



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**SCORPION: A LOW COST, LOW RISK, LOW ASSET
STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING LOW LEVEL CONFLICTS**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLIFTON L. BRAY, JR.
United States Air Force

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited

19960604 052

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**SCORPION: A LOW COST, LOW RISK, LOW ASSET STRATEGY
FOR RESOLVING LOW LEVEL CONFLICTS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Clifton L. Bray Jr.
United States Air Force

Colonel Stuart A. Herrington
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Clifton L. Bray Jr. (LTC) USAF

TITLE: SCORPION: A Low Cost, Low Risk, Low Asset Strategy For
Resolving Low Level Conflicts

FORMAT: Strategy Research Paper

DATE: 15 April 1996

PAGES: 74

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Despite a significant drawdown, the U.S. military must be ready for two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). Frequent deployments in support of contingencies short of an MRC are affecting our MRC readiness. Often the cost for these large deployments comes from training, readiness, and modernization related funds. Deployed units cannot complete certain types of critical training and in some cases, lost training is never made up. Another problem is a rising concern toward casualties, especially casualties not clearly associated with America's vital interests. Is there a low cost, low risk, low asset strategy for resolving low level conflicts? This paper analyzes our current situation and proposes a strategy that combines precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft, information warfare, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare into an integrated method of fighting. This strategy is codenamed *SCORPION*.

*"Whoever fights monsters should
see to it that in the process he does not
become a monster. And when you look into
an abyss, the abyss looks into you."
Nietzsche*

In the year 2005, Libyan military forces, in two corps strength, cross the border into Tunisia and occupy new oil fields discovered that year. After meeting with his cabinet, the President asks Congress for a resolution supporting military measures against Libya. Congress meets within 24 hours and passes the resolution. U.S. military forces commence hostile attacks within 36 hours. To compel Libya to cease hostilities, the United States sends six F-22s and a single Special Operations Company. Two weeks later, all Libyan forces withdraw from Tunisia. Not a single American dies and only 54 Libyans are killed. The total cost of the operation is under fifty million dollars, a sum Libya delivers to the United States the next day.

This paper deals with national security strategy.

Introduction

Problem:

Despite a significant drawdown, the U.S. military must be ready for two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). The situation compounds itself when we deploy sizable forces to places like Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti to support

regional contingencies short of an MRC. Often, the cost of these large deployments comes from training, readiness, and modernization funds. To make matters worse, deployed units cannot complete certain types of critical training and in some cases, lost training is never made up.

Another problem affecting national security is America's concern towards casualties, especially casualties not clearly associated with America's vital interests. Our nation, which sustained more than 500,000 casualties in WW II, 35,000 in Korea, and another 50,000 in Vietnam, now considers it unacceptable when 18 soldiers are killed in Somalia. America's leadership is hesitant to commit troops due to the political impact if something goes wrong. As a result, situations fester until they demand emergency action, often requiring thousands of troops.

A third problem is related to the first two above. Concern over casualties, dollar costs, and readiness may cause us to disregard some crisis altogether. Disengaging ourselves from critical situations could be disastrous. Our National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement holds promise for an improved world; however we must have a means to implement it.

Thesis:

America needs a strategy for addressing the problems described above. Specifically, we need a low cost, low risk, low asset strategy for responding to conflicts short of an MRC. Does such a strategy exist?

Concept:

Potential exists for resolving certain types of conflicts by combining several forms of warfare into a new and imaginative strategy. For the purpose of this paper, this strategy is codenamed *SCORPION*.

SCORPION is an economy-of-force military strategy that combines precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft, information warfare, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare into an integrated method of fighting. By combining these old and new methods, we can resolve select conflicts with a low cost, low risk, low asset option.

SCORPION incorporates a belief that the strategic center of gravity of certain opponents is their leadership. In cases where this strategy is applicable, we would directly target selected enemy political, military, industrial, and business leaders. Traditional targets such as the enemy's armed forces, industry, and population are not targeted when a contingency is selected for action under the SCORPION strategy.

Proposal:

Reorganize a small portion of our military to create a force dedicated full-time to leading, planning, and executing the resolution of select conflicts where targeting leaders is deemed effective. This strategy provides other forces and the warfighting CINCs more time to plan, train, and execute Major Regional Contingencies.

Hypothesis:

Precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft, information warfare, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare can be combined into a successful, low cost, low risk, low asset strategy for resolving select conflicts.¹

Note: SCORPION is not an end-all strategy for fighting. Certain situations exist where SCORPION is not an appropriate response.² However, in some potential conflicts, SCORPION is a better option than deploying 20,000 combat troops into harm's way.^{3, 4}

Overview

This paper discusses SCORPION by answering the following questions:

Why is SCORPION possible now but was not possible a few years ago?

What was significant about the year 1989?

Why do we need a strategy like SCORPION?

What is the true center of gravity in many conflicts?

What are the tenets of SCORPION?

Is SCORPION legal?

Does SCORPION support the classic principles of war?

When is SCORPION applicable?

What past problems are eliminated by SCORPION?

The scope of this paper is to introduce the strategy and show its viability. The reader may have questions concerning other details. Some of those questions, such as specific force structure, are answered in the attachments.

Before examining SCORPION in detail, let's take a look back.... to 1989... a lot has happened since then that makes SCORPION possible.

1989

The year 1989 brought a revolution to military affairs... but it came and went with much less fanfare than deserved. Several events in 1989 laid the groundwork to lead America into a new era.

Panama

In 1989, America invaded Panama with a force of over 27,000. In a textbook coup-de-main, Just Cause forces swept General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power in less than an hour.⁵ It had been six years since America's last major military operation, Urgent Fury in Grenada. It would not be another six years to the next.

Desert Storm

Desert Storm would occur a year after Panama. Although on a much larger scale, Desert Storm had a similar ring to Panama... another country's leader gone out of control. This time it was Saddam Hussein.⁶

The F-117

In Desert Storm, we witnessed the first major conflict fought extensively with precision guided munitions, or "PGMs". Desert Storm was the war of the "stealth" fighter, the F-117... but in 1989, during Just Cause, the F-117 and its PGMs made their debut.⁷ Prior to Just Cause, the world had not seen this self-lasing aircraft in action.⁸

Cruise Missiles

Desert Storm was a "first" for something else, the Tomahawk Cruise Missile was fired in anger. Skeptics of this system included General Colin Powell, who commented that planners should backup Tomahawk targets with aircraft strikes.⁹ Cruise missiles had been around since the German V-1 in WW II, but the performance of the Tomahawk in Desert Storm made believers out of almost everyone.¹⁰

USSOCOM

1989 witnessed the United States Special Operations Command's first major operation as a new unified command. The creation of this command marked the most significant event in U.S. Special Operations history and set the stage for an increased role for Special Operations.¹¹

Cybernauts

In 1989, several computer system researchers were formulating the mechanism for widespread information dissemination. They believed a system used by university researchers could be expanded to provide information to thousands... maybe even millions... perhaps even to the average household. Five years later their concept became the *internet*.¹²

Cable News

In 1989, during Just Cause, a new issue arose concerning the news media. The media felt purposely excluded from first hand reporting. The military felt media reporting threatened operations. Reporters were part of U.S. military operations since 1776... what was different during Just Cause? The issue: a new concept in reporting... cable news network, or CNN, which brought a speed to reporting that startled military commanders. Just Cause brought the first "real time" reporting of a conflict with live updates every 30 minutes. What if the enemy was watching CNN?¹³

Missile Proliferation

In 1989, there were more ballistic missile launches by non-US/USSR countries than by the US/USSR. The proliferation of ballistic missiles had commenced. Soon Syria, Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Iran would boast arsenals of modern missiles many capable of carrying chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads.¹⁴

Goodby USSR

In 1989, the Soviet Union began a rapid succession of events leading to its dissolution.¹⁵ This collapse triggered a dramatic, often traumatic, downsizing of the U.S. military. The fall of the Soviet Union opened the door for the United States to accomplish remarkable things with the extra time, energy, money, and freedom of action gained because the Soviet bear was no longer a threat.¹⁶

Casualties

Just Cause was executed with very few American casualties in relation to the scope of the operation. Desert Storm likewise produced amazingly low numbers of American deaths since predictions were in the thousands. This produced a feeling that America could successfully fight almost bloodless wars... at least as far as American blood was concerned. An expectation of low casualties became the standard.

These occurrences, during and since 1989, produced lasting effects on the world and on the U.S. military. They still interact and produce concepts previously not possible. SCORPION is one such concept.

1996

Now it is 1996. The concepts described above, stealth aircraft, precision munitions, cruise missiles, the internet, cable news, the fall of the Soviet Union, downsizing the military, and expectations of low casualties have altered policy and affected operations to some degree, however, no new, revolutionary strategy has emerged to take advantage of these significant changes in history and technology. Our National Security Strategy remains very much unchanged.

Two MRC Strategy

Although the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, America still faces significant enemies.

The strongest of these enemies are the ones we may fight in a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) or perhaps even two.¹⁷ President Clinton wisely directs a two MRC capability in our National Security Strategy.¹⁸ However, saying we have a two MRC capability and actually being capable of executing two MRCs depends on readiness.¹⁹ Maintaining a two MRC capability is not an easy task due to several facts.

Downsizing

U.S. Armed Forces have been reduced significantly since 1989. On an average, a 40% reduction,²⁰ which makes a two MRC capability very difficult; hence the current policy is carefully described as one in which the United States can fight "two *nearly simultaneous* MRCs".²¹ Regardless of how we execute our MRC strategy, our forces must be trained and ready.²²

Operations Tempo

Our operations tempo is significant.²³ Deployments since 1989 include Desert Storm and repeated deployments to the Kuwait theater, as well as operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Turkey, and Bosnia.²⁴

These deployments tie up large numbers of troops who cannot train for their primary mission which is fighting and winning an MRC. Critical unit and individual training requirements are lost and often never recovered.

The high operations tempo causes another problem... decreased troop morale due to lengthy deployments.²⁵

Dollars

The dollar cost of these deployments is a concern to taxpayers who pay the bills and the military who ultimately see the cost as siphoning funds from modernization and training.²⁶

Below are the costs of recent contingencies.²⁷

Somalia ---- 2 Billion

Haiti ----- 1.5 Billion

Bosnia ----- 2 to 12 Billion

Since the DOD contingency fund is \$640 million, we can expect U.S. involvement in future contingencies to cut into readiness funds. Our National Security Strategy voices this concern.²⁸ The dollar problem is complicated by decreasing budget authority. Projected defense spending is at best, level for the next year and increases only a minor amount in 1998.²⁹

The U.S. needs a strategy that resolves contingencies at a cost of approximately \$50 million versus several billion.

Casualties

While history shows America's willingness to accept battle casualties, this willingness diminishes when the precise interest of the United States is not apparent.³⁰ Fighting and dying against Adolf Hitler to save Europe is one thing; fighting and dying against Farah Aided to save Somalia is a different matter.³¹ Americans show little tolerance for these casualties.³² It might be a lagging Vietnam syndrome, a new isolationist attitude or the

graphic images on CNN, but never before has America been so preoccupied with the plight of a single soldier as we have seen in instances such as Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant and Captain Scott O'Grady.³³

This concern over casualties hampers our willingness to engage enemies. Great debates precede every deployment and slogans like "its not worth a single American life" are common.³⁴ Once a deployment occurs, it can be ended abruptly by casualties. The eighteen Ranger deaths in Somalia resulted in issuing an exit policy within days.³⁵ As long as this attitude exists, America's policy of "enlargement and engagement" is curtailed as we back away from conflicts due to the potential loss of American life.³⁶

In sum, the problem affecting national security is a downsized force with a decreased budget, who must remain trained for two MRCs, while maintaining a high operation tempo in contingencies which must avoid casualties for the U.S. to stay engaged in world situations.

A New View Towards Combat

To address the above problems, SCORPION combines precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft, information warfare, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare into an integrated low cost, low risk, low asset strategy of fighting.

However, there is more to SCORPION than simply combining the above elements into a single pot.... stirring.... and then running off to combat. *The United States must adopt a different view towards combat.*

Centers of Gravity

In the early 1980's, the U.S. military embraced the doctrine of AirLand Battle which encourages *"striking decisive, violent blows from unanticipated angles on the centers of gravity of an enemy's armed forces."*³⁷ Strategists frequently identify the "center of gravity" as an enemy's armed force and historically, armies have attacked armies.³⁸ Warfighting became a series of offensives, defensives, attacks, counterattacks, and maneuvers.... *all aimed at defeating the enemy's armed forces.*³⁹ Most "operational art" and tactics center around this approach.⁴⁰

Weapons

When armies fight armies, strategists design weapons to defeat an enemy's weapons. This technology race resulted in aircraft flying higher and faster, tanks which shot further, and missiles and bombs that were "smart". As each offensive technology emerged, a defensive technology countered it, and so went the arms race.

Most weapons through history had something in common; they were designed for use against an enemy's armed force. The ultimate goal was developing a perfect weapon... one the enemy could not defend against. To a degree, stealth technology coupled with highly accurate precision guided munitions is such a weapon.⁴¹

Targets

Stealth aircraft strike an enemy with little risk of being countered.⁴² In addition, accuracy and reliability of newly developed precision guided munitions assures success at hitting a target.⁴³ *The problem is that in many cases, we are going after the wrong targets.*

Targets fall into these categories:⁴⁴

Armed Forces: An Enemy's Army, Air Force, and Navy

Warmaking Capacity: Production Plants, Logistics Centers

Infrastructure: Electrical Stations, Water Treatment Plants, Communications, Transportation

Population: Cities, People

These targets are associated with an opponent's armed forces or their ability to support and equip an armed force. Such targets were appropriate in past conflicts, and may be appropriate in future conflicts involving an MRC, however there is a more appropriate target in many contingencies.... *enemy leaders.*

Enemy Leaders

Enemy leadership includes the political, military, business, and industrial leaders of an opponent. In this group, the seeds of conflict start. Once aggression begins, it is within the power of this group to influence the decision to continue to fight or withdraw.

