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**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS AT WORK**

BY DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED &

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**Special Operations Forces and Counterproliferation:
The Interagency Process at Work**

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Special Operations Forces and Counterproliferation:
The Interagency Process at Work.

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 1 April 1996 **PAGES:** 24 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The threat of use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the United States or against American vital interests overseas is real. Combating the proliferation of WMD has become a high priority for the U.S. Government. Within Department of Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DOD CPI) of 1993 Special Operations Forces (SOF) have become pivotal players in the creation of a full range of military options to counter this threat. SOF provides the National Command Authority (NCA) with flexible and responsive options. In order to successfully execute any type of CP related special operation, the interagency process must be fully engaged and synchronized. This study assesses the nature of the threat, reviews the evolution of the DOD CPI, and focuses on the use of SOF as an instrument of U.S. policy. Specifically this study explores the connectivity of the interagency process to support a U.S. SOF Counterproliferation mission.

Introduction

Wall Street was crowded on this warm fall day. People were hustling to and from appointments. Shoppers were busy. As always, the streets were packed with bumper-to-bumper traffic. No one paid attention to the couple sitting at the corner of Broadway and Exchange, nor did anyone question the presence of a small aluminum case they carried. The man and woman were non-distinctly dressed. They blended well with the New York City crowds. No one knew that they were members off Aum Shinriyko, the dangerous cult responsible for the 1995 subway attacks in Japan. And of course no one knew, including the US government or local law enforcement officials, that this couple had secretly been manufacturing Anthrax in a warehouse in the Bronx. These two and several other bright young terrorists developed the recipe for the deadly potion by surfing on the Internet for the information provided by the US government printing office. In a matter of weeks they had manufactured enough Anthrax to kill half the population of Manhattan if the weather conditions were favorable. At 1150, the suitcase is placed between a park bench and a garbage can. A small bomb is set to detonate at 1200 hours exactly and release its deadly biological contents.

Obviously, this story is currently fictional. Is it plausible? Will it remain fictional in the future? The threat of use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the United States or against American vital interests overseas is real. A Senate Sub-committee recently reported that "These weapons may be the most serious threat to our national security in light of the growing evidence that some terrorist groups and rogue states have already acquired and others are actively seeking such weapons for their arsenals."⁽¹⁾ How has the threat from WMD evolved since the end of the Cold War. How should the US government respond to this threat. If the National Command Authority (NCA) elects to use military force, how could US Special Operations Forces accomplish the mission? Finally, how will the interagency process support their decision and the mission of assigned Special Operations Forces?

This paper will address these questions, focusing on how the interagency process must be synchronized to successfully plan and execute a special operation in support the National Military Strategy, and provide a model process and recommendations for consideration.

Threat

Massive violence is not new, nor is killing large numbers of people. We have proven ourselves fairly adept in the art of killing. WMD merely makes it easier and quicker. It is alarming that the global WMD paradigm has shifted so substantially. No longer do the U.S. and Soviet Union alone control most nuclear and chemical/biological arsenals and stockpiles around the world. Of the 185 UN member states, 8 or more have nuclear weapons, 20 or more have chemical weapons, and 18 or more can deploy ballistic missiles.⁽²⁾ Possibly another half dozen countries are in the market for WMD and the means to deliver them. Missiles apparently seem to be the WMD delivery system of choice, but they certainly aren't the only means.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent loss of control over the former Soviet Union's stock of weapon-grade nuclear material have greatly increased international angst. Of even more immediate concern is the possibility of former Soviet technicians armed with their information/data bases, specialized equipment, or even weapons showing up in the international market place. Another disconcerting trend is the growing demand for WMD (especially nuclear weapons) in the international arms race.

