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**CHANGING PARADIGMS: U.S. ARMY RESERVE  
MOBILIZATION IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY**

**BY**

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**Changing Paradigms: U.S. Army Reserve Mobilization in the  
Twenty First Century**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States Army is undergoing a revolution in military affairs which is radically affecting the operating tempo of the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The increased demands on the Contingency Force Package (CFP) Reserve units will require a sea change in mobilization and readiness paradigms in order to effect a seamless marriage of Army Reserve CS/CSS units with the Active Component combat forces. This study explores some of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm and their applicability to current USAR force structure and policy. Further, this study evaluates whether lessons learned have been fully applied to policy and procedural changes in mobilization planning for the reserves. Recommendations are made for organization culture and procedural changes to improve readiness and responsiveness of mobilizing USAR units.

## Introduction

In the intervening five years since the Gulf War, much has been written about the lessons learned and proposals to remedy the mobilization problems which were identified. Concurrently, the Army Reserve has been mobilized three times under Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC). A review of mobilization lessons-learned and subsequent solutions to problems, identified several critical core issues which are addressed in this study. The systemic problems have been embraced and remedied for the most part. The overriding reality that the current Revolution In Military Affairs(RMA) demands a new culture with new paradigms has not yet been, but must be embraced at all levels of the Army Reserve organization. An organization transformation must be proactively initiated if the Army Reserve is to keep pace with this RMA and remain a relevant player in Force XXI.

SECDEF Melvin Laird originated the Total Force Policy in August 1970, in response to shrinking Post-Vietnam budgets as a means to create efficiencies and improve the taxpayer's return on investment in the Reserve Components(RC). Total Force Policy has been endorsed by every Secretary of Defense since and has continuously evolved for a quarter century.

Army Reserve mobilization during the Gulf War conclusively demonstrated the efficacy of the Total Force Policy, but also identified problems with the procedures for bringing reservists onto active duty for a call-up. Investigation into the many

administrative, logistical, personnel, and training readiness issues of the Gulf War reveals that the Army Reserve has substantively engaged these problems and is implementing the necessary "systems" changes to improve mobilization readiness. These initiatives include legislative changes to improve accessibility, equipment enhancements for higher level CFP units, improved C2 structure in the Army Reserve, and improvements in personnel readiness and family programs. Concurrently, the roles and missions of the Army Reserve have changed in revolutionary rather than evolutionary fashion and Civil Military Operations (CMO's) and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) are becoming a routine basis for activating the Reserve under the Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC).

During the Cold War, the Reserve Component mission was predominantly backup for the Active Army in a major global conflict with the Soviets, a threat-based force structure. Rather than the monolithic threat which we faced during the Cold War, we are now confronting numerous ill-defined, regional threats and instabilities throughout the world. "As the RC roles and missions expand, the RC becomes a greater asset than just a force held in readiness for use in wartime. Consequently ordering the RC to active duty without their consent, during periods other than war and contingencies, is a recurring theme in DoD planning because of the need to rely on RC capabilities for certain peace operations."<sup>1</sup> The mandate is for units which can

be easily accessed, nearly instantly mobilized, and deployed worldwide for a broad spectrum of crises.

The Post-Cold War environment has put new emphasis on the full integration of the Reserve Components into the Total Force. Again, in the face of budget cuts, the Army is confronted with tough decisions of how to do more with less. The Active Component (AC) and the Army Reserve are both being dramatically impacted by drawdowns. Since Operation Desert Storm (ODS), the AC end strength has gone from 735,000 to a projected 475,000 (35% reduction) or less by 1997, perhaps as low as 400,000 by 2000. At the same time, the Army's Selected Reserve will shrink from 319,000 in FY 91 to 208,000 in FY 99 (35% reduction). In order to control costs while maintaining readiness in the Total Force, the Department of Defense adopted a new strategy known as "compensating leverage" in response to severely constrained defense budgets.

The Bottom Up Review (BUR) and the Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement in 1993 defined, in part, the compensating leverage roles and missions of the Army Reserve as an integral part of the 21st Century power projection Army. Four core competencies for the Army Reserve have been identified: 1) being a federal force, always under the Active Army control and capable of rapid deployment; 2) providing the bulk of combat support/combat service support forces; 3) providing command and control and combat service support units for echelons above corps and

echelons above division; and 4) providing the ability to rebuild and reconstitute the force during or after protracted conflict.<sup>2</sup> In 1993, the Total Army Plan required the Army Reserve to provide 19 percent of the Contingency Force Pool (CFP). The Army Reserve complement to the CFP would be between 146 to 171 units, 66 percent of the early deploying combat service support, and 32 percent of the combat support units in the CFP.

