

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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JOINT INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING

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BY

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ABSTRACT

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Ten years after Goldwater-Nichols, it is the opinion of General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that service members do not have an attitude of jointness. This study explores the history of joint training in the Armed Services for an explanation of the development of current training programs and of how they evolved. The paper investigates the basis of the Chairman's dissatisfaction and uncovers the lack of joint training of enlisted in all the Armed Services. Addressing the shortfall in enlisted personnel training, the paper proposes a possible solution. The solution requires philosophical and practical changes to the Armed Services Recruit Training Programs and the creation of a new joint training program for all enlisted personnel called the Joint Initial Entry Training Program.

I. INTRODUCTION

When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win. So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time. Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is the best in the world. Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea. Every Marine must hit the beach believing that there are no better infantrymen in the world. But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win. This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.¹

--General Colin L. Powell (1995)

Joint warfare and team warfare are part of our history and tradition. The branches of the Armed Services, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, have always recognized the advantages of joint warfare, but rarely have they promoted it, except in times of need. Leaders, at all ranks, who saw the advantages of joint operations and were capable of coordinating with leaders in other Services, created the history and tradition of joint operations. They realized the synergy of combined land, sea and air forces created a power greater than the sum of its parts. They determined that joint operations are the most efficient and effective form of military operations. Today, ten years after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1968, jointness is the norm for senior military officers, and numerous joint documents exist. Yet, General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remains unsatisfied with the level of joint warfighting particularly in terms of doctrine, training, requirements, and readiness.² What would he like to see?

The Chairman has challenged service members to adopt a positive attitude toward joint warfare and team warfare.³ This may be an easy task for senior officers who have been educated and assigned to joint tours of duty as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. For most other military personnel, especially enlisted personnel who are not trained for joint operations or to possess a positive attitude toward jointness, the word "jointness" has little or no meaning. The U.S. Armed Services currently provide extremely limited joint operations experience to enlisted personnel from which they can develop positive attitudes towards teamwork with other service members. This "officer only" policy is a shortfall in Service training programs, that will continue to impede the institutionalization of jointness unless it is changed. The U.S. Armed Services should provide enlisted personnel with joint experience by working with members of other services during initial entry training. Such training will develop a positive attitude toward jointness across the future Armed Services.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN JOINTNESS

Since Goldwater-Nichols, the word "joint" appears to be synonymous with joint military operations. However, Joint Publication 1-02 defines "joint" as "...activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate." This meaning covers all contexts and all service members. Thus, the term jointness is used in a holistic sense.⁴ It is not intended to be just a term used by senior officers in the context of military operations.

It is a word that most closely describes the attitude General Shalikashvili wants to develop throughout the armed forces.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the need to educate and provide senior military officers with experiences in joint operations. The Act focused on senior military officers because they plan, coordinate and execute most joint operations and work with Congress and the government on a daily basis. At the time, Congress was fully aware that the unity of effort needed in military operations required jointness "to focus all the energy of the Armed Forces across the full range of military operations, throughout all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical), in every environment (peace, crisis, and war), toward enhancing the effectiveness of military operations."⁵ It was not the purpose of Congress to exclude any group from gaining education or experience in joint operations as, in fact, has happened.

There were a number of factors at the time of Goldwater-Nichols that caused Congress to mandate education and experience for senior officers only. In 1986, Congress was focused on significant Department of Defense (DOD) budget reductions. The additional cost of training junior officers and enlisted personnel in joint operations was prohibitive. Congress also knew the Armed Services considered Goldwater-Nichols as a major intrusion into traditionally "military business" and that there was a limit to what Congress could direct. Congress also expected the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to use joint-trained senior officers to establish joint doctrine and train the remainder of the Armed Services. A short review of history demonstrates how the Armed Services' singular focus on meeting the specific

requirements of Congress in the past has led the Armed Services to overlook the need for a holistic approach to establishing an attitude of jointness across the Services.

In 1945, the Richardson Committee examined the organizational structure of the military and strongly advocated the establishment of a system of joint education and training.⁶ Numerous subsequent studies emphasized the need for senior military officers to possess a much broader understanding outside their individual Services and recommended establishment of joint national security schools.⁷ Later, recommendations from the Baxter Board (1955) and the National War College Ad Hoc Committee (1956), led to the revision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Plan for Coordinating the Education of the Members of the Armed Services.⁸ Throughout these studies, the solution for the lack of jointness remained focused on the education of senior officers at Service war colleges.

