

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE NEED FOR A NATO-UN LEND-LEASE PROGRAM:
A FIRST STEP AND WHY ONLY NATO CAN TAKE IT**

BY

**COLONEL M. G. MACDONALD
Canadian Army**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited

19960603 208

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE NEED FOR A NATO-UN

LEND-LEASE

PROGRAM:

A FIRST STEP

AND

WHY ONLY NATO CAN TAKE IT

by

Colonel M G Macdonald
Canadian Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: M. G. Macdonald, (COL), Canadian Army

TITLE: The Need For a NATO-UN Lend-Lease Program: A First Step
and Why Only NATO Can Take It

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 April 1996 PAGES: 27 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This short paper will highlight the need for a better command and control capability for the UN in the area of peace operations. It will go on to point out that this current shortcoming could be covered by using existing NATO resources under a new form of lend-lease. It will then offer an opinion as to why NATO is the only existing organization that can initiate the process by voluntarily producing a global security estimate.

INTRODUCTION

As we approach the next millennium, the international community is still struggling to determine the way ahead in many areas. None of these areas is as important as finding a process that will allow for at least a modicum of global security and stability. The cold war is dead and buried and along with it the focus it brought in terms of defense and security interests. The world was a dangerous place in which to live, but at least we knew which side we were on. This bi-polar focus by itself produced a macabre type of stability that is lacking today.

It is probably time, therefore, for two of the major international bodies concerned with conflict resolution to adapt to changing circumstances. Both the United Nations, (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO), are deeply concerned with peace and security albeit from different perspectives and historically in different regions.¹ Each obviously has other areas of interest and influence.

This short paper will only highlight the need for a better command and control capability for the UN in the area of peace operations. It will go on to point out that this current shortcoming could be covered by using existing NATO resources under a new form of lend-lease. It will then offer an opinion as to why NATO is the only existing organization that can initiate the process by voluntarily producing a global security estimate.

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in a speech before the 25th Vienna Seminar in March of 1995 said:

"The need to establish a workable system of international security is urgent. Not until we do so can we give our full attention to the longer-term, deeper requirements of building a better world."²

CAVEATS

There are a few points worth mentioning at the outset of this paper. First of all, it is important to remember that sovereign states will always make decisions in their own best interests and this must be considered in any discussion of international cooperation. Secondly, it is necessary to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the UN and NATO. Finally, the role of the United States, (US), as the last remaining superpower must be weighed in any debate regarding the future of the UN and NATO.

It is of the utmost importance that those seeking a better response to conflict resolution thoroughly understand the charters of both NATO and the UN. This is critical so that any future initiatives are grounded in an appreciation of the fundamentals of the two associations. It must be assumed that the founding principles of the two bodies will remain consistent and that consensus must be achieved within and between the groups if any changes to the structures, missions or simply operating

procedures of one, or both, is envisioned.

This paper will pose many more questions than it can possibly answer given its length. However, the questions are all part of the equation that must be balanced if positive change is to occur. Is it time to marry the military resources and expertise of NATO to the global responsibilities of the UN? If the answer is yes, then how is it best accomplished? Will it be necessary to form another international body, with all that might entail, or is there sufficient flexibility within the mandates of the two organizations to allow for a combined effort in support of international conflict resolution? If the flexibility does not currently exist can the charters be amended to allow NATO and the UN to better respond to the challenges of conflict resolution? Or if that is impossible, can resources somehow be shared to the mutual advantage of both organizations and the world at large?

The aim of this paper is not to resolve these issues, but rather to simply stimulate debate on the matter by highlighting one possibility for much improved cooperation between the UN and NATO.

NATION STATES

Prior to any further discussion of the issue, a word of caution on nation states is in order. It is naive to presume that

nation states will subjugate their will to a collective good. However, it is probably worth the effort to make proposals for change which can then be debated in any number of international fora. This paper will attempt to do that.

