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**INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR
COUNTERPROLIFERATION**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The success of the Clinton Administration's policy of Counterproliferation will likely depend on the ability of the Intelligence Community to deliver actionable intelligence to a wide range of consumers. This study explores fundamental, non-technical challenges and discusses implications of U.S. intelligence capabilities and limitations. It relies on an examination of recent pronouncements by policymakers, assessments of key Intelligence Community leaders and traditional sources.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION

Since assuming office in January 1993, the Clinton administration has significantly changed U.S. policy towards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Promoting an overarching strategy of counterproliferation, the President has vastly expanded the scope of the policy and the range of options for addressing proliferation threats to the vital interests of the United States and its allies. In discussing the elements of national power that must be applied to achieve the strategic ends of counterproliferation, Secretary of State Warren Christopher recently identified "information" as an element of power ranking along with the traditional economic, diplomatic and military dimensions.¹ In this elevation of information as an element of national power, Secretary Christopher acknowledges the critical role that the United States Intelligence Community must play in providing accurate and timely information to a wide range of policymakers and military consumers responsible for executing the strategy of counterproliferation. The ability of the Intelligence Community to provide such information may well be the "long pole in the tent" that ultimately determines the success or failure of Counterproliferation.²

During the two years since this policy's official introduction, the Intelligence Community's daunting challenges have received comparatively little attention despite the Director of Central Intelligence's acknowledgement that proliferation would represent the most significant intelligence challenge in

the near future.³ Most discussions regarding intelligence support for counterproliferation have focused on requirements for new technologies for offensive and defensive counterproliferation-associated weapons systems, such as precision strike and ballistic missile defense. This paper will explore some of the non-technical intelligence challenges and discuss implications of U.S. intelligence capabilities and limitations for counterproliferation.

The Strategic Intent of Counterproliferation (ENDS)

The U.S. policy of counterproliferation was unveiled on 7 December 1993, when Secretary of Defence Les Aspin announced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCPI) in a speech before the National Academy of Sciences. In announcing the DCPI, Secretary Aspin attributed his concern for counterproliferation to the recently completed Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which identified numerous regional proliferation threats that had emerged with the end of the Cold War. Recounting the projected proliferation threat articulated in the BUR, Mr. Aspin noted that

These new developments tell us a couple of very important things. The first, of course, is that we face a bigger proliferation danger than we've ever faced before. But second, and most important, is that a policy of prevention through denial won't be enough to cope with the potential for tomorrow's proliferators.⁴

Aspin thus endorsed the need to expand the scope of U.S. policy to address proliferation threats that are likely to occur in

spite of efforts to prevent proliferation, thereby marking a fundamental change in U.S. policy. For the first time, the U.S. officially declared that its policy would include options to "counter" proliferation, once it had occurred, through the direct application of all of the elements of national power. Aspin then notably proclaimed that counterproliferation was a new mission for the U.S. military. This new military focus on countering the spread and effects of WMD has been designed to use the threat of U.S. military interdiction both to deter weapons proliferation and as a legitimate response to proliferation. Another essential element in this new policy was a declared intent to be proactive in "combatting" proliferation threats.⁵

Following Secretary Aspin's comments regarding the DCPI, there was considerable confusion regarding the overall strategic intent of counterproliferation. Much of the initial confusion stemmed from the attention garnered by the discussions of preemptive military strikes as a strategic option for countering proliferation. Discussions focusing on military options initially obscured the overarching nature of the policy. Commenting on the "counterproliferation concept," Dr. Georgi E. Mamedov, Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed concern that counterproliferation overemphasized the use of military force at the expense of the diplomatic and economic elements of national power.⁶ The administration itself contributed to this confusion by at times attempting to highlight the differences between preventive nonproliferation and more proactive military

counterproliferation options. Responding to Congressional questions, a White House representative stated that

Nonproliferation is the use of the full range of political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically, or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should that prove necessary.

Counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction.⁷

Despite the administration's early efforts to treat nonproliferation and counterproliferation as discrete concepts, the strategic intent of "Counterproliferation can best be understood as a response to proliferation at any level of weapon development by means of instruments ranging from diplomacy to deterrence and defense." Counterproliferation thus largely subsumes the objective of nonproliferation.⁸ The strategic intent of counterproliferation is to provide the U.S. with the ability to respond proactively to threats at any stage of the proliferation cycle, even on the battlefield. This far-ranging approach vastly increases the nature and scope of intelligence requirements at virtually every consumer level. The first problem, however, begins with the fundamental requirements for managing an intelligence system that is tasked to do much than under past policies. The intelligence process provides a useful construct for reviewing these expanded requirements.

Directing the Intelligence System

The process of developing reliable, accurate foreign intelligence is dynamic and never ending. The intelligence process begins with questions which drive the direction and planning efforts of the intelligence system. This "direction" begins at the top; it is reflected in the intelligence requirements of the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Defense Department, and other governmental agencies.⁹ The intelligence process thus reflects relative priorities and has a profound impact on what is ultimately produced by the system. Post-mortems on the IC's failure to advise policymakers on the state of development of Iraqi WMD programs are indicative of the kinds of problems that arise when the intelligence system is not sufficiently focused.¹⁰ Congressional hearings have shown that the intelligence community had significant information regarding such things as the Atlanta, Georgia, branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's (BNL) \$1.6 billion in U.S. loan guarantees used by Iraq to purchase sensitive technologies for its WMD programs.¹¹

Throughout the Cold War, directing U.S. intelligence efforts against weapons of mass destruction was relatively simple. Policymakers at every level, from the White House to theater military commanders, were clearly focused on the monolithic threat posed by the Soviet Union. No one had to speculate about who the threat was and what that threat might mean to the United

States. The Cold War U.S. Intelligence Community was shaped by the Soviet threat. Its primary mission was to monitor the development of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems and ensure that their capabilities did not surpass those of the U.S. and thereby negate the deterrence value of U.S. strategic forces. With such a clearly defined threat, the role of policymakers in directing the intelligence system was greatly simplified. The IC was able to report on developments with sufficient clarity to satisfy the policy community. The IC was so well focused on Soviet WMD developments that there were relatively few intelligence gaps that required policymakers to make judgements on the need to refocus the intelligence system.¹²

Unfortunately, the clarity of focus characteristic of the Cold War no longer exists. Commenting on the increasing complexity caused by the changing threat environment, Senator John Glenn noted that "Clearly, the tasks you [DCI] and your agency [CIA] have, have been more complex and in many ways far more sophisticated in the post-cold war world than during those happy, stable times when the Soviet Union was the overwhelming focus of our attention."¹³ The IC now faces a more complex challenge in working with the policy community in re-directing its efforts. Policymakers must understand the complexity of new threats, and the IC must understand requirements to deliver "actionable intelligence" within the context of counterproliferation policy. Commenting on counterproliferation's requirements for "actionable intelligence," the DCI stated that

"A virtue of intelligence is no longer measured only on how it adds to our knowledge of a particular subject. It is also measured by how we have directly contributed to United States and multilateral actions to stop proliferation."¹⁴

Key to directing the intelligence system towards the production of "actionable intelligence" will be the IC's ability to rethink certain intelligence protocols shaped during the Cold War. First, the IC must plan for an "environment in which there may well be a shifting set of allies and adversaries."¹⁵ Second, the Intelligence Community and policymakers must develop the ability to better prioritize and deal with multiple threats simultaneously. This will be a difficult process, involving operational requirements to shift extant collection and analytical resources in response to priorities and as well to influence the more long-term application of intelligence resources.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has identified almost thirty states that may be pursuing the acquisition of WMD capabilities.¹⁶ Secretary Aspin's Bottom-Up Review laid the preliminary conceptual groundwork to change the IC's approach. However, changing relationships between the IC and policymakers tends to mitigate against agreement on a new approach. In order to operate in a potentially pluralistic threat environment, with emerging new threats in various stages of development, the IC and the policy community must communicate closely in order to insure that intelligence assets are properly focused. In testimony

before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Roy Godson reiterated the problem in his remark "that policymakers are much too little involved in making intelligence policy--deciding on the ends and means of intelligence."¹⁷