The education system of the military remained unchanged until 1975 when the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education recommended the establishment of the National Defense University (NDU) at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Then, in 1982, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, chartered an internal study to improve the organizational and operational process of the JCS system. The study found that better education, more joint experience and improved incentives were needed for officers assigned to joint duty. As a result, the Department of Defense revamped the 1957 General Plan and issued the "Joint Professional

Military Education Policy Document."⁹ These actions made little headway toward improving daily joint military operations of the Armed Services.

Frustrated with a "non-joint" Department of Defense, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986).¹⁰ The Act forced significant changes in joint operations upon the DOD and the individual Services, changes which they were previously incapable of accomplishing because of their entrenchment in institutional self-interests. Changes to these issues are discussed by Carl H. Builder in his book, The Masks of War,

But if the issues get too close to their vital institutional interests--their budgets, independence, or control--then barriers are likely to come up, and the threatened service typically withdraws within itself rather than striking out at the other. Even though this has made for a less tumultuous era of interservice relationships, it has not led to better military planning. Indeed, concerns for avoiding interservice strife may now override service concerns about the quality of military planning.¹¹

The question remains whether or not the effects of Goldwater-Nichols will, in the future, cause the Services to adopt the required changes in joint training without the intervention of Congress.

At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, the Armed Services' attitude toward jointness was on the letter and not the intent of the Act as reflected in an excerpt from an Association of the United States Army Fact Sheet, entitled, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 -- A Primer, summarizing the effect of Goldwater-Nichols,

The emphasis is on jointness to include a major effort to develop a personnel system which produces leaders and staff officers who are qualified in joint matters (as defined by Congress). This is a major incursion into how the Services traditionally have managed their officer corps and may be the

most unsettling aspect of the new Act. Unfortunately, some of the provisions dealing with personnel matters cannot be followed without major changes in career development patterns.¹²

A more important question to consider may be whether or not the Services will approach jointness in a holistic sense or will they address questions of jointness empirically, focusing only on the stated requirements of Goldwater-Nichols? Herein may lie a portion of the reason why the Services have not impressed General Shalikashvili with satisfactory progress toward adopting jointness, either in attitude or in any practical implementation.

Goldwater-Nichols directed numerous major changes in the relationship and responsibilities of the senior members of the Department of Defense and directed specific actions toward jointness. Under Title II--Military Advice and Command Functions, Section A--Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was given a new statutory duty for developing joint doctrine.¹³ Title II, Section B--Combatant Commands (Unified and Specified Commands), required "subject to the President's waiver, that an officer have the joint specialty and have served in at least one joint duty assignment as a general or flag officer in order to be selected as a unified or specified combatant commander."¹⁴ To meet this requirement for joint education and experience and to ensure Service self-interests, senior military leaders revised their general and flag officer development plans. Title IV--Joint Officer Personnel Policy establishes an occupational category, referred to as the "joint specialty," for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint

matters.¹⁵ This statute established specific requirements for training joint specialty officers. The Services were concerned with protecting self-interests and reacted by establishing training programs that focused on meeting the letter, rather than the intent, of causing the Services to work together in a joint manner.

Between 1987 and 1990, the Armed Services conducted an intensive reassessment of the officer military education system. Five major studies were undertaken determine how well the system was functioning, and how it might be improved. The Dougherty Board on Senior Military Education focused on the need for increased and improved joint officer education. The Board's report stated, "officers should be introduced to joint matters at the earliest practical level," and concluded that the nation would be "best served by the widest possible cultivation of joint perspectives in military officers."¹⁶ The Board also offered many recommendations on how to achieve greater jointness through improvements to the structure, curriculum content, and student activities in intermediate-level colleges (ILC) and senior-level colleges (SLC), that is, the Command and Staff College level and War College level.¹⁷

Later, in 1987, the Rostow-Endicott Assessment on the Teaching of Strategy and Foreign Policy at the Senior War Colleges reinforced the importance to national security of including non-military government officials in educational programs. In 1989, the Morgan Initial Certification Group recommended that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should validate the Program for Joint Education (PJE) curricula for the ten ILCs and SLCs and also recommended many improvements to the officer military education process. Next, the National Defense University Transition Planning

