Flawed Decisions: The Korean War, September - November 1950.

Abstract

In the months following North Korea's invasion of South Korea, United Nations forces fought back from near defeat to the brink of victory. General MacArthur received high praise for the successful amphibious assault at Inchon. This paper argues that his decision making after Inchon, between 15 September and late November 1950, was flawed and led to the selection of an inappropriate course of action for operations in North Korea. The paper questions General MacArthur's failure to pursue the nearly defeated North Korean forces, his decision to leave Eighth Army and X Corps as separate commands, and the fatal decision to advance his forces to the Manchurian border. Further, this paper argues that General MacArthur's success at Inchon, created an atmosphere in which his superiors hesitated to question his decision making.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 1996
Accession Number
ADA309192

Entities

People

  • Charles E. Kerr

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Amphibious Operations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Directives
  • Far East
  • Governments
  • Korea
  • Korean War
  • Landing Forces
  • Military Operations
  • North Korea
  • Second World War
  • South Korea
  • United Nations
  • United States
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • International Relations, focusing on Korea-Africa and North Korea-South Korea relations, and Nigeria-Latin American Relations.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.