One of the potential roadblocks to be overcome in pushing both the UN and NATO towards a search for a more stable world will be the apathy of the member nations of both organizations. As a recent article in the NATO Review by Lawrence Freedman noted:

... governments have become increasingly wary about choosing to get involved in other peoples' quarrels or to bring order to what appear to be chronically disorderly parts of the world.³

As it is easier to do nothing, governments probably will. Therefore, it may be necessary to institutionalize changes to how the UN and NATO conduct operations by modifying the charters of the two bodies.

The major obstacle when attempting to resolve any conflict is obviously the national will or aim of the nation state or states directly involved in a clash.⁴ The aims or objectives of those nations that are potential contributors to a conflict resolution force must also be considered. Nation states will always decide issues in their own best interest and will normally attempt to exploit a situation to their advantage.

These comments on nation states are not meant to be negative, but rather to remind the reader that any proposed changes to the status quo, particularly in the international forum, must be tempered by reality. Nations owe allegiance only to themselves and to loosely quote an old British dictum "nation states have no permanent allies only permanent interests".

UNITED NATIONS

The UN for the last fifty years has provided an international forum that has furnished the opportunity for nation states to raise and resolve issues of common concern. As Kennedy and Russet have recently noted while commenting on the UN:

The chief reason effective international instruments are required is an eminently practical one, as the founders realized. Simply put, states, people, and businesses need an international system to provide physical, economic, and legal security. If the United Nations system did not exist, much of it would have to be invented.⁵

The UN as an international forum with a de facto global mandate, has the increasingly difficult task of acting as the universal policeman. It has been stated by many that the UN has neither the resources nor the expertise to adequately deal with conflict resolution.⁶ Recent operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia are often cited as a prime example of UN shortfalls. It is important to remember however, that those who framed the UN Charter never envisioned a full-time professional UN force.⁷

It is further commonly believed, that the UN does not have an effective or efficient command and control structure that adequately prepares forces to deploy to an operational area. It has been argued that it has even less capability to command those committed once they are on the ground. Charles J. Hanley of the Associated Press writing in regard to the UN's fiftieth anniversary noted:

"Peacekeeping Operations, a department once staffed by just eight military officers, now has 120, serving as rear echelon to 70,000 peacekeeping soldiers worldwide."⁸

Given the complexity and number of UN Peacekeeping Operations currently underway worldwide, even this fifteen-fold increase, which has only been implemented in very recent years, is regarded by many as insufficient to the tasks at hand.⁹ This will be especially true for future operations as the UN faces its most dramatic staff reductions in its history. It has recently been reported that the UN will reduce its New York headquarters staff by 1400 personnel during the next two years.¹⁰

The UN with its universal responsibilities finds itself increasingly involved in conflict resolution far beyond traditional peacekeeping missions into, whether it likes it or not, peace enforcement missions. The UN has found it difficult to anticipate, plan for and deploy into a troubled region with its current organization. The Secretary General of the UN wrote in a

1992 article that:

One of the lessons learned during the recent headlong expansion of UN peacekeeping is the need to accelerate the deployment of new operations. Under current procedures three or four months can elapse between the Security Council's authorization of a mission and its becoming operational in the field.¹¹

Current command and control arrangements for UN missions are based on ad hoc groupings dependent on which nations contribute forces to that mission. It is a cumbersome, unwieldy and inefficient method of doing business.¹² The UN has no standing forces and only a small staff in New York to plan and conduct deployments.¹³ The primary focus of this staff is reaction to a crisis. It does not have the resources nor is it equipped in terms of personnel or hardware to adequately anticipate, prepare for or deploy on missions.

It is perhaps unfortunate that initiatives for change to the UN structure must come at a time of such financial difficulty for the organization. The UN is currently tapping funds committed to peacekeeping operations just to run day to day operations.¹⁴ Many nations are behind in payments to the UN and until this situation is resolved it will be difficult, if not impossible, to implement any proposed changes.