If the decision to capitulate is within the power of this group, it seems logical to attack it directly. Why has this not occurred more frequently?⁴⁵

In past conflicts, enemy armed forces were often a more pressing target than enemy leaders. If an enemy army was advancing toward you or they were defending territory you were advancing on, it was logical and necessary to attack that army.

However, armies are directed and if one could seriously threaten an opponent's leaders, they might capitulate to your demands and call off their army.

In the past, nations wishing to threaten an enemy's leadership usually found an enemy army between them and the enemy's capital or where ever the enemy leadership was located. The only way one could threaten an enemy's leaders was to first defeat their army so as to open the path to the enemy leader's front door thereby causing them to capitulate or face annihilation.⁴⁶

Indirectly, it was the enemy's leaders who were targeted.... you just had to defeat the enemy's army first. Over the years, we became so used to attacking an opponent's army that perhaps we lost sight of that point.... at least until the airplane came along.

Enter the Airplane

What if you could threaten enemy leadership without first destroying his army? When the airplane emerged, many thought we could simply bomb an enemy's leadership into submission.⁴⁷ It sounded like a good idea. However, airplanes were very inaccurate at bombing a specific person even if you could locate them from the air.

Another strategy was massive bombing of an enemy's population. If you were just trying to *kill anybody*, the accuracy of a bomb didn't really matter when dropped on a dense population center. The goal was to demoralize the population into forcing leaders to

capitulate. Unfortunately, this didn't work either. Populations proved unexpectedly durable and willing to withstand significant suffering.⁴⁸

However, this is 1996. We have bombs and delivery platforms that *can* hit a certain person. SCORPION recommends we do precisely that.⁴⁹

Leaders as the Center of Gravity

Leaders start wars, fight wars, and decide when wars end. Common citizens and soldiers do not wake up one day and spontaneously go off to war..... they are *led*.

If one wants to prevent or end a conflict, one should focus on enemy leadership. In many cases, they are the true center of gravity. The conflict ends when *they* see it is no longer to their benefit to continue.⁵⁰

The exact type of leaders to target varies by culture and society. However, SCORPION targets only those leaders who have a direct tie to the enemy's warmaking policy or warmaking production... leaders who are identified as legal combatants.

Soldiers may fight to the death.... in fact, entire armies may fight to the death, but an opponent's leadership seldom fights to the death.⁵¹ They stop fighting before they face annihilation.

Recent history provides examples. Manuel Noriega surrendered to authorities rather than attempt an escape and be killed. Saddam Hussein surrendered when it was clear the coalition could march on Baghdad. Farah Aideed negotiated with the United Nations once he saw his time in power was limited. Raul Cedras capitulated to United Nations demands when he heard sixty C-130s were inbound to Haiti. Serb leaders came to the peace table

after NATO bombings threatened their power.

If a nation's leaders are threatened with removal from power during a conflict, that conflict will likely end. *The goals of the conflict are seldom as important to them as staying in power or staying alive.*

SCORPION

SCORPION incorporates the logic that regardless of what we target, armies, industry, or populations, the real target we are trying to reach is the enemy leadership, so why not bypass traditional targets and *strike directly at leadership?*

An enemy's "leadership" is not just the top one or two leaders. It is the top one to two *hundred* leaders.⁵²

The following are the tenets of SCORPION.

SCORPION is a low cost, low risk, low asset strategy to compel an enemy's political, military, industrial, and business leaders to comply with United States' will.

SCORPION does not attack an opponent's armed forces.⁵³

SCORPION does not attack an opponent's population. We make an incredible effort to avoid civilian casualties.⁵⁴

SCORPION does not attack an enemy's industrial centers, factories, power grids, water treatment facilities, transportation systems, or telecommunications networks. To do so would threaten the well being of the population.⁵⁵

SCORPION attacks the physical and mental well being of selected enemy leaders.⁵⁶ They are systematically targeted, attacked and destroyed.⁵⁷ The purpose of SCORPION is to demonstrate our will, break their will, and compel them to comply with our desires.⁵⁸ A quote from Trotsky is appropriate: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you." SCORPION takes war to the leader's front door... literally. They may have looked at war from a safe, sterile perspective that SCORPION now denies them.

SCORPION uses precision guided munitions delivered by stealth aircraft as a tool to place pressure on leaders.⁵⁹ In the past, we used large armies, massive airstrikes, and large naval battles to produce the same pressure and feeling of vulnerability. Precision strikes by stealth aircraft produce the same effect using fewer assets at a much lower cost and risk.

SCORPION airstrikes use special low yield precision guided munitions to minimize collateral damage and reduce the potential for uncontrollable fires.⁶⁰

SCORPION targets are identified on the internet, radio and television broadcasts, and via leaflet drops. Potential targets where leaders might be located are often listed to permit evacuation of the area.⁶¹

SCORPION may or may not have the strategic end state of removing the enemy leadership from power. SCORPION is meant to convince them to change their actions and comply with United States' will. *It may be wise to keep selected leaders alive and in power.* For many situations, the strategic end state is simply a return to the status quo prior to hostilities.⁶²

SCORPION places relentless pressure on leaders by showing them that they will not be safe until the demands of the United States are met. They will not enjoy life. They stand a good chance of losing everything.... power, wealth, property, prestige, association with families and friends, and possibly their life.⁶³ SCORPION maintains the initiative and dictates the terms of battle to the enemy.⁶⁴

SCORPION minimizes the numbers of Americans placed at risk. Rarely would an American combatant be on the ground in enemy territory. Pilots will not fly over a target country if there is a threat of being shot down. For this reason, SCORPION uses stealth aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and cruise missiles.⁶⁵ The goal of SCORPION is *zero* American casualties.⁶⁶

In SCORPION, there are no American ground forces committed. This does not mean SCORPION is simply attacking the enemy from the air. Certain targets cannot be viably attacked using precision guided munitions. They must be attacked from the ground.⁶⁷

SCORPION applies pressure from ground and air to create the psychological environment conducive to capitulation. However, ground attacks will not come from American troops. It is here that another important aspect of SCORPION emerges: SCORPION uses unconventional warfare in the form of indigenous guerrilla attacks on enemy leaders.

Guerrillas

The ability of guerrillas to successfully engage urban targets is well documented. Historically, the U.S. military's unconventional warfare experience has been in *counter-guerrilla* operations.⁶⁸ "Countering" guerrilla attacks is much harder than "executing" guerrilla attacks. In SCORPION, we perform the easier of the two, we are on the side of the guerrillas. The guerrilla forces are trained and equipped by United States Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Forces have performed the mission of unconventional warfare since 1957.⁶⁹ Their training and mission directives require a proficiency in directing and executing guerrilla operations.⁷⁰

Guerrilla operations associated with SCORPION are limited. A strike once a week at the onset of SCORPION will suffice to let leaders know a hostile force is operating on the ground in concert with the air strikes. The guerrillas need not inflict much damage for leaders to radically alter their lives due to the apparent threat.⁷¹

Guerrilla strikes include bombings, shootings, car tampering, booby traps, and abductions. As with the airstrikes, guerrillas are disciplined to avoid unneeded killing and collateral damage. Their targets are directed by the United States and they are not free agents acting on their own.⁷²

Another role of the guerrillas is intelligence gathering concerning the locations of targeted leaders and relaying precise GPS coordinates to air planners.⁷³

Information

SCORPION uses products of the information revolution as tools for combat.⁷⁴

Although still in its infancy, the information revolution has already led to a new category of combat called *Information Warfare*. However, SCORPION uses information in a different manner than conventional thinking.⁷⁵

Current thinking centers around providing greater amounts of information to U.S. commanders and troops. The term frequently used is "battlefield awareness". The goal is providing our troops with information they need to effectively fight. The principle ideas of the U.S. Army's Force XXI program center around that concept.⁷⁶

SCORPION uses information in another way. In addition to providing information to our leaders, we also give it to enemy leaders. The information we provide allows our enemies to realize they cannot win and places them in a psychological state conducive to capitulation.⁷⁷

We use several information systems to accomplish this.

Cable News

It began with the creation of CNN in 1981, now the flow of information concerning world events travels fast enough that we usually see the event occurring.⁷⁸ News services are a big business and companies scramble to have reporters on the scene providing reports within minutes of a critical event.⁷⁹ Widespread real time reporting became possible in the last few

years with the advent of suitcase satellite technology now possessed by all major news services.⁸⁰

News services will show SCORPION to the world and unlike many past operations, we want total news coverage. SCORPION provides news services superb stories and their coverage shows our enemies that SCORPION is a viable and credible program.⁸¹ News coverage allows SCORPION attacks in one country, to be seen by leaders in other countries.

Deterrence

The goal is creating deterrence through example. With the "example" seen by others, we avoid being like the Romans who found it necessary to administer Roman brutality in virtually every conquered land to convince populations they had the capability and will to carry it out.⁸²

The Internet

The internet is another information capability enlisted by SCORPION. Almost any person in the world can access the internet. Leaders will definitely want to be "on line" because SCORPION provides them critical information.

The SCORPION WebSite lists potential targets and often includes the time window when they might be attacked. This reduces potential casualties and allow news coverage;⁸³ although in certain situations, announcing the location of the attack may be impractical. The purpose is to create a psychological environment of helplessness. Imagine going to the internet and seeing your name listed for attack... and there is little you can do about it... unless your country capitulates.⁸⁴

Psychological Operations

SCORPION is a psychological operation.⁸⁵ The use of precision munitions dropped by stealth aircraft combined with guerrilla strikes and the use of modern information services creates a psychological environment never felt by any nation's leadership. Instead of watching the war from an aspect of safety, they are now in the war... *in fact they are the front line.*

Leaders have been bombed before, but with SCORPION it isn't a chance bomb to worry about, it is a precision guided munition aimed deliberately at you. *You are the target.* The fact you are being targeted and your army is not, your population is not, and your industrial centers are not, isolates you from the rest of your country. As a moving target, you endanger all those you come near. SCORPION places you in a similar situation to those who have leprosy. *Modern day lepers!* SCORPION targets not only your physical well being but also your psychological well being.

Intelligence

Intelligence requirements for SCORPION are narrow but absolutely critical. Specifically, we need to know who the leaders are, where they work, and their location at a given time.⁸⁶ There are examples where this proved difficult, a recent example being the search for Manuel Noriega.⁸⁷ However, Noriega was constantly one step ahead of searchers and in such fear he sought safety in the Vatican Embassy.

Locating leaders is not as much of a problem in SCORPION as the Noriega hunt since numerous leaders are targeted not just one. One or two leaders may evade our intelligence system but fifty will not.

Human intelligence is the primary source of information and this adds to the psychological effects of SCORPION. Leaflet drops, television and radio intrusions, and internet messages encourage the population to provide information on leader locations. As in the Noriega search, rewards can be offered.⁸⁸ Even if no one provides information, the psychological effect is significant.

Ends, Ways, and Means

SCORPION is the way the U.S. can resolve certain conflicts. The end is an enemy's compliance with our will. The means is a tailored force structure to apply violence directly on selected leaders.⁸⁹

There is an ends, ways, means test for strategies shown below:⁹⁰

Ends ----- Suitable ---- Desired Effect

Ways ----- Feasible ---- Capable of Being Done

Means ----- Acceptable -- Reasonable Cost

SCORPION produces the desired effect and is within our capabilities. The last test concerns reasonable cost; here SCORPION makes its greatest contribution as a low cost option in both dollars and potential casualties.

Force Structure

SCORPION has a relatively small force structure... less than 5,000 personnel dedicated full time. A 5,000 person force is less than 1/3 of 1% of our current strength.⁹¹ Although

small, the strength of this force is that they are dedicated full time to hunting, finding, and attacking enemy leaders. Over a period of time they will become very proficient at this specialized task. The force structure for SCORPION is shown at Attachment 1.

The American People

SCORPION must have the full support and full knowledge of the American people. Recent conflicts raise significant debate over where and when the United States should commit forces.⁹² This is a major political consideration for our leaders, and often the result is vacillation and delay until a low level conflict reaches a boiling point and a massive response is the only answer. A massive response that requires a long deployment and has the potential for casualties is not acceptable to the American people, who show little patience and expect quick victories.⁹³ SCORPION should have their support since it is a low cost, low casualty strategy that produces results.

Ensuring the American people support SCORPION fulfills the first step in achieving Clausewitz's "holy trinity".⁹⁴

The Government

SCORPION gives our leaders a viable option to the cycle of delaying action too long and then having to apply massive force which takes time, ties up units, creates significant expense, and contains the potential for casualties.⁹⁵ Our leaders can act fast and resolve certain conflicts early without worrying about the political effect.⁹⁶ We become proactive versus reactive.

The effects of SCORPION are improved if the Executive and Legislative branches act together. Since current law concerning the President's authority to deploy forces is in dispute since the War Powers Act, a wise approach is to gain congressional approval immediately.⁹⁷ Historically, Congress supports the President in an international crisis despite the political rhetoric one hears.⁹⁸ SCORPION eliminates the political controversies entailed in military actions, specifically cost, casualties, and possible mission creep.⁹⁹ With the controversies gone, Congress can rapidly approve a SCORPION deployment... a step which may alone result in enemy capitulation when they see our resolve.

Government support of SCORPION is the second step of the holy trinity.

The Military

The United States military should embrace SCORPION because it reduces the operations tempo that is taxing a downsized force structure. SCORPION frees the vast majority of the military to concentrate on their primary job... preparing for a major regional conflict.¹⁰⁰ SCORPION saves significant dollars by eliminating a large scale, lengthy deployment. These dollars can be applied to readiness and modernization.

The military completes the holy trinity of having the people, the government, and the military acting with agreed resolve.