Committee evaluated and recommended transforming the National Defense University (NDU) into a National Center for Strategic Studies and to present recommendations for improving the existing educational structure.¹⁸

The last study, the Panel on Military Education of the Committee on Armed Services, chaired by Representative Ike Skelton from 1987 to 1989, assessed a wide range of military educational issues. The Panel recognized limitations in the formal training of senior officers to work and think in a joint rather than parochial sense. Officers could be formally educated in operations of other Services, but the ability to apply that education toward joint operations required joint experience. The Panel understood that the experience of working with other Service personnel toward a common goal, was essential for the development of the desired joint attitude -- a joint attitude that puts the interest of DOD before any individual Service. As a result, the Panel focused its study on education which it could mandate and not on experience.

In order to benefit fully from these organizational changes, Congress believed it had to improve the performance of officers assigned to joint elements. The required personnel changes are contained in Title IV of the act, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy." These personnel changes are designed to ensure quality and two related factors--experience and education. This study focuses on education.¹⁹

The Panel also recognized that:

The Goldwater-Nichols Act would enhance joint education both to meet the increased responsibilities of the joint elements and to provide officers with joint perspectives. Education on joint matters is a basic link between a service competent officer and a joint competent officer. Further, joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements.²⁰

The Skelton Panel addressed three areas of Professional Military Education (PME), *jointness, strategy, and quality*, and directed numerous specific recommendations at improving joint military officer education.

All of the studies above addressed the problem of improving jointness primarily through senior officer education and excluded the education of enlisted service men and women. The intention of Goldwater-Nichols was to cause the Services to act in concert with one another in all operations whether on the Hill, in the Pentagon or in military operations. Congress wanted to establish and improve jointness in a holistic sense throughout the Services and expected joint-trained senior officers to train subordinates and cause the Services to become more joint oriented over time.

In 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the recommendations of the Panel on Military Education and incorporated them into the 1990 Military Education Planning Document (MEPD). This first MEPD established a military education framework that added Joint Introductory and Joint Awareness training to the two lowest levels of a five-level PME framework for officer training: *precommissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and general/flag officer*.²¹ There is no mention of enlisted training.

The subsequent 1993 MEPD clarifies many joint training questions, specifies interrelationships in joint training, and illustrates the educational linkage of the competent service officer to the competent joint officer. This later document also includes a single reference to the need for enlisted education. "The success of military

education relies on the Services to: ... (7) Ensure that proper attention is given to total force requirements (e.g., Reserve components, civilian and enlisted) relative to PME and Joint Professional Military Education."²²

III. JOINTNESS IN TODAY'S ARMED SERVICES

Today, the Armed Services are meeting the statutory requirements for jointness established by Goldwater-Nichols. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made considerable progress towards completing his statutory duty of developing joint doctrine. Numerous Joint Publications abound in the field and many more are due in the near future. Joint-educated and experienced general and flag officers now command Combatant Commands. Senior staff officers, general and flag officers are all joint trained, and the DOD has a functioning joint officer personnel policy and education program. Senior military officers meet joint experience and education standards designed by the Skelton Panel. Successful as these initiatives undoubtedly are, they still do not fulfill the stated expectations of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After nearly ten years, the institutionalization of senior military officer education and experience, has not facilitated an overall attitude of jointness throughout the Services. The Services must recognize the situation and take action to broaden the current program, to include providing education and experience to enlisted personnel, to the *entire force*. Given appropriate education and experience, enlisted

personnel will be able to contribute immeasurably to the attitude that, "Joint warfare is team warfare." This missing component of the "team," to which Generals Powell and Shalikashvili refer in Joint Pub 1, is essential before an attitude of *jointness* and *joint team* can establish and perpetuate itself across the Armed Services.

Today, joint training in the Armed Services has expanded to include Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and interservice initial skills training programs. The JPME is now a portion of the DOD Professional Military Education Framework and includes all active duty officers (18% of the Armed Services).²³ In addition to the senior officer education dictated by Goldwater-Nichols, it includes professional joint education over the span of any officer's career. Precommissioning education includes an overview of the joint arena, its history and purpose. At the primary and intermediate levels, joint training includes a study of joint organizations and command relationships and defense planning systems. Joint senior level training consists of national military capabilities and command structure, joint doctrine, joint planning, campaign planning and joint and combined warfare in the theater context.²⁴ But this is all oriented toward officers.

