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**MANNING SHORTFALLS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
READY RESERVES IN PROVIDING COMBAT SUPPORT
AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PERSONNEL
FOR THE TOTAL ARMY**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LARRY LANDRUM
United States Army Reserves

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USAWC Strategy Research Project

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**Manning Shortfalls of the Individual Ready Reserves
in Providing Combat Support and Combat Service Support Personnel
for the Total Army**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Larry Landrum
United States Army Reserve

Colonel Robert H. Wig II
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Larry Landrum

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The Total Army has evolved from its conception in the early 1970s into a force dependant upon the reserves to provide supporting units in order to project a force in times of crisis. Operation Desert Storm proved the need for the reserves to deploy Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units quickly and early. With the smaller Army of the late 1990s, the second order affect of this dependance on reserve support units is the greater requirement placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to provide pre-trained individual soldiers to both active and reserve CS/CSS units in order for them to deploy. The Army has no other source of personnel to fill these deploying units to the required levels for war. This paper examines why the Army needs CS/CSS IRR soldiers to be trained and ready to assume positions to support the Total Army.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Table 1:	Training Times for Deployment	3
Table 2:	Manning for Mobilization	8
Table 3:	Army Manpower	15

Manning Shortfalls of the Individual Ready Reserves in Providing Combat Support and Combat Service Support Personnel for the Total Army

INTRODUCTION

The Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) is a valuable and often overlooked asset of the Total Army. It has a stated mission of providing individual soldiers as fillers for the units of the Active Army and Selected Reserves and of providing the initial casualty replacements for our army engaged in war.¹ With the advent of the Total Force concept, a greater reliance on reserve Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units to provide the needed support for the deployed forces has emerged. This dependence on support from the reserves has caused a second order affect with regards to the IRR. It has placed a greater emphasis on having available the trained CS/CSS individual soldiers, in sufficient numbers, to bring deploying support units up to their required wartime strengths. CS/CSS units are manned at peacetime levels, short of the needed numbers to go to war.

Since Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced the idea of the Total Force in 1970, there has been a constant movement of support functions from the Active Army's inventory to the reserve components'. Today, the reserves provide 68 percent of the needed CS/CSS units required to project a force.² No longer do we have the capability of deploying a "pure" Active Army to any sizeable conflict without reserve support units.


The Total Army has downsized by 29 percent of the levels it had for Desert Storm.³ Given this diminished capacity to wage war and given the support structure needed for two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), the Army needs all of its components trained, capable, and manned. Current strategy relies more than ever on the reserves. Over seven

thousand reserve CS/CSS personnel are designated to deploy within the first 30 days of a conflict. Another 108,000 reserve support soldiers will deploy within the next 45 days.⁴ These planned deployments reveal the need for individual fillers to bring these units up to the required manning levels. As budgetary constraints tighten and the Active Army strives to maintain an initial deployable response, the Army can no longer cross-level soldiers between units to fill manpower vacancies as it did in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) without seriously degrading its follow-on units' capabilities. Thus the IRR has become the Army's safety net in its overall ability to project a force in war.

HISTORICAL NEEDS FOR INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS

We have mobilized individual reservists in all the major crisis and wars of the last half of this century to provide manpower fillers for deploying units. In World War II, the Army expanded from a 3-division force to a 36-division force before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the Korean War, the Army increased from 10 divisions to 18. In Vietnam, 76 reserve units mobilized, of which 43 deployed.⁵ In all these mobilizations, units reached deployable status only after extensive use of individual manpower fillers, assimilated during weeks of post-mobilization training. By contrast, the average post-mobilization training times for reserve units has gone from 43 weeks in World War II to less than two weeks for CS/CSS units in ODS (see Table 1). This decrease in deployment times reflects the need for quick access to reserve units to form the support base for our deploying armies and a need to have quick access to individual soldiers to round-out these CS/CSS units.

