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**JOINT INTERDICTION -- THE GRAY AREA**

DEFENSE SECRETARIAT

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the implications of the interdiction mission as an overlapping requirement for component commanders in support of a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) campaign plan. Since the services must fight as a synergistic joint team in order to achieve the JFC's objectives, service doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures must not cause friction or misunderstanding in their application. Presented here is an analysis of approved joint definitions and doctrine, and their application to the battlefield framework in order to identify the overlap problem and determine possible solutions.

Questions explored are:

1. Does joint doctrine outline the implications of the interdiction mission adequately and feasibly?
2. Are the Air Force and Army bringing their service doctrine into consonance with the approved joint doctrine?

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# JOINT INTERDICTION -- THE GRAY AREA

## INTRODUCTION

Joint warfighting is no longer a pipe dream. The Armed Services have progressed well past the jointness point of no return. Any thoughts of an individual service being assigned an operation by itself are all but inconceivable. Although change is slow and difficult, joint doctrine is gaining acceptance steadily. Even the most contentious issues will soon meld into an approved joint publication.

One such publication is Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. It soon will be published as approved doctrine (proposed final version is in print as this paper is being written). Interdiction is a major mission area of combat, and sets the stage for ultimate success on the battlefield and conflict termination. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of the interdiction mission as an overlapping requirement for the component commanders in support of a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) campaign plan. Is the joint doctrine outlining the implications of the interdiction mission adequate and feasible? And are the services, particularly the Army and Air Force, bringing their doctrine into consonance with the approved joint doctrine?

This latter question is crucial. Since the services must fight as a joint team, synchronization is key to effective mission accomplishment. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army each have service doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures

that in some respects cause friction in the cooperative application of combat power in the interdiction mission.

No small amount of this friction is due to misunderstood or misapplied doctrine. In fact, one of the significant challenges facing the JFC is to achieve a common understanding of doctrinal principles, concepts, and terminology to facilitate unified operations. Therefore, an analysis here of approved joint definitions and doctrine, and their application to the battlefield framework, will be a necessary prerequisite to correctly identify the overlap of missions, and determine appropriate, possible solutions.

This paper takes as a framework for analysis a high intensity, major regional contingency against a technologically advanced enemy (or one who possesses and employs advanced targeting and weapon systems). Such a scenario places the JFC in the most taxing combat environment possible, necessitating the JFC synchronize every means at his/her\* disposal in order to ensure mission success. Although interdiction operations apply to maritime battlespace as well, this paper focuses on the overlap of the interdiction mission over land, since the most contentious issues seem to originate between the land and air components (usually the Army and Air Force).

\*Hereafter the masculine form will be used for brevity.

## WHAT DOES THE JOINT DOCTRINE SAY?

Joint doctrine places interdiction within the context of how a JFC structures his theater of operations. Normally a JFC defines areas of operations (AOs) for land and naval forces.

**The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs** based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. **Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander** and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.<sup>1</sup>

Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations...JFCs may use **lateral, rear, and forward boundaries** to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.<sup>2</sup>

The use of boundaries enables the tactical forces (e.g., corps, divisions, marine expeditionary forces, destroyer squadrons, or surface action groups) to plan and conduct operations to complement their functional component commander's operations in support of the JFC's campaign plan. These boundaries are for all intents and purposes AOs within AOs. They can be both permissive and restrictive measures depending on one's point of view. That is, the commander and his subordinate units have full freedom to conduct combat operations within the confines of his boundaries without any external coordination. Should he need to fire or

maneuver outside his boundaries, or another (possibly adjacent) commander similarly desire to fire or maneuver inside the other's boundaries, he would have to request and receive permission from the owning commander to do so.

Besides boundaries, commanders designate fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) which also are either permissive or restrictive. The primary purpose of a permissive measure is to facilitate the attack of targets. "With the establishment of a permissive measure, no further coordination is required for the engagement of targets affected by the measure."<sup>3</sup> Conversely, the primary purpose of a restrictive measure is to provide safeguards for friendly forces. "The establishment of a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure."<sup>4</sup>

**Joint fire support coordinating measures** and the procedures associated with those measures **assist in the C<sup>2</sup>[command and control] of joint forces.** Within their AOs, **land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures** to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations.<sup>5</sup>

One key FSCM is the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Joint doctrine extensively discusses the FSCL.

