

**STRATEGY
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FORCE XXI AND PEACE OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this paper is to answer the question: How well does Force XXI, the Army's guiding doctrine for the Army for the 21st Century, prepare us to accomplish the missions we are most likely to face? Force XXI is best suited for future conflict at the high end of the spectrum (War) which is the most dangerous threat, but has serious shortcomings when applied to peace operations, the most likely threat we face.

This paper first discusses a vision of future armed conflict. Then, peace operations requirements are defined and described. Force XXI characteristics and principles are reviewed. Force XXI principles when compared with peace operations requirements identify shortfalls and weaknesses. Solutions are recommended to address the identified weaknesses of Force XXI for peace operations.

VISION OF FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT

The greatest threats to the US for the next 20 years are not superpowers but rebels, insurgents and third world armies. Conflicts will be within borders and will be among factions. The greatest threat will be from those who do not play by the rules and will be unsophisticated opponents. A recent article in Military Review discusses the most frequent threat as Third Wave armies characterized by:

- Mix of terrorist, paramilitary and conventional forces; perhaps rogue armies.
- Complicated, schizophrenic political/military nature.
- Wide variety of weapons-rifles, mines & some sophisticated equipment.
- Some high tech portable comms & GPS systems.
- Seek portable or low cost WMD-prestige.
- Decentralized C² nets difficult to detect, much less neutralize and interdict.
- Fight without convention, ruthless & unpredictable.
- Seek protracted war and undermine relevance of modern armies.
- Manipulate world opinion.
- Blend with population-impossible to detect.
- Defy conventional military resolution.

Seeking to control people, they will take their fighting to those areas where the world's population is moving-- *urban environments*...leaders of these forces will be adept at manipulating world opinion-experts at creating complex political, societal and military conditions that *defy a conventional military resolution*. (Italics added for emphasis).¹

The most dangerous threat to our survival is a Tier I threat: a highly sophisticated, modernized army which can directly threaten our military and our existence. Such a Tier I force would closely resemble our current Army. It would rely on information operations and automated systems,

precision munitions and sophisticated platforms, just as our own army does.²

While we must be prepared to fight against a Tier I threat, few countries are capable of fielding such a force. Our success in Desert Storm has sent a clear message that the US is dominant in most of the "traditional" warfighting areas. Potential future adversaries would probably avoid direct confrontation with the US and would conduct asymmetrical combat against us. This asymmetrical combat may include non-lethal ways (attack our information systems) and the low cost means (mines, precision guided munitions).

The U.S. has no superpower rival at present and it is unlikely that one will emerge in the next 20 years. Future warfare will most likely be what we used to characterize as "low intensity conflict" against a committed, manpower intensive, low-tech opponent. As Martin Van Creveld, concludes:

Armed conflict will be waged by men on earth, not robots in space. It will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large scale conventional war.³

Another characteristic of future conflicts is that US forces must be able to transition quickly from deployment to employment. We cannot assume the luxury of a lengthy buildup period to arrive in theater, train up and deploy to combat, like we had in Desert Storm. Future conflicts will be largely "Come as you are" situations and require a decisive combat capability upon arrival.⁴

PEACE OPERATIONS

US Army doctrine has come to use the term Operations Other Than War (OOTW) to describe conflict short of war. There are a dozen activities that fall under OOTW, according to FM 100-5.⁵ In order to narrow the scope of this paper, peace enforcement operations were selected to discuss Force XXI in future conflict because that is the OOTW mission in which force will most likely be used.

FM 100-23 defines peace enforcement as:

the application of military force or the threat of use to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. Peace enforcement's purpose is to maintain or restore peace. Peace enforcement may include combat, which requires the successful application of warfighting skills. The mission-to deter, compel or reassure-will be present in peace operations in a delicate balance and in varying degrees of emphasis and execution.⁶

The US has frequently conducted peace operations throughout the past 50 years and it is likely that we will continue to conduct peace operations in the future. This is due not only to the current U.S. National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, but also our obligation as part of the UN to participate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If Force XXI is to be our doctrine for conflict in the 21st century, it must address both our most dangerous threat and our most likely threat.

Our current doctrine lays out the principles to conduct successful peace enforcement. Some terms have specific

meaning in peace enforcement operations that may not be the same as when applied to war.

