SPECIAL FORCES' MISSION FOCUS FOR THE FUTURE

A Monograph
By
Major Kenneth E. Tovo
Special Forces



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This monograph examines the doctrinal mission focus of U.S. Army Special Forces to determine if it is appropriate to prepare the force to meet the requirements of the post-Cold War environment. The study suggests that current doctrine, largely written to meet Cold War requirements, is too broad and all-encompassing. With operations tempo for Special Forces units at an all time high, a narrower mission focus would allow Special Forces detachments to use their limited training time to concentrate on its indirect mission skills, which will be in great demand in the post-Cold War environment.

The monograph begins by defining two categories of Special Forces' missions. Indirect missions rely on linguistic, interpersonal, and cross cultural communications skills, regional orientation, and training skills to influence indigenous forces. Examples include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and special reconnaissance and direct action when conducted with or through indigenous personnel. Direct missions rely on the application of firepower, technology, and technical skills in a precise and rapid manner to achieve results. Unilateral direct action and special reconnaissance when performed as unilateral battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance are examples of direct missions. The study traces Special Forces' doctrine from inception to the present to establish that SF was originally focused on purely indirect missions, and examine the reasons for the inclusion of direct missions.

The study then examines two post-Cold War operations, the Gulf War and the intervention in Haiti, to determine which missions, direct or indirect, best met two criteria, suitability and significance, that were derived from Joint Special Operations doctrine. It then proceeds to examine the probable nature of future conflict and Special Forces' role in it. The study concludes that future conflict will be ill suited to firepower and technology based solutions and will require Special Forces to conduct primarily indirect missions.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later signaled the end of the Cold War era. A known, relatively predictable, and stable threat environment has been replaced by one characterized by its uncertainty, complexity, and violence. Seeking to "secure the peace won in the Cold War," the U.S. has adopted a national security strategy committed to remaining engaged in world affairs and enlarging the community of democratic nations.[1] Special Forces' unique capabilities make it particularly suited to this strategy - that suitability, coupled with the chaotic nature of the post-Cold War era, has placed tremendous demands on Special Forces.

The number of missions that Special Forces conducted more that quadrupled from 1991 to 1994.[2] The force is beginning to show signs of wear from the increased tempo. LTG Scott, Commander, USASOC, recently remarked, "I don't think we can afford to pick up too many more projects without letting some go."[3] In a similar vein, MG Garrison, Commander, USAJFKSWCS, commenting on SF operations in Haiti said,

> We've always been at the forefront in these unconventional types of missions...however, we need to make sure the country's leadership understands the demands being placed on us. Certainly it's fair to say that in terms of both dollars and personnel, we're pretty tapped out.[4]

From 1993 to 1995, retention rates for initial and mid term CMF 18 noncomissioned officers have dropped 21.2 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively, an indication that the force may be over stressed.[5] Additionally, high operations tempo has put training time at an all time premium. These conditions make it imperative that Special Forces be employed only on missions that require their unique skills and provide a significant return, and that training is focused on such missions. The basis for employment and training must be sound doctrine - doctrine that focuses training on the skills required to accomplish the

high payoff missions and allows detachments to achieve and maintain a real level of readiness.

Research Question

Given the nature of the post Cold-War environment is the current doctrinal focus appropriate or should Special Forces' doctrine concentrate on indirect operations?

Definitions

Currently, Special Forces doctrine has a dual mission focus. Unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID) are indirect missions that emphasize working through indigenous personnel to accomplish objectives. Direct action and strategic reconnaissance can be conducted as indirect missions, using indigenous assets; however, they are more often conducted as direct missions. For example, a detachment, operating unilaterally, destroys or surveils a target.

The delineation of Special Forces missions into indirect and direct operations is not a doctrinal one, although FM 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations, in discussing how SF commanders influence their operational environment by generating sufficient military power, states that commanders can "...apply this military power through *indirect means* or through the *direct application of combat power* in a specific, usually surgical, economy of force operation (emphasis added)."[6] GEN Wayne A. Downing, Commander, USSOCOM, recently wrote:

> Recent wargames and assessments have caused us to look at the two primary categories of missions that we now conduct. The first is characterized by *direct contact with the enemy*, whether in direct action or special reconnaissance. The second is characterized by *indirect contact with the enemy*, either through training foreign military forces or through our influence on civilian populations and enemy attitudes. The changing nature of war may cause us to readjust the mix of forces we allocate to these two kinds of missions or even to readjust which units perform these missions. For example, can we expect a unit to maintain two very different kinds of skills?[7] [emphasis in original]

For the purposes of this paper, SF missions are classified as direct or indirect missions using the following definitions:

Direct operations: Operations conducted in a unilateral or purely joint manner. They are normally characterized by tight command and control, heavy influence of technology, and rapid execution to seek an immediate decision or precise effects. The executor is a technician; he has finely developed methods and "hard" skills that are essentially appropriate to any environment with minimal adjustment. The technician has often been labeled the "commando." Examples of direct missions include unilateral direct actions involving terminal guidance, raid, or ambush techniques; special reconnaissance when performed as unilateral battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance; combat search and rescue when it is executed in a "point to point" method; i.e., Special Forces provides local security for the aircraft. The key aspect of direct operations is that Special Forces operate independently from indigenous support, and directly apply military power to achieve objectives.

Indirect operations: Operations conducted in a multinational manner. They are characterized by relatively loose command and control, often imprecise or unquantifiable effects, and require persistence rather than precision. The executor of indirect operations must blend "soft" skills with "hard" skills. He has technical skills, but they are often not as fully developed and polished as the technician; he relies on training and teaching techniques, interpersonal and cross-cultural communications techniques, regional orientation, and language qualification. The name "warrior-diplomat" has been used to describe the person required. He succeeds through influence as opposed to technology. Examples include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, coalition support, special reconnaissance conducted using low level source operations or other clandestine collection methods, combat search and rescue when it involves contact with indigenous

personnel, etc. The key aspect of indirect operations is that Special Forces soldiers work through indigenous or other foreign personnel to accomplish their assigned mission.[8]

Background

Although the U.S. Special Forces were not as singularly focused on a major conflict with the Soviet Union as the conventional forces, a great deal of priority was placed, both doctrinally and in practice, on employment in that environment. SF detachments were focused on: Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions to identify operational and strategic echelons, as well as chemical and nuclear delivery systems; Direct Action (DA) missions to destroy critical targets, such as air defense command and control nodes; and, to a lesser extent, on Unconventional Warfare (UW), to exploit the potential of the people in Soviet-occupied territories to resist. To support the national strategy of containment of communism, SF conducted Foreign Internal Defense (FID) throughout the Third World, to enhance the capability of pro-U.S. nations to defeat communist insurgencies. Special Forces doctrine, as reflected in FM 100-25, Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces and FM 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations acknowledges other threats than the Soviet Union; however, the five basic missions of SF remain unchanged from their Cold War roots.[9] In fact, both current doctrinal manuals predate the fall of the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the post-Cold War era coincides with the advent of the Information Age, precipitating what has been termed a revolution in military affairs, in which technological advances are radically changing the nature of war.[10] The twin challenges of the new strategic environment and Information Age warfare have called into question the validity of military doctrine developed largely to execute Cold War strategies.[11] The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command acknowledges the interrelated nature of strategy and doctrine, and in its conceptual vision of future joint military operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, states "Military

doctrine must be capable of executing the strategy of its time."[12] The uncertain nature of the post-Cold War environment has created a debate within the Special Forces community as to what is the appropriate tactical focus for SF to meet the challenges of the future. The debate centers on whether SF should continue to train for employment in both the direct and indirect mode; i.e., should SF continue to try and be both "commandos" and "warrior-diplomats."[13] One group advocates maintaining the status quo; the other argues that the Rangers and the Special Mission Units (SMUs) within the SOF community are more suited to the direct application of force.[14] This latter group believes that Special Forces detachments should concentrate their limited training time on the "bread and butter" unconventional warfare skills of language expertise, regional orientation, cross-cultural communications and MOS proficiency, that provide the basis for the indirect application of force.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine Special Forces' role in the post-Cold War world, considering the impacts of the changing world environment and Information Age technology, to determine if the current Special Forces doctrinal mission focus is appropriate. Major General William F. Garrison, commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently noted the importance of appropriate doctrine to the SOF community when he wrote, "In general, 'today' belongs to the operators, and 'tomorrow' is in the hands of the trainers and training institutions. But the long-term future of the force depends on the doctrine-development process."[15] Michael Howard, a noted military historian, remarked in a frequently quoted speech that whatever doctrine the military was working on at the time was wrong, but that was not important. What is important, according to Howard, is to "...get it right quickly when the moment arrives."[16] That philosophy may have been appropriate during the Cold War, but seems less so today. Special Forces must get its doctrine "right" or very nearly so, to ensure that limited

resources are applied to preparing the force for the future. It must be flexible, but not all encompassing. This study attempts to contribute to that effort by determining what Special Forces' focus should be for the post-Cold War environment.

Methodology

This study begins by establishing the current dual doctrinal focus on both direct and indirect missions by examining Army and Joint Special Operations doctrinal publications. Next, it examines two operations in the post-Cold War era that involved significant Special Forces commitment. The first, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm illustrates Special Forces in war; the second, Operation Uphold Democracy, examines Special Forces conducting military operations other than war in Haiti. From these examinations, the study draws conclusions about which type of missions contributed significantly to the overall effort, and what lessons they provide for the future. This is followed with an examination of several theorists' views on the nature of future conflict to draw some assumption-based conclusions on the what type of missions SF should expect to be tasked with in the future. With this view of future requirements, coupled with the historical evidence of SF operations in the post-Cold War environment, the study analyzes whether the current SF doctrinal mission focus is adequate to meet both the reality of today's environment and the anticipated requirements of the future.

Delimitation

1. As stated in FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, SF participation in counterterrorism is limited to specifically designated, trained, organized, and equipped units designated in theater contingency plans.[17] Most aspects of SF participation in counterterrorism are classified and therefore outside the scope of this study.

2. This study made use of several classified sources; the material used is entirely unclassified. The classified nature of many Special Forces operations eliminated them

from inclusion in this study; however, the range of unclassified missions examined in the two case studies serve to establish the general nature of operations.

CHAPTER II

Special Forces Doctrine: The Dichotomy

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dual focus of Special Forces doctrine. It begins with an examination of the roots of the dichotomy to provide the background necessary to understand its original purpose. The chapter then examines Joint and Army Special Operations doctrine in order to establish the dual focus in current doctrine, as well as to derive criteria with which to evaluate the appropriateness of SF doctrinal mission focus. In November 1994, GEN Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed that all doctrine and TTPs described in joint publications be considered authoritative, and as such, "be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."[18] Consequently, both Joint and Army Special Operations doctrine must be examined in order to provide the necessary basis to understand and evaluate current Special Forces doctrine.