As an aside, it will also be necessary to overcome resistance to change from the large entrenched bureaucracy, but as change may be the only way to save the institution and the

principles for which it stands, this should not be considered an insurmountable stumbling block.¹⁵

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Turning to NATO, the *raison d'etre* for which the alliance was formed some fifty years ago no longer seems to be its primary focus. With the end of the Cold War the organization has accomplished its intended principle mission of defence of Western Europe. That is not to say it should be disbanded, but rather to suggest that its sphere of influence could now be expanded to include regions beyond its original alliance boundaries.¹⁶

As long ago as the late 1970s at the height of the Cold War, NATO recognized the impact of global affairs on member states:

NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty and common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas...¹⁷

NATO has very considerable standing forces and virtually unlimited resources available on demand. It also has large, robust and capable headquarters and staffs from the tactical through strategic levels. These headquarters tend to be multinational and very experienced. They have the command,

control and communication assets that allow them to deploy and conduct operations over vast areas.¹⁸

UNITED STATES

The US fully participates in all NATO and most UN activities and it can easily be argued that it is "first among equals" within both organizations. US support for any initiatives that would see some type of agreement on the sharing of command and control resources between the UN and NATO is therefore critical to the success of those proposals. Anthony Lewis writing in the New York Times last summer noted:

The UN and NATO cannot function effectively in crisis situations without leadership by the President of the United States.¹⁹

In 1994 President Clinton put forward a collection of ideas concerning reform in the area of peace operations. He specifically targeted changes to how the UN might better handle conflict resolution. The paper covered a wide range of issues from cost reductions to the overall strengthening of the UN. One topic specifically addressed was that of command and control of US forces. He reaffirmed that these forces have in the past, and will in the future, be made available to the UN for peace operations if it is in the interest of the US to do so. He also stated that they can be deployed under the operational control of a foreign commander but that command of US forces will always

rest within the American chain of command.²⁰

This issue of command and control then, is the key factor to be considered if future conflicts are to be successfully resolved. Given the above, the issue of whether US troops can be committed to an operation is moot, and should not therefore, cloud the discussion of possibilities for future conflict resolution as has so often been the case in the past. The debate continues to rage in the US even today. The President and Congress are still at odds over the recent deployment of troops to Bosnia even under a NATO flag.

Understanding there might be difficulties associated with future deployments under some type of UN leadership, or at least auspices, should not preclude the study or formulation of options for the US, NATO and the UN to work together in the area of conflict resolution.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The question then becomes what command and control assets does the UN need to carry out its peace operation tasks? Volumes have been written concerning what the UN lacks in terms of capabilities and resources, but little has been produced about specific solutions to these problems. A study currently being reviewed within the UN does offer some concrete proposals for

change to how the UN might better accomplish its aims.

A recently completed report by the Government of Canada proposed a rapid reaction capability for the UN. The report is detailed and the result of extensive research. The authors consulted international experts within and without governments and non-governmental organizations. The report made twenty-six recommendations for the Secretary General to consider and most of the points are beyond the scope of this paper. However, in terms of command and control, two key areas of the report are worth mentioning.

First of all, the Canadians described the capabilities required by a rapid reaction force as follows:

The ability to acquire, analyze and take timely decisions.

The organizational capability to prepare generic plans.

The ability to undertake concurrent activities.

The capability to deploy operational-level command and control facilities.

The capability to deploy (approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel) within three to five weeks.²¹

Secondly, the report is forceful in stating the need for a proper headquarters:

Indispensable to filling the vacuum at the operational level of the UN is creating a headquarters unit. It should be capable of rapid deployment under the authority of the Security Council and at the strategic direction of the Secretary General, and it should function as an integral part of the UN Secretariat.²²

Leaving aside the issues of deploying a headquarters and troops to a mission area as it is contentious and in need of separate study; there is still a requirement to provide the UN with the planning, organizing and coordinating functions it lacks.