TABLE 1



SOURCE: Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of the U.S. Reserve Components, US Department of the Army, Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Va., 1972 and Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: First Report to the Secretary of Defense, Rand National Defense Institute, Santa Monica, Ca, 1992.

In 1939, the Army found itself about to enter World War II with a force of 186,000 regular soldiers and only a paper reserve force.⁶ The victorious Army of World War I diminished quickly in the 1920's, with little resourcing for active or reserve forces in personnel, training, or modernization. The Organized Reserves Corps (ORC) -- the predecessor of the current United States Army Reserves (USAR) -- had no usable units on which to draw upon. Instead, it was used as a pool of individual soldiers, similar to the current IRR. The ORC was able to provide almost 80,000 officers and 3000 enlisted personnel to expand the force. Most had received some limited training in the years between the wars.⁷ These soldiers were able to take up positions in Active Army units and in mobilized units of the National Guard as individual fillers. Even under full mobilization and

the use of most of the reservists in the ORC, it took almost three years to raise the Army to fighting strength after Germany's invasion of Poland.⁸

At the beginning of the Korean War, over 186,000 individual reservists were recalled to fill out active and reserve units needed for the initial fight. Most had not trained since they left the active services at the end of World War II. The Army was forced to recall reservists with only three days notice to report; some receiving as little as 12 days of training before being deployed to the war.⁹ The Selective Service, nearly inactive since the end of World War II, was unprepared to respond to the Korean War. World War II veterans, maintained as individual reservists in the Army Reserve, complained that they had fought in a world war and now were forced to serve their country again in Korea, while a younger generation was not called upon until later in the war.¹¹ After the Korean War, to insure manpower needed to support the Cold War of the 1950s was available, the Selective Service remained active. This reliance on conscripts to provide the individual replacements for the Army, continued through the Vietnam War.

Partial Mobilization for the Vietnam War occurred on 11 April 1968 and served more to round-out the force structure than to meet personnel needs.¹² The mobilized reserve forces were a mix of combat and support units, some needed overseas and some at home to provide additional support to the effort. IRR soldiers were called-up to bring these units up to deployable strength. Of the 20,000 reservists mobilized, 2752 were IRR members.¹³ Reliance on conscripts to provide replacements for the deployed active and reserve units, instead of the IRR, was the policy for the war. The rapid induction of draftees into the Army, with a required active service period of two years, provided the IRR with a large and continuous

flow of personnel. The Army's IRR reached its maximum level of 921,000 soldiers in 1971.¹⁴ Whereas the Korean War spurred complaints of using individual reservists to fill out the Army, the Vietnam War spurred opposition to a conscript Army forced to fight in a limited conflict. Opponents of the draft argued that a professional army should fight limited wars. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) became the hallmark of the post-Vietnam War era. The Selective Service lost its job. Plans for winning a conflict against the Warsaw Pack in Europe relied heavily on reserve units and the IRR to support a total fighting effort. As the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, the Army entered ODS still manned for the most part as a force designed to win a total war in Europe.

Before 1970, the reserve forces served primarily as an argumentation to the Active Army, a "force in waiting." This concept changed with the transition to the Total Army, which called for the shifting of CS/CSS functions to the reserves. ODS put the Total Army to its first test. The Army quickly found itself depending on reserve support forces to mount the deployment to Saudi Arabia. Military Police, chemical, transportation, medical, ordnance, and quartermaster assets were not sufficiently available in the Active Army inventory to provide sufficient support. At the lowest level of mobilization, the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority, some 22,000 reserve soldiers (221 units) mobilized and deployed in the first three months of ODS.¹⁵ To provide the needed CS/CSS individual fillers for these deploying units, 1874 soldiers were solicited from the 6357 IRR members who had volunteered to serve.¹⁶ Call-up of the IRR was not authorized under the PSRC authority enacted by President Bush at the start of the war.¹⁷ Five months later, under the increased authority of Partial Mobilization, some 20,000 IRR soldiers were recalled to provide possible

casualty replacements for the war.¹⁸ The Army heralded this initial response of the Total Army as a success, although it required heroic efforts to provide manning for units with a manpower base designed to win a major war in Europe rather than the "real" war in ODS.