Origins of the Dual Focus

The dual focus of Special Forces doctrine on both direct and indirect operations began as an outgrowth of the Vietnam War. When Special Forces was officially formed in 1952, its sole orientation was unconventional warfare; in fact, the organizers consciously fought the incorporation of direct, "ranger" missions.[19] FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare, 1955 discusses only guerrilla warfare - it does not mention the role of Special Forces. By 1958, the doctrine was rewritten to include the mission, organization and role of Special Forces. FM 31-21, Guerilla [sic] Warfare and Special Forces identified the mission of the Special Forces as:

a. The primary mission of special forces units is to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerilla [sic] forces in support of conventional operations.
b. Secondary missions of special forces units are to-
(1) Engage in psychological warfare, intelligence, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance).
(2) Provide appropriate specialists and advisors to assist in accomplishing the above missions on a coordinated basis.
(3) Perform such other missions as may be directed by the theater commander.[20]

Shelby Stanton, in his definitive history of SF in Southeast Asia, Green Berets at War, notes that SF teams were deployed in a FID role beginning in July 1959 to train Laotian forces to fight insurgent Pathet Lao guerrillas and as early as 1957 in South Vietnam to train indigenous units in unconventional warfare tactics.[21] As Stanton notes, despite SF's doctrinal focus on raising guerrilla forces behind enemy lines during general war, lack of other suitable forces within the Army led to the U.S.'s use of SF to train various Southeast Asian allies in ranger and unconventional warfare techniques.[22] By 1961, these training missions developed into raising and advising paramilitary organizations in the outlying provinces of South Vietnam to help maintain order and stability against the growing insurgent threat of the Viet Cong.[23] Although these missions were not strictly within the doctrinal definition of UW, they relied on SF's ability to accomplish objectives indirectly through the training and direction of indigenous personnel. Although actual SF operations had expanded beyond what was defined in doctrine, both doctrine and reality emphasized an indirect role for Special Forces.

In 1961, new doctrine was published with FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, 1961, which distinguished between missions in war, limited war, and in Cold War. The mission of Special Forces in war remained unconventional war, primarily guerrilla warfare; the role in limited war was the same except that the SF detachments might train the indigenous force in a non-denied area, and not accompany them into combat. The Cold War mission added a new dimension to Special Forces

doctrine, and addressed the reality of what Special Forces had been doing. The revised manual described the role of Special Forces in Cold War as:

> ...assist[ing] in training military personnel in combatting guerrilla and terrorist activities and subversion. In addition, they may train foreign military personnel in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus enhancing the defense capability of the nation concerned. When so employed, special forces units supplement the U.S. military assistance groups and army missions.[24]

Although doctrine had expanded to include foreign internal defense missions(although not called that) it maintained its focus on the indirect application of force.

Although it is difficult to identify a specific moment when SF activities expanded to include "direct" special operations, several key events in 1964 seem to mark the transition point. In October 1964, Project DELTA, comprised of Special Forces and South Vietnamese personnel, was initiated to strike at Viet Cong operations deep in uncontrolled territory. Detachments conducted long range reconnaissance to collect information for tactical and strategic purposes, conducted interdiction operations by directing air strikes, mining transportation routes, recovered downed pilots, conducted BDA, PSYOPS, deception operations, and a variety of other missions.[25] In January 1964, MACV-SOG was activated, also with a mixture of Special Forces and South Vietnamese, and began executing operations similar to Project DELTA, although with a cross-border emphasis.[26] Although both MACV-SOG and Project DELTA used multinational formations, many of the missions were conducted unilaterally. Special Forces conducted numerous other "Projects" throughout the course of the war, the majority with a direct mission focus; i.e., they were unilaterally executed.

The training base made the first attempts to rectify the discrepancy between what Special Forces doctrine said and what Special Forces soldiers were actually doing around the world. COL (retired) S. Crerar, who served in MACV-SOG and then was an instructor at the Special Warfare Center upon returning from Vietnam in 1967, explained

that direct action training, originally called "do it yourself missions", was incorporated into the basic SF training course in 1968, to reflect the reality of ongoing unilateral operations in Southeast Asia.[27] The most significant of these unilateral direct missions was the Son Tay raid, a November, 1970 attempt to rescue American POWs held at a camp near Son Tay. Lacking a standing direct action-capable special operations force, the Army leadership turned to Special Forces to create an ad hoc force to develop and train for a rescue operation. Although the execution of the mission was flawless, it was several months too late, as the POWs had been moved in July, 1970. Special Forces' demonstrated ability to conduct direct operations in Southeast Asia, both DA and SR, served to validate a direct and indirect mission capability for SF - all that remained was to revise Special Forces doctrine to match reality.[28]

By 1969, Special Forces doctrine began to catch up with the training program at the Special Warfare Center and the missions Special Forces were executing around the world. FM 31-21 Special Forces Operations, US Army Doctrine, 1969 stated that the primary Special Forces mission was UW/GW, but also stated that SF could train, advise, and assist non-US military and paramilitary forces, as well as plan and conduct deep penetrations to attack critical strategic targets and collect intelligence.[29] ATT 31-101, Airborne Special Forces Group, 1972 identified the testable missions for SF as unconventional warfare (a behind the lines, guerrilla warfare scenario), stability operations (advising and assisting a friendly nation), and direct action (raid scenario).[30] The dual focus of Special Forces on direct and indirect operations, generated during the Vietnam era, was codified into Special Forces doctrine. In the post-Vietnam era, direct operations actually achieved primacy, as Special Forces struggled to survive force reductions by demonstrating continued relevancy. In the European- and tactically-focused Army of the 1970's and early 1980's, direct action and special reconnaissance missions established that

relevancy. Special Forces doctrinal manuals, all of Cold War vintage, continue to reflect this dual focus.

Joint & Army Special Operations Doctrine

Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, authored by USSOCOM under its legislatively mandated authority as the doctrine developer for all DOD special operations forces, serves as the keystone manual for all special operations forces, to include U.S. Army Special Forces.[31] It, in addition to Joint Publication 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, FM 100-20, Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces, and FM 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations are examined in this section in order to document the dual doctrinal focus of SF, and also to provide insight into what Joint and Army doctrine state should be some of the key employment considerations of special operations forces. These employment considerations will be useful later in the paper as criteria to evaluate if Special Forces doctrinal mission focus is indeed appropriate for the post-Cold War world. Army Special Operations doctrine is generally consistent with Joint doctrine; to avoid redundancy, they will be examined simultaneously, and any major differences will be noted.

Joint and Army Special Operations doctrine are largely consistent in defining Direct Action with direct and indirect components, although Army doctrine emphasizes the indirect aspects to a greater degree. In fact, in discussing Direct Action, Joint Pub 3-05 only mentions indigenous assistance as a possible aspect of SOF personnel recovery operations (which it classifies as a subset of DA) in order to differentiate them from Service CSAR operations.[32] Joint Pub 3-05.3 fails to mention the possibility of SOF conducting DA operations with, or supported by, indigenous forces in either its discussion of missions and capabilities or planning considerations for DA operations.[33] In fact, it stresses the importance of maintaining unit integrity, "[b]ecause DA missions depend heavily on unit cohesion," implying that DA should not be conducted in a multinational

configuration.[34] In contrast, FM 31-20 identifies four modes in which SF can execute DA operations:

- Unilaterally, with pure SF teams.
- Unilaterally, with a mix of SF, other SOF, and conventional US forces.
- As a combined operation, with SF-led foreign teams.
- As a combined operation, with SF-trained and directed foreign teams.[35]

The first two modes would be direct operations, while the latter two would be indirect. FM 31-20 acknowledges that:

> UW and DA are interrelated activities, particularly when the DA mission involves the use of foreign teams or clandestine sabotage techniques. Three criteria distinguish DA from UW:
>
> - DA operations are controlled and directed by a SOF chain of command not by an indigenous resistance organization with SOF advice and assistance.
> - DA operations do not depend on the popular support of the indigenous population.
> - DA operations are short-term, with specific and well-defined objectives.[36]

FM 100-25 mirrors Joint Pub 3-05 in citing use of indigenous assistance as one of the factors that differentiates DA recovery operations from CSAR.[37] Like FM 31-20, it identifies that DA operations can be unilateral or combined, and are often similar to UW operations, but that they are distinguishable by their command and control arrangements. Significantly, it differentiates between SF and Ranger roles in DA. FM 100-25 states:

> SF and ranger roles overlap in the area of DA operations. SF conducts small-scale DA operations *requiring unconventional techniques, area orientation, language qualification, and SF skills*. Ranger DA operations use *conventional tactics (for example, raids and ambushes)* and specialized ranger techniques in platoon or greater strength.[38] [emphasis added]

Clearly, the authors of FM 100-25 saw a difference in the way SF and rangers should conduct DA; yet, FM 31-20 states that:

> In the conduct of DA operations, SF teams may employ direct assault, raids, ambushes, and sniping. They may emplace mines and other munitions. They may

> provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions. They may also perform more subtle forms of DA, such as independent clandestine sabotage.[39]

Only when it refers to "more subtle forms of DA", does FM 31-20 address those forms of DA that FM 100-25 implies are SF appropriate; i.e., the "indirect" DA missions. Using FM 100-25's definition, DA is appropriate for Special Forces when it involves foreign SOF, indigenous support, or unconventional techniques; otherwise it is more appropriate for Ranger units.

Joint and Army special operations doctrine for Special Reconnaissance are closely aligned in all respects, to include their discussion of direct and indirect elements. Joint Pub 3-05 states that missions may be conducted unilaterally or employ indigenous assets.[40] Joint Pub 3-05.3 further specifies that SR techniques may include battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, technical collection, hydrographic reconnaissance, low-level source operations, and clandestine collection.[41] Both FM 31-20 and FM 100-25 essentially mirror these techniques, and add that while battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance use "...standard patrolling tactics and techniques...," clandestine collection methods rely on "...language skills, UW operational skills, and area orientation..."[42] FM 31-20 goes on to provide the same differentiation from UW, as was discussed above with DA operations; i.e., command and control exercised through SOF chain of command vice indigenous.[43]

A critical theme that appears throughout Joint and Army doctrine is that, despite SOF's ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict and achieve effects at all three levels of war, SOF missions "should always contribute substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed."[44] Joint Pub 3-05 states:

> SOF are limited in size and therefore, must be judiciously applied against high-value, high-risk, or intelligence-critical targets whose destruction, elimination, degradation, or surveillance would have significant positive and lasting effects on achieving US national objectives or on a theater campaign plan.[45]

In discussing SR, FM 100-25 states, "SOF conduct SR primarily in support of national and unified strategic objectives."[46] Similarly, Joint Pub 3-05.3 discusses SOF's conduct of SR as "...a wide variety of information-gathering activities of strategic or operational significance."[47] FM 100-5, Operations, the U.S. Army's capstone doctrinal manual, is in agreement on this point as well. It states:

> While each special operations action may be tactical in nature, its effects often contribute directly to theater operational or strategic objectives in support of the theater campaign plan. Special operations may seek either immediate or long range effects on the conflict.[48]

Finally, Joint Pub 3-05 drives the point home in discussing "mass" as a principle of war and its application to special operations, when it states that "Care must be taken not to fragment the efforts of SOF against attractive but perhaps operationally or strategically irrelevant targets."[49] From this derives the first criteria which this paper will use to evaluate the appropriateness of SF direct mission focus; i.e., **Is the mission operationally or strategically significant?**

Joint Pub 3-05 establishes three criteria for evaluating special operations options: appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability.[50] The first, appropriateness, has two components, suitability for SOF capabilities and compatibility with national policy. The first component will be used as a second criteria to evaluate the adequacy of SF direct mission focus. Joint Pub 3-05 defines suitability as:

> The target or the mission environment must have a unique aspect that requires the use of SOF and renders the mission unsuitable or less suitable for action by conventional forces or other national assets. The mere existence of a target is not justification for assignment of SOF. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. Political constraints, the need for precise and flexible application of force, or the avoidance of collateral damage, among others, may be suitable justification for the use of SOF; lack of conventional force is not.[51]

Although it does not use the term suitability per se, FM 100-25 emphasizes the concept that SOF should be employed "...when nonmilitary options are insufficient and other

military (conventional) options are inappropriate or infeasible," and "...where results are required beyond the area of influence of conventional military forces."[52] In discussing specific operations it states (FM 31-20 uses almost the exact same wording), "SR operations normally collect and report information beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems," and DA operations usually occur beyond the range (or other operational capability) of tactical weapons systems and conventional maneuver forces."[53] Collectively, both Joint and Army Special Operations doctrine suggests that suitability is a valid criteria for evaluating Special Forces mission focus; i.e., **Does the mission have aspects that place it beyond the capabilities of conventional forces?**

Summary

This chapter examined the historical roots of the Special Forces "doctrinal dichotomy" to demonstrate that SF was originally solely focused on indirect missions. A direct mission focus developed in doctrine during the late 1960's to bring doctrine in line with the reality of what SF was doing in Southeast Asia; i.e., conducting both indirect and direct missions - largely because they were the only force capable of executing these type missions. The chapter then established the current nature of the dual focus in Joint and Army Special Operations doctrine, and derived two criteria, which will be used later in the paper to evaluate if it is appropriate to retain a direct missions focus in SF doctrine.