During the Cold War, the bi-polar environment produced relative predictability. That “discipline” is now gone, replaced by regionally focused arms races. The 1995 strategic assessment from the Institute for National Strategic Studies indicated that in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, WMD were becoming “the Currency of Power.”⁽³⁾ The continued presence of destabilizing regional powers like North Korea, Iraq, and Libya pose an on-going threat to US vital interests around the world. Moreover, we are increasingly concerned about WMD becoming the “tool of choice” for terrorist groups. We are identifying an increasing number of rogue or radical fundamentalist groups who devise terrorist plans in order to grab headlines in the newspaper, or get 30 seconds on CNN. Today terrorism has moved to a new plateau of violence. We need only consider the nerve gas attack in the Japanese subway by Aum Shinriyko for verification. Finally, our perspective of the WMD proliferation threat must now acknowledge the information explosion:

The widening proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing application of civilian technology to military purposes, the weaknesses of anti and counterproliferation regimes all point to the possibility of “small” wars getting bigger and nastier, and spreading across borders--including the borders of the so-called Zone of Peace in which the high-tech powers dwell, and in which war is supposedly inconceivable.⁽⁴⁾

Proliferants can now enter the information super-highway to find an abundance of data on the development, sale, and use of any type of WMD. Recipes and directions for making WMD are readily available in open literature and on the Internet.⁽⁵⁾

The US in the post Cold-War era cannot ignore the threat of WMD in the hands of a rogue nation, political madman, or criminal elements. How Washington is responding the threat marks another chapter in our evolutionary National Military Strategy.

US Response: Defense Counterproliferation Initiative

One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction whether they are nuclear, chemical or biological; and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away...If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure.

President Clinton⁽⁶⁾

As President Clinton stated, combating the proliferation of WMD has become a high priority for the United States Government. Our national strategy aims at preventing further proliferation, protecting US vital interests at home and abroad, as well as protecting and ensuring the safety of our military forces from WMD.

To demonstrate its resolve, the Clinton Administration has created a dedicated interagency working group, headed by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, to focus on counterproliferation efforts. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Security and Proliferation has assumed primary responsibility for coordinating counterproliferation policy and acquisition activities within OSD.⁽⁷⁾

In one of his last acts as the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin laid out the basic tenets of the Department of Defense (DOD) Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). He stated that the Bottom Up Review highlighted four major threats to the United States: The highest priority was the danger posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Two key events triggered the Secretary's new policy: First, we have come to a frightening realization of how close Saddam Hussin came to secretly procuring and using

a nuclear weapon against US forces in the Gulf War: Second, we were dealing with the recurring nuclear projects of the radical regime in North Korea ⁽⁸⁾. The objective of the CPI is to prevent proliferation and protect the vital interests of the US and its allies, including their civilian populations and military forces.

The designers of the CPI were pragmatic realists in every sense. In a 7 December 1993 speech before the National Academy of Sciences on International Security and Arms Control, Mr. Aspin noted that “in past administrations, the focus was on prevention...Prevention remains our pre-eminent goal.” ⁽⁹⁾ However, the DOD CPI acknowledges that with the increasing threat, the chances for total prevention is decreasing, thus the CPI increased emphasis on protection, rather than prevention. Aspin stated that increasing military capabilities to deal with the new threat was the nucleus of the CPI.

Mr. Aspin elaborated on five key elements of the CPI: First, it creates a new military mission of counterproliferation ⁽¹⁰⁾. (This will be addressed in more detail later.) DOD has taken steps under Secretary Perry’s guidance to create a clear policy which will help the warfighters plan and train for counterproliferation related contingencies. ⁽¹¹⁾ Second, it changed DOD’s acquisition system to meet the threat. For example, the procurement of non-nuclear penetrating munitions for use in selected strike operations. ⁽¹²⁾ Although DOD’s overall acquisition reforms have been slow, efforts have accelerated for procurement of selected items of equipment to protect our forces. Third, military planners have fully integrated the CP threat into mission planning in terms of operations, tactics, and procedures. Mr. Perry tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the regional CINC's to develop plans to deal with the specific threats in their areas.⁽¹³⁾ DOD's Joint Precision Strike Demonstrations are designed to develop and demonstrate new procedures and techniques for monitoring and detecting threatening delivery systems. This initiative is not a panacea, but it's a big step in the right direction. Fourth, the aforementioned discovery that Saddam Hussin's nuclear weapons program was much more advanced than we knew highlights the need for improved intelligence support for counterproliferation. Although the Director for Central Intelligence (DCI) created a Nonproliferation Center within the intelligence community,⁽¹⁴⁾ we still have a long way to go. The apparent "intelligence failure" leading up to the gas attack on the Japanese subway in March 1995 is illustrative. Finally, the CPI fosters international cooperation. Combined operations are now the norm for a multitude of military operations. We must continue engaging our allies in constructive military planning, in intelligence exchanges, and in diplomatic dialogue. In the past several years the DOD has made strides in this regard with NATO, the Russian Republic, Japan and South Korea.⁽¹⁵⁾