Despite its success, ODS may portend future problems. We may be required to react quickly to protect our interests in an area of the world that offers little in Host Nation Support (HSN) for the Army. Unlike our experience in ODS, the Army of the late 1990s will lack a large manpower pool on which to draw upon. Allocation of training dollars and manpower allotments will be critical for those forces scheduled for early deployment. A Contingency Force Pool (CFP), units needed for early deployments, was designated by the Army to receive scarce resources in both the active and reserve forces as the answer to this problem.¹⁹ DOD has realized the need to have quicker access to individual reservists to be used as fillers for these CFP units and is currently seeking changes to the PSRC authority. The current effort is the creation of a new category within PSRC called the Individual Selective Augmentee -- 30,000 IRR personnel for the services. This legislation is currently before Congress.²⁰

MANNING LEVELS

In ODS, reserve manning problems surfaced from the beginning. Since DOD had not enacted the planned adjustments to lower manning levels of the reserves in response to the dissolution of the Soviet threat, force planners were able to select the best units available to support the conflict from a larger inventory than was needed at the time. The Unit Status Reports, used to indicate the readiness status of individual Army units, acted as a primary tool


in selection of the reserve elements to mobilize.²¹ This process of choosing the best on paper nonetheless brought reserve units into the mobilization process with an average of Category 3 (CAT 3) status (CAT 1 = 90 percent or better in resources, CAT 2 = 80 to 89 percent, and CAT 3 = 70 to 79 percent).²² Since the Army was denied access to the manpower pool of the IRR to provide potential fillers due to lack of access under PSRC, major reserve commands at all levels were forced to cross-level personnel from other reserve units to fill the selected units to deployable status.²³ These personnel losses degraded potential follow-on units, leaving them short in personnel and equipment when they were called to support the offensive action later in the conflict.²⁴ It was the classic case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, and then asking Peter for a loan!

Manning the reserves has been a recurring problem in every mobilization in the past 50 years. Great improvements have been made to the reserve system since the days in World War II, when less than 50 percent of the manning could be mustered to fill mobilized units (see Table 2). The need for individuals to fill in these shortfalls has been a constant throughout the years. The most significant change in recent years is the greater dependence on the reserves to provide the needed CS/CSS portion of the Total Army. In 1969, Army force planners, faced with lower authorized manning levels in the latter part of the Vietnam War, decided that one-half the non-divisional support elements for Active Army divisions would not be needed for the first 60 days of a conflict. The Army could then sustain combat power while assuming the risks of lower levels of support not initially needed in a conflict.²⁵ This decision triggered a migration of the CS/CSS capabilities to the reserves. Simultaneously, the strength of the IRR dropped some 500,000 soldiers to less than 200,000 by 1978.²⁶ Thus, the

reserves did not have the required manpower levels needed in units or the IRR to sustain the CS/CSS support base for the Total Army.

TABLE 2

MANNING FOR MOBILIZATION



*No Deployment

** Based on CAT 3 Average

SOURCE: Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of the U.S. Reserve Components, US Department of the Army, Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Va., 1972. and Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: First Report to the Secretary of Defense, Rand National Defense Institute, Santa Monica, CA, 1992.

ODS tested the Total Army concept and revealed some of the manning shortfalls in the reserve. But these shortfalls were not unique to the reserves. Active Army units also experience similar problems -- non-deployable personnel due to family problems, medical problems, and personnel temporarily unavailable in training programs. It is estimated that non-deployable personnel assets can be as high as 25 percent of a unit's strength.²⁷ The Army plans to cover these shortfalls by replacing these soldiers with those from the various Active Army training programs (basic training through advance training programs) and by the mobilization of IRR soldiers. Adding to this problem of non-deployable personnel is the

peacetime manning levels of CS/CSS units which are set by Congress at 90 percent or below the required personnel levels needed for war (warfighters are set at 97 percent).²⁸ Thus, support units can be expected to have at least a 10 percent shortfall in personnel upon mobilization from the start.

