not proceed at exactly the same pace. Their memberships are not and will not be identical, but the two organizations are clearly mutually supportive. Expansion of both is equally necessary for a stable Europe.
28. Ibid. See also The NATO Enlargement Study that states, "[NATO enlargement] should complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracy in the East." "Study On NATO Enlargement," p.3.

29. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 26. See also, Marten Van Heuven, "Partnership for Peace: An American View," The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA., 1993, 2. See also, Los Angeles Times, "NATO Expansion: Are Americans Snoozing?" 2 October 1995, sec. B, p. 4.

30. The majority of this section of the paper is paraphrased directly from the *NATO Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document*, found in James W. Morrison, "NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments," McNair Paper 40, Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1995, 137- 141. In order to understand the benefits of PFP it is critical to examine this document. Twenty six nations are currently signatories to this document.

31. Ibid., p. 138.

32. Ibid., p. 140.

33. "NATO Enlargement Study," p. 3.

34. Bill Slayton, "Central European Defense Profiles," Central and East European Defense Studies, SHAPE Belgium, 21 December 1995, 7. This report goes into the details of Eastern and Central European current defense spending.

35. John M. Collins, "NATO's Military Enlargement Problems and Prospects," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 95-1160 F, 1 December 1995, p. 4.

36. See appendix 1 for a detailed list of PFP exercises for 1995. The table was adapted from *NATO Review*, July 1995, p. 8.

37. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, "Cooperative Nugget 95 Tactical Field Training," News Release, Ref NO. 460-95, 22 August 1995.

38. "The NATO Enlargement Study," p. 14.

39. Czech Republic Travel Databank, "Economy," Internet site (<http://www.teachersoft.com/library/ref/atlas/europe/cz.htm#economy>), 28 February 1996.

40. Richard C. Holbrooke, "Advancing U.S. Interests in Europe," US Department of State Dispatch, (20 March 1995):212.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 213.

43. Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, p.16.

44. Ibid., p. 17.

45. Geipel, "Expanding NATO: Good for Europe and Good for the U.S.," p. 14. See also, William Odom, "NATO's Expansion Why Critics are Wrong," The National Interest, 39 (Spring 1995): 45 and Robin Knight, "Is it a Wrap for NATO?" US News & World Report, 10 January 1994, 24. See also, Stanley Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 95-979 S, 15 September 1995.

46. Carpentar, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, p. 16.

47. See chart, Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense," p. 40. This chart shows the detailed plans for military to military contacts, within the framework of PfP, through 1995.

48. Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival, 37 (Spring 1995): 35.

49. Trevor Taylor, "NATO's Future: Evolution not Revolution," in NATO: The Challenges of Change, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 202. See also, Sloan, "NATO's Future Beyond Collective Defense," p. 21.

50. Editorial, "NATO is Obsolete," New Statesman & Society, 7 January 1993, 5. See also, Jonathan Clarke, "Replacing NATO," Foreign Policy, 93 (Winter 1993): 29. See also, Asmus Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabbe, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival, 37 (Spring 1995): 20-23.

51. Warren Christopher, "Russia Joins the Partnership for Peace: A Historic Moment for NATO and Europe," US Department of State dispatch, (20 June 1994): 433.

52. William J. Perry, DoD News Briefing at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Internet Edition, 5 December 1995.

53. Asmus, Ronald D., and Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabbe, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival, 37(Spring 1995): 22.

54. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan For Europe," Foreign Affairs, (January/February 1995): 34.

55. Ibid. See Also "The NATO Enlargement Study," pgs. 16-24.

56. Sloan, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: Cold War to Cold Peace?" p. 38.

57. Morrison, "NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments," p. 69.

58. Ibid., 71.

59. Michael Dobbs, "Balancing Political Costs After the Rhetoric Is Spent," The Washington Post, 7 July 1995, sec. A, p. 24.

60. NATO Handbook, p. 232.
61. Dobbs, "Balancing Political Costs After the Rhetoric Is Spent," sec. A, p. 24.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Morrison, "NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments," p. 72.
65. A 4-7 December 1993 *Los Angeles Times* poll indicated that 61 percent of the American public favored maintaining NATO. Ibid p. 73.
66. Dobbs, "Balancing Domestic Political Costs After the Rhetoric Is Spent," sec. A, p. 24.
67. The NATO Handbook, p. 233.
68. Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington D.C., 1995:14.
69. Malcom Rifkind, "Rifkind Proposes 'Atlantic Community'," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 February 1995, 70.
70. Ibid.
71. Geoffrey L. Williams, "NATO's Expansion: The Big Debate," NATO Review (Web Edition) 43 no. 3, (May 1995): 9-14.
72. A prominent Western Ambassador is quoted in the Washington Times stating, "We think it is dangerous to push too hard and create another problem" for President Boris Yeltsin. NATO has "let off the gas pedal," . . . "It is wise to take into account the upcoming election in Russia. Also, A State Department Official speaking on the condition of anonymity stated, "The U.S. government does not feel rushed to expand NATO for the sake of expansion. We are decidedly serious about the commitment involved in Article 5, Absolutely." See, Martin Sieff and Ben Barber, "NATO In No Hurry to Grow, Britain's Defense Chief Says," The Washington Times, 24 January 1996, sec. A, p. 13. See also Paul B. Henze, "What to Do About Russia," The Wall Street Journal, 1 February 1996, sec. A, p. 18.
73. Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams," NATO Enlargement and the European Union," p. 86.