The Chairman, JCS, GEN Shalikashvili uses the term "Active Reserve" to describe the new role of the Army Reserve in the power projection force. He cites two challenges facing the armed forces in the 21st Century: The 1999 defense budget will be less than half what we were spending in 1988 during the height of the Cold War. Second, the revolution in military affairs sparked by new information age technologies, and an entirely new way of fighting puts incredible demands on a military which is reducing and economizing.<sup>3</sup> There is also a broadening political and public acceptance for use of the reserve in MOOTW (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia) and in CMOs like disaster relief for Hurricane Andrew and the Midwest floods.

Doing more, more often, with fewer resources, while improving training, personnel, and equipment readiness in order to mobilize nearly instantaneously, in the midst of a RMA is a potential prescription for implosion of the Army Reserve. However, if managed well, it will be a catalyst in solidifying the Total Army concept and conclusively demonstrating the Army

Reserve fully capable of providing the compensating leverage needed in the downsized force. Managing this change in roles and missions will preoccupy the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) for the remainder of this decade.

Mobilization is the *raison d'être* of the RC and readiness is the key to mobilization success. There has long been speculation about the actual readiness of the RC. In the event of a significant call-up, would there be large numbers of no-shows and would actual readiness square with Unit Status Reports (USRs)? The end of the Cold War, huge federal deficits, and serious domestic issues all portended smaller defense budgets and increased reliance on the Reserve in fulfillment of national military strategy. For this reason, mobilization of the Reserve during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) became the validation test for the Total Force policy. The Reserve Components met the challenge. A Rand study on the lessons learned during the gulf war mobilization concluded, "Under Total Force Policy, the reserve forces are intended to be available and ready as the *initial and primary augmentation* of the active forces in any contingency [my emphasis]. Judged by these criteria, Total Force Policy, while not without some problems and not without some controversy, was effective in the Persian Gulf Conflict."<sup>4</sup> Some of the more significant "systems" remedies to problems uncovered in ODS are discussed next.

### Mobilization Systems Improvements

The Cold War culture in the Army Reserve created an ethos at the unit level, based on the underlying belief that *if* the unit was mobilized, there would be a rolling mobilization and validation process from home station, through (in some cases) mobilization site, mobilization station, and possible deployment. In the assessment of unit leaders, this would provide the necessary time to complete individual and collective training and unit readiness preparations. Prior to ODS, the expectancy level for mobilization was generally low in the Army Reserve. Some reserve soldiers' remarks during the ODS call-up reflected a certain incredulity that their units had actually been called to active duty and deployed. Much of the Army Reserve senior leadership was raised in this organizational culture.

The compensating leverage strategy necessitates a change in paradigms that recognizes, particularly in CFP units, that wartime mobilization is not merely *possible*, but more accurately, *probable*. The timeliness of mobilization will be increasingly critical. One of the findings of a Rand study on the ODS mobilization was that delays in lift availability afforded mobilizing units additional time to complete mobilization station preparations.<sup>5</sup> Since then, the trend is away from forward presence to power projection strategy. Recognizing this shift in strategy, congress has allocated additional funding to strategic sea and airlift capacity. Therefore, mobilization processing must gain momentum. In some instances it will involve

homestation Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM), Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), validation and movement to the Sea Port of Embarkation (SPOE) or Air Port of Embarkation (APOE). Also, with the Cold War reserve force structure still intact, much homestation cross-leveling for ODS was accomplished prior to actual call-up. Thus, many of the readiness issues were fixed before the mobilization clock started running. The drawdown in the selected reserve no longer affords the excess manpower or equipment pools to accomplish this pre-alert mobilization cross-leveling, so an innovative approach to improving premobilization readiness was needed.

#### **Tiered Resourcing**

In response to the issue of timely mobilization call-up required of a contingency-based force, the Chief, Army Reserve has implemented a strategy of tiered resourcing (Figure 1).<sup>6</sup> Tiered resourcing gives priority to the units which are the first to fight for personnel, equipment and training resources. The objective response time from call-up to deployment varies from 14 days or less for CFP 1-4 units (Tier 1) and 14 to 31 days for CFP 5-7 units (Tier 2).