**FSCLs are permissive fire support coordinating measures. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries** in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. **Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders**

in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. **The FSCL is not a boundary** -- the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary....<sup>6</sup>

Many caveats accompany this definition in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. The level of detail that this "keystone document of the joint operation series"<sup>7</sup> gives to one particular coordination measure is unusual. Some of these detailed discussions include considerations on: where to place it in relation to the location of enemy forces, or if performing offensive or defensive operations; its associated benefits in reducing potential fratricide; the criticality of expediting, yet coordinating attacks beyond it especially when using area denial munitions, and attempting to avoid conflicting or redundant attack operations; and whether or not a commander should even use one.

However, this is where the interdiction missions overlap. The detailed attention paid to the FSCL represents the outcome to date of a broader debate over responsibility for interdiction. It is at the FSCL that a "gray area" of battlespace management and control commences, and the issue of the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) authority begins to contend with that of the land commanders.

While land boundaries impose restrictions except as relaxed by a permissive measure, the airspace above the battlefield is inherently a permissive area except as declared restricted in an imposed control measure.

**Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se.** However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, **JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to decon-flict [sic] the multiple uses required of this space.**<sup>8</sup>

Coordinating altitudes, minimum risk routes, and airspace control areas are among some of the more widely used measures.

Having identified some of the joint definitions framing the battlefield structure, it will be useful to review some of the missions pertinent to this topic. The JFC has the difficult task of synchronizing maneuver and interdiction in order to secure his objectives and therefore conflict termination.

**The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity** in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity.<sup>9</sup>

**Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.** Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; SOF [special operating forces]; amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; EW [electronic warfare] systems; antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. The JFACC is the supported

commander for the JFC's overall **air** [emphasis added] interdiction effort.<sup>10</sup>


Interdiction is the pivotal linkage in the JFC's campaign plan. It cuts across nearly the entire length and breadth of the battlefield. All of the component commanders get actively involved in this fight. Increased weapon and target acquisition technologies in all of the services now allow overlapping coverage of many target sets on the battlefield. The JFC's biggest challenge in waging a successful campaign is, arguably, to effectively synchronize the overall interdiction and maneuver missions. "Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather **complementary operations** designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives."<sup>11</sup>

**The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations** to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander's boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.<sup>12</sup>

Joint doctrine clearly supports the surface commander's requirement for a structured battlefield framework, once committed. Figure 1 may assist in visualizing a type example.

The land commander by definition is required to use the depth of his AO to maneuver rapidly and fight at extended ranges. Additionally he is to synchronize the interdiction efforts within his AO by describing the type of effects, and the timing and prioritization of attacks by all forces supporting this effort. These complex requirements necessitate coordination and cooperation between the various component services in theater in order to produce the JFC's desired synergy. The next two sections of this paper explore how Air Force and Army service doctrine support this challenge.

FIGURE 1  
SAMPLE BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK



LEGEND:

- FLOT- Forward Line Own Troops
- FSCL- Fire Support Coordination Line
- CAS - Close Air Support
- 1 - Corps Troops (possible Rear Battle)
- 2 - Close Battle
- 3 - Corps Deep Battle
- 4 - Corps Forward Area
- 5 - JFLCC AO

## AIR FORCE DOCTRINE

The U.S. Air Force service doctrine resides in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1992. This two volume set provides the framework for understanding the USAF's basic philosophy on the application of aerospace power. Volume I describes the doctrine in a quick-reference, "bare bones" fashion. Volume II is a collection of essays that are cross referenced to the specific sections in Volume I, and provide the evidence and supporting rationale for each doctrinal statement.<sup>13</sup>

There are two different passages in AFM 1-1 that do not seem consistent with joint interdiction doctrine. One addresses the control of the function itself, while the other speaks to the control of interdiction forces. The function passage is found in Essay Q of AFM 1-1, Volume II:

Because synchronization is usually vital to effectiveness, the theater commander should make the joint force air component commander responsible for **controlling the overall interdiction effort** when aerospace forces provide the preponderance of interdiction capability.<sup>14</sup>

Interestingly, AFM 1-1 does not pursue this statement in any greater detail in either volume. Nonetheless, it is important to examine what "controlling" interdiction implies in two ways: a general discussion, and a look outside doctrine into other Air Force writings.