APPENDIX 1
Partnership For Peace Exercises in 1995

Name	Form/Type	Dates	Area/Location
Cooperative Rescue	Sea	7 June	Bulgaria
Cooperative Nugget	Land	6-28 August	Louisiana, USA
Cooperative Venture	Sea	4-18 September	Norwegian/Barents Sea
Cooperative Determination	Land	7-16 September	Romania
Cooperative Partner	Sea	10-15 September	Bulgaria
Cooperative Support	Logistic	25-29 September	Norfolk, USA
Cooperative Challenge	Land	26 September- 6 October	Czech Republic
Cooperative Jaguar	Land, Sea, Air	2-13 October	Jutland/Denmark
Cooperative Light	Land	12-24 October	Hungary
Cooperative Dragon-Esperia	Land	18-28 October	Italy
Cooperative Mermaid-Classica	Sea	November	Mediterranean Sea

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Barry, Charles L., and Lennart Souchon, eds., A Security Architecture for Europe. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.
- Carpenter, Ted G., Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars. Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, 1995.
- Golden, James R., Daniel J. Kaufman, Asa A. Clark IV, and David H. Petraeus, eds., NATO At Forty: Change, Continuity and Prospects. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1989.
- Haglund, David G., ed., Can America Remain Committed? U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992.
- Kelleher, Catherine M., The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995.
- Kugler, Richard L., Commitment To Purpose: How the Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War. San Jose, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1993.
- McInnes, Colin. ed. Security and Strategy in the New Europe. London: Routledge, 1992.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Handbook. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992.
- Simon, Jeffrey, ed., The Challenge of Change. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

- Apple, R.W. Jr. "The Growth of NATO: Will Moscow Go Along?" The New York Times, 11 May 1995, sec. A, p.10.
- Atkinson, Rick. "Russia Warns NATO on Expansion." The Washington Post, 21 March 1995, sec. A, p. 14.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "NATO-Expand or Die?" The New York Times, 28 December 1994, sec. A, p. 15.
- Carpenter, Ted G. "Saving NATO a Poor Excuse for U.S. Casualties in Bosnia." Army Times, 20 November 1995, 54.
- Dobbs, Michael. "Balancing Domestic Political Costs After the Rhetoric Is Spent." The Washington Post, 7 July 1995, sec. A, p. 24.

- _____. "NATO Has Initial Talks With Russia." The Washington Post, 1 June 1995, sec. A, p. 1.
- Editorial. "A Chance to Lead." The Wall Street Journal, 23 October 1995, sec. A, p. 18.
- Erlanger, Steven. "Clinton and Yelstin Find Way to Ease Strains at Least a Bit." The New York Times, 11 May 1995, sec. A, p. 1.
- Henze, Paul B. "What to Do About Russia." The Wall Street Journal, 1 February 1996, sec. A, p. 18.
- Hoagland, Jim. "A Clear View of Europe." The Washington Post, 28 September 1995, sec. A, p. 29.
- Ikle, Fred C. "How to Ruin NATO." The New York Times, 11 January 1995, sec. A, p. 21.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "The Russian Front-Runner." The Wall Street Journal, 22 September 1995, sec. A, p. 14.
- Kissinger, Henry. "Expand NATO Now." The Washington Post, 19 December 1994, sec. A, p. 27.
- Kupchan, Charles A. "Expand NATO-and Split Europe." The New York Times, 27 November 1994, sec. E, p. 11.
- Lovell, Jeremy. "Solana Aiming to Strengthen NATO Links." Reuter (Web Addition), 23 January 1996, p.1-2.
- Onyszkiewicz, Janusz. "Why NATO should Expand to the East." The Washington Post, 6 January 1994, sec. A, p. 27.
- Rodman, Peter W. "4 More for NATO." The Washington Post, 13 December 1994, sec. A, p. 27.
- _____. "Understanding With Moscow." The Washington Post, 16 January 1996, sec. A, p. 15.
- Schifter, Richard. "Partnership for a Stronger NATO." The Washington Post, 25 May 1995, sec. A, p. 21.
- Sieff, Martin and Ben Barber, "NATO In No Hurry To Grow, Britain's Defense Chief Says." The Washington Times, 24 January 1996, sec. A, p. 13.
- Strobel, Warren P. "Yeltsin Doesn't Want NATO Expansion." The Washington Times, 1 February 1996, sec. A, p. 20.
- Whitney, Craig. "Expand NATO? Yes, Say Most Experts, but What does the Public Think?"