Such dialogue must be based upon an honest depiction of U.S. intelligence gaps and a recognition that policymakers will be required to establish priorities for collection against those uncertainties. In order to facilitate this process, the DCI recently established a new National Needs Process, which is specifically designed for flexible response to rapid changes in the world threat situation. As highlighted in the SECDEF's 1994 Nonproliferation Program Review Committee's Report to Congress, this new Needs Process will be essential for focusing intelligence resources to support requirements.¹⁸ Policymakers will also need more forward-looking intelligence assessments to focus the system. Given the range of responses included in counterproliferation strategy, it will be important for policymakers not just to know who is getting WMD, but how they might be used against the United States or its allies. Similarly, policymakers will require estimates on the vulnerabilities of the U.S. and its potential adversaries, and projections of what might be done to exploit them. The Intelligence Community has traditionally avoided such projections due to concerns of too much involvement in policy.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the IC will have to engage in projection excursions in order to assist policymakers and focus the intelligence system.

Following the Gulf War in 1991, the DCI took a first step in attempting to tackle the operational problem of focusing collection, analysis, and production requirements associated with WMD proliferation by establishing the Central Intelligence Agency's Nonproliferation Center (NPC). Although the role of the NPC transcends virtually all aspects of U.S. counter-proliferation, it is chartered to interface with policymakers and intelligence consumers at all interagency levels and insure that the intelligence system is directed against the most significant threats as determined by U.S. policymakers.²⁰

The NPC was established along the lines of the intelligence models of the successful Centers for Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics. The mission of the NPC is to serve as the focal point for all intelligence matters relating to proliferation issues. The NPC seeks to develop and implement a corporate strategic plan which will produce a balanced intelligence effort to counter proliferation.²¹ Assuming that policymakers and the Intelligence Community can make the necessary decisions to properly focus the intelligence system, the next challenge is the actual collection of information. This task also poses problems that will require new approaches in order to satisfy counter-proliferation intelligence requirements. Many of the difficulties of directing the intelligence system to support the full range of proliferation related programs is revealed through the complex requirements for supporting WMD preventive regimes.

Intelligence Support for WMD Preventive Regimes

Counterproliferation recognizes the importance of regimes designed to prevent and to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Clarifying the administration's position, Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, stated that

In placing new emphasis on countering the effects of proliferation in regional conflicts, we are in no way de-emphasizing our efforts to prevent proliferation in the first place. Prevention is our first choice and our highest priority.²²

One of the mainstays of U.S. strategy for preventing the spread of WMD is to actively participate in the protocols outlined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The IC's support for the renewal of the NPT reveals both problems and opportunities for U.S. intelligence under the strategy of counterproliferation.

The NPT represents an agreement among some 169 non-nuclear states to forego nuclear weapons development programs. In return for technical assistance from the five proclaimed weapons states in developing peaceful applications of nuclear power, signer nations are obliged to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and tougher safeguards over their nuclear material and facilities. Although post-Desert Storm inspections in Iraq highlight IAEA weaknesses, statements from both U.S. policymakers and the Intelligence Community have reaffirmed

commitments to the IAEA. Responding to questions posed by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral William Studeman, noted with caution that

Increasing support to international organizations and making more intelligence available to assist their efforts to monitor and verify nonproliferation agreements has become an increasingly important mission. More openness, particularly with such an international audience, requires careful consideration of sources and methods.²³

Studeman's comment indicates the IC's acceptance of responsibility to support international preventive regimes. The IC's support for extension of the NPT further expands the IC role into the realm of policy. Although IAEA inspections are fallible, they nevertheless afford access to areas otherwise denied to U.S. technical surveillance. The DCI has declared that IAEA verification initiatives will be effective in detecting large scale developments that are not in compliance with the NPT.²⁴ In that regard, support to the IAEA and other international regimes may serve to cue U.S. intelligence and potentially perform an economy of force role in freeing up U.S. intelligence resources to focus on other potential areas of national concern. The requirement to support the NPT with U.S. intelligence, however, raises the classic intelligence dilemma of protecting national sources while providing information to policymakers. Although the question is not new, its implications for counterproliferation are significant.