Some have suggested that NATO offers an attractive model on which the UN could pattern a peace operations headquarters.²³ At the lower end of the scale of resources that could assist the UN is perhaps something as small as the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), AMF(L), which is approximately brigade-size and which was one of the three prototype headquarters described in the Canadian report.²⁴ At the upper end of the scale could be something as large as the four star headquarters belonging to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).²⁵

The obvious focus of the AMF(L) is Europe and that of SACLANT the great expanse of the Atlantic ocean. So what then do they have to offer to the UN? Both have multinational staffs and access to NATO intelligence sources along with a host of other capabilities.

As has been noted by the Canadian report, amongst others, what the UN lacks most of all in the area of peace operations is the ability to foresee problem areas and then plan for and deploy to a mission area. These are the standard requirements of any

military headquarters. NATO relies on its various levels of headquarters to conduct these tasks and they have years of experience in fulfilling these requirements. Were one of these headquarters, or any other NATO headquarters for that matter, to be given responsibility for planning UN missions it has the immediate advantages of experience, expertise and access to information.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali commenting recently on the potential for a NATO deployment to Bosnia said:

If peace enforcement is needed in the future it should be conducted by countries with the will to do it. There will still be a role for the UN to play; it will still be necessary for the Security Council to give a mandate to whatever kind of multinational force is decided upon. But I believe a multinational force of NATO and other troops, is the best way to solve the problem under present circumstances.²⁶

NATO/UN JOINT VENTURES

NATO and the UN have recently worked together, or at least alongside each other, in attempting to resolve the conflict in the Balkans. The process of cooperating however is convoluted, time consuming and frustrating. Even minor policy or operational decisions must go to the North Atlantic Council, in the case of NATO, and the Security Council, within the UN, for resolution. The oft reported difficulties with the "double or dual key" approach for NATO air strikes in support of UN troops in Bosnia is a classic example of the cumbersome procedures that currently exist between the UN and NATO. Consensus must be reached both within and between the organizations before decisions can be implemented on the ground. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former US Ambassador to the UN, commenting in October 1995 about the

potential, at that time, deployment of NATO troops to Bosnia said:

... it seems doubtful that NATO is well-suited to an operation whose principle requirement is peace. It is a first-class military force which has already been compromised by being placed under a "double key" arrangement with UN civilians holding the other key and by being ordered to use its high-tech capacities for "bombings" of no strategic importance.²⁷

If command and control arrangements can be agreed upon between the organizations, before committing forces to an operation, commanders on the ground will have more flexibility when dealing with problems and difficulties such as those described by Kirkpatrick can be minimized if not avoided altogether.

THE WAY AHEAD

It is now appropriate to address, in general terms, the potential that exists for the UN and NATO to work together in the area of command and control in future conflict resolution. The UN has the need for additional resources and NATO has the capabilities to do the job now.

Given that NATO recognizes its out of area responsibilities, and that the US, as the de facto leader of the alliance, has expressed that it is capable of deploying troops or resources under the operational control of commanders from other nations, is there a way for NATO to practically help the UN in the area of

command and control, at least in the short term, until the UN can develop its own capabilities?

In the area of peace operations the international community is faced with a classic case of supply and demand. The UN has a need for a headquarters organization with which to at least plan operations even if that headquarters could not deploy to a mission area. NATO has all the resources required at several levels, and given the diminished threat which has followed the collapse of the Berlin wall, it probably has the time to dedicate itself to other problem areas of the world.

The issue of closer ties between the UN and NATO in the areas of command and control in support of peace operations is in need of much further examination beyond the cursory glance afforded by this paper. However, it is probably worthwhile to present now what might be considered a first step in the process.

LEND-LEASE

Maybe it is time for a new type of lend-lease agreement similar to that between the US and the allies during the Second World War. Could the UN contract some of its work to NATO? Could NATO second a headquarters group to the UN? If not, why not?

A first step must be taken sometime and now is as good a

time as any. The point to be made is that a practical solution to the problems faced by the UN is available today, albeit only through NATO largess, if the international community is willing to both propose and allow it.