Without a doubt, WMD pose a viable threat. To protect American interests, we must maintain a credible ability to respond aggressively, with a full range of economic, political, and military options. The DOD CPI provides a frame-work for fully integrating the military capabilities into the NCA's decision making process. As Les Aspin told the National Academy of Science Committee on International Security in Dec. 1993, "At the heart of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative...is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this threat."⁽¹⁶⁾

When U.S. nonproliferation efforts ultimately fail, a virtual certainty, the NCA must decide how to respond. How long will Washington tolerate WMD in the hands of a Saddam Hussein in Iraq or a Muammar Khadafi in Libya? How does the use of the military fit into our national counterproliferation strategy? Let's explore the military option in more detail.

Military Options

Lewis Dunn, Vice President and Manager of the Weapons Proliferation and Strategic Planning Department of Science Applications International Corporation, believes that traditional responses to proliferation have failed to synchronize US national and international efforts. He offers four concurrent approaches to the problem: First, leverage global arms control and non-proliferation actions; second, institutionalize a presumption of UN Security Council action in response to non-compliance and to deal with threats of proliferation to peace; third, deter acquisition of WMD by potential regional rogue states or entities; and fourth, conduct contingency planning to provide active or counter force military options.⁽¹⁷⁾ The final two recommendations fit squarely in the military sphere of responsibility. Deterring acquisition requires both a political and "military" bite. However, the political/diplomatic process must clearly take the lead. Even so, the military option places DOD in a leading role, putting a premium on the interagency planning process.

The types of Counterproliferation (CP) missions involving US military forces will vary greatly. DOD's February 1995 annual report to the President and Congress

identified eight functional areas for study under the rubric of

Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation:

- . Intelligence
- . Battlefield surveillance
- . Passive defense
- . Active defense
- . Counter force capabilities
- . Inspection support
- . Export support
- . Counter-terrorism ⁽¹⁸⁾

These eight functional areas reside within an offensive and defensive context relating to our overall national military objectives. A Congressional Research Service Report recently provided four basic military objectives relating to the WMD threat:

- . Disable or destroy enemy NBC units, delivery systems, and munitions stockpiles.
- . Control escalation.
- . Limit damage and casualties to U.S./allied military forces and installations, as well as among noncombatants.
- . Conclude combat quickly on U.S./allied terms. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Planning and execution of these objectives will require synchronization of many DOD and Non-DOD assets. Given the nature of the threat and the seemingly fragmented geo-political situation, the NCA requires the greatest possible flexible response capability. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide that flexibility and have increasingly become the NCA's instrument of choice.

Implication for SOF

Even the definition of combat is changing. While traditional concepts are still valid, we are finding new definitions of combat embodied in new kinds of military operations, such as humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, a whole range of people operations, counter-proliferation...⁽²⁰⁾

*General Wayne A. Downing, USA
Commander in Chief, USSOCOM*

As we continue to scrutinize Mr. Dunn's recommendation for "active measures" for counterproliferation, we can see that SOF increases the NCA's range of options in dealing with the threat. Special Operations are defined as "Operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary military forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in an hostile, denied or politically sensitive area."⁽²¹⁾ By their very nature, SOF operate in a high stakes and high risk environment. Current Special Operations Forces doctrine is joint and differs from conventional military operations in that it:

- . Requires unconventional training and unique equipment
- . Is virtually always constrained by the political sensitivity of the mission
- . Melds traditional, conventional principles of war with unorthodox approaches
- . Is extremely time-sensitive; the right place at the right time
- . Requires timely, accurate, relevant, and tailored intelligence⁽²²⁾

Since their creation, SOF has often been misunderstood and poorly used. This has changed dramatically since 1987. The basic tenets of SOF doctrine are now well understood both in and outside the special operations community. Although SOF roles and missions have expanded in recent years, the one constant is the high quality of the

individual SOF operator. SOF professionals are some of the highest quality people in our services today.