Acquiring weapons of mass destruction is usually a clandestine activity. National intelligence agencies, particularly those of the United States, are likely to have the most complete information on who is trying to get what and who is selling what. However, public disclosure of such information increases the chances that the source supplying will relent. This phenomenon has several implications for formulating nonproliferation policy:

It increases the temptation to emphasize unilateral or bilateral steps to block specific U.S. exports or foreign transfers, as opposed to multilateral actions, which requires broad sharing of information.

It challenges intelligence agencies and policymakers to find ways to share findings with multilateral organizations that monitor proliferation (e.g., the UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency).²⁵

Additionally, the intelligence community must develop new sources of information when old sources are compromised in the course of intelligence sharing with international agencies.

Arguably, the problem of protection of intelligence sources in regards to counterproliferation has become more complex. First, there is clearly a stated desire on the part of senior U.S. policymakers for better access to information on WMD proliferation at an unclassified level in order to allow public access and debate. Key members of Congress have gone on record in requesting that the Defense Intelligence Agency provide unclassified proliferation estimates similar to the 1980s Pentagon surveys on "Soviet Military Power."²⁶ Faced with DIA's steadfast refusal to comply, the U.S. Senate Committee on

Government Affairs, which has oversight on matters of WMD proliferation, began publishing its own open-source document, Proliferation Watch, on matters of proliferation concern to policymakers. Further, Congress contends that information must be made available in order to justify and defend IC budgets as they are increasingly subjected to political scrutiny. Second, concerning the impact of public diplomacy in exposing proliferant's behavior, the IC will be required to adjust to policymakers' demands more than in the past. The entire problem of classification and intelligence sharing also permeates potential coalition warfare associated with counterproliferation offensive and defensive military operations. Other problems associated with collecting information required to support counterproliferation are equally challenging.

Collection Support for Counterproliferation

Counterproliferation's focus on creating conditions for influencing proliferant's behavior at any stage of the weapons development process places exacting demands on collection efforts. In order to successfully collect the desired information, U.S. collection capabilities must be reevaluated. Several challenges and potential problems are evident in a brief assessment of current capabilities.

First, the U.S.'s traditional Cold War reliance on national technical collection means to detect WMD proliferation will remain important, despite the fact that the total number of collection systems has declined.²⁷ National technical collection means, which include satellite-gathered signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) will remain particularly important in monitoring program development.²⁸ Recognizing the need to further enhance technical intelligence collection capabilities, the Secretary of Defense has directed the IC to integrate its efforts with more advanced technical surveillance technologies currently available and under development at the U.S. national laboratories. This directive has produced a significant memorandum of coordination between the Departments of Defense and Energy. These agreements have, according to the 1995 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee's Report to Congress, already produced significant improvements in U.S. capabilities to monitor nuclear explosions and for such things as the forensic identification of nuclear materials.²⁹ Additionally, these cooperative agreements have produced significant developments in other technical programs. Of particular note, the Los Alamos Laboratory is conducting ongoing research and development projects such as chemical analysis by laser interrogation of proliferant effluents (CALIOPE), multispectral thermal imaging (MTI), fast on-orbit recording of transient events (FORTE), and remote ultralow light level identification

system (RULLI).³⁰ These initiatives bode well for increasing the U.S. ability to detect and identify potential proliferant activities. Perhaps the most critical area of support for national technical means will be in direct support to military operations. Before considering this prospect, let's first review collection challenges for supporting less aggressive aspects of the counterproliferation policy. One of the key challenges is to quickly identify precisely the path that a proliferant state might take in order to obtain WMD capabilities.

Iraq's efforts to obtain a nuclear weapons capability through the purchase of key technologies and materials on the international market demonstrate the requirement for new non-technical intelligence collection techniques using both open sources, as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. Post-mortems of Iraqi pre-Gulf War attempts to purchase materials for WMD development have caused the intelligence community to redouble efforts to collect information relative to the transfer of WMD materials on the international market. Collection of this type of information , which indicate efforts to build a WMD program through the global market, has proven extremely complex and manpower intensive. The DCI has acknowledged these difficulties and has concluded that

The proliferation market tends to be driven by demand rather than supply. That is, by countries looking for goods to support their programs rather than by companies or ministries seeking to market their goods solely for economic reasons.³¹

For these reasons, the IC has determined that collections of

information on proliferation behavior on the international market is best focused first on programs seeking such purchases; second, on suppliers with a history of dealing with proliferants; and third, on suppliers judged to have exceptional potential to satisfy proliferants' needs.