HOLLOWED FORCE

Since the early 1970s, the Active Army has been transferring support forces to the reserves to maintain its combat strength in armor, infantry, and artillery. Consequently, only 26 percent of the support personnel needed for the Total Army exists in the Active Army, the smallest active support base of all the services.²⁹ In transferring the mission of support to the reserves, no increase in personnel manning levels was given to the CS/CSS units to bring them up to the required manning levels needed for war. Besides this built-in shortfalls for CS/CSS units, the non-deployable personnel in reserve and active units will require individual fillers as well. The Army assumes that a "robust IRR" can rapidly respond to these shortages.

This "robust IRR" is the same as the one that has been on the books since the early 1970's. Historically, approximately 14 percent of the soldiers are classified in the IRR as RT-12s, soldiers who departed active service within the past 12 months.³⁰ Since they have been recently trained, these soldiers are considered ready and require almost no post-mobilization training. Plans call for using RT-12s to provide the initial manpower to fill out units and to replace the initial casualties. This means that soldiers who were on Active Duty less than a

year ago would find themselves again on Active Duty if a major crisis arose. After this pool is exhausted, the need for greater post-mobilization training for the IRR emerges as the individual soldier's time since departing active service is lengthened. We are depending on the RT-12s to quickly fill-in the gaps in personnel manning while our training systems gears up to handle the additional IRR soldiers who will need greater amounts of post-mobilization training.

A quick look at the makeup of the IRR enlisted personnel pool finds 80 percent are within their initial legal Military Service Obligation (MSO) of eight years, with an average of 26 months of active duty.³¹ Thus, the bulk of the IRR enlisted personnel have received military training within the last 3-5 years. The Army assumes they have retained some of their military skill. They will need some retraining to serve as viable replacements in active units. Initial screening of IRR soldiers called to active duty will include testing in basic soldiers skills and specialty tasks to determine the degree of retraining needed by each individual soldier.³² About 29 percent of these IRR personnel have Combat Arms (CA) specialties; most of the rest have CS/CSS specialties.³³ Less than 5 percent of the IRR has been allocated training to maintain their skills in recent years.³⁴ The Army's FY96 budget projection for training of the IRR is about one-third of the previous year level.³⁵ This decision to allocate less training to the IRR comes when planners claim the pre-trained pool provides the "robust" force needed to meet two MRCs.

The Army hollowed out its CS/CSS capabilities in the 1980s. Because of funding constraints and manning decisions made over a decade ago, the support forces needed by the

CFP within the first 75 days of a conflict are already short. Almost all the CS/CSS units in the Active Army are committed during the initial 30 days of the first MRC. Some of these units also find themselves assigned missions in the second MRC as well. The number of support soldiers needed in the first 75 days of a conflict is around 180,000, of which the Active Army provides only 37,000. This means that no delays in reserve deployments can be tolerated, since no active duty support forces are available to backup the reserve units if they fail to deploy on time.³⁶ The second MRC would then be supported almost entirely by reserve units, 188,900 soldiers.³⁷ Further, the 1994 "Bottom-Up-Review" (BUR) was conducted by the Army to determine the requirements needed to fight two MRCs, found almost 60,000 CS/CSS personnel short in the force structure. This was above the already known shortages built into the manning structure of CS/CSS units.³⁸ The impact is that the IRR is the only initial source of manpower to fill these requirements, other than degrading active and reserve follow-on units of their personnel.

MANPOWER SOURCES

Manpower to fill the Army's personnel requirements and replace its losses in a conflict comes from two sources -- the IRR and the Selective Service. The IRR provides the initial manpower fillers needed to bring deploying units to required strength. Additionally, it provides for casualty replacements in the first few months of a war.³⁹ This manpower pool

acts as a stopgap until the Selective Service can be fully activated and provide a personnel flow into the Army's training system.