The Law of Armed Conflict

Is SCORPION legal in regard to international laws of armed conflict? A literal reading of the Hague Conventions indicates SCORPION is a possible violation of targeting non-

combatants and destroying civilian property.¹⁰¹ However, research shows this is not true because much of the literal wording has been ruled to be no longer applicable.¹⁰² Over the last 90 years, the overriding theme of the courts is protection of innocents during an armed conflict and avoiding indiscriminate killing and wanton destruction of property.¹⁰³

The tenets of SCORPION promote minimizing property damage and avoiding deaths. If there was ever a program that embraced the intent desired by the authors of the Hague Conventions it is SCORPION.¹⁰⁴ In fact, if we can resolve a crisis by using SCORPION versus a more bloody option, we are directed by international law to use SCORPION.¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless, targets in SCORPION are untraditional and will be controversial. For this reason, each targeted individual must be thoroughly evaluated to ensure the individual does not fall into the categories of a protected person or a non-combatant.

Principles of War

Although SCORPION is a departure from conventional approaches to fighting, it is in line with the principles of war described by classical strategists and contained in current regulations.¹⁰⁷ A review of the principles of war in regard to SCORPION is at Attachment 2.

What-ifs

There are questions concerning SCORPION and the "fog of war" because things do not always go as planned.¹⁰⁸ The answers to some of these "what-if..." questions are located at Attachment 3.

Situations Where SCORPION Is Applicable

Below are situations where SCORPION is applicable:

Aggression by others against our allies

Internal strife in another country which threatens U.S. interests

Proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons

Ballistic missile proliferation

Reactions to the use of weapons of mass destruction

Drug trafficking condoned by the leadership of another country

Environmental degradation by another country

A mass refugee exodus affecting the U.S.

Internal or trans-national fighting causing widespread suffering and death

Hostage situations

Economic blackmail such as an oil embargo

SCORPION can be applied in many low level conflicts. There are certainly situations where a conventional approach is more suitable but conversely, SCORPION will succeed in some cases where a conventional military effort may not. Furthermore, if the U.S. is already engaged in an MRC, or two, SCORPION may be the only option.

Situations Prevented by SCORPION

SCORPION prevents the following situations.

Unacceptable levels of American casualties

High costs involved in deploying and sustaining 20,000 troops

Degradation of readiness due to lengthy deployments

Military disasters, i.e. Desert One, Beirut, Somalia

Complex Rules of Engagement

Cumbersome command and control situations

Accusations of an unproportional response

Long lasting anti-American feelings due to civilian casualties

No U.S. response to a critical situation due to cost and risk

Responsibility for a large population due to U.S. occupation

Friendly fire casualties

Loss of expensive equipment in combat

Embarrassing pull-outs after a military disaster which harm U.S. credibility

High risk rescues of hostages held by a government

Tragic accidents associated with military deployments, ie vehicle crashes, aircraft crashes not associated with combat

Lengthy deployments that hurt morale

Mission creep

America experienced virtually all the above problems during this decade alone.

Concluding Remarks

SCORPION should be adopted as a strategy for dealing with selected conflicts short of an MRC. However, the United States must approach the initial execution of SCORPION with all seriousness and dedication... credibility at the outset is highly important and there can be no half-hearted attempts or turning back. SCORPION requires bravery and steadfastness on the part of those who undertake its path. The most difficult execution of SCORPION will be the initial attempt. Each execution thereafter will be progressively easier. Some conflicts will be prevented by the very threat of executing SCORPION. The potential aggressors of the world must believe the credibility of SCORPION and the assurance that once SCORPION begins, their power is about to end. The United States needs a credible capability to remove an opponents leadership if the situation dictates it. By having that credible capability, we may never have to use it.

The world changed a lot since 1989. Technological advances in stealth aircraft, precision guided munitions, and information systems give the United States some tools never possessed by a military power. SCORPION takes advantage of those tools to solve problems concerning operations tempo, concern for casualties, and decreasing budget authority.

SCORPION allows our military to remain trained and ready to fight and win our nation's wars in two nearly simultaneous MRCs while still retaining a viable capability to resolve lower level conflicts affecting our interests.

The following quote from Sun Tzu provides a closing reflection on SCORPION.

"Know the enemy and yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."

Sun Tzu

Endnotes

1. At the outset of this paper it should be pointed out that no clear strategy has emerged to deal with many of the current conflicts being addressed by the United States. Jane Misheloff states:

"Under the former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of Defense William Perry a clear military strategy has yet to emerge, and U.S. leaders have often been uncertain just how to use military force in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti." Misheloff, Jane. U.S. Economic Competitiveness and the Future of the Military Industrial Base. The Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1994: 209-237.

2. Radically new approaches to warfighting are often criticized in regard to their particular inability to fit into a certain situation. Proponents must caveat their ideas as not being total solutions. General Don A. Starry made such a caveat about Division 86 and General Gordon R. Sullivan said it about Force XXI. Sullivan, Gordon R. "Future Vision." Military Review, May-June 1995: 4-14.

3. For the purposes of this paper it might be of value to set a "reference" for what the future world will be like. The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute identifies 18 main determinants in their assessment. These are paraphrased below and are used to set a world context for SCORPION.

1. Major changes in the way governmental and business organizations govern themselves
- 2a. Military budgets will decrease. Rate of decrease is an issue of who is elected.
- 2b. Performance of Army in Bosnia will affect future views of Military support and recruiting.
3. Russia will reemerge as a power.
4. Russia will continue to pursue policies that are in conflict with US.
5. China is a concern and will play a major role in the economics of the Pacific. (Taiwan and Spratley Islands)
6. Korea will remain divided and tense. If fighting breaks out, US will go.
7. Europe will remain dynamic and NATO will continue.
8. Bosnian conflicts will determine relationships of NATO, Russia, and others.
9. NATO enlargement will be an issue
10. South America will be a series of insurgencies, drug wars, and poverty crisis. Canal treaty implementation may affect the region.
11. Drug trafficking will remain high through Latin America.
12. Cuba may erupt into a crisis after the passing of Castro. US may deploy there.
13. Israeli-Arab peace process will continue with US as broker.
14. Disparity between distribution of wealth in the Mideast will continue.

15. Muslims throughout the Mideast will begin to demand that Americans leave Mideast countries and that support to U.S. activities in the region is reduced.

16. Iran will emerge as the regional leader. Iraq and Iran could unite in common efforts.

17. Africa will remain an area of spreading conflicts but no interstate wars.

18. The disintegration of Zaire and Nigeria could pose a serious challenge.

Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996.

In addition to the above 18 determinants, The 1996 Assessment also discusses potential countries where a conflict or crisis is likely. These are listed below and set the context for where SCORPION might be used.

Bosnia
Greece
Turkey
Cuba
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Peru
Panama
Brazil
Israeli
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Algeria
Iraq
Iran
Ethiopia
Somalia
Sudan
Yemen
Angola
Liberia
Zaire
Nigeria
Burundi
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
North Korea
Taiwan
China
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Bangladesh

Note: The above list simply indicates potential areas for conflict. It is not a list of countries where SCORPION would necessarily be appropriate.

In addition, the following quote from Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering's address to the U.N. is of value in setting the context of a world where SCORPION is applied:

"The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention." Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA, 28 February 1995.

4. Since the close of WW II, there have been over 150 conflicts in which over 40,000,000 people lost their lives. These numbers are certainly approximates. They are quoted from War and Anti-War by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. David Jablonsky used 127 wars and 21,000,000 deaths in Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order. The point here is that when one deploys 20,000 or more troops into a conflict, there is a likelihood of casualties on both sides. SCORPION hopes to reduce casualties on both sides and if a fraction of the deaths since WW II could be prevented, SCORPION would be certainly worthwhile. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993. Also see: Jablonsky, David. Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 1993.

5. H-Hour for Just Cause was set at 0100 Local Time. Simultaneous strikes were executed on 27 separate targets including a 650 man airdrop on Torrijos-Tocumen Airfield. General Noriega was at a military recreation facility less than a mile away. Upon learning of the attack he fled into hiding in a private automobile and never acted with any coordinated power again. McConnell, Malcolm. Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High Tech Invasion of Panama. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

6. Desert Shield began in August 1990. After five months of deploying and preparing, coalition forces began the air war on 17 January 1991 marking the start of Desert Storm. It had been less than 14 months since Just Cause. It is not the point of this paper to debate whether Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were "out of control". The analogy is made to show the similarities between the boldness and rhetoric of the two. Chase, Eric L. "Should We Kill Saddam." Newsweek, 18 February 1991. Also see: Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

7. Two F-117s dropped two laser guided bombs on a field adjacent to the barracks of the Panamanian Defense Forces at Rio Hato Airbase on 20 December 1989. Gonyea, Gregory T. The Role of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in Special Operations. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 1993. Also see: McConnell, Malcolm. Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High Tech Invasion of Panama. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

8. Immediately following the F-117 attack on Rio Hato Airfield, the United States Air Force disclosed the attacks were made by a previously kept secret aircraft with special radar evading capabilities. Another feature of the F-117 is its on-board laser that allows it to laze its own target thus eliminating the need for a ground lazing team to illuminate the target. Richardson, Doug. Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air. NY: Orion Books, 1989.

9. It should be noted that the Tomahawk had many skeptics to include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. Desert Storm vindicated the operational viability of the cruise missile and clearly demonstrated its potential. Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993. Also see: Schwartz, John. "The Mind of a Missile." Newsweek, 18 February 1991: pp 40-44.

Skeptics within the military establishment are probably the reason why most current doctrine does not address the potential of precision weapons. AFM1-1 states that:

"Most military theory at the tactical level predates precision weaponry. The high probability of successful engagement provided by precision weapons can create important results at the operational and strategic levels as well." Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992.

10. The German V-1 was one of the first designs of a "cruise missile". However, with no guidance system its accuracy did not allow use on a specific target. It simply ran out of fuel and fell on whatever was below. For this reason it was primarily used on large population centers such as London as a terror weapon. Although the first Tomahawk was fired in anger in 1991, the first shot in anger nearly occurred in 1989 in reaction to the hostage situation in Lebanon. Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.

11. Until the creation of USSOCOM, Army, Air Force, and Naval Special Operations Forces did not have a single "umbrella" organization and there were no "SOF" general officers. Today USSOCOM is led by a four star general with several other general officers on the staff. Each Theater CINC has a dedicated Special Operations Command led by a Brigadier General. U.S. Special Operations Command. USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations In Peace and War. MacDill AFB, FL, 25 January 1996.

12. The original concept called the ARPAnet began in the late 1960s and was used by military researchers. Today the internet currently has several names to include the information superhighway and the world wide web. It is a rapidly growing structure with thousands of new subscribers every day. Since the 1980s, it has grown at a rate of 20% each month. Currently, over 60 countries now have access. Of note here is that unlike many information systems, the internet has no country boundaries which is why it is also called the "world wide web". The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute states "In the Information Age, national borders are far more ambiguous and cultures more susceptible to electronic penetration." Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996. Also see: Krol, Ed. The Whole Internet Users Guide and Catalog. USA: O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., 1994. Also see: Fisher, Sharon. Riding the Internet Highway. Indianapolis: New Riders Publishing, 1993.

13. CNN first began in 1981. It was far from being the household institution it is now. By 1989, it was already an intelligence source for many decisionmakers. President Bush commented that he learned more from CNN than CIA. Stech, Frank J. "Winning CNN Wars." Parameters, Autumn 1994: 37-56.

Just Cause was our first brush with CNN reporting on real time U.S. military operations. Desert Storm finely tuned the concern. A commander's concern is a media reporter might disclose critical operational plans on worldwide television, perhaps inadvertently. During the opening hours of the air campaign over Baghdad, CNN correspondents provided reports on the ineffectiveness of Iraqi ADA and the accuracy of coalition bombing. Their cameras provided real time BDA on several targets. When the Iraqis saw this they threatened shutting down the CNN operation. See CNN Newscast, evening of 16 January 1991. Another fear is a reporter may learn of a shortcoming, i.e. only one day of ammunition left due to a supply mistake, and purposely report it in an expose' on military ineptitude that discloses the weakness to an enemy before it can be corrected.

Another point to make concerning cable news services is their ability to cover a situation virtually anywhere in the entire world. We are seeing the reporting of many situations that would not have been covered before cable news. These often startling images blasted in our faces every 30 minutes also makes us feel a need to respond if America can solve help. Ambassador Pickering's previous quote in an earlier note is applicable and is repeated here:

"The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention." Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA, 28 February 1995.

14. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.

15. The precise date the Soviet Union started crumbling is hard to determine. However, in 1989 they were still considered a viable foe. At the end of 1990, it was clear the Soviet Union was no longer a clear adversary and it was only a matter of time before the union dissolved. December 1991 is the month credited with the final fall of the USSR.

16. In the Economic Dimensions of National Security, C.R. Neu and Charles Wolfe make the following comments:

"Some argue that, with the passing of the Soviet Union threat, the ability of the United States to pursue its national interests and to shape the world to its liking is limited principally by its own willingness to act and by its ability to bear the costs of action."

"It is no longer necessary to worry as much about the potential escalation of a small scale military intervention into a confrontation with a rival superpower. At the same time, it is recognized that military action is not likely to be effective, (and even less likely to be cost effective, considering possible U.S. and allied losses) in pursuing some kinds of foreign policy goals." Neu, C.R. and Wolfe, Charles. The Economic Dimensions of National Security. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

17. The Dictionary of Military Terms defines an MRC as a Major Regional Contingency. Frequently the "C" is termed as a "Conflict", i.e. Major Regional *Conflict*. For the purpose of this paper the official definition is used. Palmer, Norman, and Warren, Mark. Dictionary of Military Abbreviations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Major Regional Contingencies are discussed on Page 9 of President Clinton's National Security Strategy. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are specifically mentioned. Libya, Syria, and China are similar foes due to their force structure and potential to be a future adversary of the United States. White House. A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995.