The requirement to collect information regarding the strategic intent of a state to obtain WMD capabilities will require far more than merely monitoring efforts to purchase materials or acquire technologies. In order to support the demanding requirements of counterproliferation, the intelligence community must be able to ascertain not only that a country has made the decision to develop a WMD program, but what it intends to do with that program once it is developed. From a collection standpoint, the implication for U.S. intelligence is clear: there must be a far greater emphasis on HUMINT to fill the gaps left by technical collection methods and the less direct collection efforts, such as those focused on activities to purchase certain capabilities.³²

HUMINT involves both overt and clandestine techniques for collecting information from a human source or the direct acquisition of information from a human collection agent. HUMINT includes several techniques that entail increasing levels of risk and payoff. The IC, operating through the CIA and the Departments of State, Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may access information pertinent to counterproliferation through overt official contacts with foreign governments, by debriefing

of foreign nationals, or through data collection by civilian or military personnel assigned to U.S. diplomatic and consular posts.³³ Since the inception of U.S. counterproliferation policy, overt HUMINT collection has played an increasingly important role. This is particularly true in the case of Iraq: Defectors interviewed by U.S. intelligence agents provided critical details on the Iraqi WMD program that had not been revealed in the course of the IAEA onsite inspections mandated by the United Nations. The IC has recently initiated structural changes that are intended to provide better management of overt HUMINT collection programs in the Department of Defense. The changes led to the creation of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), which eliminated Service HUMINT operational responsibilities and placed all DOD HUMINT under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency's National Military Intelligence Command Center.³⁴ This move significantly streamlined collection and reporting tasking mechanisms and facilitated a DHS link with the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. These structural changes incorporated through DHS provide potentially greater flexibility for DOD HUMINT, particularly in situations requiring rapid collection tasking modifications required to support counterproliferation requirements. Unfortunately, clandestine HUMINT is significantly less promising.

Clandestine HUMINT is potentially the most lucrative, and by far the most risky dimension of intelligence collection. Successful placement of an intelligence operative in a position

within a hostile state's government or WMD development program can provide the most accurate information of the status of a program and, more importantly, provide unique insight into the strategic or operational intentions of the state regarding actual use of the weapons. Additionally, HUMINT is essential for successful detection of virtually any WMD program. This is particularly true in the case of chemical programs. As Kathleen Bailey noted in discussions of CW proliferation, "If the country involved were intent on hiding the activity, there would be no way of detecting it unless there were accurate intelligence from a human source."³⁵ The proliferation environment, with its increasing numbers of potential proliferant states and with more avenues for both the purchase and indigenous development of WMD, will place increasing demands on the U.S.'s clandestine HUMINT capabilities. We have noted that determining where best to initiate clandestine HUMINT operations will be difficult. Additionally, the intelligence community will likely face resistance and skepticism from the traditional U.S. suspicion of clandestine intelligence collection operations. Policymakers at all levels must understand the limitations of HUMINT in supporting collection efforts and that such limitations will inevitably lead to significant intelligence gaps on proliferation. These gaps will directly impact on intelligence analysis and assessments required to support counterproliferation.

Analytical Challenges for Counterproliferation

Analysis and production are the last steps in the intelligence process before information is presented to consumers. The intelligence community has taken positive steps to insure that proliferation data is accurately analyzed. The Secretary of Defense has forged a closer link between the Department of Energy's national laboratories and the DCI's Nonproliferation Center, substantially enhancing the IC's ability to analyze highly technical data.³⁶ Despite these improvements, the IC will likely be plagued by problems associated with analysis and assessment of the most dangerous threats--those on the threshold of proliferation. The Iraqi case illustrates some of those problems.