First, the issue here is the control of the function, the overall interdiction effort. No one will argue that the concept

of synchronization will enhance effectiveness. The key point argued in this passage of AFM 1-1 is that if aerospace forces provide the preponderance of the force conducting the interdiction effort, then the JFACC ought to be designated to control that effort. Joint doctrine already designates the JFACC as the supported commander for air interdiction. Simple deduction could drive one to the inevitable conclusion that, if the JFACC is already the supported commander for air interdiction, and aerospace forces are providing the preponderance of interdiction forces, and unity of command - the purpose of which is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective - is a principle of war, then the JFACC ought to be given control of the overall interdiction effort.

But what does *control* actually mean? According to Joint Pub 3-0, "Control is inherent in command."<sup>15</sup> With that approved concept, and given the fact that the JFACC is a commander by definition, then this control of the function should lead to the JFACC's designation as the commander of the interdiction mission (supported commander) complete with prescribed boundaries and objectives. The paradigm of prescribed boundaries does not sit very well with most aerospace advocates, but is used here to suggest that some type of coordinating measure(s) would be necessary to delineate battlespace responsibilities with surface forces to ensure unity of effort.

The other relationship that could be conferred upon the JFACC is that of Coordinating Authority. "Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Services, functional components, or two or more forces of the same Service..."<sup>16</sup> While this is not an authority by which command may be exercised, nor even by which agreement between the affected agencies may be compelled, it serves the purpose of common direction (unity of effort). Disagreements between agencies in this relationship would have to be adjudicated by the JFC personally.

The JFACC's role as the supported commander for the JFC's **air** interdiction mission received added emphasis in the previously cited definition of interdiction. Air interdiction is obviously a subset of the overall interdiction effort as stated in the joint doctrine. The joint definition of air interdiction is:

Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.<sup>17</sup>

The variables in this definition are desired effects, time, and distance (therefore, degree of integration required). When compared to the adjacent air missions of close air support (CAS) and strategic attack, the hybrid nature of interdiction is readily apparent. The CAS mission in support of friendly forces

differs from interdiction in time and distance (degree of integration); CAS being missions "...in close proximity to friendly forces and which require[s] detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces"<sup>18</sup> At the other end of the spectrum, strategic attacks on enemy centers of gravity typically continue throughout the entire length of the campaign, target the enemy's war-making capabilities, and politico-military will to continue the fight, and usually deliver delayed effects which may be experienced across the entire theater of operations. The time and distance factors here demand far less integration or coordination below JFC level.

The second method of supporting this claim for control of the interdiction effort is made in published articles and presentations. For example, senior Air Force officials and approved service documents continue to insist that the FSCL ought to be treated as a boundary. The Korean model is constantly surfaced as the "right answer" by Air Force leaders.<sup>19</sup> In the Korean theater the JFC is really the Commander in Chief (CINC) of Combined Forces Command (CFC). That is, the CINCCFC is not only the joint (US) forces commander, but commands the South Korean (ROK) military forces as well. Based on a number of factors which include: the proximity (25 mi) of the South Korean capital city to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a political imperative to protect Seoul from penetration by North Korean forces, type and disposition of enemy forces, and friendly combined forces disposition and supporting intelligence and weapon systems; the

CINCCFC determined that a deviation from normal joint doctrine is necessary due to exceptional circumstances.<sup>20</sup>

In Korea, for the aforementioned reasons, CINCCFC has, "...focused the frontline field armies on the close-in battle. Therefore, we scribe the FSCL very close - closer than you'd draw in the academic environment, clearly closer than for a fight in Europe, and fundamentally closer than what you saw in Operation Desert Storm."<sup>21</sup> That is, the FSCL is positioned at artillery range (approximately 20 km from the FLOT [forward line own troops]). Their Deep Battle Synchronization Line (DBSL) is positioned approximately 50 km from the FLOT. While the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is the supported commander out to the DBSL, initially the JFACC has been designated the *coordinating authority* (over all fires) for the area between the FSCL and the DBSL. "...He's to shape it [deep battle] in accordance with the theater commander's priorities and his understanding of what maneuver commanders are confronted with on the battlefield."<sup>22</sup> Other component commanders are able to engage high payoff targets within this area upon receiving concurrence from the JFACC via a quick-fire channel to manage joint fires within this band.<sup>23</sup>