Interservice initial skills training programs increased in the early 1990s to include nearly 400 military specialties.²⁵ These programs improve management and efficiency of initial skills training by consolidating interservice training. Most programs resulted from work by the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) which was established after the Vietnam War to cut costs by consolidating similar inter-service training programs. It was not until members of Congress and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense recently emphasized lowering training costs, removing redundancy, downsizing infrastructure and fostering teamwork that the Armed Services adopted ITRO's recommendations.

One ITRO objective is to teach every soldier, sailor, marine and airman the same basic skills through joint education and training.²⁶ Examples of existing inter-service initial skills training at consolidated locations are: welding, explosive ordnance, law enforcement and food service. A vanguard program is the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System which has led to large economic savings. The Services adopted these programs to save money and now realize the additional benefits of fostering teamwork and nurturing jointness gained by exposing Service personnel to inter-service dialogue early in their careers.²⁷ While these programs demonstrate the potential for training a larger cross section of personnel in jointness, they do not address jointness in a holistic sense, nor are they designed for the entire enlisted force.

The incorporation of joint training into enlisted careers may appear to be a daunting commitment and added burden for a downsizing military operating on an ever-decreasing budget. Jointness-oriented training is almost entirely absent from enlisted professional training programs of all the Armed Services. As an example, the U.S. Army's "Noncommissioned Officer Education System does not contain a viable piece of Jointness."²⁸ Specifically, the nine month long U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course contains only a single three hour "joint" lesson on joint combatant commands.²⁹ However, traditional NCO roles do not require detailed training in joint

military operations. They do require some training in joint awareness, interservice relationships and joint organizations, to maintain positive attitudes in this regard. If the Services agree, Service professional development programs and career education training can easily incorporate this training without additional course requirements.

Military training and leadership depend heavily upon noncommissioned officers. Participation by NCOs in joint decisions and execution should be consistent up and down the chain. NCOs direct and monitor training that, while not usually joint at the individual and small unit levels, definitely affects joint operations. They enhance jointness by explaining policy to enlisted men and women and glean feedback from them. NCOs enlighten the leadership by listening, questioning, monitoring, reassuring, ensuring, enforcing and reporting back to superiors. These responsibilities are key and essential to successful joint operations. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen should be able to look to the NCO chain to learn about the latest joint policies and decisions. By their sheer number (80% of the Armed Forces), enlisted personnel must be included in the philosophical and practical changes necessary in each Service if jointness is going to be adopted.³⁰

Providing joint experience to enlisted personnel is more difficult and requires a significant change to existing Service Recruit Training and Initial Skill Training institutions. Resource constraints preclude common joint training for enlisted personnel careers except at the initial stage. The Interservice Training Review Organization supports this conclusion, stating, "the greatest potential for integration is found in common initial skill training where individual service requirements are

similar."³¹ If the Armed Services reorganized their existing Recruit Training and Initial Skill Training Programs to adopt a Joint Initial Entry Training Program that included all existing common Recruit Training subjects, a holistic and positive attitude could develop across the entire Armed Services.

IV. ARMED SERVICE RECRUIT TRAINING

There are both numerous similarities as well as distinct differences among the Armed Services' Recruit Training Programs. Recruit Training provides an orderly transition from civilian to military life, instruction in the required basic skills, and motivation to become dedicated and productive service members. Jointness is not taught or emphasized in any program. Training in each of the Services emphasizes discipline, military rules, social conduct, physical conditioning and development of self confidence. Beyond these common objectives, individual Services design Recruit Training to meet their own particular mission and training requirements. Following additional formal or on-the-job training in a particular skill, graduates of Recruit Training have the basic knowledge and skills required to qualify them for service in an operational unit.³²

Many similarities in training among all, or many, of the Services are not obvious because of differences in terms, methods of data computation, and Service traditions and institutions. Armed Service Recruit Training Programs are completely separate institutions that begin stovepiped enlisted career development for each

Service. Other similarities are not readily apparent because they are spread throughout programs that combine Recruit Training and Initial Skills Training. Two such programs are the Marine Corps Boot Camp and the U.S. Army One Station Unit Training (OSUT). The training of general subjects, physical conditioning and basic discipline is similar in all programs. Training at the beginning of each program is the most similar and becomes more Service specific in the later portions of the programs in preparation for Initial Skill Training.