The Selective Service is currently in a stage of hibernation. It provides only a basic shell for the Department of Defense manning system. It maintains data on young men turning 18 years of age, who are required to register by law. The Selective Service is responsible for providing an initial 100,000 conscripts to the military training systems between 13 and 30 days after its activation. The Army expects to receive the first draftees after they complete their initial military training around 90 days later.⁴⁰ At 180 days of operations, the Selective Service is to place some 650,000 conscripts into the initial training systems of the military services, thereby providing for the individual fillers and replacements for a military engaged in combat.⁴¹ After this initial period, the Selective Service should be capable of further expansion to meet all the manpower needs of the services. This requires the IRR to fill all the personnel requirements for the Army for at least the first six months of a major conflict or war!

In the initial AVF study, the IRR was expected to provide the bulk of all the individual manpower requirements for the services in case of war. With the IRR averaging 1.1 million men for all services (780,000 for the Army) throughout the 1960s, the study overlooked the possible loss of IRR manning that occurred early in the 1970s after the draft stopped providing conscripts. Additionally, the increased need of the IRR to supply the fillers for the CS/CSS active and reserve units under the Total Army concept was not considered in the late 1960s.⁴² In 1980, in response to this shortfall in the military manning system,

President Carter initiated draft registration. This was done to cut the response time of the Selective Service in providing manpower from 210 days to 113 days after its activation.⁴³ The Government Accounting Office predicted that it could take the Selective Service up to 130 days to meet the goals set for the first 30 days if there is no warning for mobilization.⁴⁴ In this worst-case situation, the Army might have to wait 220 days for the first soldier drafted to show up in a unit. The IRR pool could easily become exhausted of manpower.


INSUFFICIENT POOL

The IRR pool is built from the soldiers coming off Active Duty and out of the Selective Reserves (soldiers who train with reserve units). Most are awaiting the completion of their MSO and/or the expiration of their enlistments.⁴⁵ As these sources for the IRR have grown smaller in recent years, so has the number of soldiers entering the pool. Since the average IRR enlisted soldier has three to four years of active service, the IRR will not feel the effects of the drawdown until four to five years later, when no one replaces the soldiers completing their MSO.⁴⁶ The proposed Army Budget for 1996 anticipates a leveling-out of the IRR around 480,000 soldiers due to the additional two years added to the MSO in 1984. But this increase would have begun late in 1990, when the force would have been purged of the previous six-year MSO soldiers, and ended by 1992, when the additional MSO requirement would have saturated the force. As seen in Table 3, the increase in IRR manning in the early 1990s came while the Active Army was downsizing. This also increased the IRR pool; it was

not only the result of the additional two-year MSO. This artificial increase has now almost surged through the IRR, since the delayed effect of the downsizing evaporated with the lapse of the remaining enlisted soldiers' MSO. The size of the IRR is dropping and will level out in the late 1990s, its numbers will be in proportion to the active forces that feeds it.

TABLE 3

ARMY MANPOWER



	FY78	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00
IRR	169	202	199	213	219	246	277	302	301	287	293	275	284	359	419	438	412	386	350	320	300	280	280
ACTIVE	771	758	777	781	780	780	780	781	781	781	772	770	751	725	671	572	541	510	495	495	495	495	495
USAR	186	190	213	225	257	266	275	292	310	314	313	319	310	309	302	276	260	243	230	215	210	208	208
ARNG	341	346	367	389	408	417	434	440	446	452	455	457	437	441	426	410	397	387	373	367	367	367	367