CHAPTER III

The Future: More of the Same?

Gulio Douhet, in his classic futuristic work on air power, The Command of the Air, said: "...I have dared to look into the future, but that in so doing I have based my views, not on idle imaginings, but upon the reality of today, out of which grows the reality of tomorrow."[54] This chapter follows Douhet's philosophy; the events of the PCW to date provide an indication of the future world environment and SF's role in it. This chapter examines Special Forces operations during war and military operations other than

war, using the previously established evaluation criteria, to determine which type of mission provides for the most effective use of Special Forces, and what type of mission SF has been predominantly tasked to perform.

Special Forces in War

The Persian Gulf War provided the first major glimpse of the changed nature warfare in a non-bipolar world at the beginning of the Information Age. Two significant factors emerged from that war, both with major implications for Special Forces. The first factor is the increased necessity for the United States to conduct multinational operations. This necessity is a result of decreased U.S. force structure, and perhaps more significantly, the increasing political demand at home and abroad to resort to force only after a demonstrable international consensus has been achieved. Clearly, alliances are not new to warfare, nor to the United States; however, the coalition arrayed against Iraq was a very diverse assemblage of nations and cultures. This diversity of languages, cultures, and levels of technological advancement created a demand for Special Forces coalition support teams (CSTs) to bridge the gap with their UW skills.

The second significant factor to emerge from the Gulf War is the increased dominance of what has been referred to as "third wave" technologies of precision weapons and information collection platforms.[55] These technologies served to limit the need for SF special reconnaissance and direct action missions. As the USASOC History Office report on Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM noted:

> In terms of direct action, the involvement of special operations was only a comparatively small portion of SOF operations in theater. In most cases, the risk of sending SF teams deep into enemy territory outweighed the benefit, especially when "smart" munitions often could perform the same job without the corresponding risk.[56]

Coming as it did on the very heels of the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Information Age, the Gulf War serves as an important departure point for attempting to

determine future requirements. Special Forces conducted a wide range of missions during the Gulf War, with varying degrees of effect on the overall campaign. The majority of these activities fell into four broad categories: coalition support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), special reconnaissance, and direct action.

Coalition Support Operations

Coalition support, the most significant SF contribution to the Gulf War, involved two main components, training and liaison. SF training of Arab forces was essential to overcome the wide variety of equipment, doctrine, and level of training, and to help incorporate them into the coalition.[57] Kuwaiti forces that had escaped to Saudi Arabia and units created from Kuwaiti expatriates required significant reconstitution and training to make them an effective fighting force. SF teams from two battalions of 5th SFG(A) helped the Kuwaitis organize and train an armored brigade, four light infantry brigades, a motorized brigade, and a commando battalion by the time the ground war commenced.[58] 5th SFG(A) teams also trained Arab forces in small unit tactics, minefield breaching, control of close air support, chemical protection measures, individual and crew served weapons, fire direction control, IPB, staff operations, armored and mechanized tactics, and a variety of other subjects.[59] One training effort is particularly notable because it demonstrates the versatility of Special Forces. "Team Tank", composed of two Ft. Knox certified SF tank crews and SF personnel with previous experience in armor units, assisted the 8th RSLF Bde (Saudi Arabia) transition from M60A1s to M60A3s.[60] SF training teams enhanced the capabilities of allied forces in the Persian Gulf War, preparing them to better accomplish their assigned missions; this valuable economy of force mission freed U.S. forces for the decisive operational maneuver in the west.

The second major function of the coalition support teams was liaison. When the coalition forces commenced the ground offensive, 109 SF CSTs accompanied every battalion, brigade, and division of Arab forces, providing connectivity between the Arab

forces and U.S. maneuver units, higher headquarters, and air support.[61] For example, SF CSTs were critical in facilitating a forward passage of lines by the 1st Cavalry Division through a Syrian armored division.[62] The CSTs were also critical in providing ground truth to the operational commander through accurate and timely situation reports on the status of allied operations.[63] This was particularly critical since the Arab forces were under the operational control of the Saudi's, not CINCCENT.[64] SF CSTs significantly increased the interoperability of U.S. and allied forces, helped maximize the contributions of allied forces, and contributed to the success of the overall campaign.

Evaluation of Coalition Support Operations

Significance

The coalition support mission performed by Special Forces was tactically, operationally and strategically significant. The CSTs provided a vertical and lateral command and control capability within the Arab forces that was largely nonexistent, particularly lateral communications, thus allowing tactics to take place. At the operational level, the enhanced readiness of the Arab forces and their linkage to U.S. air support through CSTs, allowed the operational commander the flexibility to use them as the critical fixing force that allowed U.S., French, and British formations to execute the operational envelopment in the west.[65] It was noted of the SF CSTs to Arab forces that: "...of all missions assigned to SF--real and imagined--the "ground truth" mission was the most critical to allied success."[66] Brigadier General Robert Scales, in Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War, describes the SF teams as a "... 'directed telescope' with enough experience to draw frank, objective conclusions [about the fighting ability of the Arab forces] and pass them in confidence to CENTCOM.[67] The final Desert Storm report to Congress noted that, "The network of US liaison officers [referring to CSTs] provided the best (and sometimes only) comprehensive command, control, and communications (C3) system among the diverse Coalition forces..."[68]

At the strategic level, maintenance of the coalition was critical; BG Scales wrote that "Schwarzkopf considered the Coalition's center of gravity to be the Coalition itself. If the frail bonds of the Arab-Islamic commitment to the US-led Coalition could be broken...the Coalition would likely be fragmented and torn apart."[69] As General H. Norman Schwarzkopf noted in his memoirs, geopolitical factors necessitated that any offensive involve Arab forces in significant numbers.[70] The DOD interim report to Congress also emphasized the importance of Arab forces participating in the ground campaign in a manner that demonstrated that they were a real part of the effort against Iraq.[71] Many of the Arab forces considered Special Forces to be the U.S. Army's best and most elite force. The allocation of Special Forces teams to work with them was seen by the Arab forces as a signal that the U.S. valued them, and helped strengthen their participation in the coalition. Special Forces CSTs played a major role by preparing the Arab forces for the offensive and accompanying them throughout it; their contributions were both operationally and strategically significant.

Suitability

The coalition support mission was one to which Special Forces were uniquely suited. The final report to Congress on the conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict noted that the coalition support mission "...was tasked to US Special Operations Forces (SOF) because of because of their unique capabilities - language and cultural orientation skills, wide range of tactical and technical expertise, and high levels of training."[72] Although other forces within DOD possessed the technical skills required for the training mission, only the soldiers of the 5th SFG(A) provided the comprehensive force package of language skills, cultural sensitivity, and the experience of working in similar ambiguous inter cultural situations, to meet the demanding role of trainer, advisor, and liaison officer. The skills SF soldiers developed over years of regionally oriented training to conduct UW

and FID missions, paid great dividends and were an essential part of the success of coalition warfare in the Gulf War.

Special Reconnaissance

SF conducted special reconnaissance in both the direct and indirect mode during the Gulf War. During the initial build up phase of Operation Desert Shield, when a renewed Iraqi offensive into Saudi Arabia seemed imminent, initial SR missions were indirect operations. 5th SFG(A) teams deployed with Saudi paratroopers to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border to provide early warning of an Iraqi invasion. SF teams provided the critical link to the attack aircraft, upon which, in the absence of heavy ground forces, the initial Coalition defense was tremendously dependent. Additionally, these SF teams provided the CINC much needed "ground truth" about the situation at the border, much like the CSTs.[73] These border surveillance missions lasted until January 19 and eventually involved 32 SF soldiers and 247 Saudi paratroopers.[74]

Special Forces' SR operations in denied territory were extremely limited. The USASOC history office report records only twelve cross border SR missions, all conducted during the period 07-27 Feb 91. SR missions were constrained by two factors: concern on the part of the CENTCOM staff that SF teams could accomplish their mission without compromise due to the terrain and density of enemy forces; and GEN Schwarzkopf's concerns that the risks outweighed the gains - to include the risk of precipitating a conflict before the coalition was ready. This second factor continued to influence events even after the air war began; only two missions would be conducted early in February. The remainder would be held until 23 February 1991, one day prior to the commencement of the ground offensive.[75] The focus of most of these operations was to warn ARCENT of any attempts by the Republican Guards to counterattack or retreat along Highway 8, the major road running southeast from Baghdad to Basra, paralleling the Euphrates River.[76]

Evaluation of Special Reconnaissance Operations

Significance

The overall significance of any of the Special Reconnaissance operations, direct or indirect, is difficult to assess as the various sources have little to say about it; however, from what has been written it appears that SF special reconnaissance operations had little strategic or operational significance. This is not to say that these operations had no effect; the final DOD report to Congress notes:

> ...Army SF performed SR missions to support XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps. Army SF teams provided essential information to ground *tactical commanders* during the final ground offensive preparations. This information included analyzing soil conditions to determine whether it would permit passage of heavy armored vehicles.[77] (emphasis added)

It can be inferred from this that the information collected was of a tactical, not operational or strategic nature. The USASOC history report states that, "On the whole, the results of these missions (SR, 07-27 Feb 91) were not entirely satisfactory." The report goes on to note that if success consisted of not being compromised, staying on the ground the projected duration, and achieving some degree of intelligence collection, only three of the 12 missions were successful.[78] One may also infer from GEN Schwarzkopf's reluctance to commit SF teams to cross border SR missions until just before the ground offensive, that he did not see an operational requirement for them. Once committed, the SR teams generally supported the tactical commanders at Corps level.

Suitability

The evaluation of Special Force's suitability to the SR missions in the Gulf War results in a mixed assessment. The multilateral border surveillance missions conducted with the Saudis early in the Desert Shield phase of the conflict required language skills and cultural sensitivity, much like the coalition support missions. Operating in a multinational role with the Saudis was important - particularly on their territory and early on, when a

unilateral effort might make it appear as if the U.S. was ramrodding the effort instead of acting in concert with them. These considerations argue for using Saudi-U.S SF teams for the border surveillance, as opposed to other potential forces then in country, such as 82d Abn Division or XVIIIth Abn Corps long range surveillance units (LRSU). Additionally, the intelligence architecture was not fully developed in the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, necessitating the use of SF. However, as the ground war approached, the conventional forces made use of various collection systems that largely obviated the need for SOF.