18. The strategy here is one of deterrence. A single MRC strategy would allow one opponent to take advantage of the situation, thus setting the example for others to follow. We hope to prevent ever having to fight in two nearly simultaneous MRCs by being capable of doing so. A two MRC capability gives America a "who else wants a blackeye" capability as we fight the first MRC. White House. A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995.

The guidance in the National Security Strategy is echoed in the 1995 National Military Strategy which states "The core requirement of our strategy is a force capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously."

Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 1995

19. As with a prizefighter, we hope that a second party will still be deterred from stepping into the ring because the prizefighter can handle two opponents. However, a prizefighter must stay in fighting condition. In the U.S. military we term this as readiness.

20. Exact reductions vary for each military unit and capability. As an example in the USAF, Long range bombers have been decreased by 60% while special operations aircraft actually increased.

Specifically the following reductions illustrate the drawdown in forces from 1989 projected to 2000:

Active Army Divisions 18 to 10
Carriers 16 to 11
Surface combatants 287 to 161
Tactical Air Wings 25 to 13
Strategic airlift 367 to 245
Active Personnel 2,130,000 to 1,445,000
Reserve and Guard 1,171,000 to 893,000

Source: Congressional Budget Office

21. Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 1995

22. The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute states " Today's army can possibly handle two MRCs but not in addition to peacekeeping and support of missions like Bosnia and Haiti." and "The army must be ready to fight and win. It must be able to accede to its will through military force. If we can do that then we can deter many potential conflicts." Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996.

23. This is a generalization. Operations tempo for some units has not increased at all. However, it is an accepted fact that more military personnel are on extended deployments than in the years before 1989. It is also an issue that this tempo is a quality of life issue affecting readiness. Pomeroy, Gary. "CSAF Reports Air Force Posture to Senate Panel". Air Force News Release, 14 March 1995. Also see: Pomeroy, Gary. "SECAF Presents Posture Statement To Panel". AF News Release, 9 March 95. Also see: Widnall, Sheila E., and Fogleman, Ronald R. 1995 Joint Posture Hearing Statement. Washington D.C., 1995.

AFM 1-1 makes the statement:

"America's military forces are involved in more operations of greater duration that at any time in the past 20 years and these operations have been conducted with 25% of the total force and 40% fewer forward deployed forces than the Services possessed in 1989." Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992, p-5.

37, 38, 39
(Blank)

24. Many of these operations fall into the relatively new category of conflict termed Operations Other Than War (OOTW) also frequently termed MOOTW, (Military Operations Other Than War). Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are defined in 16 categories to include Arms Control, Combatting Terrorism, Counterdrug Operations, Nation Assistance, Noncombatant Evacuations, Peace Operations, and Support to Insurgences. OOTW has become a catch all phrase for any operation short of an MRC. The lines between some OOTW and war become blurred at the far end of the spectrum, Somalia being a recent example. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington D.C.

25. Morale and Quality of Life levels are surveyed by the military each year and record the trend in number of days TDY per year. The USAF has set 120 days a year as a guide for the maximum level before morale is affected. While some actually enjoy lengthy TDYs and even volunteer for these duties, most see a schedule of over 120 days as severely hampering relationships and quality of life. The problem is that despite high dedication, everyone has a limit and readiness is affected when highly trained troops decide they have had enough and depart the service. See individual service quality of life survey results 1994. Pomeroy, Gary. "CSAF Reports Air Force Posture to Senate Panel." Air Force News Release, 14 March 1995. Pomeroy, Gary. "SECAF Presents Posture Statement To Panel". AF News Release, 9 March 95. Grier, Peter. "The Quality of Military Life." Air Force Magazine. December 1995: 30-35. Also see: Widnall, Sheila E., and Fogleman, Ronald R. 1995 Joint Posture Hearing Statement. Washington D.C., 1995.

26. General Shalikashvili stated "having too little money available for contingencies could mean setting ourselves up for readiness degradation." Army Times Editor William Mathews stated "In 1994, unexpected operations in Rwanda, Haiti, and elsewhere drained operations and maintenance accounts and forced services to let readiness decline." Mathews, Lloyd J. "On Clausewitz.." Army Magazine. February 1988

27. Zakheim, Dov S. "Adding Up the Taxpayers Tab for Bosnia." New York Times.

The cost of these operations is much more than the amounts shown. The amounts shown are the amounts above current funding, i.e. money that must be appropriated above that already given to the military. As an example, much of the airlift for contingencies is paid for out of money already budgeted for C-141, C-5, and C-17 yearly flying hours.

28. Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 1995.

29. Amounts for 1994 to 1998 are shown below:

1994 --- \$264B
1995 --- \$263B
1996 --- \$254B
1997 --- \$248B
1998 --- \$254B

Since 1994, the amount allocated over the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) has decreased from \$1441B to \$1283B. Congressional Budget Office. The Clinton Administration's Plan. Washington D.C. 1995

30. U.S. soldier battle deaths in major wars, conflicts, and contingencies are shown below:

Revolutionary War	4435	
War of 1812	2260	
Mexican War	13283	
Civil War	364611	
Spanish American War	2446	
World War I	116516	
World War II	405399	
Korean Conflict	36914	
Vietnam Conflict	58169	
Lebanon	268	
Grenada	42	
Panama	26	
Desert Storm	293	
Somalia	43	
Haiti	1	
Bosnia	1	(Still ongoing as of the writing of this paper)

Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.
Also see: Department of Defense. Defense Almanac 95. Issue 5. 12 October 95.

31. Of all the leaders in the world Farrah Aideed was very likely the one who could threaten the safety of the United States the least. However, in an attempt to end his rule as a Somali warlord, the United States lost 18 soldiers in a single raid. Although, hundreds of Somalis lost their lives that same day, the United States suffered a terrific blow in world opinion. The loss of the soldiers coupled with the capture of CWO Durant led to an exit of U.S. forces and hurt the credibility of U.S. resolve. Elliot, Michael. "The Making of a Fiasco." Newsweek, 18 October 1993: 34-38. Also see: Elliot, Michael. "Damned Yankees." Newsweek, 25 October 1993: 21-24. Also see: DeLong, Kent, and Tuckey, Steven. Mogadishu, Heroism and Tragedy. Connecticut: Praeger, 1994.

Gonzalo I. Vergara writing for the American Legion Magazine stated: "American people are less tolerant of casualties in areas where our national interests are unclear, or where we have few if any emotional ties."
Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.

32. Following the tragic raid in Somalia, public outcry resulted in several investigations. The credibility of the Secretary of Defense was affected due to criticism concerning his disapproval of sending armor support to Somalia. The incident carried top billing on newscasts and magazines. The cover of Time Magazine showed a picture of captured flyer Michael Durant and stated in bold letters "What on earth are we doing?". Elliot, Michael. "The Making of a Fiasco." Newsweek, 18 October 1993: 34-38. Also see: Elliot, Michael. "Damned Yankees." Newsweek, 25 October 1993: 21-24. Also see: DeLong, Kent, and Tuckey, Steven. Mogadishu, Heroism and Tragedy. Connecticut: Praeger, 1994.

Another example was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon where the killing of 238 troops caused large numbers of Americans and Congress to call for an immediate pullout. Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.

33. The pictures of Michael Durant and Scott O'Grady were on the cover of both Time and Newsweek. CNN carried coverage of their plight with updates every 30 minutes. Their return to the United States was televised live. Both appeared on Larry King Live as well as other television interviews. President Clinton invited both to the White House. This coverage was unprecedented. Past Medal of Honor winners and men who were POWs in VietNam for years did not get such attention.

34. Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.

35. The casualties occurred on 3 October 1993 President Clinton announced the exit date of not later than March 31 within 10 days.

36. The 1995 National Security Strategy is termed "Engagement and Enlargement". In it, President Clinton states "The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever. I am committed to forging a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad in pursuit of our cherished goal - a more secure world where democracy and free markets know no borders." White House. A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995.

The 1996 Strategic Assessment From the Strategic Studies Institute ponders the question "How can the armed services retain political utility in a world where every use of military force comes under intense public scrutiny?" In the Global Security Environment, Steven Metz states " Aggressors will challenge us at levels below our national interests, if we wish to address these challenges we must be able to do so at levels where human and economic costs are sufficiently low enough to allow intervention. Otherwise, extortion of the Army's ability to promote and protect non-vital interests will result." SCORPION allows such responses to non-vital situations that are never-the-less still important. Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996.

The effects of casualties is reflected in Robert Bunker's statement in Rethinking OOTW : "The sensationalized deaths of U.S. servicemen such as the rangers in Somalia can erode political support for military operations." Bunker, Robert J. "Rethinking OOTW." Military Review, Nov-Dec 1995,

37. The concept of an enemy center of gravity comes from Clausewitz. He defines the enemy center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement". Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Interpretations of this vary, but he is simply identifying the entity that once defeated assures the attacker victory. The strategy of AirLand Battle embraced this concept and evoked the concept of deep attack. SCORPION is in line with the concept of deep attack by also "striking decisive violent blows from unanticipated angles on the centers of gravity of an enemy". Of note, General Don Morelli, a proponent of the Airland Battle concept felt that the most important change since the Vietnam War was precision guided munitions. His AirLand Battle concept was a "brute force to brain force" transition which SCORPION follows in step. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.

38. A referral to The West Point Atlas of American Wars demonstrate this. Eposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of American Wars: Volume II: 1900-1953. Praeger, Inc, 1962.

Although civilian populations have been targeted, the preponderance of fighting has been army against army. As an example, during Desert Storm, many considered the Republican Guards the center of gravity.

39. One of the best sources to examine this fact is The West Point Atlas of American Wars. In this book wars are described by showing the major battles on maneuver maps. A review of this book clearly indicates the traditional strategy of "one army maneuvering against another army" in virtually all wars. Eposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of American Wars: Volume II: 1900-1953. Praeger, Inc, 1962.

40. Refer to the various documents on doctrine of present and past armed forces. Specifically, see FM 100-5. U.S. Department of the Army. Operations. FM 100-5. (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993)

41. The concept of stealth aircraft is not that they are "totally invisible". But they fly high enough to be invulnerable to optically aimed weapons and their radar cross section is low enough that they cannot be effectively engaged by radar aimed systems. To gain an understanding of the low radar cross section (RCS) of the F-117 it can be compared to a B-52. A B-52 has an RCS of 100m², an F-117 has an RCS of .025m². (An FB-111 RCS is 7m².) If it is night, an F-117 cannot be engaged effectively by enemy aircraft. This produces a situation where an attacking stealth aircraft cannot be stopped. Richardson, Doug. Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air. NY: Orion Books, 1989. Also see: Weyermuller, Arthur P. Stealth Employments in the Tactical Air Force. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.

The accuracy of current precision guided munitions indicates the F-117 is not only unstoppable but once he reaches the target, he will not miss. Canan, James W. "In Search of Equalizers." Air Force Magazine, July 1994: 24-28. Also see: Weyermuller, Arthur P. Stealth Employments in the Tactical Air Force. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.

Dennis Drew in Airpower and the New World Order contemplates the concept of an unstoppable weapon when he states " Just what does it mean that the enemy is vulnerable at all locations and at all the time? The answer just may shape the future." Drew, Dennis M. Airpower and the New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 1993.

42. While the precise level of invulnerability is classified, the record of the first stealth fighter, the F-117, speaks for itself. There was not a single stealth fighter lost in combat during Desert Storm despite the fact the F-117 flew over 1200 sorties over the toughest air defenses in the Gulf War. (Air defenses protecting Baghdad were seven time more capable than those protecting Hanoi during Linebacker II bombings in Vietnam.) While the F-117 flew only 2% of the total attack missions during Desert Storm, they accounted for 40% of the destroyed strategic targets. They made up only 2.5% of the fighter attack aircraft deployed in the Persian Gulf War. Reliability is also a factor to consider. With only 42 aircraft deployed, they flew an average of 34 sorties a day, every day of the war and not a single aircraft was lost due to a system malfunction or engine failure. John Hopkins University. Gulf Air Power Survey. Washington D.C.: 1993. Also see: Weyermuller, Arthur P. Stealth Employments in the Tactical Air Force. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.

43. The record of precision guided munitions (PGMs) during Desert Storm was impressive. A generalization of a 3 foot median accuracy (versus the 30 feet of past best efforts and 3000 feet of most World War II strategic bombing) is often used. In Desert Storm, 83% of the PGMs dropped by the F-117 had a direct hit on their target. (Of note, many of the 17% that missed, went "dumb" due to production lot of faulty sensors.) Weyermuller, Arthur P. Stealth Employments in the Tactical Air Force. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.

It should be noted that researchers report that current PGMs are twice as accurate as those used during the Gulf War. Green, Phyllis. "Falcon Tests Improved GPS Signal." Guardian. July 1995: 18.

44. An examination of 20th century wars shows these targets in virtually every war. Until the advent of the airplane many of these targets were unreachable. During and after WW II, an enemy's war-making capacity and industrial centers became routine targets. The strategy of interdiction brought about significant campaigns to disrupt an enemy's supply centers and logistics supply lines. This strategy was largely used in both WW II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. As mentioned earlier, an enemy's armed forces were the target in the vast majority of conflicts during this century. Eposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of American Wars: Volume II: 1900-1953. Praeger, Inc, 1962. Also see: Comello, Jerome J., and Swanson, Jon M. Operation Husky: The Campaign in Sicily. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992. Also see: Craft, Douglas. An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 1992. Also see: John Hopkins University. Gulf Air Power Survey. Washington D.C.: 1993. Also see: McConnell, Malcolm. Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High Tech Invasion of Panama. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. Also see: McRaven, William H. SPECOPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. Also see: Murray, Williamson. The German Response to Victory in Poland. Transaction Publishers, 1981. Also see: Sun Tzu. The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Also see: U.S. Department of the Army. Operations. FM 100-5. Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993.

45. If attacking an enemy's leaders had been more frequent we may have evolved to having a handful of assassins instead of large armies. Certainly, there are instances of leaders being targeted in war. The Germans targeted Russian community leaders in WW II, the Japanese eliminated civic leaders in occupied China, and the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targeted village leaders in South Vietnam. Widespread use of this tactic however is not seen and when used was almost always in conjunction with the conventional warring of armies against armies in the same campaign.