The New York Times, 10 February 1995, sec. A, p. 6.

_____. "NATO Presents Plan to Expand." The New York Times, 29 September 1995, sec. A, p. 16.

_____. "NATO Sees Progress on Formula to Let Russia Join Bosnia Force." The New York Times, 28 September 1995, sec. A, p. 13

Williams, Daniel and Lee Hockstader. "NATO Seeks to Reassure East as Russia Warns Against Expansion." The Washington Post, 6 January 1994, sec. A, p. 16.

Wilson, George C., "Bosnia action is watershed for post-Cold War NATO." Army Times, 2 October 1995, 70.

PAPERS

Bombik, Svetoslav, Pavel Brantinka, Jerzy M. Nowakowski, William E. Odom, and Tamas Waschier, "NATO: The Case for Enlargement." Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, London, 1993.

Bodie, William C., William T. Johnson, Jeffrey Simon, James McCarthy, Daniel N. Nelson, and Thomas Durell-Young. "European Security Toward the Year 2000." Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 20, August 1993.

Collins, John, M. "NATO's Military Enlargement Problems and Prospects." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 95-1160 F, 1 December 1995.

Gebhard, Paul, R. S. "The United States and European Security." Adelphi Paper 286, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1994.

Geipel, Gary L., and Robert Dujarric. "Europe 2005 The Turbulence Ahead and What It Means for the United States." Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, IN., 1995.

_____. "Expanding NATO: Good for Europe and Good for the U.S." Hudson Briefing Paper no. 161., Indianapolis, IN., 1994.

Heuven, Marten Van. "Partnership for Peace: An American View." The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA., 1993.

Johnsen, William, T., "NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?" U.S. Army War College Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA., April 1995.

_____. and Thomas-Durell Young, "Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 15 August 1995.

Kugler, Richard, L. "NATO's Future Role in Europe Toward a More Political Alliance in a Stable '1 ½ Bloc' System." The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA., May 1990.

_____. "The future of NATO an U.S. Policy in Europe." Santa Monica, CA., The Rand Corporation, 1993.

Morrison, James W., "NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments." McNair Paper 40, Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1995.

Slayton, Bill. "Defense Profiles Central European States." Central & East European Defense Studies SHAPE, Belgium, 22 December 1995.

Sloan, Stanley R. "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 95-979 S, 15 September 1995.

_____, and Steve Woehrel, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: From Cold War to Cold Peace?" Congressional Reserarch Service Report for Congress 95-594 S, 15 May 1995.

Simon, Jeffrey. "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion." McNair Paper 39, Institute For National Strategic Studies, Washington D.C., 1995.

"Study On NATO Enlargement." (gopher://marvin.stc.NATO.INT/00/natodata/ENL/derek.txt). World Wide Web, September 1995.

PERIODICAL ARTICLES

Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabbe. "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps." Survival, 37 (Spring 1995): 7-33.

_____. "Building a New NATO." Foreign Affairs, 72 (September 1993): 28-40.

Borawski, John. "Partnership for Peace and Beyond." International Affairs, 71 (April 1995): 233-246.

Brown, Michael E. "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion." Survival, 37 (Spring 1995): 34-52.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "A Plan for Europe." Foreign Affairs, (January/February 1995): 26-42.

_____. "The Premature Partnership." Foreign Affairs, 73 (March 1993): 67-82.

Business America. "Traditional Export Markets." 115 (September 1994): 73-79.

Chace, James. "How to Avoid a Second Cold War." World Policy Journal, 12 (Spring 1995): 107-108.

Christopher, Warren. "Russia Joins the Partnership for Peace: A Historic Moment for NATO and Europe." US Department of State Dispatch, (27 June 1994): 431-433.

_____. "Transforming the NATO Alliance to Meet New Security Needs." US Department of State Dispatch, (20 June 1994):396-399.

Claes, Willy. "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture." NATO Review (Web Edition) 42 no.1 (December 1994/January 1995): 3-7.

Clarke, Jonathan. "Replacing NATO." Foreign Policy, 93 (Winter 1993): 22-40.

Clinton, William. "Partnership for Peace: Building A New Security for The 21st Century." US Department of State Dispatch, (January 1994):3-5.