Before beginning operations, we must determine what the desired end state and conditions are that constitute success. In peace enforcement, *settlement not victory*, is the ultimate measure of success.⁷ Peace enforcement operations use coercive force to suppress conflict in an area, create a cease fire to protect non-combatant populations and facilitate opening negotiations among local factions.

Characteristics of traditional combat (war) may be contrasted with peace operations characteristics as follows:

	<u>WAR</u>		<u>PEACE OPERATIONS</u>
<u>Objective:</u>	Battle field victory over defined enemy	vs.	Conflict suppression
<u>Rules of Engagement:</u>	Maximize casualties	vs.	Minimize casualties
<u>Lethality:</u>	Mass destruction	vs.	Non-lethal weapons
<u>Impartiality:</u>	Clearly support one side against the enemy	vs.	May attempt impartiality by using force against faction violators ⁸
<u>Perseverance:</u>	Goal is quick, decisive action	vs.	Could be short duration but probably years to achieve results

	<u>WAR</u>	<u>PEACE OPERATIONS</u>
<u>Restraint:</u>	Goal is destruction of the enemy or seize critical location. Unrestrained application of force ⁹	vs. Goal is to produce conditions conducive to peace; proportional force
<u>Battlespace:</u>	Dominate battle space with systems & equipment	vs. Population control by soldiers ¹⁰
<u>Visibility:</u>	Conceal self important	vs. Presence and exposure are important

Not only are the principles of peace enforcement different from war, but the **tasks and/or conditions** may be different as well. For example:

1. Patrols. In Haiti, were conducted under full illumination with the purpose of a show of force, rather than stealthily as required in war.
2. Cordon and search. Was preceded by allowing occupants to leave peacefully and searches were conducted with limited inconvenience to the populace, to reduce the level of violence and collateral damage.
3. Crowd control.
4. Immobilize, disorient, impair or disperse people.
5. Disable systems.
6. Provide security and surveillance.
7. Attack material support systems and infrastructure.¹¹
8. Precision weapons. Requirement for restraint in peacekeeping operations makes precision marksmanship and weapons far more important than in combat; especially retaliatory attacks.¹²

9. Guarding facilities, escorting convoys, establishing checkpoints, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and informational activities.¹³

The fundamental distinction is that warfighting involves actions against a clearly defined, differentiated enemy in a hostile environment. In contrast, peace operations are conducted against an enemy or factions intermingled with civilians in an ambiguous environment.

The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) concludes that peace operations are difficult and offer unique characteristics because:

1. The enemy is no longer easy to identify approaching in a tank or armored personnel carrier.
2. Military tasks common to war and peace such as patrolling and convoy escort, have a **fundamentally different purpose** and are conducted in a **vastly changed** environment.
3. The use of overwhelming and decisive force, the **central tenet** of US warfighting doctrine, **often has little relevance to peace operations.**¹⁴ (Bold type added for emphasis)

TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

Peace operations require appropriate training programs for leaders and soldiers and equipment that may not be addressed in preparation for war. FM 100-23 Peace Operations dictates that specialized training will be required to conduct peace operations. This special training is necessary because of the unique rules of peace operations, such as limited use of force, and sensitization to local conditions, cultures and laws. This training must be conducted down to

the individual soldier level because "Ground combat units will have extensive contact with the local populace, government and NGOs."¹⁵ A recent Army Times article on the Bosnia deployment highlighted the difficulty of changing the mindset of combat soldiers embarking on peace operations:

As the Army prepares to deploy to Bosnia, the most daunting challenge for tactical leaders will be to employ their well-trained soldiers in ways they never have before. COL. Dean Cash, Commander of CMTIC says "...we are taking the same soldiers we have trained to be accurate and fast and have told them to think 'I won't shoot and you can't make me'. That requires a different mentality."¹⁶

FORCE XXI CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES

Let us now examine Force XXI, the Army's guiding doctrine to conduct operations in the 21st Century. What exactly is Force XXI? It is the Army's philosophy of the capabilities required into the 21st century to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, including peace operations. To do this, TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations, states that our Army must

...design organizations and capabilities that will allow it to be rapidly tailorable, rapidly expandable, strategically deployable and effectively employable. To achieve decisive results in future War and OOTW in all operational environments.¹⁷