By late August, a DOD-level Joint Intelligence Center was established in Washington, DC, with the charter to use national collection assets to produce intelligence for the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). An example of their capabilities was a series of templates produced daily and transmitted digitally that:

> ...depicted every Iraqi division in the KTO on 1:50,000-scale maps. Accurate to 400 meters, the templates showed individual tanks, armored vehicles, artillery positions, trucks, command posts, and supply facilities and provided commanders with a blueprint of the Iraqi obstacle system.[79]

The XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Army's contingency corps, was able to directly access processed satellite imagery through its TENCAP Imagery Exploitation System (IES). Additionally, new technologies such as JSTARS, UAVs, and the French Horus radar augmented existing corps level collection assets such as the Mohawk's side-looking airborne radar, LRSU units, and on-board cameras from Apaches.[80] It appears that there was sufficient conventional collection capability from national level systems down to corps level assets to support the tactical commander.

As discussed in Chapter II's discussion of the criteria of suitability, FM 100-25 states "SR operations normally collect and report information beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems."[81] U.S. Army operations in Desert Storm highlighted the fact that the reach of tactical systems has been greatly expanded by the use

of systems such as JSTARS, UAVs, and TENCAP IES, and the capability to link these systems digitally to the tactical maneuver headquarters. GEN Downing, CINCSOC, in a memorandum outlining SOF mission criteria, wrote "In war, we cannot afford to do those missions which other forces train for and which do not make use of our unique skills."[82] Desert Storm provided the first glimpse that technical capabilities within the Military Intelligence community are rapidly making battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance a mission that no longer requires SF unique skills.

Direct Action

As noted earlier, the ability of "smart" munitions to destroy targets deep in enemy territory without the corresponding risk of a SOF direct action mission served to minimize SF's conduct of DA missions during the Gulf War. Despite this DA missions were conducted, both in a direct and an indirect manner. Most of these missions were conducted after the end of hostilities in Kuwait City.

The first of these DA missions was the seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy on 25 Feb 91 by a multinational force, consisting of 157 Saudi Arabian SF soldiers and one SFOD-A from 5th SFG(A). The mission was to be executed in conjunction with the conclusion of the projected seven day siege of Kuwait City. With the rapid collapse and withdrawal of the Iraqi forces, the Joint Forces Command East (SA) ordered the embassy seized to prevent trapped or retreating Iraqi forces from destroying it.[83] The multinational team seized the embassy by ground assault without incident, as it was unoccupied.

The seizure of the U.S. embassy by elements of the 3rd SFG(A) and 10th SFG(A) was similarly unopposed. In fact, the embassy had already been found to be empty and secure by U.S. forces. A Marine lieutenant had entered the embassy on 27 Feb 91 and raised a U.S. flag over it. Elements of the 5th SFG secured the outside of the embassy late on 27 Feb 91, and reported through the chain of command that it was empty and

secure. Despite this, the assault was executed as planned, simultaneously with the seizure of the British and French embassies by their forces.[84]

In the aftermath of the occupation of Kuwait city, elements of 3rd SFG(A) and 5th SFG(A) conducted approximately 60 hasty direct action missions.[85] Missions were conducted to seize and clear the Kuwaiti Police Headquarters and other key government buildings, as well as against suspected PLO headquarters, Iraqi torture sites, and other locations that were believed to house potential resistors or intelligence documents. The SF teams worked closely with Kuwaiti resistance groups and other Kuwaiti nationals, the best sources of information on Iraqi activities during their six month occupation of Kuwait City.[86]

Evaluation of Direct Action Operations

Significance

The significance of the U.S. embassy seizure was extremely limited, as the campaign was won by the time it was executed. The USASOC History Office report noted, "While not strictly necessary from a military standpoint, the political and psychological importance of such joint and combined recapturing of embassies often transcends military necessity."[87] Although the report does not elaborate on the political and psychological factors that influenced the decision to launch the embassy seizure missions, one might assume they involve sending a message to Iraq about U.S. military capabilities. That such a message was necessary to send, after the overwhelmingly one-sided victory just won by coalition ground and air forces, is certainly open to debate. The necessity of assaulting a secured facility in front of dozens of television cameras, with the attendant damage inflicted on it by explosive breaching charges, has been questioned widely within the special operations community.[88]

The Saudi embassy seizure was, militarily, no more significant than the U.S. embassy seizure; however, the decision to execute the operation was a Saudi one, not

U.S. Consequently, providing the necessary SF advise and support to the Saudi SF can be assessed as being strategically important. Maintaining close relations with Saudi Arabia was, and continues to be, an extremely important aspect of U.S. Mideast foreign policy. If the Saudis felt seizing their embassy was important, assisting them to accomplish this mission was necessary and significant in the interest of maintaining a close relationship.

The significance of the approximately 60 hasty direct action missions conducted throughout Kuwait City in the weeks following the cease-fire is difficult to evaluate. The focus of most of these operations was to seize intelligence documents. The only unclassified references to the value of these documents, state that "SOF teams captured thousands of incriminating documents which can be used in the future against terrorists and in any ensuing war crime trials." and that the DA strikes "proved worthwhile."[89] The final DOD report to Congress addresses the missions, but does not comment on their significance, and does not mention them at all in the list of SOF accomplishments.[90] The presence of the Special Forces soldiers did serve to limit retribution by the Kuwaitis against Iraqi sympathizers and avoid potentially damaging incidents from occurring.[91]

Suitability

All of the direct action missions that SF conducted in the Gulf War were suitable SOF missions. The Saudi embassy seizure and the hasty DA missions in Kuwait City offer prime examples of indirect missions. US SF assisted Saudi SF in planning and preparing for the mission, and then accompanied the Saudis on the assault, with one USSF serving as an advisor for each 12-man Saudi element.[92] Similarly, many of the hasty direct action missions throughout Kuwait City were conducted in conjunction with the Kuwaiti Army. Working through their Kuwaiti counterparts, SF personnel established close contacts with the inhabitants, and developed the intelligence necessary to support the various direct action missions.[93] By conducting these missions in an indirect, yet precise, manner, the Special Forces detachments obtained results that, in order to duplicate, would probably

have required a large conventional force commitment and broad clearance operations. The U.S. embassy seizure was clearly a suitable SOF mission, requiring precision, synchronization, and special equipment and techniques; however, SF was probably not the most appropriate special operations force for the mission. Other special operations forces that focus more exclusively on unilateral direct action missions, such as the Rangers, might have been better suited to the mission.[94]

Combat Search and Rescue

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), though by joint doctrine a Service responsibility, was assigned to SOF to perform during the Gulf War, largely because USAF designated SAR aircraft lacked the capability to conduct long range infiltrations into denied territory.[95] An estimated forty pilots were expected to be shot down on the first night of the air campaign.

> This degree of loss was obviously unacceptable to the theater commander and to the American public. Every measure that could be taken to rescue any percentage of those pilots would be time and money well spent. General Schwarzkopf turned to Special Operations Forces to provide him that capability.[96]

SOF helicopters, both Army and Air Force, were tasked to perform CSAR, missions while two teams from 2-5th SFG(A) and 6 teams from 1-10th SFG(A) were tasked to serve as ground security elements for the missions. The anticipated heavy losses never occurred; the coalition lost 52 aircraft, with twenty-two pilots and crew surviving, eight of whom successfully evaded capture. Seven total CSAR missions were launched by the Services, three of which were successful. Each of the Service's special operations forces performed one successful recovery operation.[97]

Evaluation of CSAR Operations

Significance

The actual significance of CSAR operations was minimal, due largely to the unexpectedly light losses suffered by coalition aircraft. Even had the loss rates been

higher, the operational significance of CSAR operations would have been doubtful; however, there is a psychological component to CSAR that can have strategic implications. Public support of military operations, as noted earlier, is often contingent upon minimal losses, or at least the appearance that active measures are being taken to minimize losses. For this reason (and the positive psychological effect on the pilots) CSAR could have assumed strategic significance, and consequently was an important task for some portion of the force, not necessarily SF, to perform.

Suitability

Combat search and rescue, as performed by SF in the Gulf War, was not a suitable mission for SF. While the lack of conventional aircraft suited to the projected threat environment might have necessitated the use of SOF aircraft, the security mission performed by SF personnel did not have any aspects that required SF-unique (or SOF-unique) skills. SF's role in CSAR was that of a standard security force. SF teams put 2-4 man elements on each SAR aircraft to provide a security post if the rescue helicopter had to remain on the ground for any length of time.[98] This is contrary to the doctrine of FM 31-20 which states that,

> When directed, SF units perform combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions using collateral capabilities inherent in a DA recovery mission. *SF does not employ standard CSAR procedures when executing such a mission.*[99] [emphasis added]

Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, notes that "Clandestine specialized teams and SOF are not normally assigned CSAR missions, particularly the search role."[100] When specifically discussing the capabilities of SF, the Joint Pub focuses on the capability of SF to operate clandestinely in denied territory in small elements. It stresses that this capability makes SF an appropriate CSAR asset,

> ...where these techniques of rescue and recovery may be preferable because of terrain, enemy air defenses, and weather or when an Army SF team is already present in the vicinity of the CSAR requirement.[101]

As noted earlier, Joint Pub 3-05, in discussing mission suitability states:

> SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. Political constraints, the need for precise and flexible application of force, or the avoidance of collateral damage, among others, may be suitable justification for the use of SOF; lack of conventional force is not.[102]

During the Gulf War, SF performed a security function for CSAR missions that did not require its unique skills. These CSAR missions relied upon knowing the airman's situation and a relatively precise location, based upon confirmed communications from the survivor using his survival radio. Due to the nature of the terrain, the enemy threat, and the ability to pinpoint the location of an airman through his transmissions, these missions were planned and executed as point to point missions - the helicopter flew from friendly territory to the airman's location, landed, and picked him up. The situation was not suited to inserting ground elements to conduct extensive searches, establish E & R networks, or preposition elements to conduct precautionary CSAR. In the absence of the conditions that would have allowed these type of CSAR operations, SF soldiers were in essence, "along for the ride", performing in a role that a good infantry squad or fire team could execute.

Conclusions From the Gulf War

While it is extremely dangerous to draw conclusions from a sample size of one, the Gulf War illustrated two issues that significantly effect the question of Special Forces mission focus. The first is the emergence of the coalition support mission. As noted earlier, there are significant pressures on the U.S. to operate as part of a coalition or under United Nations' auspices. With the exception of operations with NATO partners, any multinational coalition that the U.S. is involved in will be essentially ad hoc, and involve partners with disparate capabilities, knowledge, and commitment. Coalition support teams will be required to bind the coalition into a team and help bridge the gap between the U.S. forces and their partners. Their language skills, regional and cultural orientation, and

maturity will continue to ensure that Special Forces is the force of choice for the CST mission.

Perhaps the most important issue to emerge from the Gulf War is that technology is providing the conventional force the capability to perform missions that previously required SOF - specifically in the areas of direct action and special reconnaissance (the battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance aspect of SR). New technologies currently being developed greatly enhance this trend. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with 1200+ kilometer range, 24 hour endurance, and a wide range of day/night/all weather collection systems are planned for Corps and EAC level MI brigades.[103] UAVs with lesser range and endurance will be provided down to division and brigade level. Common Ground Station will allow conventional elements down to brigade level to receive UAV and JSTARS data, secondary imagery from national and theater sensors, and inputs from a variety of other sources.[104]

Conventional strike capability is being similarly enhanced. A recent U.S. Army computer simulation exercise, Prairie Warrior 95, incorporated a number of projected technologies, such as improved versions of the ATACMs missile, with a 248 kilometer range and "brilliant" munitions, capable of destroying stationary and moving targets.[105] Another projected technology, the ATACMs-delivered wide area munition (WAM), emplaces a remotely armed minefield with acoustic and seismic sensors, giving the conventional commander the capability to selectively ambush critical targets deep in denied territory.[106] Cruise missiles, used to strike fixed locations throughout Iraq during the Gulf War, can be expected to become increasingly effective and capable. These technologies and others are increasingly expanding the area in which the conventional commander can acquire, track, and engage critical targets, whether stationary or moving. The area that is " beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems," and "beyond the range (or other operational capability) of tactical weapons systems and

conventional maneuver forces" is rapidly disappearing.[107] As in the Gulf War, pressures to minimize casualties, coupled with the increasing capabilities of technology, will lead commanders to opt for lower risk alternatives to employing SF forces in denied territory in a direct role.