# USAR RESOURCING CONCEPT

**USAR 208 K  
FY 98**




Figure 1

The priority for personnel, training, and equipment resourcing has been successfully shifted to the higher priority CFP units. The AC drawdown has enabled the Army Reserve to improve equipment readiness by increasing Equipment On Hand (EOH) and modernization. Based on USR reporting figures, readiness in these units is steadily improving (Figure 2).<sup>7</sup>

# READINESS OF THE FORCE

## USAR CFP Readiness Trends Percent Units meeting minimum Standards




Figure 2

The increased readiness and OPTEMPO for these units, while meeting the objectives of compensating leverage, must be caveated with serious concern about the long term implications for recruitment and retention. The 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board reveals a negative trend in reenlistment and attrition in the junior enlisted ranks of the Army Reserve. During the period FY 92 through FY 94, first term reenlistments decreased 14 percent, from 88 to 74 percent. Attrition of

soldiers in pay grades E1-E5 for the same period climbed from 34 to 56 percent, or put another way, retention in these pay grades dropped from 66 to 44 percent in a span of three years.<sup>8</sup> While not all attrition is an entire loss for the services, since some soldiers transfer to other components and enlist for active duty, the high attrition still remains problematic because it depletes Army Reserve training dollars, degrades readiness, and creates administrative detractors to unit training. This will be discussed further in the context of changing the culture of the Reserve.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board expanded and refined its "Vision for the Reserve Components" in 1994 by identifying four imperatives for integration of the reserve components into the Total Force as active participants in facing the wide spectrum of new challenges to national security:

- **Capable:** clear mission; organized, equipped, trained, sustained to perform roles and missions; clear measurable standards to assess their capability.
- **Accessible:** must be accessible for active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, to meet operations requirements. Policy and regulations are among barriers to accessibility which must be reduced or eliminated.
- **Affordable:** cost effective, efficient force which provides mission capabilities on demand; should cost less in RC if the principle of compensating leverage is applied.
- **Relevant:** highly trained, modern equipment, fully integrated with AC(seamless); sized, shaped to meet future warfighting and domestic needs; strategic insurance for future requirements.<sup>9</sup>

## Future Capabilities - Training Initiatives

In recent comments on the readiness of the reserve components, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Hon. Deborah R. Lee stated, "Although there are many key ingredients to readiness..., military experts agree that top notch training is the cornerstone. ...the leadership of the Department of Defense recognizes that aggressive use of technology can help us revolutionize the way we train, reduce our long term costs, maximize the time we have available for training and, in the case of the reserves, deliver a high-quality, standardized product to a geographically dispersed population."<sup>10</sup> The implementation of distance learning technologies and the establishment of the Distance Learning Action Team (DLAT) consisting of representatives from the Joint Staff, SECDEF, and the military services is the type of visionary, flexible training initiative which will provide the necessary leverage to train the Reserve Components on rapidly evolving military and civilian technologies. In particular, distance learning could become an excellent vehicle for training rapidly evolving concepts in Joint Doctrine to both Active and Reserve forces. Medical units in the reserve are already using distance learning technologies. MERLIN, which stands for medical readiness learning initiative, is an interactive computer simulation providing realistic medical training to units across the country via the Internet.<sup>11</sup>

The Internet offers a wealth of training and communication opportunities for creating seamless links between the Reserve and its active counterparts, particularly their designated training relationships with their active component counterparts (formerly known as CAPSTONE). Internet e-mail and World Wide Web hyperlinks can provide easy access to large volumes of unclassified information reservists can access at their homes or places of business. Lengthy documents, doctrinal updates, training plans, briefing slides and a wide variety of information can be attached to e-mail and transmitted electronically. The World Wide Web has the capacity to provide standardized training and information packages easily accessible to reservists throughout the world, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It can become a user-friendly vehicle for training and testing a wide range of MOS skills, common tasks, and professional development subjects. We have scarcely tapped the tremendous learning potential of distance learning technologies.

The Army Reserve must be at the forefront of the RMA and provide those specialized skills which can't be replicated in the regular force. The concept of information warfare specialties like computer "hacker" or "cracker" or those trained to counter those information age electronic warfare threats are not well suited to the standing force, but could be vitally important assets as reservists. The skills and aptitudes of these information warriors are not likely to be recruited, trained, or retained in the standing force, but could be integrated into the

reserve. However, current recruitment procedures neither target nor identify these aptitudes. Forward thinking is needed in the recruitment and identification of these futuristic aptitudes and abilities. Relevance for the USAR in the information age will be recruited out of the ranks civilian high technology industry, not grown in the military culture.