Economist, "Europe's Post-Post-Cold-War Defences Wobble Into Action." 10 December 1994, 45-47.

Economist, "Partners for What?" 24 September 1994, 49-51.

Evangelista, Matthew. "NATO Stay Away from My Door." Nation, 5 June 1995, 795-796.

Gaulke, Jurgen. "Europe's Lukewarm Recovery." Fortune, 3 October 1994, 24.

Gompert, David and Richard Kugler. "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)." Foreign Affairs 74 (January 1995): 7-12.

Holbrooke, Richard C. "Advancing U.S. Interests in Europe." US Department of State Dispatch, (20 March 1995): 209-216.

_____. "America, A European Power." Foreign Affairs, 74 (March 1995): 38-51.

_____. "The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security." US Department of State Dispatch, (17 April 1995): 319-325.

Hunter, Robert E. "Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe." NATO Review (Web Edition) 43 no. 3 (May 95): 3-8.

Kamp, Karl-Heinz. "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion." Foreign Policy, 98 (Spring 95): 116-130.

Karatnycky, Adrian. "Another Chance For NATO?" National Review, 7 February 1994, 57-59.

Kissinger, Henry. "How to Achieve the New World Order-Book Excerpt." Time (Web Edition) 14 March 1994.

Knight, Robin. "From the Ashes of War." US News & World Report, 8 May 1995, 47-49.

- _____. "Is it a Wrap for NATO?" US News & World Report, 10 January 1994, 20-24.
- _____. "Rethinking Russia." US News & World Report, 20 June 1994, 19.
- Kramer, Michael. "The Case for a Bigger NATO." Time, 10 January 1994, 36-37.
- Maze, Rick. "Nunn Advises Caution in Proposal to Expand NATO." Army Times, 23 October 1995, 8.
- Mead, Walter R. "No Cold War Two." World Policy Journal, 11 (Summer 1994): 1-17.
- Moltke, Gebhardt von. "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement." NATO Review (Web Edition) 44 no.1 (January 1996): 3-6.
- New Statesman & Society. "NATO is Obsolete." 7 January 1994, 5.
- Pravada, Alex. "Russia and European Security: The Delicate Balance." NATO Review (Web Edition) 43 no. 3 (May 1995): 19-24.
- Privat, Pascal. "Europe in the Year 2000." Newsweek, 26 November 1990, 18-22.
- Pushkov, Alexei. "Russia and the West: An Endangered Relationship?" NATO Review (Web Edition) 42 no. 1 (February 1994): 19-23.
- Odom, William E. "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong." National Interest, 39 (Spring 1995): 38-49.
- Reinhardt, Charima. "NATO: Closed Club, for Now." World Press Review, 40 (December 1993): 5-6.
- Reir, Sharon. "Across the Atlantic." Financial World, 6 December 1994, 68-69.
- Rifkind, Malcolm. "Rifkind Proposes 'Atlantic Community'." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 February 1995, 70.
- Ruhle, Michael and Nicholas Williams, "NATO Enlargement and the EU." The World Today, May 1995, p. 88.
- Santer, Jacques. "The European Union's Security and Defense Policy." NATO Review (Web Edition) 43 no. 6 (November 1995): 3-10.
- Sharp, Jane M. "Let's Make a Deal: NATO and CFE." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1995, 19-21.
- Weinberger, Caspar W. "How to Destroy NATO." Forbes, 14 February 1994, 35.

Zimmermann, Tim. "Knock, Knock, NATO." US News & World Report, 7 April 1994, 12.

Williams, Geoffrey L. "NATO's Expansion: Debate." NATO Review (Web Edition) 43 no.3 (May 1995): 9-14.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress, House, National Security Revitalization Act of 1995. Pub. Report 104-18, 104th Congress, 1st sess., 1995, H.R. 7.

U.S. Congress, House, Hon. Barney Frank on tax susidy for Western Europe. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 11 January 1995. Congressional Record, vol. 141.

U.S. Congress, House. Hon. Lee H. Hamilton speaking on his perspective on NATO Expansion. 103d Cong., 2d sess., 14 February 1994. Congressional Record, vol. 141.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Senator Sam Nunn speaking on NATO Expansion. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 30 June 1995. Congressional Record, vol. 141.

The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995.

SPEECH

Perry, William J., "A Leader in a New World." remarks given at the Euro-Atlantic Society, 27 June 1995, (<http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenseink/pubs/di95/d1045.html>), World Wide Web.

Shalikashvili, John M. "Grand Challeges for the Post-Cold War World." Remarks at the Naval War College graduation, Newport, R.I., June 16, 1995, (<http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenseink/pubs/di95/d1045.html>), World Wide Web.