Even if the proposal is agreed, it is still a very long way from implementation. A free and open discussion among all concerned parties will now be necessary to validate and then, hopefully, agree the concept. This will be a long, difficult and no doubt acrimonious debate, but in all likelihood, well worth the effort.

A FIRST STEP AND WHY ONLY NATO CAN TAKE IT

It is now time to turn from the practical analysis of the issue to a theoretical first step in the process. What follows are the author's personal opinions as to how the process of lend-lease between NATO and the UN might be initiated.

As a gesture of good faith NATO, as the preeminent alliance in the world today, should voluntarily undertake to produce a global security estimate that could lay the groundwork for a comprehensive and lasting international peace. This estimate could be the first in a series of initiatives that would see the international community finally try to come to grips with producing a more stable world.

If we do not clearly understand the present international security situation from a truly global perspective we cannot start the process of developing solutions to the problem. In my opinion, NATO is the only multinational body with the standing resources to conduct the estimate in a timely, professional and impartial manner.

It is in the international community's collective best interests to nominate a focal point that could articulate and lead the way on the issue of determining a global security framework. It would not be necessary to produce a product which assigns nations tasks against identified problems, but rather simply prepare a comprehensive estimate of the situation that would level the playing field in terms of all nations understanding the key issues and potential responsibilities.

The most important question, in my mind, is who will take the lead in producing this much needed global security estimate? I would suggest that a former colonial power such as the United Kingdom, France or Japan would not be acceptable to anyone including themselves for the simple reason that they were colonial powers. I would further suggest that the United States as the only remaining military superpower would not accept the mantle for fear of becoming, if not in their own mind then everyone else's, a de facto colonial power. Russia has more than enough on its plate trying to get its economy into the twentieth

century, let alone the twenty first, to worry about leading the way on any global issue. The same can be said for China and the rest of the developing world.

In any event, it would probably be too much to ask any one individual nation to accept responsibility for producing such an estimate given that it will require a tremendous effort in terms of intelligence resources, manpower and money. Additionally, if any one country alone produced the estimate it would be accused of situating the appreciation or estimate to its own advantage whether it did so or not. Many individual nations obviously have their own global strategic estimates and it can probably be safely assumed that this information would be of invaluable assistance in producing a global estimate from a universal perspective. It can probably further be assumed that interested and responsible nations may be expected to contribute to the estimate. If no individual nation could be expected to lead the way on this issue how about existing international bodies?

The most globally comprehensive organization is obviously the United Nations. It might seem logical then, that this organization lead the way. However, it is the very size of the UN and the fact that consensus must be reached on all issues that would preclude it from accomplishing the task within any type of reasonable schedule. Additionally, as has already been noted, it does not have the trained manpower, intelligence assets or money

to conduct the task properly.

Collectively the European nations, and the same can be said for the Asian nations, have a number of economic, security and defence organizations or committees that could conceivably conduct the task. If the will was evident to focus efforts in support of producing an estimate either group might be capable of compiling a worthwhile product. Unfortunately, neither group has the standing capability to start work on the project. Additionally, the time and effort required to stand up that capability and equip it with the necessary resources would preclude it from producing a usable product probably before the end of the century.

The Group of Seven, (G7), which is an affiliation of the world's seven leading industrialized nations certainly has the means to conduct the estimate and probably has as much or more to gain from its results as any international body in the world. The main drawback to having the G7 lead on the issue is that it is really only an ad hoc financial club with no permanent or fixed headquarters capability. Other issues are discussed at their infrequent meetings but the primary focus is on economic matters. It, like the European or Asian groups, has the capacity to produce the estimate but no standing body on which to set the task. There is no doubt they are capable of producing the necessary product but again they would have to build an

organization to conduct the assignment thus wasting precious time.

If individual nations and international organizations have been eliminated from the selection process just about all that remains are alliances. In my opinion the only viable alliance in existence today is NATO. I would not attempt to argue that NATO has a global mandate, but it has, in my mind, ever increasing global interests. NATO spans two large continents and if you consider that the United States and Canada have significant interests to their West and South, and the European allies the same considerable interests to their East and South it is no great leap of logic to assume that within the alliance the bulk of the information required to produce a global estimate probably already exists. These interests although they cannot guarantee impartiality would certainly assure a balanced perspective.