From Iraqi experience, we learned that what a new weapons state does not pursue on world markets, for example, may provide as much information about its indigenous capabilities as what it does purchase. The Iraqi case also surfaced serious problems in assessing the resident level of scientific expertise, despite available information. In addition to assessing threshold programs, the IC will be keenly challenged to analyze and determine what has been characterized as the "strategic personality" of new proliferation states.³⁷

The IC will be critically challenged to determine the position that a new weapons state will assume after it has acquired WMDs. "Does it view WMD as its last-ditch deterrent to

protect the homeland? Or does it view the weapon as strictly a battlefield system, ready to compensate for any tactical disadvantage that arises? What conditions will trigger its use? What countries are targeted in its war plans?" The answers to such questions as these define what has been called the "strategic personality" of the new nuclear weapons state.³⁸ U.S. policymaking depends on how reliable these questions can be quickly answered.

A wider variety of proliferator personalities is possible than is sometimes acknowledged in most analyses of WMD strategy. Yet there is little guidance in the public domain for intelligence assessment. Nevertheless, clues for determining the strategic personality of a new WMD state will come from such things as public statements of political and military leaders and inferences drawn from command and control systems and training exercises that reveal employment doctrine. The key challenge for intelligence analysts will be to develop a credible understanding of the indicators that will reveal this "strategic personality." Such tasks are consistent with traditional analytical approaches. Regarding counterproliferation, however, analysts will likely rely less on standing intelligence data bases of the kind maintained on Soviet forces and more on geographic breadth of coverage, combined with their ability to focus flexibility on peculiar problems in particular targeted areas.

Although the predominant challenges to intelligence support for counterproliferation will center around the larger problems

associated with strategic intelligence and the requisite support at the policymaking level, counterproliferation adds new requirements for support at the military operational level. These requirements are evident primarily in programs specifically associated with the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCPI).

Support for Military Counterproliferation Operations

The DCPI greatly increases the significance of military operations as a policy option for dealing with the proliferation of weapons mass destruction. Recognition of the need to systematically include military options resulted from the administration's recognition of the potential strategic and operational impact of the employment of WMD on the battlefield. This assessment led the administration to accept both offensive and defensive military options as logical developments along a continuum of policy options, which range from diplomatic dissuasion and preventive arms control initiatives to defense initiatives designed to use military leverage to deter, eliminate, or mitigate proliferation threats.³⁹ Credibility of any U.S. military response thus currently assumes fundamental importance.

The credibility of a potential U.S. military response to proliferation is the cornerstone of the counterproliferation concept of deterrence. Deterrence is intended to "persuade even

the most ardent proliferator that the risks of the threat or use of WMD are not acceptable." The credibility of U.S. deterrence under counterproliferation is based upon offensive and defensive military capabilities. The Secretary of Defense has defined offensive military counterproliferation operations as having our military "prepared to seize, disable, or destroy WMD." By definition, potential U.S. military responses range from preemptive strikes by special operations forces to sophisticated strikes using precision guided weapons. Regardless of the strike option selected, target development will require extremely detailed intelligence. Essential Elements of Information (EEI) must focus on the proliferator's operational doctrine. These EEI should include such things as

- threat military doctrine for use, including likely target types.
- command and control procedures.
- US statements that might trigger an enemy's nuclear use.
- alerting procedures that would warn of possible intention to initiate use of nuclear weapons.
- tactical warning indicators signaling that nuclear attack against U.S. forces is underway.⁴⁰

Additionally, US operational commanders will require precise information on the location of WMD targets. This is particularly important to facilitate targeting using precision guided munitions, which are the DOD weapons of choice for destroying WMD.⁴¹

Precision strike operations against fixed WMD facilities show promise for success. Extant national technical intelligence gathering systems have demonstrated success in providing the

precise data necessary for target development. The greatest challenge, as demonstrated during the Gulf War, will be in targeting relocatable targets such as mobile missile systems. The defense intelligence community has placed considerable effort in developing new technologies that will give us this tracking capability. Precision strike demonstrations have shown the potential to use unattended aerial vehicles (UAVs) in conjunction with wide area collectors such as the Joint Strategic Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to detect and target WMD capable missile delivery systems, which pose one of the most immediate threats to US military forces. The ability to link and focus collection in support of precision strike capabilities has been substantially enhanced by improved battlefield communications and automation systems fielded since Operation Desert Storm.⁴²