A vision of that organization is contained in a DA Pam entitled America's Army of the 21st Century, Force XXI. Force XXI is the ability to exploit information. It is electronic connectivity between and among all echelons of the Army, improving speed, agility and precision of combat

operations. The result of Force XXI will be improved lethality, survivability, tempo, versatility, sustainability and deployability for the Army. The key tenets are: dominate maneuver, conduct precision strike, project rapidly, protect the force, and sustain operations. In sum, the desire is to "Complete the transformation to an information based Army, by leveraging the power of the microprocessor".¹⁸

Key principles for success of the Force XXI army in future operations are (with page number):

1. Information technology leveraged (3-3)
2. Dominant intelligence (3-6)
3. Digitization & Technology (3-7, 3-23)
4. Dominate Battle Space-quickly acquire and engage enemy throughout depth (3-8)
5. Overmatches of combat power (3-9)
6. Depth and simultaneous attack (3-10, 3-12)
7. Win information war Electronic Warfare (EW) (3-11)
8. Logistics system that is versatile, deployable, expandable (3-13)
9. Control Operational Tempo-more than speed; shortest combat at least cost (3-19)
10. Reduce manpower and risk (3-20)
11. Increased lethality by artificial intelligence robotics systems, automated weapons & computer operated C² links (3-20)
12. Overwhelm enemy commander's capability to react (3-21)
13. Control of populations and land areas (3-22)

Dominating maneuver is a critical part of war in the 21st Century. Force XXI aims to control the depth, breadth and height of the battlespace by generating maneuver dominance faster than the enemy. Long range precision engagements overwhelm the enemy through simultaneity and breadth of engagement. Greater knowledge of the enemy's location by electronic sensors will help achieve full-

spectrum dominance through precision operations.¹⁹ This results in increased destructive effectiveness above that of any competitor. Intelligence relies heavily on robust space-based systems.²⁰ To achieve these principles, Force XXI seeks to align Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, Materiel, Soldiers (DTLOMS) for optimal effectiveness.

FORCE XXI CAPABILITIES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS

Earlier in this paper, a vision of future armed conflict and our most likely involvement in peace operations was described. How well does Force XXI prepare us for success in this environment? Some Force XXI concepts will have high payoff in OOTW, particularly as it relates to deployment, tailorability, mobility, and connectivity.

Battlefield awareness and situational awareness are greatly enhanced. The ability to share information rapidly and know where your friendly forces are with great precision is a great advantage in peace operations, where forces tend to be spread out and do not have visual contact with each other. This is particularly important when operating in urban environments. Fratricide reduction will be greatly enhanced.

Logistics and sustainment capabilities will be greatly improved. Initiatives in inventory control and distribution will help get the right equipment and supplies to the right place at the right time. Of course, this assumes operations will be conducted in an area with a mature transportation

infrastructure. As Van Creveld was quoted earlier in this article, this assumption may not be valid in primitive areas.

Battle command is definitely better. Commanders will have greater ability to see the enemy through sophisticated sensors, see themselves and communicate using information technology. Commanders will have better visibility of their assets. Communication will be easier and commanders will not be as limited as they are presently in communicating instructions to subordinates. Again, this is particularly an advantage in an urban environment. Units will have a better shared picture of the battlefield.

Finally, advances in precision munitions make it easier to reduce civilian casualties in combat operations. Retaliatory strikes and response to terrorism can be much more efficient using precision munitions.

WEAKNESSES OF FORCE XXI

There are, however, some disturbing weaknesses in which reliance on Force XXI will impair or even jeopardize the success of the army in future operations.

Intelligence. The Force XXI Army focuses on directing and collecting assets to determine tactics, Order of Battle, location and capabilities of an enemy. Reliance is primarily on technical intelligence assets and only limited use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT).²¹ Our capabilities are increasingly Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and targetted against emitters. However, peace operations require HUMINT

and gathering information from people. If our foe does not possess sophisticated communications and C² equipment, for example using messengers, we may not be able to locate these nodes electronically. In addition, our sophisticated sensors will be largely neutralized by an enemy who blends in with the local populace, as was the case in Viet Nam. Thermal imagery does not discriminate friend from foe.