The precise role of SOF in Counterproliferation continues to evolve. On 5 May 95, Secretary Perry formally tasked Commander, USSOCOM, to "Assume responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and otherwise preparing US Special Operations Forces (as specified in Title 10, US Code, section 167) to conduct operations in support of US government counterproliferation objectives."⁽²³⁾ As further indicated in the SECDEF memo "your responsibilities as a supporting commander or as otherwise directed by the NCA will be clarified by the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff in a forthcoming revision to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan."⁽²⁴⁾ SOF clearly now plays a major role in our national military strategy for counterproliferation. H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) stated at the fifth annual conference of the American Defense Preparedness Association that "Special Operations Forces (SOF) can add to the range of options including reconnaissance and intelligence collection, clandestine operations to disrupt weapons research and development; and attacks on weapons systems, storage facilities or Command, Control and Communications Centers."⁽²⁵⁾ DOD's report to Congress also highlights the potential use of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) to communicate to target audiences American resolve to prevent further proliferation.⁽²⁶⁾

But a SOF counterproliferation mission will be very complex. SOF currently has the responsibility and capability to plan for a unilateral CP operation. But in today's world, that possibility is becoming very remote. In recent missions in Haiti and Somali, as well

as currently in Bosnia, SOF has been fully integrated with Joint and combined conventional forces. As Ambassador Holmes said in a 1994 interview, "Not only are SOF operations increasingly joint, but they are also increasingly "interagency." (27)

Interagency Operations and Coordination

Unity of effort in the interagency environment can only be achieved if all the critical government agencies are included in the contingency planning process.⁽²⁸⁾

The NCA will decide whether or not SOF should be used in conducting a counterproliferation mission. This decision hinges on effective interagency operations and coordination. The interagency process ensures that all options are carefully considered and that all information and guidance regarding the decision moves quickly up and down the chain, as well as laterally. Most importantly, the goals and objectives of the operation must be kept synchronized with our overall national strategy. Players in the interagency arena must overcome parochial bias and "turf issues" which could affect the operational planning and execution. Philosophical and operational differences cannot be tolerated.

Our operations in Panama highlighted the importance and difficulty of synchronizing the interagency process. Although analysts differ in their assessments, they all agree that without a fully engaged interagency process, the risk of "failure" dramatically increases.

Note this assessment of the civil-military planning and execution for operation JUST CAUSE:

Although relative unity of effort was achieved among the military forces, the same cannot be said of the interagency arena. Rather, unity of effort among the several US Government agencies

was ragged at best. Foremost among the reasons was that throughout the planning process, none of the agencies that would have to participate in the restoration of Panama were permitted to know the existence of BLIND LOGIC. It was classified, compartmentalized, and held exclusively within DOD channels.⁽²⁹⁾

Coordination for a successful SOF counterproliferation mission will require a unified national and international interagency effort. We have noted that most SOF missions are extremely politically sensitive. Moreover, planning and execution of a SOF counterproliferation mission would require near perfect synchronization of intelligence and command and control assets, and logistics support. Information and intelligence regarding the target will be fleeting, so timing becomes a key ingredient to successful mission accomplishment. Fundamental to the entire process is designation of the individual in charge of the operation: centrality and unity of command.