Special Forces in Military Operations Other Than War

The post Cold War environment has provided numerous opportunities for Special Forces to perform a variety of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Special Forces have aided refugees in Kurdistan and Somalia, performed assessments in remote areas after natural and manmade disasters in Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Florida, supported counterdrug operations at home and abroad, and numerous other missions. Of these, Operation Uphold Democracy, the multinational effort to restore stability in Haiti, is the most extensive commitment, in terms of both size and duration, of Special Forces since the Gulf War. Consequently, it serves as an ideal example of Special Forces in military operations other than war. Special Forces' operations in Haiti fell largely into two categories - coalition support teams and nation building activities.[108]

Coalition Support

Special Forces provided coalition support teams initially to the non-U.S. units of the multi-national force (MNF), and then to each UN contingent after the transition of control of the operation from the U.S. Atlantic Command to the United Nation's Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).[109] As in the Gulf War, CSTs served as trainers, advisors, and a "directed telescope" to provide the commander information concerning capabilities and activities of the multinational forces. During the MNF phase of the operation, 3rd SFG(A) had six SFODAs in Puerto Rico, training multi-national forces for duties in Haiti; during the UNMIH phase there were 9 CSTs.[110] Larger CSTs were used than in the Gulf War. For example, the CST to the Caribbean Command (CARICOM) Battalion, was a 36-man organization. The team consisted of a senior advisor (a lieutenant colonel from

SOCLANT), a 20-man support team (mess, supply, and transportation), a linguist, a Navy SEAL (port operations), and a 13-man SFOD-A to serve as the principle trainers and advisors.[111]

Evaluation of CST Operations

Significance

The CSTs performed (and continue to perform) a significant role in Operation Uphold Democracy. A recent assessment of Operation Uphold Democracy states that it had three strategic objectives: restoration of democracy in Haiti, eliminating the refugee problem, and enhancing the credibility of the U.S., the U.N. and the Organization of American States (OAS).[112] SF CSTs contributed directly to the third objective. As in the Gulf War, building a multi-national effort and avoiding the appearance of a U.S.-unilateral action was critical to U.S. regional diplomatic relations, perhaps more so as a result of a long history of U.S. interventionism throughout the region. Additionally, domestic public sentiment favored a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces and handover of the operation to U.N. control. Special Forces CSTs were key contributors to both of these goals. SF CSTs aided the non-U.S. MNF forces in the preparation and execution of their missions, enabling them to contribute to the overall effort, and thus lending credibility to the OAS. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report notes that initially U.S. commanders were hesitant in employing non-U.S. forces, and credits the CSTs with overcoming that hesitancy.[113] The CSTs also supported the goal of early transition to U.N. control by preparing non-U.S. forces of the UNMIH to accept handover of the mission from the MNF. As the CALL report commented of the CSTs "...the 13-14 soldiers on this team are in country so 3-400 other Americans don't have to be."[114]

Suitability

As noted during the evaluation of CSTs in the Gulf War, Special Forces detachments are uniquely suited for the CST mission. In the year prior to its deployment

to Haiti, 3rd SFG(A) conducted 36 deployments and training exercises in the Caribbean.[115] LTC Mike Jones, commander of 2d Battalion, 3rd SFG(A) pinpointed the value of the experiences and capabilities developed in Special Forces when he said:

> We [in Special Forces] understand not only local dialects such as Creole, but other religious and cultural aspects of the area, such as voodoo, or the fact that when someone says he'll do something, he doesn't necessarily mean today or even tomorrow.[116]

The CALL report praised the CSTs for using a variety of interpersonal techniques that fostered positive relationships and developed an effective working relationship. Regional orientation, language skills, cultural sensitivity, and previous experience in training foreigners allowed the CSTs to meet the demanding role of trainer, advisor, and liaison officer with success.

Nation Building

Although nation building is not a doctrinal term per se, it is the most accurate term to describe the ongoing activities of Special Forces detachments throughout Haiti. Special Forces detachments occupied 33 different locations throughout Haiti; each location provided its own unique challenges.[117] The mission of "...maintain[ing] a safe and secure environment, to facilitate the transition of the new government of Haiti (GOH) to functional governance..." provided broad goals to accomplish in a country in which most civil services had ceased functioning, the infrastructure was virtually nonexistent, and the police and judiciary were corrupt, oppressive, and hated by the populace.[118] While each locale provided a different array of challenges, a summary of some of the Special Forces' activities in the Haitian countryside is sufficient to establish their nature.

With the arrival of U.S. soldiers in Haiti and the removal of the military government from power, any semblance of governmental function collapsed. Conventional forces occupied the major cities of Port Au Prince and Cap Haitien, while teams from 3rd SFG(A) occupied the smaller cities, towns, and villages in the remainder

of the country, which represent 70% of the population of Haiti.[119] In most of these locations, the Special Forces detachments filled the role of local government. The SFODAs appointed Haitians to fill vacant local official positions, fired others, and generally worked to make the officials accept responsibility and perform their function. The CALL report credits Special Forces with the initiative of learning the Haitian constitution and then teaching it, and democracy in general, to a majority of the population of the rural areas.[120] The detachments also worked with Haitian officials and communities to improve their living conditions. They organized neighborhood watch programs and area constables, infrastructure repair, schools, jails, and virtually every other function civil authority performs.[121] The emphasis of the Special Forces civil effort has been to work with the Haitians to establish functioning civil services and instill in the Haitians a desire to maintain them.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Haitian police, the SFODAs also became the guarantor of security. The detachments initially policed areas unilaterally, but later they integrated the interim police security force (IPSF) into their patrols, and in some areas, have turned policing completely over to the IPSF under supervision of the International Police Monitors (IPMs).[122] In border areas, detachments functioned as the border patrol, monitoring for weapons and contraband, controlling crowds at crossing sites, and interfacing with the Dominican Republic's border police.[123] Detachments conducted low level source operations (LLSO) in many areas to support force protection and enhance security of their area of responsibility. SF security operations have been generally successful, with little violence and acts of retribution, and a return to normalcy in most outlying areas; in fact, the UNMIH identified a sustained SF presence as the key element in maintaining a secure and stable environment in the countryside.[124]

Evaluation of Nation Building Operations

Significance

Special Forces' nation building activities in Haiti directly address one of the strategic objectives noted earlier, restoration of democracy, and indirectly address another, the refugee problem. Through teaching the populace about their constitution and how a democracy works, and working with local officials to help them understand their duties and responsibilities, Special Forces have helped the Haitians take the initial steps towards democracy. By establishing a secure environment and improving the functioning of basic civil services, the Special Forces detachments are providing the Haitian government time to establish themselves, increasing the likelihood that democratic reforms take root. All these actions have a significant by-product; with improved living conditions, a secure environment, and freedom from an oppressive government, Haitians are less likely to seek refugee status in the United States. Special Forces' nation building activities have been a significant contributor to the apparent success of United States' policy towards Haiti to date.

Suitability

Special Forces was the most suitable force for the nation building mission in the outlying area of the Haitian countryside. As in discussed previously, language skills, cultural sensitivity, and interpersonal skills are critical in working with indigenous personnel. Additionally, the mission in Haiti required soldiers that were comfortable working in small groups, in an extremely uncertain, potentially volatile, and politically sensitive environment. The maturity and judgment of officers and NCOs at detachment level enabled them to translate broad mission guidance into the appropriate actions for their particular area of responsibility. SF MOS skills, particularly engineer, medical, intelligence, and communications, provided the technical competencies required to operate in an austere environment with little support, as well as to help the Haitians improve civil

services and infrastructure. Additionally, the command and control architecture of a Special Forces Group can readily support the widely dispersed elements throughout the country, just as it does for a UW operation. In fact, COL Boyatt, 3rd SFG(A) commander considered it a UW operation; the sources run by SF LLSO constituted the underground, the NGOs/PVOs provided support as the auxiliary would, and the Haitian populace were the guerrilla force. The task of the SFODAs was to organize, train, and advise the "guerrillas" to run town governments, services, etc.[125] The comparison is an appropriate one - the skills, training, and organization required for UW, which no conventional military organization possesses, were well suited to the Special Forces' nation building mission in Haiti.

Conclusions From Operations in Haiti

Special Forces' operations in Haiti have reinforced the coalition support lessons of the Gulf War. Coalition support teams are considered an essential ingredient of successful coalition operations, whether those operations are in war or other than war. Special Forces is inextricably linked with the CST mission in the minds of conventional commanders, and rightfully so, as SF is ideally suited for this mission which promises to be an operationally and strategically significant part of most future U.S. operations.

A critical lesson evident from operations in Haiti and other recent MOOTWs is the relative insignificance of high-technology systems in operations other than war. The intelligence collection effort is primarily HUMINT-dependent, although with the proliferation of inexpensive communications technology, SIGINT plays an important role as well. Technical collection capabilities, critical to the support of conventional conflict, add little value to developing the overall intelligence picture. Overwhelming and precise firepower is ineffective and inefficient in the absence of high value targets to attack, or

threaten with attack. Operations such as Haiti are struggles of influence much more susceptible to the efforts of mature, capable and thinking individuals, than to firepower. Operations in Haiti have demonstrated that these "wars of influence" are prime environments for Special Forces' unique skills and capabilities. As the next chapter will explore, these are the most likely future environments for the employment of U.S. forces.

CHAPTER IV

The Not So Uncertain Future

Prognostication is a booming business in the post-Cold War era; a wide range of scholars and authors have published a variety of views of what the future will bring. Inevitably, there is a certain amount of disagreement and contradiction; however, there is a significant amount of commonality in the various views, enough at least to attempt to establish a picture of the future threat environment. Most futurists agree that conventional inter-state warfare will remain a threat in the future, but that most threats will be low intensity and unconventional in nature. Which type of conflicts will most likely involve U.S. involvement is problematic. In the current National Security Strategy (NSS), President Clinton writes:

> We must use military force selectively, recognizing that its use may do no more than provide a window of opportunity for a society - and diplomacy - to work. We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our *interests and our values* are sufficiently at stake.[126][emphasis added]

The NSS goes on to state that:

> ...the nature of our response must depend on our own long-term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include *environmental security* as well as the *security of values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.*[127][emphasis added]

These broad definitions of U.S. security requirements, plus the empirical evidence of recent U.S. involvement in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kurdistan, and the Balkans, makes

U.S. involvement in intra-state conflict likely in the future. Additionally, it is inevitable that states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will continue to challenge U.S. interests and policies. The overwhelming victory of the Gulf War will mitigate against direct challenges of the United States, but will not rule out unconventional ventures. This chapter will examine both inter- and intra-state conflict in an attempt to determine what role Special Forces might play in them.