As the primary CS/CSS provider, the Army Reserve is being fully integrated into the Joint Warfighter Exercises conducted as part of the Force XXI Program. Some of the stated objectives of the Force XXI initiatives include the expansion of the RC role in support of the Active Army, streamlining mobilization/deployment processes, digitization and modernization of equipment to provide for seamless integration of the AC and the RC and C2 based on a common operating environment. In order to accomplish the transition to Force XXI technological trainup, the Army Reserve will either require extended Annual Training periods or flexible periods of combined AT, ADT and IDT.

#### **Acessibility Improving**

One finding of the Rand study on the ODS mobilization was that because the Individual Ready Reserve was not accessible until partial mobilization was declared, the remedy for cross-leveling units was an ad hoc process of assigning volunteers from other units and the IRR to mobilizing units. Members of Troop Program Units in contiguous areas to the mobilizing unit were also reassigned involuntarily to mobilizing units. During this

process, there was concern that later deploying units, yet to be identified as deployers, might be "broken" in order to bring early deployers to necessary readiness. However, since partial mobilization did not occur until January 1991, nearly six months after the first units were activated, IRR soldiers were not available for involuntary call-up.

Recognizing the need for greater access to the IRR, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has proposed legislative action under Title 10 USC 12304 which will give the services access to members of the IRR during PSRC.<sup>12</sup> This legislation, known as the Selected Reserve Augmentee (SRA) Program, would provide access to approximately 30,000 members of the Selected Reserve during PSRC. These soldiers will be contractually obligated to serve their remaining military service obligation (MSO) upon completion of their contracted active duty, in the Selected Reserve for a period of 24 months. While they are in the SRA program, they will be in a nontraining status, but will be subject to involuntary activation during PSRC. Several incentives such as being given priority for placement in TPU's, PX and unlimited MWR privileges are being proposed as part of the legislation. This program is expected to be approved by congress this year and will provide a key to the accessibility issue discussed above.

Total Force initiatives have shifted early deployment responsibility to Army Reserve units which were traditionally "call when needed" units during the Cold War. In a one or two MRC situation, in the absence of a draft, a near certainty would

be heavy reliance on the IRR for reconstitution and replacement operations. The delay in the politically unpalatable decision to reinstitute the draft will put heavy demands on call-up of IRR soldiers. The ability to access the IRR in a timely, efficient manner hinges largely on the accuracy of the personnel database at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). A recent automation initiative, digitizing millions of personnel records at ARPERCEN using a new system known as Personnel Electronic Records Management System (PERMS) will provide a much needed capability to quickly retrieve data and personnel management information in a matter of minutes rather than days or weeks. This information is indispensable for mobilizing the IRR, whether for cross-leveling mobilized units, reconstitution, or replacements. The PERMS digitization process must continue to be an automation priority for the quick identification and location of deployable IRR soldiers for mobilization. However, there are other personnel automation issues which need to be addressed as well.

During ODS a number of ad hoc automated data processing systems were developed at homestation, CONUSA, and mobilization stations for managing and tracking personnel during mobilization. Systems software interface problems existed between Standard Installation/Division Personnel System(SIDPERS), Mobilization Cross Leveling System(MCL), and Mobilization Personnel System (MOBPERS). Many of the "workarounds" involved the development of stand-alone database management systems on personal computers downloaded SIDPERS data and used commercial relational database

software to extract data and solve information problems. SIDPERS 3, when it is completely fielded, is supposed to resolve the interface problems between the AC and RC personnel databases. However, neither MCL or any other personnel mobilization crossleveling decision support software has been funded in the SIDPERS 3 package. The SIDPERS 3 software will operate on Non-developmental Item (NDI) computers which are essentially non-ruggedized, civilian computers. This was done in recognition of ODS experience which proved the civilian computers worked adequately, even in an austere environment.

The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) is being designed to resolve the automation interface problems at all levels of the reserve system, including USARC, FORSCOM, the NGB and TPU's. The RCAS system "will have state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, distributed data bases, and a processing capability to provide timely and accurate information to plan, prepare, and execute mobilization."<sup>13</sup> While expectations are high for the RCAS system, there have been several delays in fielding, cost overruns, and major reengineering initiatives in the RCAS program which forbode the fielding of already obsolete technology when the system is finally in place. Furthermore, funding for a mobilization crossleveling decision support system as part of RCAS was not approved.<sup>14</sup> The recognition that NDI hardware can acceptably fulfill requirements for mobilization automation hardware is symbolically relevant to the RCAS fielding. The traditional

acquisition and procurement processes are frequently not responsive enough for automation technology. We need to seek out off-the-shelf software and adapt it to our requirements. Particularly necessary is a decision support system which will replace the MCL system disbanded after ODS. As of this writing, DADCSOPS had no plans on the drawing board for a replacement for the MCL system.<sup>15</sup> Personnel cross-leveling during a major mobilization should not have to be reduced to a "stubby pencil" drill, as it so often was during the Gulf War. Accurate and efficient automation systems are an essential ingredient to accessing and mobilizing the reserve.