The decision to execute any type of military mission against a proliferant state or organization will require NCA direction. The NCA will also, as a part of this decision, appoint a lead agency or executive agent. DOD should clearly have the leading role, with support from numerous other government agencies and select non-government agencies. The NCA must also make a decision to assign the military mission to a geographic Commander in Chief (CINC) or, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, task CINCSOC with the mission. Although CINCSOC has been tasked with responsibility for initial planning of an offensive CP mission, I believe that under most circumstances Combatant Command (COCOM) will be retained by the land-owning CINC, while CINCSOC will provide a highly trained and specially equipped Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to execute the mission.

Interagency Players and Their Roles

Draft Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-08 discusses in detail the interagency environment. It sets forth joint doctrine for achieving coordination between DOD, other governmental agencies (GO's), non-governmental agencies (NGO's), private voluntary organizations (PVO's), along with other regional/international organizations. It also provides potential methodologies to synchronize interagency operations.⁽³⁰⁾

Understanding organizational relationships and functional roles is key to successfully planning any military operation. We have stated that success of an operation as politically complex and time sensitive as a offensive counterproliferation mission hinges on how well the interagency process works. JCS Pub. 3-08 generally addresses relationships and roles. The following typology describes organizational relationships concerning a counterproliferation mission in terms of primary responsibilities and the organizations' core competencies. These competencies represent the inherent skills or functions within an organization that enable mission accomplishment:⁽³¹⁾

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Core Competencies</u>
A. National Security Council	-Advises and assists the President by developing, tracking and implementing national policies. -Provides foundation for interagency coordination.	-Personality Dependent -Meshing CP issues with long-term national strategies. -Able to gather information, ideas; then synthesize data.
B. Dept. of Defense	-Security of US, its possessions and vital interests. -Uphold and advance national policies and interest. -Military departments: organize, train, equip and provide forces. -Combatant commanders:	-Rapidly respond to threats. -Deter proliferation by defensive and offensive means.

Exercise command authority,
perform assigned tasks.

C. Dept. of State	-Assist the President as required. -Responsible for Arms Control and international security. -Responsible for global affairs. -Lead agency for international terrorism issues	-Country team replicates interagency mix in Washington. Key for CINC's. - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data bases on transfer of sensitive technology.
D. Dept. of Justice	-Provides legal advice to the president, enforces federal laws, international and federal crimes. - Coordinates domestic terrorism issues.	-FBI liaison offices abroad. -Access to international policy data base. -Lead agency for domestic counter-terrorist capability.
E. Dept. of Energy	-Formulates and executes energy policies, plans and programs. -Overseas intelligence and National Security Programs. -During a crisis meet military defense and energy requirements.	-Provide energy related disaster support. -Provide support to terrorist related incidents. -Coordination with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). -Provide technical assistance to DOD as required.
F. Central Intelligence Agency	-Senior intelligence officers in US Government. -Coordinate, task all intelligence elements. -Correlate and evaluate in intelligence relating to counterproliferation.	-Provide real-time reconnaissance and intelligence collection. -Provide tailored National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) -to DOD. -Coordinates/shares intelligence with foreign governments.

This list is not inclusive. It is dynamic and will potentially change with each mission or target, depending on the weapons content, make-up, location, etc. Other governmental organization (GO's), non-governmental organizations (NGO's), and private volunteer organizations (PVO's) may be also involved.

Related Considerations

Effective, results-oriented, multi-agency endeavors have already demonstrated the value of teamwork. Interagency cooperation works best in an atmosphere that encourages and rewards consensus-building, endowing interagency groups with a level of decision-making authority sufficient to implement national policy.⁽³²⁾

As our world continues to become increasingly ambiguous and uncertain, the role of the military in the interagency process will also evolve. Today we find the military involved in a growing number of non-traditional military operations, including civil assistance, humanitarian relief, and demining as well as numerous conventional military operations. Whether planning for military operations other than war (MOOTW) or an offensive counterproliferation mission, these considerations remain constant: first, the need for timely, accurate, relevant intelligence; second, logistical support; and third, practice and training, especially on interagency operational details.