Special Forces in Inter-state Conflict

Future state-sponsored threats to U.S. interests will be largely unconventional, indirect, and seek to negate the ability of the U.S. to employ overwhelming force. One recent study suggests Iran is already applying this strategy, using acts of terrorism, hostage taking and subversion of U.S. allies to counter U.S. influence in Southwest Asia.[128] A key element of such a strategy is to wage a protracted effort, targeting the perceived (or actual) American Achilles' heel of impatience, aversion to long, often indecisive struggles, and inability to accept casualties. This strategy seeks to undermine U.S. friends and allies in a region by exploiting institutional, societal or governmental weaknesses to destroy the state, or merely to weaken its effectiveness and reduce its utility as a U.S. ally. The Iranian-supported, Islamic fundamentalist-inspired terrorist activities currently plaguing Egypt provide an example of the approach enemies will take to lessen U.S. influence.

The use unconventional means in inter-state warfare is nothing new; less powerful nations have used them to compete with more advanced states, and advanced states have used them to achieve objectives without the risks and costs of conventional war. The U.S. has been on the "giving" and the "receiving" end of this strategy. It employed this strategy against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, by supporting the mujahedeen rebels, and countered it, successfully in El Salvador, and unsuccessfully in Vietnam.

The role of Special Forces in this environment is well established, and will continue to be a significant one. Special Forces, in support of other U.S. Government agencies, conducts foreign internal defense by training, advising and assisting host nation military and paramilitary forces to increase their ability to counter internal instability.[129] In instances where supporting a group in opposition to an unfriendly government meets U.S. objectives, Special Forces can conduct unconventional warfare by organizing, training, and advising a resistance organization.[130]

While the U.S. traditionally has found itself supporting governments, the future may find the U.S. turning to unconventional warfare to achieve its aims. As one author noted:

> Western dependence on diminishing Third World oil supplies and other essential resources increasingly makes free trade an essential Western interest. In the late 1990s and early 21st Century, the West will not long tolerate economically damaging, politically motivated Third World cartels.[131]

He goes on to state that Western economic success, religious tolerance and devotion to human rights will provide an appealing message to the populous of repressed and economically poor countries, and provide an exploitable resistance potential.[132] With a national security strategy that cites the "...enlarging of the community of free market democracies" as a primary objective in an era of economic austerity, indirect and unconventional approaches will become more appealing to decision makers.

Using unconventional warfare against aggressive states will become even more attractive against those states actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is becoming increasingly apparent that controlling the proliferation of WMD technology is nearly as futile as stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. through interdiction. Between 1991 and 1994, the German government detected over 350 attempts to smuggle nuclear material through the country, with 60 actual seizures of material. When Kazakhstan asked the U.S. to store their stockpile of enriched uranium, U.S. officials

recovered 104% of the declared inventory. As Senator Richard Lugar aptly stated, "Consider the implications of a 4 percent error margin in Russian inventory accuracy."[133] The problem is not limited to nuclear technology. Iraq recently admitted to having developed numerous biological agents, to include anthrax and botulism; 5500 pounds of anthrax, theoretically enough to kill 50 million people, remains unaccounted for.[134] It seems increasingly likely that a state that is committed to acquiring WMD, will be able to do so, despite diplomatic efforts to halt their proliferation. As unfriendly nations, such as Iran and Iraq, increase their potential to threaten essential U.S. interests, the option of weakening or toppling their governments through unconventional warfare may become more and more attractive.

Even if the U.S. lacks the will or desire to exploit a resistance potential to attempt to overthrow a government, it may consider using an existing resistance structure (the Kurds in Iraq, for example) to collect information regarding WMD technology and in limited instances, act as a surrogate to destroy or seize critical WMD materials, facilities, or technicians. In such a scenario, Special Forces personnel could organize, train, advise and equip the resistance forces in friendly territory for later employment in the denied area. Although surrogate operations relinquish positive control to a third party, they can serve to limit the amount of risk to the U.S. and avoid direct confrontation.

Special Forces in Intra-state Conflict

The most likely, and probably most difficult, challenge in the future will be a tremendous rise in intra-state conflicts. Most of these conflicts occur in the under-developed nations of the world. While it is difficult to identify specific missions for Special Forces in these conflicts, the following examination of the nature of these conflicts suggests three important points. Shrinking U.S. resources will cause decision maker's to place a premium on the economy of force provided by Special Forces in the indirect role. Secondly, the U.S. National Security Strategy's focus on remaining engaged with other

nations and enlarging the community of democratic nations will lead to an increased demand on Special Forces to assist friendly nations to become self sufficient. Finally, the under-developed nature of likely areas of conflict suggests that operations in these areas will be HUMINT-dependent.

In many areas of the world, the state has lost its monopoly on the use of force, with non-national forces wielding considerable power. Groups such as drug cartels, radical religious, ethnic and nationalist movements, and terrorist organizations threaten the total breakdown of the nation-state in some areas. Recent U.S. government reports indicate drug lords exercise political control in large parts of Pakistan, Burma, and Afghanistan, to include maintaining armies. A heroin trafficker in Southeast Asia employs a 20,000 man army that operates in Burma, Thailand, and Laos.[135] Economic problems, environmental devastation, rapid population growth, and other pressures increase the destabilizing and fragmenting effects of these non-national forces in many Third World countries. Intra-state conflict resulting from these pressures will generate refugees and other humanitarian problems, such as the atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia, and threaten regional stability through spill-over violence.

One of the most compelling analyses of the nature of these pressures and their effects is by Robert Kaplan. In "The Coming Anarchy," he postulates that Africa serves today as an example of the type of problems much of the world will be facing in the future. He states:

> The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh - developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts - will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate...[136]

The West African nation of Sierra Leone illustrates the magnitude of some of these problems. The rain forest which covered 60 percent of the country in 1961, now covers

only six percent. This deforestation has led to increased soil erosion, flooding and mosquito population, which in turn has led to high disease rates. As a result of civil war, approximately 400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced, 380, 000 have fled to neighboring countries, while 400,000 Liberians have fled that country's internal unrest to seek refuge in Sierra Leone. In addition to the rebel army, there are units from two of the armies in the Liberian civil war inhabiting the countryside. Governmental functions such as maintenance of roads, bridges, schools and police forces has ceased. Similar situations exist throughout the western African nations. Failed economies, overpopulation and urbanization have led to alarmingly high disease (particularly AIDS, hepatitis, and malaria) and crime rates.[137]

These problems are not unique to Africa; examples abound in the rest of the Third World. Haiti is another prime example; overpopulation and deforestation have resulted in erosion and a reduction in arable land. Pre U.S.-intervention data indicated a mere 11 percent of Haiti's land is arable, with an estimated one percent loss per year. An estimated 70 percent of the children were malnourished - 33 percent seriously so. In addition to the array of illnesses normally associated with malnutrition, Haiti's population is nine percent HIV positive. For a population of six million people there are 810 doctors.[138] Needless, to say the situation is not hopeful, even with massive international assistance.

As recent U.S. involvement in Haiti demonstrates, media focus, regional interests, and humanitarian concerns will lead to U.S. involvement, in one form or another, in many of these conflicts. The current NSS, discussing situations for the use of force states:

> In other situations [other than direct threats to vital or survival interests] posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests - for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies.[139]

As noted earlier in the chapter, the definitions of national interest and security interests are broadening. Additionally, internal domestic politics influence these decisions as well; Kaplan suggests that domestic racial tensions will force the U.S. government to get involved in Africa.

> Africa may be marginal in terms of conventional late-twentieth century conceptions in strategy, but in an age of cultural and racial clash, when national defense is increasingly local, Africa's distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States.[140]

Increasingly the problems of the Third World will generate challenges and conflicts that the U.S. must address. Many of them will require the skills SF possesses.

The scope and complexity of the problems in the Third World are diverse, as will be the nature of the conflicts that are sure to arise there. Consequently, it is difficult to identify specific Special Forces missions that will be required; however, the nature of the Third World and intra-state conflict suggest valid generalizations of significance to Special Forces.

Technology will provide some benefit to U.S. forces operating in these environments, but technology itself will provide no solutions. As Martin van Creveld, a renowned war theorist, noted in *The Transformation of War*,

> The cold, brutal fact is that much present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interests over most of the globe; by this criterion, indeed, it scarcely amounts to "military power" at all.[141]

Van Creveld is not alone in his assessment - GEN Wayne A. Downing, Commander, United States Special Operations Command noted:

> The challenges of adapting high-technology force to a low-technology environment will not be easy. The fight in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 exemplifies this challenge. The 160th SOAR(A) employed some of its best-trained aviators and the best helicopters in the world in a low-technology environment. In an asymmetrical application of force and technology, a simple weapon - the RPG-7 - was used to shoot down two Black Hawks, severely damage two others, and make the fight exceedingly difficult.[142]

The challenges of adaptation that GEN Downing refers to will be particularly acute in the area of information gathering. As operations in Haiti demonstrated, HUMINT is the primary intelligence discipline required for operations in the Third World. While sensors, FLIR, thermal devices and other technology can provide some benefit, the Third World is becoming increasingly urban-centered, where these technologies have less utility. Special Forces' ability to provide HUMINT will become increasingly important. As fragile nation-states in the Third World come under increasing pressures, Special Forces will be increasing called upon to support other U.S. government agencies in conducting foreign internal defense missions to help stabilize countries that fall within the U.S. national interest. In states where institutions have collapsed, Special Forces could find itself engaged in nation building, similar to operations in Haiti. The possible collapse of the communist regimes in North Korea and Cuba could provide challenges of a similar nature to those faced in Haiti, but on a much larger scale. The problems facing Third World nations are complex, and defy simple solutions. Certainly, Special Forces are not a panacea, to be injected into each and every one of these conflict areas. It is apparent that much of the commitment of U.S. forces in the future will be to perform stabilizing and nation building/supporting missions. In general, operations in the Third World, whatever form they take, will be people-oriented. The language, training skills and cross-cultural skills, regional orientation, and maturity that Special Forces soldiers possess will become increasingly necessary, particularly as the conventional forces remain focused on fighting conventional, high-technology warfare.

CHAPTER V

Summary/Conclusions

The initial years of the post-Cold War era have demonstrated that while the threat of high-risk, superpower war may have disappeared for the near to mid term, conflict at the lower end of the continuum is on the rise. Special Forces have been fully engaged,

with the number of missions it has conducted more than quadrupling from 1991 to 1994.[143] This increase in tempo is not without cost, as retention rates, particularly among the NCO corps, have dropped dramatically. While a causal relationship is widely assumed between the operational tempo and retention, proof of such a relationship is beyond the scope of this study. Clearly, there are indications that the force is being stretched thin. A recent Congressionally requested assessment of SOF identified over commitment as a serious concern.[144] Both MG Garrison, Commander, JFK Special Warfare Center, and LTG Scott, Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, have been recently quoted as having concerns with operations tempo and the welfare of the force.[145] John Collins, author of the Congressionally-requested assessment states:

> The root cause of such problems [over commitment and retention] is too few SOF for too many tasks. That trend, which continues because senior leaders tend to say "can do" when they shouldn't, accomplishes current missions at the expense of future capabilities. A greater degree of restraint perhaps could lighten loads without slighting essential tasks.[146] [emphasis in original]

This study suggests that the problem is not solely a function of command, but of a doctrine which is so broad that it expects too much of the force as far as mission readiness - particularly given the increased operations tempo. While there is a certain amount of overlap between the skills required for direct and indirect missions, there are significant differences. Direct missions are skill based, executed by expert technicians with immediacy and precision. While a shift in operating environment may require subtle changes in technique, essentially the technician's skills apply anywhere, anytime. Indirect missions are people-based, conducted by what has been termed the "warrior-diplomat." Results often take time and patience, and success is directly related to the ability of the executor to influence others. Many of the warrior-diplomats skills are regional specific. SOF needs both types of soldier - the question is does Special Forces need to be both. GEN Downing, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, referring to the

distinction between the categories of missions in a recent article, posed that very question when he wrote "...can we expect a unit to maintain two very different kinds of skills?"[147]

This paper has attempted to answer that question for Special Forces. An examination of Special Forces' doctrinal history reveals that it was originally focused on indirect missions, specifically unconventional warfare and a training mission, which would later become known as foreign internal defense. Special Forces were tasked to conduct direct DA and SR missions during the conflict in Southeast Asia to fill a void; these missions were subsequently incorporated into doctrine. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Special Forces emphasized their direct capabilities to ensure survival in an Army that had had its fill of unconventional warfare, and was refocusing on the conventional battlefield of Europe. The doctrinal dual focus on direct and indirect missions has been retained through the present, and exists in Joint, Army and Special Forces doctrine, although there are indications in Army doctrine that its authors envisioned the Rangers as performing direct DA operations, while SF performed DA in an indirect manner only.[148]

The study then examined Special Forces' role in two major post-Cold War operations, the Gulf War and the intervention in Haiti. Two criteria that Joint doctrine has established to apply to specific missions, significance and suitability, were applied to the missions of the Gulf War and Haiti to determine which type of mission, direct or indirect, best met the criteria. Finally, the future environment was examined to attempt to define the role of Special Forces in it.