Initial Skill Training includes all formal training normally given immediately after Recruit Training and leading toward the award of a military occupational specialty or rating at the lowest skill level. In 1995, the Army planned 250 course starts a year with an average length of 52 days. The Navy planned 207 starts with an average length of 49 days. The Marine Corps' 209 courses average 87 days in length. And the Air Force offered 234 courses with an average length of 52 days. Successful completion of Recruit Training qualifies the service member to take a position in the job structure of the Service.³³

Air Force Basic Military Training, conducted at Lackland Air Force Base, is the shortest recruit training of the four Services. Training cycles are 6.3 weeks long and require 306 military and 58 civilian training staff members and \$ 3.9 million in Operations & Maintenance funds for FY 1996.³⁴ In 1995, 31,182 regular and 108 guard and reserve recruits entered training.³⁵

Navy Recruit Training, conducted at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Illinois, is the most unique of the four Services. The course is 9.3 weeks in duration

and requires 877 military and 9 civilian training staff members and \$ 4.7 million Operations & Maintenance Funds for FY 1996.³⁶ In 1995, 36,077 regular and 11,947 reserve recruits entered training.³⁷

The Army conducts Basic Combat Training at four different locations, Fort Sill Oklahoma; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The course is 7.9 weeks long and requires 2,290 military and 65 civilian training staff members and \$ 28.2 million in Operations & Maintenance funds for FY 1996.³⁸ In 1995, 62,131 regular, 16,909 reserve and 22,093 national guard recruits entered Army Basic Combat Training.³⁹

The Marine Corps conducts Marine Recruit Training, at Parris Island, South Carolina, and San Diego, California. This course is the longest of the Services at 11 weeks and requires 2,278 military and 8 civilian training staff members and \$ 7.3 million in Operations & Maintenance funds for 1996.⁴⁰ In 1995, 32,072 regular and 5,294 reserve recruits entered training.⁴¹

V. JOINT INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING

A close review of the Recruit Training Program of Instruction (POI), or equivalent of each Service, finds significant commonality in the subjects taught and the academic hours allocated for training. The Air Force's Basic Military Training Course List has the most subjects and academic hours in common with other Service curricula.⁴² The Navy Recruit Training Course Control Document is the most varied,

yet it shares numerous common subjects with the other Services.⁴³ The Army Basic Combat Training POI has much in common with the Air Force and Marine POIs.⁴⁴ The Marine Male Recruit Training Program of Instruction is very common to Air Force and Army POIs as well as the Army Infantry OSUT Program.⁴⁵

Results of a comparison of the Air Force Recruit Training POI subjects and academic hours in other Service POIs are at Appendix 1. It identifies, by subject, the commonality between the different Service POIs. It also demonstrates that enough common subjects exist among Service Recruit Training Programs to fill a common curriculum course three-four weeks long. The Services could take advantage of such a course to create a Joint Initial Entry Training Program where all enlisted personnel could gain positive experience working with members of other Services. The idea that "creating a joint perspective should begin from the bottom up," is a concept that has already been discussed.⁴⁶ Building a positive attitude toward jointness based upon early experience will facilitate jointness throughout the Services.

The creation of a three-four week Joint Initial Entry Training Program is adequate for this purpose. Recruit Training Noncommissioned Officers are adept at establishing and modifying recruit attitudes. "An attitude is a general tendency of an individual to act in a certain way under certain conditions" and can be easily learned through both affective and cognitive experiences.⁴⁷ These experiences can easily be incorporated into a Joint Initial Entry Training curricula of three-four weeks. Joint recruit NCO cadre, modeling an attitude of jointness, will also facilitate the learning process.⁴⁸ "Reinforcement-learning theorists predict that the most effective way to

change attitudes would be to arrange in some way for behavior related to the new attitude to be elicited and then to reinforce that behavior."⁴⁹

The purpose of the proposed Joint Initial Entry Training Program would be to provide an orderly transition from civilian to military life, instill an attitudes of service to country, build team work among members of different Armed Services, and prepare service members for follow-on Service specific training and Initial Skill Training. The objectives would be: first, maintain a curriculum that emphasizes joint training in self-discipline, motivation, basic military rules, physical training and self-confidence while instructing subjects common to current Recruit Training; second, to give recruits the experiences necessary to create a positive attitude toward jointness and team work with members of different Services.