46. Opponents have often seen that seizing an opponents government capital was the final stroke indicating victory. The annihilation, fleeing, surrender or capture of the opponents leaders were usually a part of this phase. But one usually fought all the way to the "palace gates". Recent examples include the Japanese invasion of Malaya, Germany's attack on France, the Allies invasion of Italy, Russia entering Berlin, the fall of South Vietnam, America's invasion of Panama, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. However, just as often one side sues for peace once it is clear their opponent can clearly impose their will. In this case it is not necessary to seize, annihilate, or remove an opponent's leadership. Examples include the surrender of Japan, the capitulation of Haiti in 1994, and the surrender of Iraq in Desert Storm.

47. One of the pioneer strategists in this area is Giulio Douhet, an Italian flyer who in post WW I years formulated a theory that armies and "trench warfare" was no longer a valid strategy because airplanes could fly over the front lines unopposed and wreak havoc on industrial and population centers. Since he advocated the use of poison gas and incendiaries to start fires, he might have been right if not illegal. Future developments in anti-aircraft defenses negated most of his "invincibility" theory and populations proved more durable than he envisioned especially once poison gas attacks were outlawed. Although Douhet pioneered concepts like SCORPION, he never could have envisioned the accuracy that certain aircraft would someday possess. A quote from his book reads: "Aerial bombardment can certainly never hope to attain the accuracy of artillery fire." Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Coward McCann, Inc, 1942, p58.

48. The populations of Tokyo, Berlin, Dresden, London, Hanoi, Singapore, Vicksburg, Baghdad, and Sarejevo are examples.

49. This statement is based on a precision guided 2000 pound bomb such as a GBU-24 or GBU-27 impacting within the average circular error for the bomb and the person being within that circle.

50. This is certainly not a new concept. Sam C. Sarkesian stated in *The Myth of U.S. Capability in Unconventional Warfare* that "The center of gravity (in the Clausewitzian terms) is rarely the armed forces of the antagonists but in the political-social milieu of the indigenous system." Sarkesian, Sam C. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines". *Air University Review*, Jan-Feb 1985: 4-23.

51. The exception to this would be if a leader were insane or fanatical. While insane and fanatical leaders certainly exist, they seldom exist 200-300 in a country. Seldom is *everyone* insane. In the case of an insane or fanatical leader, SCORPION targets the leaders who are sane and less fanatical to convince them to stop the fanatic or insane leader.

52. Our country can serve as an example. If SCORPION were targeting the U.S., every senator and congressman would be a potential target along with every governor. Every general officer would be targeted. Select industrial and business leaders who were tied directly to the war effort would also be targeted. As an example, the Chairman of General Motors would not be targeted, but the head of General Motors Tank Division would be. Every leader would have to be carefully reviewed by legal authorities and deemed a legal combatant and not a protected person or non-combatant. An analysis would narrow this field to those we felt were most influential and could lead a call for capitulation.

53. This statement is at odds with Clausewitz who stated in *On War* that:

"Kind hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm an enemy without too much bloodshed and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect."
Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

Clausewitz believed defeating the enemy Army was the primary goal in most wars. He believed wars must be very violent confrontations and that attempting to seek less bloody solutions usually did not work.
Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

SCORPION rejects the above concept due to advances in technology, many in the last ten years, that Clausewitz could never have foreseen; specifically the use of stealth aircraft, PGMs, and the internet.

SCORPION is a significant departure from traditional thought. To be at war and not attack an enemy's armed forces seems unrealistic. SCORPION is a paradigm shift in targeting philosophy. The normal references do not apply. Although this theory appears to contradict Clausewitz, it actually fulfills his instructions to directly attack centers of gravity whenever possible.

54. The direct bombing of populations has been deemed legal by the international courts reviewing the Hague Accords despite literal wording to the contrary. However, the moral implications still remain strong. By avoiding civilian deaths we become stronger morally. Lewis, Howard S. *Code of International Armed Conflict*. New York: Oceana Publications Inc, 1986.

Napoleon Bonaparte commented "In warfare, the moral is to the physical as three is to one." Clausewitz considers moral factors as one of his primary elements of strategy: "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade." Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

The importance of winning over a population was discussed by Squadron Leader J.C. Hartley during The Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. The negative effects of bombing civilians was also discussed at the symposium by Colonel R.L. Clutterbuck. Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.

Clausewitz has stated that "In war the result is never final." In this regard, alienating an entire nation's population may prove a disadvantage in the long run. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

55. Much like bombing civilian populations, striking industrial targets has moral implications. When airstrikes destroyed the power system in Baghdad, a claim was that thousands died because critical civilian services were not available. Drew, Dennis M. Airpower and the New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 1993.

56. In many cases, the goal of SCORPION is to kill a certain leader. However, in many other cases, the goal is simply to persuade them to capitulate to U.S. demands. Therefore, the SCORPION program is more than just killing leaders. It is a comprehensive psychological operation to place pressure on leaders to change their actions.

57. If an analysis shows leaders can be pressured into capitulation without targeting their lives, that would be the preferred method. We may want certain leaders to be preserved for post-conflict stability or the possibility of an unfavorable successor. In other situations, an analysis may indicate certain leaders should be *eliminated* to ensure post-conflict stability. A legal question arises here concerning whether the killing of enemy leaders would be illegal. Alvin W. Keller studied this question after Desert Storm and found under the International Law of Armed Conflict, killing a leader would not be considered assassination. Quoting from his paper: "Targeting of designated officers has been allowed and the legitimacy of such attacks has been accepted without considerable dimension. As previously stated, all belligerent are liable to attack at any time so long as the means utilized are compatible within the law of armed conflict. It is irrelevant whether the belligerent is enlisted, officer, or king."

Concerning civilians being viewed as military objects, he writes:
"Legitimate objects of attack include those targets which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, under the circumstances existing at the time of the attack offers definite advantage to the attacker. Because of the advances in technology, many essential military functions could not be conducted without the participation of a limited portion of a nation's civilian population. Therefore, an office will not be made immune from attack by a substituting a civilian in the office typically filled by a member of the armed forces. Additionally, a person will be vulnerable to lawful attack if his duty in a civilian assignment is of greater benefit to a country's military defense than that individual's potential military assignment."

He also states: "Furthermore, if a war of aggression could be averted or its end accelerated by killing the head of state who initiated the war, the proportionality principle would reinforce a conclusion that it is

inexcusable to subject thousands of combatants to death to protect such a leader."

In his paper, Keller remarks that the U.S. governments reluctance in the past to overtly target another nation's leader was more a matter of policy than law. Specifically Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassination of another country's leaders. However, the term assassination carries with it a connotation of killing for political purposes. The Executive Order was written in response to alleged CIA involvement in peacetime assassinations. Nothing in the order discusses targeting a leader in war. It should be noted Congress never passed any legislation supporting the order or enacting it into law.

Keller, Alvin W. Targeting the Head of State During the Gulf Conflict, A Legal Analysis. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1992.

58. Both Clausewitz and Joint Publication 3-0 state that centers of gravity should be attacked directly whenever possible. If the strategic center of gravity is identified as the enemy's will to fight, then SCORPION is in line with past and current strategy. However, the method of reaching that center of gravity is where SCORPION departs from current strategy and such a system of attack did not even exist in Clausewitz's time.

Another reference to Clausewitz is appropriate:

"War is a conflict of ideas and decisions as well as actions, requiring a perception of the struggle between the minds directing the action. If commanders fail to understand what is vital to their opponents, they fail to recognize which elements should be subjected to strategic attacks." Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.

The concept of will as a center of gravity is not new. In a recent Wall Street Journal the North Vietnamese (now simply the Vietnamese) disclosed a quote from Ho Chi Minh which stated: "By fighting a long war which would break the will of the United States, we did not need military victories, we only needed to hit them until they gave up." This is a critical lesson incorporated by SCORPION. Young, Stephen, and Bui Tin. "How North Vietnam Won The War" The Wallstreet Journal, 3 August 1995.

The British used aircraft extensively as a low cost option to maintaining control over sometimes unruly populations in Iraq, Jordan, Aden, Palestine, and India in the early 1900's. For a thorough review of using limited bombing strikes to compel an opponent to do one's will, see Pilots and Rebels. Towle, Philip A. Pilots and Rebels, The Use of aircraft in Unconventional Warfare. London: Brassey, 1989.

This concept is in agreement with AFM 1-1 which states: Strategic attacks provide the ability to strike directly at the will and war making capacity of the enemy." If "will" is a target what do you actually attack to get at the will? If one targets a population center, one should be reminded of the historic durability of populations to withstand great hardship and suffering during war. Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992, p-151. SCORPION believes "will" is a correct target and that leaders are the target to strike to reach that will.

Furthermore, General Ronald Fogleman has stated, concerning the modern use of airpower, "The concept involves the deliberate employment of force to achieve shock and surprise to make an enemy realize that the costs of continuing a conflict outweigh any conceivable gains." This is *precisely* the goal of SCORPION. . Fogleman, Ronald. Address to the Air Force Association Symposium, 15 February 1996.

59. It should be noted that SCORPION would be difficult if not impossible to execute without stealth. The potential loss of aircraft and the enormous support packages required in large assault "packages" would eliminate the low cost, low risk, low asset principles of SCORPION. A non-stealth F-16 strike requires several F-15s as force protectors, EA-6Bs as electronic warfare jammers, F-4G Wild Weasles for SAM suppression, and KC-135s for air refueling the entire package. Richardson, Doug. Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air. NY: Orion Books, 1989. Department of the Air Force.

General Ronald Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the USAF, reflected on the revolutions occurring in airpower at the Air Force Association Symposium and stated: The U.S. is at a point where it no longer must annihilate or debilitate an enemy to win a battle..... Developments in technology have placed America on the verge of introducing a new way of war, one that compels an adversary to do our will at the least cost to the U.S. in lives and resources." SCORPION fulfills his observation with just such a strategy. Fogleman, Ronald. Address to the Air Force Association Symposium, 15 February 1996.

60. This is a departure from normal weapons development. Most research has been involved with making weapons more destructive. Some of the strikes during SCORPION require specially developed warheads with damage limiting designs. The goal may be to just destroy one building and not the one next to it. It may be of psychological value to destroy only a few rooms of a large structure as a warning versus the entire structure at once. Limiting the yield of weapons also reduces the effects of an inadvertent miss. Some weapons may use only kinetic energy. Of note, during Desert Storm, consideration was given to using F-117s to drop inert bombs on aircraft relocated near mosques and other forbidden targets just to show that such a relocation tactic was ineffective and that those aircraft were not safe just because they were within feet of a forbidden target. Gonyea, Gregory T. The Role of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in Special Operations. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 1993.

61. The goal here is to avoid unnecessary casualties. Of interest, the original wording of the Hague Conventions concerning bombing and shelling specifically stated that the commander of such an attack must make every attempt possible to warn authorities. This requirement was nullified after the fielding of effective anti-aircraft weapons due to the fact the defending force would be ready to shoot down attacking aircraft if forewarned. By reinstating this requirement SCORPION fulfills the moral goals of the original Hague Conventions. Lewis, Howard S. Code of International Armed Conflict. New York: Oceana Publications Inc, 1986.

62. Changing the status quo could have destabilizing effects on the region. The goal of SCORPION is to return stability not create situations which might lead to greater instability.

63. Human beings have proven themselves very capable and willing to withstand long term suffering and deprivation. Usually this tenacity is associated with belief in some cause or ideal. Consideration must be given to the society, religion, social norms, and moral factors involved in the conflict. Executing SCORPION against a set of leaders acting on high moral factors weakens the effect of SCORPION. Conversely, there are many leaders with little moral courage and they will break under the pressure of SCORPION. Sam C. Sarkesian makes this point in The Myth of U.S. Capability in Unconventional War by saying: "The understanding of unconventional warfare necessitates a mindset and intellectual disposition that goes beyond the shift of Western cultures and the norms and expectations of an open system, i.e. Do not attempt to apply our beliefs and concerns to international conflict situations. It requires a recognition that the moral and ethical principles of open systems do not necessarily apply--in the long run it is the moral and ethical imperatives of the protagonists in the conflict area that apply... many times these are greed, power, survival, and success." Sarkesian, Sam C. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines". Air University Review, Jan-Feb 1985: 4-23.

If leaders are motivated by greed, power, survival, and success, SCORPION is an effective way to deny them those aspects.

64. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

65. SCORPION provides great potential for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). RPVs enhance the tenets of SCORPION, specifically: low cost, low risk to pilots, unstopability, low yield weapons, and psychological fear. Although still under conceptual evaluation, RPVs are actually further along than many know, the first RPV squadron has been activated at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Department of the Air Force. "USAF Commitment to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." Policy Letter Digest. August 1995.

Current uses center around reconnaissance and a weapon delivering RPV is still conceptual. However, an RPV custom designed for SCORPION would not have to be large since the weapon only needs to weigh approximately 200 pounds. A self lasing RPV would provide an exceptional platform for executing SCORPION.

66. Theoretically, the only way an American would be killed during SCORPION is if an aircraft was shot down or lost power resulting in the pilot's death. Stealth should greatly reduce the chances of a shootdown. Cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles eliminate any chance of American deaths. See earlier endnote for reliability and survivability information on the F-117 in Desert Storm.

67. Examples are leaders living in apartment houses or large office buildings. Leaders may take refuge in forbidden structures such as religious buildings or hospitals. They may even stay on the move frequently enough to make targeting them from the air difficult.