NATO has the standing capacity to produce the estimate, at least in terms of highly trained manpower, the intelligence collection assets and the proper structure. It probably also has adequate funding at current levels and if not the additional funding required would probably be minimal.

NATO, through its performance over the last fifty years, has gained worldwide prestige and I believe that the estimate it could produce would be seen to be impartial by the vast majority

of nations. It would be naive to expect total international acceptance of the end product but that is not necessary. What is needed is a start point for international consideration.

NATO should assume the task of leading the way toward a more stable world. NATO nations should be strongly encouraged to shoulder that responsibility now and produce a global security estimate which would allow the process of determining a new world order to begin.

CONCLUSION

It is time to resurrect lend-lease, but this time between the UN and NATO. This lend-lease program would allow the UN to more effectively plan for and then conduct peace operations. It will fall to NATO to lead the way. The formal process of implementing change will be long and no doubt frustrating, but in the end well worth the effort.

As a show of good faith and to energize the process, NATO should voluntarily undertake the first step by preparing a global strategic security estimate that will display its commitment to building a foundation on which the world can plan for a more stable future.

NOTES

1. Both the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 1 to the United Nations Charter refer to the fundamental principles of peace and security. In fact, the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states " The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ...".
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping for the Next Century," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol LXI, No. 11, March 15 1995, pp. 322-324.
3. Lawrence Freedman, Untitled, NATO Review No. 6 (November 1995): 19.
4. A self-evident premise perhaps but one which is not always considered when debating the potential actions of multi-national organizations such as the UN and NATO. Hence the tendency to consider these bodies in the first person as having inherent rights and powers when in fact the institutions can only act on the will of the collective nation states involved if and when they reach consensus.
5. Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett, "Reforming the United Nations," Foreign Affairs (September/October 1995): 58.
6. James Walsh, et al, "The UN at 50: Who Needs It?" Time, 23 October 1995, 16-23.
7. Morten H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, 115.
8. Charles J Hanley, "50-year-old U.N. builds up foundering nations," Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 22 October 1995, sec. A, p. 16.
9. This is also the authors personal opinion based on one year of service with the UN in Zagreb and Sarajevo during 1994-1995. It is also felt that this is a commonly held opinion amongst many civilians and military personnel who have worked on various UN missions over the years including the majority of those who served with the author in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
10. Paul Knox, "UN faces drastic staff cuts," Toronto Globe & Mail, 6 February 1996, sec. A, p. 10.

11. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations - Historic Opportunities to Strengthen World Body," Foreign Affairs (Winter 92/93): 92.

12. Again this is a personal observation but one that is shared by many who have experience with the UN. For an excellent account of one senior officer's experience with the UN see: Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper - The Road to Sarajevo. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993.

13. Karsten Prager, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," Time - International Edition, 23 October 1995, 31.

14. Louis Meixier, "UN uses peacekeeping funds during fiscal crisis," Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 24 September 1995, sec. A, p. 11.

15. George J. Church, "Draining the Swamp," Time, 23 October 1995, 34-36.

16. This has been a much debated issue especially since the demise of the Warsaw Pact but it was certainly considered before that. For one position see: Andrew J. Goodpaster and Ian O. Lesser, NATO TO THE YEAR 2000: Challenges for Coalition Deterrence and Defense. Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988), 29.

17. NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978, pp. 312-13, 316.

18. NATO Information Services, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures. Brussels: 1989 Edition.

19. Anthony Lewis, "Weakness As Policy," New York Times, 14 July 1995, sec. A, p. 25.

20. US Presidential Decision Directive 25, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington D.C., Office of the President, May 1994, "Executive Summary." Public Domain.