Pace. Force XXI seeks to quickly defeat the enemy with precision strikes before he can react. However, OOTW is an environment requiring patience and trust. The goal is not so much to kill and destroy as to win confidence. Patience and trust are inherently long term goals that do not lend themselves to quick, decisive action.

Dominate the battlespace. This is an unrealistic concept in peace operations. The OOTW environment cannot be dominated in the traditional military sense. Peace operations and future conflict will be manpower intensive. As we rely more on technology to reduce our force size, we will be less able to dominate the battlespace.

Overmatches of combat power is an illusion. We may be the "baddest dog in the fight" (as we proclaimed going into Bosnia), with the best tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). But if the enemy is armed with low tech weapons, fights dismounted, uses mines and sniper rifles, and uses terrorist tactics, we may have to redefine what overmatches of combat power means. Asymmetrical tactics can offset our technological advantages.

Over-reliance on technology.

Technology is a two-edged sword, providing us with both opportunities and risks. It provides us with high leverage to maintain a technological lead over our nearest competitors. Likewise, it presents us with risk if we choose the wrong technology for the wrong operating environment."²²

A highly decentralized threat, such as we are likely to face in peace operations, mitigates the capabilities of American technology that carried the day in Desert Storm.²³ A recent article in Parameters hones in on the central problem with Force XXI in peace operations:

A future opponent, conversant with the lessons of the Gulf War and Viet Nam, might choose to challenge MTR (Military Technological Revolution) technology by presenting an asymmetrical low-tech strategy, perhaps one not energy based and therefore not vulnerable to most of our sensors. Such a strategy would minimize communications and electronic indicators so severely that there would be very little to "read". Such a response would effectively deny the ability to employ many offensive MTR capabilities...*Our own love affair with decisive maneuver, precision strike and the ability to synchronize actions in time and space thus may not be relevant, possible or even desirable for all future opponents.*²⁴
(Italics added for emphasis)

As we pursue technology to advance our capabilities, we must be aware that there are limits to what technology can do for us, especially in peace operations. Despite overwhelming victory in Desert Storm, the US has had difficulty bringing its military might to bear (in Somalia, Haiti, North Korea and perhaps Bosnia).²⁵

Another author reminds us "All the information in the world will not help poorly motivated, badly trained and undisciplined soldiers, led by indecisive leaders fighting without a sound doctrine."²⁶ More and more, this point is being discovered at our Battle Labs, as we try to match up humans with equipment. Col G. Patrick Ritter, Mounted Battle Lab, states,

We should never forget that combat is not a technological endeavor, it is a human endeavor. We must always retain the ability to convey and receive emotion in our battle command transmissions. Today we can only do that by voice or by looking our subordinates in the eye. The closer to combat a commander is, regardless of rank, the less likely he is to use his digital communications gear. There is a human need to hear a human voice in contact.²⁷

Reduce manpower and risk. Force XXI doctrine envisions a greater leader to led ratio, but also talks about a flatter organization. Force XXI seeks to do more with less, yet peace operations are very manpower intensive. How do we reconcile the budgetary trend toward more mechanized forces and smaller manpower with the fact that mechanized forces may be less suitable for peace operations than light infantry?

In terms of risk, peace operations require presence and visibility. This is inherently risky if it is to be effective. Casualties are likely to be few at a time, but over time may demoralize us with "death by a thousand cuts". A recent article points out:

The slogan for successful counterinsurgents...is presence, persistence and patience. The counterinsurgent demoralizes his opponent through presence-oriented ground operations which seek to intimidate rather than simply to kill...If the US armed forces continue to "shoot, move and communicate" they will continue to lack the flexibility necessary to tailor operations effectively to the local understandings of legitimacy and the indigenous definitions of coercion.