Additionally, the Air Force challenges the constraints that the Army's AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine places on their ability to effectively prosecute the overall interdiction effort that they feel will normally be delegated to them. In the mid-80's, as the Army was rediscovering the operational art, and turning

toward a more offensive form of warfare to address the threat in Europe, it was also fielding more advanced sensor and weapon systems capable of giving the tactical commander the ability to engage the enemy at greater depths on the battlefield. The Air Force, not previously used to having friendly control or coordination measures imposed on their operations beyond friendly artillery range, now had to contend with a cluttered airspace of rockets, missiles, and attack helicopters on deep attack missions. "The Air Force view is that [they] should have the flexibility to attack targets beyond the FSCL without detailed integration with the ground commander's scheme of maneuver...in Army doctrine, Corps Commanders have an interest in the "deep" battle. In fact, Corps Commanders may use FSCL placement as a tool to "shape" the deep battle. Here is a classic case of a commander trying to manage a seam when he is not in control of units operating on both sides of this seam."<sup>24</sup> By introducing the deep battle concept, ALB doctrine is seen as an attempt to gain control of more terrain than the Army tactical commanders can adequately control. That is, the Army, with its ALB deep doctrine and weapons systems, will tend to push the FSCL farther out in order to interdict deeper enemy forces. This extra battle space only allows the enemy a "sanctuary" whereby he may locate his units in a range band outside of the tactical unit commander's ability to control, yet inside the Air Force's ability to rapidly interdict without coordination.

A similar view says that,

"...interdiction is a theaterwide effort. As Army corps commanders attempt to control the effects of all "deep fires" within their area of responsibility, they seek to constrain that theaterwide effort by confining it laterally within artificial boundaries. "Deep fires" is another name for interdiction, and that theaterwide effort requires unity of command to synchronize all assets. The joint force air component commander is organized, trained, and equipped for such theaterwide synchronization while a corps commander's focus is necessarily more limited."<sup>25</sup>

The second apparently inconsistent passage, which addresses the control of interdiction forces, appears in AFM 1-1, Volume I:

To achieve efficiencies and enhance effectiveness, the air component commander should **control all forces** performing interdiction and integrate interdiction with surface force operations to achieve the theater commander's objectives [emphasis added].<sup>26</sup>

As before, AFM 1-1 does not pursue this point in any greater detail in either volume. Related service publications, presentations, and articles are the only means available to piece together the intent behind this passage. The firepower forces that are in question here are aircraft (both fixed and rotary wing) and surface-to-surface missiles used in an interdiction role. For most operations the Air Force expects to have one of its officers named as the JFACC. (A naval aviator may be appointed as JFACC in the initial entry phase of the campaign where maritime forces provide the preponderance of force, but that phase would not last very long.) The Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that the designated officer and his staff may use in this role are reflected in the JFACC Primer.

This pamphlet is published by the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. It expands this concept of the JFACC controlling all forces in interdiction planning and execution. "If the JFACC is Air Force (for example) components will make the following assets available in the absence of additional guidance:

- all USAF sorties PLUS
- Marine sorties for long-range interdiction, long-range reconnaissance and air defense PLUS
- Naval air in excess of maritime air operations requirements
- TLAM [Tomahawk land-attack missile] interdiction missions beyond Army boundaries
- Army Aviation and ATACMS interdiction missions beyond Army boundaries"<sup>27</sup>

The publication goes on to say that the JFC will have to make the ultimate decision on asset allocation based on availability, campaign objectives, and unity of effort. The Army weapon systems in question here are the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and attack helicopters. Both of these interdiction capable weapon systems have a primary role that supports the close battle.

In his presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, General McPeak, then Air Force Chief of Staff, challenges the Army's ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System -- fired from the MLRS launcher) as an example of a redundant system that makes battlefield effectiveness more difficult to achieve. "The Army sees ATACMS as the instrument by which the Corps Commander has his own ability to fight deep. But its employment creates a requirement to coordinate with the air

commander, who controls most of the deep action."<sup>28</sup> Clearly the Air Force view of interdiction includes the notion that regardless of Service, any weapon or weapon system that delivers fires in a deep battle ought to be controlled by the JFACC.

The precedence for this notion has already been set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff policy for the command and control of Marine Corps aircraft in sustained operations ashore (1986 Omnibus Agreement).<sup>29</sup> This agreement basically states that Marine aircraft sorties in excess of MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force, or the joint force as a whole.

## ARMY DOCTRINE

The Army's doctrinal keystone manual is Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993. It contains fourteen chapters describing how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations. The AirLand Battle doctrine first introduced in the 1986 version of this manual is tempered by the end of the Cold War, the shift to stronger joint operations (Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986), the interservice arena, combined operations propensity, and a force projection environment.<sup>30</sup>

It does not appear to have any text that is at cross purposes with approved joint doctrine. The date of publication may have something to do with this. FM 100-5 was printed 15 months after AFM 1-1. Many joint publication issues were resolved in the months succeeding the Persian Gulf war. To the FM 100-5 editors' credit, many of the passages in it read virtually word-for-word as they do in current joint doctrine.