#### Affordability In Austere Times

There are numerous initiatives in the Army Reserve which are germane to the issue of affordability. The downsizing of the Army Reserve logically had to be accompanied by corresponding efficiencies in the command and control structure. However, and the ability to manage mobilization readiness had to remain intact. The Chief, Army Reserve recognized the need to reduce the C2 TDA structure of the Army Reserve in light of a 35 percent reduction in the Selected Reserve. By the end of FY 96, twenty Army Reserve Command headquarters (ARCOMs) will be replaced by ten regionally based Regional Support Commands (RSCs), serving as C2 headquarters for all assigned units in their geographical area. RSCs will manage and maintain readiness of assigned units, be responsible for Base Operations (BASOPS) of all USAR units in their region, and provide initial management of

mobilizing units, including cross-leveling personnel and equipment.

Although not directly related to affordability, the restructuring also included the addition of twelve new Garrison Support Units (GSU), added to the force structure in response to a deficiency identified in ODS.<sup>16</sup> In some instances during that mobilization, mobilized soldiers scheduled for deployment were used for installation support to the detriment of their postmobilization training. The activation of the GSU's for future larger mobilizations will improve the timeliness and efficiency of mobilization operations versus detailing deploying RC soldiers to installation support duties.

#### **Relevance in the Information Age**

The RMA dictates that the technological skills required to fight future wars will continue to escalate. The Army's ability to recruit, train and retain soldiers with these skills will be increasingly challenged by the competing civilian job market, both in terms of availability and affordability. A positive aspect of the Army Reserve is the value added through civilian acquired technical and professional skills in short supply or unavailable in the active component. Fields like computer technology, medical, and language training are examples. These skills, while more readily available, are still a precious commodity in the Reserve. The high cost of training in these low density skills is prohibitive to the Army Reserve. Future availability of some civilian acquired skills will be exacerbated

by trends in educational demographics. However, current force planning initiatives attempt to locate reserve units in proximity to civilian industries related to the unit mission. There seems to be an opportunity to enter in cooperative training efforts with some corporations willing to cost share in mutually beneficial technology, language, and professional training. As the Army becomes more reliant upon off-the-shelf, dual use technologies, this concept of training partnerships will be more of an inducement to corporations.

Similarly, less high-tech training collaborations should be explored. For instance, equipment maintenance training collaborations between manufacturers, civilian equipment repair and transportation companies and reserve maintenance units could be cost shared. Facilities and, in some instances, equipment costs could be shared. This program could inexpensively and effectively be negotiated and administered through the Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR).

Selected Reservists, based on their performance and commitment to the Reserve (based on evaluations and reenlistment) should be encouraged to participate in command pre-approved civilian management development and technical training courses related to their specialty, in lieu of some regular drills or annual training. Again, cost-sharing of registration fees could be entertained with civilian employers.

### Creating New Paradigms

There are critical concerns for mobilization readiness caused by the shift to compensating leverage strategy. The mechanical "systems fixes" identified during ODS have ostensibly been addressed and remedied. However, the tougher issues involving the very culture of the USAR is still in the process of resolution. These will be long term processes to which the Army Reserve must commit, in order to remain capable, affordable, accessible, and relevant. Significant culture changes must be initiated in recruitment, vision and missions of organizations; the individual soldier, leaders, and units must systematically change to meet these challenges. The shift to new paradigms for the Army Reserve must be nurtured at each level of the organization.

The recruitment process for the Army Reserve must be carefully reevaluated in light of the RMA. In the Force XXI environment of information warfare and compensating leverage strategy, the USAR becomes the majority of the CS/CSS structure(66%)in the first fight. The apparent lesson is that the quality of reserve recruits must equal or surpass that of their AC counterparts. Because of their dual roles as citizen soldiers and the limitations on training time, arguably the reservist of Force XXI must be more flexible, adaptable and trainable. In his discussion of the RMA and imperatives for defense planning, Dr. Michael Mazarr states, "Only highly intelligent, superbly trained, well equipped troops with high morale and wide experience will be able to flourish in the

incredibly demanding atmosphere of future war...Measures to recruit, train and retain high quality troops in all branches of the military must therefore be among our top priorities."<sup>17</sup> There are inconsistencies in the reserve recruitment techniques we are using in the current context of compensating leverage.