The experience of the Gulf War, coupled with an evaluation of the impact of new technologies currently coming available, indicates that the need for Special Forces to perform direct missions in war, such as unilateral direct action and battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, is disappearing. The reach of conventional systems to detect, track, and destroy enemy targets has increased to such an extent that there will be a very limited number of significant targets that require SOF. Commanders will be hesitant to risk the

loss of soldiers if it provides only a marginal increase in benefit over a technological system. Those targets that do require SOF in a direct role should be well within the capabilities of the Rangers and other units within the SOF community that focus primarily on the direct application of force and as the Congressional assessment of SOF noted "...undertake the most sensitive and difficult reconnaissance and direct action missions."[149] The increasing frequency of Third World conflict will also serve to limit the need for Special Forces direct operations. Most of these conflicts will take place in a low-technology environment against opponents much less susceptible to a firepower- and technology-based approach.

The experience of the recent past, and an examination of the nature of future warfare, indicates that Special Forces' greatest contributions have been, and will continue to be, a result of indirect efforts. The U.S. will increasingly operate as part of a coalition, both in war and operations other than war. These coalitions will usually be ad-hoc collections of forces assembled for a single mission, as opposed to long standing alliances. Special Forces will play a key coalition support role, by providing the means to bridge cultural and technical communications barriers and aid unity of effort. Special Forces training teams will continue to be required to increase the capabilities of coalition partners and allow them to tap into U.S. resources, such as air support. Unconventional warfare operations will become increasingly attractive to policy makers seeking to minimize U.S. commitment and risk, particularly in those situations unsuited to precision firepower. Special Forces will be required to conduct poorly defined stability operations in the Third World. As in Haiti, these operations may require SF to first assess what needs to be done, what is in the realm of the possible, and then exercise their indirect skills to accomplish their mission. Regardless of the mission, operations in the Third World will be HUMINT-dependent and require Special Forces to be adept at HUMINT operations.

General Downing recently wrote,

> Some current special operations missions and tasks may no longer be relevant to the emerging security environment or may be executed just as well by other forces. In such cases, SOF must be prepared to move into *appropriate* emerging mission areas where there is currently a gap in our national defense capabilities.[150]

The exigencies of the Cold War required Special Forces with a direct and an indirect mission focus. The emerging security environment does not; however, it does promise a multitude of opportunities to exercise indirect capabilities. Special Forces doctrine should focus on the indirect missions of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. The definition of unconventional warfare should be broadened so that it subsumes direct action and special reconnaissance missions conducted by Special Forces-trained indigenous personnel with U.S. command and control. Focusing Special Forces doctrine on indirect missions would allow detachments to achieve and maintain the requisite readiness in the unconventional warfare skills that differentiate them from other members of the SOF and conventional forces. Readiness in the UW mission would provide detachments a baseline capability to build on to meet a threat-specific, battle-focused requirement to conduct direct missions in such numbers that it exceeds the capabilities of the Rangers and other SOF. By pulsing the threat and creating a direct mission capability by exception, the Special Forces community could work on enhancing those indirect capabilities that will be in increasing demand.

We must avoid the same temptation in our doctrine that we have all succumbed to when packing our rucksacks for a mission. For the sake of redundancy and flexibility we put in equipment for every contingency and then struggle under the load, to the detriment of the mission. Special Forces doctrine should have plenty of flexibility packed in, while not imposing an unbearable training load on the force.

Glossary

battle damage assessment: The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also bomb damage assessment; combat assessment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat search and rescue: A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action: Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

guerrilla warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

irregular forces: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

low intensity conflict: Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military

instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional
and global security implications. Also called LIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MACV-SOG: Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group "executed special operations and missions under the guise of a MACV staff agency charged with the preparation of various Vietnam studies. In actuality, MACV-SOG was a joint service high command unconventional warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia." Stanton, 194-195.

special activities: Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives which are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special mission unit: A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities. Also called SMU. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations: Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations forces: Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. See also Air Force special operations forces; Army special operations forces; naval special warfare forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special reconnaissance: Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic

characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. Also called UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ENDNOTES

[1]The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February,1995), 2.

[2]James Kitfield, "New World Warriors", Government Executive, (November 1995): 39. Missions rose from 252 in 1991 to 1,142 in 1994. Kitfield does not give a source for this data in his article. Data from USASFC provided to the author showed 999 missions for 1994.

[3]Ibid, 40.

[4]Ibid, 39

[5]Retention rates for initial term CMF 18 were 94.7% in 1993, 90.1% in 1994, and 73.5% in 1995. The overall Army rates were 49%, 42.6%, and 42.4%. Mid term retention rates for CMF 18 were 96.7% in 1993, 90.2% in 1994, and 85.6% in 1995. The overall Army rates were 74.6%, 72.9%, and 73.2%. The loss of the retention bonus is certainly a factor, although since it was lost at the end of 1993 it doesn't fully explain the drop from 1994 to 1995. Data provided to the author by PERSCOM CMF 18 management office.

[6]Ibid, 1-13.

[7]GEN Wayne A. Downing, "Challenges of the Future," in Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War, [(Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 1995)], 4.

[8]U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991) 2-2, provides some discussion of indirect versus direct operations when it states that, "Some ARSOF have a global orientation (Rangers, ARSOA). They emphasize the direct application of U.S. military power to achieve their objectives. Other ARSOF emphasize language skills and regional orientation. They perform primarily in a force multiplier role with foreign military and paramilitary forces."

[9]U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 1-2. The fifth mission, not mentioned, is counterterrorism. Although some Soviet satellite states harbored terrorists, the CT mission cannot really be considered as merely an outgrowth of the Cold War, but rather as a response to the use of terrorism against U.S. interests by groups with a variety of motives.

[10]For an account of the Information Age and its effect on warfare see Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1993).

[11]The concept that the two major forces shaping the future environment are a radically altered strategic environment and the advent of the Information Age is summarized from U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), 1-1.

[12]Ibid, 1-3.

[13]Christopher Lamb, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," Special Warfare 8, no. 3 (July 1995): 4. Christopher Lamb, Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, classifies all SOF in two broad categories, the "commando" and the "unconventional warrior". He argues that, "Special-operations forces execute the role of unconventional warrior when they influence, advise, train and conduct operations with foreign forces and populations." He identifies UW, FID, training and advising counterinsurgency forces as these type of operations, because they emphasize the indirect approach and place a premium on language skills, political sensitivity, patience, and commitment. "Special-operations forces in the commando role use stealth, speed and audacity to undertake precision penetration and strike operations in limited, specialized contingencies across the operational spectrum." He goes on to state that although certain SOF will emphasize one role above the other, they must be able to operate in both modes, although he fails to provide a convincing justification for this belief. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Warrior-Diplomats - Not Political Warriors: Sound Guidelines For Employing US Special Operations Forces," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1995, 42, uses the term "warrior-diplomat" in the same manner as Lamb's "unconventional warrior." Warrior-diplomat seems less confusing, in that the "commando" uses unconventional techniques in executing his direct missions.

[14]The assertion that direct missions should be left to Rangers and SMUs is from COL Mark Boyatt, "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations," Special Warfare 7, no. 4 (October, 1994): 12-13. Other examples of the controversy include (Lamb, 1995, 2-9) LTG William P.Yarborough, "Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspective," Special Warfare 8, no. 3 (July 1995): 10-12, and SFC(P) Brian Duffy, "SF Needs Warfighting Emphasis," Special Warfare 8, no. 3 (July 1995): 43. The above are the proverbial tip of the iceberg when it comes to what can be a very emotional topic - many SF members are concerned about losing the warrior aspect of their profession.

[15]MG William F. Garrison, "A USSOCOM View of Doctrine," Special Warfare 8, no. 3 (July 1995): 17.

[16]Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," speech given 3 October 1973 at the Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture. As quoted in JRUSI, Mar 1974, pp.3-9.

[17]U.S. Army, Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 3-5.

[18]Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum MCM-135-94," (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, 25 November 1994). See also Garrison, 16, for a discussion of the significance of joint doctrine, the impact of CJCS directives to strengthen and increase that significance, and the role of USSOCOM in developing joint special operations doctrine.

[19]COL Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1986), 167-176.

[20]U.S. Army, Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla [sic] Warfare and Special Forces Operations. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1958), 16.

[21]Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia,1956-1975, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 18. By November 1960 SF personnel in Laos had developed into combat advisors in order to help in counter coup efforts, Stanton, 20. The role of SF in South Vietnam is from Stanton, 35.

[22]Ibid, 17 and 36. The idea that SF were selected for these missions due to lack of a suitable alternative is echoed by Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 71.

[23]Stanton, 37-38. The expansion of the SF role into counterinsurgency training was not limited to Southeast Asia. For a good overview of SF FID and counterinsurgency training roles in Africa and Latin America see Simpson, 81-90.

[24]U.S. Army, Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1961), 12. For an excellent examination and summary of Special Forces doctrine from OSS to present, see MAJ David S. Maxwell, "Special Forces Missions: A Return To The Roots For A Vision Of The Future," (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 19-58.

[25]Stanton, 194-195.

[26]Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group "executed special operations and missions under the guise of a MACV staff agency charged with the preparation of various Vietnam studies. In actuality, MACV-SOG was a

joint service high command unconventional warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia." Ibid, 205.

[27]COL (ret.) Scott Crerar, phone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 16 August 95.

[28]The terms Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance were not in use during the war in Southeast Asia, but serve to categorize the type of direct missions that SF was conducting in that period.

[29]U.S. Army, Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations, US Army Doctrine, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1969), 1-2.

[30]U.S. Army, Army Training Test ATT 31-101, Airborne Special Forces Group, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1972), 3.

[31]Garrison, 16.

[32]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), II-7.

[33]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), II-2, 3 and IV-10, 11.

[34]Ibid, II-3. Implicit in the way the quoted passage is written is the idea that doing DA with indigenous personnel (or other U.S. forces for that matter) would violate that integrity and cohesion.

[35]FM 31-20, 11-2.

[36]Ibid, 11-2.

[37]FM 100-25, 3-12.

[38]Ibid, 3-12.

[39]Ibid, 11-1.

[40]Joint Pub 3-05, II-7.

[41]Joint Pub 3-05.3, IV-11.

[42]FM 31-20, 12-1 and FM 100-25, 3-13.

[43]FM 31-20, 12-1.