Joint Initial Entry Training would include all Armed Service recruits. A minimum of ten percent of each recruit class would come from each nonhost Service. A minimum of fifteen percent of the military training staff would come from each nonhost Service, with a combined total of nonhost military training staff not less than forty-five percent. Portions of existing Recruit Training sites would be designated for Joint Initial Entry Training. The Services would establish the exact length of the program and training days based upon commonality of training, Military Entrance Processing requirements, efficiency of receiving stations, required Recruit and Initial Skill Training time, and time necessary to achieve standards. Training objectives should be established that require the issue of only two types of uniforms, (physical conditioning and Battlefield Dress Uniforms (BDU)/dungarees). No weapons would be

issued, ammunition expended, or field training conducted. Compliance with the above would ensure cost efficiency and more focused follow-on Recruit Training.

Joint Initial Entry Training offers numerous advantages to the Armed Services and the nation. First and foremost, it would create a holistic approach to jointness that includes all service members, officer *and* enlisted. It would permit the Armed Services to adopt and perpetuate the attitude of jointness which General Shalikashvili addresses in Joint Pub 1. The teamwork experience by members of different Services would emphasize service to country and unity of effort. It would reduce the competitiveness and parochialism of the Armed Services and broaden experiences of the newest service members. The training would help civilians medically, physically, and mentally transition into Service Recruit Training and possibly reduce current attrition rates. It would allow Recruit Training to be more concentrated with fewer administrative disruptions. Joint Initial Entry Training, besides standardizing initial training, would also facilitate standardization among other existing and future Service training programs.

Establishing a Joint Initial Entry Training Program would also facilitate future cost saving measures and open the door to changes in the current, stovepiped, Service education institutions. It would free Recruit Training to incorporate future training requirements: cognitive skills, decision making, organizing information, problem solving and independent operations. Recruit Training could begin training individual service members who must perform more complex tasks with more complex systems in the future.⁵⁰ Joint Initial Entry Training would facilitate the adoption of

common systems for personnel administration, pay, education and benefits. Portions of existing medical and dental Service programs could standardize services. The system of Military Entrance Processing Stations and military reception stations could possibly streamline operations. A Joint Initial Entry Training Program could also facilitate reductions in recruiting expenses and manpower.

The greatest difficulty in adopting a Joint Initial Entry Training Program is the change it requires to the existing institutions of all four Services. Services will have to stop the traditions of training and start training traditions. It will require Service consensus on the curriculum and cause each Service to reorganize its Recruit Training and Initial Skill Training curricula. Services must establish and emplace standardized goals, objectives, military staffs and operating procedures before any training begins. Start-up costs must be acceptable. Different Service uniforms and basic issue must be stocked at different training sites. The transportation of Service personnel to different sites may increase transportation costs until the Services adopt a system that maximizes the assignment of local recruits from the different Services to Joint Initial Entry Training sites. The training time saved from the reorganization of Recruit Training and Initial Skill Training will offset the additional travel time required by an added permanent change of station move by recruits attending Joint Initial Entry Training at a different Service-hosted training site.

V. CONCLUSION

The attitude of jointness desired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is certainly achievable, but not by current Service institutions. Goldwater-Nichols mandated specific education and experience for senior military officers to fix the problem. Later studies recommended solving the entrenched "non-jointness" problem by broadening professional military education to include civilians and junior officers. Few enlisted personnel possess an attitude of jointness, despite ten years of statutory requirements, officer education and training, and doctrine development. The approach used by the Armed Services to train military officers and civilians in conducting joint military operations falls short of the desired outcome. To reach the Chairman's goal, the Armed Services must adopt a holistic meaning of jointness and expand joint training to include enlisted personnel.

Joint Initial Entry Training will instill an attitude of jointness throughout the Armed Services. It will provide enlisted personnel with an opportunity to develop this attitude at the beginning of their careers. This attitude of jointness will then exist in service members during peace and war, in joint and single Service operations, and while assigned to or out of statutory joint assignments. Jointness will not be achieved without both philosophical and practical changes in the structure of the Armed Services.