The defensive element of defense counterproliferation has been defined as

responding to a potential adversary armed with WMD or missiles to deliver them by employing active or passive defenses that will mitigate the effects of these agents and enable U.S. forces to fight effectively even on a contaminated battlefield.⁴³

Although many DOD initiatives have been designed to enhance the protection of individual soldiers on the battlefield, by far the leading defensive initiative is the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. Regardless of the types of systems eventually developed and fielded under the BMD, the primary operational intelligence requirement will be to provide accurate and timely threat missile launch data for cueing the U.S. response.⁴⁴ The

success of this effort will depend largely on the integration of national technical collection capabilities with theater operational resources. The main problem in our reliance on BMD may be competition for scarce national assets in the event of multiple simultaneous conflicts.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The strategy of counterproliferation has defined a bold and flexible approach, clearly capable of providing the U.S. with a variety of responses to prevent and counter the spread and use of WMD. Its success depends on accurate information provided on a timely basis for the initiation of an appropriate response. Presently, the Intelligence Community does not have the capability to consistently respond to complex counterproliferation requirements. The flexibility of counterproliferation is not supported by an equally flexible intelligence system. This lack of flexibility greatly increases the likelihood that the IC will be unable to deliver the information that will allow U.S. policymakers to consistently act proactively. Despite the current shortfalls, there are steps that both the policy and Intelligence Community can take to reduce the likelihood of a failure.

The DCI must play a more dynamic role in linking the intelligence and policy communities. Policymakers must clearly understand where the IC can deliver and where it cannot. The

DCI's establishment of the Nonproliferation Center indicates the Intelligence Community's awareness of potential problems that span the entire intelligence process. Thus far, however, the criticism levied on the NPC by Congress and other members of the policy community indicates a lack of confidence in the IC's ability to change itself into an institution capable of supporting counterproliferation. Given the importance of the NPC in focusing national counterproliferation efforts and serving as a bridge to the policy community, the DCI must empower the NPC and prevent internal IC initiatives that may fragment efforts and appear to the policy community that the IC cannot adapt to the challenges.

Discussions intended to focus the Intelligence Community on specific issues of counterproliferation have to date largely been subsumed by larger discussions concerning the need to reform the entire intelligence system. Ironically, as academics have argued "that intelligence after the Cold War will best serve US national security by focusing on the relatively few problems where it can make a genuinely unique contribution," the expanding areas where the IC has been asked to focus its resources has thus far scattered rather than focused capabilities.⁴⁵ This is particularly the case with counterproliferation. The challenge for both the IC and the policy community will be to jointly ascertain what information should be sought. This statement of priorities must be predicated upon a realistic expectation of intelligence collection capabilities. The policy community must

accept risks in the form of intelligence gaps in areas where resources are inadequate.

Traditional analysis and production techniques used by the IC appear adequate for support to counterproliferation. Analysts will, however, have to improve modeling techniques for interpreting and predicting the complex paths for WMD development. Perhaps the most difficult analytical challenge will be determining the "strategic intent" of emerging proliferant elements. This effort will require extensive cultural and motivational analysis and methods for allowing the consideration of competitive analysis.

As the IC must become more open to the policy community as priorities are determined and analytical excursions become more important, it must also address the long-standing issues surrounding the releasability of information and the protection of sensitive intelligence sources. Two things are apparent as this issue is discussed in the context of counterproliferation policy: several counterproliferation strategy options will require public disclosure of information developed by the IC and policymakers are growing increasingly impatient with what they view as an IC more focused on protecting sources than supporting national security policy. The IC must do more to deliver tailored intelligence to policymakers in the formats that they believe necessary to execute counterproliferation policy. The IC's position regarding the protection of sources requires a complete reevaluation. There are many ways for the IC to sanitize

information and thus make it more usable, without jeopardizing sources.

In summary, the present US intelligence system is not capable of supporting the expansive requirements of counterproliferation. As Counterproliferation becomes more ensconced as a key element of US national security policy, it will incorporate increasing amounts of risks.

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