Physical presence on the ground, killing that is up close and personal, coerces far more effectively than remotely delivered fire, which because of its arbitrary and capricious nature, rarely intimidates, but always provokes...Presence and not firepower is the most effective means of coercion.²⁸

Mind set. A subtle but insidious attitude underlies Force XXI pronouncements among some military leaders at all levels. That is the mind set that the Army should not be involved in peace operations because it detracts from preparation for real war. We do not want to be distracted from our *raison d'etre*, to fight the nation's wars. We therefore think that any unit can do OOTW as an additional task. We hope we will not have to conduct peace operations, if we can avoid it. If we cannot avoid peace operations, we presuppose (or hope) that there is time to train for such a mission. A recent book by Chayes and Raach from the National Defense University speaks to this problem:

Although an increasing number of military leaders and strategists do understand the relevance of peace operations to national security, there are those who continue to view them as distracting from the military's primary function of fighting and winning wars. For the most part, those who view peace operations as a detractor see them as something entirely different from, and only remotely associated with, conventional military operations.²⁹

Some military leaders are troubled by peace operations because they feel it will detract from readiness and "dull the warrior edge", hampering our ability to defend the nation's vital interests in wartime.³⁰

What seems to be fueling Force XXI is the belief that the Gulf War symbolizes a new warfighting paradigm. A major concern is that our leadership believes success in Desert Storm was due to technology and a new way of war that has made all other forms of war obsolete. In reality, Desert Storm is the exception to US involvement in the last 50 years, rather than the rule. TRADOC Pam 525-5 speaks extensively about OOTW in Chapter 2, but the rest of the Pam does not link Force XXI to conditions we are likely to face in an OOTW scenario. In "Desert Storm Siren Song", MAJ Lohide cautions:

Believing that the Gulf War symbolizes a new warfighting paradigm promotes a hazardous singularity of thought that can easily create within the US military a kind of collective cognitive dissonance. Defense planners are incapable of mentally envisioning any future scenario that contradicts the Desert Storm model. US military must not permit itself to be further handicapped by such mental occification (in the face of budget cutbacks and force drawdowns).³¹

Although he was speaking primarily to the Air Force, this warning applies to all military services. The fact is that peace operations or future war by an adversary in mountainous terrain and crowded cities can neutralize a force such as ours which relies on employing ultra-expensive, precision guided munitions. We must realize that

the conditions permitting effective military action in the Persian Gulf were the exception, rather than the rule.³²

The most dangerous result of this mind set is that it causes us to relegate training for peace operations to a very low level. Consider these comments by a senior Army officer:

Our training policy will continue to focus on warfighting. Training and preparation for peace operations *should not detract from a unit's readiness to fight and win in combat*. In fact, the first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of war fighting skills. When we know we are about to engage in a peace operation, units must execute a tailored training cycle using mobile training teams and training support packages....US forces must continue to develop realistic simulations and combat training center scenarios to better train deploying units.³³ (Italics added for emphasis)

Can we count on a 2 year train up like the 1st AD had for Bosnia...or will it be the 72 hour notice a unit at Ft. Carson had to deploy and conduct OOTW in Cuba?

The GAO found that when units receive short notice, they spend most of their time executing deployment Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and have little time for training. This lack of training time is particularly serious for initial deploying units. Recent examples are: American forces had only a 3 week notice for Haiti; 10th Mountain Division had less than 3 weeks notice for Somalia and units going to Rwanda had less than 2 weeks notice.

The training problem is further compounded by the fact that some missions require units to be deployed in ways they

are not accustomed to fighting. For example, the Implementation Force (IFOR) has not taken many of its tank units to Bosnia. Macedonia peace keepers left their Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and exclusively conducted dismounted operations. Cuba refugee control by a mechanized infantry battalion was entirely without BFVs.³⁴ In fact, an air defense artillery battalion replaced an infantry battalion to conduct the mission. This air defense unit does not have the skills and expertise in patrolling, checkpoints, search and clear operations required in peace enforcement.

Chapter 3 of TRADOC Pam 525-5 says, "Well-trained and discipline units, provided with sufficient time and resources to train, can transition to OOTW missions as required."³⁵ Chayes and Raach speak more clearly to the problems:

Peace operations...are given a low priority for programming, planning and training--until the military is called upon to intervene in a crisis. Thus, although the military has responded immediately to policy decisions to participate in peace operations, many military leaders continue to regard such operations as a diversion and outside their planned activities. Consequently, when the President decides to deploy forces to a peace operation, *ad hoc measures are often taken to cobble together an operation of available, but not necessarily properly trained or equipped forces funded from existing budgets at some cost to the rest of the force.*³⁶ (Italics added for emphasis)