A recent United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Army Reserve recruiting advertisement softsells an inaccurate picture of reserve commitment, "Part time service close to home... As a citizen soldier you can enjoy the best of both worlds - keeping a full time civilian job and serving just one weekend a month and two weeks a year soldiering."<sup>18</sup> The Army Reserve and USAREC must develop accurate reserve enlistment expectations for periods of active duty service (more frequent and longer duration) requiring professionalism, career training, mobilization and deployment in fulfillment of our national security commitments. The "weekend warrior" ethos needs to be put to rest as an old recruiting paradigm.

Assessment and selection (A&S) instruments have been developed for selection of soldiers for Special Operations Forces (SOF) training. The objective of A&S is to maximize return on investment of SOF training by assessing aptitude, commitment, and values. (SOF Truths: Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. SOF cannot be mass produced. Competent SOF cannot be created after an emergency arises.)<sup>19</sup> The objective is to look very carefully at a number of human

dimensions of SOF candidates, before spending large sums on expensive training. The instrument has proven effective in evaluating the target criteria. Further investigation into the applicability of assessment and selection instruments is warranted for the recruitment and school selection process for Army Reservists entering the "high cost" MOS producing schools like communications equipment repair, intelligence, language school, etc. A&S criteria should also be developed for Tier I, CFP units. The nature of reserve duty in these units is significantly challenging, personally and professionally. Consequently, if soldiers are not up to the demands of these challenges, attrition will severely degrade readiness. Soldiers with prior service should be recruitment targets for CFP units because of their experience with high OPTEMPO in the active force.

Retention is a good barometer of organizational health. Stephen Covey, author of Principle Centered Leadership, identifies seven chronic problems which plague organizations:

- **Problem 1- No shared vision and values:** either the organization has no mission statement or there is no deep understanding of and commitment to the mission at all levels of the organization.
- **Problem 2- No strategic path:** either the strategy is not well developed or it ineffectively expresses the mission statement and/or fails to meet the wants and needs and realities of the stream.
- **Problem 3- Poor alignment:** bad alignment between structure and shared values, between vision and systems; the structure

and systems of the organization poorly serve and reinforce the strategic paths.

- **Problem 4- Wrong style**: the management philosophy is either incongruent with shared vision and values or the style inconsistently embodies the vision and values of the mission statement.
- **Problem 5- Poor skills**: style does not match skills, or managers lack the skills they need to use an appropriate skill.
- **Problem 6- Low trust**: staff has low trust, a depleted emotional bank account, and that low trust results in closed communications, little problem-solving and poor cooperation and teamwork.
- **Problem 7- No integrity**: values do not equal habits; there is no correlation between what I value and believe and what I do.<sup>20</sup>

These problems are characteristic of some of the issues identified as factors affecting low retention rates. The vision, mission, and goals of the Army Reserve at the strategic level are not aligned with the organizational culture at the operational level of the USAR, namely the TPU level. Business as usual no longer works at the operational level. Since most CFP units are company size units, the leadership maturity and competencies at this level must be addressed.

One significant finding in several recent studies is related to perceived deficiencies in officer and NCO leadership in reserve units (Griffith 1995)<sup>21</sup> (Thomas 1995)<sup>22</sup>. Both identified issues of trust and trustworthiness of leaders. Griffiths found "Perhaps the most bothersome finding of our study, and a finding substantiated by field visits and interviews, was junior-ranking enlisted's perceptions of needed improvements in both NCO and

officer leadership. Unit leaders, especially officers, were not trusted, did not have the soldiers' confidence, and were not seen as caring about the soldiers" Further, he suggests this "... may explain junior ranking enlisted's complaints about weekend drill (e.g., doing nothing, wasting time, not having good job supervision) and the lack of individual and team training."<sup>23</sup> A 1994 (Amerind, Inc.) survey of TPU soldiers on the issue of attrition suggests that if a junior enlisted soldier isn't treated with respect, treated fairly, given opportunities for advancement and training, and isn't led by competent, caring leaders, these factors would "contribute a great deal" to a his decision to leave the Army Reserve.<sup>24</sup>

Thomas' study on leadership and retention in TPU's and Dr. Covey's book, Principle Centered Leadership discuss two forms of leadership theory relevant to the problem. The first theory is "transactional leadership," which focuses on task and people issues in the organization. Task oriented behavior deals with how involved the leader is in the initiation of structure, i.e. how much he initiates work activity, organizes it, and defines how it is to be done. The people-oriented leader behavior in that theory, known as consideration, deals with the concern for the human relations or welfare of the work group members. This is the short range leadership which addresses the unit's ability to perform its Mission Essential Task List (METL) functions. Transactional leadership focuses on events and tactical issues,

i.e. the bottom line. Obviously, transactional leadership is necessary and important in the unit.