68. Specifically, counter-guerrilla operations in early 1900's Haiti, American Indian wars, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Vietnam. Notable exceptions include aid to Nicaraguan contras and Afghanistan rebels. These were very limited operations compared to China and North Vietnam's support of the Viet Cong. Not only has the U.S. military not been deeply involved in guerrilla operations but there is a historical lack of doctrine on the subject, especially concerning the use of the airplane in support of guerrillas. Harned, Glenn M. "Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?" Special Warfare, October 1995. Also see: Sarkesian, Sam C. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines". Air University Review, Jan-Feb 1985: 4-23. Also see: Sarkesian, Sam C. "The Myth of US Capability in UW Conflicts." Military Review, September 1988: 3-17. Also see: Strother, Kenneth C. Unconventional Warfare: A Brief Review. Memorandum RM-3104-PR. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1962. (Previously Classified Secret, Downgraded to Unclassified 1972.) Also see: Symanski, Michael W. "Hoist with the LIC Petard." Military Review, September 1988: 18-26.

69. The United States has certainly been involved in guerrilla operations before 1957. In fact, guerrilla operations date back to the Revolutionary War and Francis Marion's operations in the South Carolina swamps. 1957 is listed as the date the term Special Operations Forces began being used. The point being made is special operations forces have been involved with this mission for almost 40 years.

70. The amount of time devoted to unconventional warfare versus other special operations missions has varied over the years since 1957 when the concept first began to be documented in doctrine. A debate still continues concerning this capability. However, the skills needed and ability of U.S. forces to effectively execute guerrilla operations still exists today despite the more popular appeal of direct action or counterterrorism missions. Low Intensity Warfare, which SCORPION is, differs from conventional war in the fact it concentrates on conflicts where political, economic, and social factors supersede military factors. Harned, Glenn M. "Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?" Special Warfare, October 1995.

71. The purpose of SCORPION is to place psychological pressure on leaders. If they are forced to seclude themselves in one place, then the effect of their country's actions become evident to them on a daily basis and there is no need for SCORPION resources to continue psychological pressure since it is self-imposed by the leader. In fact, a combination of self-imposed restrictions with restrictions created by SCORPION creates a higher environment of suffering not possible by only applying outside force. Example: If SCORPION wants to prevent a leader from enjoying his luxurious home and he elects to leave that home and live in a bunker or a church, there is no need for SCORPION to attack his home or pursue him any longer. The fact that he has restricted himself from his home may have a greater psychological effect than if a bombing attack drove him from that home.

72. Collateral damage must be limited during SCORPION. If a targeted individual locates himself in an area in close proximity to a children's nursery, a church, in an apartment house, then he should be attacked by guerrilla forces acting with precision not possible even with a PGM.

Of important note, the guerrillas must be highly controlled and disciplined to follow precise directions. They are not free roving bands operating in autonomy which is the traditional method. Marighella, Carlos. Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. June 1969.

The use of booby traps as an effective psychological weapon is described in FM 31-20-3, page-H-2.

The value of combining airstrikes with agents on the ground when targeting individuals is documented by Colonel R.L. Clutterbuck during the Symposium On The Role OF Airpower In CounterInsurgency And Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.

Furthermore AFM 1-1 states that "The effects of strategic attacks may be increased when they are integrated with surface operations to form a synergistic campaign." Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992.

Of concern is the legal status of the guerrillas as combatants. The 1907 Hague states four requirements to be considered a combatant:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable from a distance
3. To carry arms openly
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war

Glahm, Gerhard von. Law Among Nations. NY: MacMillian Publishing, 1981, p 642.

The courts have recognized requirements 2 and 3 negate the ability of guerrillas to effectively operate. Requirements 1 and 4 are the only current requirements for guerrillas. Strother, Kenneth C. Unconventional Warfare: A Brief Review. Memorandum RM-3104-PR. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1962. (Previously Classified Secret, Downgraded to Unclassified 1972.)

73. Current technology has fielded handheld radios with GPS receivers which can data burst messages and coordinates via satellite communications. One such system is TALON-HOOK a TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) Program. Hayward, George. "What If Warfare." Guardian. July 1995: 3-5.

Another aid is a cigarette pack/flashlight size laser designator. ALSA Center. The Air Land Sea Bulletin. December 1993: 15.

74. Specifically, the internet, CNN, e-mail, and voicemail. These are systems that were not prevalent until the last five to ten years. Without them the psychological effects of SCORPION are not possible. The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute states that "The increased access people, corporations, non-governmental institutions have to information and data will be the most notable feature of the next two decades." Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996.

In "Closing the Media-Military Technology Gap", LTC Terrance M. Fox states "Cable television is available in all developed countries and most third world nations." Fox, Terrance M. "Closing the Media-Military Technology Gap". Military Review, November-December 1995: 10-16.

75. Most applications of information deal with providing our warfighters, at all levels, with faster, more accurate information. Giving our soldiers *battlefield awareness* is the term frequently used. Another application of information strategy is information warfare (IW). IW mainly deals with denying or disrupting an enemy's use of their information systems (offensive IW) or preventing an enemy's ability to disrupt our information systems (defensive IW). SCORPION has the tenet of *giving* the enemy information, not misinformation but accurate information about precisely what we plan to do - who we will attack and when we will attack. Furthermore, most discussion concerning Information Warfare revolves around *helping a soldier* to win a battle versus the concept in SCORPION where *Information Warfare* wins the battle. Joint Warfighting Center. Warfighting Vision 2010. A Framework for Change. Ft. Monroe, VA, 1 August 1995. Also see: Sullivan, Gordon R. "Future Vision." Military Review, May-June 1995: 4-14. U.S. Department of the Army. Force XXI. Army Focus 94. Washington D.C. 1994.

76. General Sullivan stated that Force XXI design principles should organize to *optimize* information-based operations. Sullivan, Gordon R. "Future Vision." Military Review, May-June 1995: 4-14.

SCORPION design principles will organize totally *around and on* information-based operations. Force XXI concepts incorporate information systems into traditional weapons such as a tank, aircraft, or infantryman. SCORPION uses information *itself* as a weapon and does not simply place it on or in an existing concept.

77. History has numerous examples of leaders taking the wrong action because they were not aware of an enemies capabilities. Had they known the facts, they would have never continued their aggressive actions. General Custer's battle at Little Big Horn is a classic example. Had Custer been told by his opponent of what he was up against, he would have never attacked. If Farah Aideed had sent the rangers an e-mail showing them the force he had arrayed near the Olympic Hotel, the rangers would have never assaulted the hotel. SCORPION prevents miscalculations by leaders concerning the intent and capabilities of the United States.

78. Outstanding examples are the initial air attacks on Baghdad, the arrival of Navy SEAL forces in Somalia, and the police chase of O.J. Simpson on the Los Angeles freeway.

79. During news breaking events, cable news services frequently garnish a majority of the viewing audience. The chase of O.J. Simpson's white Ford Bronco was one of the most watched events in all of history. The President's speech the night of the air attacks on Baghdad was watched by a record setting number of viewers.

The dollar amounts associated with such events is significant. Howard, Lucy and Zeman, Ned. "A Record-Breaking TV Audience." Newsweek, 18 February 1991.

80. Fox, Terrance M. "Closing the Media-Military Technology Gap". Military Review, November-December 1995: 10-16.

82. Three definitions of deterrence are provided below:

"A psychological process involving threat and dissuasion, or promise and persuasion, to influence the perceptions and will of potential opponents and thereby, to increase one's own security and freedom of action. Department of the Air Force." AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992.

"The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." Joint Pub 1-02

"Measures to discourage or restrain an enemy from using his military forces." Library of Congress

All three of the above are indicative of SCORPION.

81. AFM 1-1 makes the applicable statement: Adversaries must believe that a nation possesses the will and the capability to carry out the threats or promises it has made. Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992, p-175.

83. The term "website" or "homepage" is a term used to describe the first screen one sees when entering an internet site. The U.S. military will have a site on the internet where virtually anyone in the entire world can see who and what we are targeting and when the strikes will occur and the results. Hoffman, Paul E. Netscape and the World Wide Web for Dummies. Chicago: IDG Books, 1995.

84. Although leaflets and radio/television broadcasts accomplish the same function as announcements via the internet, they don't have the same "high tech" aura about them. The up to the minute information capability of the internet is mesmerizing and produces a powerful draw to be "on line". Bombing schedules could be purposely changed and one target substituted for another having a tense psychological effect.

Leaflets will almost always be used in conjunction with the internet simply because many of the populations in targeted countries have high rates of illiteracy. The internet messages are primarily for the leaders although most of them are posted on a billboard file for all to see.

The use of leaflet operations targeting specific individuals was discussed by Commodore A.D.J. Garrison at the Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.

The above stated that radio broadcasts were much more effective than leaflets. Taped broadcasts from

already surrendered leaders were particularly effective. Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.

85. Clausewitz discusses this in On War. So does Sun Tzu in the Art of War. USSOCOM Pub 1 defines psychological operations as "Planned operations to convey selected information to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals." U.S. Special Operations Command. USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations In Peace and War. MacDill AFB, FL, 25 January 1996. Also see: Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976. Also see: Sun Tzu. The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

86. Historically, this has not been a large function of intelligence agencies who concern themselves over the location and disposition of forces more than specific individuals. New intelligence methods may be needed to support SCORPION. Dennis Drew states that: "Airpower is targeting and targeting is intelligence. New methods are called for in intelligence technology and new organizational structures." Drew, Dennis M. Airpower and the New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 1993.

87. Manuel Noriega eluded searchers for 11 days before taking refuge in the Papal Nunciatura. Critics faulted intelligence agencies and the military for their inability to locate him. McConnell, Malcolm. Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High Tech Invasion of Panama. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

88. Rewards were also used in British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya. The rewards were substantial for the time; \$20,000 for locations of terrorists. Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.

89. "Ends, ways, and means" is currently used at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks as a method of analyzing alternatives to complex problems and is also used in U.S. Army FM 100-1. Lykke, Arthur F. Jr. Military Strategy, Lecture at U.S. Army War College. 1995

90. This test was described in a lecture by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. to the U.S. Army War College Class of 1996. Lykke, Arthur F. Jr. Military Strategy, Lecture at U.S. Army War College. 1995

The cost analysis portion of this test is significant since the current National Security Strategy states "Our engagements must meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds." Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 1995

91. Active duty military manning levels are shown below for the three services and the Marine Corps. When one accounts for civilian and reservist personnel. The actual personnel force structure for SCORPION falls below 1/3 of 1%.

Army ----- 517,131
Air Force --- 439,693
Navy ----- 173,659
Marines ----- 402,633

Total ----- 1,533,116

Department of Defense. Defense Almanac 95. Issue 5. 12 October 95.

92. The debates over our involvement in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Desert Storm serve as examples.

93. The American Legion Magazine discusses this situation in 'Do Americans Expect Bloodless War?' stating "The American public has been conditioned to believe that in order to be judged a success, a military operation must be quickly accomplished and relatively bloodless." Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.

Major Michael W. Symanski made this point in 1988 saying: "The American wants to fight only for something that has an immediate and direct benefit that is worth the cost. And since we are a nation fixated on short term gratification, the fight must be won quickly and justly." Symanski, Michael W. "Hoist with the LIC Petard." Military Review, September 1988: 18-26.

94. The term "Holy Trinity" is attached to Clausewitz because it has become commonplace to do this since Harry Summers wrote his book On Strategy and attached the concept to Clausewitz. In reality, the term "Holy Trinity" belongs to Harry Summers who describes his holy trinity as the government, the military, and the people. In order for success, the three must work together in concert. If one is out of agreement concerning the conflict or does not support it, failure is very possible. I have called it "Clausewitz's Holy Trinity" for reader recognition. Summers, Harry G. Jr. Col(Ret),USA. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1981. Also see: Villacres, Edward J., and Bassford, Christopher. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity." Parameters. Autumn 1995: 9-19.

Also for an insightful view to how the Holy Trinity applied in the Vietnam War and Desert Storm see Victory and Defeat: The Difference in Principle, an unpublished paper by Captain Dennis E. Fox, USAF, Dover AFB. De.

95. Recent examples of this include Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. Recognizing hindsight is better than foresight, it is obvious that a different approach to those conflicts may have eliminated the need for a substantial deployment. For costs and casualties see previous notes.

96. The inhibitor to acting is that U.S. involvement often becomes a political stumbling block. By waiting, the crisis either goes away by itself or escalates to a crucial level thus affecting interests enough that bi-partisan support is forthcoming.

97. The War Powers Act, Public Law 93-148 allows the President to deploy troops in an emergency without approval from Congress. He is required to inform them within 24 hours and the deployment cannot last longer than a set time without Congressional approval. If hostilities commence he should seek congressional approval.

98. Congress has overridden a Presidential veto concerning foreign policy only once since 1973. Lindsay, James M., and Ripley, Randall B. Congress Resurget: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill. University of Michigan Press, 1993.

For the Laws of Armed Conflict to protect U.S. actions during a SCORPION operation, it would be wise to have a formal declaration of war to preclude an interpretation of assassination should a targeted leader be killed. Keller, Alvin W. Targeting the Head of State During the Gulf Conflict, A Legal Analysis. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1992.

99. Examples of such debates include Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, and Haiti. Though part of our constitution and society, these public debates often serve only political rhetoric purposes and confuse our opponents concerning American support and will.

100. While other conflicts have importance to our national interests, our main concern is being capable of fighting and winning a major conflict. Our philosophy is if we can win a major conflict we certainly should be able to win a lesser one against a lesser enemy. This is not always the case. However, one thing seems certain, an unready, untrained force will not win a major conflict. Lengthy deployments in support of minor conflicts hurt units by taking away both training time and training dollars. Indirectly, modernization, another form of readiness, is hurt by using modernization dollars to pay for contingency deployments.

101. Article 331.2, Law of the Attack states that "Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives."

Article 25 states " The attack or bombardment by whatever means of towns, villages, dwelling, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." Article 331.2

Article 24 (3-4) of 1923 Hague Accords states "The aerial bombardment of cities, villages, dwellings, or buildings not in the neighborhood of land forces is prohibited." Article 623.1

Military objects are defined as "Insofar as objects are concerned, military objects are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage." Article 151.4

Civilians are defined as: "Any person who is not a member of the armed forces is considered a civilian." Article 751.3

Civilian objects are defined as "Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in Articles 151.4 of this code." Article 151.5

Lewis, Howard S. Code of International Armed Conflict. New York: Oceana Publications Inc, 1986.