SOURCE: Department of Defense, *Selective Manpower Statistics (Annual)*, *Army Budget FY96*, *Defense Trends*, Issue 5, and correlation between average mid and late 1980s staffing levels to the proposed staffing levels 1999 or 1.5m active reserve unit strength /300k average IRR strength for mid/late 1980 compared to 1.1m active reserve unit strength/220k IRR correlation for 1999 plus 60k increase due to two years MSO.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, DOD was concerned that the downsizing during the post-Vietnam War era was adversely influencing the manning levels of the IRR considered

necessary to support a major mobilization for Europe. The Army estimated in the mid-1970s that it was short some 490,000 IRR soldiers to meet mobilization requirements.⁴⁷ The AVF concept was questioned due to the inability of the reserves to support a major conflict with individual soldiers. To correct this imbalance and to infuse additional manpower in the out-years, Congress took several initiatives. It required all soldiers with an MSO to transfer to the IRR, instead of offering a discharge from service starting in FY78. It stopped the practice of automatically transferring soldiers to the Stand-By Reserves for their last year of their MSO starting in FY80. And it extended the MSO from six to eight years starting in FY84.⁴⁸ These initiatives were to increase the size of the IRR by an estimated 168,000 soldiers.⁴⁹ Table 3 shows an immediate rise in the numbers in FY79 to the complete saturation of the IRR with the two-year extension of MSO by FY92. But these numbers resulted from manning sources for the IRR that averaged close to 1.5 million throughout most of the 1980s.

Since the size of the IRR in the mid-to-late 1980s was produced by a force of approximately 1.5 million Active Duty and Selective Reserve soldiers, it would be reasonable to suggest that a 1.1 million man force planned for 1999 will produce an IRR force of similar proportions. Thus, if the mid-to-late 1980s force produced approximately a 300,000 manned IRR force, the late 1990s force should produce approximately a 220,000 manned force. We would have to account for the increase of the additional two-year MSO in this estimate to reflect those soldiers leaving initial active service to the IRR. In 1976, it was expected that this number would provide approximately 83,000 additional IRR soldiers, but again this was based on a source pool of 1.5 million.⁵⁰ For 1999, with a source pool of 1.1 million, the resulting number can be expected would be 60,800, resulting in the IRR pool in 1999 of

280,800 soldiers. This is only an estimate based on similar notions of the late 1970s. Then the IRR dropped to some 65 percent of its past levels, whereas the input sources of the Active Army and Selective Reserves only dropped only 21 percent of their previous levels.⁵¹

All of this calls into question the assumption of a "robust IRR" to fill our hollowed-out units in the case of two MRCs. The RT-12 pool of the IRR, the primary group of soldiers to meet the immediate needs of the Army, is also shrinking in total numbers. In the FY99 IRR pool consisting of 280,000, the RT-12 pool would be approximately 39,000 soldiers (14 percent of the total). Only about 26,500 RT-12s would fall in the CS/CSS specialties (IRR enlisted makeup is 34 percent CS and 31 percent CSS). Of this number, the Army expects a yield rate -- the total number expected to report upon initial notification of mobilization -- of only 70 percent.⁵² This diminishes the RT-12 CS/CSS soldiers to 18,500. This is short of the needed initial 38,000 CS/CSS individuals needed to cover the 10 percent shortfall built into the active and reserve unit manning structures needed to support two MRCs and does not consider the non-deployable personnel replacements that will be needed for these same units. The Army estimated in FY90 that it would need some 115,000 IRR soldiers to bring the forward-deployed, deploying, and stateside CS/CSS units to their war time strengths to support a single MRC.⁵³

CONCLUSIONS

A future MRC may occur in which we find ourselves faced with a situation similar at the onset of the Korean War. A deploying army built with CFP units may find itself

attempting to maintain an edge over an aggressive enemy. The need to mobilize the reserve CS/CSS units quickly may allow no time for cross-leveling other reserve units for manpower fillers. But the critical component, the availability of the 186,000 individual reservists who were initially drawn to fill out deploying units for the Korean War, may not be there to support the next war. The Army may find itself looking at the IRR that has not been "robust" since the early 1970s, inadequate in size and training to meet the immediate needs of a committed force.