Transactional leadership improvements have been effectively applied at the unit level since the Gulf War. There have been several important initiatives to improve the quality of training in the USAR including the Bold Shift Program (1992) and Title VII and Title XI AC/RC Program (1994) which assigned over 5,000 Active Component Captains, Majors, and senior NCO's to full time training support to the RC. The infusion of "top shelf" officers and NCO's from the AC has significantly improved the quality of training. The deficiencies in training conducted by the TPU leaders during drills can often be traced directly to insufficient preparation time, proper equipment/training aids not being on hand or available, weak supervision of training and lack of current experience in the subject matter being trained. The AC/RC Program is specifically designed to address these transactional leadership shortcomings.

In order to change the culture of the Army Reserve to meet the new roles and missions of Force XXI, we need to apply the transformational leadership model as well. "The goal of transformational leadership is to 'transform' people and organizations in a literal sense- to change them in mind and heart; enlarge vision, insight, and understanding; clarify purposes; make behavior congruent with beliefs, principles, or

values; and bring about changes that are permanent, self perpetuating, and momentum building."<sup>25</sup>

This transformational leadership is necessary to create the synergism of the Chief of Staff's reinvention initiatives. The type of leadership talent required for Force XXI is visionary, highly proactive, and professionally dedicated. The U.S. Army Reserve leadership must adapt to the quantum changes in information age technology and warfare, or face obsolescence.

The metaphor of mobilization as a heavy freight train slowly lumbering away from home station through a series of intermediate stops, finally arriving at its in-theater destination, is passé. The mobilization timeline must be condensed to virtual real-time. Reserve units must become self-activating rather than passively mobilized. Annual training should be akin to the Emergency Deployment Readiness Evaluation(EDRE) process, whereby AC units' ability to be deployed into theater quickly are actually evaluated. Implicit in this process are several factors: 1)Empowerment of soldiers at every level of the unit to make decisions and act independently with minimal supervision. 2) Validation should be a precondition inherent in the decision to mobilize a unit, not a mobstation "check the block" process, subjectively determined at the various mobstations. 3)Determination of soldiers'deployability must be an ongoing homestation process. The Department of the Army implementation of the Title XI, the Army National Guard Combat

Readiness Reform Act, included requirements for Army Reserve reporting of nineteen categories of personnel in a Non-deployable Personnel Account (NDPA) beginning in 1995. The ability to monitor nondeployable personnel on an ongoing basis will contribute to this prevalidation of units.

While training time is a premium commodity in the Army Reserve, we need to make a commitment to initiate meaningful training of unit leadership to become transformational leaders. First, we need to reevaluate the process used to select unit commanders. Historically, company command has been a "right of passage" for all company grade officers. We need more senior leadership input in the assessment, selection, and training of company level leadership (both noncommissioned and commissioned officers). Criteria for command selection need to be carefully evaluated in relationship to the increasing commitments of the Reserve under current Total Force Policy and the character of future warfare.

Just as is occurring in industry, military hierarchies must become flatter, reducing the levels of middle management, and increasing the efficiency of decision-making. This means that lower levels of organizational leadership must be empowered and capable of making better decisions. A 1993 Army Reserve general officer steering committee (GOSC) recommended streamlining of pre-mobilization functions and reorganization to a flatter command and control structure (which is happening under the

reorganization of ARCOM's to RSC's). "The challenge to the military is to retain its system of values and to enforce traditional respect for rank and order while changing the hierarchical system of command."<sup>26</sup> The Army Reserve must find ways to empower its leaders and soldiers to be more creative and autonomous in decision making and training initiatives, while still adhering to the overriding organizational values of the United States Army. The value-added dimension of the Army Reserve will increasingly be the diverse private-sector problem solving capabilities and high technology skills its members bring to the table.