In summary, Force XXI possesses numerous shortfalls as the Army's guiding doctrine for likely future warfare and peace operations. It inclines us to train for high intensity

combat operations while reacting to peace operations. It is based more on capabilities than on the likely future threat environment. It does not balance the potential impact of emerging technology with the perceived threat. We are captivated by the most dangerous threat (war) rather than the most likely threat (peace operations). TRADOC Pam 525-5 refers to peace operations throughout, but peace operations are really only an afterthought. The tone of TRADOC Pam 525-5 is almost totally geared to combat between complex adaptive armies and does not adequately consider OOTW.³⁷

In view of the shortcomings identified, what can be done to improve Force XXI so that it better prepares us to conduct the operations we are most likely to face in the next 20 years? The following recommendations focus on research and development, training and force structure needs.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

DOD must put priority of emphasis, research and development dollars, toward Force XXI areas that are most immediately needed, e.g. HUMINT, and soldier system equipment. There are already several equipment initiatives being pursued by the Army and Marines. These involve vehicle modifications, equipment to fight in Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) and non-lethal munitions.³⁸ Priority should be placed on acquiring the technology to support the following tasks:

1. Neutralize combatants intermingled with non-combatants.
2. Controlling hostile crowds.
3. Disabling and disrupting military logistics.
4. Disabling and disrupting communications, transportation and energy infrastructure.
5. Incapacitating/immobilizing weapons or weapon development and production processes.

Currently, TRADOC is drafting a concept paper for non-lethal capabilities.³⁹ This is a step in the right direction.

Training. Develop leader and soldier training that prepares all soldiers regardless of rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in how to use Force XXI technology in the OOTW environment. Peace operations training increases confidence, reduces the likelihood of incidents that may cause political embarrassment to the United States and makes sense given the likelihood of having to respond to one of these operations.⁴⁰ The DOD Inspector General (IG) identified three gaps where US preparation for peace operations could be enhanced in the near term: UN observer training; use of existing US and foreign training programs and educational opportunities; and staff and interagency training, particularly Joint Task Force (JTF) for peace operations.⁴¹

Individual training might include how to interact with civilians, MOUT and Rules of Engagement (ROE) training. Leader training might include how to plan and conduct operations in peace-enforcement, Officer Professional Development classes (OPDs), Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT)s and schoolhouse classes. Units should train

periodically in OOTW scenarios and environment, including Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations.

We must resolve the contradiction between METL, which focuses training on a few specific tasks, with the FM 100-5 tenet of versatility, which requires units to be able to do anything, anywhere, any time. The 10th Mountain Division (Light) has developed a 5 prong training strategy to prepare for missions at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).⁴² USAREUR now conducts a 2-5 day peace operations mission out of its 21 day rotation at Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) under 2 scenarios--peace enforcement and peace keeping. Peace keeping includes: establishing, operating and reinforcing observation posts and securing convoy operations. Peace enforcement missions include monitoring the separation zone between belligerent parties, attacking and defending.⁴³

With downsizing and PersTempo (PersTempo measures the amount of time a soldier spends away from home station and family because of temporary deployments) that has increased 300% since the late 1980's⁴⁴, all units are likely to be involved in peace operations. Therefore, all army units should revise their METLs and develop training programs to achieve the standards required to conduct peace operations. A way to do this might be to follow a proposal by John W. Jandora. We must first identify potential threat forces we may face (Regime forces, Insurgent or factional forces, Terrorists, Criminal Organizations or Armed Populace). Then,

propose appropriate mission activities to address these threats. Intelligence gathering requirements may be a useful basis for developing technology and training procedures that are effective against these threats.⁴⁵

As an alternative, if we cannot identify specific threats, it may be that we return to the Civil Disturbance Training conducted by the Army some twenty-five years ago. At that time, every soldier was subject to face domestic rioters with little advance notice or opportunity to train before deployment. Therefore, periodically, small amounts of training were required for units and leaders to sustain their proficiency in this non-combat task. The focus was on crowd control, minimum use of force, ROE and Civil-Military relations.

A third approach might be to designate some units and individuals for use in OOTW and give them peace operations as their METL tasks. Otherwise, we can accept a lower competence across the board so that all forces train and can function in the OOTW environment. As a recent speaker to the Army War College Class of 1996 put it, "Good enough in all threats and not great in any one threat."