Key points of the Army's doctrine in this discussion include deep operations either to shape enemy forces, or destroy capabilities, and the procedures for establishing the FSCL. The Army view of "deep" is that area forward of the close fight, out to the limits of the forward boundary. In this forward area the land commander is always concerned with any enemy force (potential) that could reinforce the close battle in the near term. Such an enemy force must be targeted for coordinated deep operations in order to deny the enemy commander freedom of action. That is, the land commander must shape the enemy force

by fire and/or maneuver to disrupt his coherence and tempo, or through attrition the size and effectiveness of his force.

The word shape is used with the realization that normally the defeat or destruction of these forces requires an inordinate and unacceptable expenditure of resources. Eventually some semblance of these forces will reinforce the close fight. The overall purpose of shaping those reinforcements is to not allow the enemy commander to commit them in strength, and at the time and place of his choosing. Rather, to ensure a successful outcome of the close fight, the enemy commander must be reduced to committing these forces on terms acceptable to the friendly force commander based on the results of the deep battle.

Shaping can take several forms - fires to canalize, divert, or delay enemy forces; airborne or air assault operations; attack helicopter operations; or deep ground maneuver. This shaping usually requires clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and coordinated fires in the area where it is to occur.<sup>31</sup>

"A well-orchestrated deep battle may help the enemy to be defeated outright or may prevent him from achieving his intended objectives...Army forces use deep operations to set the conditions for decisive operations."<sup>32</sup> "While firepower plays an essential role in the conduct of deep operations, the integrated application of firepower and maneuver makes the Army's deep attack capability effective. Airborne and air assault forces, attack aviation units, and high speed armor forces provide the land component and joint force commanders the capability to thrust deep into the battlefield to seize facilities and destroy

key enemy functions that would be too expensive or risky to attack by other means."<sup>33</sup>

Since the FSCL is viewed as the "near edge" of the interdiction area of overlap, the Army's procedures for its establishment merit presentation. Army doctrine (Marines use the same fire support measures and considerations) reiterates the joint philosophy of the FSCL. That is, a permissive measure to allow the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Army FM 6-20-30 (Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations) advises the corps commander that three conditions should be met before an FSCL is established:

- \* A portion of the corps deep operations area does not require selective targeting to shape the deep operations fight.

- \* The expeditious attack of targets beyond the FSCL will support the operations of the corps, the attacking unit, or the higher headquarters of the attacking unit.

- \* The corps and its supporting units are willing to accept the possible duplication of effort which may result from dual targeting beyond the FSCL.<sup>34</sup>

The *primary* consideration for placement of an FSCL is that it **should be located beyond the area in which the corps intends to shape its deep operations fight**. The deep operations fight is shaped by restricting the movement of enemy follow-on forces to influence the time and location of their arrival into the close operations area [emphasis added].<sup>35</sup>

This primary consideration for FSCL emplacement should normally focus the land commander's deep battle in the area short of the FSCL. The JFC has recognized the land commander's

requirement for depth in prosecuting an extended range battle when he assigned him an AO by designating boundaries. Although the land commander will continue to engage in operations beyond the FSCL, throughout his AO, the coordination required by supporting commanders to attack targets beyond the FSCL ought to be streamlined by its proper emplacement.

## CONCLUSION

This struggle over interdiction raises the question of whether joint doctrine in this area is adequate and feasible. The definition of interdiction in Joint Pub 3-0, especially in the context of the definition of an AO, clearly identifies the intent and forces necessary, in weaving this mission area into the JFC's campaign plan. Whereas the doctrine delineates the JFACC as the supported commander for air interdiction, it fails to identify a supported commander for the overall interdiction effort. It does go into length to discuss the concept of the land (surface) commander as the supported commander in his AO, and clearly requires him to define his objectives and requirements for interdiction efforts by supporting commanders within his AO.

Is the joint doctrine's failure to identify a supported commander for the overall interdiction effort a lapse in doctrine that requires remedy, or is this purposefully left vague to provide the JFC an opportunity to apply these principles against his particular set of circumstances? Given the Korean example, the case for retaining the flexible approach seems the correct answer. This requires, of course, that the JFC must clearly define the missions, responsibilities, and coordination requirements for each operation or campaign.