Intelligence Support

Intelligence support from the national agencies and the international intelligence community must be seamless and time sensitive. Special operations by their nature are tremendous consumers of intelligence as well as being great sources of information. SOF intelligence requirements range from the macro-strategic assessments of a geographic target country or entity, to granular, micro-detailed combat information. The combatant commanders' SOF must have continuous access to intelligence products, automated (and correlated) data bases, and sophisticated mission planning material/equipment. SOF uses this information not only to plan and rehearse the operation but also to continuously assess the feasibility of the mission.

The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee's 1995 report to Congress stated that a mission of US intelligence is to assist those who make and execute US policy in stemming proliferation by:

- . Providing accurate, comprehensive, timely and actionable foreign intelligence;
- . Searching for new ways and opportunities for intelligence activities to add substantial value to policy decisions related to the four aspects of US national

strategy: preventing acquisition; cutting or rolling back existing capabilities deterring weapons use; and adapting US military forces to respond to threats.
(33)

As mentioned before, the CIA's Non-Proliferation Center was created in 1994 to function as the intelligence communities focal point for proliferation-related issues. The Deputy Director for Military Support is responsible for providing the intelligence community with tailored intelligence products as well as providing its traditional diplomatic non-proliferation support. (34) Joint, interagency and multi-agency intelligence activities are essential to counterproliferation mission planning and execution. Gone are the days when the various agencies were asked, "Who's the enemy?" Remember their responses?

State Department: "There are no enemies."

CIA Operations Directorate: "We know who the enemy is, but telling you would endanger the source."

CIA Intelligence Directorate: "We wrote about who the enemy is and what they might do, but management politicized the conclusions."

Defense Intelligence Agency: "We wrote the same thing CIA/DI did, but by the time it got through review, the enemy had come and gone."

The National Security Agency: "We know who the enemy is and what they choose to do, but you aren't cleared for that codeword."

Marines: "Doesn't matter. Mess with best, die like the rest. Do you like John Wayne movies?"

FBI: CIA. (35)

Logistical Coordination

In addition to high quality intelligence, a SOF counterproliferation mission will require extensive logistical support. Logistic issues range from research, development

and acquisition (RD&A), to actually providing the forces' basic and SOF unique equipment. In most cases, a unified interagency effort is required. Marshaling necessary resources will require a holistic approach to planning and synchronization.

USSOCOM is currently developing a device with the ability to provide stand-off, detection, location, and classification of fixed and mobile WMD.⁽³⁶⁾ Meanwhile, DOD continues to accelerate fielding of improved protective suits, filter systems, and other types of personal gear to ensure survivability of SOF personnel.⁽³⁷⁾ USSOCOM's Special Operations Research Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) serves as SOF's centralized management agency for the research, development, acquisition of special operations unique materials and services. Within the joint and interagency arena, SORDAC has primary proponentcy for fleshing out operational requirements and for contracting with other government agencies or industry.⁽³⁸⁾

From a warfighting perspective, logistical support for a "active" counterproliferation operation would potentially include deployment requirements, forward basing support, most classes of supplies (including SOF unique items), and host nation support. Several interagency organizations would be fundamental to the mission.

The ability of SOF to plan and execute a counterproliferation mission hinges on logistical support. The new technologies already mentioned, melded with existing SOF capabilities and infrastructure support, could determine the outcome of SOF's missions.

Interagency Exercises/Rehearsals

William W. Mandel and David G. Bradford wrote a case study in March 1995 proposing methods to encourage and support multi-agency cooperation.⁽³⁹⁾ They sought

to explain how civil and military leaders (and their organizations) can integrate skills and capabilities to operate more effectively.⁽⁴⁰⁾ According to them:

Today, the Unified Commands find themselves operating in regions containing vast “gray areas” where some governments cannot control the cities, regions, or the fundamental functions and institutions of their societies...The environment at the turn of this century will make necessary the artful combination of all elements of our national power...But directly, interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision of peace time engagement.⁽⁴¹⁾

Mandel and Bradford subscribe to a school of thought that says in order for the interagency process to work beyond formal structures, exercises must be held to hone the interagency machine.⁽⁴²⁾ Draft JCS Pub 3-08 indicates that “Rehearsal and synchronization exercises between combatant commands, JTF’s, other elements of DOD, and separate agencies provide an essential forum for key events and policy issues to be coordinated and resolved.”⁽⁴³⁾ SOF must habitually operate with numerous DOD and Non-DOD organizations. This requires detailed, time-sensitive planning, tough standards, and the involvement of key leaders inside the interagency process. USSOCOM forces currently conduct quarterly exercises with the regional CINC’s to test and validate various war plans. A full-blown counterproliferation scenario, including interagency participation, should be forth-coming.