21. Report of the Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. September 1995, p. 15.

22. Ibid., p. 50.

23. William J. Durch, "The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century," Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, February 1993, 29-30.

24. Government of Canada, 20-21.

25. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 346.

26. Boutros Boutros-Ghali as quoted by Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Peacekeeping has not helped as Serbs resume cleansing," Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 15 October 1995, sec. B, p. 17.

27. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "25,000 Americans - Ambiguous goals set for troop commitment," Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 22 October 1995, Sec B, p. 11. The author, as the Chief of Operations for Bosnia-Herzegovina Command within the United Nations Protection Force, was stationed in Sarajevo under Lt Gen Rupert Smith in the winter and spring of 1995. As such I was required on a regular basis to prepare the air support or air strike requests in accordance with the Commander's needs. The process of forwarding requests through the UN mission Headquarters in Zagreb to the main UN Headquarters in New York while at the same time briefing the appropriate NATO headquarters on the task was cumbersome at best and life threatening at worst. I would therefore endorse Ms Kirkpatrick's position on the efficiency of the "double key" system. I do however take exception in regards to her comments about "'bombings' of no strategic importance" especially concerning those of May through September 1995.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Arend, Anthony Clark, & Robert J Beck. International Law & the use of Force. New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Goodpaster, Andrew J., and Ian O. Lesser. NATO TO THE YEAR 2000: Challenges for Coalition Deterrence and Defense. Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988.
- Haass, Richard N. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. Washington: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994.
- Halperin, Morten H., & David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small. Self-Determination in the New World Order. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992.
- MacKenzie, Lewis. Peacekeeper - The Road to Sarajevo. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993.
- Murphy John F., The United Nations and the Control of International Violence. Totowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers Inc, 1982.
- Schmitz, Peter N., Defending the NATO Alliance - Global Implications. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987.
- Sloan, Stanley R., NATO's Future - Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985.

Periodical Articles

- Bentinck, Marc. "NATO's Out-of Area Problem." Adelphi Papers No. 211 (Autumn 1996).
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "Empowering the United Nations - Historic Opportunities to Strengthen World Body." Foreign Affairs (Winter 92/93): 89-102.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros as quoted by Jeane Kirkpatrick. "Peacekeeping has not helped as Serbs resume 'cleansing'". Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 15 October 1995, sec. B, p. 17.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping for the Next Century," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol LXI, No. 11, March 15 1995, pp. 322-324.

Church, George J. "Draining the Swamp." Time, 23 October 1995, 34-36.

Freedman, Lawrence. Untitled. NATO Review No. 6 (November 1995): 19-23.

Hanley, Charles J. "50-year-old U.N. builds up foundering nations," Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 22 October 1995, sec. A, p. 16.

Kennedy, Paul and Bruce Basset. "Reforming the United Nations." Foreign Affairs (September/October 1995): 56-71.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "25,000 Americans - Ambiguous goals set for troop commitment." Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 22 October 1995, sec. B, p. 11.

Knox, Paul. "UN faces drastic staff cuts." Toronto Globe & Mail, 6 February 1996, sec. A, p. 10.

Lewis, Anthony. "Weakness As Policy." New York Times, 14 July 1995, sec. A, p. 25.

Meixier, Louis. "UN uses peacekeeping funds during fiscal crisis." Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, 24 September 1995, sec. A, p. 11.

Prager, Karsten. "The Limits of Peacekeeping." Time - International Edition, 23 October 1995, 31.

Walsh, James, et al, "The UN at 50: Who Needs It?" Time, 23 October 1995, 16-23.

International Publications

Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. Ottawa: September 1995.

NATO Information Services, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures. Brussels: NATO, 1978 and 1989 Editions.

United Nations Department of Public Information, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York: United Nations, Reprint September 1993.

United States Presidential Decision Directive 25, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington D.C., Office of the President, May 1994, "Executive Summary." Public Domain.

Military Publications

Durch, William J., The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College, 1993.

Snow, Donald M., Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U. S. Role in the New International Order. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College, 1993.