102. Quoting from Part 6, Page 215, Methods and Means of Making War in the Air, of the Code of International Armed Conflict: "The first sentence of Paragraph 1 of the present article (See Article 24, 3-3 above) no longer states a valid rule of the international law of air warfare"

In Law Among Nations, von Glahm comments: "Article 25 was virtually obsolete before the end of WW I. Although the rule still stands technically, it had to be abandoned in practice and finds modern application only in instances of wanton destruction totally unconnected with an attempt to weaken an enemies war potential." Glahm, Gerhard von. Law Among Nations. NY: MacMillian Publishing, 1981, p 653.

Glahm states that the current interpretation of a nation in arms opens virtually any civilian community to attack. p 657 and "That by 1945, it was generally accepted that strategic bombing from the air, without warning, was an accepted method of warfare." Glahm, Gerhard von. Law Among Nations. NY: MacMillian Publishing, 1981, p 658.

An earlier analysis (see note 57) of who can be targeted is repeated here:

A legal question arises here concerning whether the killing of enemy leaders would be illegal. Alvin W. Keller studied this question after Desert Storm and found under the International Law of Armed Conflict, killing a leader would not be considered assassination. Quoting from his paper:

"Targeting of designated officers has been allowed and the legitimacy of such attacks has been accepted without considerable dimension. As previously stated, all belligerent are liable to attack at any time so long as the means utilized are compatible within the law of armed conflict. It is irrelevant whether the belligerent is enlisted, officer, or king."

Concerning civilians being viewed as military objects, he writes:

"Legitimate objects of attack include those targets which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, under the circumstances existing at the time of the attack offers definite advantage to the attacker. Because of the advances in technology, many essential military functions could not be conducted without the participation of a limited portion of a nation's civilian population. Therefore, an office will not be made immune from attack by a substituting a civilian in the office typically filled by a member of the armed forces. Additionally, a person will be vulnerable to lawful attack if his duty in a civilian assignment is of greater benefit to a country's military defense than that individual's potential military assignment."

He also states: "Furthermore, if a war of aggression could be averted or its end accelerated by killing the head of state who initiated the war, the proportionality principle would reinforce a conclusion that it is inexcusable to subject thousands of combatants to death to protect such a leader."

In his paper, Keller remarks that the U.S. governments reluctance in the past to overtly target another nation's leader was more a matter of policy than law. Specifically Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassination of another country's leaders. However, the term assassination carries with it a connotation of killing for political purposes. The Executive Order was written in response to alleged CIA involvement in peacetime assassinations. Nothing in the order discusses targeting a leader in war. It should be noted Congress never passed any legislation supporting the order or enacting it into law.

Keller, Alvin W. Targeting the Head of State During the Gulf Conflict, A Legal Analysis. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1992.

103. Most current interpretations are included in the Soldiers Guide to the Laws of War. Concerning places which may be attacked it states: "A military objective is something which if destroyed would be of distinct military benefit to the attacker." No where does it specifically exclude civilian property. Greenspan, Morris. The Soldiers Guide to the Laws of War. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1969.

Concerning damage to civilian property it states: "The necessity of military operations justify the use or damage of enemy property, public or private." Greenspan, Morris. The Soldiers Guide to the Laws of War. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1969.

It should be noted that no where in Chapter 7.1, Protection of Persons does it specifically forbid targeting political, military, business, or industrial leaders. Greenspan, Morris. The Soldiers Guide to the Laws of War. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1969.

104. The Hague met in response to the brutality of war. In the preamble to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 the "interests of humanity" are linked even more directly with the ultimate ratio juris in bello: "the ever progressive needs of civilization." Schwarzenberger, Georg. International Law. London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1968.

105. Keller, Alvin W. Targeting the Head of State During the Gulf Conflict, A Legal Analysis. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1992.

106. The Council of Bishops criteria for a just war are shown below:

Just War Criteria

Jus Ad Bellum (Just Recourse to War)

Just Cause
Legitimate Authority
Just Intentions
Public Declaration of Causes and Intents
Last Resort
Reasonable Hope of Success

Jus in Bello (Just Conduct in War)

Discrimination
Proportionality

United Methodist Council of Bishops. In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace. Graded Press, 1985.

An examination of each of these indicates scorpion would meet the Bishops criteria in all categories. For a more complete discussion on moral factors and the concepts of proportionality and discrimination see The Just War Tradition and the American Military. Johnson, James Turner. "The Just War Tradition and the American Military." Ethics and Public Policy Center.

107. There are many "lists" of principles of war and semantics change from each to each. The list at Attachment 2 is a compilation from the below.

Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992.

U.S. Department of the Army. Operations. FM 100-5. (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993)

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

108. Clausewitz also uses the term "friction of war". Both terms describe the disparity that usually occurs in war between what one anticipated and what is actually occurring. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.

Bibliography

- Air Force Association. USAF Almanac 1995. Air Force Magazine, May 1995.
- Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University Press. Ft. McNair, Washington D.C. January 1995.
- Army Budget Office. The Army Budget, 1996/1997 President's Budget. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1995.
- Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.
- Bunker, Robert J. "Rethinking OOTW." Military Review, Nov-Dec 1995.
- Boykin, William G. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why It Was Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 April 1991.
- Canan, James W. "In Search of Equalizers." Air Force Magazine, July 1994: 24-28.
- Canan, James W. "Airpower From Homebase." Air Force Magazine, June 1994: 20-26.
- Chase, Eric L. "Should We Kill Saddam." Newsweek, 18 February 1991.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Comello, Jerome J., and Swanson, Jon M. Operation Husky: The Campaign in Sicily. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.
- Congressional Budget Office. The Clinton Administration's Plan. Washington D.C. 1995.
- Craft, Douglas. An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,, August 1992.
- Czege, Huba Wass de. "Clausewitz: Historical Theories Remain Sound Compass References; The Catch Is Staying On Course." Army Magazine, February 1988.
- DeLong, Kent, and Tuckey, Steven. Mogadishu, Heroism and Tragedy. Connecticut: Praeger, 1994.
- DeLupis, Ingrid Delter. The Law of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Department of the Air Force. "F-22." Policy Letter Digest. Jan/Feb 1996.
- Department of the Air Force. F-22 Air Superiority Fighter. USAF Aeronautical Systems Center, August 1994.
- Department of the Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington D.C.: March 1992.
- Department of the Air Force. "USAF Commitment to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." Policy Letter Digest. August 1995.

Department of the Air Force. Global Reach, Global Power. The Evaluating Air Force Contribution to National Security. Washington D.C., December 1992.

Department of Defense. Defense Almanac 95. Issue 5. 12 October 95.

Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington D.C., 1995

Department of Defense. Directions for Defense. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. Washington D.C. 1994

Doll, William J. "The Future." World View, The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Edited by Earl H. Tilford. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996: 49-51.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Coward McCann, Inc, 1942.

Downing, Wayne A. "Joint Special Operations in Peace and War." Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995: 22-27.

Drea, Edward J. Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939. Fort Leavenworth, KN, Combat Studies Institute, January 1981.

Drew, Dennis M. Airpower and the New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 1993.

Elliot, Michael. "The Making of a Fiasco." Newsweek, 18 October 1993: 34-38.

Elliot, Michael. "Damned Yankees." Newsweek, 25 October 1993: 21-24.

Eden, Charles K. Assassination: A Military View. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 23 March 1987.

Eposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of American Wars: Volume II: 1900-1953. Praeger, Inc, 1962.

Finch, Louis C. "Keeping Forces Ready to Fight." Defense 95: 2-13

Fisher, Sharon. Riding the Internet Highway. Indianapolis: New Riders Publishing, 1993.

Fogleman, Ronald. Address to the Air Force Association Symposium, 15 February 1996.

Fox, Terrance M. "Closing the Media-Military Technology Gap". Military Review, November-December 1995: 10-16.

Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.

Gilbert, Sivanus T. LTC, USAF. What Will Douhet Think of Next? An analysis of Stealth Technology on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, June 1993.

Glahm, Gerhard von. Law Among Nations. NY: MacMillian Publishing, 1981.

Gonyea, Gregory T. The Role of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in Special Operations. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 1993.

Green, Phyllis. "Falcon Tests Improved GPS Signal." Guardian. July 1995: 18.

Greenspan, Morris. The Soldiers Guide to the Laws of War. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1969.

Grier, Peter. "The Quality of Military Life." Air Force Magazine. December 1995: 30-35.

Hart, Liddell. History of the Second World War. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970.

Hayward, George. "What If Warfare." Guardian. July 1995: 3-5.

Harned, Glenn M. "Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?" Special Warfare, October 1995.

Hoffman, Paul E. Netscape and the World Wide Web for Dummies. Chicago: IDG Books, 1995.

Holmes, H. Allen, "America's Approach to Special Operations." Defense 95. Issue 1, 1995.

Howard, Lucy and Zeman, Ned. "A Record-Breaking TV Audience." Newsweek, 18 February 1991

Institute For National Strategic Studies. Strategic Assessment 1995, U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. Fort McNair, Washington D.C. 30 November 1994.

Jablonsky, David. Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 1993.

Jablonsky, The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Change and Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 1995.

Jablonsky, David. Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 June 1995.

John Hopkins University. Gulf Air Power Survey. Washington D.C.: 1993.

Johnson, James Turner. "The Just War Tradition and the American Military." Ethics and Public Policy Center.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Pub 3-05. Washington D.C. 28 October 1992.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington D.C.

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Ft. Monroe, VA. 1 February 1995.

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Ft Monroe, VA. 13 April 1995.

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Services of the United States. Ft. Monroe, VA. 10 January 1995.

Joint Warfighting Center. Warfighting Vision 2010, A Framework for Change. Ft. Monroe, VA, 1 August 1995. (Draft)

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA, 28 February 1995.

Jones, Jeffrey B. and Mathews, Michael P. "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC." Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1995: 28-33.

Keller, Alvin W. Targeting the Head of State During the Gulf Conflict, A Legal Analysis. Carrlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1992.

- Kennedy School of Government. The Fall of the Shah of Iran. Harvard University.
- Krol, Ed. The Whole Internet Users Guide and Catalog. USA: O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., 1994.
- Lasswell, James A. "Presence-Do We Stay or Do We Go?" Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1995: 83- 85.
- Lewis, Howard S. Code of International Armed Conflict. New York: Oceana Publications Inc, 1986.
- Lindsay, James M.,and Ripley, Randall B. Congress Resurget: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill. University of Michigan Press, 1993.
- Lykke, Arthur F. Jr. Military Strategy, Lecture at U.S. Army War College. 1995.
- Mann, Edward, LTC, USAF. "One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal. Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-41.
- Mann, Edward, Col, USAF. "Desert Storm: The First Information War?" Airpower Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 4, (Winter 1994): 5-6.
- Manstein, Eric Von. Lost Victories. CA: Presidio Press, 1982
- Marighella, Carlos. Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. June 1969.
- Mathews, Lloyd J. "On Clausewitz.." Army Magazine. February 1988
- McConnell, Malcolm. Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High Tech Invasion of Panama.New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Metz, Steven. The Global Security Environment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1996.
- McRaven, William H. SPECOPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
- Misheloff, Jane. U.S. Economic Competiveness and the Future of the Military Industrial Base. The Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1994: 209-237.
- Murray, Williamson. The German Response to Victory in Poland. Transaction Publishers, 1981.
- Neu, C.R. and Wolfe, Charles. The Economic Dimensions of National Security. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. Policy Letter Digest. Washington D.C., October 1995.
- O'Neill, Bard E., and Kass Ilana. "The Persian Gulf War: A Political-Military Assessment". Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, No 2, 1992.
- Osgood, Robert E. Limited War Revisited. Westview Press, Inc.
- Palmer, Norman, and Warren, Mark. Dictionary of Military Abreviations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.
- Pearlman, Michael D. "The Rise and Fall of Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction." Military Review. September 1988: 78-79.

- Perry, William J. "The Rule of Commensurate Military Force". Defense 95. Issue 3, 1995: 2-7.
- Peters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." Parameters, Summer 1994: 16-26.
- Peters, Ralph. "After the Revolution." Parameters. Volume XXV, No. 2: 7-14.
- Peterson, A.H., Reinhardt, G.C. and Conger, E.E. Symposium on the Role of Airpower in the Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1963.
- Pomeroy, Gary. "CSAF Reports Air Force Posture to Senate Panel." Air Force News Release, 14 March 1995.
- Pomeroy, Gary. "SECAF Presents Posture Statement To Panel". AF News Release, 9 March 95.
- Post, Tom. "Sailing Into Big Trouble." Newsweek, 1 November 1993: 34-35.
- Post, Tom. "No way to Cut and Run." Newsweek, 25 October 1993: 25.
- Elliot, Michael. "Damned Yankees." Newsweek, 25 October 1993: 21-24.
- Record, Jeffrey. Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 10 April 1995.
- Reisman Michael W. and Baker, James C. Regulating Covert Action. Yale University Press, 1992.
- Richardson, Doug. Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air. NY: Orion Books, 1989.
- Riscassi, Robert W. "Principles For Coalition Warfare." Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993: 58-71.
- Roskin, Michael G. National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 20 May 1994.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. "The Myth of US Capability in UW Conflicts." Military Review, September 1988: 3-17.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines". Air University Review, Jan-Feb 1985: 4-23.
- Schaeder, Peter J. United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994.
- Schmitter, Phillip C, and Karl, Terry Lynn. "What Democracy Is... And Is Not." Journal of Democracy, Summer 1991: 75-88.
- Schneider, James J., and Izzo, Lawrence L. Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity. Parameters. September 1987: 46-57.
- Schwartz, John. "The Mind of a Missile." Newsweek, 18 February 1991: pp 40-44.
- Schwarzenberger, Georg. International Law. London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1968.
- Stech, Frank J. "Winning CNN Wars." Parameters, Autumn 1994: 37-56.
- Strother, Kenneth C. Unconventional Warfare: A Brief Review. Memorandum RM-3104-PR. Santa Monica, CA:

Rand Corporation, April 1962. (Previously Classified Secret, Downgraded to Unclassified 1972.)