[44]JP 3-05, p. IV-6, identifies the quoted passage as the first of three SO planning principles. Secondly, it states that SOF missions must be planned as complete packages, with the entire mission planned prior to committing the force. Thirdly, it states that SO can rarely be repeated or reattempted, since SO targets are usually politically or militarily perishable. The last two criteria apply more strictly to solely direct operations than to indirect; consequently, they did not lend themselves to use as evaluation criteria for this study.

[45]Joint Pub 3-05, V-10.

[46]FM 100-25, 3-13.

[47]Joint Pub 3-05.3, II-3.

[48]FM 100-5, 2-20.

[49]Joint Pub 3-05, E-1.

[50]Ibid, IV-7, 8.

[51]Ibid, IV-7.

[52]FM 100-25, 2-16.

[53]Ibid, 3-13(SR), and 3-11(DA). FM 31-20 uses essentially the exact language to make this point. 3-3 (DA) and 3-4 (SR) same lang.

[54]Gulio Douhet, Command of the Air, trans. by Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 91.

[55]The concept of information warfare being third wave weaponry is from Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 67, 70.

[56]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 1993), p. 2 of executive summary.

[57]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-15, notes that: "As early as August (1990), with the prospect of more and more Coalition forces being

committed to support Operation Desert Shield using different equipment and command and control (C2) procedures, CINCCENT had recognized two important requirements: to assess their capabilities and limitations, and to ensure they were integrated at the operational and tactical level."

[58]The data on Kuwaiti units trained is from U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 32 and page 1 of the executive summary.

[59]Training provided by SF throughout DESERT SHIELD is from Ibid, 1. 5th SFG(A) trained units from Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Oman, Morocco, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar. Ibid, 18.

[60]In 1988, then 1st SOCOM Commander, MG Guest, directed that 5th SFG(A) maintain two tank crews certified by Ft. Knox. The teams started training on M60's, then M1s, and finally on Warsaw Pact tanks. These two teams, plus augmentation from Special Forces officers and NCOs with previous armor experience formed "Team Tank." Ibid, 26-27.

[61]Number of CSTs is from Ibid, 1, of executive summary.

[62]Role of SF CSTs in the POL between 1st Cav and Syrians is fully described in Ibid, 49.

[63]Results of SF CSTs from Ibid, 59. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs), (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), JULLS 30620-85323 "Coalition Warfare Training for Special Ops" which describes SF coalition support operations as a "campaign success".

[64]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-10.

[65]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, 20-2. States that the role of fixing force by Coalition forces was "extremely valuable."

[66]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 59. "Ground truth" was defined by the 5th SFG(A) Commander, COL Krauss, "...as passing directly to the CINC information on coalition unit location, status, capabilities and intent...", 144. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-9 also notes that: "Army SF liaison teams provided the theater commander a more expeditious means of acquiring information about forces locations, status, and capabilities. These teams also provided coordination between adjacent Coalition forces, which helped in command and control, and did much to prevent casualties from the fire of friendly forces."

[67]Brigadier General Robert Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War, (Washington, DC: Office of the US Army Chief of Staff, 1993), 123.

[68]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-15. The report expands on this theme on page J-9. Richard M. Swain, in "Lucky War" Third Army in Desert Storm, (U.S. Army CGSC Press: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994), 147, notes that SF CSTs formed part of a command information and communications network to ARCENT and CINCCENT from the Arab forces that was more reliable and immediate than the formal system the Arab forces had to their operational headquarters (either the Northern or Eastern Area Commands, depending on the unit).

[69]Scales, 122.

[70]General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, written with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1992), 355. Schwarzkopf defined this to his planning staff as a requirement that Arab forces be the ones to liberate Kuwait City, which they did, with SF teams accompanying them.

[71]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, 20-2.

[72]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-15.

[73]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 14-17.

[74]Ibid, 16-17, 49.

[75]Ibid, 35 discusses the factors constraining SR missions. Douglas Waller, The Commandos, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 304, also discusses Shwarzkopf's restriction of SF cross border operations. U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S),, p. 69 provides the information that there were 12 missions. Each of the missions is discussed in detail in the report. Scales, 198, notes that 8 missions were inserted on 23 Feb 91.

[76]The purpose of the SR missions is from Scales, 197.

[77]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-11.

[78] U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 69.

[79]Scales, 164-165.

[80]Ibid, 165-169. "JSTARS is a highly modified Boeing 707 aircraft equipped with a synthetic aperture radar. In the targeting mode, the radar can search a 4x5 kilometer area and provide locations of assembly areas and individual vehicles to an accuracy sufficient for attack by air or artillery. As a surveillance system, JSTARS can range several hundred kilometers to paint a 25x20 kilometer sector. It would be able to watch all of Kuwait and major portions of southern Iraq. The system was designed to operate in both modes simultaneously. In either mode, JSTARS can detect all moving targets and many stationary features such as the Iraqi obstacle system. Information produced by the radar could be passed to ground stations and AWACS in near real time." Ibid, 167. The French Horus system is a prototype moving-target indicator, similar to the JSTARS, mounted on a Puma helicopter. The Horus system was deployed with the French 6th Light Division, opcon to the XVIII Airborne Corps. Ibid, 169.

[81]FM 100-25, 3-13.

[82]GEN Wayne A. Downing, "SOF Mission Criteria" Memorandum, (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 9 August 1993), 2.

[83]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S),, 106-107.

[84]Ibid, 108.

[85]Ibid, 108

[86]Ibid, 108-109, and Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-11.

[87]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 108.

[88]Ibid, 107.

[89]Ibid, 109 and U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned "DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM" (S/NF), (Ft. Bragg, NC: USA John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School, undated), 1-1.

[90]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-15, J-27.

[91]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 66-67.

[92]Ibid, 107.

[93]Ibid, 108-109.

[94]Scales, 186, discusses a single Ranger operation, a DA mission by a reinforced platoon to destroy an Iraqi communications facility near the Jordanian border. Although it does not give the date of the mission, it implies it was on or about 07 Feb 91, leaving the unit available for the embassy seizure mission.

[95]Until designated SAR forces have capability to long range penetrate, SOF will remain primary force for CSAR in denied territory. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs), (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), JULLS 51455-56740 "Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)" and Dr. Richard Stewart, Roles and Missions of Special Operations in DESERT STORM: An Initial Historical Summary (S) (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, undated) 1-2.

[96]Dr. Richard Stewart, Roles and Missions of Special Operations in DESERT STORM: An Initial Historical Summary (S) (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, undated), 1.

[97]Scales, 195. Although Scales credits each Service's special operations aviation units with a recovery, one recovery was actually by SEALs from a SH-60 off the frigate *USS Nicholas* according to Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-17. The same report also records only 38 downed aircraft and a fourth successful recovery of a Kuwaiti pilot by Kuwaiti partisan forces, J-16.

[98]U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 11 states that 2 SF soldiers were part of MH-60 missions and 4 SF soldiers on MH-47 missions.

[99]FM 31-20, 1990, p. 3-6.

[100]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **199**), II-11.

[101]Joint Pub 3-50.2, F-2.

[102]Joint Pub 3-05, IV-7.

[103]U.S. Army Intelligence Center, "Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) System Fact Sheets", (Fort Huachuca, AZ: Directorate of Combat Developments Concepts Division, 06 April 94), 10. The UAV-Close Range will have a 50 km radius and 3 hour endurance. The UAV-Short Range will have a 300 km radius and 10 hour

endurance. The Tactical Endurance-UAV will have a 1200 km radius and an endurance of greater than 24 hours. A variety of payloads are planned to include forward looking infrared radar (FLIR), moving target indicator (MTI), SIGINT, and several others.

[104]Ibid, 6.

[105]"Mobile Strike Force Student Handbook", ([Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 1995]), 86-87, issued to the author as a computer disk for CGSC course A308.

[106]Ibid, 97.

[107]Ibid, 3-13(SR), and 3-11(DA). FM 31-20 uses essentially the exact language to make this point. 3-3 (DA) and 3-4 (SR) same lang.

[108]There is not a clear doctrinal mission that covers SF activities throughout the Haitian countryside. The term nation building is perhaps inappropriate in that it implies a long term commitment to Haiti that may not be politically palatable, but it is descriptive of the type activities SF teams are conducting.

[109]3rd Special Forces Group(Airborne), Haiti: Unconventional Operations; briefing slides, 21 Mar 95, slide "SOF Team". Hereafter referred to as 3rd SFG(A).

[110]COL Mark D. Boyatt, 3rd SFG(A) commander, Interview by the author, 07 Sep 95, provided the information about the 6 teams in Puerto Rico. Hereafter referred to as Boyatt, Interview. The figure of 9 CSTs is as of 14 Jun 95, from United Nations Mission in Haiti(UNMIH), UNMIH Command Brief, briefing slides, undated (circa 12 Jun 95), 13. Hereafter referred to as UNMIH.

[111]Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1995), 134. Hereafter referred to as CALL. The CARICOM battalion consisted of soldiers from 7 Caribbean nations.

[112]Dr. John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack", ([Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 1995]), 7.

[113]CALL, 138.

[114]CALL, 139.

[115]The data on deployments is from James Kitfield, "New World Warriors", Government Executive, (November 1995): 40.

[116]As quoted in Ibid, 40.

[117]3rd SFG(A), slide "Special Forces Employment", 12 Dec 94, As of 110500ZNov94 shows the locations of 23 SFOD-As, 7 SFOD-Bs, and 3 FOBs.

[118]Ibid, slide "ARSOTF Mission", 12 Dec 94.

[119]Demographic data from CALL, 132.

[120]Ibid, 132.

[121]3rd SFG(A), slide "ODB/ODAs Became: "Civil Authority", 21 Mar 95.

[122]CALL, 133 and 3rd SFG(A), slide "ODB/ODAs Became: De Facto Police", 21 Mar 95, for description of SF policing role.

[123]3rd SFG(A), slide "ODB/ODAs Became: Border Patrol", 21 Mar 95.

[124]CALL, 131 and UNMIH, slide titled "Force Operational Concept" (undated).

[125]Boyatt, Interview.

[126]The White House, ii.

[127]Ibid, 7.

[128]Jeffrey Record, Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom?, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 8. The author postulates that future threats to the U.S. will be indirect, and cites Iran as already following such a strategy.

[129]The role of SF in FID is from FM 31-20, 3-2.

[130]The role of SF in UW is from FM 31-20, 9-5.

[131]Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century, (Washington: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990), 115.

[132]Ibid, 115.

[133]Statistics and Senator Lugar's statement are from George F. Will, "Perot's allure, Lugar's alarm," The Kansas City Star, 19 August 1995, C-7.

[134]Christopher Dickey, "Plagues in the Making," Newsweek (9 October 1995): 51.

[135]The information on the drug war is from R. Jeffrey Smith, "Drug War is Lagging," The Kansas City Star, 10 July 1995, A-6.

[136]Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (July 1993): 58.

[137]The information on the problems facing Sierra Leone is from Ibid, 46, 48.

[138]The statistics about Haiti are from Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, Reconciling The Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook For U.S. Policy Toward Haiti, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 3-5.

[139]The White House, 13.

[140]Kaplan, 76.

[141]Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991), 27.

[142]GEN Wayne A. Downing, "Special Operations Aviation," Army Aviation, 44, no. 7 (July 1995): 6.

[143]Kitfield, 39.

[144]Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 133-134.

[145]Kitfield, 39.

[146]Collins, 134.

[147]GEN Wayne A. Downing, "Challenges of the Future," in Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War, [(Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 1995)], 4.

[148]See page 11.

[149]Collins, 132-133, makes this comment about the special mission units.

[150]Downing, "Challenges of the Future," 3.

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