An excellent initiative being undertaken is Warrior XXI. This remote site learning allows units conducting peace operations in the field to broadcast live their techniques and lessons learned to follow-on or replacement units at home station. This is a great example of leveraging technology to improve training readiness and is particularly

important for units deploying on short notice, Reservists or individual replacements.

Force Structure. A recent book suggests that the DOD should examine three alternative means to fulfill the requirements posed by peace operations. These alternatives are:

1. Creating a pool of US active forces that prepare for peace operations as a secondary mission.
2. Restricting US contributions to providing specialized capabilities, equipment and training.
3. Depending more on designated reserve component forces and civilian contractors.⁴⁶

Since peace operations are inherently manpower intensive, we are faced with unappealing choices. We can increase the number of soldiers in units or add units to the force structure, especially dismounted infantry and selected specialties for OOTW. If we do not do this, the PerSTempo for units will continue at an unacceptable rate and would probably cause deteriorating morale and declining force retention. A third option is to conduct training that keeps all units at a minimum level of proficiency for peace operations. The only other option would be for the administration to avoid involvement in peace operations. Given our national security strategy of engagement and enlargement, it is neither likely nor feasible that we will refrain from peace operations any time in the future.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we are facing important decisions for the future with a reduced budget and uncertain threats.

Peace operations will be the future armed conflict involving the US for the next 20 years. Our evolving doctrine described in Force XXI is best suited for the high intensity conflict end of the spectrum, the most dangerous threat we may face in the 21st Century. However, Force XXI is deficient when applied against the requirements for OOTW and peace operations, the much more likely near term threat. If we do not adjust our focus, research, training and leadership, as well as force structure, we are subject to have a superbly armed force that is unsuitable to fight the enemy we face.

As recent conflicts, (including Viet Nam and Somalia) demonstrated, technological superiority and firepower alone do not decide outcomes. Future adversaries will use both low and high-tech solutions to counter American high-tech advantages to strike directly at our centers of gravity.⁴⁷ Americans must be disabused of the notion, vastly reinforced by the fabulous success of Desert Storm, that technology is sanitizing war or paving the way for an era where technologically advanced countries such as the United States will employ the military instrument bloodlessly.⁴⁸ The United States' own standing as an old-style superpower will become increasingly questionable as we disarm and as our sophisticated military power becomes irrelevant to solving many of the ambiguous problems confronting us.⁴⁹

Force XXI has shortcomings preparing us to fight in the 21st Century. The greatest danger is that we will focus our

energies on preparing for the war we want to fight instead of the peace we need to keep. We can harness technology without becoming a slave to it. Our training must prepare our soldiers to face the current threat, which may not be the one we want to face, but it is the one we will have to face. Col. Gary Griffin sums it up in Military Review:

Designing a land force with the flexible doctrine, relevant training, necessary material and, most of all, dynamic leaders and skilled soldiers essential for success is the greatest intellectual and practical challenge facing the United States since its emergence as a world power a century ago.⁵⁰

NOTES

¹ Col. Gary B. Griffin, US Army, "Future Foes, Future Fights," Military Review 74 (November 1994):57-8.

² Ibid., 56-7.

³ Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War as quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly vol. 273 (February 1994): 73.

⁴ LTC Benedict, "A Critical Analysis of Force XXI from a OOTW Perspective," Army Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict paper, September, 1995: 1.

⁵ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington:U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993):13-0.

⁶ Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington:U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994): 22-3.

⁷ BG Morris A. Boyd, "Peace Operations: A Capstone Doctrine," Military Review (May-June, 1995): 22.

⁸ The ideas for this paragraph and items 1-4 were taken from William J. Durch and J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations," in Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy, ed. Antonia H. Chayes and George T. Raach (Washington:National Defense University Press, 1995), 29-30.

⁹ Principles 5-7 come from Boyd, "Peace Operations", 24-25.

¹⁰ BG Morris J. Boyd and MAJ. George E. Dodge, US Army, "Force XXI Operations," Military Review 74 (November, 1994): 22.

¹¹ U.S. Government Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment and Other Factors on Unit Capability, (Washington:USGAO, October, 1995): 16, 46.