The military is steeped in tradition and history, much of which is Service specific. A Joint Initial Entry Training Program need not threaten the essential traditions which exist in each of the Services. The separate identities of the Army, Air

Force, Navy and Marines must remain intact. However, we must realistically anticipate the forging of new traditions as the force modernizes and moves into the 21st century. Rather than continuing to merely investigate and discover a lack of jointness, it is incumbent upon the Armed Services to begin now to work pro-actively towards true military jointness.

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²⁷*Ibid.*, 45.

²⁸Robert L. Jordan, Jr., "NCO Joint Education," Memorandum For Record, Fort Bliss, TX: Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 8 February 1996.

²⁹*Ibid.*, AD-1.

³⁰SGM William P Traeger, USA, "A Joint NCO?," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn 1995): 8.

³¹Vicellio, 44.

³²Department of Defense, Military Manpower Training Report FY 1996, (Washington: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), May 1995), 14.

³³Ibid., 35.

³⁴Ibid., C-1 & E-1.

³⁵John Schlichter, "USMEPCOM Workload," Memorandum for Colonel Joseph M. Norberg, Chicago, IL, 14 February 1996, 2.

³⁶Department of Defense, Military Manpower Training Report FY 1996, C-1 & E-1.

³⁷Schlichter, 2.

³⁸Department of Defense, Military Manpower Training Report FY 1996, C-1 & E-1.

³⁹Schlichter, 2.

⁴⁰Department of Defense, Military Manpower Training Report FY 1996, C-1 & E-1.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Air Education and Training Command, Basic Military Training Course Chart, Number LMABM9T000, (Randolf AFB, TX: Headquarters, 737th Training Wing, May 1995), 2-6.

⁴³Chief of Naval Education and Training, U.S. Navy Recruit Training Course Control Document, (Great Lakes, IL: U.S. Navy Recruit Training Command, January 1995), B-1.

⁴⁴U.S. Army Infantry School, Basic Combat Training Program of Instruction, 21-114, (Fort Benning, GA: Directorate of Operations and Training, October 1994), 4.

⁴⁵Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Recruit Training POI Male, SCS 808, (Parris Island, SC: Eastern Recruiting Region, October, 1994), vii.

⁴⁶Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Miller, "Joint Education: Where It Really Should Begin," U.S. Army War College individual study project, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 15 April 1993), 22.

⁴⁷Robert M. W. Travers, Essentials of Learning, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), 386.

⁴⁸Robert F. Mager, Developing Attitudes Toward Learning, (Belmont, CA: Fearon Pitman Publishers, Inc., 1968), 61.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 392.

⁵⁰National Research Council, Star 21 Strategic Technologies For The Army Of The Twenty-First Century, (Washington: National Academy Press, 1992), 3.

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APPENDIX A

COMMONALITY AMONG ARMED SERVICES' BASIC TRAINING SUBJECTS

Subjects Common To All Services' Training (Air Force Course Sequence Followed)

1. Base Details
2. Dormitory Maintenance
3. Dormitory Appraisals/Inspection
4. Drill, Individual
5. Drill, Transitory
6. Wear of Uniform
7. Premarksmanship
8. Group Exercise/PT
9. Confidence Course
10. Dress & Personal Appearance
11. Rank Insignias
12. Rendering Courtesies
13. Code of Conduct
14. Law of Armed Conflict
15. Substance Abuse Control
16. Human Relations
17. Sexually Transmitted Diseases
18. Administration

Subjects Common In Three Armed Services' Course Descriptions

1. Dormitory Guard
2. Marking Locker/Equipment
3. Drill Ceremony
4. Military Citizenship & Ethics
5. Environmental Awareness
6. Security
7. Financial Management

Subjects Common In Two Armed Services' Course Descriptions

1. Reporting Procedures
2. Montgomery GI Bill
3. Military Entitlements
4. Resource Protection
5. Educational Opportunities
6. First Aid
7. General Safety

Subjects Common To All Services (Content Is Service Specific)

1. Enlisted Force Structure
2. Career Progression
3. Quality Force Program

4. History of Enlisted Force
5. Service History
6. Organization of Service
7. Chain of Command
8. Staff Referral Agencies