Sullivan, Gordon R. "Future Vision." Military Review, May-June 1995: 4-14.

Summers, Harry G. Jr. Col(Ret),USA. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1981.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Swanson, Jon M., and Comello, Jerome J. Operation Husky: The Campaign in Sicily. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992.

Symanski, Michael W. "Hoist with the LIC Petard." Military Review, September 1988: 18-26.

Taber, Cpt. "Night CAS on the Conventional Battlefield." The Air Land Sea Bulletin, No. 93-4, (December 1993): 15.

Tilford, Earl H. World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 February 1996.

Tirpak, John A. "The Long Reach of Air Combat Command." Air Force Magazine, December 1995: 22-28.

Tirpak, John A. "Heavyweights for the New Strategy." Air Force Magazine, October 1995: 24-32.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.

Tooke, Lamar. Concepts of Operational Design. Briefing prepared at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

Towle, Philip A. Pilots and Rebels, The Use of aircraft in Unconventional Warfare. London: Brassey, 1989.

United Methodist Council of Bishops. In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace. Graded Press, 1985.

U.S. Congress. War Powers Resolution (PL 93-148). Washington D.C.

U.S. Department of the Army. Operations. FM 100-5. (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993)

U.S. Department of the Army. Force XXI. Army Focus 94. Washington D.C. 1994

U.S. Department of the Army. Force XXI: America's Army of the 21st Century. Fort Monroe, VA: DACS-LM, 15 January 1995.

U.S. Department of the Army. FM 27-2, Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War. Ft. Monroe, VA. November 1997.

U.S. Department of the Army. U.S. Army in World War II, European Theatre of Operations, The Supreme Command. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954.

U.S. Special Operations Command. Posture Statement. MacDill AFB, FL, 1994.

U.S. Special Operations Command. USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations In Peace and War. MacDill AFB, FL, 25 January 1996.

Vergara, Gonzalo I. "Do Americans Expect Bloodless Wars?" The American Legion, August 1995: 26-27, 58.

Villacres, Edward J., and Bassford, Christopher. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity." Parameters. Autumn 1995: 9-19.

Weidenbaum, Murray. Small Wars, Big Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Weinberger, Casper W. "The Uses of Military Power." Defense 85, January 1985.

Weyermuller, Arthur P. Stealth Employments in the Tactical Air Force. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1992.

White House. A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995.

Widnall, Sheila E., and Fogleman, Ronald R. 1995 Joint Posture Hearing Statement. Washington D.C., 1995.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

Young, Stephen, and Bui Tin. "How North Vietnam Won The War" The Wallstreet Journal, 3 August 1995.

Yost, David S. "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence." Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1995: 70-82

Zakheim, Dov S. "Adding Up the Taxpayers Tab for Bosnia." New York Times, No date.

Attachment One

Force Structure

This attachment outlines the force structure assigned to SCORPION. These assets and personnel are "dedicated" to the mission. This would not preclude their use in an MRC and these assets could be used for Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan allocation. Their use in an MRC may affect the ability to simultaneously execute SCORPION operations.

Many of the forces below are based at installations with like forces to facilitate training, logistics, and maintenance. However, the personnel would belong to separate units and under the command of a centralized Joint Headquarters subordinate to the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Air Forces

Aircraft/Crews (2.0 crew ratio)*

B-2 -----	3/6
F-22 -----	6/12
F-117 -----	6/12
C-17 -----	6/12
KC-10 -----	6/12
KC-135 -----	6/12
E-3C AWACS -----	0/6 (Crews only)
E-28 JSTARS -----	0/4 (Crews only)
P-3 -----	3/6 (U.S. Navy asset)
MH-53 -----	3/6
MH-60 -----	3/6
MH-60 -----	3/6 (U.S. Army asset)
MH-47 -----	3/6 (U.S. Army asset)

Dedicated Maintenance -----	600
Staff -----	50
Support -----	250

* USAF normal crew ratio is 1.5, however due to the small number of crews assigned to each weapons system, a 2.0 crew ratio is required.

Ground Forces

Special Operations Company -----	1
Psychological Operations Company -	1
Staff -----	50
Support -----	250
Guerrilla forces -----	100
(Non-U.S)	

Sea Forces

Special Operations Coastal Patrol Craft ---	3
SEAL Team -----	1
Special Boat Squadron -----	1
Staff -----	50
Support -----	250

The above force structure is dedicated full time to SCORPION. Their entire focus is on SCORPION type operations. They do nothing else. A 5,000 man force comprises less than 1/3 of 1% of US active duty force.

Reservists

Many of SCORPION's positions can be manned by reservists. In fact, it is wise to use reservists in SCORPION because this creates a cadre of personnel who spend their entire military careers involved with SCORPION. This eliminates the lack of expertise and experience often found in the high turnover active duty force. Someone who supports, trains, and executes SCORPION operations for 20 years will be very proficient at these operations.

Attachment 2

Principles of War Analysis

Objective ----- SCORPION has a clear objective: enemy leadership

Offensive ----- SCORPION maintains the offensive

Mass ----- SCORPION masses forces against a single target, enemy leadership

Maneuver ----- SCORPION is completely flexible and easily shifted from one target to the next

Economy ----- SCORPION uses relatively little force to accomplish its mission

Unity ----- SCORPION is commanded by a single commander

Security ----- SCORPION protects American lives to the utmost potential

Surprise ----- SCORPION delivers overwhelming surprise and shock to the enemy

Simplicity ----- SCORPION requires few moving parts, ie a single commando team or a single aircraft at a given time

Timing ----- SCORPION uses timing as a major factor to effect enemy capitulation

Sustainability ----- SCORPION employs few forces requiring logistic support. There are no forward LOCs at risk

Command and Control - There is a clear command and control system

Reserve ----- There is no requirement for a reserve

Risk ----- A tenet of SCORPION is no friendly casualties

Attachment 3

What Ifs

There are certainly opposing views to the SCORPION strategy. This attachment answers some of the potential opposing views over the strategy. Most opposition questions start with "What if....." The major "What Ifs" are discussed below.

What if SCORPION doesn't cause leaders to capitulate to our will?

It may seem we have only two choices: execute a conventional military response, ie Just Cause, Desert Storm or simply quit. Quitting is unacceptable because it reduces the credibility of SCORPION during future operations. An escalation of the conflict to a higher level such as Desert Storm would have to be reviewed in regard to our national interests. However, a third choice is present. *Eliminate the leaders.* If the leaders will not bend then we eliminate the targeted leaders. In this situation SCORPION enters a "Phase II" which is actively and rapidly killing the legal combatant leadership of the target nation. This phase should solve the problem. It would also serve as an example to others of our will and make SCORPION that much more credible to future aggressors.

What if a pilot or guerrilla is captured?

The target nation should treat them in accordance with the laws of armed conflict and we should normally gain their release at the termination of hostilities. Since their capture is of significant propaganda value, we must end their incarceration as quickly as possible. If a pilot or a guerrilla is captured, the tempo of SCORPION increases until capitulation. This turns the propaganda tide against the target country because all they gain by holding prisoners is greater pain.

What if a captured guerrilla or pilot is tortured or executed?

This would be a violation of the Geneva Conventions and the leadership of the country could be tried for a war crime. It is possible that there would be no proof of such a killing. As long as the target country does not openly claim they are executing SCORPION pilots or guerrillas, there should be no harm to the program. Pilots and guerrillas may die in executing SCORPION as in any war. The goal is reducing casualties to acceptable levels. Remember the guerrillas are not Americans and the pilots are all volunteers. This has a favorable effect because it eliminates the "young farmboy with a sweetheart" image of an American casualty. Instead of an outcry of "what's America doing over there" we will get "he knew the risks but volunteered for his country".

What if an aircraft is shot down or has a mechanical problem?

The use of stealth, unmanned aircraft, or cruise missiles reduces the possibility of a shootdown. An aircraft could have a mechanical failure forcing the bailout of the pilot. Rescue forces are standing by if the pilot proceeds to a precoordinated safe pickup point. However in some cases there will be no rescue since sending a rescue party places additional Americans at risk. This is a departure from previous policies where every attempt is made to rescue a downed pilot. However, the tenets of SCORPION cannot allow 50 Americans to get killed and multiple aircraft to be destroyed trying to rescue a single pilot.

What if the target country uses their citizens (women and children) as shields to protect leaders? They might also use Americans residing in the country or POWs as shields.

This would be of great propaganda value to the United States. News services would report on such a tactic and world opinion would most certainly turn against the target country's leadership. SCORPION will never attack a target where there is likelihood of innocents being killed so this tactic would be an effective defense against attacks by PGMs or cruise missiles. However it would not be an effective defense against guerrilla attacks. One method of dissuading the use of human shields is stating that any leader using human shields would become the top SCORPION target and killed. If they survive the conflict, they would be tried for war crimes and executed. This would serve as an example to dissuade future use of such a tactic.

What if the target country responds with reprisals against the United State's leadership? What if they execute terrorist attacks on Americans at home and abroad?

There are concerns about what SCORPION might bring home to the United States. The first concern is reprisals against our government leaders. Frustrated by an inability to stop SCORPION, a foreign leader may send agents to the United States to execute a "scorpion" of their own. This has always been the concern of those who would consider peacetime assassination attempts... paybacks may be in kind. While SCORPION does not assassinate anyone according to the Law of Armed Conflict, it produces the same emotional response. As a result, our leaders could see their homes and government buildings being bombed and it would be legal for an enemy to do so if they follow the accepted rules of war. While this seems possible, it is highly unlikely.

Most nations targeted by SCORPION will not have the resources to execute a similar program. They do not have stealth or PGMs, they do not have sophisticated intelligence, they cannot overfly our

territory at will, and many do not have the necessary funds. They also do not have a motive. Our motive is to force an enemy to stop aggression. The United States is not doing anything the enemy wants stopped... except SCORPION... and if we stop SCORPION then the enemy faces a less desirable alternative.... invasion by the United States and mass destruction of their armed forces and industrial systems.

During all our conflicts, there has never been a coordinated attack on our soil even during conflicts where we inflicted much greater harm on an enemy than that produced by SCORPION. However the U.S. has never executed anything like SCORPION... so for the sake of argument lets say reprisals did occur.

The first reprisal against the United States would be met with a massive attack on all remaining SCORPION targets. The attack would proceed unabated by any enemy attempts to sue for peace. This massive attack should come to no surprise to the target country or the rest of the world because the promise to do it would be published at the onset of SCORPION. An enemy's reprisal against the United States is met with such fury that it actually strengthens SCORPION.

Reprisals against the United States accomplish something else... it will meld the will of the American people as did Pearl Harbor. I doubt the enemy will advertise his reprisal with a warning of the place and time as SCORPION does. His attack will not be considered just and will not receive the same interpretation in world opinion as SCORPION attacks receive. The last thing an enemy will want to do is execute a reprisal against the United States.

If the reprisal is executed by fanatics not working out of a logical strategy, then we are up against a problem no different than exists today. If a fanatic group is going to attack the United States, it won't be due to SCORPION. In fact, SCORPION may just prevent such an attack. Fanatics are usually out for revenge. Revenge that finds its roots in personal loss such as the killing of innocent family members and friends. SCORPION does not kill innocents... in fact it may not kill at all. SCORPION may prevent generations of fanatical killers bent on seeking revenge against the United States. If we are concerned about reprisals then we definitely want to stop fighting as we do now. How many innocents have we killed in Baghdad, Somalia, and Panama? How many might we have killed in Haiti if the invasion had been executed?

What if other country's deny us basing rights to stage SCORPION air attacks?

SCORPION attacks can be executed from the United States using B-2

bombers. A B-2 can reach any location on earth non-stop from a homebase in the United States. Intelligence on targeting and mission criteria can be passed enroute. This capability has already been proven using the B-52 and B-1. The B-2 is not currently modified to deliver conventional precision guided munitions but these modifications are already programmed and funded. Another option would be to launch a SCORPION strike from an aircraft carrier. The problem with using a carrier is the U.S. Navy has cancelled its stealth carrier aircraft program and there are no current plans to configure the F-22 for carrier operations.

What if there is a world outcry that the United States is "bullying" helpless leaders who cannot defend themselves? What if the U.N passes a resolution condemning the strategy and calling for economic sanctions against the U.S.?

This is highly unlikely since most of the targeted countries are in clear violation of the Hague Conventions. However, if it did occur, the United States must stand tall on the moral aspects of the proportionality principle and ask what the alternatives might be? There may be an outcry, as there was after Panama and Haiti but the rhetoric was short lived and produced no sanctions against the United States. Nearly the entire world supported Desert Storm and that should be indicative of current world opinion towards aggression.

What if leaders go into a massive underground bunker and wait out the war?

Then we will know precisely where to find them. Remember SCORPION takes advantage of emerging information systems. It would not be difficult to learn the locations of protective structures. Part of SCORPION is developing bunker busting munitions. Follow-on leaders would be reluctant to repeat such a mistake after the first group was buried alive. Remember SCORPION goes after the top 50 to 100 leaders, they couldn't all live underground or want to. A self-imposed exile in a bunker would produce the necessary psychological effect and soon there would be a coup in the bunker. Bunkers are vulnerable in many ways to guerrilla attacks as well.

There are certainly other questions and "What ifs" concerning SCORPION, but the major ones were covered here. However, the overriding answer to most concerns is simply what are the alternatives? It would be difficult to find a strategy that risks so few Americans, places little equipment at risk, avoids the past problems listed earlier, and also allows the United States to respond to other conflicts while we execute a two MRC strategy.