¹² Durch and Vaccaro, 33.

¹³ Ibid., 35.

¹⁴ General Accounting Office, 10.

¹⁵ General Accounting Office, 17.

¹⁶ Editorial, "Reshaping a Mindset," Army Times, 11 December 1995, p. 32.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Force XXI Operations, TRADOC Pam 525-5 (Ft. Monroe, VA:TRADOC, 1 August 1994), 3-1.

¹⁸ GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and Togo West, America's Army of the 21st Century--Force XXI (Washington:Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, January 15, 1995): 14.

¹⁹ The ideas for this paragraph are taken from LTC Felker, Warfighting Vision 2010. A Framework for Change (DRAFT) (Ft. Monroe, VA:Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Division, August 1, 1995): 12.

²⁰ Ibid., 10-12.

²¹ Benedict, 2.

²² Felker, 6.

²³ MAJ Kurtis D. Lohide, USAF, "Desert Storm's Siren Song," Airpower Journal 9 (Winter, 1995): 108.

²⁴ MAJ Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. USMC, "Beyond Luddites and Magicians: Examining MTR," Parameters 25 (Summer, 1995): 18.

²⁵ LTC (ret.) Fred J. Brown, Tactical Situational Awareness: The Human Challenge, paper prepared for War in the Information Age Conference, Cambridge, MA, November 15-16, 1995, 212.

²⁶ R.L. DiNardo and Daniel T. Hughes, "Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare," Air Power Journal 9 (Winter, 1995): 76.

²⁷ Sean D. Naylor, "Digitized Force Better, Not Smaller," Army Times, 23 October 1995, p. 32.

²⁸ Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel--Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Peacekeeping Post-Cold War," Small Wars and Insurgencies 4 (Autumn, 1993): 257-8.

²⁹ Chayes and Raach, 9.

³⁰ Ibid., 127-128.

³¹ Lohide, 109.

³² A.J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Times," The Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter, 1995): 51.

³³ Boyd, 28-9.

³⁴ General Accounting Office, 26.

³⁵ Benedict, 2.

³⁶ Chayes and Raach, 10-11.

³⁷ The ideas in this paragraph come from LTC Benedict, 1.

³⁸ The Army and Marines have enhanced protection of armored HMMWVs and tiles to protect Bradleys. Army and Marine Corps are studying urban warfare technology and identifying equipment needs here. In addition, they are identifying appropriate systems and purchasing commercially or working with labs to develop or acquire non-lethal equipment such as sticky foam, aqueous foam, road spikes and non-lethal munitions.

Army and Marines are jointly developing MOUT equipment beginning in 1996. Specific areas:

1. Reconnaissance & Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
2. Situational awareness
3. Communications
4. Navigation
5. Discriminated application of firepower
6. Anti-sniper
7. Mission planning
8. Combat Service Support (CSS)

Army Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is working on Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), non-lethal weapons, soldier protection from detection by sensors & NVGs, translation equipment-real time. Dismounted Battle Lab, MP School, TRADOC & Army Material Command are also working equipment issues. GAO Report, 6-7, 41-43.

³⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁴¹ Ibid., 11.

⁴² The 10th Mountain Division training strategy for JRTC is:

1. Integrate operations other than war factors into conventional training.

2. Periodically participate in a peace enforcement rotation at the combat training center.
3. Integrate a 1 or 2 day optional peace enforcement package into the leadership training program at Army CTCs.
4. Integrate peace operations into a program of instruction at Command and General Staff Colleges (CGSCs) and the War Colleges.
5. Dedicate some OOTW training for leaders in the following areas: Intelligence, Coalition Logistics, Measures of Effectiveness, Negotiating Skills, Country Team Relations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), UN agencies, Media management and PSYOPS. Ibid., 21.

⁴³ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁴ Editorial, "Money Matters," Army Times, 15 April 1996, p. 32.

⁴⁵ John W. Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters 25 (Spring, 1995): 58.

⁴⁶ Chayes and Raach, 73.

⁴⁷ Felker, 31.

⁴⁸ Bacevich, 53.

⁴⁹ Col. Richard M. Swain, "Adapting to Change in Times of Peace," Military Review 74 (July, 1994): 51.

⁵⁰ Griffin, 60.

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