The ability of the IRR to provide both individual fillers for active and reserve units and to provide necessary replacements for casualties is critical to the continued success of a volunteer army. If the Army fails its mission of maintaining a pre-trained and ready IRR, the ability to win future wars is in question. Alternatively, the Selective Service might be forced back into service. Thus, the All-Volunteer Force of the 1970s could be abandoned for a less costly conscript force. The Total Army dependance on the reserves to provide the bulk of the CS/CSS forces is a grave responsibility. The IRR must maintain adequate numbers to fill the CFP active and reserve units with individual fillers at the start of a conflict.

The reserves' success in ODS has overshadowed problems that could have an adverse influence on our Army in the future. The post-mobilization deployment times for CS/CSS units have decreased significantly since World War II, reflecting the need for fast access to reserve support units for an MRC. Manning of reserve units has increased to high levels, but it is still not sufficient to meet all needs of deployment (at least 90% of required manning levels for war). In ODS, only by cross-leveling manpower at all levels did we achieve our success. This was possible because the force structure was 29 percent greater than it is now.

This practice of robbing Peter to pay Paul cannot be the norm with the smaller force of the future. We must be able to "reach out and touch" a member of the IRR to fill a vacant position quickly to assure a smooth and orderly flow of reserve units to their designated position alongside Active Duty forces.

The current strength of the IRR is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the two MRC scenario. We have hollowed-out CS/CSS units, reducing the actual personnel numbers needed to go to war. It will require approximately 38,000 support soldiers, or about 10 percent of the nearly 380,000 active and reserve support personnel scheduled to man both MRCs. The additional 58,000 positions that the National Guard plans to convert to CS/CSS specialties to cover the support shortfall found by the BUR will add an additional requirement on the IRR to cover the differences between these units authorized and required strengths -- another 5800 soldiers.⁵⁴ If we added in the non-deployable personnel in both active and reserve units, the requirement on the IRR could grow as high as 25 to 30 percent of the total force needed. The Army planners have included in their plans a "robust IRR," but the IRR is fed only by the influx of soldiers from active service. It does not grow additional manpower on its own. We are currently riding a high wave of population that will eventually get smaller due to the current losses in the source population of the Selective Reserves and Active Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To insure that the CS/CSS mission of the Total Army can be met by sufficient manpower from the reserves, I recommend that the following three steps be taken:

1. Increase the training for current IRR soldiers. The adage "if you ignore a soldier, he or she will go away" holds true even for the IRR. Failure to provide training to this group will only insure non-retention in the future. By providing training to the CS/CSS specialties needed to support an MRC, we will more likely to retain these soldiers at the end of their MSO.

2. Initiate an intensive management program to retrain soldiers in the IRR from excess specialties to fill shortfalls in the manning of the CS/CSS units in the CFP. Combat specialties required in the first 90 days of a conflict are limited, whereas CS/CSS specialties are numerous. This program would have to manage not only the correct specialty mix for the IRR, but also the utilization of the retrained soldiers within the Selective Reserve.

3. Increase the manning levels of reserve CS/CSS units to required levels. It does little good to be manned at authorized levels that are less than the required levels for war, since there exists an almost immediate need for these units to support the Total Army. This would reverse to manning structure of the reserve to the opposite of that of the manning structure of the Active Army. Whereas the Active Army brings to the fight the warfighters and has high manning levels in these units, the reserves brings the support units and needs high manning levels as well. This will reduce the requirements for the IRR to provide as many filler personnel to bring the CS/CSS units to deployable status and allow greater visibility of the manning levels needed by the support forces of the reserves.

These three recommendations will tailor the IRR to fit the current force requirements of the Total Army. The first two makes do with what we have. The last is to correct the flaw in a manning structure that was designed for the Active Army and designs a separate manning

structure for the reserves. The outcome will be stronger reserve unit force structure designed to provide the quick response to the Total Army and an IRR structure capable of providing the adequate numbers of individual soldiers to meet all of its missions given the limits to its size.

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