The concept of the FSCL as a permissive coordination measure, however, needs to be addressed. As the definition takes shape in draft Joint Pub 3-09, it can no longer be classified as

a truly permissive measure. Given the current coordination requirements hung on it, the term RCL (restrictive coordination line) is a better suited title. Rather than suggest that this idea be adopted as the joint answer, a better solution may be to return to the previously permissive definition (pre-Desert Storm), and allow the JFC the option to emplace some restrictive airspace measures in order to avoid any potential fratricide problems. Such a solution would clearly serve to expedite fires beyond the FSCL without coordination.

The Army's doctrine states that interdiction is accomplished within the land commander's AO with all types of maneuver and firepower forces. Defining targeting objectives into this AO would be the land commander's responsibility in terms of priority, effects, and timing. This action serves to favorably shape enemy forces that will eventually be engaged in close battle.

The Army appears to have aligned its doctrine along joint lines pretty well. This is especially the case in the interdiction area where the Army's ALB fits nicely with the joint descriptions of AOs and the interdiction implications of depth of operations with both maneuver and fires. Their TTP for outlining particular coordination requirements appears to be well reflected in draft Joint Pub 3-09.

The Air Force has developed JFACC TTP as a single service endeavor. Their doctrine states that as a service they are best suited for the role as the supported commander for the overall

interdiction effort. This, they argue, would best maximize unity of effort/command in achieving the JFC's campaign plan objectives, especially since joint doctrine has already declared the JFACC supported commander for the overall air interdiction effort. Additionally, Air Force doctrine states that the JFACC should control all forces performing the interdiction mission.

Air Force doctrine needs to more closely view interdiction as not just an air-to-surface battle. They therefore must consider adopting a more customer service oriented, supporting commander approach to their interdiction operations over a surface commander's AO.

Interdiction overlap occurs when the Air Force claims unity of command of any operation that delivers munitions over the same ground that the land commander claims belongs to him in directing an overall interdiction effort encompassing maneuver forces as well.

The bottom line in interdiction operations is that it is a JFC's call on how he intends to conduct his campaign. However, once he decides to commit a ground force into battle, he necessarily drags with it the inescapable battlefield framework of AOs, boundaries, FSCMs, and other structure that breed coordination challenges for the various components. In order to facilitate unified operations, especially interdiction, the JFC must ensure a common understanding exists by clearly articulating his objectives, missions, responsibilities, and coordination requirements.



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 February 1995), IV-15 (hereafter referred to as JP 3-0).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., III-33.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle, Field Manual 6-20 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 May 1988), 3-6.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>JP 3-0, III-33.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., III-34.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., i.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., III-33.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., IV-8.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., IV-11.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., IV-13.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., IV-15.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, (Washington: Department of the Air Force, March 1992), Volume I, v (hereafter referred to as AFM 1-1).

<sup>14</sup>AFM 1-1, Volume II, 163.

<sup>15</sup>JP 3-0, II-17.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., II-10.

<sup>17</sup>Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 23 March 1994), 16.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 70.

<sup>19</sup>Ralph E. Eberhart, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, "Air Employment," (Briefing given to the Joint Flag Officer

Warfighting Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 3 February 1996), charts 71-73, 75.

<sup>20</sup>JP 3-0, i.

<sup>21</sup>Robert W. RisCassi, General, U.S. Army, "The Korean Theater---One-of-a-Kind," interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Field Artillery, February 1993, 10.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Merrill A. McPeak, General, U.S. Air Force, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 September 1994), 34.

<sup>25</sup>Daniel P. Leaf, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, "Unity of Command and Interdiction," (Research Report, Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, July 1994), 85.

<sup>26</sup>AFM 1-1, Volume I, 12.

<sup>27</sup>Department of the Air Force, JFACC Primer, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, February 1994), 32 (hereafter referred to as JFACC Primer).

<sup>28</sup>McPeak, 55.

<sup>29</sup>JFACC Primer, 12.

<sup>30</sup>Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), vi (hereafter referred to as FM 100-5).

<sup>31</sup>Department of the Army, Corps Operations, Field Manual 100-15 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 13 September 1989), 3-3.

<sup>32</sup>FM 100-5, 6-14.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Department of the Army, Fire Support For Corps And Division Operations, Field Manual 6-20-30 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 18 October 1989), F-3.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

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