Counterterrorism: A Model for Consideration

Since the early 1980’s, the DOD and several other key interagency players have made great strides in formulating policies and procedures for dealing with international and domestic terrorism by using a standing interagency coordinating group. This

mechanism for interagency cooperation for our national counter terrorism (CT) strategy provides a viable model for the evolving counterproliferation initiative.

A special assistant to the President (NSC staff member), heads a Standing interagency Coordinating Group (SCG) responsible for terrorist related policy, program progress, and operational issues. To date this group, (members including DOS, DOJ, DOD, CIA, DOE) has clearly proven effective at synchronizing the domestic and international intelligence community, as well as coordinating responses to numerous terrorist threats. The Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism Report outlined the following roles of interagency programs and working groups to counter the terrorist threat:

- Technical Support Working Group - assures the development of appropriate counterterrorism technological efforts.
- Public Diplomacy Working Group - designed to generate greater global understanding of the threat of terrorism and efforts to resist it.
- Anti-Terrorist Assistance Coordinating Committee - Coordinates the anti-terrorism training programs of State, Defense, and the CIA.
- Rewards Committee - develops procedures for the monetary rewards program for information on terrorists.
- Exercise Committee - coordinates anti-terrorism exercise programs
- Maritime Security Working Groups - assesses port and shipping vulnerabilities to terrorism.
- Legislative Group - reviews legislative proposals and develops future anti-terrorism initiatives.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Although the report is 10 years old, most of the working groups remain intact or have evolved to another level of functionality. What's important is that this report caused the interagency community to respond to a national strategy (combating terrorism) by

molding and shaping enduring policies and procedures. It remains relevant by providing the interagency arena an azimuth of attack.

DOD's CPI is now three years old. However, I do not believe the interagency process has matured sufficiently to assist DOD in the planning and successful execution of a pre-emptive, or even retaliatory, SOF executed counterproliferation mission. By failing to look to our past, we are potentially posturing SOF for failure.

Therefore, the interagency community should consider these recommendations: First, additional intelligence resources must be provided in order to improve and expand their ability to provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. Secondly, DOD must continue to accelerate the acquisition process to provide our forces necessary protection against today's threat. Finally, the interagency coordination process in support of a SOF CP mission must be rehearsed in detail. Key decision makers must be involved.

Conclusion

In March 1992, then presidential candidate Clinton declared that "no national security issue is more urgent than the question of who will control the nuclear weapons and technology of the former Soviet Empire...We must do more to stop the threat of weapons of mass destruction from spreading."⁽⁴⁵⁾ The threat has continued to grow despite Washington's efforts on counterproliferation. DOD's Counterproliferation Initiative recognizes this fact and takes a step in the right direction. As the CPI continues to evolve DOD must aggressively evaluate the implications and consider a full range of options for which the US military must prepare.

The NCA has required CINCSOC to begin planning for the possibility of offensive counterforce operations against proliferant states or organizations. In order to successfully execute any type of counterproliferation related special operation, the interagency process must be fully engaged and synchronized. All key players must be fully vetted into the planning process. Such fundamental issues as command and control, intelligence, and logistic support must be totally integrated. Most importantly, the entire process must be rehearsed in detail through regularly scheduled exercises. These exercises must always involve the key decision-makers. They should be built against tough, realistic standards and time lines. Once the NCA decides to execute such a mission, there will be no time to educate and train the interagency players. I recommend that the process and procedures for our national counterterrorist strategy serve as a model for our evolving counterproliferation effort.

Endnotes

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