### **Conclusions**

The postlude to the mobilization lessons learned in the Gulf War is generally positive for the Army Reserve. The CS/CSS roles and missions for which the USAR is best suited, its core competencies, have been carefully analyzed and the resulting force structure is coherent and consistent with the findings of Rand, the GOSC, and the Offsite Agreement. The USAR has undergone a remarkable change process, adapting the Gulf War lessons-learned to the way we prepare for and conduct mobilization. The systemic fixes required of the bureaucracy have largely been accomplished by policy and legislative changes. The required individual and collective training improvements are progressing well, in part because of the Title VII and Title XI

AC/RC initiatives. The administrative, personnel, equipment issues are all improving through the Tiered Resourcing concept and automation initiatives. As mentioned, these are the simpler things to fix. The task of changing Army Reserve culture will take time, commitment, resolve, and resources. The dilemma, however, is that time is of the essence in this Revolution In Military Affairs.

Learning and adapting new paradigms is never simple. Copernicus' heliocentric astronomy disproving the earth as center of the universe, was first espoused in 1530. It was shunned as heresy for nearly a hundred years before being widely accepted, despite its scientific validity. George Boole's Boolean algebra theories were developed prior to 1850, but the application of his theory was in the area of binary logic and computer science, over a hundred years later. Today, however, because information and technology are advancing at an exponential rather than linear rate, we must aggressively and immediately pursue organization transformation change in the Reserve. Changing the recruitment, selection, training, and personnel management systems will be the simpler mechanical task. The real challenge will be to change the very culture of the organization to meet the challenges of the Force XXI environment. If we faint from the challenge of adapting to the information age, the Army Reserve will be quickly relegated to obsolescence.



## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup>Hon. Deborah R. Lee, "Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces," Defense Issues, Vol . 9, No. 45, (1994), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>" U. S. Army Reserve Command -- Command Briefing," 30 Apr 93.

<sup>3</sup>GEN John M. Shalikashvili, "Guard and Reserve in the 21st Century," The Officer, (February 1995), p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, Roger Brown, "Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During The Persian Gulf Conflict," (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), p. 84.

<sup>5</sup>ibid. p. 83.

<sup>6</sup> COL Charles Galbreath, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, "USAR Force Structure and Readiness Briefing," 12 May 1995.

<sup>7</sup> ibid.

<sup>8</sup>"Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1994," The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, (January 1995), p. 45.

<sup>9</sup>ibid., p. 135.

<sup>10</sup>Hon. Deborah R. Lee, "Change, Readiness, and the Reserve Components," Defense Issues, Vol. 10, No.111, 1995, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> ibid., p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> LTC Taflan, OCAR, DAAR-PE, Information Paper, Subject: Selected Reserve Augmentee (SRA) Concept, 30 January 1995.

<sup>13</sup>\_\_\_\_\_. FM 100-17 Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Final Draft), (February 1995), p. C-11.

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<sup>14</sup>Ellen Embrey, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Reserve Affairs), telephone interview by author, 11 April 1996.

<sup>15</sup> LTC Kenneth Matlock, DADCSOPS, DAMO-ODM, telephone interview with author, 11 April 1996.

<sup>16</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Mobilization of the Reserve Components (RC) For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," CALL Newsletter, No. 92-2, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, February 1992), p. 8.

<sup>17</sup>Dr. Michael J. Mazarr, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, June 10, 1994), p. 29.

<sup>18</sup>US Army Recruiting Command, RPI "Learn More About the United States Army Reserve", <http://www.usarec.army.mil/usar.htm>, 16 February 1996.

<sup>19</sup>USACOM PUB 1, Special Operations In Peace and War (United States Special Operations Command: 25 January 1996), p. 2-27.

<sup>20</sup>Dr. Stephen R. Covey, Principle Centered Leadership (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) pp. 165-172.

<sup>21</sup>James Griffith, "The Army Reserve Soldier in Operation Desert Storm: Perceptions of Being Prepared for Mobilization, Deployment and Combat," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Winter 1995), p. 211.

<sup>22</sup>Kenneth Thomas, "Leadership and Retention in TPU's: A Framework," (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School (August 1995), p. 21.

<sup>23</sup>op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>24</sup>Amerind, Inc., 1994 Survey of Troop Program Unit Soldiers, Tabulation Volume I: All Respondents, Alexandria, VA: Amerind Inc., Question 50.

<sup>25</sup>Dr. Stephen R. Covey, Principle Centered Leadership (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) p. 287.

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<sup>26</sup>Dr. Earl H. Tillford, Jr., "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, June 23, 1995), p. 13.



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